@kya-os/cli 1.8.3 → 2.0.2

package/node_modules/@kya-os/contracts/dist/handshake/schemas.js

@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.AgentDispatchRequestSchema = exports.AgentStatusReportSchema = exports.AgentStatusKindSchema = exports.AGENT_STATUS_KINDS = exports.DIDCommProofSchema = exports.DIDCommChallengeSchema = exports.ObserverHelloSchema = exports.DIDCommPopClaimsSchema = exports.DIDCOMM_POP_ALG = exports.DIDCOMM_POP_TYP = exports.NONCE_LENGTH_BYTES = exports.DEFAULT_TIMESTAMP_SKEW_SECONDS = exports.DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_MINUTES = exports.NonceCacheConfigSchema = exports.NonceCacheEntrySchema = exports.SessionContextSchema = exports.HandshakeRequestSchema = exports.MCPClientSessionInfoSchema = exports.MCPClientInfoSchema = exports.SessionIdentityStateSchema = void 0;
+const zod_1 = require("zod");
+/**
+ * OAuth Identity schema (inlined to avoid ESM/CJS boundary issues with @kya-os/consent)
+ * This is a copy of OAuthIdentitySchema from @kya-os/consent for use in handshake types.
+ */
+const oauthIdentitySchema = zod_1.z.object({
+    provider: zod_1.z.string().min(1).max(50),
+    subject: zod_1.z.string().min(1).max(255),
+    email: zod_1.z.string().email().max(255).optional(),
+    name: zod_1.z.string().max(255).optional(),
+});
+/**
+ * Handshake and session management schemas
+ */
+/**
+ * Session Identity State
+ *
+ * Tracks whether a session has been authenticated via OAuth.
+ * Phase 5: Anonymous Sessions Until OAuth
+ *
+ * - 'anonymous': No userDid assigned yet (session started without OAuth)
+ * - 'authenticated': userDid assigned via OAuth → AgentShield identity resolution
+ */
+exports.SessionIdentityStateSchema = zod_1.z.enum(["anonymous", "authenticated"]);
+const MCPClientCapabilitiesSchema = zod_1.z.record(zod_1.z.string(), zod_1.z.unknown());
+exports.MCPClientInfoSchema = zod_1.z.object({
+    name: zod_1.z.string().min(1), // e.g., "Claude Desktop"
+    title: zod_1.z.string().optional(), // Human-readable display name
+    version: zod_1.z.string().optional(), // e.g., "1.0.0"
+    platform: zod_1.z.string().optional(), // e.g., "desktop", "web", "mobile"
+    vendor: zod_1.z.string().optional(), // e.g., "Anthropic"
+    persistentId: zod_1.z.string().optional(), // Client-provided stable identifier
+});
+const MCPHandshakeClientInfoSchema = exports.MCPClientInfoSchema.extend({
+    clientId: zod_1.z.string().optional(), // Server-generated identifier (optional in request)
+});
+exports.MCPClientSessionInfoSchema = exports.MCPClientInfoSchema.extend({
+    clientId: zod_1.z.string(), // Generated by server
+    protocolVersion: zod_1.z.string().optional(), // Negotiated protocol version
+    capabilities: MCPClientCapabilitiesSchema.optional(), // Negotiated capabilities snapshot
+});
+exports.HandshakeRequestSchema = zod_1.z.object({
+    nonce: zod_1.z.string().min(1),
+    audience: zod_1.z.string().min(1),
+    timestamp: zod_1.z.number().int().positive(),
+    agentDid: zod_1.z.string().startsWith("did:").optional(), // Agent DID for delegation verification
+    clientInfo: MCPHandshakeClientInfoSchema.optional(), // Optional client information from MCP initialize
+    clientProtocolVersion: zod_1.z.string().min(1).optional(), // Protocol version negotiated during initialize
+    clientCapabilities: MCPClientCapabilitiesSchema.optional(), // Client capability advertisement
+});
+exports.SessionContextSchema = zod_1.z.object({
+    sessionId: zod_1.z.string().min(1),
+    audience: zod_1.z.string().min(1),
+    nonce: zod_1.z.string().min(1),
+    timestamp: zod_1.z.number().int().positive(),
+    createdAt: zod_1.z.number().int().positive(),
+    lastActivity: zod_1.z.number().int().positive(),
+    ttlMinutes: zod_1.z.number().int().positive().default(30),
+    agentDid: zod_1.z.string().optional(), // MCP Client/Agent DID (from handshake)
+    serverDid: zod_1.z.string().min(1).optional(), // MCP-I Server DID (optional for backward compatibility)
+    clientDid: zod_1.z.string().optional(), // Client app DID (if different from agent)
+    userDid: zod_1.z.string().optional(), // User DID (delegator)
+    clientInfo: exports.MCPClientSessionInfoSchema.optional(), // MCP client information with negotiated metadata
+    // Phase 5: Anonymous Sessions Until OAuth
+    /**
+     * Identity state of the session
+     * @default 'anonymous' - Sessions start anonymous until OAuth completes
+     */
+    identityState: exports.SessionIdentityStateSchema.default("anonymous"),
+    /**
+     * OAuth identity information (populated after successful OAuth)
+     * Contains provider, subject, email from OAuth provider
+     */
+    oauthIdentity: oauthIdentitySchema.optional(),
+    /**
+     * Delegation VC credential ID for the active delegation.
+     * Set after delegation verification succeeds for a protected tool call.
+     * Used by outbound fetch interceptors as the delegation reference embedded
+     * in the KYA-OS-Delegation-Chain / KYA-OS-Delegation-Proof headers.
+     */
+    delegationRef: zod_1.z.string().optional(),
+    /**
+     * Reference chain string for the delegation hierarchy.
+     * Format: "vc_id_1>del_id_1>vc_id_2>del_id_2"
+     * Used by outbound fetch interceptors to inject KYA-OS-Delegation-Chain header.
+     */
+    delegationChain: zod_1.z.string().optional(),
+    /**
+     * Scopes granted by the active delegation.
+     * Used by outbound fetch interceptors to inject KYA-OS-Granted-Scopes header.
+     */
+    delegationScopes: zod_1.z.array(zod_1.z.string()).optional(),
+});
+exports.NonceCacheEntrySchema = zod_1.z.object({
+    sessionId: zod_1.z.string().min(1),
+    expiresAt: zod_1.z.number().int().positive(),
+});
+/**
+ * Configuration for nonce cache implementations
+ */
+exports.NonceCacheConfigSchema = zod_1.z.object({
+    type: zod_1.z.enum(["memory", "redis", "dynamodb", "cloudflare-kv"]).optional(),
+    redis: zod_1.z
+        .object({
+        url: zod_1.z.string().url(),
+        keyPrefix: zod_1.z.string().default("mcpi:nonce:"),
+    })
+        .optional(),
+    dynamodb: zod_1.z
+        .object({
+        tableName: zod_1.z.string(),
+        region: zod_1.z.string().optional(),
+        keyAttribute: zod_1.z.string().default("nonce"),
+        ttlAttribute: zod_1.z.string().default("expiresAt"),
+    })
+        .optional(),
+    cloudflareKv: zod_1.z
+        .object({
+        namespace: zod_1.z.string(),
+        keyPrefix: zod_1.z.string().default("nonce:"),
+    })
+        .optional(),
+});
+// Constants
+exports.DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_MINUTES = 30;
+exports.DEFAULT_TIMESTAMP_SKEW_SECONDS = 120;
+exports.NONCE_LENGTH_BYTES = 16; // 128-bit
+/* ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+ * DIDComm proof-of-possession
+ *
+ * The wire format a connector uses to prove it holds the private half of the key
+ * it presented at handshake. The coordination hub challenges with a nonce; the
+ * connector returns a compact JWS over it.
+ *
+ * Lives here, on the `./handshake` subpath, rather than under `./proof` --
+ * both are plain wire material, but this IS handshake material, and
+ * `./proof` was (until review-loop P20 folded it) a flat file shadowed by a
+ * same-named directory: tsc's extensionless resolution favored the flat
+ * `proof.d.ts` while Node's exports map followed `dist/proof/index.js`, so a
+ * symbol added to only one type-checked in dev and failed the build. This
+ * directory has that exact same flat/dir twin today -- P20 folds this file's
+ * content in from the former flat `src/handshake.ts`, which is now a
+ * `@deprecated` one-line shim of `./index.ts` -- so new symbols belong here,
+ * in the directory, never back in the flat file.
+ *
+ * Shared because there are two implementors: the hub in @kya-os/compute verifies
+ * these, and @kya-os/cli produces one when its orchestrator daemon attaches as an
+ * observer. The CLI cannot depend on compute -- compute is PID 1 in a Fly worker,
+ * the CLI is a published package -- so without a shared spec the format would
+ * exist twice and drift the first time either side touched a header.
+ *
+ * Only the FORMAT is here; signing and verification stay with the sides holding
+ * keys, which is why this adds no crypto dependency.
+ *
+ * Related: #3147 (hello proof-of-possession)
+ * ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+/**
+ * JWS `typ` header for a DIDComm proof-of-possession.
+ *
+ * A verifier MUST reject a proof whose `typ` differs. Without that check a JWS
+ * minted for some other purpose — an API token, a delegation credential — could
+ * be replayed as a possession proof, since both are signed by the same key.
+ */
+exports.DIDCOMM_POP_TYP = 'didcomm-pop+jwt';
+/** Signature algorithm. Ed25519 throughout the platform. */
+exports.DIDCOMM_POP_ALG = 'EdDSA';
+/**
+ * Claims a proof carries.
+ *
+ * `nonce` is the hub's challenge, which makes the proof fresh and single-use.
+ * `sub` binds it to the DID that presented the key, so a valid proof for one DID
+ * cannot be replayed as another's.
+ */
+exports.DIDCommPopClaimsSchema = zod_1.z.object({
+    /** The exact nonce the hub issued. */
+    nonce: zod_1.z.string().min(1),
+    /** The DID being proven. */
+    sub: zod_1.z.string().min(1),
+});
+/**
+ * The `observe` frame an observer sends to attach to a hub.
+ *
+ * `did` and `publicKey` are optional on the wire because a hub may admit a
+ * loopback observer without them. When the hub requires authentication, both are
+ * needed: the DID to bind the proof to, and the key to verify the binding before
+ * a challenge is spent.
+ */
+exports.ObserverHelloSchema = zod_1.z.object({
+    type: zod_1.z.literal('observe'),
+    did: zod_1.z.string().min(1).optional(),
+    /** JSON-serialised public JWK. */
+    publicKey: zod_1.z.string().min(1).optional(),
+});
+/** The hub's challenge, and the answer to it. */
+exports.DIDCommChallengeSchema = zod_1.z.object({
+    type: zod_1.z.literal('challenge'),
+    nonce: zod_1.z.string().min(1),
+});
+exports.DIDCommProofSchema = zod_1.z.object({
+    type: zod_1.z.literal('proof'),
+    /** Compact JWS over {@link DIDCommPopClaimsSchema}. */
+    jws: zod_1.z.string().min(1),
+});
+/* ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+ * Agent harness wrapper wire frames (review-loop P17)
+ *
+ * `kya-os agent run` attaches to the hub over the SAME hello/challenge/proof
+ * handshake an observer uses (`ObserverHelloSchema` above) -- it presents its
+ * profile's DID and answers the hub's challenge identically. What differs is
+ * that a wrapper is not a passive spectator: once attached it SENDS its own
+ * lifecycle status and CAN receive a hub-originated dispatch, so it needs two
+ * frame shapes an observer never uses.
+ *
+ * These are deliberately NOT wire-compatible with the existing full DIDComm
+ * worker protocol `packages/compute/src/didcomm/hub.ts` speaks to a connected
+ * `ConnectedAgent` (signed envelopes, `https://kya-os.ai/didcomm/task/*`
+ * typed messages) -- that protocol lives in `@kya-os/compute`, which the CLI
+ * must never import, so it cannot be spoken directly from here. Reconciling
+ * hub-side handling of the frames below with that existing worker path is
+ * follow-up work; this module only fixes the format both sides need to agree
+ * on, exactly as `./handshake`'s existing observer frames already do for the
+ * #686 precedent.
+ * ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+/**
+ * Lifecycle status kinds a wrapper reports. `dispatch_result` and
+ * `dispatch_refused` only occur for a profile whose `commandAllowlist` is
+ * non-empty (contracts has no opinion on the allowlist itself -- that lives
+ * on the profile, on disk, on the user's machine).
+ */
+exports.AGENT_STATUS_KINDS = [
+    'started',
+    'heartbeat',
+    'stopped',
+    'dispatch_result',
+    'dispatch_refused',
+];
+exports.AgentStatusKindSchema = zod_1.z.enum(exports.AGENT_STATUS_KINDS);
+/**
+ * A wrapper's lifecycle report, sent hub-ward over its attached connection.
+ *
+ * `detail` is deliberately an OPEN record rather than a per-status union of
+ * required fields: v1 is process-level only (started/heartbeat/stopped), and
+ * task-level detail arriving later (once a harness exposes hooks) must not
+ * require a new message `type` -- only a new key inside `detail`. Adding a
+ * required field here for one status would also make it meaningless for
+ * every other status, which `.record` avoids by construction.
+ */
+exports.AgentStatusReportSchema = zod_1.z.object({
+    type: zod_1.z.literal('agent_status'),
+    /** The reporting profile's DID -- who this status is about. */
+    did: zod_1.z.string().min(1),
+    slug: zod_1.z.string().min(1),
+    status: exports.AgentStatusKindSchema,
+    timestamp: zod_1.z.number().int().positive(),
+    detail: zod_1.z.record(zod_1.z.string(), zod_1.z.unknown()),
+});
+/**
+ * A hub-originated task, addressed to one wrapper. The wrapper MUST refuse
+ * (never execute) any `command` that is not an exact-match entry in its
+ * profile's on-disk `commandAllowlist` -- that gate lives entirely on the
+ * receiving side; this schema only fixes the wire shape of the proposal.
+ *
+ * /get finding (bestbrian, PR #708, P2): `taskId`/`command` were unbounded
+ * strings. Not an execution risk -- `command` still has to exact-match the
+ * allowlist to run anything -- but an unbounded frame is unbounded log and
+ * memory growth per delivery regardless of whether it is ever executed.
+ * `taskId` gets the same identifier bound this file already uses elsewhere
+ * (`subject: z.string().min(1).max(255)`); `command` gets a generous but
+ * finite bound for a shell command line.
+ */
+exports.AgentDispatchRequestSchema = zod_1.z.object({
+    type: zod_1.z.literal('agent_dispatch'),
+    taskId: zod_1.z.string().min(1).max(255),
+    command: zod_1.z.string().min(1).max(4096),
+});
+// A pending P16 GitHub credential anchor is delivered hub-ward through the
+// wire frame P16 already defines and tests (`GithubCredentialAnchorMessageSchema`,
+// re-exported from `./index.ts`) via `deliverPendingGithubCredentialAnchor` --
+// no separate P17 frame type is needed for it.

package/node_modules/@kya-os/contracts/dist/handshake/verify.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/**
+ * GitHub Credential Anchor Verification
+ *
+ * Raw Ed25519 verify for a `GithubCredentialAnchor` (see
+ * `github-credential-anchor.ts`), kept in its own subpath
+ * (`@kya-os/contracts/handshake/verify`) rather than the `./handshake`
+ * barrel — same reason `review/verify.ts` is split from `./review`: this
+ * file's `node:crypto` import would otherwise be pulled into
+ * `@kya-os/mcp-i-cloudflare`'s Cloudflare Workers bundle, which imports
+ * `@kya-os/contracts/handshake` for its session/nonce types and has no
+ * `node:crypto`. Import this module directly wherever the verify function
+ * itself is actually needed (today: `@kya-os/compute`'s hub, which is
+ * Node-only).
+ *
+ * @module @kya-os/contracts/handshake/verify
+ */
+import { type GithubCredentialAnchor } from './github-credential-anchor.js';
+/**
+ * Verify that `anchor.proof.signature` was produced by the private half of
+ * `publicKeyRaw` (raw 32-byte Ed25519 public key) over
+ * `getGithubCredentialAnchorSigningString(anchor)` (the anchor minus its own
+ * `proof`).
+ *
+ * This does NOT check that the signer's DID is actually listed in
+ * `anchor.agentDids`, or that `publicKeyRaw` actually belongs to that DID —
+ * callers (the hub) supply the public key for the DID they have
+ * independently authenticated (e.g. via the observer hello/challenge/proof
+ * handshake) and cross-check membership in `agentDids` themselves. This
+ * verifies one fact — possession + integrity of the signed tuple — not the
+ * whole anchoring protocol's authorization decision.
+ *
+ * Fail-closed: any malformed input, key-import failure, or signature
+ * mismatch returns `false` rather than throwing — never admit on an
+ * unverifiable anchor.
+ */
+export declare function verifyGithubCredentialAnchorProof(anchor: GithubCredentialAnchor, publicKeyRaw: Uint8Array): boolean;

package/node_modules/@kya-os/contracts/dist/handshake/verify.js

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * GitHub Credential Anchor Verification
+ *
+ * Raw Ed25519 verify for a `GithubCredentialAnchor` (see
+ * `github-credential-anchor.ts`), kept in its own subpath
+ * (`@kya-os/contracts/handshake/verify`) rather than the `./handshake`
+ * barrel — same reason `review/verify.ts` is split from `./review`: this
+ * file's `node:crypto` import would otherwise be pulled into
+ * `@kya-os/mcp-i-cloudflare`'s Cloudflare Workers bundle, which imports
+ * `@kya-os/contracts/handshake` for its session/nonce types and has no
+ * `node:crypto`. Import this module directly wherever the verify function
+ * itself is actually needed (today: `@kya-os/compute`'s hub, which is
+ * Node-only).
+ *
+ * @module @kya-os/contracts/handshake/verify
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.verifyGithubCredentialAnchorProof = verifyGithubCredentialAnchorProof;
+const node_crypto_1 = require("node:crypto");
+const github_credential_anchor_js_1 = require("./github-credential-anchor.js");
+// DER prefix that turns a raw 32-byte Ed25519 public key into an SPKI key —
+// the same wrapping `review/verify.ts`'s `verifyFixAttestationProof` and
+// `utils/dco/ssh-key.ts`'s PKCS8 sibling prefix use for the private half.
+const ED25519_SPKI_PREFIX = Buffer.from('302a300506032b6570032100', 'hex');
+/**
+ * Verify that `anchor.proof.signature` was produced by the private half of
+ * `publicKeyRaw` (raw 32-byte Ed25519 public key) over
+ * `getGithubCredentialAnchorSigningString(anchor)` (the anchor minus its own
+ * `proof`).
+ *
+ * This does NOT check that the signer's DID is actually listed in
+ * `anchor.agentDids`, or that `publicKeyRaw` actually belongs to that DID —
+ * callers (the hub) supply the public key for the DID they have
+ * independently authenticated (e.g. via the observer hello/challenge/proof
+ * handshake) and cross-check membership in `agentDids` themselves. This
+ * verifies one fact — possession + integrity of the signed tuple — not the
+ * whole anchoring protocol's authorization decision.
+ *
+ * Fail-closed: any malformed input, key-import failure, or signature
+ * mismatch returns `false` rather than throwing — never admit on an
+ * unverifiable anchor.
+ */
+function verifyGithubCredentialAnchorProof(anchor, publicKeyRaw) {
+    try {
+        const { proof, ...rest } = anchor;
+        const signingString = (0, github_credential_anchor_js_1.getGithubCredentialAnchorSigningString)(rest);
+        const publicKey = (0, node_crypto_1.createPublicKey)({
+            key: Buffer.concat([ED25519_SPKI_PREFIX, Buffer.from(publicKeyRaw)]),
+            format: 'der',
+            type: 'spki',
+        });
+        return (0, node_crypto_1.verify)(null, Buffer.from(signingString, 'utf8'), publicKey, Buffer.from(proof.signature, 'base64url'));
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false; // fail-closed — never admit on an unverifiable anchor
+    }
+}

package/node_modules/@kya-os/contracts/dist/handshake.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/**
+ * @deprecated Flat-file twin of `./handshake/`. All content now lives in
+ * `./handshake/schemas.ts` (plus the pre-existing `github-credential-anchor.ts`
+ * directory sibling), reached through `./handshake/index.ts`. This file
+ * exists only so a pre-existing deep import of the compiled
+ * `@kya-os/contracts/dist/handshake.js` path keeps resolving for one more
+ * minor version; new code should import `./handshake/index.js` (or the
+ * `@kya-os/contracts/handshake` package subpath) directly.
+ *
+ * Removal slated for contracts 2.0.0 (review-loop P20 epic, phase 3).
+ */
+export * from "./handshake/index.js";

package/node_modules/@kya-os/contracts/dist/handshake.js

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+"use strict";
+var __createBinding = (this && this.__createBinding) || (Object.create ? (function(o, m, k, k2) {
+    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
+    var desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(m, k);
+    if (!desc || ("get" in desc ? !m.__esModule : desc.writable || desc.configurable)) {
+      desc = { enumerable: true, get: function() { return m[k]; } };
+    }
+    Object.defineProperty(o, k2, desc);
+}) : (function(o, m, k, k2) {
+    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
+    o[k2] = m[k];
+}));
+var __exportStar = (this && this.__exportStar) || function(m, exports) {
+    for (var p in m) if (p !== "default" && !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(exports, p)) __createBinding(exports, m, p);
+};
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+/**
+ * @deprecated Flat-file twin of `./handshake/`. All content now lives in
+ * `./handshake/schemas.ts` (plus the pre-existing `github-credential-anchor.ts`
+ * directory sibling), reached through `./handshake/index.ts`. This file
+ * exists only so a pre-existing deep import of the compiled
+ * `@kya-os/contracts/dist/handshake.js` path keeps resolving for one more
+ * minor version; new code should import `./handshake/index.js` (or the
+ * `@kya-os/contracts/handshake` package subpath) directly.
+ *
+ * Removal slated for contracts 2.0.0 (review-loop P20 epic, phase 3).
+ */
+__exportStar(require("./handshake/index.js"), exports);

package/node_modules/@kya-os/contracts/dist/identity/index.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+/**
+ * Identity Module
+ *
+ * Exports for OAuth identity → persistent user DID resolution.
+ * Part of Phase 5: Identity Resolution Integration
+ *
+ * Also exports KTA registration types for reputation tracking.
+ */
+export * from "./schemas.js";
+export { KTARegistration, KTARegistrationSchema, AgentIdentity, AgentIdentitySchema, } from "../config/identity.js";

package/node_modules/@kya-os/contracts/dist/identity/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Identity Module
+ *
+ * Exports for OAuth identity → persistent user DID resolution.
+ * Part of Phase 5: Identity Resolution Integration
+ *
+ * Also exports KTA registration types for reputation tracking.
+ */
+var __createBinding = (this && this.__createBinding) || (Object.create ? (function(o, m, k, k2) {
+    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
+    var desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(m, k);
+    if (!desc || ("get" in desc ? !m.__esModule : desc.writable || desc.configurable)) {
+      desc = { enumerable: true, get: function() { return m[k]; } };
+    }
+    Object.defineProperty(o, k2, desc);
+}) : (function(o, m, k, k2) {
+    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
+    o[k2] = m[k];
+}));
+var __exportStar = (this && this.__exportStar) || function(m, exports) {
+    for (var p in m) if (p !== "default" && !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(exports, p)) __createBinding(exports, m, p);
+};
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.AgentIdentitySchema = exports.KTARegistrationSchema = void 0;
+__exportStar(require("./schemas.js"), exports);
+// Re-export KTA registration and AgentIdentity types from config/identity (canonical location)
+var identity_js_1 = require("../config/identity.js");
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "KTARegistrationSchema", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return identity_js_1.KTARegistrationSchema; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "AgentIdentitySchema", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return identity_js_1.AgentIdentitySchema; } });