@kya-os/create-mcpi-app 1.10.1 → 1.10.3

package/dist/bundles/hardware-world.js

@@ -19235,7 +19235,7 @@ var require_base2 = __commonJS({
     var agentshield_api_1 = require_agentshield_api();
     var user_did_manager_1 = require_user_did_manager();
     var wire_format_1 = require_wire_format();
-    var isRecord2 = (value) => typeof value === "object" && value !== null;
+    var isRecord3 = (value) => typeof value === "object" && value !== null;
     var MCPIRuntimeBase3 = class _MCPIRuntimeBase {
       crypto;
       clock;
@@ -19535,7 +19535,7 @@ var require_base2 = __commonJS({
                 });
               }
               const clientInfo = session?.clientInfo;
-              const clientCaps = isRecord2(clientInfo?.capabilities) ? clientInfo.capabilities : void 0;
+              const clientCaps = isRecord3(clientInfo?.capabilities) ? clientInfo.capabilities : void 0;
               const uiResult = this.buildConsentUIResult(toolName, protection.requiredScopes, session, resumeToken, session?.projectId || void 0, session?.serverOrigin || void 0, clientCaps);
               if (uiResult) {
                 return uiResult;
@@ -20118,7 +20118,7 @@ var require_base2 = __commonJS({
       async verifyProof(dataOrProof, proofOrSession) {
         if (dataOrProof && typeof dataOrProof === "object" && "jws" in dataOrProof && "meta" in dataOrProof) {
           const detachedProof = dataOrProof;
-          const session = isRecord2(proofOrSession) ? proofOrSession : void 0;
+          const session = isRecord3(proofOrSession) ? proofOrSession : void 0;
           if (this.proofVerifier) {
             try {
               const didDoc = await this.fetch.resolveDID(detachedProof.meta.did);
@@ -20139,10 +20139,10 @@ var require_base2 = __commonJS({
             }
           } else {
             console.warn("[MCPIRuntimeBase] ProofVerifier not available, using fallback verification");
-            return this.verifyProofLegacy(dataOrProof, isRecord2(proofOrSession) ? proofOrSession : {});
+            return this.verifyProofLegacy(dataOrProof, isRecord3(proofOrSession) ? proofOrSession : {});
           }
         } else {
-          return this.verifyProofLegacy(dataOrProof, isRecord2(proofOrSession) ? proofOrSession : {});
+          return this.verifyProofLegacy(dataOrProof, isRecord3(proofOrSession) ? proofOrSession : {});
         }
       }
       /**
@@ -20537,7 +20537,7 @@ var require_base2 = __commonJS({
         };
       }
       extractPublicKey(didDoc) {
-        const verificationMethods = isRecord2(didDoc) ? didDoc.verificationMethod : void 0;
+        const verificationMethods = isRecord3(didDoc) ? didDoc.verificationMethod : void 0;
         const method = Array.isArray(verificationMethods) ? verificationMethods[0] : void 0;
         if (method?.publicKeyBase64) {
           return String(method.publicKeyBase64);
@@ -20551,7 +20551,7 @@ var require_base2 = __commonJS({
        * Extract public key JWK from DID document
        */
       extractPublicKeyJwk(didDoc, kid) {
-        const verificationMethods = isRecord2(didDoc) ? didDoc.verificationMethod : void 0;
+        const verificationMethods = isRecord3(didDoc) ? didDoc.verificationMethod : void 0;
         const verificationMethodList = Array.isArray(verificationMethods) ? verificationMethods : [];
         const verificationMethod = verificationMethodList.find((vm) => {
           const vmType = typeof vm.type === "string" ? vm.type : void 0;
@@ -20560,7 +20560,7 @@ var require_base2 = __commonJS({
           const matchesKid = !kid || vmId === kid || vmId?.endsWith(`#${kid}`);
           return matchesType && matchesKid;
         }) || verificationMethodList[0];
-        if (verificationMethod && isRecord2(verificationMethod.publicKeyJwk)) {
+        if (verificationMethod && isRecord3(verificationMethod.publicKeyJwk)) {
           const jwk = verificationMethod.publicKeyJwk;
           if (jwk.kty === "OKP" && jwk.crv === "Ed25519") {
             return jwk;
@@ -80849,7 +80849,7 @@ var init_protocol4 = __esm({
         const capturedTransport = this._transport;
         const relatedTaskId = request.params?._meta?.[RELATED_TASK_META_KEY2]?.taskId;
         if (handler === void 0) {
-          const errorResponse = {
+          const errorResponse2 = {
             jsonrpc: "2.0",
             id: request.id,
             error: {
@@ -80860,11 +80860,11 @@ var init_protocol4 = __esm({
           if (relatedTaskId && this._taskMessageQueue) {
             this._enqueueTaskMessage(relatedTaskId, {
               type: "error",
-              message: errorResponse,
+              message: errorResponse2,
               timestamp: Date.now()
             }, capturedTransport?.sessionId).catch((error87) => this._onerror(new Error(`Failed to enqueue error response: ${error87}`)));
           } else {
-            capturedTransport?.send(errorResponse).catch((error87) => this._onerror(new Error(`Failed to send an error response: ${error87}`)));
+            capturedTransport?.send(errorResponse2).catch((error87) => this._onerror(new Error(`Failed to send an error response: ${error87}`)));
           }
           return;
         }
@@ -80934,7 +80934,7 @@ var init_protocol4 = __esm({
           if (abortController.signal.aborted) {
             return;
           }
-          const errorResponse = {
+          const errorResponse2 = {
             jsonrpc: "2.0",
             id: request.id,
             error: {
@@ -80946,11 +80946,11 @@ var init_protocol4 = __esm({
           if (relatedTaskId && this._taskMessageQueue) {
             await this._enqueueTaskMessage(relatedTaskId, {
               type: "error",
-              message: errorResponse,
+              message: errorResponse2,
               timestamp: Date.now()
             }, capturedTransport?.sessionId);
           } else {
-            await capturedTransport?.send(errorResponse);
+            await capturedTransport?.send(errorResponse2);
           }
         }).catch((error87) => this._onerror(new Error(`Failed to send response: ${error87}`))).finally(() => {
           this._requestHandlerAbortControllers.delete(request.id);
@@ -141255,6 +141255,11 @@ function resolveHttpChallengeConfig(config4, env2) {
   if (!enabled)
     return null;
   const anchorTtlS = Math.min(positiveOrDefault(httpChallenge?.anchorTtlS, ANCHOR_TTL_MAX_S), ANCHOR_TTL_MAX_S);
+  const anchorRegistrationEnvFlag = readHttpChallengeEnvFlag(env2?.MCPI_ANCHOR_REGISTRATION);
+  let remoteAnchorRegistration = httpChallenge?.remoteAnchorRegistration ?? true;
+  if (anchorRegistrationEnvFlag !== void 0) {
+    remoteAnchorRegistration = anchorRegistrationEnvFlag;
+  }
   return {
     enabled: true,
     mode: httpChallenge?.mode ?? "negotiated",
@@ -141262,7 +141267,8 @@ function resolveHttpChallengeConfig(config4, env2) {
     pollIntervalS: positiveOrDefault(httpChallenge?.pollIntervalS, 3),
     anchorTtlS,
     delegationExpiresInS: positiveOrDefault(httpChallenge?.delegationExpiresInS, 900),
-    allowUnverifiedKeyidHolders: httpChallenge?.allowUnverifiedKeyidHolders ?? false
+    allowUnverifiedKeyidHolders: httpChallenge?.allowUnverifiedKeyidHolders ?? false,
+    remoteAnchorRegistration
   };
 }
 
@@ -141325,6 +141331,7 @@ function mapPrefixedEnv(env2, prefix) {
     MCPI_HTTP_CHALLENGE: typeof env2.MCPI_HTTP_CHALLENGE === "string" ? env2.MCPI_HTTP_CHALLENGE : void 0,
     MCPI_TEST_CONSENT: typeof env2.MCPI_TEST_CONSENT === "string" ? env2.MCPI_TEST_CONSENT : void 0,
     MCPI_INLINE_CONSENT: typeof env2.MCPI_INLINE_CONSENT === "string" ? env2.MCPI_INLINE_CONSENT : void 0,
+    MCPI_ANCHOR_REGISTRATION: typeof env2.MCPI_ANCHOR_REGISTRATION === "string" ? env2.MCPI_ANCHOR_REGISTRATION : void 0,
     // MCP_OBJECT: Durable Object namespace for MCP agent
     // Try prefixed first, then fall back to unprefixed (most deployments use unprefixed)
     MCP_OBJECT: env2[`${prefixWithUnderscore}_MCP_OBJECT`] || env2[`${prefixWithoutUnderscore}_MCP_OBJECT`] || env2.MCP_OBJECT,
@@ -141456,6 +141463,7 @@ function sha256Hex(input) {
 // ../mcp-i-cloudflare/dist/delegation-http/constants.js
 var PICKUP_ROUTE = "/api/delegation/pickup/:sid";
 var CONSENT_ROUTE = "/consent";
+var ANCHOR_REGISTRATION_ROUTE = "/api/v1/bouncer/sessions";
 var PICKUP_TOKEN_HEADER = "X-KYA-Pickup-Token";
 var FALLBACK_DELEGATION_HEADER = "KYA-Delegation";
 var CHALLENGE_PARAM_ORDER = [
@@ -141484,6 +141492,21 @@ var INTERNAL_PICKUP_INFO = "/_internal/pickup/info";
 
 // ../mcp-i-cloudflare/dist/delegation-http/anchor-do.js
 init_storage_keys();
+function anchorSnapshot(rec) {
+  return {
+    sid: rec.sid,
+    status: rec.status,
+    requiredScopes: rec.requiredScopes,
+    minAssurance: rec.minAssurance,
+    expiresAt: rec.expiresAt,
+    createdAt: rec.createdAt,
+    registeredAtMs: rec.registeredAtMs,
+    issuedAtMs: rec.issuedAtMs,
+    agentDid: rec.agentDid,
+    audience: rec.audience,
+    serverDid: rec.serverDid
+  };
+}
 var pendingBody = () => ({ status: "pending" });
 var pinnedErr = () => ({ error: KYAOS_ERRORS.pickupPinned });
 var invalidSessionErr = () => ({ error: KYAOS_ERRORS.invalidSession });
@@ -141491,7 +141514,12 @@ var pickupExpiredErr = () => ({ error: KYAOS_ERRORS.pickupExpired });
 function reduceCreate(rec, input, now2) {
   const i2 = input;
   if (rec && now2 <= rec.expiresAt) {
-    return { response: { status: 201, body: { success: true } } };
+    return {
+      response: {
+        status: 201,
+        body: { success: true, reused: true, anchor: anchorSnapshot(rec) }
+      }
+    };
   }
   const record4 = {
     sid: i2.sid,
@@ -141501,6 +141529,11 @@ function reduceCreate(rec, input, now2) {
     pollIntervalS: i2.pollIntervalS,
     createdAt: now2,
     expiresAt: now2 + i2.anchorTtlS * 1e3,
+    agentDid: typeof i2.agentDid === "string" ? i2.agentDid : void 0,
+    audience: typeof i2.audience === "string" ? i2.audience : void 0,
+    serverDid: typeof i2.serverDid === "string" ? i2.serverDid : void 0,
+    registeredAtMs: typeof i2.registeredAtMs === "number" ? i2.registeredAtMs : void 0,
+    issuedAtMs: now2,
     pin: i2.pin ? {
       type: i2.pin.type,
       valueSha256: i2.pin.valueSha256,
@@ -141508,7 +141541,13 @@ function reduceCreate(rec, input, now2) {
       source: "challenge"
     } : void 0
   };
-  return { record: record4, response: { status: 201, body: { success: true } } };
+  return {
+    record: record4,
+    response: {
+      status: 201,
+      body: { success: true, anchor: anchorSnapshot(record4) }
+    }
+  };
 }
 function reducePoll(rec, holder, now2) {
   if (!rec) {
@@ -141639,7 +141678,10 @@ async function handlePickupInternal(ctx, request, now2) {
         status: rec.status,
         requiredScopes: rec.requiredScopes,
         minAssurance: rec.minAssurance,
-        expiresAt: rec.expiresAt
+        expiresAt: rec.expiresAt,
+        agentDid: rec.agentDid,
+        audience: rec.audience,
+        serverDid: rec.serverDid
       }
     });
   }
@@ -141649,7 +141691,7 @@ async function handlePickupInternal(ctx, request, now2) {
 // ../mcp-i-cloudflare/package.json
 var package_default = {
   name: "@kya-os/mcp-i-cloudflare",
-  version: "1.11.1",
+  version: "1.12.1",
   description: "Cloudflare Workers adapter for MCP-I framework",
   main: "dist/index.js",
   types: "dist/index.d.ts",
@@ -141719,7 +141761,7 @@ var package_default = {
 
 // ../mcp-i-cloudflare/dist/delegation-http/well-known-capability.js
 var KYA_OS_IDENTITY_WELL_KNOWN_PATH = "/.well-known/kya-os-identity";
-function augmentKyaOsIdentityWellKnown(wellKnownPath, result, cfg) {
+function augmentKyaOsIdentityWellKnown(wellKnownPath, result, cfg, anchorRegistration) {
   if (wellKnownPath !== KYA_OS_IDENTITY_WELL_KNOWN_PATH || !result) {
     return result;
   }
@@ -141727,11 +141769,429 @@ function augmentKyaOsIdentityWellKnown(wellKnownPath, result, cfg) {
     ...result,
     delegationHttp: {
       enabled: cfg !== null,
-      version: package_default.version
+      version: package_default.version,
+      anchorRegistration
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+// ../mcp-i-cloudflare/dist/delegation-http/sid.js
+var ANCHOR_SID_RE = /^kya-[0-9a-f]{16,64}$/;
+function isAnchorSid(s5) {
+  return typeof s5 === "string" && ANCHOR_SID_RE.test(s5);
+}
+
+// ../mcp-i-cloudflare/dist/delegation-http/challenge.js
+var CHALLENGE_PROOF_METHOD = "kyaos/challenge";
+function buildWWWAuthenticateDelegation(i2) {
+  const values = {
+    realm: i2.realm,
+    sid: i2.sid,
+    consent_uri: buildConsentUri(i2),
+    pickup_uri: buildPickupUri(i2),
+    scope: i2.requiredScopes.join(" "),
+    min_assurance: i2.minAssurance,
+    interval: String(i2.pollIntervalS),
+    kind: "delegation"
+  };
+  const params = CHALLENGE_PARAM_ORDER.filter(
+    // min_assurance is the only optional param: omit the whole token when absent.
+    (key) => values[key] !== void 0
+  ).map((key) => `${key}="${values[key]}"`);
+  return `Delegation ${params.join(", ")}`;
+}
+function buildWWWAuthenticateBearer(realm) {
+  return `Bearer resource_metadata="https://${realm}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"`;
+}
+function buildConsentUri(i2) {
+  return `https://${i2.authorizationHost}/consent?sid=${i2.sid}`;
+}
+function buildPickupUri(i2) {
+  return `https://${i2.authorizationHost}/api/delegation/pickup/${i2.sid}`;
+}
+function buildInstructions(i2) {
+  const consentUri = buildConsentUri(i2);
+  const pickupUri = buildPickupUri(i2);
+  return `This action requires human authorization. Show your user this link and ask them to approve: ${consentUri}. Then poll ${pickupUri} every ${i2.pollIntervalS} seconds. If you can sign HTTP requests, sign each poll with an ephemeral did:key; otherwise generate one random 32-byte token and send it as X-KYA-Pickup-Token on EVERY poll. When the response status is 200, take the 'delegation' value and retry your original request with header 'Authorization: Bearer <delegation>'.`;
+}
+function buildChallengeBody(i2, challengeProof) {
+  const kyaos = {
+    sid: i2.sid,
+    consent_uri: buildConsentUri(i2),
+    pickup_uri: buildPickupUri(i2),
+    required_scopes: i2.requiredScopes
+  };
+  if (i2.minAssurance !== void 0) {
+    kyaos.min_assurance = i2.minAssurance;
+  }
+  kyaos.poll_interval_s = i2.pollIntervalS;
+  kyaos.challenge_proof = challengeProof;
+  return {
+    error: KYAOS_ERRORS.authorizationRequired,
+    kyaos,
+    instructions: buildInstructions(i2)
+  };
+}
+function buildChallengeResponse(i2, challengeProof) {
+  const headers = new Headers();
+  headers.append("WWW-Authenticate", buildWWWAuthenticateDelegation(i2));
+  headers.append("WWW-Authenticate", buildWWWAuthenticateBearer(i2.realm));
+  headers.set("Retry-After", String(i2.pollIntervalS));
+  headers.set("Content-Type", "application/json");
+  headers.set("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+  return new Response(JSON.stringify(buildChallengeBody(i2, challengeProof)), {
+    status: 401,
+    headers
+  });
+}
+function buildFetcherChallengeResponse(i2, challengeProof) {
+  const consentUri = buildConsentUri(i2);
+  const headers = new Headers();
+  headers.set("Content-Type", "application/json");
+  headers.set("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+  headers.set("KYA-Auth-Required", "true");
+  headers.set("KYA-Auth-Url", consentUri);
+  headers.set("Link", `<${consentUri}>; rel="kya-authorize"`);
+  headers.set("KYA-Action", "challenge");
+  return new Response(JSON.stringify(buildChallengeBody(i2, challengeProof)), {
+    status: 200,
+    headers
+  });
+}
+async function signChallengeProof(gen, payload) {
+  const proof = await gen.generateProof({
+    method: CHALLENGE_PROOF_METHOD,
+    params: {
+      sid: payload.sid,
+      consent_uri: payload.consent_uri,
+      required_scopes: payload.required_scopes
+    }
+  }, { data: { sid: payload.sid } }, {
+    // The session binds the proof to this anchor; sid is the natural nonce.
+    nonce: payload.sid,
+    audience: payload.consent_uri,
+    sessionId: payload.sid
+  });
+  return proof.jws;
+}
+
+// ../mcp-i-cloudflare/dist/delegation-http/registrar-auth.js
+function constantTimeEqualHex(a5, b3) {
+  if (a5.length !== b3.length)
+    return false;
+  let diff = 0;
+  for (let i2 = 0; i2 < a5.length; i2++) {
+    diff |= a5.charCodeAt(i2) ^ b3.charCodeAt(i2);
+  }
+  return diff === 0;
+}
+function registrarAuthorized(env2, authorizationHeader) {
+  const expected = env2.AGENTSHIELD_API_KEY;
+  if (!expected || !authorizationHeader)
+    return false;
+  const match2 = /^Bearer\s+(.+)$/i.exec(authorizationHeader.trim());
+  if (!match2)
+    return false;
+  return constantTimeEqualHex(sha256Hex(match2[1]), sha256Hex(expected));
+}
+var RATE_WINDOW_MS = 6e4;
+var RATE_MAX_PER_WINDOW = 60;
+var rateWindowStart = 0;
+var rateCount = 0;
+function registrationRateLimited(now2) {
+  if (now2 - rateWindowStart >= RATE_WINDOW_MS) {
+    rateWindowStart = now2;
+    rateCount = 0;
+  }
+  rateCount += 1;
+  return rateCount > RATE_MAX_PER_WINDOW;
+}
+
+// ../mcp-i-cloudflare/dist/delegation-http/anchor-registration-validate.js
+var DID_RE = /^did:(key|web):.+$/;
+var SYNTHETIC_DETECTED_DID_PREFIX = "did:web:detected:";
+function didIssueMessage(value) {
+  if (typeof value !== "string" || !DID_RE.test(value)) {
+    return "Invalid DID format. Must be did:key: or did:web:";
+  }
+  if (value.startsWith(SYNTHETIC_DETECTED_DID_PREFIX)) {
+    return "Synthetic detected DIDs are not valid KYA-OS identities";
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+function isRecord2(value) {
+  return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+function checkString(issues, path, value, max) {
+  if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length < 1 || value.length > max) {
+    issues.push({ path, message: `${path} must be a string (1-${max} chars)` });
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+function checkOptionalString(issues, path, value, max) {
+  if (value === void 0)
+    return;
+  checkString(issues, path, value, max);
+}
+function validateChallenge(issues, raw2) {
+  if (raw2 === void 0)
+    return void 0;
+  if (!isRecord2(raw2)) {
+    issues.push({ path: "challenge", message: "challenge must be an object" });
+    return void 0;
+  }
+  const issuesBefore = issues.length;
+  const scopes = raw2.required_scopes;
+  if (!Array.isArray(scopes) || scopes.length < 1 || scopes.length > 50 || scopes.some((s5) => typeof s5 !== "string" || s5.length < 1 || s5.length > 200)) {
+    issues.push({
+      path: "challenge.required_scopes",
+      message: "challenge.required_scopes must be 1-50 strings of 1-200 chars each"
+    });
+  }
+  checkOptionalString(issues, "challenge.pep_surface", raw2.pep_surface, 64);
+  checkOptionalString(issues, "challenge.verdict", raw2.verdict, 64);
+  checkOptionalString(issues, "challenge.challenge_pin", raw2.challenge_pin, 512);
+  if (raw2.detected_agent_did !== void 0) {
+    const issue4 = didIssueMessage(raw2.detected_agent_did);
+    if (issue4) {
+      issues.push({ path: "challenge.detected_agent_did", message: issue4 });
+    }
+  }
+  if (raw2.audience !== void 0) {
+    const issue4 = didIssueMessage(raw2.audience);
+    if (issue4) {
+      issues.push({ path: "challenge.audience", message: issue4 });
+    }
+  }
+  if (issues.length > issuesBefore)
+    return void 0;
+  return {
+    requiredScopes: scopes,
+    pepSurface: raw2.pep_surface,
+    verdict: raw2.verdict,
+    detectedAgentDid: raw2.detected_agent_did,
+    challengePin: raw2.challenge_pin,
+    audience: raw2.audience
+  };
+}
+function validateRegistrationBody(raw2) {
+  if (!isRecord2(raw2)) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      issues: [{ path: "", message: "body must be a JSON object" }]
+    };
+  }
+  const issues = [];
+  checkString(issues, "session_id", raw2.session_id, 255);
+  {
+    const issue4 = didIssueMessage(raw2.agent_did);
+    if (issue4)
+      issues.push({ path: "agent_did", message: issue4 });
+  }
+  if (typeof raw2.project_id !== "string" || raw2.project_id.length < 1) {
+    issues.push({
+      path: "project_id",
+      message: "project_id must be a non-empty string"
+    });
+  }
+  if (typeof raw2.created_at !== "number" || !Number.isInteger(raw2.created_at) || raw2.created_at <= 0 || raw2.created_at > 864e13) {
+    issues.push({
+      path: "created_at",
+      message: "created_at must be a valid positive unix-ms integer"
+    });
+  }
+  const clientInfo = raw2.client_info;
+  if (!isRecord2(clientInfo)) {
+    issues.push({
+      path: "client_info",
+      message: "client_info must be an object"
+    });
+  } else {
+    checkString(issues, "client_info.name", clientInfo.name, 255);
+    checkOptionalString(issues, "client_info.version", clientInfo.version, 50);
+  }
+  if (raw2.server_did !== void 0) {
+    const issue4 = didIssueMessage(raw2.server_did);
+    if (issue4)
+      issues.push({ path: "server_did", message: issue4 });
+  }
+  const challenge = validateChallenge(issues, raw2.challenge);
+  if (raw2.challenge !== void 0 && typeof raw2.session_id === "string" && raw2.session_id.length < 22) {
+    issues.push({
+      path: "session_id",
+      message: "session_id must be at least 22 characters (\u2248128-bit) when a challenge is attached"
+    });
+  }
+  if (issues.length > 0)
+    return { ok: false, issues };
+  return {
+    ok: true,
+    input: {
+      sessionId: raw2.session_id,
+      agentDid: raw2.agent_did,
+      projectId: raw2.project_id,
+      createdAt: raw2.created_at,
+      clientName: clientInfo.name,
+      clientVersion: clientInfo.version,
+      serverDid: raw2.server_did,
+      challenge
     }
   };
 }
 
+// ../mcp-i-cloudflare/dist/delegation-http/anchor-registration.js
+var DO_INTERNAL_ORIGIN = "https://do.internal";
+function isAnchorRegistrationEnabled(cfg, env2) {
+  return cfg !== null && cfg.remoteAnchorRegistration && typeof env2.AGENTSHIELD_API_KEY === "string" && env2.AGENTSHIELD_API_KEY.length > 0 && // No anchor store, no registration surface: getAnchorStub throws on an
+  // unbound MCP_OBJECT, so an unbound deployment must 404 like every other
+  // unprovisioned state instead of 500ing per request.
+  env2.MCP_OBJECT !== void 0;
+}
+function deriveRegistrationSid(sessionId) {
+  if (isAnchorSid(sessionId))
+    return sessionId;
+  return `kya-${sha256Hex(sessionId).slice(0, 32)}`;
+}
+function errorResponse(status, code, message3, details) {
+  return new Response(JSON.stringify({
+    success: false,
+    error: { code, message: message3, ...details ? { details } : {} }
+  }), {
+    status,
+    headers: {
+      "Content-Type": "application/json",
+      "Cache-Control": "no-store"
+    }
+  });
+}
+async function callAnchor(env2, deps, sid, internalPath, body) {
+  const stub = deps.getAnchorStub(env2, sid);
+  const response = await stub.fetch(new URL(internalPath, DO_INTERNAL_ORIGIN).toString(), {
+    method: "POST",
+    headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+    body: JSON.stringify(body)
+  });
+  return response;
+}
+async function ensureAnchor(env2, cfg, deps, sid, challenge, session) {
+  const pin = challenge.challengePin && cfg.allowUnverifiedKeyidHolders ? { type: "keyid", valueSha256: sha256Hex(challenge.challengePin) } : void 0;
+  const anchorUnavailable = {
+    error: errorResponse(502, "anchor_unavailable", "The anchor store did not accept the registration")
+  };
+  let created;
+  let body;
+  try {
+    created = await callAnchor(env2, deps, sid, INTERNAL_PICKUP_CREATE, {
+      sid,
+      requiredScopes: challenge.requiredScopes,
+      pollIntervalS: cfg.pollIntervalS,
+      anchorTtlS: cfg.anchorTtlS,
+      delegationExpiresInS: cfg.delegationExpiresInS,
+      agentDid: challenge.detectedAgentDid ?? session.agentDid,
+      registeredAtMs: session.registeredAtMs,
+      // Cross-resource claim inputs (drive the minted VC's aud / server_did —
+      // see consent-anchor-bridge's withCrossResourceClaims).
+      ...challenge.audience ? { audience: challenge.audience } : {},
+      ...session.serverDid ? { serverDid: session.serverDid } : {},
+      ...pin ? { pin } : {}
+    });
+    if (created.status !== 201)
+      return anchorUnavailable;
+    body = await created.json();
+  } catch (error87) {
+    console.warn(`[kya-http] anchor create failed (sid=${sid}):`, error87 instanceof Error ? error87.message : String(error87));
+    return anchorUnavailable;
+  }
+  if (!body.anchor || !Array.isArray(body.anchor.requiredScopes)) {
+    return anchorUnavailable;
+  }
+  return { isNew: body.reused !== true, snapshot: body.anchor };
+}
+async function handleAnchorRegistration(c, env2, cfg, deps) {
+  if (!registrarAuthorized(env2, c.req.header("Authorization"))) {
+    return errorResponse(401, "unauthorized", "Invalid or missing API key");
+  }
+  if (registrationRateLimited(Date.now())) {
+    return errorResponse(429, "rate_limited", "Too many anchor registrations; retry shortly");
+  }
+  let raw2;
+  try {
+    raw2 = await c.req.raw.clone().json();
+  } catch {
+    return errorResponse(400, "invalid_request", "Invalid request body", [
+      { path: "", message: "body must be JSON" }
+    ]);
+  }
+  const validated = validateRegistrationBody(raw2);
+  if (!validated.ok) {
+    return errorResponse(400, "invalid_request", "Invalid request body", validated.issues);
+  }
+  const { challenge } = validated.input;
+  if (!challenge) {
+    return errorResponse(401, "unauthorized", "This endpoint only accepts challenge registration");
+  }
+  const sid = deriveRegistrationSid(validated.input.sessionId);
+  if (!challenge.audience) {
+    console.warn(`[kya-http] external registration without challenge.audience (sid=${sid}): the minted credential will FAIL an org-pinned \xA74.3 audience gate; cross-resource use requires the registrar to send challenge.audience`);
+  }
+  const anchor = await ensureAnchor(env2, cfg, deps, sid, challenge, {
+    agentDid: validated.input.agentDid,
+    serverDid: validated.input.serverDid,
+    registeredAtMs: validated.input.createdAt
+  });
+  if ("error" in anchor)
+    return anchor.error;
+  const host = cfg.realm || new URL(c.req.url).host;
+  const verdict = {
+    requiredScopes: anchor.snapshot.requiredScopes,
+    authorizationHost: host,
+    realm: host,
+    sid,
+    pollIntervalS: cfg.pollIntervalS
+  };
+  const consentUri = buildConsentUri(verdict);
+  let challengeProof;
+  try {
+    challengeProof = await signChallengeProof(await deps.proofGenerator(), {
+      sid,
+      consent_uri: consentUri,
+      required_scopes: anchor.snapshot.requiredScopes
+    });
+  } catch (error87) {
+    console.warn(`[kya-http] registration challenge_proof signing failed (sid=${sid}):`, error87 instanceof Error ? error87.message : String(error87));
+    return errorResponse(502, "proof_unavailable", "The challenge proof could not be signed");
+  }
+  const createdAtMs = anchor.snapshot.registeredAtMs ?? validated.input.createdAt;
+  const issuedAtMs = anchor.snapshot.issuedAtMs ?? Date.now();
+  return new Response(JSON.stringify({
+    success: true,
+    data: {
+      session_id: sid,
+      registered: true,
+      created_at: new Date(createdAtMs).toISOString(),
+      challenge: {
+        consent_uri: consentUri,
+        challenge_proof: challengeProof,
+        required_scopes: anchor.snapshot.requiredScopes,
+        issued_at: issuedAtMs,
+        // ADDITIVE diagnostic (not in the frozen conformance key set, ignored
+        // by both existing parsers): whether the minted credential will carry
+        // the §4.3 cross-resource claims. False means no audience was
+        // registered — the credential only self-verifies at this worker.
+        cross_resource: typeof anchor.snapshot.audience === "string"
+      }
+    }
+  }), {
+    status: anchor.isNew ? 201 : 200,
+    headers: {
+      "Content-Type": "application/json",
+      // Checkpoint's route parity (its success responses are private/no-cache).
+      "Cache-Control": "private, no-cache"
+    }
+  });
+}
+
 // ../mcp-i-cloudflare/dist/agent.js
 init_storage_keys();
 
@@ -144166,7 +144626,7 @@ var MCPICloudflareAgent = class extends McpAgent {
           const mappedEnv = envPrefix ? mapPrefixedEnv(this.env, envPrefix) : this.env;
           const runtimeConfig = this.getRuntimeConfigInternal(mappedEnv);
           const httpChallengeCfg = resolveHttpChallengeConfig(runtimeConfig, mappedEnv);
-          const augmented = augmentKyaOsIdentityWellKnown(wellKnownPath, result, httpChallengeCfg);
+          const augmented = augmentKyaOsIdentityWellKnown(wellKnownPath, result, httpChallengeCfg, isAnchorRegistrationEnabled(httpChallengeCfg, mappedEnv));
           return new Response(JSON.stringify(augmented), {
             status: 200,
             headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }
@@ -146908,12 +147368,6 @@ var cors = (options) => {
   };
 };
 
-// ../mcp-i-cloudflare/dist/delegation-http/sid.js
-var ANCHOR_SID_RE = /^kya-[0-9a-f]{16,64}$/;
-function isAnchorSid(s5) {
-  return typeof s5 === "string" && ANCHOR_SID_RE.test(s5);
-}
-
 // ../mcp-i-cloudflare/dist/delegation-http/anchor-routing.js
 function anchorInstanceId(sid) {
   return `pickup:${sid}`;
@@ -146973,10 +147427,10 @@ async function handlePickupGet(c, env2, cfg) {
 init_dist2();
 init_crypto();
 init_storage();
-var DO_INTERNAL_ORIGIN = "https://do.internal";
-async function callAnchor(env2, sid, internalPath, body) {
+var DO_INTERNAL_ORIGIN2 = "https://do.internal";
+async function callAnchor2(env2, sid, internalPath, body) {
   const stub = getAnchorStub(env2, sid);
-  const response = await stub.fetch(new URL(internalPath, DO_INTERNAL_ORIGIN).toString(), {
+  const response = await stub.fetch(new URL(internalPath, DO_INTERNAL_ORIGIN2).toString(), {
     method: "POST",
     headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
     body: JSON.stringify(body)
@@ -147109,6 +147563,17 @@ function isTestConsentMode(env2) {
   const environment = String(bag.ENVIRONMENT ?? bag.MCPI_ENV ?? "").toLowerCase();
   return environment === "development";
 }
+function withCrossResourceClaims(unsigned, info, sid) {
+  if (!info.audience)
+    return unsigned.signingInput;
+  const payload = {
+    ...unsigned.payload,
+    aud: info.audience,
+    sid,
+    ...info.serverDid ? { server_did: info.serverDid } : {}
+  };
+  return `${unsigned.encodedHeader}.${base64UrlEncodeString(JSON.stringify(payload))}`;
+}
 async function mintDelegationVcJwt(env2, sid, info, expiresInS) {
   const cryptoProvider = new WebCryptoProvider();
   const configuredIdentity = getConfiguredIdentity(env2);
@@ -147125,7 +147590,7 @@ async function mintDelegationVcJwt(env2, sid, info, expiresInS) {
     keyId = `${issuerDid}#${didKeyFragment2(issuerDid)}`;
     signingPrivateKey = rawKeyPair.privateKey;
   }
-  const agentDid = env2.MCP_IDENTITY_AGENT_DID || issuerDid;
+  const agentDid = info.agentDid || env2.MCP_IDENTITY_AGENT_DID || issuerDid;
   const nowS = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
   const delegation = {
     id: `urn:uuid:${sid}`,
@@ -147135,7 +147600,11 @@ async function mintDelegationVcJwt(env2, sid, info, expiresInS) {
     constraints: {
       scopes: info.requiredScopes,
       notBefore: nowS,
-      notAfter: nowS + expiresInS
+      notAfter: nowS + expiresInS,
+      // §11.7 outer===inner audience invariant (checkpoint's own mints bind the
+      // audience in BOTH the JWT aud and constraints.audience): set the inner
+      // half for cross-resource anchors so verifiers reading either slot agree.
+      ...info.audience ? { audience: info.audience } : {}
     },
     signature: "",
     status: "active",
@@ -147146,13 +147615,14 @@ async function mintDelegationVcJwt(env2, sid, info, expiresInS) {
     issuanceDate: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString()
   });
   const vcWithIssuer = { ...unsignedVC, issuer: issuerDid };
-  const { signingInput } = createUnsignedVCJWT2(vcWithIssuer, { keyId });
+  const unsigned = createUnsignedVCJWT2(vcWithIssuer, { keyId });
+  const signingInput = withCrossResourceClaims(unsigned, info, sid);
   const signatureBytes = await cryptoProvider.sign(new TextEncoder().encode(signingInput), signingPrivateKey);
   const signature = base64urlEncodeFromBytes2(signatureBytes);
   return completeVCJWT2(signingInput, signature);
 }
 async function handleAnchorConsentGet(c, sid, env2, _cfg) {
-  const infoResponse = await callAnchor(env2, sid, INTERNAL_PICKUP_INFO, {
+  const infoResponse = await callAnchor2(env2, sid, INTERNAL_PICKUP_INFO, {
     sid
   });
   if (infoResponse.status === 404)
@@ -147174,7 +147644,7 @@ async function handleAnchorConsentApprove(c, sid, env2, cfg) {
       return htmlResponse(page("Authorization failed", `<main class="kya-consent-failed"><h1>Authorization failed</h1><p>Invalid or missing security token. Please reload and try again.</p></main>`), 403);
     }
   }
-  const infoResponse = await callAnchor(env2, sid, INTERNAL_PICKUP_INFO, {
+  const infoResponse = await callAnchor2(env2, sid, INTERNAL_PICKUP_INFO, {
     sid
   });
   if (infoResponse.status === 404)
@@ -147193,7 +147663,7 @@ async function handleAnchorConsentApprove(c, sid, env2, cfg) {
     console.warn(`[kya-http] delegation mint failed (sid=${sid}):`, error87 instanceof Error ? error87.message : String(error87));
     return approvalFailedPage("We could not complete the authorization. Please start over.", 500);
   }
-  const approveResponse = await callAnchor(env2, sid, INTERNAL_PICKUP_APPROVE, {
+  const approveResponse = await callAnchor2(env2, sid, INTERNAL_PICKUP_APPROVE, {
     sid,
     vcJwt,
     expiresInS: cfg.delegationExpiresInS
@@ -147237,7 +147707,7 @@ function resolveRequest(c, options) {
     return { env: c.env, cfg: null };
   }
 }
-function registerDelegationHttpRoutes(app, options) {
+function registerDelegationHttpRoutes(app, options, deps) {
   app.get(PICKUP_ROUTE, async (c, next) => {
     const { env: env2, cfg } = resolveRequest(c, options);
     if (!cfg)
@@ -147258,6 +147728,17 @@ function registerDelegationHttpRoutes(app, options) {
       return next();
     return handleAnchorConsentApprove(c, sid, env2, cfg);
   });
+  const proofGenerator = deps?.proofGenerator;
+  app.post(ANCHOR_REGISTRATION_ROUTE, async (c, next) => {
+    const { env: env2, cfg } = resolveRequest(c, options);
+    if (!cfg || !isAnchorRegistrationEnabled(cfg, env2) || !proofGenerator) {
+      return next();
+    }
+    return handleAnchorRegistration(c, env2, cfg, {
+      getAnchorStub,
+      proofGenerator: () => proofGenerator(c)
+    });
+  });
 }
 
 // ../mcp-i-cloudflare/dist/delegation-http/bearer-retry.js
@@ -147360,100 +147841,6 @@ async function applyBearerDelegation(request, env2, _cfg) {
   return { request: rewritten };
 }
 
-// ../mcp-i-cloudflare/dist/delegation-http/challenge.js
-var CHALLENGE_PROOF_METHOD = "kyaos/challenge";
-function buildWWWAuthenticateDelegation(i2) {
-  const values = {
-    realm: i2.realm,
-    sid: i2.sid,
-    consent_uri: buildConsentUri(i2),
-    pickup_uri: buildPickupUri(i2),
-    scope: i2.requiredScopes.join(" "),
-    min_assurance: i2.minAssurance,
-    interval: String(i2.pollIntervalS),
-    kind: "delegation"
-  };
-  const params = CHALLENGE_PARAM_ORDER.filter(
-    // min_assurance is the only optional param: omit the whole token when absent.
-    (key) => values[key] !== void 0
-  ).map((key) => `${key}="${values[key]}"`);
-  return `Delegation ${params.join(", ")}`;
-}
-function buildWWWAuthenticateBearer(realm) {
-  return `Bearer resource_metadata="https://${realm}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"`;
-}
-function buildConsentUri(i2) {
-  return `https://${i2.authorizationHost}/consent?sid=${i2.sid}`;
-}
-function buildPickupUri(i2) {
-  return `https://${i2.authorizationHost}/api/delegation/pickup/${i2.sid}`;
-}
-function buildInstructions(i2) {
-  const consentUri = buildConsentUri(i2);
-  const pickupUri = buildPickupUri(i2);
-  return `This action requires human authorization. Show your user this link and ask them to approve: ${consentUri}. Then poll ${pickupUri} every ${i2.pollIntervalS} seconds. If you can sign HTTP requests, sign each poll with an ephemeral did:key; otherwise generate one random 32-byte token and send it as X-KYA-Pickup-Token on EVERY poll. When the response status is 200, take the 'delegation' value and retry your original request with header 'Authorization: Bearer <delegation>'.`;
-}
-function buildChallengeBody(i2, challengeProof) {
-  const kyaos = {
-    sid: i2.sid,
-    consent_uri: buildConsentUri(i2),
-    pickup_uri: buildPickupUri(i2),
-    required_scopes: i2.requiredScopes
-  };
-  if (i2.minAssurance !== void 0) {
-    kyaos.min_assurance = i2.minAssurance;
-  }
-  kyaos.poll_interval_s = i2.pollIntervalS;
-  kyaos.challenge_proof = challengeProof;
-  return {
-    error: KYAOS_ERRORS.authorizationRequired,
-    kyaos,
-    instructions: buildInstructions(i2)
-  };
-}
-function buildChallengeResponse(i2, challengeProof) {
-  const headers = new Headers();
-  headers.append("WWW-Authenticate", buildWWWAuthenticateDelegation(i2));
-  headers.append("WWW-Authenticate", buildWWWAuthenticateBearer(i2.realm));
-  headers.set("Retry-After", String(i2.pollIntervalS));
-  headers.set("Content-Type", "application/json");
-  headers.set("Cache-Control", "no-store");
-  return new Response(JSON.stringify(buildChallengeBody(i2, challengeProof)), {
-    status: 401,
-    headers
-  });
-}
-function buildFetcherChallengeResponse(i2, challengeProof) {
-  const consentUri = buildConsentUri(i2);
-  const headers = new Headers();
-  headers.set("Content-Type", "application/json");
-  headers.set("Cache-Control", "no-store");
-  headers.set("KYA-Auth-Required", "true");
-  headers.set("KYA-Auth-Url", consentUri);
-  headers.set("Link", `<${consentUri}>; rel="kya-authorize"`);
-  headers.set("KYA-Action", "challenge");
-  return new Response(JSON.stringify(buildChallengeBody(i2, challengeProof)), {
-    status: 200,
-    headers
-  });
-}
-async function signChallengeProof(gen, payload) {
-  const proof = await gen.generateProof({
-    method: CHALLENGE_PROOF_METHOD,
-    params: {
-      sid: payload.sid,
-      consent_uri: payload.consent_uri,
-      required_scopes: payload.required_scopes
-    }
-  }, { data: { sid: payload.sid } }, {
-    // The session binds the proof to this anchor; sid is the natural nonce.
-    nonce: payload.sid,
-    audience: payload.consent_uri,
-    sessionId: payload.sid
-  });
-  return proof.jws;
-}
-
 // ../mcp-i-cloudflare/dist/delegation-http/challenge-middleware.js
 async function readAuthorizationRequiredMeta(response) {
   let parsed;
@@ -147656,7 +148043,9 @@ function createMCPIApp(options) {
       });
     }
   });
-  registerDelegationHttpRoutes(app, options);
+  registerDelegationHttpRoutes(app, options, {
+    proofGenerator: (c) => buildChallengeProofGenerator(c)
+  });
   app.get("/consent.js", async (c) => {
     const server = await getMcpiServer(c.env);
     return server.handleRequest(c.req.raw, c.executionCtx);