@laceio/sdk 0.1.1-canary.3 → 0.1.1

package/dist/init-ZjNDDC-T.cjs

@@ -1,2375 +0,0 @@
-require("./rolldown-runtime-Br2OG8yv.cjs");
-require("./_polyfill-buffer-patch-CM8X7JiY.cjs");
-require("./codecs-Cswkg7Tm.cjs");
-const require_bytes_vo = require("./bytes.vo-BNRquqaO.cjs");
-const require_grant_rules = require("./grant-rules-7Zqi_3BN.cjs");
-const require_providers = require("./providers-BLgJ0uQs.cjs");
-const require_gated_call = require("./gated-call-DJWY299W.cjs");
-const require_artefact_loader = require("./artefact-loader-DZPYrq-6.cjs");
-const require_types = require("./types-Zj78LtYu.cjs");
-const require_errors = require("./errors-BZ8hnhCM.cjs");
-const require_envelopes = require("./envelopes-ETZEJS_O.cjs");
-const require_enc_key_circuits = require("./enc-key-circuits-C8fGAMEF.cjs");
-const require_grant_circuits = require("./grant-circuits-_1x--moV.cjs");
-const require_acc_module = require("./acc-module-4iIUv6My.cjs");
-const require_device_readers = require("./device-readers-CIgYZN7f.cjs");
-const require_grants = require("./grants--b0LQQzZ.cjs");
-const require_account_call = require("./account-call-DIIa2rK_.cjs");
-let rxjs = require("rxjs");
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/acc/device-circuits.ts
-/**
-* The gated circuits the device flows authorise, named once so the flow
-* that submits a call and the signer that scopes a key session to it
-* agree on the circuit.
-*/
-const ADD_DEVICE_CIRCUIT = "add_device_with_jubjub";
-const REMOVE_DEVICE_CIRCUIT = "remove_device_with_jubjub";
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/acc/pending-deployment.ts
-/** Whether a record's pending creation carries the whole deployment, not only its marker. */
-const isPendingDeployment = (pending) => "authorityKey" in pending;
-/**
-* The refusal of a creation that resumes an unfinished one under another
-* lock choice than `recorded`, the one it was started with, which the
-* message names so a retry can repeat it.
-*/
-const lockChoiceMismatch = (recorded) => new require_errors.CreationLockMismatchError(`The unfinished Passport account creation was started with lockAccount ${recorded}; resume it with the same lock choice.`);
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/store/envelope.ts
-/** AES-GCM is specified for 96-bit IVs; each seal draws a fresh one. */
-const IV_LENGTH = 12;
-const utf8 = (value) => new TextEncoder().encode(value);
-/** Whether a stored value has the sealed envelope layout. */
-const isSealedRecord = (value) => {
-	if (typeof value !== "object" || value === null) return false;
-	const candidate = value;
-	return candidate.v === 1 && typeof candidate.iv === "string" && typeof candidate.ciphertext === "string";
-};
-/**
-* Encrypts a record into a {@link SealedRecord} under the given key,
-* marking the envelope pending when asked.
-*/
-const sealRecord = async (key, record, { pending = false } = {}) => {
-	const iv = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(IV_LENGTH));
-	const ciphertext = await crypto.subtle.encrypt({
-		name: "AES-GCM",
-		iv
-	}, key, utf8(JSON.stringify(record)));
-	return {
-		v: 1,
-		iv: require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(iv),
-		ciphertext: require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(new Uint8Array(ciphertext)),
-		...pending ? { pending: true } : {}
-	};
-};
-/**
-* Decrypts a {@link SealedRecord} back into the record it sealed. Any
-* failure to open - a tampered ciphertext, a mismatched key, or a
-* malformed envelope - throws RecordCorruptedError.
-*/
-const openRecord = async (key, sealed) => {
-	try {
-		const plaintext = await crypto.subtle.decrypt({
-			name: "AES-GCM",
-			iv: require_bytes_vo.ByteArray.fromHex(require_bytes_vo.HexBytes(sealed.iv))
-		}, key, require_bytes_vo.ByteArray.fromHex(require_bytes_vo.HexBytes(sealed.ciphertext)));
-		return JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext));
-	} catch {
-		throw new require_errors.RecordCorruptedError();
-	}
-};
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/store/account-record.ts
-const COLLECTION_ID = "passport-account";
-const ACCOUNT_RECORD_KEY = "account";
-/**
-* An {@link AccountRecordStore} over the platform key-value storage,
-* namespaced under its own collection. With a `keyProvider` the record is
-* sealed at rest and only sealed envelopes are readable. What a sealed
-* record reads as without a `keyProvider` is the caller's choice:
-* 'skip' (the default) reads it as undefined, for the ceremony-free
-* restore peek that cannot open it by design; 'error' raises
-* RecordUnreadableError, for the flows where a missing storage key is a
-* persistence misconfiguration that must not look like an absent
-* account. Without a `keyProvider` (the dev authoriser) the record
-* persists in plaintext, which holds no secret once the account is
-* complete; while a creation is unfinished it holds the contract's
-* maintenance authority key (see {@link PassportAccountRecord}), so the
-* dev authoriser is for development and tests only.
-*/
-const createAccountRecordStore = (createKeyValueStorage, keyProvider, { onSealedWithoutKey = "skip" } = {}) => {
-	const storage = createKeyValueStorage({ collectionId: COLLECTION_ID });
-	const open = async (keyOf, value) => isSealedRecord(value) ? openRecord(await keyOf(), value) : void 0;
-	const stored = () => storage.getValues([ACCOUNT_RECORD_KEY]).pipe((0, rxjs.map)(([value]) => value), (0, rxjs.defaultIfEmpty)(void 0));
-	const isPending = (record) => record.deployment !== void 0;
-	const presenceOf = (value) => {
-		if (value === void 0) return "absent";
-		return (isSealedRecord(value) ? value.pending === true : isPending(value)) ? "pending" : "complete";
-	};
-	return {
-		read: () => keyProvider ? stored().pipe((0, rxjs.concatMap)(async (value) => open(keyProvider, value))) : stored().pipe((0, rxjs.map)((value) => {
-			if (!isSealedRecord(value)) return value;
-			if (onSealedWithoutKey === "error") throw new require_errors.RecordUnreadableError();
-		})),
-		write: (record) => keyProvider ? (0, rxjs.defer)(async () => sealRecord(await keyProvider(), record, { pending: isPending(record) })).pipe((0, rxjs.mergeMap)((sealed) => storage.setValue(ACCOUNT_RECORD_KEY, sealed))) : storage.setValue(ACCOUNT_RECORD_KEY, record),
-		presence: () => stored().pipe((0, rxjs.map)(presenceOf))
-	};
-};
-/**
-* The promise view of an {@link AccountRecordStore}, for the flows. A
-* storage that completes without emitting (destroyed mid-flow) reads as
-* absent and writes as done, mirroring the stream contract so a flow
-* never hangs on it.
-*/
-const toAccountRecords = (store) => ({
-	read: async () => (0, rxjs.firstValueFrom)(store.read(), { defaultValue: void 0 }),
-	write: async (record) => (0, rxjs.firstValueFrom)(store.write(record), { defaultValue: void 0 }),
-	presence: async () => (0, rxjs.firstValueFrom)(store.presence(), { defaultValue: "absent" })
-});
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/acc/inbox-walk.ts
-const defaultLoadLedger = async () => import("@midnightntwrk/ledger-v9");
-/** The entries the contract holds, in inbox order, the Lace records included. */
-const inboxEntries = (ledgerState) => {
-	const entries = [];
-	for (let ordinal = 0n; ordinal < ledgerState.inbox_count; ordinal += 1n) if (ledgerState.inbox.member(ordinal)) entries.push(ledgerState.inbox.lookup(ordinal));
-	return entries;
-};
-/**
-* The commitment the chain carries for a coin the account received,
-* recomputed with the ledger's own output construction: a contract-owned
-* output of this coin towards the account address, which is exactly what
-* a depositor builds and the contract claims. A description the ledger
-* refuses to commit to is no candidate.
-*/
-const toCandidate = ({ ZswapOutput }, address, { coin, entry }) => {
-	try {
-		return {
-			coin,
-			commitment: ZswapOutput.newContractOwned({
-				type: require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(coin.color),
-				nonce: require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(coin.nonce),
-				value: coin.value
-			}, void 0, address).commitment.toLowerCase(),
-			entry
-		};
-	} catch {
-		return null;
-	}
-};
-/**
-* The tree index of every shielded output the chain created for the
-* account, by commitment, read from the ledger events of the transactions
-* that acted on the contract. A deposit is one such action, so its
-* transaction is among them.
-*/
-const receivedOutputs = async (address, indexer) => {
-	const actions = await indexer.enumerateContractActions(address);
-	const hashes = [...new Set(actions.map((action) => action.txHash))];
-	const outputs = await Promise.all(hashes.map(async (hash) => indexer.queryShieldedOutputs(hash)));
-	const recipient = address.toLowerCase();
-	return new Map(outputs.flat().filter((output) => output.contractAddress === recipient).map((output) => [output.commitment, output.index]));
-};
-/**
-* Walks the account's inbox the way the custody standard prescribes:
-* every entry other than the Lace records, which hold the account keys
-* and the grant bookkeeping rather than coins, is opened with the
-* encryption secrets, each coin that opens is verified by recomputing
-* its commitment and finding it among the outputs the chain created for
-* the account, and the index that output took in the commitment tree is
-* captured with it. Anyone can append any
-* bytes to the inbox, so an entry that does not open, or opens to a coin
-* the chain never created for this account, is skipped as noise and
-* counted, never raised. Two entries describing the same coin, as a
-* re-encryption after a key rotation leaves behind, yield one holding,
-* read from the first entry that described it. An empty inbox, or one
-* with nothing that opens, is answered without loading the ledger or
-* reading the chain's history. A ledger binding that fails to load is a
-* failure of the walk itself, not of any entry, so it is raised rather
-* than reported as an inbox of noise.
-*/
-const walkInbox = async ({ address, ledgerState, indexer, openEntries, loadLedger = defaultLoadLedger }) => {
-	const entries = inboxEntries(ledgerState).filter((entry) => !require_envelopes.isLaceRecord(entry));
-	const nothing = (skippedEntries) => ({
-		holdings: [],
-		holdingEntries: [],
-		skippedEntries
-	});
-	if (entries.length === 0) return nothing(0);
-	const coins = await openEntries(entries);
-	if (coins.every((coin) => coin === null)) return nothing(entries.length);
-	const ledger = await loadLedger();
-	const candidates = coins.map((coin, ordinal) => coin && toCandidate(ledger, address, {
-		coin,
-		entry: entries[ordinal]
-	}));
-	if (candidates.every((candidate) => candidate === null)) return nothing(entries.length);
-	const outputs = await receivedOutputs(address, indexer);
-	const holdings = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-	const holdingEntries = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-	let skippedEntries = 0;
-	for (const candidate of candidates) {
-		const index = candidate && outputs.get(candidate.commitment);
-		if (!candidate || index === void 0) {
-			skippedEntries += 1;
-			continue;
-		}
-		if (holdings.has(candidate.commitment)) continue;
-		holdings.set(candidate.commitment, {
-			color: require_types.TokenColor(require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(candidate.coin.color)),
-			value: candidate.coin.value.toString(),
-			commitment: candidate.commitment,
-			index: Number(index)
-		});
-		holdingEntries.set(candidate.commitment, candidate.entry);
-	}
-	return {
-		holdings: [...holdings.values()],
-		holdingEntries: [...holdingEntries.values()],
-		skippedEntries
-	};
-};
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/flows/key-session.ts
-/**
-* Runs an operation under a single key ceremony, so a flow that reaches
-* for the device key several times costs one user prompt instead of one
-* per authoriser call. `flow` names the flow for an authoriser that
-* presents it before the ceremony. An authoriser with no interactive
-* ceremony exposes no session, and the operation runs directly. The
-* session function is used detached, so implementations must not rely on
-* `this`.
-*/
-const inKeySession = async (authoriser, flow, operation) => {
-	const { withKeySession } = authoriser;
-	return withKeySession ? withKeySession(operation, flow) : operation();
-};
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/acc/enc-key-rotation.ts
-/** Prepares `rotate_enc_key_with_jubjub` over the raw 32-byte X25519 key `enc_key` is replaced with. */
-const prepareRotateEncKey = (newKey) => ({
-	circuit: require_enc_key_circuits.ROTATE_ENC_KEY_CIRCUIT,
-	args: [newKey]
-});
-/** Prepares `append_inbox_with_jubjub` over one inbox entry: a re-encrypted coin or a Lace record. */
-const prepareAppendInbox = (entry) => ({
-	circuit: require_enc_key_circuits.APPEND_INBOX_CIRCUIT,
-	args: [entry]
-});
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/flows/rotation.ts
-/**
-* How long an accepted call is given to show in the indexer's view of the
-* ledger, which can lag the block the call landed in.
-*/
-const LEDGER_POLL_ATTEMPTS = 30;
-const LEDGER_POLL_DELAY_MS = 1e3;
-const sleep$1 = async (ms) => new Promise((resolve) => {
-	setTimeout(resolve, ms);
-});
-/**
-* The encryption key's view members, which a rotation and a read grant's
-* issue need: the re-encryption a rotation moves the holdings through
-* and the sealing a grantee receives the secret by.
-*
-* @throws {@link ReadUnavailableError} when the key offers either not,
-* as a key that only opens entries does.
-*/
-const viewCapability = (encryptionKey) => {
-	const { reencryptInbox, sealView } = encryptionKey;
-	if (!reencryptInbox || !sealView) throw new require_errors.ReadUnavailableError();
-	return {
-		reencryptInbox,
-		sealView
-	};
-};
-/** Resolves this device's reader and device keys, inside the caller's key session. */
-const readLocalDevice = async ({ passportAuthoriser, passportEncryptionKey, passportNetwork }) => ({
-	readerPublicKey: await passportEncryptionKey.readerPublicKey(passportNetwork.networkId),
-	devicePublicKey: require_envelopes.encodeDevicePublicKey(await passportAuthoriser.devicePublicKey())
-});
-/** Reads the inbox and this device's keyring of the account from its ledger. */
-const readAccountInbox = (account, ledgerState, readerPublicKey) => {
-	const entries = inboxEntries(ledgerState);
-	return {
-		entries,
-		keyring: {
-			account: require_providers.AccAddress(account),
-			encKey: ledgerState.enc_key,
-			envelopes: require_envelopes.deviceEnvelopes(entries, readerPublicKey)
-		}
-	};
-};
-/**
-* The device entries the ledger holds, as lowercase hex, less `except`:
-* the devices a rotation may seal the new secret to, which a key session
-* names to the user before it opens.
-*
-* @throws {@link DeviceRosterInvalidError} when there are more than
-* {@link MAX_DEVICE_ENTRIES}, which no signer would accept.
-*/
-const liveDeviceEntries = (ledgerState, except) => {
-	const entries = [...ledgerState.devices].map((entry) => require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(entry)).filter((entry) => entry !== except?.toLowerCase());
-	if (entries.length > 64) throw new require_errors.DeviceRosterInvalidError(`The account holds ${entries.length} device entries, more than the 64 a rotation names.`);
-	return entries;
-};
-/**
-* The ledger once the indexer reflects a call that advanced the auth
-* nonce past `authNonce`. A chain of gated calls must have each bind the
-* nonce the previous one left behind, which the indexer can serve a
-* moment late.
-*
-* @throws {@link GrantRosterUnsettledError} when the indexer never
-* reflects the call within the polling window.
-*/
-const awaitAdvancedLedger = async (indexer, address, authNonce) => {
-	for (let attempt = 0; attempt < LEDGER_POLL_ATTEMPTS; attempt++) {
-		const ledgerState = await require_account_call.queryAccountLedger(indexer, address);
-		if (ledgerState.auth_nonce > authNonce) return ledgerState;
-		await sleep$1(LEDGER_POLL_DELAY_MS);
-	}
-	throw new require_errors.GrantRosterUnsettledError(`The ledger of ${address} never reflected the accepted call.`);
-};
-/**
-* Starts a chain of gated calls at `start`. Each accepted call reports
-* the counter it advanced this device to, then waits for the indexer to
-* reflect it, so the next call binds the auth nonce it left; the local
-* roster row follows the entry each call leaves it on.
-*/
-const callChain = ({ account, start, indexer, seams, onProgress, onAdvanced }) => {
-	let current = start;
-	const submit = async (call) => {
-		const { advancedCounter, localCommitmentHex } = await require_account_call.submitAccountCall({
-			circuit: call.circuit,
-			args: call.args,
-			account,
-			localUseCounter: current.localUseCounter,
-			ledgerState: current.ledgerState,
-			onStage: onProgress
-		}, seams);
-		const localUseCounter = advancedCounter.toString();
-		await onAdvanced(localUseCounter);
-		current = {
-			ledgerState: await awaitAdvancedLedger(indexer, account.address, current.ledgerState.auth_nonce),
-			localUseCounter,
-			devices: require_account_call.withRefreshedLocalDevice(current.devices, localCommitmentHex)
-		};
-	};
-	return {
-		submit,
-		append: async (stage, entries) => {
-			if (entries.length > 0) onProgress(stage);
-			for (const entry of entries) await submit(prepareAppendInbox(entry));
-		},
-		position: () => current
-	};
-};
-/** The registrations of an inbox, by hex. */
-const registrationsOf = (entries) => new Set(entries.filter(require_envelopes.isDeviceRegistration).map((entry) => require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(entry)));
-/**
-* The roster a rotation seals to: the registrations the live roster key
-* opens, resolved against the ledger's device set so only a registration
-* whose device key derives a live entry counts, and only one whose entry
-* is among `devices`. A registration naming nobody's live device is
-* passed over, and named devices left without a reader, by a conflict or
-* for want of a registration, are reported dropped, see
-* {@link resolveLiveReaders}; this device, sealed to regardless, is never
-* reported dropped. The registration whose live entry is `target`, the
-* entry a removal takes out, is named so no reader paired with its device
-* is sealed to.
-*/
-const sealedRoster = async ({ account, encryptionKey, networkId, local, ledgerState, inbox, devices, target, localEntry }) => {
-	const registered = (await encryptionKey.openInbox(networkId, inbox.keyring, inbox.entries.filter(require_envelopes.isDeviceRegistration))).flatMap((opened) => opened?.kind === "device" ? [opened.device] : []);
-	const self = require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(local.readerPublicKey);
-	const { readers, dropped, outside } = require_device_readers.resolveLiveReaders({
-		scope: {
-			address: account.address,
-			epoch: ledgerState.device_epoch
-		},
-		registered,
-		isLive: (entryHex) => ledgerState.devices.member(require_bytes_vo.ByteArray.fromHex(require_bytes_vo.HexBytes(entryHex))),
-		allowed: new Set(devices),
-		target
-	});
-	const removed = outside.find(({ entryHex }) => entryHex === target);
-	return {
-		readers: readers.filter(({ reader }) => reader.readerPublicKey !== self).map(({ reader }) => reader),
-		dropped: dropped.filter((entry) => entry !== localEntry),
-		...removed ? { removed: {
-			devicePublicKey: removed.reader.devicePublicKey,
-			epoch: removed.reader.epoch,
-			counter: removed.reader.counter
-		} } : {}
-	};
-};
-/**
-* Rotates the account encryption key to a fresh random secret and
-* re-encrypts every live holding towards it, as the scoped grants
-* standard requires before a read grant is issued and after one is
-* revoked, and as a device removal requires so the removed device reads
-* nothing newer. The holdings are walked with the keyring of the ledger's
-* `enc_key` from the position the chain is at, a keyring this device's
-* envelopes do not open rejecting with EncryptionKeyMismatchError before
-* anything is submitted. The encryption key draws the new secret and
-* seals it, with the roster key, to this device and to every registered
-* device that is enrolled now and among `devices`, and answers the
-* ciphertexts alone: one envelope per device and, when the roster key is
-* fresh, one registration each. Should any registration the live roster
-* key opens land while the rotation runs, as another device's enrolment
-* does, the rotation refuses with DeviceRosterInvalidError before
-* `enc_key` is replaced, so a device enrolled meanwhile is never left
-* without the new key; registrations that open under no roster key are
-* noise and do not stop it. Devices whose registrations conflict are
-* left out and reported in the result. The holdings are
-* re-encrypted towards the new key, the envelopes and registrations are
-* appended, `enc_key` is replaced through `rotate_enc_key_with_jubjub`,
-* and each re-encrypted holding is appended, one gated call each, all in
-* the key session the caller holds. The envelopes land ahead of the
-* rotation, so no device is left without the key the chain then holds;
-* a rotation interrupted after it leaves holdings under the previous
-* key, which every device still opens from its older envelopes and the
-* next rotation re-encrypts. The previous secret is never derived again
-* by anyone: entries sealed towards it stay readable to whoever held it,
-* and nothing newer is.
-*/
-const rotateEncKey = async ({ account, encryptionKey, view, local, chain, indexer, networkId, onProgress, devices, rotateRoster, target }) => {
-	const { ledgerState } = chain.position();
-	const inbox = readAccountInbox(account.address, ledgerState, local.readerPublicKey);
-	const { entries, keyring } = inbox;
-	const { holdingEntries } = await walkInbox({
-		address: account.address,
-		ledgerState,
-		indexer,
-		openEntries: async (coinEntries) => (await encryptionKey.openInbox(networkId, keyring, coinEntries)).map((opened) => opened?.kind === "coin" ? opened.coin : null)
-	});
-	const { readers, dropped, removed } = await sealedRoster({
-		account,
-		encryptionKey,
-		networkId,
-		local,
-		ledgerState,
-		inbox,
-		devices,
-		target,
-		localEntry: chain.position().devices.find((device) => device.isLocal)?.commitmentHex.toLowerCase()
-	});
-	const keys = await encryptionKey.createKeys(networkId, {
-		devicePublicKey: local.devicePublicKey,
-		keyring,
-		registrations: entries.filter(require_envelopes.isDeviceRegistration),
-		readers,
-		...rotateRoster === void 0 ? {} : { rotateRoster },
-		...removed ? { removed } : {}
-	});
-	const reencrypted = (await view.reencryptInbox(networkId, {
-		keyring,
-		to: keys.encKey
-	}, holdingEntries)).filter((entry) => entry !== null);
-	onProgress("rotating");
-	for (const entry of [...keys.envelopes, ...keys.registrations]) await chain.submit(prepareAppendInbox(entry));
-	const before = registrationsOf(entries);
-	const appended = registrationsOf(keys.registrations);
-	const landed = inboxEntries(chain.position().ledgerState).filter((entry) => require_envelopes.isDeviceRegistration(entry) && !before.has(require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(entry)) && !appended.has(require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(entry)));
-	if (landed.length > 0 && (await encryptionKey.openInbox(networkId, keyring, landed)).some((opened) => opened?.kind === "device")) throw new require_errors.DeviceRosterInvalidError(`Registrations landed in the inbox of ${account.address} while its keys rotated; rotate again.`);
-	await chain.submit(prepareRotateEncKey(keys.encKey));
-	await chain.append("reencrypting", reencrypted);
-	return {
-		encKey: keys.encKey,
-		dropped,
-		keyring: {
-			account: require_providers.AccAddress(account.address),
-			encKey: keys.encKey,
-			envelopes: keys.envelopes.filter((envelope) => require_envelopes.isAddressedTo(envelope, local.readerPublicKey))
-		}
-	};
-};
-/**
-* Seals the live secret of `keyring` to each read grant's read key, with
-* the grant record that keeps each seal on chain for this device. A
-* grant the key refuses to seal to, an expired key session included, is
-* listed unsealed rather than failing a rotation that already landed, or
-* as revocation pending when the key refuses it with
-* GrantRevocationPendingError.
-*/
-const sealViews = async ({ view, networkId, keyring, account, targets }) => {
-	const sealedEncKey = require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(keyring.encKey);
-	const result = {
-		sealed: [],
-		unsealed: [],
-		revocationPending: [],
-		entries: []
-	};
-	for (const target of targets) {
-		let refusal;
-		const delivery = await view.sealView(networkId, keyring, {
-			...target,
-			account
-		}).catch((error) => {
-			refusal = error;
-		});
-		if (!delivery) {
-			(refusal instanceof require_errors.GrantRevocationPendingError ? result.revocationPending : result.unsealed).push(target.grantId);
-			continue;
-		}
-		result.sealed.push({
-			...target,
-			seal: require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(delivery.seal),
-			sealedEncKey
-		});
-		result.entries.push(delivery.entry);
-	}
-	return result;
-};
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/flows/stored-grants.ts
-/**
-* The slot each stored grant was derived under, keyed by id, as the
-* roster decoder takes them.
-*/
-const storedGrantSlots = (stored) => new Map(Object.entries(stored ?? {}).map(([id, { slot }]) => [require_grant_rules.GrantId(id), require_grant_rules.GrantSlot(slot)]));
-/**
-* The opening of each stored grant whose object fields were kept, keyed by
-* id, as the roster decoder attaches them. A read grant whose seal this
-* client holds carries it in the opening's view, with the `enc_key` whose
-* secret it seals.
-*/
-const storedGrantOpenings = (stored) => new Map(Object.entries(stored ?? {}).flatMap(([id, grant]) => grant.object ? [[require_grant_rules.GrantId(id), {
-	scopeSalt: require_grant_rules.GrantScopeSalt(grant.scopeSalt),
-	granteeScheme: require_types.storedGranteeScheme(grant),
-	granteePublicKey: grant.granteePublicKey,
-	origin: grant.origin,
-	color: require_types.TokenColor(grant.object.color),
-	recipient: grant.object.recipient,
-	maxCoinValue: grant.object.maxCoinValue,
-	...grant.view?.seal === void 0 || grant.view.sealedEncKey === void 0 ? {} : { view: {
-		readPublicKey: grant.view.readPublicKey,
-		seal: grant.view.seal,
-		sealedEncKey: grant.view.sealedEncKey
-	} }
-}]] : []));
-/**
-* The stored grants with the view of one grant replaced: its read key
-* and, when given, the seal towards it of the secret of `sealedEncKey`.
-*/
-const withStoredGrantView = (stored, grantId, view) => {
-	const grant = stored[grantId];
-	if (!grant) return stored;
-	return {
-		...stored,
-		[grantId]: {
-			...grant,
-			view
-		}
-	};
-};
-/**
-* The read grants this client holds the read key of and the chain still
-* lists active, other than `except`: the grants a rotation seals the new
-* secret to again. A read grant issued by another client has no stored
-* key here, so it is not among them.
-*/
-const liveStoredReadGrants = (stored, roster, except) => {
-	const active = new Set(roster.filter((record) => record.active && record.scope.read).map(({ id }) => id));
-	return Object.entries(stored ?? {}).flatMap(([id, grant]) => grant.view && active.has(require_grant_rules.GrantId(id)) && id !== except ? [{
-		grantId: require_grant_rules.GrantId(id),
-		readPublicKey: grant.view.readPublicKey
-	}] : []);
-};
-/**
-* The active read grants this client holds the read key of whose stored
-* seal does not hold the secret of `encKey`, the ledger's current one:
-* their grantees read nothing newer until a rotation seals to them again
-* or they are issued again. A read grant issued by another client has no
-* stored key here, so it is not among them.
-*/
-const unsealedStoredReadGrants = (stored, roster, encKey) => liveStoredReadGrants(stored, roster).filter(({ grantId }) => stored?.[grantId]?.view?.sealedEncKey !== encKey).map(({ grantId }) => grantId);
-/** The stored grants with one more entry, under its grant id. */
-const withStoredGrant = (stored, grantId, grant) => ({
-	...stored,
-	[grantId]: grant
-});
-/**
-* The record a completed account persists: its identity, this device's
-* use counter, the grant bookkeeping when there is any, and the roster of
-* devices the account keys were sealed to when it is known. It never
-* carries a deployment, so a write of it completes a pending record.
-*/
-const completedRecord = ({ address, bindingVersion }, localUseCounter, { grants }) => ({
-	address,
-	bindingVersion,
-	localUseCounter,
-	...grants ? { grants } : {}
-});
-/**
-* The stored grants with the seals of a rotation applied: each sealed
-* grant's view carries its new seal and the `enc_key` it holds, and each
-* unsealed one keeps its read key alone.
-*/
-const withSealedViews = (stored, { sealed, unsealed }) => {
-	if (!stored) return stored;
-	let next = stored;
-	for (const { grantId, readPublicKey, seal, sealedEncKey } of sealed) next = withStoredGrantView(next, grantId, {
-		readPublicKey,
-		seal,
-		sealedEncKey
-	});
-	for (const grantId of unsealed) {
-		const readPublicKey = next[grantId]?.view?.readPublicKey;
-		if (readPublicKey !== void 0) next = withStoredGrantView(next, grantId, { readPublicKey });
-	}
-	return next;
-};
-/** Each grant's parts by id, the later of two parts of a kind winning. */
-const partsByGrant = (parts) => {
-	const byGrant = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-	for (const part of parts) {
-		const held = byGrant.get(part.grantId) ?? {};
-		byGrant.set(part.grantId, {
-			...held,
-			[part.part]: part
-		});
-	}
-	return byGrant;
-};
-/**
-* Whether a grant's bookkeeping opens its on-chain commitments under the
-* account at `address`: the id derives from the account, the grantee
-* key under its scheme, the origin and the slot, the object commitment
-* from the salt and the object fields, and the read key hashes to the
-* one the contract holds, or is absent for a grant that does not read.
-* Anyone can append any bytes to the inbox, and another client of the
-* account issuing to the same grantee from the same origin lands on the
-* same id with its own salt, so this check, not where the bookkeeping
-* came from, is what makes it trusted.
-*/
-const opensOnChain = async (record, fields, address) => {
-	try {
-		const grantee = {
-			scheme: fields.granteeScheme,
-			publicKey: fields.granteePublicKey
-		};
-		const grantId = require_grants.deriveGrantId({
-			contractAddress: require_bytes_vo.ByteArray.fromHex(require_bytes_vo.HexBytes(address)),
-			granteePublicKey: require_grant_rules.granteePoint(grantee),
-			originHash: await require_grants.originHash(fields.origin),
-			slot: require_grant_rules.GrantSlot(fields.slot)
-		});
-		const encoded = require_grant_rules.circuitScope({
-			grantee,
-			operations: [],
-			color: require_types.TokenColor(fields.object.color),
-			recipient: fields.object.recipient,
-			maxCoinValue: fields.object.maxCoinValue,
-			perCallCap: "0",
-			cap: "0",
-			expiresAt: null,
-			...fields.readPublicKey === void 0 ? {} : { readPublicKey: fields.readPublicKey }
-		});
-		return grantId === record.id && require_grants.grantObjectCommit(require_bytes_vo.ByteArray.fromHex(require_bytes_vo.HexBytes(fields.scopeSalt)), encoded) === record.scope.objectCommit && require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(encoded.readPkHash) === record.scope.readPkHash && fields.readPublicKey !== void 0 === record.scope.read;
-	} catch {
-		return false;
-	}
-};
-/**
-* The stored grants narrowed to the ones that still open what the chain
-* holds under their id, or undefined once none is left. A grant the
-* chain no longer holds is dropped, and so is one whose kept fields do
-* not open its commitments: the entry an issue wrote before a call that
-* never landed, once another client of the account issued over the same
-* id, or an entry written before the object fields were kept, which
-* cannot be checked. A revoked grant stays in the contract's map as a
-* tombstone, so its slot and salt are kept until a revoke-all clears the
-* map or a new grant overwrites the id.
-*/
-const retainStoredGrants = async (stored, roster, address) => {
-	if (!stored) return void 0;
-	const retained = {};
-	for (const record of roster) {
-		const grant = stored[record.id];
-		if (!grant?.object) continue;
-		if (await opensOnChain(record, {
-			...grant,
-			granteeScheme: require_types.storedGranteeScheme(grant),
-			object: grant.object,
-			...grant.view === void 0 ? {} : { readPublicKey: grant.view.readPublicKey }
-		}, address)) retained[record.id] = grant;
-	}
-	return Object.keys(retained).length > 0 ? retained : void 0;
-};
-/**
-* The bookkeeping of grants this device issued, rebuilt from the grant
-* records it opened in the inbox, for the grants the chain still holds:
-* each grant whose parts open its on-chain commitments under this
-* account and origin, with its read key and, when the newest view record
-* holds the seal of the ledger's `enc_key`, that seal. A grant whose
-* parts do not check out, or whose grant or object part is missing, is
-* left out. Undefined when nothing is rebuilt.
-*/
-const rebuildStoredGrants = async (parts, roster, scope) => {
-	const byGrant = partsByGrant(parts);
-	const rebuilt = {};
-	for (const record of roster) {
-		const held = byGrant.get(record.id);
-		if (!held?.grant || !held.object) continue;
-		const { grant, object, view } = held;
-		if (!await opensOnChain(record, {
-			...grant,
-			origin: scope.origin,
-			object: object.object
-		}, scope.address)) continue;
-		const readPublicKey = grant.readPublicKey;
-		const isCurrent = view !== void 0 && scope.encKey.startsWith(view.encKeyPrefix);
-		rebuilt[record.id] = {
-			slot: grant.slot,
-			scopeSalt: grant.scopeSalt,
-			granteeScheme: grant.granteeScheme,
-			granteePublicKey: grant.granteePublicKey,
-			origin: scope.origin,
-			object: object.object,
-			...readPublicKey === void 0 ? {} : { view: isCurrent ? {
-				readPublicKey,
-				seal: view.seal,
-				sealedEncKey: scope.encKey
-			} : { readPublicKey } }
-		};
-	}
-	return Object.keys(rebuilt).length > 0 ? rebuilt : void 0;
-};
-/**
-* The record's bookkeeping with every rebuilt grant it lacks added: what
-* the record holds is kept, so a record that survived is never
-* overwritten by the chain's copy, except for a view whose seal is not of
-* `encKey`, the ledger's current one, when the rebuilt view's seal is:
-* the record write after a rotation can be lost while its seal reached
-* the inbox. Run over the bookkeeping {@link retainStoredGrants} checked,
-* a rebuilt grant takes the place of an entry that did not open.
-*/
-const withRebuiltGrants = (stored, rebuilt, encKey) => {
-	if (!rebuilt) return stored;
-	const merged = {
-		...rebuilt,
-		...stored
-	};
-	for (const [id, fromChain] of Object.entries(rebuilt)) {
-		const held = stored?.[id];
-		if (held && held.view?.sealedEncKey !== encKey && fromChain.view?.sealedEncKey === encKey) merged[id] = {
-			...held,
-			view: fromChain.view
-		};
-	}
-	return merged;
-};
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/flows/create-account.ts
-/** The initial device entry is inserted at epoch 0 with use counter 0. */
-const INITIAL_DEVICE_EPOCH = require_gated_call.DeviceEpoch(0n);
-const INITIAL_USE_COUNTER_VALUE = "0";
-/**
-* The record of a creation left unfinished on this device, read inside
-* the session once presence reported one. A record that opens without a
-* pending deployment, or that this authoriser cannot open, refuses with
-* AccountExistsError: it names an account that must not be created over.
-* A record that carries only the marker of its creation, which a hosted
-* signer shows no flow but the creation, cannot be resumed and is
-* refused, as is one started under another lock choice than
-* `lockAccount`, with CreationLockMismatchError naming the recorded one.
-*/
-const pendingRecord = async (accountRecords, lockAccount) => {
-	const record = await accountRecords.read();
-	if (!record?.deployment) throw new require_errors.AccountExistsError();
-	if (!isPendingDeployment(record.deployment)) throw new Error(`The unfinished creation of the account at ${record.address} was read without its deployment, so it cannot be resumed.`);
-	if (record.deployment.lockAccount !== lockAccount) throw lockChoiceMismatch(record.deployment.lockAccount);
-	return {
-		...record,
-		deployment: record.deployment
-	};
-};
-/**
-* Runs the deployment: a fresh one, which draws the account keys first,
-* deploys with their `enc_key` and records the pending deployment, with
-* this device's envelope and registration, as soon as the deploy lands
-* so an interruption can be resumed; or the remaining waves of a
-* recorded one, with the key entries it recorded.
-*/
-const deploy = async ({ providers, lockAccount, pending, local, context: { seams, accountRecords } }) => {
-	const { passportAuthoriser, passportEncryptionKey, passportNetwork } = seams;
-	if (pending) return {
-		deployed: await require_gated_call.resumeAccountDeployment({
-			providers,
-			authoriser: passportAuthoriser,
-			address: pending.address,
-			pending: pending.deployment
-		}),
-		pending: pending.deployment
-	};
-	const keys = await passportEncryptionKey.createKeys(passportNetwork.networkId, { devicePublicKey: local.devicePublicKey });
-	const keyEntries = [...keys.envelopes, ...keys.registrations].map((entry) => require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(entry));
-	const progress = {};
-	const deployed = await require_gated_call.deployAccount({
-		providers,
-		authoriser: passportAuthoriser,
-		encPublicKey: keys.encKey,
-		lockAccount,
-		onDeployed: async (address, deployment) => {
-			progress.recorded = {
-				...deployment,
-				keyEntries
-			};
-			await accountRecords.write({
-				address,
-				bindingVersion: require_artefact_loader.accManifest.bindingVersion,
-				localUseCounter: INITIAL_USE_COUNTER_VALUE,
-				deployment: progress.recorded
-			});
-		}
-	});
-	if (!progress.recorded) throw new Error("The deployment landed without reporting its progress.");
-	return {
-		deployed,
-		pending: progress.recorded
-	};
-};
-/**
-* Creates a Passport account: the passkey ceremony (implicit in the first
-* authoriser use), the account keys drawn through the encryption key
-* seam, the Account Custody Contract deployment in waves with sponsored
-* fees, the initial device activation, the delivery of the account keys
-* to this device's inbox, and the local persistence of the account
-* record. Every step runs inside one key session, so the whole flow costs
-* a single ceremony rather than one per authoriser call. The flow never
-* holds the encryption secret: the seam draws it at random, seals it to
-* this device's reader key and hands back only its public key, which the
-* constructor takes as `enc_key`, with this device's envelope and its
-* registration under a fresh roster key; once the device is active, both
-* are appended to the inbox, one gated call each, so the account keys
-* live on chain from the start.
-*
-* Progress is reported through `onProgress`: 'deploying' once the
-* authoriser has produced the device key, 'proving' and 'sponsoring' from
-* inside each transaction submission (a transaction proves first, then
-* the sponsor balances it), 'activating' before the activation call and
-* 'recording' before the key entries are appended. The record is written
-* before the promise resolves, so a process that dies right after still
-* recognises the account on next startup.
-*
-* The flow runs to completion once started: cancelling mid-deploy could
-* orphan a contract the sponsor already paid for. The caller's flow gate
-* is what keeps a second request from starting one. Should the process
-* die between waves anyway, the record written when the deploy landed
-* names the contract, what it still needs and the key entries, and the
-* next create request on this device resumes from the operations the
-* chain holds, activates once every wave is in and appends whichever key
-* entry the inbox still lacks; a creation that died after its activation
-* landed resumes from there. A resumed creation finishes exactly as it
-* began, with the keys recorded then: a request under another lock choice
-* than the recorded one is refused with CreationLockMismatchError, and a
-* build pinning other verifier keys than the recorded deployment with
-* CreationArtefactMismatchError, both before any wave. The session names
-* the lock choice, so an authoriser that asks consent first shows it; a
-* hosted signer refuses the same lock mismatch itself, and a resume
-* started from another origin than the creation it resumes.
-*
-* A device already holding a completed account record refuses with
-* AccountExistsError before the ceremony runs: the record is the only
-* pointer to the deployed contract and there is no recovery path, so
-* creating over it would orphan the existing account. Presence is read
-* without opening the record, and it tells a completed record from an
-* unfinished one, so a sealed record blocks the flow without costing a
-* prompt and only a record the flow may resume is opened, inside the
-* session, where it costs no extra prompt.
-*/
-const createAccount = async ({ lockAccount }, context) => {
-	const { seams, accountRecords, onProgress } = context;
-	const presence = await accountRecords.presence();
-	if (presence === "complete") throw new require_errors.AccountExistsError();
-	const { passportAuthoriser, passportNetwork, passportProver, passportSponsor } = seams;
-	return inKeySession(passportAuthoriser, {
-		kind: "create-account",
-		lockAccount
-	}, async () => {
-		const local = await readLocalDevice(seams);
-		const pending = presence === "pending" ? await pendingRecord(accountRecords, lockAccount) : void 0;
-		onProgress("deploying");
-		const { deployed, pending: deployment } = await deploy({
-			providers: await require_providers.createMidnightProviders({
-				network: passportNetwork,
-				prover: passportProver,
-				sponsor: passportSponsor,
-				onStage: onProgress
-			}),
-			lockAccount,
-			pending,
-			local,
-			context
-		});
-		if (!deployed.isActivated) {
-			onProgress("activating");
-			await deployed.activate();
-		}
-		const account = {
-			address: deployed.address,
-			bindingVersion: require_artefact_loader.accManifest.bindingVersion,
-			status: "ready",
-			networkId: passportNetwork.networkId
-		};
-		const startCounter = pending?.localUseCounter ?? INITIAL_USE_COUNTER_VALUE;
-		const { indexer, ledgerState } = await require_account_call.readAccountLedger(deployed.address, passportNetwork);
-		const held = new Set(inboxEntries(ledgerState).map((entry) => require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(entry)));
-		const chain = callChain({
-			account,
-			start: {
-				ledgerState,
-				localUseCounter: startCounter,
-				devices: [{
-					commitmentHex: await passportAuthoriser.deviceCommitment(require_providers.AccAddress(deployed.address), INITIAL_DEVICE_EPOCH, require_gated_call.UseCounter(BigInt(startCounter))),
-					isLocal: true
-				}]
-			},
-			indexer,
-			seams,
-			onProgress,
-			onAdvanced: async (localUseCounter) => accountRecords.write({
-				address: account.address,
-				bindingVersion: account.bindingVersion,
-				localUseCounter,
-				deployment
-			})
-		});
-		await chain.append("recording", deployment.keyEntries.filter((entry) => !held.has(entry)).map((entry) => require_bytes_vo.ByteArray.fromHex(require_bytes_vo.HexBytes(entry))));
-		const { localUseCounter, devices } = chain.position();
-		const counter = localUseCounter ?? startCounter;
-		await accountRecords.write(completedRecord(account, counter, {}));
-		return {
-			account,
-			devices,
-			localUseCounter: counter,
-			grants: [],
-			encKey: require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(ledgerState.enc_key)
-		};
-	});
-};
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/acc/read-grants.ts
-const NO_SLOTS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-const NO_OPENINGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-/** The slot reported for a grant whose slot this client never learned. */
-const UNKNOWN_SLOT = require_grant_rules.GrantSlot(0);
-const toNumber = (field, value) => {
-	if (value > BigInt(Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER)) throw new Error(`Grant field ${field} exceeds the safe integer range`);
-	return Number(value);
-};
-const toOperations = (scope) => {
-	const operations = [];
-	if (scope.op_withdraw_unshielded) operations.push("withdraw-unshielded");
-	if (scope.op_withdraw_shielded) operations.push("withdraw-shielded");
-	if (scope.op_withdraw_shielded_to_contract) operations.push("withdraw-shielded-to-contract");
-	return operations;
-};
-const toScope = (scope) => ({
-	operations: toOperations(scope),
-	read: scope.read,
-	objectCommit: require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(scope.object_commit),
-	perCallCap: scope.per_call_cap.toString(),
-	cap: scope.cap.toString(),
-	expiresAt: scope.expires_at === 0n ? null : toNumber("expires_at", scope.expires_at),
-	rpCommit: require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(scope.rp_commit),
-	readPkHash: require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(scope.read_pk_hash),
-	window: scope.window_len === 0n ? null : {
-		lengthSeconds: toNumber("window_len", scope.window_len),
-		cap: scope.window_cap.toString()
-	},
-	callerCommit: require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(scope.caller_commit)
-});
-const toRecord = (id, record, { slot, opening }) => ({
-	id,
-	slot,
-	active: record.active,
-	epoch: toNumber("epoch", record.epoch),
-	generation: toNumber("gen", record.gen),
-	issuedAt: toNumber("issued_at", record.issued_at),
-	scope: toScope(record.scope),
-	spentWindow: {
-		start: toNumber("window_start", record.window_start),
-		spent: record.window_spent.toString()
-	},
-	...opening ? { opening } : {}
-});
-/**
-* Decodes the account's grant roster from the ledger's grants map, in the
-* map's order. Plain fields decode to the read model's numbers and
-* decimal strings, commitments stay as hex, and an expiry or window of
-* zero reads as none. A revoked grant stays in the map as an inactive
-* tombstone and is listed as such. The contract stores no slot: the
-* caller supplies the slots of the grants it issued, and a grant issued by
-* another client of the account reports slot 0. The openings the caller
-* holds are attached to their grants.
-*/
-const readGrants = (ledgerState, slots = NO_SLOTS, openings = NO_OPENINGS) => Array.from(ledgerState.grants, ([rawId, record]) => {
-	const id = require_grant_rules.GrantId(require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(rawId));
-	return toRecord(id, record, {
-		slot: slots.get(id) ?? UNKNOWN_SLOT,
-		opening: openings.get(id)
-	});
-});
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/flows/devices.ts
-/**
-* Contract aborts meaning the removal would leave the account without an
-* authorising device: the caller rule and the redundant count floor.
-*/
-const LAST_DEVICE_ABORTS = ["failed assert: cannot remove the authorising device", "failed assert: cannot remove last device"];
-/**
-* Types a raw contract abort by the assert message the Account Custody
-* Contract raises; anything unrecognised passes through unchanged.
-* An unknown-entry abort on the remove circuit is attributed to the
-* removal target, not the caller: the circuit checks the caller first,
-* and the caller's entry was resolved against live ledger state inside
-* the same gate, so only a mid-flight roll of the caller's own entry
-* could produce it, while a stale target commitment always does.
-*/
-const classifyContractAbort$1 = (error, circuit) => {
-	const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
-	if (LAST_DEVICE_ABORTS.some((abort) => message.includes(abort))) return new require_errors.LastDeviceError(message);
-	if (message.includes("failed assert: unknown device entry")) return circuit === "remove_device_with_jubjub" ? new require_errors.RemovalTargetNotFoundError(message) : new require_errors.NotAuthorisedError(message);
-	if (require_account_call.isNotAuthorisedAbort(message)) return new require_errors.NotAuthorisedError(message);
-	return error;
-};
-/**
-* Whether any read grant of the account is live: its grantees hold the
-* live account secret, so a device handed the keys while one is live
-* gets a fresh secret first.
-*/
-const hasLiveReadGrant = (ledgerState) => readGrants(ledgerState).some((record) => record.active && record.scope.read);
-/** The devices list with the enrolled commitment appended. */
-const withDevice = (devices, commitmentHex) => [...devices, {
-	commitmentHex,
-	isLocal: false
-}];
-/** The devices list with the revoked commitment dropped. */
-const withoutDevice = (devices, commitmentHex) => devices.filter((device) => device.commitmentHex !== commitmentHex);
-/** A device's entry as the call that targets it takes it. */
-const entryArgument = (commitmentHex) => require_bytes_vo.ByteArray.fromHex(require_bytes_vo.HexBytes(commitmentHex.toLowerCase()));
-/** The counter the chain left this device at, or the one it started from. */
-const chainCounter = (chain, input) => chain.position().localUseCounter ?? input.localUseCounter ?? "0";
-/**
-* Opens what a device flow runs on inside its key session: the grant
-* bookkeeping of the record, read where it costs no extra prompt so every
-* write keeps it, and a chain of gated calls from the ledger read ahead
-* of the session, each persisting the counter it advanced this device to
-* before the next call. The bookkeeping is checked against the ledger
-* first, so an entry that does not open the grant the chain holds under
-* its id, as one an issue wrote before a call that never landed, is
-* neither re-sealed to nor kept.
-*/
-const openDeviceSession = async (input, { ledgerState, indexer }, { seams, accountRecords, onProgress }) => {
-	const { account, devices, localUseCounter } = input;
-	let grants = await retainStoredGrants((await accountRecords.read())?.grants, readGrants(ledgerState), account.address);
-	const write = async (counter) => accountRecords.write(completedRecord(account, counter, { grants }));
-	const chain = callChain({
-		account,
-		start: {
-			ledgerState,
-			localUseCounter,
-			devices
-		},
-		indexer,
-		seams,
-		onProgress,
-		onAdvanced: write
-	});
-	return {
-		grants,
-		chain,
-		keep: async (next) => {
-			grants = next;
-			await write(chainCounter(chain, input));
-		}
-	};
-};
-/**
-* Enrols a new device key on the account. `commitmentHex` carries the new
-* device's entry commitment, derived out of band by the joining device;
-* the local device authorises `add_device_with_jubjub` through the
-* gated-call pattern. The roster gains the commitment on success only,
-* marked as remote, and the same result moves the local device's own row
-* to the successor entry the call left it on, so the roster and the use
-* counter never disagree about where this device stands.
-*
-* When `reader` names the joining device's reader and device keys, the
-* account keys are delivered to it in the same session: its device key
-* must derive the enrolled commitment at use counter 0 and its reader key
-* must be one the account seals to, both checked before any prompt. The
-* encryption key seals the live secret and the roster key to the reader
-* key, and the envelope and the device's registration under the roster
-* key are appended to the inbox, one gated call each, ahead of the
-* enrolment, so an enrolment that lands never leaves the device without
-* its keys; until it lands the registration names no live entry and a
-* rotation passes over it. While any read grant is live its grantees
-* hold the live secret, and one could seal it to the joining reader with
-* a roster key of its own ahead of the genuine envelope, so the account
-* keys are rotated first in the same session, with a fresh roster key,
-* as a removal rotates them, the joining device handed the new secret no
-* grantee has seen, and the live read grants this client holds the read
-* key of sealed it after; with no live read grant only enrolled devices
-* hold the secret, and the live keys are handed over as they are. The
-* joining device then signs in and reads the holdings with its own
-* passkey alone. Without `reader` the
-* device can authorise but reads nothing until some device delivers it
-* the keys.
-*
-* The advanced counter is persisted to the account record after every
-* call, before the roster is returned, so the next flow rescans from a
-* fresh anchor. A failure leaves the roster unreturned.
-*
-* A rejected authorisation (bad signature, malformed key, or a caller
-* entry the on-chain set no longer holds) rejects with NotAuthorisedError;
-* a record whose address holds no live contract rejects with
-* AccountContractMissingError; joining keys that do not match the entry
-* reject with DeviceReaderInvalidError. The transactions' proving and
-* sponsoring stages and 'recording' are reported through `onProgress`.
-*/
-const addDevice = async ({ reader, ...input }, context) => {
-	const { seams, onProgress } = context;
-	const { account, commitmentHex } = input;
-	const { networkId } = seams.passportNetwork;
-	try {
-		const ledger = await require_account_call.readAccountLedger(account.address, seams.passportNetwork);
-		if (reader) require_device_readers.assertJoiningDevice({
-			address: account.address,
-			epoch: ledger.ledgerState.device_epoch
-		}, reader, commitmentHex);
-		const view = reader && hasLiveReadGrant(ledger.ledgerState) ? viewCapability(seams.passportEncryptionKey) : void 0;
-		const devices = view ? liveDeviceEntries(ledger.ledgerState) : void 0;
-		return await inKeySession(seams.passportAuthoriser, {
-			kind: "add-device",
-			commitmentHex,
-			account: require_providers.AccAddress(account.address),
-			...reader ? { reader } : {},
-			...devices ? { devices } : {}
-		}, async () => {
-			const { grants, chain, keep } = await openDeviceSession(input, ledger, context);
-			let rotated;
-			if (reader) {
-				const local = await readLocalDevice(seams);
-				if (view && devices) rotated = await rotateEncKey({
-					account,
-					encryptionKey: seams.passportEncryptionKey,
-					view,
-					local,
-					chain,
-					indexer: ledger.indexer,
-					networkId,
-					onProgress,
-					devices,
-					rotateRoster: true
-				});
-				const delivery = await seams.passportEncryptionKey.sealToDevice(networkId, rotated?.keyring ?? readAccountInbox(account.address, chain.position().ledgerState, local.readerPublicKey).keyring, {
-					...reader,
-					epoch: ledger.ledgerState.device_epoch,
-					counter: 0n
-				});
-				await chain.append("recording", [delivery.envelope, delivery.registration]);
-				if (view && rotated) {
-					const views = await sealViews({
-						view,
-						networkId,
-						keyring: rotated.keyring,
-						account: require_providers.AccAddress(account.address),
-						targets: liveStoredReadGrants(grants, readGrants(chain.position().ledgerState))
-					});
-					await keep(withSealedViews(grants, views));
-					await chain.append("recording", views.entries);
-				}
-			}
-			await chain.submit({
-				circuit: ADD_DEVICE_CIRCUIT,
-				args: [entryArgument(commitmentHex)]
-			});
-			return {
-				devices: withDevice(chain.position().devices, commitmentHex),
-				localUseCounter: chainCounter(chain, input),
-				...rotated ? {
-					encKey: require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(rotated.encKey),
-					droppedDevices: rotated.dropped
-				} : {}
-			};
-		});
-	} catch (error) {
-		throw classifyContractAbort$1(error, ADD_DEVICE_CIRCUIT);
-	}
-};
-/**
-* Refuses a removal the contract would refuse before any prompt: a
-* target the on-chain device set does not hold, and the local device,
-* which cannot remove itself. The rotation a removal runs comes first,
-* so a removal refused only after it would have cost the target device
-* its keys for nothing.
-*
-* @throws {@link RemovalTargetNotFoundError} when the target is gone.
-* @throws {@link LastDeviceError} when the target is this device.
-*/
-const assertRemovable = ({ devices, commitmentHex }, { ledgerState }) => {
-	if (!ledgerState.devices.member(entryArgument(commitmentHex))) throw new require_errors.RemovalTargetNotFoundError(`The account holds no device entry ${commitmentHex}.`);
-	if (devices.find((device) => device.isLocal)?.commitmentHex.toLowerCase() === commitmentHex.toLowerCase()) throw new require_errors.LastDeviceError("The device that authorises a removal cannot remove itself.");
-};
-/**
-* Revokes a device key from the account and rotates the account keys so
-* the removed device reads nothing newer. `commitmentHex` names the
-* target by its current entry commitment, which is the literal set
-* element the contract removes; the local device authorises
-* `remove_device_with_jubjub` through the gated-call pattern.
-*
-* Ahead of the removal, in the same session, the encryption key is
-* rotated with a fresh roster key and sealed only to this device and to
-* the registered devices whose device key derives a live entry other
-* than the target, which the key session names to the user before it
-* opens; the live holdings are re-encrypted towards it, and it is sealed
-* again to every live read grant this client holds the read key of, each
-* seal kept on chain in a grant record. The removed device's envelopes
-* stay in the inbox and keep opening the secrets they held, but none
-* opens the new one, and the registrations under the old roster key no
-* longer count, any it planted for itself included. A roster in which
-* two readers claim one live device, or one reader two, refuses with
-* DeviceRosterInvalidError rather than guess.
-*
-* The roster drops the commitment on success only, and the same result
-* moves the local device's own row to the successor entry the call left
-* it on. The advanced counter is persisted to the account record after
-* every call. The contract's own guards surface as typed errors: a
-* removal that would strand the account (the authorising device, or the
-* count floor) rejects with LastDeviceError, a rejected authorisation
-* (bad signature or malformed key) with NotAuthorisedError, and a target
-* entry that is no longer in the on-chain set with
-* RemovalTargetNotFoundError; the target's presence and the local device
-* are checked before any prompt, and an encryption key that cannot
-* rotate refuses with ReadUnavailableError before any prompt too. The
-* rotation's stages, 'recording' and the transactions' proving and
-* sponsoring are reported through `onProgress`.
-*/
-const removeDevice = async (input, context) => {
-	const { seams, onProgress } = context;
-	const { account, commitmentHex } = input;
-	const { networkId } = seams.passportNetwork;
-	try {
-		const view = viewCapability(seams.passportEncryptionKey);
-		const ledger = await require_account_call.readAccountLedger(account.address, seams.passportNetwork);
-		assertRemovable(input, ledger);
-		const devices = liveDeviceEntries(ledger.ledgerState, commitmentHex);
-		return await inKeySession(seams.passportAuthoriser, {
-			kind: "remove-device",
-			commitmentHex,
-			account: require_providers.AccAddress(account.address),
-			devices
-		}, async () => {
-			const { grants, chain, keep } = await openDeviceSession(input, ledger, context);
-			const rotated = await rotateEncKey({
-				account,
-				encryptionKey: seams.passportEncryptionKey,
-				view,
-				local: await readLocalDevice(seams),
-				chain,
-				indexer: ledger.indexer,
-				networkId,
-				onProgress,
-				devices,
-				rotateRoster: true,
-				target: commitmentHex.toLowerCase()
-			});
-			const views = await sealViews({
-				view,
-				networkId,
-				keyring: rotated.keyring,
-				account: require_providers.AccAddress(account.address),
-				targets: liveStoredReadGrants(grants, readGrants(chain.position().ledgerState))
-			});
-			await keep(withSealedViews(grants, views));
-			await chain.append("recording", views.entries);
-			await chain.submit({
-				circuit: REMOVE_DEVICE_CIRCUIT,
-				args: [entryArgument(commitmentHex)]
-			});
-			return {
-				devices: withoutDevice(chain.position().devices, commitmentHex),
-				localUseCounter: chainCounter(chain, input),
-				encKey: require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(rotated.encKey),
-				droppedDevices: rotated.dropped
-			};
-		});
-	} catch (error) {
-		throw classifyContractAbort$1(error, REMOVE_DEVICE_CIRCUIT);
-	}
-};
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/flows/grants.ts
-/** Contract abort naming a grant the grants map does not hold. */
-const UNKNOWN_GRANT_ABORT = "failed assert: unknown grant";
-/** Contract abort refusing a revoke over a grant already inactive. */
-const GRANT_NOT_LIVE_ABORT = "failed assert: grant not live";
-/** Contract abort refusing an issue over a grant id that is still active. */
-const GRANT_ACTIVE_ABORT = "failed assert: grant already active";
-/**
-* How long an accepted call is given to show in the indexer's view of the
-* grants map, which can lag the block the call landed in.
-*/
-const ROSTER_POLL_ATTEMPTS = 30;
-const ROSTER_POLL_DELAY_MS = 1e3;
-const MILLISECONDS_PER_SECOND = 1e3;
-const sleep = async (ms) => new Promise((resolve) => {
-	setTimeout(resolve, ms);
-});
-const isActive = (roster, grantId) => roster.some((record) => record.id === grantId && record.active);
-const activeCount = (roster) => roster.filter((record) => record.active).length;
-const nowSeconds = () => Math.floor(Date.now() / MILLISECONDS_PER_SECOND);
-/**
-* Types a raw contract abort by the assert message the Account Custody
-* Contract raises; anything unrecognised passes through unchanged. An
-* unknown-entry abort can only come from the caller check here, since no
-* grant circuit names a device entry.
-*/
-const classifyContractAbort = (error) => {
-	const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
-	if (message.includes(UNKNOWN_GRANT_ABORT)) return new require_errors.GrantNotFoundError(message);
-	if (message.includes(GRANT_NOT_LIVE_ABORT)) return new require_errors.GrantRevokedError(message);
-	if (message.includes(GRANT_ACTIVE_ABORT)) return new require_errors.GrantIssueRejectedError(message);
-	if (message.includes("failed assert: unknown device entry") || require_account_call.isNotAuthorisedAbort(message)) return new require_errors.NotAuthorisedError(message);
-	return error;
-};
-/**
-* Refuses a device whose storage holds no account record before any
-* ceremony. The gate only runs a call over an account in state, so an
-* absent record means the storage was cleared underneath it.
-*/
-const assertRecordPresent = async (accountRecords) => {
-	if (await accountRecords.presence() === "absent") throw new require_errors.AccountNotFoundError("No Passport account record is stored on this device.");
-};
-/**
-* The stored record of the account a grant call acts on, read inside the
-* session where it costs no extra prompt. Presence was checked ahead of
-* the session, so a missing record here vanished in between.
-*/
-const storedRecord = async (accountRecords) => {
-	const record = await accountRecords.read();
-	if (!record) throw new require_errors.AccountNotFoundError("No Passport account record is stored on this device.");
-	return record;
-};
-/**
-* The ledger state once the indexer reflects the accepted call, with the
-* roster read from it. The submission settled in a block, but the
-* indexer can serve the state from before it for a moment, and a roster
-* read then would deny the call its own result.
-*
-* @throws {@link GrantRosterUnsettledError} when the indexer never
-* reflects the call within the polling window.
-*/
-const awaitSettledRoster = async ({ indexer, address, slots, openings, isSettled }) => {
-	for (let attempt = 0; attempt < ROSTER_POLL_ATTEMPTS; attempt++) {
-		const ledgerState = await require_account_call.queryAccountLedger(indexer, address);
-		const roster = readGrants(ledgerState, slots, openings);
-		if (isSettled(roster)) return {
-			ledgerState,
-			roster
-		};
-		await sleep(ROSTER_POLL_DELAY_MS);
-	}
-	throw new require_errors.GrantRosterUnsettledError(`The grant roster of ${address} never reflected the accepted call.`);
-};
-/**
-* Runs one gated grant call inside a single key session, so the use
-* counter rescan and the authorisation cost one ceremony rather than one
-* per authoriser call. A device whose storage holds no record is refused
-* ahead of the session. The record is read inside it, where it costs no
-* extra prompt, its grant bookkeeping narrowed to the grants whose kept
-* fields open what the ledger read before the call holds under their id,
-* so an entry an issue wrote before a call that never landed is neither
-* an opening nor a re-seal target. It is rewritten with the advanced
-* counter and the grant bookkeeping after every call, so a roster is
-* never published ahead of the record that anchors the next rescan and
-* names the slots. A call
-* that keeps its bookkeeping ahead of the submission writes it once more
-* before it, under the counter the record holds. A call that rotates the
-* encryption key does so in the same session ahead of its own circuit.
-* The other live read grants are sealed the new secret right after the
-* rotation lands, their seals kept in the record and on chain before the
-* call is submitted, so they keep reading whatever the call's outcome.
-* Once the roster shows an issued grant active, its bookkeeping is
-* appended to the inbox, sealed to this device alone, and the grantee of
-* a read grant is sealed the new secret, the seal kept the same way. The
-* wait for the indexer is reported as 'confirming' and the appends as
-* 'recording'. The contract's own aborts surface as typed errors;
-* anything else, and a failing on-chain status in particular, rejects
-* unchanged with the counter unmoved.
-*/
-const runGrantCall = async ({ config: { call, flow, nextStoredGrants, writeBeforeCall, isSettled, rotation, reseal, issued }, input: { account, devices, localUseCounter }, ledger: { indexer, ledgerState }, roster: listed, context: { seams, accountRecords, onProgress } }) => {
-	const { networkId } = seams.passportNetwork;
-	const accountAddress = require_providers.AccAddress(account.address);
-	try {
-		await assertRecordPresent(accountRecords);
-		const rotationDevices = rotation ? liveDeviceEntries(ledgerState) : void 0;
-		return await inKeySession(seams.passportAuthoriser, rotationDevices ? {
-			...flow,
-			devices: rotationDevices
-		} : flow, async () => {
-			const record = await storedRecord(accountRecords);
-			let stored = nextStoredGrants(await retainStoredGrants(record.grants, listed, account.address));
-			const write = async (counter) => accountRecords.write(completedRecord(account, counter, { grants: stored }));
-			if (writeBeforeCall) await write(record.localUseCounter);
-			const chain = callChain({
-				account,
-				start: {
-					ledgerState,
-					localUseCounter,
-					devices
-				},
-				indexer,
-				seams,
-				onProgress,
-				onAdvanced: write
-			});
-			const counter = () => chain.position().localUseCounter ?? record.localUseCounter;
-			const roster = (state) => readGrants(state, storedGrantSlots(stored), storedGrantOpenings(stored));
-			let rotated;
-			let unsealedGrantIds = [];
-			let revocationPendingGrantIds = [];
-			if (rotation) {
-				rotated = await rotateEncKey({
-					account,
-					encryptionKey: seams.passportEncryptionKey,
-					view: rotation,
-					local: await readLocalDevice(seams),
-					chain,
-					indexer,
-					networkId,
-					onProgress,
-					devices: rotationDevices ?? []
-				});
-				if (reseal) {
-					const views = await sealViews({
-						view: rotation,
-						networkId,
-						keyring: rotated.keyring,
-						account: accountAddress,
-						targets: liveStoredReadGrants(stored, roster(chain.position().ledgerState), reseal.except)
-					});
-					stored = withSealedViews(stored, views);
-					unsealedGrantIds = views.unsealed;
-					revocationPendingGrantIds = views.revocationPending;
-					await write(counter());
-					await chain.append("recording", views.entries);
-				}
-			}
-			await chain.submit(call);
-			onProgress("confirming");
-			const settled = await awaitSettledRoster({
-				indexer,
-				address: account.address,
-				slots: storedGrantSlots(stored),
-				openings: storedGrantOpenings(stored),
-				isSettled
-			});
-			let grants = settled.roster;
-			if (issued) {
-				const entries = await seams.passportEncryptionKey.sealGrant(networkId, accountAddress, issued.bookkeeping);
-				if (rotation && rotated && issued.readPublicKey !== void 0) {
-					const views = await sealViews({
-						view: rotation,
-						networkId,
-						keyring: rotated.keyring,
-						account: accountAddress,
-						targets: [{
-							grantId: issued.bookkeeping.grantId,
-							readPublicKey: issued.readPublicKey
-						}]
-					});
-					stored = withSealedViews(stored, views);
-					unsealedGrantIds = [...unsealedGrantIds, ...views.unsealed];
-					revocationPendingGrantIds = [...revocationPendingGrantIds, ...views.revocationPending];
-					entries.push(...views.entries);
-					await write(counter());
-					grants = roster(settled.ledgerState);
-				}
-				await chain.append("recording", entries);
-			}
-			return {
-				grants,
-				devices: chain.position().devices,
-				localUseCounter: counter(),
-				...rotated ? {
-					encKey: require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(rotated.encKey),
-					droppedDevices: rotated.dropped
-				} : {},
-				unsealedGrantIds,
-				revocationPendingGrantIds
-			};
-		});
-	} catch (error) {
-		throw classifyContractAbort(error);
-	}
-};
-/**
-* Refuses a grant its grantee could never spend: one naming a scheme
-* whose withdrawals the account was deployed without. Installing them
-* takes a maintenance update, which a locked account can no longer sign
-* and an unlocked one no longer holds the key for, so the issue is
-* refused before the owner is asked to authorise it.
-*
-* @throws {@link GrantScopeInvalidError} when a withdrawal of the
-* grantee's scheme is not installed on the account.
-*/
-const requireGranteeWithdrawals = async (indexer, address, scheme) => {
-	const installed = new Set(await require_account_call.queryAccountOperations(indexer, address));
-	const missing = require_grant_circuits.GRANTEE_WITHDRAWAL_CIRCUITS[scheme].filter((circuit) => !installed.has(circuit));
-	if (missing.length > 0) throw new require_errors.GrantScopeInvalidError(`the account cannot serve a ${scheme} grantee, it lacks ${missing.join(", ")}`);
-};
-/**
-* Issues a scoped grant to an agent key. The scope is checked against the
-* rules the contract asserts before any prompt: a shielded operation
-* needs read, a read grant needs a canonical read public key, a rolling
-* window is refused because the contract reserves its bounds, and a
-* grant beyond sixteen active ones is refused as Lace's limit. Each
-* refusal is a GrantScopeInvalidError or GrantLimitReachedError and costs
-* no ceremony; a host with no relying party id is refused with
-* GrantOriginMissingError before the chain is read, and a read grant
-* with ReadUnavailableError when the encryption key held here cannot
-* share the viewing secret. The grant id is derived from the account,
-* the grantee key, the hash of this host's relying party id and the
-* first slot free for that pair, and the scope salt is drawn fresh; the
-* local device then authorises `issue_grant_with_jubjub` over the id and
-* the salted scope digest, which binds the hash of the read key. The key
-* session is opened with the account, the slot, the salt and the digest
-* beside the id and the scope, so an authoriser that does not share this
-* flow's memory can re-derive both before it signs.
-*
-* A read grant delivers the account's viewing secret, and read is total:
-* the grantee sees every shielded holding, current and future, until the
-* key is rotated again. So the key is rotated first, in the same session:
-* a fresh random secret is sealed to every device, the live holdings are
-* re-encrypted towards it, its public key replaces `enc_key`, and only
-* then is the grant issued, so the grantee reads nothing of the
-* account's spent history. Right after the rotation lands the new secret
-* is sealed to every other live read grant this client holds the key of,
-* so they keep reading even should the issue fail, and once the grant
-* shows active it is sealed to the grantee's read key; the seals join
-* the bookkeeping, and the grantee's reaches it through the agent
-* policy, never the chain. A grantee seal the key seam refuses after the
-* grant landed leaves the grant active and unsealed, named among the
-* result's unsealed grants, rather than failing the issue.
-*
-* The slot and salt are kept in the account record, since the contract
-* stores neither, together with the object fields its commitment hides
-* (colour, recipient and coin bound) and the read key, which the grantee
-* needs to open it and which reach the roster as the grant's opening.
-* They are written before the call is submitted: a grant that lands
-* without its salt could never be opened for its grantee. A call that
-* never lands leaves a stale entry, which the next sign-in prunes against
-* the chain and a later issue over the same id overwrites. Once the
-* grant shows active the same bookkeeping, and each seal, is appended to
-* the inbox in grant records only this device opens, so a sign-in after
-* the record is lost rebuilds it. The roster is read back from chain
-* once the grant shows active in it.
-*
-* A grant id the contract still holds active rejects with
-* GrantIssueRejectedError, and a rejected authorisation with
-* NotAuthorisedError. The transaction's proving and sponsoring stages,
-* the rotation, the wait for the indexer and the appends are reported
-* through `onProgress`.
-*/
-const issueGrant = async ({ scope, ...input }, context) => {
-	const { rpId, seams } = context;
-	if (rpId === void 0) throw new require_errors.GrantOriginMissingError();
-	const view = scope.read ? viewCapability(seams.passportEncryptionKey) : null;
-	const { account } = input;
-	const ledger = await require_account_call.readAccountLedger(account.address, seams.passportNetwork);
-	await requireGranteeWithdrawals(ledger.indexer, account.address, scope.grantee.scheme);
-	const roster = readGrants(ledger.ledgerState);
-	require_grant_rules.validateGrantScope(scope, {
-		nowSeconds: nowSeconds(),
-		grantCount: activeCount(roster)
-	});
-	const { grantId, slot, scopeSalt, scopeDigest, call } = require_grants.prepareIssueGrant({
-		contractAddress: require_bytes_vo.ByteArray.fromHex(require_bytes_vo.HexBytes(account.address)),
-		scope,
-		originHash: await require_grants.originHash(rpId),
-		roster
-	});
-	const readPublicKey = view ? scope.readPublicKey : void 0;
-	const object = {
-		color: scope.color,
-		recipient: scope.recipient,
-		maxCoinValue: scope.maxCoinValue
-	};
-	return {
-		grantId,
-		...await runGrantCall({
-			config: {
-				call,
-				flow: {
-					kind: "issue-grant",
-					grantId,
-					scope,
-					account: require_providers.AccAddress(account.address),
-					slot,
-					scopeSalt,
-					scopeDigest
-				},
-				nextStoredGrants: (stored) => withStoredGrant(stored, grantId, {
-					slot,
-					scopeSalt,
-					granteeScheme: scope.grantee.scheme,
-					granteePublicKey: scope.grantee.publicKey,
-					origin: rpId,
-					object,
-					...readPublicKey === void 0 ? {} : { view: { readPublicKey } }
-				}),
-				writeBeforeCall: true,
-				isSettled: (settled) => isActive(settled, grantId),
-				...view && readPublicKey !== void 0 ? {
-					rotation: view,
-					reseal: { except: grantId }
-				} : {},
-				issued: {
-					bookkeeping: {
-						grantId,
-						slot,
-						scopeSalt,
-						granteeScheme: scope.grantee.scheme,
-						granteePublicKey: scope.grantee.publicKey,
-						object,
-						...readPublicKey === void 0 ? {} : { readPublicKey }
-					},
-					...readPublicKey === void 0 ? {} : { readPublicKey }
-				}
-			},
-			input,
-			ledger,
-			roster,
-			context
-		})
-	};
-};
-/**
-* The stored grants with the seal of one grant dropped, its read key
-* kept: a revoked read grant's seal holds a secret the rotation that
-* follows retires.
-*/
-const withoutSeal = (stored, grantId) => {
-	const view = stored?.[grantId]?.view;
-	return stored && view ? withStoredGrantView(stored, grantId, { readPublicKey: view.readPublicKey }) : stored;
-};
-/**
-* Revokes one grant by its id. A grant the chain does not hold is refused
-* with GrantNotFoundError before any prompt, and one it lists inactive
-* with GrantRevokedError; the same errors type the contract's own aborts
-* should the grant vanish or be revoked elsewhere in between. The local
-* device authorises `revoke_grant_with_jubjub`. The grant stays in the
-* roster as an inactive tombstone, so its stored slot and salt are kept,
-* and the roster is read back from chain once the grant shows inactive.
-*
-* Revoking a read grant also rotates the encryption key, in the same
-* session ahead of the revocation: a fresh random secret is sealed to
-* every device and the live holdings are re-encrypted towards it, so the
-* revoked grantee keeps what it already read and nothing newer, and
-* right after the rotation lands the new secret is sealed again to every
-* other read grant this client holds the read key of, ahead of the
-* revocation. A read grant is refused with ReadUnavailableError before
-* any prompt when the encryption key held here cannot re-encrypt and
-* seal.
-*/
-const revokeGrant = async ({ grantId, ...input }, context) => {
-	const { account } = input;
-	const ledger = await require_account_call.readAccountLedger(account.address, context.seams.passportNetwork);
-	const roster = readGrants(ledger.ledgerState);
-	const listed = roster.find((record) => record.id === grantId);
-	if (!listed) throw new require_errors.GrantNotFoundError(`The account at ${account.address} holds no grant ${grantId}.`);
-	if (!listed.active) throw new require_errors.GrantRevokedError(`The grant ${grantId} of the account at ${account.address} is already revoked.`);
-	const rotation = listed.scope.read ? viewCapability(context.seams.passportEncryptionKey) : void 0;
-	return runGrantCall({
-		config: {
-			call: require_grants.prepareRevokeGrant(grantId),
-			flow: {
-				kind: "revoke-grant",
-				grantId,
-				account: require_providers.AccAddress(account.address),
-				...rotation ? { read: true } : {}
-			},
-			nextStoredGrants: (stored) => rotation ? withoutSeal(stored, grantId) : stored,
-			writeBeforeCall: false,
-			isSettled: (settled) => !isActive(settled, grantId),
-			...rotation ? {
-				rotation,
-				reseal: { except: grantId }
-			} : {}
-		},
-		input,
-		ledger,
-		roster,
-		context
-	});
-};
-/**
-* Revokes every grant the account has issued: the local device
-* authorises `revoke_all_grants_with_jubjub`, which clears the grants
-* map and advances the grant generation. The record's grant bookkeeping
-* is dropped with the map, and the roster is read back from chain once
-* it lists nothing, tombstones included. While any read grant is live,
-* the encryption key is rotated in the same session ahead of the call
-* and the live holdings are re-encrypted, so no revoked grantee reads
-* on; with every grant gone there is nobody to re-seal to. The rotation
-* is refused with ReadUnavailableError before any prompt when the
-* encryption key held here cannot re-encrypt.
-*/
-const revokeAllGrants = async (input, context) => {
-	const { account } = input;
-	const ledger = await require_account_call.readAccountLedger(account.address, context.seams.passportNetwork);
-	const roster = readGrants(ledger.ledgerState);
-	const rotation = roster.some((record) => record.active && record.scope.read) ? viewCapability(context.seams.passportEncryptionKey) : void 0;
-	return runGrantCall({
-		config: {
-			call: require_grants.prepareRevokeAllGrants(),
-			flow: {
-				kind: "revoke-all-grants",
-				account: require_providers.AccAddress(account.address),
-				...rotation ? { read: true } : {}
-			},
-			nextStoredGrants: () => void 0,
-			writeBeforeCall: false,
-			isSettled: (settled) => settled.length === 0,
-			...rotation ? { rotation } : {}
-		},
-		input,
-		ledger,
-		roster,
-		context
-	});
-};
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/flows/holdings.ts
-/**
-* Reads the account's shielded holdings from public chain data: the
-* contract's inbox is walked with the account secrets this device's own
-* envelopes deliver, the one deriving the ledger's `enc_key` first and
-* the older ones after it, so a coin a racing sender or an interrupted
-* rotation left under an earlier key is still found, and each coin that
-* opens is kept only once its commitment is found among the outputs the
-* chain created for the account, with the tree index it took. The
-* envelopes are opened inside one key session, so the walk costs one
-* ceremony however many entries the inbox holds, and none at all when
-* it holds no coin to open; only the opened coin descriptions reach this
-* flow, never a secret. Nothing is written: no record, no chain call.
-*
-* A record whose address holds no live contract rejects with
-* AccountContractMissingError, and an inbox holding no envelope of this
-* device that opens the ledger's `enc_key` with EncryptionKeyMismatchError
-* rather than an inbox read as empty. An entry that fails to open or
-* describes a coin the chain never created is skipped and counted, never
-* an error; the account keys and grant bookkeeping the inbox also holds
-* are not coins and are not counted.
-*
-* Reports no intermediate stage: the ceremony and the indexer reads all
-* settle before there is anything to report.
-*/
-const readShieldedHoldings = async ({ account }, { seams }) => {
-	const { passportAuthoriser, passportEncryptionKey, passportNetwork } = seams;
-	const indexer = require_account_call.createIndexerClient({
-		indexerUrl: passportNetwork.indexerUrl,
-		indexerWsUrl: passportNetwork.indexerWsUrl
-	});
-	const ledgerState = await require_account_call.queryAccountLedger(indexer, account.address);
-	const { holdings, skippedEntries } = await walkInbox({
-		address: account.address,
-		ledgerState,
-		indexer,
-		openEntries: async (entries) => inKeySession(passportAuthoriser, { kind: "read-holdings" }, async () => {
-			const { keyring } = readAccountInbox(account.address, ledgerState, await passportEncryptionKey.readerPublicKey(passportNetwork.networkId));
-			return (await passportEncryptionKey.openInbox(passportNetwork.networkId, keyring, entries)).map((entry) => entry?.kind === "coin" ? entry.coin : null);
-		})
-	});
-	return {
-		holdings,
-		skippedEntries
-	};
-};
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/flows/sign-in.ts
-/**
-* The account's whole device roster, read from the on-chain device set.
-* Entries are opaque rolling commitments, so a remote entry carries no
-* identity beyond its commitment: only the local device can be named, by
-* the commitment its own rescan resolved.
-*/
-const toDeviceRoster = (entries, localCommitmentHex) => Array.from(entries, (entry) => {
-	const commitmentHex = require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(entry);
-	return {
-		commitmentHex,
-		isLocal: commitmentHex === localCommitmentHex
-	};
-});
-/**
-* Refuses a record whose creation is still unfinished on chain. A record
-* that carries a pending deployment names a contract that may still miss
-* verifier keys, its initial device or the entries that deliver the
-* account keys, which only the create flow can complete; but a creation
-* that appended its key entries and then died before its final record
-* write left a usable account behind, and the chain's boot flag and inbox
-* tell the two apart.
-*/
-const assertCreationComplete = (record, isActivated, entries) => {
-	const { deployment } = record;
-	if (deployment === void 0) return;
-	const held = new Set(entries.map((entry) => require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(entry)));
-	if (!isActivated || deployment.keyEntries.some((entry) => !held.has(entry))) throw new require_errors.AccountCreationPendingError(`The account at ${record.address} is deployed but not yet ready; resume the creation on this device, from the site that started it.`);
-};
-/** The grant record parts the Lace records of an inbox opened to. */
-const grantPartsOf = (opened) => opened.flatMap((entry) => entry?.kind === "grant" ? [entry.record] : []);
-/**
-* Recognises an existing Passport account on this device: the passkey
-* ceremony (implicit in the first authoriser use) proves the device key,
-* the persisted account record names the Account Custody Contract, the
-* indexer confirms the contract is live, this device's own envelopes in
-* the contract's inbox open a secret deriving the `enc_key` the contract
-* advertises, and the use-counter rescan restores this device's roster
-* position from the on-chain device set. The account secret is never
-* read from the record or derived from the passkey: it is random, and
-* this device reaches it only through an envelope sealed to its reader
-* key, so a device enrolled with its own passkey signs in without the
-* record of the device that created the account. The roster is rebuilt
-* from every entry in the device set, so a device enrolled elsewhere
-* survives a reload; only the local entry is named, the rest are opaque
-* commitments. The grant roster is read from the contract's grants map
-* the same way, with the slots and openings the record kept for the
-* grants this client issued; a grant the record lacks, as after the
-* record was lost, is rebuilt from the grant records this device keeps in
-* the inbox once they open its on-chain commitments under this host's
-* relying party id, its seal kept only while it holds the live secret.
-* A grant the record holds is kept only while its fields open the
-* commitments the chain holds under its id, so an entry an issue wrote
-* before a call that never landed gives way to the grant another client
-* of the account issued over the same id, and a rebuilt grant takes its
-* place when there is one. The live read grants whose kept seal does not
-* hold the live secret, as after an issue that failed before its seal,
-* are reported as unsealed.
-* The devices registered under the live roster key are kept in the
-* record as the roster the next rotation seals to. The whole chain runs
-* inside one key session, so it costs a single ceremony rather than one
-* per authoriser call.
-*
-* The healed counter is written back to the persisted record before this
-* resolves, so the next sign-in rescans from a fresh anchor instead of the
-* creation-time one. That write also completes a record a creation left
-* pending after its key entries landed, dropping the deployment and the
-* authority key it carries, and drops the bookkeeping of grants the chain
-* no longer holds or whose commitments it does not open. A missing record
-* raises AccountNotFoundError, a record whose address holds no live
-* contract raises AccountContractMissingError,
-* a record whose creation is unfinished on chain raises
-* AccountCreationPendingError, and an inbox holding no envelope of this
-* device that opens the live `enc_key`, as for a device never handed the
-* keys or removed since, raises EncryptionKeyMismatchError before the
-* rescan runs; rediscovering an account by name service when no record is
-* persisted is a separate flow and out of scope here.
-*
-* signIn reports no intermediate stage: the ceremony, the indexer read and
-* the rescan all settle before there is anything to report.
-*/
-const signIn = async ({ seams, accountRecords, rpId }) => {
-	const { passportAuthoriser, passportEncryptionKey, passportNetwork } = seams;
-	return inKeySession(passportAuthoriser, { kind: "sign-in" }, async () => {
-		const local = await readLocalDevice(seams);
-		const record = await accountRecords.read();
-		if (!record) throw new require_errors.AccountNotFoundError("No Passport account record is stored on this device.");
-		const state = await require_account_call.createIndexerClient({
-			indexerUrl: passportNetwork.indexerUrl,
-			indexerWsUrl: passportNetwork.indexerWsUrl
-		}).queryContractState(record.address);
-		if (!state) throw new require_errors.AccountContractMissingError(`No live Account Custody Contract found at ${record.address}.`);
-		const ledgerState = require_acc_module.ledger(state.data);
-		const { entries, keyring } = readAccountInbox(record.address, ledgerState, local.readerPublicKey);
-		assertCreationComplete(record, ledgerState.booted, entries);
-		if (keyring.envelopes.length === 0) throw new require_errors.EncryptionKeyMismatchError(`The inbox of the account at ${record.address} holds no envelope for this device.`);
-		const grantParts = grantPartsOf(await passportEncryptionKey.openInbox(passportNetwork.networkId, keyring, entries.filter(require_envelopes.isLaceRecord)));
-		const { useCounter, commitmentHex } = await require_gated_call.resolveUseCounter({
-			ledgerState,
-			authoriser: passportAuthoriser,
-			address: require_providers.AccAddress(record.address),
-			knownUseCounter: require_gated_call.UseCounter(BigInt(record.localUseCounter))
-		});
-		const devices = toDeviceRoster(ledgerState.devices, commitmentHex);
-		const encKey = require_bytes_vo.HexBytes.fromByteArray(ledgerState.enc_key);
-		const onChain = readGrants(ledgerState);
-		const stored = withRebuiltGrants(await retainStoredGrants(record.grants, onChain, record.address), rpId === void 0 ? void 0 : await rebuildStoredGrants(grantParts, onChain, {
-			address: record.address,
-			origin: rpId,
-			encKey
-		}), encKey);
-		const grants = readGrants(ledgerState, storedGrantSlots(stored), storedGrantOpenings(stored));
-		const localUseCounter = useCounter.toString();
-		await accountRecords.write(completedRecord(record, localUseCounter, { grants: stored }));
-		return {
-			account: {
-				address: record.address,
-				bindingVersion: record.bindingVersion,
-				status: "ready",
-				networkId: passportNetwork.networkId
-			},
-			devices,
-			localUseCounter,
-			grants,
-			encKey,
-			unsealedGrantIds: unsealedStoredReadGrants(stored, onChain, encKey)
-		};
-	});
-};
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/store/dependencies.ts
-/**
-* Runs a flow as a cold stream of its events. `run` is invoked once per
-* subscription with a progress sink that emits synchronously as the flow
-* reports; the resolution emits 'done' and completes, and a rejection
-* errors the stream. Unsubscribing only stops delivery: the running
-* promise is not cancelled, because a flow must run to completion once
-* started (abandoning it mid-deploy could orphan a sponsored contract).
-*/
-const observeFlow = (run) => new rxjs.Observable((subscriber) => {
-	let isDelivering = true;
-	run((stage) => {
-		if (isDelivering) subscriber.next({
-			type: "progress",
-			stage
-		});
-	}).then((result) => {
-		if (!isDelivering) return;
-		subscriber.next({
-			type: "done",
-			result
-		});
-		subscriber.complete();
-	}, (error) => {
-		if (isDelivering) subscriber.error(error);
-	});
-	return () => {
-		isDelivering = false;
-	};
-});
-/**
-* The context a flow runs under, drawn from the side-effect dependency
-* bag: the five seams, the record store and the relying party id. An
-* injected store is used as is; otherwise the store is built over the
-* platform storage and keyed by the authoriser, so a record sealed by one
-* authoriser is only ever written through it. The sealed-record options
-* apply to that built store; signIn and the grant flows pass
-* `onSealedWithoutKey: 'error'` so a sealed record found without a
-* storage key surfaces as record-unreadable rather than as an absent
-* account.
-*/
-const toFlowContext = ({ createKeyValueStorage, passportAuthoriser, passportEncryptionKey, passportNetwork, passportProver, passportSponsor }, onProgress, { store, rpId, ...recordOptions }) => ({
-	seams: {
-		passportAuthoriser,
-		passportEncryptionKey,
-		passportNetwork,
-		passportProver,
-		passportSponsor
-	},
-	accountRecords: toAccountRecords(store ?? createAccountRecordStore(createKeyValueStorage, passportAuthoriser.storageKey, recordOptions)),
-	onProgress,
-	rpId
-});
-/**
-* Maps the platform capabilities passed to `createPassportAccountModule`
-* onto the `passport-dependency` contract, and exposes the platform-neutral
-* flows observable-based. The flows are promise functions; wrapping them
-* here rather than in the side effects is what keeps promise handling out
-* of the side effects, so they compose the flows as plain streams and stay
-* testable on a virtual scheduler. The relying party id defaults to the
-* page's hostname, as the passkey ceremony's does.
-*/
-const createDependencies = ({ authoriser, encryptionKey, sponsor, prover, network, accountRecordStore, rpId = globalThis.location?.hostname }) => {
-	const host = {
-		store: accountRecordStore,
-		rpId
-	};
-	const recordRequired = {
-		...host,
-		onSealedWithoutKey: "error"
-	};
-	return {
-		passportAuthoriser: authoriser,
-		passportEncryptionKey: encryptionKey,
-		passportSponsor: sponsor,
-		passportProver: prover,
-		passportNetwork: network,
-		passportFlows: {
-			createAccount: (input, dependencies) => observeFlow(async (onProgress) => createAccount(input, toFlowContext(dependencies, onProgress, host))),
-			signIn: (dependencies) => observeFlow(async (onProgress) => signIn(toFlowContext(dependencies, onProgress, recordRequired))),
-			addDevice: (input, dependencies) => observeFlow(async (onProgress) => addDevice(input, toFlowContext(dependencies, onProgress, host))),
-			removeDevice: (input, dependencies) => observeFlow(async (onProgress) => removeDevice(input, toFlowContext(dependencies, onProgress, host))),
-			issueGrant: (input, dependencies) => observeFlow(async (onProgress) => issueGrant(input, toFlowContext(dependencies, onProgress, recordRequired))),
-			revokeGrant: (input, dependencies) => observeFlow(async (onProgress) => revokeGrant(input, toFlowContext(dependencies, onProgress, recordRequired))),
-			revokeAllGrants: (input, dependencies) => observeFlow(async (onProgress) => revokeAllGrants(input, toFlowContext(dependencies, onProgress, recordRequired))),
-			readShieldedHoldings: (input, dependencies) => observeFlow(async (onProgress) => readShieldedHoldings(input, toFlowContext(dependencies, onProgress, host)))
-		}
-	};
-};
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/store/side-effects/flow-actions.ts
-/**
-* The flow error a failure reports: the error's own typed code when it
-* carries one, otherwise the flow's fallback code.
-*/
-const toFlowError = (error, fallbackCode) => ({
-	code: error instanceof Object && "code" in error && typeof error.code === "string" ? error.code : fallbackCode,
-	message: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
-});
-/**
-* Maps a flow's events onto the passport flow state: each stage to
-* setFlow, the result to its publishing actions followed by
-* setFlow('ready'), and a failure to its `onFailed` actions followed by
-* a single setFlowError, so a flow always settles in 'ready' or 'error'.
-*/
-const flowActions = (events$, { actions, fallbackCode, onDone, onFailed = [] }) => events$.pipe((0, rxjs.mergeMap)((event) => event.type === "progress" ? [actions.passport.setFlow(event.stage)] : [...onDone(event.result), actions.passport.setFlow("ready")]), (0, rxjs.catchError)((error) => (0, rxjs.of)(...onFailed, actions.passport.setFlowError(toFlowError(error, fallbackCode)))));
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/store/side-effects/passport-flows.ts
-/** Flow error code for creation failures that carry no typed code of their own. */
-const CREATE_ACCOUNT_FALLBACK_ERROR_CODE = "account-create-failed";
-/** Flow error code for sign-in failures that carry no typed code of their own. */
-const SIGN_IN_FALLBACK_ERROR_CODE = "account-sign-in-failed";
-/** Flow error codes for device call failures that carry no typed code of their own. */
-const ADD_DEVICE_FALLBACK_ERROR_CODE = "device-add-failed";
-const REMOVE_DEVICE_FALLBACK_ERROR_CODE = "device-remove-failed";
-/** Flow error codes for grant call failures that carry no typed code of their own. */
-const ISSUE_GRANT_FALLBACK_ERROR_CODE = "grant-issue-failed";
-const REVOKE_GRANT_FALLBACK_ERROR_CODE = "grant-revoke-failed";
-const REVOKE_ALL_GRANTS_FALLBACK_ERROR_CODE = "grant-revoke-all-failed";
-/** Flow error code for holdings reads that carry no typed code of their own. */
-const READ_HOLDINGS_FALLBACK_ERROR_CODE = "holdings-read-failed";
-/**
-* Flows an account call may start from. 'error' is a settled state, not
-* an operation in progress, so a call that failed can be retried without
-* a fresh sign-in ceremony; every other non-ready flow is an operation
-* left unfinished, whose account and use counter cannot be trusted yet.
-*/
-const SETTLED_FLOWS = ["error", "ready"];
-/**
-* The actions that publish a roster a flow left behind: the devices, then
-* the counter the local row sits at. Both land ahead of 'ready', in the
-* order the flows have always published them.
-*/
-const publishDeviceRoster = (actions) => ({ devices, localUseCounter }) => [actions.passport.setDevices(devices), actions.passport.setLocalUseCounter(localUseCounter)];
-/**
-* The actions that publish what a grant call left behind: the device
-* roster and counter it advanced, the `enc_key` a rotation it ran stepped
-* the encryption key to and the devices it left without the new key, the
-* grant roster, then the read grants the
-* call could not seal the viewing secret to, empty when it sealed all,
-* and those the signer refused because their revocation is pending.
-*/
-const publishGrantRoster = (actions) => ({ grants, encKey, unsealedGrantIds, revocationPendingGrantIds, droppedDevices, ...roster }) => [
-	...publishDeviceRoster(actions)(roster),
-	...encKey === void 0 ? [] : [actions.passport.setEncKey(encKey)],
-	...droppedDevices === void 0 ? [] : [actions.passport.setDroppedDevices(droppedDevices)],
-	actions.passport.setGrants(grants),
-	actions.passport.setUnsealedGrantIds(unsealedGrantIds),
-	actions.passport.setRevocationPendingGrantIds(revocationPendingGrantIds)
-];
-/**
-* The actions that publish an issued grant: the rosters, then the id of
-* the grant, last so a consumer reacting to it finds the record in state.
-*/
-const publishIssuedGrant = (actions) => ({ grantId, ...roster }) => [...publishGrantRoster(actions)(roster), actions.passport.setLastIssuedGrantId(grantId)];
-/**
-* The actions that publish an account a flow left ready: the account,
-* its device roster and counter, the `enc_key` its encryption key is
-* at, then its grant roster.
-*/
-const publishAccountState = (actions) => ({ account, grants, encKey, ...roster }) => [
-	actions.passport.setAccount(account),
-	...publishDeviceRoster(actions)(roster),
-	actions.passport.setEncKey(encKey),
-	actions.passport.setGrants(grants)
-];
-/**
-* The actions that publish an account a sign-in recognised: the account
-* state, see {@link publishAccountState}, then the read grants whose kept
-* seal does not hold the live viewing secret, and no grants pending a
-* revocation, which only a grant call learns from the signer.
-*/
-const publishRecognisedAccount = (actions) => ({ unsealedGrantIds, ...state }) => [
-	...publishAccountState(actions)(state),
-	actions.passport.setUnsealedGrantIds(unsealedGrantIds),
-	actions.passport.setRevocationPendingGrantIds([])
-];
-/**
-* A device or grant call may rotate the account keys before it fails, so
-* the `enc_key` state holds may be the one rotated away: it is forgotten
-* until the next sign-in or rotation publishes it again, rather than let
-* a stale seal pass as current. The read grants an earlier call reported
-* unsealed or pending revocation were judged against that key, so they
-* are emptied with it.
-*/
-const forgetKeyState = (actions) => [
-	actions.passport.clearEncKey(),
-	actions.passport.setUnsealedGrantIds([]),
-	actions.passport.setRevocationPendingGrantIds([])
-];
-/**
-* The createAccount flow behind the createAccount action, as the actions it
-* publishes: each reported stage as setFlow, then the created account, its
-* one-device roster, this device's counter and its empty grant roster,
-* then 'ready'. The flow itself persists the account record before it
-* resolves, so the account is never published ahead of the record that
-* recognises it.
-*/
-const runCreateAccount = (input, dependencies) => {
-	const { actions, passportFlows } = dependencies;
-	return flowActions(passportFlows.createAccount(input, dependencies), {
-		actions,
-		fallbackCode: CREATE_ACCOUNT_FALLBACK_ERROR_CODE,
-		onDone: publishAccountState(actions)
-	});
-};
-/**
-* The signIn flow behind the signIn action, as the actions it publishes:
-* the recognised account, its whole device roster, this device's healed
-* use counter, the grant roster and its unsealed read grants, then
-* 'ready'. The flow itself persists the healed counter before it
-* resolves, so the record is never left behind the state it publishes.
-*/
-const runSignIn = (dependencies) => {
-	const { actions, passportFlows } = dependencies;
-	return flowActions(passportFlows.signIn(dependencies), {
-		actions,
-		fallbackCode: SIGN_IN_FALLBACK_ERROR_CODE,
-		onDone: publishRecognisedAccount(actions)
-	});
-};
-/**
-* The actions that publish what a device call left behind: its roster and
-* counter, then, when it rotated the account keys, the `enc_key` it
-* stepped to and the devices it left without the new key.
-*/
-const publishDeviceCall = (actions) => ({ encKey, droppedDevices, ...roster }) => [
-	...publishDeviceRoster(actions)(roster),
-	...encKey === void 0 ? [] : [actions.passport.setEncKey(encKey)],
-	...droppedDevices === void 0 ? [] : [actions.passport.setDroppedDevices(droppedDevices)]
-];
-/**
-* The addDevice flow behind its action: what the call left behind, see
-* {@link publishDeviceCall}, then 'ready'. The joining device's keys
-* travel with the request when the action names them.
-*/
-const addDeviceCall = {
-	start: ({ commitmentHex, reader }, input, dependencies) => dependencies.passportFlows.addDevice({
-		commitmentHex,
-		...reader ? { reader } : {},
-		...input
-	}, dependencies),
-	onDone: publishDeviceCall,
-	fallbackCode: ADD_DEVICE_FALLBACK_ERROR_CODE,
-	onFailed: forgetKeyState
-};
-/**
-* The removeDevice flow behind its action: what the call left behind, see
-* {@link publishDeviceCall}, then 'ready'.
-*/
-const removeDeviceCall = {
-	start: ({ commitmentHex }, input, dependencies) => dependencies.passportFlows.removeDevice({
-		commitmentHex,
-		...input
-	}, dependencies),
-	onDone: publishDeviceCall,
-	fallbackCode: REMOVE_DEVICE_FALLBACK_ERROR_CODE,
-	onFailed: forgetKeyState
-};
-/**
-* The issueGrant flow behind its action: the rosters the call left
-* behind and the issued grant's id, then 'ready'.
-*/
-const issueGrantCall = {
-	start: (scope, input, dependencies) => dependencies.passportFlows.issueGrant({
-		scope,
-		...input
-	}, dependencies),
-	onDone: publishIssuedGrant,
-	fallbackCode: ISSUE_GRANT_FALLBACK_ERROR_CODE,
-	onFailed: forgetKeyState
-};
-/** The revokeGrant flow behind its action: the rosters it left behind, then 'ready'. */
-const revokeGrantCall = {
-	start: ({ grantId }, input, dependencies) => dependencies.passportFlows.revokeGrant({
-		grantId,
-		...input
-	}, dependencies),
-	onDone: publishGrantRoster,
-	fallbackCode: REVOKE_GRANT_FALLBACK_ERROR_CODE,
-	onFailed: forgetKeyState
-};
-/** The revokeAllGrants flow behind its action: the rosters it left behind, then 'ready'. */
-const revokeAllGrantsCall = {
-	start: (_payload, input, dependencies) => dependencies.passportFlows.revokeAllGrants(input, dependencies),
-	onDone: publishGrantRoster,
-	fallbackCode: REVOKE_ALL_GRANTS_FALLBACK_ERROR_CODE,
-	onFailed: forgetKeyState
-};
-/**
-* The readShieldedHoldings flow behind its action: the holdings the walk
-* verified, then 'ready'. The skip count is the flow's to report, not the
-* store's to keep: a skipped entry is noise the inbox will carry forever.
-*/
-const readShieldedHoldingsCall = {
-	start: (_payload, input, dependencies) => dependencies.passportFlows.readShieldedHoldings(input, dependencies),
-	onDone: (actions) => ({ holdings }) => [actions.passport.setShieldedHoldings(holdings)],
-	fallbackCode: READ_HOLDINGS_FALLBACK_ERROR_CODE
-};
-/**
-* An account call behind its action, as the actions it publishes: what
-* the call left behind, then 'ready', or, when it fails, the actions
-* undoing what state may wrongly claim, then the error. The flow itself
-* persists the counter before it resolves.
-*
-* Requires an account and a settled flow: with no account in state, or
-* with an operation left unfinished, the flow is never called (so the
-* chain and the key session are never touched) and the call settles in
-* 'error' with 'no-account'. The refusal still runs behind the gate, so
-* it enters 'ceremony' first like any accepted request and clears the
-* error a previous flow left behind.
-*/
-const runAccountCall = ({ start, onDone, fallbackCode, onFailed }, { payload, flow, account, devices, localUseCounter }, dependencies) => {
-	const { actions } = dependencies;
-	if (!account || !SETTLED_FLOWS.includes(flow)) return (0, rxjs.of)(actions.passport.setFlowError(toFlowError(new require_errors.NoAccountError(), fallbackCode)));
-	return flowActions(start(payload, {
-		account,
-		devices,
-		localUseCounter
-	}, dependencies), {
-		actions,
-		fallbackCode,
-		onDone: onDone(actions),
-		...onFailed ? { onFailed: onFailed(actions) } : {}
-	});
-};
-/**
-* One start per dispatched account call action, each carrying the state
-* the call needs. State is sampled when the action arrives rather than
-* when the shared gate starts the call, so a call reads the account,
-* roster and counter the user acted on.
-*/
-const accountCallStarts = ({ config, trigger$, stateObservables: { passport: { selectAccount$, selectDevices$, selectFlow$, selectLocalUseCounter$ } }, dependencies }) => trigger$.pipe((0, rxjs.withLatestFrom)(selectFlow$, selectAccount$, selectDevices$, selectLocalUseCounter$), (0, rxjs.map)(([{ payload }, flow, account, devices, localUseCounter]) => () => runAccountCall(config, {
-	payload,
-	flow,
-	account,
-	devices,
-	localUseCounter
-}, dependencies)));
-/**
-* Runs whichever passport flow was requested: {@link runCreateAccount}
-* behind the createAccount action, {@link runSignIn} behind signIn, and
-* {@link runAccountCall} behind addDevice, removeDevice, issueGrant,
-* revokeGrant, revokeAllGrants and readShieldedHoldings.
-*
-* Every flow owns the same account record, the same device key and the
-* same flow state, and each chain call resolves the account's use counter
-* and auth nonce, so they must never overlap: two calls resolving the same
-* counter both spend the same entry, one transaction is rejected, and the
-* loser reports its own failure over state the winner already moved on.
-* A holdings read spends no entry, but it opens the same key session and
-* reports through the same flow state, so it runs behind the same gate.
-* One exhaustMap over the merged starts, rather than one per action,
-* makes them mutually exclusive: a dispatch arriving while any flow is in
-* flight emits nothing at all, and the next one is only accepted once the
-* running flow settles. Dropping it silently is the stance exhaustMap
-* already took for a repeated dispatch of one action; a flow the user
-* never saw start is not a failure to report.
-*
-* Because only the gate knows which requests it accepted, it also owns
-* the entry into 'ceremony': the trigger reducers are pure, so a dropped
-* request cannot overwrite the running flow's state, and setFlow clears
-* the error a previous flow left behind. The emission is synchronous on
-* the accepted start, so a consumer sees the ceremony within the same
-* dispatch cycle as the trigger.
-*
-* The flow state cannot carry this guard the other way round: state
-* reaches a side effect before the action does, and an inner flow is
-* still subscribed while its own terminal setFlow('ready') is delivered,
-* so a reducer reading the flow back cannot tell a request the gate will
-* accept from one it will drop.
-*/
-const runPassportFlow = ({ passport: { addDevice$, createAccount$, issueGrant$, readShieldedHoldings$, removeDevice$, revokeAllGrants$, revokeGrant$, signIn$ } }, stateObservables, dependencies) => (0, rxjs.merge)(createAccount$.pipe((0, rxjs.map)(({ payload }) => () => runCreateAccount(payload, dependencies))), signIn$.pipe((0, rxjs.map)(() => () => runSignIn(dependencies))), accountCallStarts({
-	config: addDeviceCall,
-	trigger$: addDevice$,
-	stateObservables,
-	dependencies
-}), accountCallStarts({
-	config: removeDeviceCall,
-	trigger$: removeDevice$,
-	stateObservables,
-	dependencies
-}), accountCallStarts({
-	config: issueGrantCall,
-	trigger$: issueGrant$,
-	stateObservables,
-	dependencies
-}), accountCallStarts({
-	config: revokeGrantCall,
-	trigger$: revokeGrant$,
-	stateObservables,
-	dependencies
-}), accountCallStarts({
-	config: revokeAllGrantsCall,
-	trigger$: revokeAllGrants$,
-	stateObservables,
-	dependencies
-}), accountCallStarts({
-	config: readShieldedHoldingsCall,
-	trigger$: readShieldedHoldings$,
-	stateObservables,
-	dependencies
-})).pipe((0, rxjs.exhaustMap)((start) => (0, rxjs.concat)((0, rxjs.of)(dependencies.actions.passport.setFlow("ceremony")), start())));
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/store/side-effects/restore-account.ts
-/** Whether a stored record names an activated account rather than a deployment in progress. */
-const isActivatedRecord = (record) => record !== void 0 && record.deployment === void 0;
-/**
-* The grant roster of the restored account, read from chain with the
-* slots the record kept. The read needs no ceremony, but it does need
-* the indexer: a contract it does not serve, or a read it fails, leaves
-* the roster empty rather than failing the restore, and the next sign-in
-* or grant call reads it again.
-*/
-const restoreGrants = (record, { indexerUrl, indexerWsUrl }, actions) => (0, rxjs.defer)(async () => require_account_call.createIndexerClient({
-	indexerUrl,
-	indexerWsUrl
-}).queryContractState(record.address)).pipe((0, rxjs.filter)((state) => state !== null && state !== void 0), (0, rxjs.map)((state) => actions.passport.setGrants(readGrants(require_acc_module.ledger(state.data), storedGrantSlots(record.grants)))), (0, rxjs.catchError)(() => rxjs.EMPTY));
-/**
-* Rehydrates the persisted account record into the store on startup, so a
-* returning user's account is recognised without a new passkey ceremony.
-* Only a record whose activation succeeded is restored, hence status
-* 'ready'; a record still carrying a pending deployment names no usable
-* account and is left for the create flow to resume, or for sign-in to
-* complete once the chain shows it activated. The device set is not
-* persisted and is rebuilt from chain by the device-management flows; the
-* grant roster is read from chain here, once the account is published,
-* so a consumer lists grants without a ceremony. A record sealed by a
-* passkey authoriser cannot be opened without a ceremony, and a ceremony
-* cannot run without a user gesture, so no storage key is passed here: a
-* sealed record reads as absent and the sign-in flow recognises the
-* account instead.
-*/
-const restorePassportAccount = (_actionObservables, _stateObservables, { actions, createKeyValueStorage, passportNetwork }) => createAccountRecordStore(createKeyValueStorage).read().pipe((0, rxjs.filter)(isActivatedRecord), (0, rxjs.mergeMap)((record) => (0, rxjs.concat)((0, rxjs.of)(actions.passport.setAccount({
-	address: record.address,
-	bindingVersion: record.bindingVersion,
-	status: "ready",
-	networkId: passportNetwork.networkId
-}), actions.passport.setLocalUseCounter(record.localUseCounter)), restoreGrants(record, passportNetwork, actions))));
-//#endregion
-//#region ../../packages/module/passport-account/src/store/init.ts
-/**
-* Builds the passport-account module's store initializer for the given
-* platform capabilities: the mutually exclusive passport flows behind the
-* createAccount, signIn, addDevice, removeDevice, issueGrant, revokeGrant
-* and revokeAllGrants actions, and the restore of a previously created
-* account from its persisted record.
-*/
-const createInit = (props) => () => ({
-	sideEffects: [runPassportFlow, restorePassportAccount],
-	sideEffectDependencies: createDependencies(props)
-});
-//#endregion
-exports.createInit = createInit;