@kya-os/mcp-i 1.7.8 → 1.7.10

package/dist/runtime/delegation/vc-verifier.js

@@ -245,39 +245,73 @@ class DelegationCredentialVerifier {
             const vcWithoutProof = { ...vc };
             delete vcWithoutProof.proof;
             // The proof.proofValue is base64url-encoded Ed25519 signature
-            // The proof.jws is an alternative JWS-based signature format
-            const proofValue = vc.proof?.proofValue || vc.proof?.jws;
-            if (!proofValue) {
+            // The proof.jws is an alternative JWS-based signature format (header.payload.signature)
+            const rawProofValue = vc.proof?.proofValue || vc.proof?.jws;
+            if (!rawProofValue) {
                 return {
                     valid: false,
                     reason: 'Proof missing proofValue or jws',
                     durationMs: Date.now() - startTime,
                 };
             }
-            try {
-                // For Ed25519Signature2020, we need to:
-                // 1. Canonicalize the VC without proofValue
-                // 2. Canonicalize the proof options
-                // 3. Hash both and concatenate
-                // 4. Verify the signature
+            // Extract signature bytes and construct signing input
+            // Handle both JWS format (header.payload.signature) and proofValue format
+            let signatureBase64url;
+            let signingInput;
+            if (rawProofValue.includes('.')) {
+                // JWS format with b64:false (standard for Ed25519Signature2020)
+                // The signing input is: base64url(header) + "." + payload_bytes
+                const jwsParts = rawProofValue.split('.');
+                if (jwsParts.length !== 3) {
+                    return {
+                        valid: false,
+                        reason: `Invalid JWS format: expected 3 parts, got ${jwsParts.length}`,
+                        durationMs: Date.now() - startTime,
+                    };
+                }
+                const [headerB64, payloadB64, signatureB64] = jwsParts;
+                signatureBase64url = signatureB64;
+                // For b64:false JWS, the signing input is the detached payload format:
+                // ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))) || '.' || JWS Payload
+                // The payload is the hash of the document (for Ed25519Signature2020)
+                // Per RFC 7797 (JWS Unencoded Payload Option)
+                // Construct proof options for hashing (everything in proof except signature fields)
+                const proofOptions = { ...vc.proof };
+                delete proofOptions.proofValue;
+                delete proofOptions.jws;
+                delete proofOptions.signatureValue;
+                const canonicalDoc = (0, json_canonicalize_1.canonicalize)(vcWithoutProof);
+                const canonicalProof = (0, json_canonicalize_1.canonicalize)(proofOptions);
+                // Hash both and concatenate (payload for JWS)
+                const docHash = (0, crypto_1.createHash)('sha256').update(canonicalDoc, 'utf8').digest();
+                const proofHash = (0, crypto_1.createHash)('sha256').update(canonicalProof, 'utf8').digest();
+                const payloadBytes = Buffer.concat([proofHash, docHash]);
+                // JWS signing input: header + "." + payload_bytes
+                const headerBytes = Buffer.from(headerB64, 'utf8');
+                const separator = Buffer.from('.', 'utf8');
+                signingInput = Buffer.concat([headerBytes, separator, payloadBytes]);
+            }
+            else {
+                // proofValue is raw base64url signature (Ed25519Signature2020 native format)
+                signatureBase64url = rawProofValue;
                 // Construct proof options (everything in proof except proofValue)
                 const proofOptions = { ...vc.proof };
                 delete proofOptions.proofValue;
                 delete proofOptions.jws;
                 delete proofOptions.signatureValue;
-                // Create signing input: hash(canonicalize(document)) + hash(canonicalize(proofOptions))
+                // Create signing input: hash(canonicalize(proofOptions)) || hash(canonicalize(document))
                 const canonicalDoc = (0, json_canonicalize_1.canonicalize)(vcWithoutProof);
                 const canonicalProof = (0, json_canonicalize_1.canonicalize)(proofOptions);
-                // For Ed25519Signature2020, signing input is:
-                // SHA-256(canonicalize(proofOptions)) || SHA-256(canonicalize(document))
                 const docHash = (0, crypto_1.createHash)('sha256').update(canonicalDoc, 'utf8').digest();
                 const proofHash = (0, crypto_1.createHash)('sha256').update(canonicalProof, 'utf8').digest();
-                const signingInput = Buffer.concat([proofHash, docHash]);
+                signingInput = Buffer.concat([proofHash, docHash]);
+            }
+            try {
                 // Decode the base64url signature
-                const signatureBytes = Buffer.from(proofValue, 'base64url');
+                const signatureBytes = Buffer.from(signatureBase64url, 'base64url');
                 // Use subtle crypto for Ed25519 verification
                 const cryptoKey = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey('jwk', publicKeyJwk, { name: 'Ed25519' }, false, ['verify']);
-                const isValid = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.verify({ name: 'Ed25519' }, cryptoKey, signatureBytes, signingInput);
+                const isValid = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.verify({ name: 'Ed25519' }, cryptoKey, new Uint8Array(signatureBytes), new Uint8Array(signingInput));
                 if (!isValid) {
                     return {
                         valid: false,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@kya-os/mcp-i",
-  "version": "1.7.8",
+  "version": "1.7.10",
   "description": "The TypeScript MCP framework with identity features built-in",
   "type": "commonjs",
   "main": "dist/index.js",