@kya-os/checkpoint-shared 1.5.1 → 1.5.2

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Files changed (141) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +120 -0
  2. package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.d.mts +36 -0
  3. package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.d.mts.map +1 -0
  4. package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.d.ts +36 -0
  5. package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  6. package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.js +305 -0
  7. package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.mjs +294 -0
  8. package/dist/beacon-nonce/index.mjs.map +1 -0
  9. package/dist/beacon-types/index.d.mts +29 -0
  10. package/dist/beacon-types/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
  11. package/dist/beacon-types/index.d.ts +29 -0
  12. package/dist/beacon-types/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  13. package/dist/beacon-types/index.js +36 -5
  14. package/dist/beacon-types/index.mjs +33 -6
  15. package/dist/beacon-types/index.mjs.map +1 -1
  16. package/dist/browser-posture-D4j2a5gi.d.ts +169 -0
  17. package/dist/browser-posture-D4j2a5gi.d.ts.map +1 -0
  18. package/dist/browser-posture-DVoHMHjY.d.mts +169 -0
  19. package/dist/browser-posture-DVoHMHjY.d.mts.map +1 -0
  20. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.d.mts +4 -2
  21. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.d.mts.map +1 -0
  22. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.d.ts +4 -2
  23. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.d.ts.map +1 -0
  24. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.mjs.map +1 -1
  25. package/dist/browser-posture-proof.d.mts +18 -0
  26. package/dist/browser-posture-proof.d.mts.map +1 -0
  27. package/dist/browser-posture-proof.d.ts +18 -0
  28. package/dist/browser-posture-proof.d.ts.map +1 -0
  29. package/dist/browser-posture-proof.js +66 -0
  30. package/dist/browser-posture-proof.mjs +63 -0
  31. package/dist/browser-posture-proof.mjs.map +1 -0
  32. package/dist/browser-posture-report.d.mts +59 -2
  33. package/dist/browser-posture-report.d.mts.map +1 -1
  34. package/dist/browser-posture-report.d.ts +59 -2
  35. package/dist/browser-posture-report.d.ts.map +1 -1
  36. package/dist/browser-posture-report.js +1 -1
  37. package/dist/browser-posture-report.mjs +1 -1
  38. package/dist/browser-posture-report.mjs.map +1 -1
  39. package/dist/browser-posture.d.mts +2 -85
  40. package/dist/browser-posture.d.ts +2 -85
  41. package/dist/browser-posture.js +205 -43
  42. package/dist/browser-posture.mjs +194 -44
  43. package/dist/browser-posture.mjs.map +1 -1
  44. package/dist/browser.d.mts +0 -8
  45. package/dist/browser.d.mts.map +1 -1
  46. package/dist/browser.d.ts +0 -8
  47. package/dist/browser.d.ts.map +1 -1
  48. package/dist/browser.js +1 -1
  49. package/dist/browser.mjs +1 -1
  50. package/dist/browser.mjs.map +1 -1
  51. package/dist/clearance.d.mts +1 -1
  52. package/dist/clearance.d.ts +1 -1
  53. package/dist/{client-ip-HOfe6ucV.mjs → client-ip-B2Xeo-GK.mjs} +2 -2
  54. package/dist/{client-ip-HOfe6ucV.mjs.map → client-ip-B2Xeo-GK.mjs.map} +1 -1
  55. package/dist/{client-ip-1y2iXAYW.js → client-ip-CW6pRyLf.js} +1 -1
  56. package/dist/consent-handoff.d.mts +41 -0
  57. package/dist/consent-handoff.d.mts.map +1 -0
  58. package/dist/consent-handoff.d.ts +41 -0
  59. package/dist/consent-handoff.d.ts.map +1 -0
  60. package/dist/consent-handoff.js +1 -0
  61. package/dist/consent-handoff.mjs +2 -0
  62. package/dist/consent-handoff.mjs.map +1 -0
  63. package/dist/errors/index.d.mts +138 -0
  64. package/dist/errors/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
  65. package/dist/errors/index.d.ts +138 -0
  66. package/dist/errors/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  67. package/dist/errors/index.js +441 -9
  68. package/dist/errors/index.mjs +441 -10
  69. package/dist/errors/index.mjs.map +1 -1
  70. package/dist/{external-jr_S4iSS.d.mts → external-Ct8j_hto.d.mts} +2 -2
  71. package/dist/{external-jr_S4iSS.d.mts.map → external-Ct8j_hto.d.mts.map} +1 -1
  72. package/dist/{external-jr_S4iSS.d.ts → external-Ct8j_hto.d.ts} +2 -2
  73. package/dist/{external-jr_S4iSS.d.ts.map → external-Ct8j_hto.d.ts.map} +1 -1
  74. package/dist/gateway-client-ip.d.mts +1 -1
  75. package/dist/gateway-client-ip.d.ts +1 -1
  76. package/dist/gateway-client-ip.js +1 -1
  77. package/dist/gateway-client-ip.mjs +1 -1
  78. package/dist/index.d.mts +5131 -967
  79. package/dist/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
  80. package/dist/index.d.ts +5131 -967
  81. package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  82. package/dist/index.js +3678 -546
  83. package/dist/index.mjs +3446 -534
  84. package/dist/index.mjs.map +1 -1
  85. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.d.mts +1 -1
  86. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
  87. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.d.ts +1 -1
  88. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  89. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.js +48 -48
  90. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.mjs +48 -48
  91. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.mjs.map +1 -1
  92. package/dist/posture-origins/index.d.mts +41 -0
  93. package/dist/posture-origins/index.d.mts.map +1 -0
  94. package/dist/posture-origins/index.d.ts +41 -0
  95. package/dist/posture-origins/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  96. package/dist/posture-origins/index.js +441 -0
  97. package/dist/posture-origins/index.mjs +430 -0
  98. package/dist/posture-origins/index.mjs.map +1 -0
  99. package/dist/posture-origins-CEm83u4D.js +621 -0
  100. package/dist/posture-origins-Dl7i8j93.mjs +533 -0
  101. package/dist/posture-origins-Dl7i8j93.mjs.map +1 -0
  102. package/dist/rules.json +0 -1
  103. package/dist/signals/index.d.mts +75 -55
  104. package/dist/signals/index.d.mts.map +1 -1
  105. package/dist/signals/index.d.ts +75 -55
  106. package/dist/signals/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  107. package/dist/signals/index.js +246 -2
  108. package/dist/signals/index.mjs +236 -3
  109. package/dist/signals/index.mjs.map +1 -1
  110. package/fixtures/browser-integrity/captured-java-0.2.1-missing-score.json +10 -0
  111. package/fixtures/browser-integrity/null-score.json +11 -0
  112. package/fixtures/browser-integrity/numeric-score.json +11 -0
  113. package/fixtures/browser-posture-claims.json +168 -0
  114. package/fixtures/browser-posture-headers.json +6 -0
  115. package/fixtures/kya-http/README.md +1 -0
  116. package/fixtures/kya-http/consent-handoff.codes.json +34 -0
  117. package/fixtures/workbench/a2a-signed-request.v1.json +255 -0
  118. package/fixtures/workbench/artifact-bindings.v1.json +1003 -0
  119. package/fixtures/workbench/delegation-management.v1.json +507 -0
  120. package/fixtures/workbench/didcomm-task-source.v1.json +191 -0
  121. package/fixtures/workbench/graph-interfaces.v1.json +1887 -0
  122. package/fixtures/workbench/identity-provisioning.v1.json +643 -0
  123. package/fixtures/workbench/linear-installation.v1.json +484 -0
  124. package/fixtures/workbench/management-session.v1.json +716 -0
  125. package/fixtures/workbench/model-credentials.v1.json +630 -0
  126. package/fixtures/workbench/source-claim-pooled.v1.json +50 -0
  127. package/fixtures/workbench/task-grant.v1.json +695 -0
  128. package/fixtures/workbench/task-status-projection.v1.json +591 -0
  129. package/fixtures/workbench/workload-enrollment.v1.json +580 -0
  130. package/package.json +21 -2
  131. package/src/data/compiled/merged-rules.json +2 -9
  132. package/src/data/default-rules.json +0 -1
  133. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie-Dmq9Brf_.d.mts +0 -5
  134. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie-Dmq9Brf_.d.mts.map +0 -1
  135. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie-Dmq9Brf_.d.ts +0 -5
  136. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie-Dmq9Brf_.d.ts.map +0 -1
  137. package/dist/browser-posture.d.mts.map +0 -1
  138. package/dist/browser-posture.d.ts.map +0 -1
  139. package/dist/patterns-CkRVOdtV.js +0 -243
  140. package/dist/patterns-DzkGy_qk.mjs +0 -173
  141. package/dist/patterns-DzkGy_qk.mjs.map +0 -1
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
1
+ //#region src/beacon-nonce/index.ts
2
+ /**
3
+ * Stateless, client-bound beacon nonce, issued and verified by both the
4
+ * origin (`apps/web/lib/services/nonce.service.ts`) and the beacon-ingest
5
+ * edge Worker.
6
+ *
7
+ * Every pixel/beacon response hands the browser a per-session nonce that its
8
+ * next post must echo. A queue-only edge returns its receipt before the
9
+ * origin has seen the batch, so the nonce cannot depend on origin state:
10
+ * it is an HMAC-SHA256 under a secret shared by origin and edge. The origin
11
+ * verifies it at synchronous ingest, or on replay using the edge's
12
+ * acceptance time as the clock.
13
+ *
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+ * Web Crypto only (`crypto.subtle`, `crypto.getRandomValues`): this runs
15
+ * unchanged in Cloudflare Workers, Node ≥ 20 and the browser bundle.
16
+ *
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+ * Wire format (56 chars, inside the schema's 64-char cap):
18
+ *
19
+ * n2.<issuedAt base36 seconds>.<random 8 bytes b64url>.<HMAC 16 bytes b64url>.<ctx tag 8 bytes b64url>
20
+ *
21
+ * The first HMAC binds the format version + project + session + issue time +
22
+ * random. The trailing context tag additionally binds the requester's
23
+ * network prefix and User-Agent (`beaconNonceContext`), so a nonce lifted
24
+ * from one client does not verify from another. The version is inside the
25
+ * MAC, so a nonce cannot be relabelled to dodge the context tag.
26
+ *
27
+ * Verdict semantics — three states, never two:
28
+ * - `verified`: signature matches THIS project+session, the context matches,
29
+ * and it is within TTL.
30
+ * - `forged`: well-formed but the MAC does not match this session/secret.
31
+ * The only outcome that counts as evidence against the client.
32
+ * - `unverified`: nothing could be proven — not signed-format (absent, or
33
+ * a value from before signing existed), expired, from the future, this
34
+ * side has no secret, or the session signature is genuine but the
35
+ * requester's network/User-Agent differs from the one it was issued to (a
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+ * roaming phone and a replay from elsewhere look the same, so neither is
37
+ * treated as fabrication). Staleness is not forgery: an edge that stopped
38
+ * issuing (secret unset) leaves clients echoing old values, and that must
39
+ * degrade to "unknown", never to "failed".
40
+ *
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+ * Any unexpired signature for the session verifies, so a nonce is not
42
+ * single-use within its TTL. Multi-tab sessions need no window at all.
43
+ */
44
+ const NONCE_VERSION = "n2";
45
+ const MAC_INPUT_PREFIX = `checkpoint-beacon-nonce:${NONCE_VERSION}`;
46
+ const CONTEXT_INPUT_PREFIX = `checkpoint-beacon-nonce:ctx:${NONCE_VERSION}`;
47
+ const RANDOM_BYTES = 8;
48
+ const MAC_BYTES = 16;
49
+ const CONTEXT_TAG_BYTES = 8;
50
+ const MAX_CONTEXT_USER_AGENT_LENGTH = 512;
51
+ const IPV4_PATTERN = /^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/;
52
+ const IPV6_GROUP_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/;
53
+ const ISSUED_AT_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-z]{1,16}$/;
54
+ const BASE64URL_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/;
55
+ const HANDOFF_TOKEN_INPUT_PREFIX = "checkpoint-handoff-token:v1";
56
+ const HANDOFF_ID_BYTES = 16;
57
+ const HANDOFF_TAG_BYTES = 16;
58
+ const HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/;
59
+ /** How long an issued nonce stays verifiable. */
60
+ const BEACON_NONCE_TTL_SECONDS = 600;
61
+ /** Edge and origin clocks may disagree; a nonce this far "in the future" still verifies. */
62
+ const BEACON_NONCE_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 60;
63
+ /** The beacon wire schema's `nonce: z.string().max(64)`. */
64
+ const BEACON_NONCE_MAX_LENGTH = 64;
65
+ function ipv4Prefix(ip) {
66
+ const match = IPV4_PATTERN.exec(ip);
67
+ return match ? `${match[1]}.${match[2]}.${match[3]}` : null;
68
+ }
69
+ /**
70
+ * The first three groups (a /48) of an IPv6 address, expanded so compressed
71
+ * forms agree with their spelled-out equivalents. An IPv4-mapped address
72
+ * (`::ffff:a.b.c.d` or its hex spelling) is a v4 client and keys on its /24.
73
+ * `null` for anything that is not a well-formed address.
74
+ */
75
+ function ipv6Prefix(ip) {
76
+ const bare = ip.toLowerCase().split("%")[0];
77
+ const lastColon = bare.lastIndexOf(":");
78
+ const embedded = IPV4_PATTERN.exec(bare.slice(lastColon + 1));
79
+ const halves = (embedded ? `${bare.slice(0, lastColon + 1)}${(Number(embedded[1]) << 8 | Number(embedded[2])).toString(16)}:${(Number(embedded[3]) << 8 | Number(embedded[4])).toString(16)}` : bare).split("::");
80
+ if (halves.length > 2) return null;
81
+ const head = halves[0] ? halves[0].split(":") : [];
82
+ const tail = halves.length === 2 && halves[1] ? halves[1].split(":") : [];
83
+ const missing = 8 - head.length - tail.length;
84
+ if (halves.length === 1 ? missing !== 0 : missing < 1) return null;
85
+ const groups = [
86
+ ...head,
87
+ ...Array(halves.length === 2 ? missing : 0).fill("0"),
88
+ ...tail
89
+ ];
90
+ if (!groups.every((group) => IPV6_GROUP_PATTERN.test(group))) return null;
91
+ const words = groups.map((group) => parseInt(group, 16));
92
+ if (words.slice(0, 5).every((word) => word === 0) && words[5] === 65535) return `${words[6] >> 8}.${words[6] & 255}.${words[7] >> 8}`;
93
+ return words.slice(0, 3).map((word) => word.toString(16)).join(":");
94
+ }
95
+ /**
96
+ * The requester facts a nonce is bound to: the network prefix (IPv4 /24,
97
+ * IPv6 /48, so NAT and DHCP churn inside one access network still verify)
98
+ * and the User-Agent. Empty when neither is known, which binds nothing.
99
+ */
100
+ function beaconNonceContext(client) {
101
+ const ip = client.ip?.trim() ?? "";
102
+ const prefix = ipv4Prefix(ip) ?? (ip.includes(":") ? ipv6Prefix(ip) : null) ?? "";
103
+ const userAgent = (client.userAgent ?? "").slice(0, MAX_CONTEXT_USER_AGENT_LENGTH);
104
+ return prefix || userAgent ? `${prefix}|${userAgent}` : "";
105
+ }
106
+ const encoder = new TextEncoder();
107
+ const keyCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
108
+ function hmacKey(secret) {
109
+ let key = keyCache.get(secret);
110
+ if (!key) {
111
+ key = crypto.subtle.importKey("raw", encoder.encode(secret), {
112
+ name: "HMAC",
113
+ hash: "SHA-256"
114
+ }, false, ["sign"]);
115
+ keyCache.set(secret, key);
116
+ }
117
+ return key;
118
+ }
119
+ function base64url(bytes) {
120
+ let binary = "";
121
+ for (const byte of bytes) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);
122
+ return btoa(binary).replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/, "");
123
+ }
124
+ /**
125
+ * Length-prefixed canonical encoding (`<byteLength>:<field>`), never a bare
126
+ * delimiter join: `sessionId` is caller-controlled at the edge, so a value
127
+ * that embeds the delimiter must not be able to shift the field boundaries
128
+ * and re-bind the MAC to another session (Cursor Bugbot, PR #5255).
129
+ */
130
+ function canonical(fields) {
131
+ const chunks = fields.map((field) => {
132
+ const bytes = encoder.encode(field);
133
+ return [encoder.encode(`${bytes.length}:`), bytes];
134
+ });
135
+ const total = chunks.reduce((sum, [len, bytes]) => sum + len.length + bytes.length, 0);
136
+ const out = new Uint8Array(new ArrayBuffer(total));
137
+ let offset = 0;
138
+ for (const [len, bytes] of chunks) {
139
+ out.set(len, offset);
140
+ offset += len.length;
141
+ out.set(bytes, offset);
142
+ offset += bytes.length;
143
+ }
144
+ return out;
145
+ }
146
+ async function mac(secret, binding, issuedAt, random) {
147
+ const input = canonical([
148
+ MAC_INPUT_PREFIX,
149
+ binding.projectId,
150
+ binding.sessionId,
151
+ issuedAt,
152
+ random
153
+ ]);
154
+ const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign("HMAC", await hmacKey(secret), input);
155
+ return base64url(new Uint8Array(signature, 0, MAC_BYTES));
156
+ }
157
+ async function contextTag(secret, binding, issuedAt, random) {
158
+ const input = canonical([
159
+ CONTEXT_INPUT_PREFIX,
160
+ binding.projectId,
161
+ binding.sessionId,
162
+ issuedAt,
163
+ random,
164
+ binding.context
165
+ ]);
166
+ const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign("HMAC", await hmacKey(secret), input);
167
+ return base64url(new Uint8Array(signature, 0, CONTEXT_TAG_BYTES));
168
+ }
169
+ function constantTimeEqual(left, right) {
170
+ if (left.length !== right.length) return false;
171
+ let diff = 0;
172
+ for (let i = 0; i < left.length; i += 1) diff |= left.charCodeAt(i) ^ right.charCodeAt(i);
173
+ return diff === 0;
174
+ }
175
+ /** True when `nonce` is in the signed wire format (not necessarily valid). */
176
+ function isSignedBeaconNonce(nonce) {
177
+ return typeof nonce === "string" && nonce.startsWith(`${NONCE_VERSION}.`);
178
+ }
179
+ /**
180
+ * Mint a nonce for `binding` at `issuedAtMs`. Throws when `secret` is
181
+ * empty — issuing an unsigned value would be indistinguishable from a
182
+ * real one on the wire, so the caller must decide to issue nothing.
183
+ */
184
+ async function issueSignedBeaconNonce(secret, binding, issuedAtMs) {
185
+ if (!secret) throw new Error("beacon nonce secret is required to issue a signed nonce");
186
+ const issuedAt = Math.floor(issuedAtMs / 1e3).toString(36);
187
+ const random = base64url(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(RANDOM_BYTES)));
188
+ return [
189
+ NONCE_VERSION,
190
+ issuedAt,
191
+ random,
192
+ await mac(secret, binding, issuedAt, random),
193
+ await contextTag(secret, binding, issuedAt, random)
194
+ ].join(".");
195
+ }
196
+ /**
197
+ * Verify `nonce` against `binding` as of `nowMs`. Never throws; every
198
+ * failure mode is a verdict (see the module doc for why expiry is
199
+ * `unverified` rather than `forged`).
200
+ */
201
+ async function verifySignedBeaconNonce(secret, binding, nonce, nowMs) {
202
+ if (!isSignedBeaconNonce(nonce)) return {
203
+ verdict: "unverified",
204
+ reason: "malformed"
205
+ };
206
+ const parts = nonce.split(".");
207
+ if (parts.length !== 5 || parts.some((part) => part.length === 0)) return {
208
+ verdict: "unverified",
209
+ reason: "malformed"
210
+ };
211
+ const [, issuedAt, random, providedMac, providedContextTag] = parts;
212
+ if (!ISSUED_AT_PATTERN.test(issuedAt) || !BASE64URL_PATTERN.test(random) || !BASE64URL_PATTERN.test(providedMac) || !BASE64URL_PATTERN.test(providedContextTag)) return {
213
+ verdict: "unverified",
214
+ reason: "malformed"
215
+ };
216
+ if (!secret) return {
217
+ verdict: "unverified",
218
+ reason: "no_secret"
219
+ };
220
+ if (!constantTimeEqual(providedMac, await mac(secret, binding, issuedAt, random))) return {
221
+ verdict: "forged",
222
+ reason: "signature"
223
+ };
224
+ const issuedAtSeconds = parseInt(issuedAt, 36);
225
+ const nowSeconds = Math.floor(nowMs / 1e3);
226
+ if (!Number.isFinite(issuedAtSeconds)) return {
227
+ verdict: "unverified",
228
+ reason: "malformed"
229
+ };
230
+ if (issuedAtSeconds - nowSeconds > 60) return {
231
+ verdict: "unverified",
232
+ reason: "future"
233
+ };
234
+ if (nowSeconds - issuedAtSeconds > 600) return {
235
+ verdict: "unverified",
236
+ reason: "expired"
237
+ };
238
+ if (!constantTimeEqual(providedContextTag, await contextTag(secret, binding, issuedAt, random))) return {
239
+ verdict: "unverified",
240
+ reason: "context"
241
+ };
242
+ return { verdict: "verified" };
243
+ }
244
+ async function handoffTag(secret, projectId, idBytes) {
245
+ const input = canonical([
246
+ HANDOFF_TOKEN_INPUT_PREFIX,
247
+ projectId,
248
+ base64url(idBytes)
249
+ ]);
250
+ const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign("HMAC", await hmacKey(secret), input);
251
+ return new Uint8Array(signature, 0, HANDOFF_TAG_BYTES);
252
+ }
253
+ function base64urlDecode(text) {
254
+ const padded = text.replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/").padEnd(Math.ceil(text.length / 4) * 4, "=");
255
+ return Uint8Array.from(atob(padded), (char) => char.charCodeAt(0));
256
+ }
257
+ function bytesEqual(left, right) {
258
+ if (left.length !== right.length) return false;
259
+ let diff = 0;
260
+ for (let i = 0; i < left.length; i += 1) diff |= left[i] ^ right[i];
261
+ return diff === 0;
262
+ }
263
+ async function issueHandoffToken(secret, projectId) {
264
+ if (!secret) throw new Error("beacon nonce secret is required to issue a handoff token");
265
+ const id = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(HANDOFF_ID_BYTES));
266
+ const token = /* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(32);
267
+ token.set(id, 0);
268
+ token.set(await handoffTag(secret, projectId, id), HANDOFF_ID_BYTES);
269
+ return base64url(token);
270
+ }
271
+ const HANDOFF_USER_HASH_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-f]{8}$/;
272
+ const HANDOFF_USER_SEPARATOR = "~";
273
+ function splitHandoffToken(raw) {
274
+ const parts = raw.split(HANDOFF_USER_SEPARATOR);
275
+ const [token, userHash] = parts;
276
+ if (parts.length > 2 || userHash !== void 0 && !HANDOFF_USER_HASH_PATTERN.test(userHash)) return { token: raw };
277
+ return {
278
+ token,
279
+ ...userHash === void 0 ? {} : { userHash }
280
+ };
281
+ }
282
+ async function handoffTokenAuthentic(secrets, projectId, token) {
283
+ if (typeof token !== "string" || !HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATTERN.test(token)) return false;
284
+ const bytes = base64urlDecode(token);
285
+ if (bytes.length !== 32) return false;
286
+ if (base64url(bytes) !== token) return false;
287
+ const id = bytes.slice(0, HANDOFF_ID_BYTES);
288
+ const providedTag = bytes.slice(HANDOFF_ID_BYTES);
289
+ return (await Promise.all(secrets.filter((secret) => secret.length > 0).map(async (secret) => bytesEqual(providedTag, await handoffTag(secret, projectId, id))))).includes(true);
290
+ }
291
+
292
+ //#endregion
293
+ export { BEACON_NONCE_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, BEACON_NONCE_MAX_LENGTH, BEACON_NONCE_TTL_SECONDS, HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATTERN, HANDOFF_USER_HASH_PATTERN, beaconNonceContext, handoffTokenAuthentic, isSignedBeaconNonce, issueHandoffToken, issueSignedBeaconNonce, splitHandoffToken, verifySignedBeaconNonce };
294
+ //# sourceMappingURL=index.mjs.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"index.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../src/beacon-nonce/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Stateless, client-bound beacon nonce, issued and verified by both the\n * origin (`apps/web/lib/services/nonce.service.ts`) and the beacon-ingest\n * edge Worker.\n *\n * Every pixel/beacon response hands the browser a per-session nonce that its\n * next post must echo. A queue-only edge returns its receipt before the\n * origin has seen the batch, so the nonce cannot depend on origin state:\n * it is an HMAC-SHA256 under a secret shared by origin and edge. The origin\n * verifies it at synchronous ingest, or on replay using the edge's\n * acceptance time as the clock.\n *\n * Web Crypto only (`crypto.subtle`, `crypto.getRandomValues`): this runs\n * unchanged in Cloudflare Workers, Node ≥ 20 and the browser bundle.\n *\n * Wire format (56 chars, inside the schema's 64-char cap):\n *\n * n2.<issuedAt base36 seconds>.<random 8 bytes b64url>.<HMAC 16 bytes b64url>.<ctx tag 8 bytes b64url>\n *\n * The first HMAC binds the format version + project + session + issue time +\n * random. The trailing context tag additionally binds the requester's\n * network prefix and User-Agent (`beaconNonceContext`), so a nonce lifted\n * from one client does not verify from another. The version is inside the\n * MAC, so a nonce cannot be relabelled to dodge the context tag.\n *\n * Verdict semantics — three states, never two:\n * - `verified`: signature matches THIS project+session, the context matches,\n * and it is within TTL.\n * - `forged`: well-formed but the MAC does not match this session/secret.\n * The only outcome that counts as evidence against the client.\n * - `unverified`: nothing could be proven — not signed-format (absent, or\n * a value from before signing existed), expired, from the future, this\n * side has no secret, or the session signature is genuine but the\n * requester's network/User-Agent differs from the one it was issued to (a\n * roaming phone and a replay from elsewhere look the same, so neither is\n * treated as fabrication). Staleness is not forgery: an edge that stopped\n * issuing (secret unset) leaves clients echoing old values, and that must\n * degrade to \"unknown\", never to \"failed\".\n *\n * Any unexpired signature for the session verifies, so a nonce is not\n * single-use within its TTL. Multi-tab sessions need no window at all.\n */\n\nconst NONCE_VERSION = 'n2';\nconst MAC_INPUT_PREFIX = `checkpoint-beacon-nonce:${NONCE_VERSION}`;\nconst CONTEXT_INPUT_PREFIX = `checkpoint-beacon-nonce:ctx:${NONCE_VERSION}`;\nconst RANDOM_BYTES = 8;\nconst MAC_BYTES = 16;\nconst CONTEXT_TAG_BYTES = 8;\nconst MAX_CONTEXT_USER_AGENT_LENGTH = 512;\nconst IPV4_PATTERN = /^(\\d{1,3})\\.(\\d{1,3})\\.(\\d{1,3})\\.(\\d{1,3})$/;\nconst IPV6_GROUP_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/;\n// Each wire part has a closed alphabet and is rejected as malformed before any\n// MAC work when it strays outside it — a nonce is no place for `\\0` or `.`.\nconst ISSUED_AT_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-z]{1,16}$/;\nconst BASE64URL_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/;\nconst HANDOFF_TOKEN_INPUT_PREFIX = 'checkpoint-handoff-token:v1';\nconst HANDOFF_ID_BYTES = 16;\nconst HANDOFF_TAG_BYTES = 16;\n\nexport const HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/;\n\n/** How long an issued nonce stays verifiable. */\nexport const BEACON_NONCE_TTL_SECONDS = 10 * 60;\n/** Edge and origin clocks may disagree; a nonce this far \"in the future\" still verifies. */\nexport const BEACON_NONCE_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 60;\n/** The beacon wire schema's `nonce: z.string().max(64)`. */\nexport const BEACON_NONCE_MAX_LENGTH = 64;\n\nexport type BeaconNonceVerdict = 'verified' | 'forged' | 'unverified';\n\nexport type BeaconNonceVerification =\n | { verdict: 'verified' }\n | { verdict: 'forged'; reason: 'signature' }\n | {\n verdict: 'unverified';\n reason: 'malformed' | 'expired' | 'future' | 'no_secret' | 'context';\n };\n\nexport interface BeaconNonceBinding {\n projectId: string;\n sessionId: string;\n /** `beaconNonceContext(...)` of the request being issued to or verified. */\n context: string;\n}\n\nfunction ipv4Prefix(ip: string): string | null {\n const match = IPV4_PATTERN.exec(ip);\n return match ? `${match[1]}.${match[2]}.${match[3]}` : null;\n}\n\n/**\n * The first three groups (a /48) of an IPv6 address, expanded so compressed\n * forms agree with their spelled-out equivalents. An IPv4-mapped address\n * (`::ffff:a.b.c.d` or its hex spelling) is a v4 client and keys on its /24.\n * `null` for anything that is not a well-formed address.\n */\nfunction ipv6Prefix(ip: string): string | null {\n const bare = ip.toLowerCase().split('%')[0];\n const lastColon = bare.lastIndexOf(':');\n const embedded = IPV4_PATTERN.exec(bare.slice(lastColon + 1));\n const text = embedded\n ? `${bare.slice(0, lastColon + 1)}${((Number(embedded[1]) << 8) | Number(embedded[2])).toString(16)}:${((Number(embedded[3]) << 8) | Number(embedded[4])).toString(16)}`\n : bare;\n const halves = text.split('::');\n if (halves.length > 2) return null;\n const head = halves[0] ? halves[0].split(':') : [];\n const tail = halves.length === 2 && halves[1] ? halves[1].split(':') : [];\n const missing = 8 - head.length - tail.length;\n if (halves.length === 1 ? missing !== 0 : missing < 1) return null;\n const groups = [...head, ...Array<string>(halves.length === 2 ? missing : 0).fill('0'), ...tail];\n if (!groups.every((group) => IPV6_GROUP_PATTERN.test(group))) return null;\n const words = groups.map((group) => parseInt(group, 16));\n const mapped = words.slice(0, 5).every((word) => word === 0) && words[5] === 0xffff;\n if (mapped) return `${words[6] >> 8}.${words[6] & 0xff}.${words[7] >> 8}`;\n return words\n .slice(0, 3)\n .map((word) => word.toString(16))\n .join(':');\n}\n\n/**\n * The requester facts a nonce is bound to: the network prefix (IPv4 /24,\n * IPv6 /48, so NAT and DHCP churn inside one access network still verify)\n * and the User-Agent. Empty when neither is known, which binds nothing.\n */\nexport function beaconNonceContext(client: { ip?: string; userAgent?: string }): string {\n const ip = client.ip?.trim() ?? '';\n const prefix = ipv4Prefix(ip) ?? (ip.includes(':') ? ipv6Prefix(ip) : null) ?? '';\n const userAgent = (client.userAgent ?? '').slice(0, MAX_CONTEXT_USER_AGENT_LENGTH);\n return prefix || userAgent ? `${prefix}|${userAgent}` : '';\n}\n\nconst encoder = new TextEncoder();\n\nconst keyCache = new Map<string, Promise<CryptoKey>>();\n\nfunction hmacKey(secret: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n let key = keyCache.get(secret);\n if (!key) {\n key = crypto.subtle.importKey(\n 'raw',\n encoder.encode(secret),\n { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n false,\n ['sign']\n );\n keyCache.set(secret, key);\n }\n return key;\n}\n\nfunction base64url(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n let binary = '';\n for (const byte of bytes) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);\n return btoa(binary).replace(/\\+/g, '-').replace(/\\//g, '_').replace(/=+$/, '');\n}\n\n/**\n * Length-prefixed canonical encoding (`<byteLength>:<field>`), never a bare\n * delimiter join: `sessionId` is caller-controlled at the edge, so a value\n * that embeds the delimiter must not be able to shift the field boundaries\n * and re-bind the MAC to another session (Cursor Bugbot, PR #5255).\n */\nfunction canonical(fields: readonly string[]): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> {\n const chunks = fields.map((field) => {\n const bytes = encoder.encode(field);\n return [encoder.encode(`${bytes.length}:`), bytes] as const;\n });\n const total = chunks.reduce((sum, [len, bytes]) => sum + len.length + bytes.length, 0);\n const out = new Uint8Array(new ArrayBuffer(total));\n let offset = 0;\n for (const [len, bytes] of chunks) {\n out.set(len, offset);\n offset += len.length;\n out.set(bytes, offset);\n offset += bytes.length;\n }\n return out;\n}\n\nasync function mac(\n secret: string,\n binding: BeaconNonceBinding,\n issuedAt: string,\n random: string\n): Promise<string> {\n const input = canonical([\n MAC_INPUT_PREFIX,\n binding.projectId,\n binding.sessionId,\n issuedAt,\n random,\n ]);\n const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', await hmacKey(secret), input);\n return base64url(new Uint8Array(signature, 0, MAC_BYTES));\n}\n\nasync function contextTag(\n secret: string,\n binding: BeaconNonceBinding,\n issuedAt: string,\n random: string\n): Promise<string> {\n const input = canonical([\n CONTEXT_INPUT_PREFIX,\n binding.projectId,\n binding.sessionId,\n issuedAt,\n random,\n binding.context,\n ]);\n const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', await hmacKey(secret), input);\n return base64url(new Uint8Array(signature, 0, CONTEXT_TAG_BYTES));\n}\n\nfunction constantTimeEqual(left: string, right: string): boolean {\n if (left.length !== right.length) return false;\n let diff = 0;\n for (let i = 0; i < left.length; i += 1) diff |= left.charCodeAt(i) ^ right.charCodeAt(i);\n return diff === 0;\n}\n\n/** True when `nonce` is in the signed wire format (not necessarily valid). */\nexport function isSignedBeaconNonce(nonce: string | undefined): nonce is string {\n return typeof nonce === 'string' && nonce.startsWith(`${NONCE_VERSION}.`);\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint a nonce for `binding` at `issuedAtMs`. Throws when `secret` is\n * empty — issuing an unsigned value would be indistinguishable from a\n * real one on the wire, so the caller must decide to issue nothing.\n */\nexport async function issueSignedBeaconNonce(\n secret: string,\n binding: BeaconNonceBinding,\n issuedAtMs: number\n): Promise<string> {\n if (!secret) throw new Error('beacon nonce secret is required to issue a signed nonce');\n const issuedAt = Math.floor(issuedAtMs / 1000).toString(36);\n const random = base64url(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(RANDOM_BYTES)));\n return [\n NONCE_VERSION,\n issuedAt,\n random,\n await mac(secret, binding, issuedAt, random),\n await contextTag(secret, binding, issuedAt, random),\n ].join('.');\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify `nonce` against `binding` as of `nowMs`. Never throws; every\n * failure mode is a verdict (see the module doc for why expiry is\n * `unverified` rather than `forged`).\n */\nexport async function verifySignedBeaconNonce(\n secret: string | undefined,\n binding: BeaconNonceBinding,\n nonce: string | undefined,\n nowMs: number\n): Promise<BeaconNonceVerification> {\n if (!isSignedBeaconNonce(nonce)) return { verdict: 'unverified', reason: 'malformed' };\n const parts = nonce.split('.');\n if (parts.length !== 5 || parts.some((part) => part.length === 0)) {\n return { verdict: 'unverified', reason: 'malformed' };\n }\n const [, issuedAt, random, providedMac, providedContextTag] = parts;\n if (\n !ISSUED_AT_PATTERN.test(issuedAt) ||\n !BASE64URL_PATTERN.test(random) ||\n !BASE64URL_PATTERN.test(providedMac) ||\n !BASE64URL_PATTERN.test(providedContextTag)\n ) {\n return { verdict: 'unverified', reason: 'malformed' };\n }\n if (!secret) return { verdict: 'unverified', reason: 'no_secret' };\n\n const expectedMac = await mac(secret, binding, issuedAt, random);\n if (!constantTimeEqual(providedMac, expectedMac))\n return { verdict: 'forged', reason: 'signature' };\n\n const issuedAtSeconds = parseInt(issuedAt, 36);\n const nowSeconds = Math.floor(nowMs / 1000);\n if (!Number.isFinite(issuedAtSeconds)) return { verdict: 'unverified', reason: 'malformed' };\n if (issuedAtSeconds - nowSeconds > BEACON_NONCE_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS) {\n return { verdict: 'unverified', reason: 'future' };\n }\n if (nowSeconds - issuedAtSeconds > BEACON_NONCE_TTL_SECONDS) {\n return { verdict: 'unverified', reason: 'expired' };\n }\n if (!constantTimeEqual(providedContextTag, await contextTag(secret, binding, issuedAt, random))) {\n return { verdict: 'unverified', reason: 'context' };\n }\n return { verdict: 'verified' };\n}\n\nasync function handoffTag(\n secret: string,\n projectId: string,\n idBytes: Uint8Array\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n const input = canonical([HANDOFF_TOKEN_INPUT_PREFIX, projectId, base64url(idBytes)]);\n const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', await hmacKey(secret), input);\n return new Uint8Array(signature, 0, HANDOFF_TAG_BYTES);\n}\n\nfunction base64urlDecode(text: string): Uint8Array {\n const padded = text\n .replace(/-/g, '+')\n .replace(/_/g, '/')\n .padEnd(Math.ceil(text.length / 4) * 4, '=');\n return Uint8Array.from(atob(padded), (char) => char.charCodeAt(0));\n}\n\nfunction bytesEqual(left: Uint8Array, right: Uint8Array): boolean {\n if (left.length !== right.length) return false;\n let diff = 0;\n for (let i = 0; i < left.length; i += 1) diff |= left[i] ^ right[i];\n return diff === 0;\n}\n\nexport async function issueHandoffToken(secret: string, projectId: string): Promise<string> {\n if (!secret) throw new Error('beacon nonce secret is required to issue a handoff token');\n const id = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(HANDOFF_ID_BYTES));\n const token = new Uint8Array(HANDOFF_ID_BYTES + HANDOFF_TAG_BYTES);\n token.set(id, 0);\n token.set(await handoffTag(secret, projectId, id), HANDOFF_ID_BYTES);\n return base64url(token);\n}\n\nexport const HANDOFF_USER_HASH_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-f]{8}$/;\nconst HANDOFF_USER_SEPARATOR = '~';\n\nexport function splitHandoffToken(raw: string): { token: string; userHash?: string } {\n const parts = raw.split(HANDOFF_USER_SEPARATOR);\n const [token, userHash] = parts;\n if (parts.length > 2 || (userHash !== undefined && !HANDOFF_USER_HASH_PATTERN.test(userHash))) {\n return { token: raw };\n }\n return { token, ...(userHash === undefined ? {} : { userHash }) };\n}\n\nexport async function handoffTokenAuthentic(\n secrets: readonly string[],\n projectId: string,\n token: unknown\n): Promise<boolean> {\n if (typeof token !== 'string' || !HANDOFF_TOKEN_PATTERN.test(token)) return false;\n const bytes = base64urlDecode(token);\n if (bytes.length !== HANDOFF_ID_BYTES + HANDOFF_TAG_BYTES) return false;\n if (base64url(bytes) !== token) return false;\n const id = bytes.slice(0, HANDOFF_ID_BYTES);\n const providedTag = bytes.slice(HANDOFF_ID_BYTES);\n const matches = await Promise.all(\n secrets\n .filter((secret) => secret.length > 0)\n .map(async (secret) => bytesEqual(providedTag, await handoffTag(secret, projectId, id)))\n );\n return 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@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ export interface BeaconDispatchTriggers {
66
66
  untrusted?: boolean;
67
67
  posture?: boolean;
68
68
  unload?: boolean;
69
+ navigation?: boolean;
69
70
  }
70
71
  export interface BeaconConfig {
71
72
  projectId: string;
@@ -77,12 +78,15 @@ export interface BeaconConfig {
77
78
  debug?: boolean;
78
79
  logLevel?: 'error' | 'warn' | 'info' | 'debug';
79
80
  respectDoNotTrack?: boolean;
81
+ requireConsent?: boolean;
80
82
  anonymizeIp?: boolean;
81
83
  stripUrlFragment?: boolean;
82
84
  scrubQueryParams?: string[];
83
85
  dropQueryParams?: boolean;
84
86
  sessionTimeout?: number;
85
87
  sessionCookieName?: string;
88
+ browserSessionId?: string;
89
+ onReceipt?: (receipt: BeaconReceipt) => void;
86
90
  batchSize?: number;
87
91
  flushInterval?: number;
88
92
  evidenceGrowthFactor?: number;
@@ -202,6 +206,9 @@ export interface TransportOptions {
202
206
  priority?: 'low' | 'normal' | 'high' | 'critical';
203
207
  retry?: boolean;
204
208
  timeout?: number;
209
+ publicJwk?: EcPublicJwk;
210
+ deviceId?: string;
211
+ handoffToken?: string;
205
212
  }
206
213
  export interface TransportResponse {
207
214
  success: boolean;
@@ -390,15 +397,33 @@ export interface OfflineQueueEntry {
390
397
  retryCount: number;
391
398
  size: number;
392
399
  }
400
+ export interface EcPublicJwk {
401
+ kty: 'EC';
402
+ crv: 'P-256';
403
+ x: string;
404
+ y: string;
405
+ }
406
+ export interface BeaconReceipt {
407
+ sessionId?: string;
408
+ browserSessionId: string;
409
+ posture?: {
410
+ token: string;
411
+ expiresAt: number;
412
+ };
413
+ postureStatus?: string;
414
+ }
393
415
  export interface BeaconBatch {
394
416
  projectId: string;
395
417
  events: BeaconEvent[];
396
418
  sessionId: string;
419
+ handoffToken?: string;
420
+ deviceId?: string;
397
421
  batchId: string;
398
422
  timestamp: number;
399
423
  anonymizeIp?: boolean;
400
424
  nonce?: string;
401
425
  nonceEcho?: boolean;
426
+ publicJwk?: EcPublicJwk;
402
427
  }
403
428
  export interface BeaconCollectorData {
404
429
  userAgent?: string;
@@ -449,6 +474,10 @@ export declare class AgentShieldBeacon implements IAgentShieldBeacon {
449
474
  destroy(): Promise<void>;
450
475
  }
451
476
  export declare const BEACON_MAX_EVENTS_PER_BATCH = 100;
477
+ export declare const SESSION_IDLE_GAP_MAX_MS = 21600000;
478
+ export declare const BEACON_MAX_BATCH_ID_LENGTH = 255;
479
+ export declare const BEACON_ORIGIN_CONTRACT_VERSION = 1;
480
+ export declare const BEACON_ORIGIN_CAPABILITIES: readonly ["batch-replay-v1", "receipt-status-v1"];
452
481
  export declare const POSTURE_TTL_SECONDS = 120;
453
482
  //#endregion
454
483
  //# sourceMappingURL=index.d.mts.map
@@ -1 +1 @@
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@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ export interface BeaconDispatchTriggers {
66
66
  untrusted?: boolean;
67
67
  posture?: boolean;
68
68
  unload?: boolean;
69
+ navigation?: boolean;
69
70
  }
70
71
  export interface BeaconConfig {
71
72
  projectId: string;
@@ -77,12 +78,15 @@ export interface BeaconConfig {
77
78
  debug?: boolean;
78
79
  logLevel?: 'error' | 'warn' | 'info' | 'debug';
79
80
  respectDoNotTrack?: boolean;
81
+ requireConsent?: boolean;
80
82
  anonymizeIp?: boolean;
81
83
  stripUrlFragment?: boolean;
82
84
  scrubQueryParams?: string[];
83
85
  dropQueryParams?: boolean;
84
86
  sessionTimeout?: number;
85
87
  sessionCookieName?: string;
88
+ browserSessionId?: string;
89
+ onReceipt?: (receipt: BeaconReceipt) => void;
86
90
  batchSize?: number;
87
91
  flushInterval?: number;
88
92
  evidenceGrowthFactor?: number;
@@ -202,6 +206,9 @@ export interface TransportOptions {
202
206
  priority?: 'low' | 'normal' | 'high' | 'critical';
203
207
  retry?: boolean;
204
208
  timeout?: number;
209
+ publicJwk?: EcPublicJwk;
210
+ deviceId?: string;
211
+ handoffToken?: string;
205
212
  }
206
213
  export interface TransportResponse {
207
214
  success: boolean;
@@ -390,15 +397,33 @@ export interface OfflineQueueEntry {
390
397
  retryCount: number;
391
398
  size: number;
392
399
  }
400
+ export interface EcPublicJwk {
401
+ kty: 'EC';
402
+ crv: 'P-256';
403
+ x: string;
404
+ y: string;
405
+ }
406
+ export interface BeaconReceipt {
407
+ sessionId?: string;
408
+ browserSessionId: string;
409
+ posture?: {
410
+ token: string;
411
+ expiresAt: number;
412
+ };
413
+ postureStatus?: string;
414
+ }
393
415
  export interface BeaconBatch {
394
416
  projectId: string;
395
417
  events: BeaconEvent[];
396
418
  sessionId: string;
419
+ handoffToken?: string;
420
+ deviceId?: string;
397
421
  batchId: string;
398
422
  timestamp: number;
399
423
  anonymizeIp?: boolean;
400
424
  nonce?: string;
401
425
  nonceEcho?: boolean;
426
+ publicJwk?: EcPublicJwk;
402
427
  }
403
428
  export interface BeaconCollectorData {
404
429
  userAgent?: string;
@@ -449,6 +474,10 @@ export declare class AgentShieldBeacon implements IAgentShieldBeacon {
449
474
  destroy(): Promise<void>;
450
475
  }
451
476
  export declare const BEACON_MAX_EVENTS_PER_BATCH = 100;
477
+ export declare const SESSION_IDLE_GAP_MAX_MS = 21600000;
478
+ export declare const BEACON_MAX_BATCH_ID_LENGTH = 255;
479
+ export declare const BEACON_ORIGIN_CONTRACT_VERSION = 1;
480
+ export declare const BEACON_ORIGIN_CAPABILITIES: readonly ["batch-replay-v1", "receipt-status-v1"];
452
481
  export declare const POSTURE_TTL_SECONDS = 120;
453
482
  //#endregion
454
483
  //# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map
@@ -1 +1 @@
1
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1
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@@ -41,13 +41,26 @@ function booleanOr(value, fallback, onReject) {
41
41
  onReject?.(value);
42
42
  return fallback;
43
43
  }
44
+ /** Ingest's own `sessionId` bound (1-255), limited to characters a cookie value carries unescaped. */
45
+ const RESUMABLE_SESSION_ID = /^[A-Za-z0-9._~-]{1,255}$/;
46
+ function resumableSessionId(value, onReject) {
47
+ if (value === void 0) return void 0;
48
+ if (typeof value === "string" && RESUMABLE_SESSION_ID.test(value)) return value;
49
+ onReject?.(value);
50
+ }
51
+ function receiptCallback(value, onReject) {
52
+ if (value === void 0) return void 0;
53
+ if (typeof value === "function") return value;
54
+ onReject?.(value);
55
+ }
44
56
  const DISPATCH_TRIGGER_NAMES = [
45
57
  "arrival",
46
58
  "signals",
47
59
  "interaction",
48
60
  "untrusted",
49
61
  "posture",
50
- "unload"
62
+ "unload",
63
+ "navigation"
51
64
  ];
52
65
  /**
53
66
  * Keeps only the known trigger names with a real boolean; anything else is
@@ -144,7 +157,7 @@ function parseOfflineQueueEntry(input) {
144
157
  if (!isRecord(input)) throw new Error("Invalid offline queue entry");
145
158
  const entry = input;
146
159
  return {
147
- id: stringOr(entry.id, `${Date.now()}_${Math.random().toString(36).substr(2, 9)}`),
160
+ id: stringOr(entry.id, `${Date.now()}_${Array.from(crypto.getRandomValues(/* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(6)), (byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("")}`),
148
161
  events: Array.isArray(entry.events) ? entry.events : [],
149
162
  timestamp: numberOr(entry.timestamp, Date.now()),
150
163
  expiresAt: numberOr(entry.expiresAt, Date.now() + 864e5),
@@ -152,10 +165,17 @@ function parseOfflineQueueEntry(input) {
152
165
  size: numberOr(entry.size, 0)
153
166
  };
154
167
  }
168
+ function randomId() {
169
+ const bytes = crypto.getRandomValues(/* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(16));
170
+ bytes[6] = bytes[6] & 15 | 64;
171
+ bytes[8] = bytes[8] & 63 | 128;
172
+ const hex = Array.from(bytes, (byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
173
+ return `${hex.slice(0, 8)}-${hex.slice(8, 12)}-${hex.slice(12, 16)}-${hex.slice(16, 20)}-${hex.slice(20)}`;
174
+ }
155
175
  function parseBeaconWorkerMessage(input) {
156
176
  if (!isRecord(input)) throw new Error("Invalid beacon worker message");
157
177
  const msg = input;
158
- const messageId = stringOr(msg.messageId) ?? stringOr(msg.id) ?? crypto.randomUUID();
178
+ const messageId = stringOr(msg.messageId) ?? stringOr(msg.id) ?? randomId();
159
179
  return {
160
180
  type: isBeaconWorkerMessageType(msg.type) ? msg.type : "init",
161
181
  data: msg.data,
@@ -178,7 +198,7 @@ function parseWorkerMessage(input) {
178
198
  const msg = input && typeof input === "object" ? input : null;
179
199
  if (!msg) throw new Error("Invalid worker message");
180
200
  return {
181
- id: msg.id || crypto.randomUUID(),
201
+ id: msg.id || randomId(),
182
202
  type: isWorkerMessageType(msg.type) ? msg.type : "request",
183
203
  action: msg.action,
184
204
  payload: msg.payload,
@@ -281,12 +301,15 @@ function parseBeaconConfig(input, onWarn) {
281
301
  debug: config.debug === true,
282
302
  logLevel: isLogLevel(config.logLevel) ? config.logLevel : "error",
283
303
  respectDoNotTrack: config.respectDoNotTrack !== false,
304
+ requireConsent: config.requireConsent === true,
284
305
  anonymizeIp: config.anonymizeIp === true,
285
306
  stripUrlFragment: config.stripUrlFragment !== false,
286
307
  scrubQueryParams: isStringArray(config.scrubQueryParams) ? config.scrubQueryParams : void 0,
287
308
  dropQueryParams: config.dropQueryParams === true,
288
- sessionTimeout: numberOr(config.sessionTimeout, 18e5),
309
+ sessionTimeout: numberOr(config.sessionTimeout, void 0),
289
310
  sessionCookieName: stringOr(config.sessionCookieName, "_as_beacon_session"),
311
+ browserSessionId: resumableSessionId(config.browserSessionId, (received) => onWarn?.(`browserSessionId must match ${RESUMABLE_SESSION_ID} (received ${JSON.stringify(received)}); ignoring it`)),
312
+ onReceipt: receiptCallback(config.onReceipt, (received) => onWarn?.(`onReceipt must be a function (received ${typeof received}); ignoring it`)),
290
313
  batchSize: typeof config.batchSize === "number" ? config.batchSize : void 0,
291
314
  flushInterval: typeof config.flushInterval === "number" ? config.flushInterval : void 0,
292
315
  collectorDeadlineMs: numberOr(config.collectorDeadlineMs, 1600),
@@ -315,6 +338,10 @@ function parseBeaconConfig(input, onWarn) {
315
338
  * the SDK's offline drain never dequeues more than this per request.
316
339
  */
317
340
  const BEACON_MAX_EVENTS_PER_BATCH = 100;
341
+ const SESSION_IDLE_GAP_MAX_MS = 216e5;
342
+ const BEACON_MAX_BATCH_ID_LENGTH = 255;
343
+ const BEACON_ORIGIN_CONTRACT_VERSION = 1;
344
+ const BEACON_ORIGIN_CAPABILITIES = ["batch-replay-v1", "receipt-status-v1"];
318
345
  /**
319
346
  * Lifetime of the signed browser posture token, in seconds. Defined here and
320
347
  * re-exported by `browser-posture.ts` (which imports `jose`) so the
@@ -323,9 +350,13 @@ const BEACON_MAX_EVENTS_PER_BATCH = 100;
323
350
  const POSTURE_TTL_SECONDS = 120;
324
351
 
325
352
  //#endregion
353
+ exports.BEACON_MAX_BATCH_ID_LENGTH = BEACON_MAX_BATCH_ID_LENGTH;
326
354
  exports.BEACON_MAX_EVENTS_PER_BATCH = BEACON_MAX_EVENTS_PER_BATCH;
355
+ exports.BEACON_ORIGIN_CAPABILITIES = BEACON_ORIGIN_CAPABILITIES;
356
+ exports.BEACON_ORIGIN_CONTRACT_VERSION = BEACON_ORIGIN_CONTRACT_VERSION;
327
357
  exports.POSTURE_TTL_SECONDS = POSTURE_TTL_SECONDS;
328
358
  exports.ResourceUsageSchema = ResourceUsageSchema;
359
+ exports.SESSION_IDLE_GAP_MAX_MS = SESSION_IDLE_GAP_MAX_MS;
329
360
  exports.WorkerPoolConfigSchema = WorkerPoolConfigSchema;
330
361
  exports.isBeaconIdentity = isBeaconIdentity;
331
362
  exports.parseBeaconConfig = parseBeaconConfig;