@kya-os/mcp 1.6.1 → 1.9.0

package/dist/card/schema.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+import { z } from 'zod';
+/**
+ * Zod schema for the KYA-OS Entity Card — the runtime source of truth, mirroring
+ * `schemas/kya-os-card.schema.json` (the published JSON Schema). Types are derived
+ * via `z.infer`, matching the package convention (see `src/authz/requirement.ts`).
+ */
+/** A `did:key` or `did:web` DID — the single source of truth for the DID shape (imported, never re-declared). */
+export declare const Did: z.ZodString;
+export declare const EntityTypeSchema: z.ZodEnum<{
+    mcp: "mcp";
+    agent: "agent";
+    client: "client";
+    verifier: "verifier";
+    human: "human";
+}>;
+export declare const ConformanceLevelSchema: z.ZodEnum<{
+    L1: "L1";
+    L2: "L2";
+    L3: "L3";
+}>;
+export declare const Ed25519PublicJwkSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    kty: z.ZodLiteral<"OKP">;
+    crv: z.ZodLiteral<"Ed25519">;
+    x: z.ZodString;
+    kid: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    use: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+}, z.core.$strict>;
+/** A P-256 public JWK — the ES256 (ECDSA, FIPS-eligible) proof-signing key. */
+export declare const P256PublicJwkSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    kty: z.ZodLiteral<"EC">;
+    crv: z.ZodLiteral<"P-256">;
+    x: z.ZodString;
+    y: z.ZodString;
+    kid: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    use: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+}, z.core.$strict>;
+/** A proof-signing public JWK: Ed25519 (EdDSA) or P-256 (ES256) — the two profile algorithms. */
+export declare const ProofPublicJwkSchema: z.ZodUnion<readonly [z.ZodObject<{
+    kty: z.ZodLiteral<"OKP">;
+    crv: z.ZodLiteral<"Ed25519">;
+    x: z.ZodString;
+    kid: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    use: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+}, z.core.$strict>, z.ZodObject<{
+    kty: z.ZodLiteral<"EC">;
+    crv: z.ZodLiteral<"P-256">;
+    x: z.ZodString;
+    y: z.ZodString;
+    kid: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    use: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+}, z.core.$strict>]>;
+/**
+ * Deliberately NON-strict: the JSON Schema marks `CapabilityAttestation` as
+ * `additionalProperties: true`, so extra keys alongside `vc` are permitted here.
+ */
+export declare const CapabilityAttestationSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    vc: z.ZodUnion<readonly [z.ZodString, z.ZodRecord<z.ZodString, z.ZodUnknown>]>;
+}, z.core.$strip>;
+export declare const Level2CapabilitySchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    name: z.ZodString;
+    attestations: z.ZodArray<z.ZodObject<{
+        vc: z.ZodUnion<readonly [z.ZodString, z.ZodRecord<z.ZodString, z.ZodUnknown>]>;
+    }, z.core.$strip>>;
+}, z.core.$strict>;
+/** L1 bare-string name, or an L2 object carrying attestations. */
+export declare const CapabilitySchema: z.ZodUnion<readonly [z.ZodString, z.ZodObject<{
+    name: z.ZodString;
+    attestations: z.ZodArray<z.ZodObject<{
+        vc: z.ZodUnion<readonly [z.ZodString, z.ZodRecord<z.ZodString, z.ZodUnknown>]>;
+    }, z.core.$strip>>;
+}, z.core.$strict>]>;
+export declare const AttestationSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    type: z.ZodEnum<{
+        IdentityVerification: "IdentityVerification";
+        CapabilityAttestation: "CapabilityAttestation";
+    }>;
+    vc: z.ZodUnion<readonly [z.ZodString, z.ZodRecord<z.ZodString, z.ZodUnknown>]>;
+    subject: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    issuer: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+}, z.core.$strict>;
+/** The canonical per-request proof profile id — the ONE source of truth every consumer
+ *  references (the proof's `prf` tag, its `_meta` key, and the card's `proofProfile` field). */
+export declare const PROOF_PROFILE_ID = "org.kya-os/proof@1";
+/**
+ * Self-declared per-request holder-of-key proof profile. A card carrying this advertises
+ * that its requests ride the stateless, sender-constrained `org.kya-os/proof@1` envelope
+ * (distinct from the legacy session-bound ProofMeta). The proof itself is NEVER on the
+ * static card — it rides per-request `_meta`; this field only names the profile.
+ */
+export declare const ProofProfileSchema: z.ZodLiteral<"org.kya-os/proof@1">;
+/**
+ * CIMD (draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document) binding — the L1 on-ramp
+ * coordinates. `clientId` is the `did:web` HTTPS form; `jwksUri` is the DID-keyed JWKS the
+ * AS validates `private_key_jwt` against (so OAuth client-auth IS a DID-key proof).
+ */
+export declare const CimdBindingSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    clientId: z.ZodString;
+    jwksUri: z.ZodString;
+}, z.core.$strict>;
+/**
+ * W3C Bitstring Status List v1.0 `credentialStatus` entry — the StatusList2021
+ * SUCCESSOR. `statusListIndex` is an integer expressed as a string (per the spec).
+ */
+export declare const BitstringStatusListEntrySchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    statusListCredential: z.ZodString;
+    statusListIndex: z.ZodString;
+}, z.core.$strict>;
+export declare const EntityCardSchema: z.ZodObject<{
+    id: z.ZodString;
+    entityType: z.ZodEnum<{
+        mcp: "mcp";
+        agent: "agent";
+        client: "client";
+        verifier: "verifier";
+        human: "human";
+    }>;
+    name: z.ZodString;
+    kid: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    publicKeyJwk: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodObject<{
+        kty: z.ZodLiteral<"OKP">;
+        crv: z.ZodLiteral<"Ed25519">;
+        x: z.ZodString;
+        kid: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+        use: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    }, z.core.$strict>>;
+    createdAt: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    capabilities: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodArray<z.ZodUnion<readonly [z.ZodString, z.ZodObject<{
+        name: z.ZodString;
+        attestations: z.ZodArray<z.ZodObject<{
+            vc: z.ZodUnion<readonly [z.ZodString, z.ZodRecord<z.ZodString, z.ZodUnknown>]>;
+        }, z.core.$strip>>;
+    }, z.core.$strict>]>>>;
+    conformanceLevel: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodEnum<{
+        L1: "L1";
+        L2: "L2";
+        L3: "L3";
+    }>>;
+    responsibleParty: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    principal: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    delegationRef: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    attestations: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodArray<z.ZodObject<{
+        type: z.ZodEnum<{
+            IdentityVerification: "IdentityVerification";
+            CapabilityAttestation: "CapabilityAttestation";
+        }>;
+        vc: z.ZodUnion<readonly [z.ZodString, z.ZodRecord<z.ZodString, z.ZodUnknown>]>;
+        subject: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+        issuer: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    }, z.core.$strict>>>;
+    didDocument: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    proofProfile: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodLiteral<"org.kya-os/proof@1">>;
+    cimd: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodObject<{
+        clientId: z.ZodString;
+        jwksUri: z.ZodString;
+    }, z.core.$strict>>;
+    revocation: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodObject<{
+        statusListCredential: z.ZodString;
+        statusListIndex: z.ZodString;
+    }, z.core.$strict>>;
+}, z.core.$strict>;
+export type EntityType = z.infer<typeof EntityTypeSchema>;
+export type ConformanceLevel = z.infer<typeof ConformanceLevelSchema>;
+export type Ed25519PublicJwk = z.infer<typeof Ed25519PublicJwkSchema>;
+export type P256PublicJwk = z.infer<typeof P256PublicJwkSchema>;
+/** The proof-signing key type — Ed25519 or P-256 (discriminated by `kty`/`crv`). */
+export type ProofPublicJwk = z.infer<typeof ProofPublicJwkSchema>;
+export type CapabilityAttestation = z.infer<typeof CapabilityAttestationSchema>;
+export type Level2Capability = z.infer<typeof Level2CapabilitySchema>;
+export type Capability = z.infer<typeof CapabilitySchema>;
+export type Attestation = z.infer<typeof AttestationSchema>;
+export type ProofProfile = z.infer<typeof ProofProfileSchema>;
+export type CimdBinding = z.infer<typeof CimdBindingSchema>;
+export type BitstringStatusListEntry = z.infer<typeof BitstringStatusListEntrySchema>;
+export type EntityCard = z.infer<typeof EntityCardSchema>;
+/** Flatten capabilities (bare strings or attested objects) to their names. */
+export declare function capabilityNames(caps: Capability[]): string[];
+//# sourceMappingURL=schema.d.ts.map

package/dist/card/schema.d.ts.map

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package/dist/card/schema.js

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+import { z } from 'zod';
+/**
+ * Zod schema for the KYA-OS Entity Card — the runtime source of truth, mirroring
+ * `schemas/kya-os-card.schema.json` (the published JSON Schema). Types are derived
+ * via `z.infer`, matching the package convention (see `src/authz/requirement.ts`).
+ */
+/** A `did:key` or `did:web` DID — the single source of truth for the DID shape (imported, never re-declared). */
+export const Did = z.string().regex(/^did:(key|web):.+$/, 'must be a did:key or did:web DID');
+export const EntityTypeSchema = z.enum(['mcp', 'agent', 'client', 'verifier', 'human']);
+export const ConformanceLevelSchema = z.enum(['L1', 'L2', 'L3']);
+export const Ed25519PublicJwkSchema = z
+    .object({
+    kty: z.literal('OKP'),
+    crv: z.literal('Ed25519'),
+    x: z.string(),
+    kid: z.string().optional(),
+    use: z.string().optional(),
+})
+    .strict();
+/** A P-256 public JWK — the ES256 (ECDSA, FIPS-eligible) proof-signing key. */
+export const P256PublicJwkSchema = z
+    .object({
+    kty: z.literal('EC'),
+    crv: z.literal('P-256'),
+    x: z.string(),
+    y: z.string(),
+    kid: z.string().optional(),
+    use: z.string().optional(),
+})
+    .strict();
+/** A proof-signing public JWK: Ed25519 (EdDSA) or P-256 (ES256) — the two profile algorithms. */
+export const ProofPublicJwkSchema = z.union([Ed25519PublicJwkSchema, P256PublicJwkSchema]);
+/** A Verifiable Credential — a compact VC-JWT string or a pre-parsed object. */
+const VcValue = z.union([z.string(), z.record(z.string(), z.unknown())]);
+/**
+ * Deliberately NON-strict: the JSON Schema marks `CapabilityAttestation` as
+ * `additionalProperties: true`, so extra keys alongside `vc` are permitted here.
+ */
+export const CapabilityAttestationSchema = z.object({
+    vc: VcValue,
+});
+export const Level2CapabilitySchema = z
+    .object({
+    name: z.string().min(1),
+    attestations: z.array(CapabilityAttestationSchema).min(1),
+})
+    .strict();
+/** L1 bare-string name, or an L2 object carrying attestations. */
+export const CapabilitySchema = z.union([z.string().min(1), Level2CapabilitySchema]);
+export const AttestationSchema = z
+    .object({
+    type: z.enum(['IdentityVerification', 'CapabilityAttestation']),
+    vc: VcValue,
+    subject: Did.optional(),
+    issuer: Did.optional(),
+})
+    .strict();
+/** The canonical per-request proof profile id — the ONE source of truth every consumer
+ *  references (the proof's `prf` tag, its `_meta` key, and the card's `proofProfile` field). */
+export const PROOF_PROFILE_ID = 'org.kya-os/proof@1';
+/**
+ * Self-declared per-request holder-of-key proof profile. A card carrying this advertises
+ * that its requests ride the stateless, sender-constrained `org.kya-os/proof@1` envelope
+ * (distinct from the legacy session-bound ProofMeta). The proof itself is NEVER on the
+ * static card — it rides per-request `_meta`; this field only names the profile.
+ */
+export const ProofProfileSchema = z.literal(PROOF_PROFILE_ID);
+/**
+ * CIMD (draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document) binding — the L1 on-ramp
+ * coordinates. `clientId` is the `did:web` HTTPS form; `jwksUri` is the DID-keyed JWKS the
+ * AS validates `private_key_jwt` against (so OAuth client-auth IS a DID-key proof).
+ */
+export const CimdBindingSchema = z
+    .object({
+    clientId: z.string().min(1),
+    jwksUri: z.string().min(1),
+})
+    .strict();
+/**
+ * W3C Bitstring Status List v1.0 `credentialStatus` entry — the StatusList2021
+ * SUCCESSOR. `statusListIndex` is an integer expressed as a string (per the spec).
+ */
+export const BitstringStatusListEntrySchema = z
+    .object({
+    statusListCredential: z.string().min(1),
+    statusListIndex: z.string().regex(/^[0-9]+$/, 'statusListIndex must be a canonical non-negative decimal'),
+})
+    .strict();
+export const EntityCardSchema = z
+    .object({
+    id: Did,
+    entityType: EntityTypeSchema,
+    name: z.string().min(1),
+    kid: z.string().optional(),
+    publicKeyJwk: Ed25519PublicJwkSchema.optional(),
+    createdAt: z.string().optional(),
+    capabilities: z.array(CapabilitySchema).optional(),
+    /** DERIVED summary — never trusted on input (a verifier recomputes it). */
+    conformanceLevel: ConformanceLevelSchema.optional(),
+    responsibleParty: Did.optional(),
+    principal: Did.optional(),
+    delegationRef: z.string().optional(),
+    attestations: z.array(AttestationSchema).optional(),
+    didDocument: z.string().optional(),
+    /** Names the per-request holder-of-key proof profile this entity's requests carry. */
+    proofProfile: ProofProfileSchema.optional(),
+    /** L1 CIMD on-ramp coordinates (client_id ↔ did:web, jwks_uri ↔ DID keys). */
+    cimd: CimdBindingSchema.optional(),
+    /** W3C Bitstring Status List v1.0 revocation entry for this card's credential. */
+    revocation: BitstringStatusListEntrySchema.optional(),
+})
+    // Mirrors `additionalProperties: false` on the published JSON Schema: a conformant
+    // Card MUST NOT carry unknown top-level properties (SPEC §7). Reject, never strip.
+    .strict();
+/** Flatten capabilities (bare strings or attested objects) to their names. */
+export function capabilityNames(caps) {
+    return caps.map((c) => (typeof c === 'string' ? c : c.name));
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=schema.js.map

package/dist/card/schema.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/card/verify.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+/**
+ * KYA-OS Entity Card — VERIFY (the proof half).
+ *
+ * Verify a resolved card's claims via injected, level-AGNOSTIC crypto seams (the pattern
+ * `validateLevel2` uses for its `signatureVerifier`, keeping `@kya-os/mcp` free of any mcp-i-core
+ * runtime dep) and RECOMPUTE the conformance level — the self-declared `conformanceLevel` is NEVER
+ * trusted; the LEVEL is derived here, never baked into a function name. Four fail-closed seams the
+ * SPEC §9/§11 ladder needs:
+ *   - `capabilityVerifier`  — per-capability attestation check (L1 floor if omitted);
+ *   - `accountabilityVerifier` — delegation edge: `responsibleParty === issuer(rootVC)`, `leaf-invoker
+ *     === proof.did` (via `ctx.proofDid`), AND the chain `fresh` L3 gate (./delegation);
+ *   - `proofVerifier` + `proof`/`request` — the live per-request holder-of-key proof (./proof);
+ *   - `statusListChecker` — W3C Bitstring Status List v1.0 liveness (./revocation).
+ * Fail-closed everywhere: a missing/expired/revoked artifact DEMOTES the level (L3→L2→L1) and never
+ * errors open; an unreachable/stale status list OR stale delegation chain demotes L3→L2.
+ */
+import { type EntityCard, type EntityType, type ConformanceLevel, type Capability, type Attestation } from './schema.js';
+import type { RevocationChecker } from './revocation.js';
+import type { ProofAssurance, ProofVerifyResult } from './proof/index.js';
+import type { ToolRequest } from '../proof/generator.js';
+export declare const ENTITY_TYPES: readonly EntityType[];
+export declare const DEFAULT_TRUSTED_ISSUERS: readonly ["did:web:example.com"];
+export interface CapabilityCheckResult {
+    /** Capability names whose attestation verified (eligible for L2). */
+    verified: string[];
+    /** Capability names that were self-declared (bare string) or failed. */
+    unverified: string[];
+    /** True iff every attested capability's status was read from a LIVE list (§9.3 L3 gate). Omitted ⇒ unknown ⇒ no demotion. */
+    fresh?: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Verifies capability attestations. Deliberately NOT named for a level — the level is DERIVED
+ * downstream (see `deriveConformanceLevel`). A runtime supplies an implementation (e.g. an adapter
+ * over mcp-i-core's `validateLevel2`); `@kya-os/mcp` ships only the interface.
+ */
+export type CapabilityVerifier = (capabilities: Capability[], ctx: {
+    subjectDid: string;
+    trustedIssuers: readonly string[];
+}) => Promise<CapabilityCheckResult>;
+/** Verifies a single attestation VC (trusted issuer + signature + expiry). */
+export type AttestationVerifier = (attestation: Attestation, ctx: {
+    subjectDid: string;
+    trustedIssuers: readonly string[];
+}) => Promise<boolean>;
+/**
+ * The accountability seam's verdict. `fresh` is the freshness channel a bare boolean cannot express
+ * (SPEC §9.3/§12.6): a stale-but-non-revoked chain stays `verified:true` (keeps §10.6's cached L2)
+ * yet `fresh:false` demotes L3→L2; omitted `fresh` ⇒ freshness UNKNOWN so no demotion (back-compat).
+ */
+export interface AccountabilityResult {
+    /** True iff the delegation edge verified (`responsibleParty === issuer(rootVC)`, leaf-invoker join). */
+    verified: boolean;
+    /** True iff every leaf/chain delegation credential status was read from a LIVE list (drives L2→L3). */
+    fresh?: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Verifies the accountability edge: resolve `card.delegationRef` → the signed
+ * DelegationCredential chain and confirm `card.responsibleParty === issuerDid(rootVC)` AND —
+ * when a live proof accompanies the request — the leaf invoker `=== ctx.proofDid` (the
+ * delegation/accountability JOIN of ./delegation, recomputed, asserted nowhere). `proofDid` is
+ * OPTIONAL and additive: implementations that ignore it keep the L2 offline check unchanged.
+ * Returns a bare boolean (DEPRECATED alias) or an {@link AccountabilityResult} carrying `fresh`.
+ */
+export type AccountabilityVerifier = (card: EntityCard, ctx: {
+    trustedIssuers: readonly string[];
+    proofDid?: string;
+}) => Promise<boolean | AccountabilityResult>;
+/**
+ * Recompute a live per-request holder-of-key proof against the request it must bind. The
+ * caller pre-binds the crypto seams (e.g. `verifyCardProof(proof, req, deps)` from ./proof);
+ * `@kya-os/mcp` ships only this interface. Fail-closed: a rejected promise DEMOTES, never throws
+ * out of `verifyCard`.
+ */
+export type CardProofVerifier = (proof: unknown, request: ToolRequest) => Promise<ProofVerifyResult>;
+export interface VerifyCardDeps {
+    /** Verifies capability attestations (option C seam). If omitted, capabilities are L1. */
+    capabilityVerifier?: CapabilityVerifier;
+    /** Verifies an attestation VC (e.g. KYC/KYB). If omitted, attestations are unverified. */
+    attestationVerifier?: AttestationVerifier;
+    /** Verifies the accountability edge (delegationRef → responsibleParty, leaf-invoker join). */
+    accountabilityVerifier?: AccountabilityVerifier;
+    /** The per-request holder-of-key proof that rode `_meta['org.kya-os/proof@1']` (recomputed here). */
+    proof?: unknown;
+    /** The request the proof must bind (`method` + `params`); required alongside `proof`. */
+    request?: ToolRequest;
+    /** Recomputes `proof` against `request` (pre-bound ./proof `verifyCardProof`). Lifts L2 → L3. */
+    proofVerifier?: CardProofVerifier;
+    /** Live W3C Bitstring Status List v1.0 check for `card.revocation` (fail-closed). */
+    statusListChecker?: RevocationChecker;
+    /** True iff the caller independently proved CIMD L1 key possession (private_key_jwt ↔ jwks_uri). */
+    cimdKeyProven?: boolean;
+    /** Trusted issuer allowlist. Default: `DEFAULT_TRUSTED_ISSUERS`. */
+    trustedIssuers?: readonly string[];
+}
+export interface VerifyCardResult {
+    /** True iff every trust-bearing claim *present* on the card verified (proof is per-request, not a card claim). */
+    ok: boolean;
+    entityType: EntityType;
+    /** RECOMPUTED — the card's self-declared `conformanceLevel` is never trusted. */
+    conformanceLevel: ConformanceLevel;
+    verifiedCapabilities: string[];
+    accountability?: {
+        responsibleParty?: string;
+        principal?: string;
+        verified: boolean;
+        fresh?: boolean;
+    };
+    attestations: Array<{
+        type: string;
+        subject?: string;
+        verified: boolean;
+    }>;
+    /** Present when a proof was recomputed: the live holder-of-key verdict. */
+    proof?: {
+        verified: boolean;
+        did?: string;
+        level?: ProofAssurance;
+        reasons: string[];
+    };
+    /** Present when the card declares `revocation` and a `statusListChecker` was supplied. */
+    revocation?: {
+        revoked: boolean;
+        fresh: boolean;
+    };
+    /** Echoes `deps.cimdKeyProven` — the caller's L1 CIMD key-possession evidence. */
+    cimdKeyProven?: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Verify a resolved card: recompute capabilities + accountability + attestations + the live proof
+ * + revocation via the injected seams, and RECOMPUTE the conformance level. The card's
+ * self-declared `conformanceLevel` is ignored. `ok` is true iff every claim that is *present*
+ * verified (a card with only self-declared capabilities is still `ok` — it is just L1); a per-request
+ * proof affects the LEVEL, not `ok`, but a revoked card credential fails closed (`ok:false`, L1).
+ */
+export declare function verifyCard(card: EntityCard, deps: VerifyCardDeps): Promise<VerifyCardResult>;
+/**
+ * Derive the conformance FLOOR from verified capabilities, live-proof validity, and freshness.
+ * L3 ⊇ L2 ⊇ L1: all declared capabilities attested ⇒ L2; plus a valid holder-of-key proof (`proofOk`)
+ * AND a fresh (live) status check ⇒ L3. Any self-declared (unverified) capability keeps the floor at
+ * L1. `revocationFresh` (the AND of card / delegation-chain / capability status liveness) defaults to
+ * `true` so 2-arg calls still compile; a `false` (unreachable/stale list) demotes L3 → L2.
+ */
+export declare function deriveConformanceLevel(check: CapabilityCheckResult, proofOk: boolean, revocationFresh?: boolean): ConformanceLevel;
+//# sourceMappingURL=verify.d.ts.map

package/dist/card/verify.d.ts.map

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package/dist/card/verify.js

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+/**
+ * KYA-OS Entity Card — VERIFY (the proof half).
+ *
+ * Verify a resolved card's claims via injected, level-AGNOSTIC crypto seams (the pattern
+ * `validateLevel2` uses for its `signatureVerifier`, keeping `@kya-os/mcp` free of any mcp-i-core
+ * runtime dep) and RECOMPUTE the conformance level — the self-declared `conformanceLevel` is NEVER
+ * trusted; the LEVEL is derived here, never baked into a function name. Four fail-closed seams the
+ * SPEC §9/§11 ladder needs:
+ *   - `capabilityVerifier`  — per-capability attestation check (L1 floor if omitted);
+ *   - `accountabilityVerifier` — delegation edge: `responsibleParty === issuer(rootVC)`, `leaf-invoker
+ *     === proof.did` (via `ctx.proofDid`), AND the chain `fresh` L3 gate (./delegation);
+ *   - `proofVerifier` + `proof`/`request` — the live per-request holder-of-key proof (./proof);
+ *   - `statusListChecker` — W3C Bitstring Status List v1.0 liveness (./revocation).
+ * Fail-closed everywhere: a missing/expired/revoked artifact DEMOTES the level (L3→L2→L1) and never
+ * errors open; an unreachable/stale status list OR stale delegation chain demotes L3→L2.
+ */
+import { EntityTypeSchema, capabilityNames, } from './schema.js';
+export const ENTITY_TYPES = EntityTypeSchema.options;
+export const DEFAULT_TRUSTED_ISSUERS = ['did:web:example.com'];
+/**
+ * Verify a resolved card: recompute capabilities + accountability + attestations + the live proof
+ * + revocation via the injected seams, and RECOMPUTE the conformance level. The card's
+ * self-declared `conformanceLevel` is ignored. `ok` is true iff every claim that is *present*
+ * verified (a card with only self-declared capabilities is still `ok` — it is just L1); a per-request
+ * proof affects the LEVEL, not `ok`, but a revoked card credential fails closed (`ok:false`, L1).
+ */
+export async function verifyCard(card, deps) {
+    const trustedIssuers = deps.trustedIssuers ?? DEFAULT_TRUSTED_ISSUERS;
+    const check = await checkCapabilities(card, deps, trustedIssuers);
+    const proof = await recomputeProof(deps);
+    const proofDid = proof?.ok ? proof.did : undefined;
+    const accountability = await checkAccountability(card, deps, trustedIssuers, proofDid);
+    const attestations = await checkAttestations(card, deps, trustedIssuers);
+    const revocation = await checkCardRevocation(card, deps.statusListChecker);
+    const accountabilityOk = !card.responsibleParty || Boolean(accountability?.verified);
+    const attestationsOk = attestations.every((a) => a.verified);
+    return {
+        ok: accountabilityOk && attestationsOk && !revocation.revoked,
+        entityType: card.entityType,
+        conformanceLevel: deriveConformanceLevel(demoteOnRevocation(check, revocation.revoked), proof?.ok ?? false, (!revocation.checked || revocation.fresh) && (accountability?.fresh ?? true) && (check.fresh ?? true)),
+        verifiedCapabilities: check.verified,
+        accountability,
+        attestations,
+        proof: proof
+            ? { verified: proof.ok, did: proof.did, level: proof.level, reasons: proof.reasons }
+            : undefined,
+        revocation: revocation.checked ? { revoked: revocation.revoked, fresh: revocation.fresh } : undefined,
+        cimdKeyProven: deps.cimdKeyProven,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Derive the conformance FLOOR from verified capabilities, live-proof validity, and freshness.
+ * L3 ⊇ L2 ⊇ L1: all declared capabilities attested ⇒ L2; plus a valid holder-of-key proof (`proofOk`)
+ * AND a fresh (live) status check ⇒ L3. Any self-declared (unverified) capability keeps the floor at
+ * L1. `revocationFresh` (the AND of card / delegation-chain / capability status liveness) defaults to
+ * `true` so 2-arg calls still compile; a `false` (unreachable/stale list) demotes L3 → L2.
+ */
+export function deriveConformanceLevel(check, proofOk, revocationFresh = true) {
+    const allAttested = check.verified.length > 0 && check.unverified.length === 0;
+    if (!allAttested)
+        return 'L1';
+    return proofOk && revocationFresh ? 'L3' : 'L2';
+}
+// ── Internals ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/** Run the capability seam (or floor everything to unverified when no seam is injected). */
+async function checkCapabilities(card, deps, trustedIssuers) {
+    const capabilities = card.capabilities ?? [];
+    return deps.capabilityVerifier
+        ? deps.capabilityVerifier(capabilities, { subjectDid: card.id, trustedIssuers })
+        : { verified: [], unverified: capabilityNames(capabilities) };
+}
+/**
+ * Recompute the accountability edge, threading `proofDid` for the leaf-invoker join and surfacing the
+ * delegation-chain `fresh` signal the §9.3/§12.6 L3 gate needs. A bare boolean is the DEPRECATED alias.
+ */
+async function checkAccountability(card, deps, trustedIssuers, proofDid) {
+    if (!card.responsibleParty)
+        return undefined;
+    const raw = deps.accountabilityVerifier
+        ? await deps.accountabilityVerifier(card, { trustedIssuers, proofDid })
+        : false;
+    const { verified, fresh } = typeof raw === 'boolean' ? { verified: raw, fresh: undefined } : raw;
+    return { responsibleParty: card.responsibleParty, principal: card.principal, verified, fresh };
+}
+/** Recompute each attestation VC via the injected seam (unverified when no seam is injected). */
+async function checkAttestations(card, deps, trustedIssuers) {
+    return Promise.all((card.attestations ?? []).map(async (a) => ({
+        type: a.type,
+        subject: a.subject,
+        verified: deps.attestationVerifier
+            ? await deps.attestationVerifier(a, { subjectDid: a.subject ?? card.id, trustedIssuers })
+            : false,
+    })));
+}
+/**
+ * Recompute the live per-request proof. Returns `undefined` when no proof/request/verifier was
+ * supplied (the level then rests at the capability floor, no proof lift). Fail-closed: a throwing
+ * verifier yields `{ ok:false }` (a demotion) rather than escaping `verifyCard`.
+ */
+async function recomputeProof(deps) {
+    if (!deps.proofVerifier || deps.proof === undefined || deps.request === undefined)
+        return undefined;
+    try {
+        return await deps.proofVerifier(deps.proof, deps.request);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { ok: false, reasons: ['proof_verifier_threw'] };
+    }
+}
+/** Live-check `card.revocation` via the injected seam; fail-closed (unreachable ⇒ revoked). */
+async function checkCardRevocation(card, checker) {
+    if (!checker || !card.revocation)
+        return { checked: false, revoked: false, fresh: true };
+    try {
+        const status = await checker(card.revocation);
+        return { checked: true, revoked: status.revoked, fresh: status.fresh };
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { checked: true, revoked: true, fresh: false };
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * A REVOKED card credential voids its attested trust: every otherwise-verified capability drops to
+ * unverified so the floor collapses to L1 (revocation demotes L3→L2→L1). A clean-but-stale list
+ * leaves `check` untouched — it only trims `revocationFresh` (L3→L2). No-op when not revoked.
+ */
+function demoteOnRevocation(check, revoked) {
+    if (!revoked)
+        return check;
+    return { verified: [], unverified: [...check.verified, ...check.unverified] };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=verify.js.map

package/dist/card/verify.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/delegation/bitstring.d.ts

@@ -1,12 +1,17 @@
 /**
- * Bitstring Utilities for StatusList2021
+ * Bitstring Utilities for W3C status lists (StatusList2021 / Bitstring Status List v1.0).
  *
  * Implements GZIP compression + base64url encoding for efficient status lists.
- * Per W3C StatusList2021 spec, each bit represents credential status:
+ * Each bit represents credential status:
  * - 0: Not revoked/suspended
  * - 1: Revoked/suspended
  *
- * Related Spec: W3C StatusList2021
+ * Bit order is MSB-FIRST within each byte (index 0 → the 0x80 bit), matching the W3C spec and
+ * the Digital Bazaar reference `Bitstring` (`0x80 >> bit`). This is the SAME order the Entity Card
+ * revocation reader (`src/card/revocation.ts`) uses, so both code paths read an identical
+ * `encodedList` to the SAME verdict.
+ *
+ * Related Spec: W3C Bitstring Status List v1.0 (successor to StatusList2021)
  */
 export interface CompressionFunction {
     compress(data: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>;
@@ -16,10 +21,9 @@ export interface DecompressionFunction {
 }
 export declare class BitstringManager {
     private compressor;
-    private decompressor;
     private bits;
     private size;
-    constructor(size: number, compressor: CompressionFunction, decompressor: DecompressionFunction);
+    constructor(size: number, compressor: CompressionFunction, _decompressor: DecompressionFunction);
     setBit(index: number, value: boolean): void;
     getBit(index: number): boolean;
     getSetBits(): number[];
@@ -28,9 +32,7 @@ export declare class BitstringManager {
     getRawBits(): Uint8Array;
     getSize(): number;
     private base64urlEncode;
-    private static base64urlDecode;
     private bytesToBase64;
-    private static base64ToBytes;
     static fromSetBits(size: number, setBits: number[], compressor: CompressionFunction, decompressor: DecompressionFunction): BitstringManager;
 }
 export declare function isIndexSet(encodedList: string, index: number, decompressor: DecompressionFunction): Promise<boolean>;