@kya-os/checkpoint-shared 1.4.0 → 1.5.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (161) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +32 -0
  2. package/dist/beacon-types/index.d.mts +441 -432
  3. package/dist/beacon-types/index.d.mts.map +1 -0
  4. package/dist/beacon-types/index.d.ts +441 -432
  5. package/dist/beacon-types/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  6. package/dist/beacon-types/index.js +198 -182
  7. package/dist/beacon-types/index.mjs +197 -179
  8. package/dist/beacon-types/index.mjs.map +1 -0
  9. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie-Dmq9Brf_.d.mts +5 -0
  10. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie-Dmq9Brf_.d.mts.map +1 -0
  11. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie-Dmq9Brf_.d.ts +5 -0
  12. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie-Dmq9Brf_.d.ts.map +1 -0
  13. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.d.mts +2 -0
  14. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.d.ts +2 -0
  15. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.js +1 -0
  16. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.mjs +2 -0
  17. package/dist/browser-posture-cookie.mjs.map +1 -0
  18. package/dist/browser-posture-report.d.mts +48 -44
  19. package/dist/browser-posture-report.d.mts.map +1 -0
  20. package/dist/browser-posture-report.d.ts +48 -44
  21. package/dist/browser-posture-report.d.ts.map +1 -0
  22. package/dist/browser-posture-report.js +1 -1
  23. package/dist/browser-posture-report.mjs +2 -1
  24. package/dist/browser-posture-report.mjs.map +1 -0
  25. package/dist/browser-posture.d.mts +80 -75
  26. package/dist/browser-posture.d.mts.map +1 -0
  27. package/dist/browser-posture.d.ts +80 -75
  28. package/dist/browser-posture.d.ts.map +1 -0
  29. package/dist/browser-posture.js +159 -18993
  30. package/dist/browser-posture.mjs +158 -18990
  31. package/dist/browser-posture.mjs.map +1 -0
  32. package/dist/browser.d.mts +323 -316
  33. package/dist/browser.d.mts.map +1 -0
  34. package/dist/browser.d.ts +323 -316
  35. package/dist/browser.d.ts.map +1 -0
  36. package/dist/browser.js +1 -1
  37. package/dist/browser.mjs +2 -1
  38. package/dist/browser.mjs.map +1 -0
  39. package/dist/canonical-signer/index.d.mts +38 -33
  40. package/dist/canonical-signer/index.d.mts.map +1 -0
  41. package/dist/canonical-signer/index.d.ts +38 -33
  42. package/dist/canonical-signer/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  43. package/dist/canonical-signer/index.js +411 -181
  44. package/dist/canonical-signer/index.mjs +383 -175
  45. package/dist/canonical-signer/index.mjs.map +1 -0
  46. package/dist/clearance.d.mts +30 -0
  47. package/dist/clearance.d.mts.map +1 -0
  48. package/dist/clearance.d.ts +30 -0
  49. package/dist/clearance.d.ts.map +1 -0
  50. package/dist/clearance.js +120 -0
  51. package/dist/clearance.mjs +112 -0
  52. package/dist/clearance.mjs.map +1 -0
  53. package/dist/client-ip-1y2iXAYW.js +237 -0
  54. package/dist/client-ip-HOfe6ucV.mjs +215 -0
  55. package/dist/client-ip-HOfe6ucV.mjs.map +1 -0
  56. package/dist/deploy/index.d.mts +339 -339
  57. package/dist/deploy/index.d.mts.map +1 -0
  58. package/dist/deploy/index.d.ts +339 -339
  59. package/dist/deploy/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  60. package/dist/deploy/index.js +505 -413
  61. package/dist/deploy/index.mjs +504 -410
  62. package/dist/deploy/index.mjs.map +1 -0
  63. package/dist/errors/index.d.mts +101 -101
  64. package/dist/errors/index.d.mts.map +1 -0
  65. package/dist/errors/index.d.ts +101 -101
  66. package/dist/errors/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  67. package/dist/errors/index.js +341 -314
  68. package/dist/errors/index.mjs +340 -311
  69. package/dist/errors/index.mjs.map +1 -0
  70. package/dist/external-jr_S4iSS.d.mts +4187 -0
  71. package/dist/external-jr_S4iSS.d.mts.map +1 -0
  72. package/dist/external-jr_S4iSS.d.ts +4187 -0
  73. package/dist/external-jr_S4iSS.d.ts.map +1 -0
  74. package/dist/gateway/index.d.mts +138 -132
  75. package/dist/gateway/index.d.mts.map +1 -0
  76. package/dist/gateway/index.d.ts +138 -132
  77. package/dist/gateway/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  78. package/dist/gateway/index.js +117 -81
  79. package/dist/gateway/index.mjs +116 -78
  80. package/dist/gateway/index.mjs.map +1 -0
  81. package/dist/gateway-client-ip.d.mts +59 -0
  82. package/dist/gateway-client-ip.d.mts.map +1 -0
  83. package/dist/gateway-client-ip.d.ts +59 -0
  84. package/dist/gateway-client-ip.d.ts.map +1 -0
  85. package/dist/gateway-client-ip.js +149 -0
  86. package/dist/gateway-client-ip.mjs +139 -0
  87. package/dist/gateway-client-ip.mjs.map +1 -0
  88. package/dist/index.d.mts +14895 -14240
  89. package/dist/index.d.mts.map +1 -0
  90. package/dist/index.d.ts +14895 -14240
  91. package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  92. package/dist/index.js +15180 -31025
  93. package/dist/index.mjs +15065 -30942
  94. package/dist/index.mjs.map +1 -0
  95. package/dist/mcpi/agentshield-api/index.d.mts +45 -44
  96. package/dist/mcpi/agentshield-api/index.d.mts.map +1 -0
  97. package/dist/mcpi/agentshield-api/index.d.ts +45 -44
  98. package/dist/mcpi/agentshield-api/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  99. package/dist/mcpi/agentshield-api/index.js +0 -2
  100. package/dist/mcpi/agentshield-api/index.mjs +1 -1
  101. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.d.mts +63 -61
  102. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.d.mts.map +1 -0
  103. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.d.ts +63 -61
  104. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  105. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.js +220 -140
  106. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.mjs +219 -137
  107. package/dist/mcpi/approval-grant/index.mjs.map +1 -0
  108. package/dist/mcpi/dashboard-config/index.d.mts +2323 -2318
  109. package/dist/mcpi/dashboard-config/index.d.mts.map +1 -0
  110. package/dist/mcpi/dashboard-config/index.d.ts +2323 -2318
  111. package/dist/mcpi/dashboard-config/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  112. package/dist/mcpi/dashboard-config/index.js +605 -458
  113. package/dist/mcpi/dashboard-config/index.mjs +604 -455
  114. package/dist/mcpi/dashboard-config/index.mjs.map +1 -0
  115. package/dist/mcpi/multibase-ed25519.d.mts +10 -8
  116. package/dist/mcpi/multibase-ed25519.d.mts.map +1 -0
  117. package/dist/mcpi/multibase-ed25519.d.ts +10 -8
  118. package/dist/mcpi/multibase-ed25519.d.ts.map +1 -0
  119. package/dist/mcpi/multibase-ed25519.js +182 -106
  120. package/dist/mcpi/multibase-ed25519.mjs +181 -103
  121. package/dist/mcpi/multibase-ed25519.mjs.map +1 -0
  122. package/dist/patterns-CkRVOdtV.js +243 -0
  123. package/dist/patterns-DzkGy_qk.mjs +173 -0
  124. package/dist/patterns-DzkGy_qk.mjs.map +1 -0
  125. package/dist/project-verification-key-C3L5rd8a.js +41 -0
  126. package/dist/project-verification-key-CgSVX9_m.mjs +37 -0
  127. package/dist/project-verification-key-CgSVX9_m.mjs.map +1 -0
  128. package/dist/rolldown-runtime-iY2fYEqi.mjs +19 -0
  129. package/dist/schemas-BmjNLAE7.js +5677 -0
  130. package/dist/schemas-DxY-dk9y.mjs +5511 -0
  131. package/dist/schemas-DxY-dk9y.mjs.map +1 -0
  132. package/dist/signals/index.d.mts +125 -115
  133. package/dist/signals/index.d.mts.map +1 -0
  134. package/dist/signals/index.d.ts +125 -115
  135. package/dist/signals/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  136. package/dist/signals/index.js +1693 -1536
  137. package/dist/signals/index.mjs +1692 -1533
  138. package/dist/signals/index.mjs.map +1 -0
  139. package/dist/test-fixtures/index.d.mts +124 -119
  140. package/dist/test-fixtures/index.d.mts.map +1 -0
  141. package/dist/test-fixtures/index.d.ts +124 -119
  142. package/dist/test-fixtures/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  143. package/dist/test-fixtures/index.js +460 -228
  144. package/dist/test-fixtures/index.mjs +459 -225
  145. package/dist/test-fixtures/index.mjs.map +1 -0
  146. package/dist/tool-protection/index.d.mts +343 -343
  147. package/dist/tool-protection/index.d.mts.map +1 -0
  148. package/dist/tool-protection/index.d.ts +343 -343
  149. package/dist/tool-protection/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  150. package/dist/tool-protection/index.js +366 -285
  151. package/dist/tool-protection/index.mjs +365 -282
  152. package/dist/tool-protection/index.mjs.map +1 -0
  153. package/fixtures/bot-signal-resolution.json +142 -0
  154. package/fixtures/browser-posture-claims.json +421 -0
  155. package/fixtures/browser-posture-headers.json +46 -0
  156. package/fixtures/detection/reason-codes.json +10 -1
  157. package/fixtures/kya-http/challenge.delegation.fetcher-200.json +9 -3
  158. package/fixtures/kya-http/challenge.delegation.full.json +9 -3
  159. package/fixtures/kya-http/challenge.delegation.minimal.json +9 -3
  160. package/fixtures/kya-http/error-codes.json +7 -2
  161. package/package.json +20 -6
@@ -1,150 +1,232 @@
1
- import { importJWK, SignJWT, jwtVerify, base64url } from 'jose';
1
+ import { SignJWT, base64url, importJWK, jwtVerify } from "jose";
2
2
 
3
- // src/mcpi/approval-grant/grant.ts
4
- var APPROVAL_GRANT_TYP = "approval-grant+jwt";
5
- var APPROVAL_GRANT_MAX_LIFETIME_SEC = 300;
3
+ //#region src/mcpi/approval-grant/grant.ts
4
+ /**
5
+ * Step-up approval grants — portable, edge-safe reference implementation.
6
+ *
7
+ * The signed approval-grant scheme the step-up gate verifies. Lives in
8
+ * `@kya-os/checkpoint-shared` (the runtime-neutral home) so every runtime that
9
+ * enforces N-of-M step-up at the edge — the central gateway AND the SDK
10
+ * middleware adapters (Express / Next.js / Cloudflare-worker / .NET-port) —
11
+ * injects the SAME verifier into the step-up core
12
+ * (`@kya-os/checkpoint-wasm-runtime/step-up`) instead of re-implementing it.
13
+ *
14
+ * A grant is a compact EdDSA JWS (one crypto path with the delegation proof)
15
+ * binding five independent dimensions so a captured grant can't be replayed or
16
+ * repurposed past any one of them:
17
+ * - `requestHash` — the exact suspended action (TOCTOU)
18
+ * - `aud` — the resource/gateway it's valid for
19
+ * - `sub` — the AGENT being approved (`agentDid`; an approval for X must
20
+ * not satisfy Y's byte-identical call)
21
+ * - `iat`/`exp` — freshness (lifetime <= 300s; jose enforces exp)
22
+ * - `nonce` — server-issued + single-use; consumed on quorum satisfaction
23
+ * so a resubmission of the same grants is rejected
24
+ *
25
+ * The approver holds their own key and signs client-side; verification resolves
26
+ * the approver DID (via the host-injected {@link ApproverKeyResolver}) and is
27
+ * fail-closed.
28
+ *
29
+ * Edge-safe: `jose` is isomorphic (Web Crypto `SubtleCrypto`); nonce generation
30
+ * uses `globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues` (see `./nonce`). No `node:*` import.
31
+ *
32
+ * @module @kya-os/checkpoint-shared/mcpi/approval-grant
33
+ */
34
+ const APPROVAL_GRANT_TYP = "approval-grant+jwt";
35
+ const APPROVAL_GRANT_MAX_LIFETIME_SEC = 300;
36
+ /** Produce a signed grant (runs in the approver's client, with their key). */
6
37
  async function signApprovalGrant(meta, privateKeyJwk) {
7
- if (!Number.isInteger(meta.created) || !Number.isInteger(meta.expires)) {
8
- throw new Error("approval grant: created/expires must be integer unix seconds");
9
- }
10
- if (meta.expires <= meta.created) {
11
- throw new Error("approval grant: expires must be after created");
12
- }
13
- if (meta.expires - meta.created > APPROVAL_GRANT_MAX_LIFETIME_SEC) {
14
- throw new Error(`approval grant: lifetime exceeds ${APPROVAL_GRANT_MAX_LIFETIME_SEC}s ceiling`);
15
- }
16
- const key = await importJWK(privateKeyJwk, "EdDSA");
17
- const claims = {
18
- requestHash: meta.requestHash,
19
- decision: meta.decision,
20
- nonce: meta.nonce
21
- };
22
- if (meta.amr) claims.amr = meta.amr;
23
- if (meta.delegationRef) claims.delegationRef = meta.delegationRef;
24
- const jws = await new SignJWT(claims).setProtectedHeader({
25
- alg: "EdDSA",
26
- kid: `${meta.approverDid}#key-1`,
27
- typ: APPROVAL_GRANT_TYP
28
- }).setIssuer(meta.approverDid).setSubject(meta.agentDid).setAudience(meta.audience).setJti(meta.approvalRequestId).setIssuedAt(new Date(meta.created * 1e3)).setExpirationTime(new Date(meta.expires * 1e3)).sign(key);
29
- return { jws, meta };
38
+ if (!Number.isInteger(meta.created) || !Number.isInteger(meta.expires)) throw new Error("approval grant: created/expires must be integer unix seconds");
39
+ if (meta.expires <= meta.created) throw new Error("approval grant: expires must be after created");
40
+ if (meta.expires - meta.created > 300) throw new Error(`approval grant: lifetime exceeds ${300}s ceiling`);
41
+ const key = await importJWK(privateKeyJwk, "EdDSA");
42
+ const claims = {
43
+ requestHash: meta.requestHash,
44
+ decision: meta.decision,
45
+ nonce: meta.nonce
46
+ };
47
+ if (meta.amr) claims.amr = meta.amr;
48
+ if (meta.delegationRef) claims.delegationRef = meta.delegationRef;
49
+ return {
50
+ jws: await new SignJWT(claims).setProtectedHeader({
51
+ alg: "EdDSA",
52
+ kid: `${meta.approverDid}#key-1`,
53
+ typ: APPROVAL_GRANT_TYP
54
+ }).setIssuer(meta.approverDid).setSubject(meta.agentDid).setAudience(meta.audience).setJti(meta.approvalRequestId).setIssuedAt(/* @__PURE__ */ new Date(meta.created * 1e3)).setExpirationTime(/* @__PURE__ */ new Date(meta.expires * 1e3)).sign(key),
55
+ meta
56
+ };
30
57
  }
58
+ /** Verify a single grant against the gateway's expectation. Fail-closed. */
31
59
  async function verifyApprovalGrant(opts) {
32
- const { grant, expected, resolveKey } = opts;
33
- const approverDid = grant?.meta?.approverDid;
34
- if (typeof approverDid !== "string" || approverDid.length === 0) {
35
- return { valid: false, reason: "missing_approver_did" };
36
- }
37
- let publicKeyJwk = null;
38
- try {
39
- publicKeyJwk = await resolveKey(approverDid);
40
- } catch {
41
- return { valid: false, reason: "approver_key_unresolved" };
42
- }
43
- if (!publicKeyJwk) {
44
- return { valid: false, reason: "approver_key_unresolved" };
45
- }
46
- try {
47
- const key = await importJWK(publicKeyJwk, "EdDSA");
48
- const { payload, protectedHeader } = await jwtVerify(grant.jws, key, {
49
- algorithms: ["EdDSA"],
50
- issuer: approverDid,
51
- audience: expected.audience,
52
- ...expected.now !== void 0 ? { currentDate: new Date(expected.now * 1e3) } : {}
53
- });
54
- if (protectedHeader.typ !== APPROVAL_GRANT_TYP) {
55
- return { valid: false, reason: "bad_typ" };
56
- }
57
- if (payload.requestHash !== expected.requestHash) {
58
- return { valid: false, reason: "request_hash_mismatch" };
59
- }
60
- if (payload.nonce !== expected.nonce) {
61
- return { valid: false, reason: "nonce_mismatch" };
62
- }
63
- if (payload.sub !== expected.agentDid) {
64
- return { valid: false, reason: "agent_mismatch" };
65
- }
66
- if (payload.decision !== "approve") {
67
- return { valid: false, reason: "not_approved" };
68
- }
69
- const iat = payload.iat;
70
- const exp = payload.exp;
71
- if (typeof iat !== "number" || typeof exp !== "number") {
72
- return { valid: false, reason: "missing_times" };
73
- }
74
- if (exp - iat > (expected.maxLifetimeSec ?? APPROVAL_GRANT_MAX_LIFETIME_SEC)) {
75
- return { valid: false, reason: "lifetime_exceeded" };
76
- }
77
- if (grant.meta.requestHash !== payload.requestHash || grant.meta.nonce !== payload.nonce || grant.meta.agentDid !== payload.sub || grant.meta.audience !== payload.aud || grant.meta.decision !== payload.decision || grant.meta.approverDid !== payload.iss) {
78
- return { valid: false, reason: "meta_mismatch" };
79
- }
80
- return { valid: true, approverDid };
81
- } catch {
82
- return { valid: false, reason: "verify_failed" };
83
- }
60
+ const { grant, expected, resolveKey } = opts;
61
+ const approverDid = grant?.meta?.approverDid;
62
+ if (typeof approverDid !== "string" || approverDid.length === 0) return {
63
+ valid: false,
64
+ reason: "missing_approver_did"
65
+ };
66
+ let publicKeyJwk = null;
67
+ try {
68
+ publicKeyJwk = await resolveKey(approverDid);
69
+ } catch {
70
+ return {
71
+ valid: false,
72
+ reason: "approver_key_unresolved"
73
+ };
74
+ }
75
+ if (!publicKeyJwk) return {
76
+ valid: false,
77
+ reason: "approver_key_unresolved"
78
+ };
79
+ try {
80
+ const key = await importJWK(publicKeyJwk, "EdDSA");
81
+ const { payload, protectedHeader } = await jwtVerify(grant.jws, key, {
82
+ algorithms: ["EdDSA"],
83
+ issuer: approverDid,
84
+ audience: expected.audience,
85
+ ...expected.now !== void 0 ? { currentDate: /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(expected.now * 1e3) } : {}
86
+ });
87
+ if (protectedHeader.typ !== "approval-grant+jwt") return {
88
+ valid: false,
89
+ reason: "bad_typ"
90
+ };
91
+ if (payload.requestHash !== expected.requestHash) return {
92
+ valid: false,
93
+ reason: "request_hash_mismatch"
94
+ };
95
+ if (payload.nonce !== expected.nonce) return {
96
+ valid: false,
97
+ reason: "nonce_mismatch"
98
+ };
99
+ if (payload.sub !== expected.agentDid) return {
100
+ valid: false,
101
+ reason: "agent_mismatch"
102
+ };
103
+ if (payload.decision !== "approve") return {
104
+ valid: false,
105
+ reason: "not_approved"
106
+ };
107
+ const iat = payload.iat;
108
+ const exp = payload.exp;
109
+ if (typeof iat !== "number" || typeof exp !== "number") return {
110
+ valid: false,
111
+ reason: "missing_times"
112
+ };
113
+ if (exp - iat > (expected.maxLifetimeSec ?? 300)) return {
114
+ valid: false,
115
+ reason: "lifetime_exceeded"
116
+ };
117
+ if (grant.meta.requestHash !== payload.requestHash || grant.meta.nonce !== payload.nonce || grant.meta.agentDid !== payload.sub || grant.meta.audience !== payload.aud || grant.meta.decision !== payload.decision || grant.meta.approverDid !== payload.iss) return {
118
+ valid: false,
119
+ reason: "meta_mismatch"
120
+ };
121
+ return {
122
+ valid: true,
123
+ approverDid
124
+ };
125
+ } catch {
126
+ return {
127
+ valid: false,
128
+ reason: "verify_failed"
129
+ };
130
+ }
84
131
  }
132
+ /**
133
+ * Quorum is satisfied iff >= `quorum.n` DISTINCT allow-listed approvers each
134
+ * signed a valid grant bound to the suspended action's outstanding nonce. On
135
+ * satisfaction the nonce is consumed — a replay of the same grants then finds no
136
+ * outstanding nonce and is rejected. Reuses {@link verifyApprovalGrant} per grant.
137
+ */
85
138
  async function verifySignedApprovalQuorum(opts) {
86
- const { grants, expected, quorum, resolveKey, nonceStore } = opts;
87
- if (!Number.isInteger(quorum.n) || quorum.n < 1) {
88
- return { satisfied: false, reason: "invalid_quorum" };
89
- }
90
- if (!Array.isArray(quorum.approvers) || quorum.approvers.length === 0) {
91
- return { satisfied: false, reason: "no_approvers" };
92
- }
93
- const nonce = nonceStore.current(expected.requestHash);
94
- if (!nonce) {
95
- return { satisfied: false, reason: "no_outstanding_challenge" };
96
- }
97
- const approvers = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
98
- for (const grant of grants) {
99
- const v = await verifyApprovalGrant({
100
- grant,
101
- expected: {
102
- requestHash: expected.requestHash,
103
- audience: expected.audience,
104
- agentDid: expected.agentDid,
105
- nonce,
106
- ...expected.now !== void 0 ? { now: expected.now } : {}
107
- },
108
- resolveKey
109
- });
110
- if (!v.valid || !v.approverDid) continue;
111
- if (!quorum.approvers.includes(v.approverDid)) continue;
112
- approvers.add(v.approverDid);
113
- }
114
- if (approvers.size >= quorum.n) {
115
- if (!nonceStore.tryConsume(expected.requestHash)) {
116
- return { satisfied: false, reason: "nonce_already_consumed" };
117
- }
118
- return { satisfied: true };
119
- }
120
- return { satisfied: false, reason: `quorum_not_met:${approvers.size}/${quorum.n}` };
139
+ const { grants, expected, quorum, resolveKey, nonceStore } = opts;
140
+ if (!Number.isInteger(quorum.n) || quorum.n < 1) return {
141
+ satisfied: false,
142
+ reason: "invalid_quorum"
143
+ };
144
+ if (!Array.isArray(quorum.approvers) || quorum.approvers.length === 0) return {
145
+ satisfied: false,
146
+ reason: "no_approvers"
147
+ };
148
+ const nonce = nonceStore.current(expected.requestHash);
149
+ if (!nonce) return {
150
+ satisfied: false,
151
+ reason: "no_outstanding_challenge"
152
+ };
153
+ const approvers = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
154
+ for (const grant of grants) {
155
+ const v = await verifyApprovalGrant({
156
+ grant,
157
+ expected: {
158
+ requestHash: expected.requestHash,
159
+ audience: expected.audience,
160
+ agentDid: expected.agentDid,
161
+ nonce,
162
+ ...expected.now !== void 0 ? { now: expected.now } : {}
163
+ },
164
+ resolveKey
165
+ });
166
+ if (!v.valid || !v.approverDid) continue;
167
+ if (!quorum.approvers.includes(v.approverDid)) continue;
168
+ approvers.add(v.approverDid);
169
+ }
170
+ if (approvers.size >= quorum.n) {
171
+ if (!nonceStore.tryConsume(expected.requestHash)) return {
172
+ satisfied: false,
173
+ reason: "nonce_already_consumed"
174
+ };
175
+ return { satisfied: true };
176
+ }
177
+ return {
178
+ satisfied: false,
179
+ reason: `quorum_not_met:${approvers.size}/${quorum.n}`
180
+ };
121
181
  }
182
+
183
+ //#endregion
184
+ //#region src/mcpi/approval-grant/nonce.ts
185
+ /**
186
+ * Server-issued, single-use nonce store for step-up approval grants.
187
+ *
188
+ * Issues one nonce per suspended action (`requestHash`) and consumes it when the
189
+ * quorum is satisfied. A resubmission of the same grants finds the nonce gone →
190
+ * rejected. This is what makes the grant single-use (closes replay across
191
+ * connections). In production this is shared state (Redis/DO); in-memory here.
192
+ *
193
+ * Edge-safe: nonce bytes come from `globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues` (Web
194
+ * Crypto — present on Node 18+, Cloudflare Workers, and Vercel Edge), encoded
195
+ * with `jose`'s isomorphic `base64url`. No `node:crypto`, no `Buffer`.
196
+ *
197
+ * @module @kya-os/checkpoint-shared/mcpi/approval-grant
198
+ */
199
+ /** 32 cryptographically-random bytes, base64url-encoded. Edge-safe. */
122
200
  function generateNonce() {
123
- return base64url.encode(globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)));
201
+ return base64url.encode(globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(/* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(32)));
124
202
  }
125
203
  var InMemoryApprovalNonceStore = class {
126
- issued = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
127
- issue(requestHash, ttlSec = APPROVAL_GRANT_MAX_LIFETIME_SEC) {
128
- const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
129
- const existing = this.issued.get(requestHash);
130
- if (existing && !existing.consumed && existing.expiresAt >= now) {
131
- return existing.nonce;
132
- }
133
- const nonce = generateNonce();
134
- this.issued.set(requestHash, { nonce, consumed: false, expiresAt: now + ttlSec });
135
- return nonce;
136
- }
137
- current(requestHash) {
138
- const e = this.issued.get(requestHash);
139
- if (!e || e.consumed || e.expiresAt < Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3)) return null;
140
- return e.nonce;
141
- }
142
- tryConsume(requestHash) {
143
- const e = this.issued.get(requestHash);
144
- if (!e || e.consumed || e.expiresAt < Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3)) return false;
145
- e.consumed = true;
146
- return true;
147
- }
204
+ issued = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
205
+ issue(requestHash, ttlSec = 300) {
206
+ const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
207
+ const existing = this.issued.get(requestHash);
208
+ if (existing && !existing.consumed && existing.expiresAt >= now) return existing.nonce;
209
+ const nonce = generateNonce();
210
+ this.issued.set(requestHash, {
211
+ nonce,
212
+ consumed: false,
213
+ expiresAt: now + ttlSec
214
+ });
215
+ return nonce;
216
+ }
217
+ current(requestHash) {
218
+ const e = this.issued.get(requestHash);
219
+ if (!e || e.consumed || e.expiresAt < Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3)) return null;
220
+ return e.nonce;
221
+ }
222
+ tryConsume(requestHash) {
223
+ const e = this.issued.get(requestHash);
224
+ if (!e || e.consumed || e.expiresAt < Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3)) return false;
225
+ e.consumed = true;
226
+ return true;
227
+ }
148
228
  };
149
229
 
230
+ //#endregion
150
231
  export { APPROVAL_GRANT_MAX_LIFETIME_SEC, APPROVAL_GRANT_TYP, InMemoryApprovalNonceStore, signApprovalGrant, verifyApprovalGrant, verifySignedApprovalQuorum };
232
+ //# sourceMappingURL=index.mjs.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"index.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../src/mcpi/approval-grant/grant.ts","../../../src/mcpi/approval-grant/nonce.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Step-up approval grants — portable, edge-safe reference implementation.\n *\n * The signed approval-grant scheme the step-up gate verifies. Lives in\n * `@kya-os/checkpoint-shared` (the runtime-neutral home) so every runtime that\n * enforces N-of-M step-up at the edge — the central gateway AND the SDK\n * middleware adapters (Express / Next.js / Cloudflare-worker / .NET-port) —\n * injects the SAME verifier into the step-up core\n * (`@kya-os/checkpoint-wasm-runtime/step-up`) instead of re-implementing it.\n *\n * A grant is a compact EdDSA JWS (one crypto path with the delegation proof)\n * binding five independent dimensions so a captured grant can't be replayed or\n * repurposed past any one of them:\n * - `requestHash` — the exact suspended action (TOCTOU)\n * - `aud` — the resource/gateway it's valid for\n * - `sub` — the AGENT being approved (`agentDid`; an approval for X must\n * not satisfy Y's byte-identical call)\n * - `iat`/`exp` — freshness (lifetime <= 300s; jose enforces exp)\n * - `nonce` — server-issued + single-use; consumed on quorum satisfaction\n * so a resubmission of the same grants is rejected\n *\n * The approver holds their own key and signs client-side; verification resolves\n * the approver DID (via the host-injected {@link ApproverKeyResolver}) and is\n * fail-closed.\n *\n * Edge-safe: `jose` is isomorphic (Web Crypto `SubtleCrypto`); nonce generation\n * uses `globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues` (see `./nonce`). No `node:*` import.\n *\n * @module @kya-os/checkpoint-shared/mcpi/approval-grant\n */\n\nimport { SignJWT, jwtVerify, importJWK, type JWK, type JWTPayload } from 'jose';\n\nimport type { ApprovalNonceStore } from './nonce';\n\nexport const APPROVAL_GRANT_TYP = 'approval-grant+jwt';\nexport const APPROVAL_GRANT_MAX_LIFETIME_SEC = 300;\n\nexport interface Ed25519PublicJWK {\n kty: 'OKP';\n crv: 'Ed25519';\n x: string;\n}\n\n/** What an approver attests — canonicalised into the JWS payload. */\nexport interface ApprovalGrantMeta {\n approvalRequestId: string;\n approverDid: string;\n /** The agent being approved (`sub`). Aligns with the engine/Cedar agent identity. */\n agentDid: string;\n requestHash: string;\n audience: string;\n decision: 'approve' | 'deny';\n nonce: string;\n created: number;\n expires: number;\n amr?: string[];\n delegationRef?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface SignedApprovalGrant {\n jws: string;\n meta: ApprovalGrantMeta;\n}\n\nexport interface ApprovalGrantExpectation {\n requestHash: string;\n audience: string;\n nonce: string;\n agentDid: string;\n now?: number;\n maxLifetimeSec?: number;\n}\n\nexport type ApproverKeyResolver = (did: string) => Promise<Ed25519PublicJWK | null>;\n\nexport interface ApprovalGrantVerification {\n valid: boolean;\n reason?: string;\n approverDid?: string;\n}\n\n/** Produce a signed grant (runs in the approver's client, with their key). */\nexport async function signApprovalGrant(\n meta: ApprovalGrantMeta,\n privateKeyJwk: JWK\n): Promise<SignedApprovalGrant> {\n if (!Number.isInteger(meta.created) || !Number.isInteger(meta.expires)) {\n throw new Error('approval grant: created/expires must be integer unix seconds');\n }\n if (meta.expires <= meta.created) {\n throw new Error('approval grant: expires must be after created');\n }\n if (meta.expires - meta.created > APPROVAL_GRANT_MAX_LIFETIME_SEC) {\n throw new Error(`approval grant: lifetime exceeds ${APPROVAL_GRANT_MAX_LIFETIME_SEC}s ceiling`);\n }\n\n const key = await importJWK(privateKeyJwk, 'EdDSA');\n const claims: JWTPayload = {\n requestHash: meta.requestHash,\n decision: meta.decision,\n nonce: meta.nonce,\n };\n if (meta.amr) claims.amr = meta.amr;\n if (meta.delegationRef) claims.delegationRef = meta.delegationRef;\n\n const jws = await new SignJWT(claims)\n .setProtectedHeader({\n alg: 'EdDSA',\n kid: `${meta.approverDid}#key-1`,\n typ: APPROVAL_GRANT_TYP,\n })\n .setIssuer(meta.approverDid)\n .setSubject(meta.agentDid)\n .setAudience(meta.audience)\n .setJti(meta.approvalRequestId)\n .setIssuedAt(new Date(meta.created * 1000))\n .setExpirationTime(new Date(meta.expires * 1000))\n .sign(key);\n\n return { jws, meta };\n}\n\n/** Verify a single grant against the gateway's expectation. Fail-closed. */\nexport async function verifyApprovalGrant(opts: {\n grant: SignedApprovalGrant;\n expected: ApprovalGrantExpectation;\n resolveKey: ApproverKeyResolver;\n}): Promise<ApprovalGrantVerification> {\n const { grant, expected, resolveKey } = opts;\n\n const approverDid = grant?.meta?.approverDid;\n if (typeof approverDid !== 'string' || approverDid.length === 0) {\n return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_approver_did' };\n }\n\n let publicKeyJwk: Ed25519PublicJWK | null = null;\n try {\n publicKeyJwk = await resolveKey(approverDid);\n } catch {\n return { valid: false, reason: 'approver_key_unresolved' };\n }\n if (!publicKeyJwk) {\n return { valid: false, reason: 'approver_key_unresolved' };\n }\n\n try {\n const key = await importJWK(publicKeyJwk, 'EdDSA');\n const { payload, protectedHeader } = await jwtVerify(grant.jws, key, {\n algorithms: ['EdDSA'],\n issuer: approverDid,\n audience: expected.audience,\n ...(expected.now !== undefined ? { currentDate: new Date(expected.now * 1000) } : {}),\n });\n\n if (protectedHeader.typ !== APPROVAL_GRANT_TYP) {\n return { valid: false, reason: 'bad_typ' };\n }\n if (payload.requestHash !== expected.requestHash) {\n return { valid: false, reason: 'request_hash_mismatch' };\n }\n if (payload.nonce !== expected.nonce) {\n return { valid: false, reason: 'nonce_mismatch' };\n }\n if (payload.sub !== expected.agentDid) {\n return { valid: false, reason: 'agent_mismatch' };\n }\n if (payload.decision !== 'approve') {\n return { valid: false, reason: 'not_approved' };\n }\n\n const iat = payload.iat;\n const exp = payload.exp;\n if (typeof iat !== 'number' || typeof exp !== 'number') {\n return { valid: false, reason: 'missing_times' };\n }\n if (exp - iat > (expected.maxLifetimeSec ?? APPROVAL_GRANT_MAX_LIFETIME_SEC)) {\n return { valid: false, reason: 'lifetime_exceeded' };\n }\n if (\n grant.meta.requestHash !== payload.requestHash ||\n grant.meta.nonce !== payload.nonce ||\n grant.meta.agentDid !== payload.sub ||\n grant.meta.audience !== payload.aud ||\n grant.meta.decision !== payload.decision ||\n grant.meta.approverDid !== payload.iss\n ) {\n return { valid: false, reason: 'meta_mismatch' };\n }\n\n return { valid: true, approverDid };\n } catch {\n return { valid: false, reason: 'verify_failed' };\n }\n}\n\n// ── Quorum over signed grants ───────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface SignedQuorumResult {\n satisfied: boolean;\n reason?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Quorum is satisfied iff >= `quorum.n` DISTINCT allow-listed approvers each\n * signed a valid grant bound to the suspended action's outstanding nonce. On\n * satisfaction the nonce is consumed — a replay of the same grants then finds no\n * outstanding nonce and is rejected. Reuses {@link verifyApprovalGrant} per grant.\n */\nexport async function verifySignedApprovalQuorum(opts: {\n grants: SignedApprovalGrant[];\n expected: { requestHash: string; audience: string; agentDid: string; now?: number };\n quorum: { n: number; approvers: string[] };\n resolveKey: ApproverKeyResolver;\n nonceStore: ApprovalNonceStore;\n}): Promise<SignedQuorumResult> {\n const { grants, expected, quorum, resolveKey, nonceStore } = opts;\n\n if (!Number.isInteger(quorum.n) || quorum.n < 1) {\n return { satisfied: false, reason: 'invalid_quorum' };\n }\n if (!Array.isArray(quorum.approvers) || quorum.approvers.length === 0) {\n // Fail-closed: an empty allowlist means \"anyone who signs\" = not authorization.\n return { satisfied: false, reason: 'no_approvers' };\n }\n\n const nonce = nonceStore.current(expected.requestHash);\n if (!nonce) {\n // No outstanding challenge — covers a replay after a prior satisfaction.\n return { satisfied: false, reason: 'no_outstanding_challenge' };\n }\n\n const approvers = new Set<string>();\n for (const grant of grants) {\n const v = await verifyApprovalGrant({\n grant,\n expected: {\n requestHash: expected.requestHash,\n audience: expected.audience,\n agentDid: expected.agentDid,\n nonce,\n ...(expected.now !== undefined ? { now: expected.now } : {}),\n },\n resolveKey,\n });\n if (!v.valid || !v.approverDid) continue;\n if (!quorum.approvers.includes(v.approverDid)) continue;\n approvers.add(v.approverDid);\n }\n\n if (approvers.size >= quorum.n) {\n // ATOMIC single-use: only the first concurrent satisfier claims the nonce and\n // proceeds. A request that verified the same grants against the same nonce but\n // lost the race is re-challenged rather than double-admitted (closes the\n // read-verify-consume TOCTOU on the shared nonce).\n if (!nonceStore.tryConsume(expected.requestHash)) {\n return { satisfied: false, reason: 'nonce_already_consumed' };\n }\n return { satisfied: true };\n }\n return { satisfied: false, reason: `quorum_not_met:${approvers.size}/${quorum.n}` };\n}\n","/**\n * Server-issued, single-use nonce store for step-up approval grants.\n *\n * Issues one nonce per suspended action (`requestHash`) and consumes it when the\n * quorum is satisfied. A resubmission of the same grants finds the nonce gone →\n * rejected. This is what makes the grant single-use (closes replay across\n * connections). In production this is shared state (Redis/DO); in-memory here.\n *\n * Edge-safe: nonce bytes come from `globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues` (Web\n * Crypto — present on Node 18+, Cloudflare Workers, and Vercel Edge), encoded\n * with `jose`'s isomorphic `base64url`. No `node:crypto`, no `Buffer`.\n *\n * @module @kya-os/checkpoint-shared/mcpi/approval-grant\n */\n\nimport { base64url } from 'jose';\n\nimport { APPROVAL_GRANT_MAX_LIFETIME_SEC } from './grant';\n\nexport interface ApprovalNonceStore {\n /**\n * The action's nonce — minted once on the first `step_up`, then REUSED on every\n * resubmit (so grants already signed for it stay valid across partial resumes).\n * A fresh nonce is minted only for a NEW action instance — after the prior was\n * consumed (the action proceeded) or expired. Idempotent per `requestHash`.\n */\n issue(requestHash: string, ttlSec?: number): string;\n /** The outstanding, unconsumed, unexpired nonce for this action — else null. */\n current(requestHash: string): string | null;\n /**\n * ATOMICALLY claim + consume the action's outstanding nonce. Returns `true` for\n * the FIRST caller to claim it, `false` for every subsequent call (already\n * consumed, expired, or never issued). This is the single-use guarantee under\n * CONCURRENCY: two overlapping requests can both verify their grants against the\n * same outstanding nonce, but only the winner of `tryConsume` proceeds — the\n * loser is re-challenged, not double-admitted. The in-memory impl is atomic by\n * virtue of the synchronous event loop; a shared (Redis/DO) impl MUST back this\n * with an atomic compare-and-delete, not a read-then-write.\n */\n tryConsume(requestHash: string): boolean;\n}\n\n/** 32 cryptographically-random bytes, base64url-encoded. Edge-safe. */\nfunction generateNonce(): string {\n return base64url.encode(globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)));\n}\n\nexport class InMemoryApprovalNonceStore implements ApprovalNonceStore {\n private readonly issued = new Map<\n string,\n { nonce: string; consumed: boolean; expiresAt: number }\n >();\n\n issue(requestHash: string, ttlSec = APPROVAL_GRANT_MAX_LIFETIME_SEC): string {\n const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n const existing = this.issued.get(requestHash);\n // Idempotent per action: a resubmitted step_up reuses the outstanding nonce\n // rather than rotating it (which would invalidate grants already signed for\n // it). Mint fresh only for a new action instance — after consume or expiry.\n if (existing && !existing.consumed && existing.expiresAt >= now) {\n return existing.nonce;\n }\n const nonce = generateNonce();\n this.issued.set(requestHash, { nonce, consumed: false, expiresAt: now + ttlSec });\n return nonce;\n }\n\n current(requestHash: string): string | null {\n const e = this.issued.get(requestHash);\n if (!e || e.consumed || e.expiresAt < Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)) return null;\n return e.nonce;\n }\n\n tryConsume(requestHash: string): boolean {\n const e = this.issued.get(requestHash);\n if (!e || e.consumed || e.expiresAt < Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)) return false;\n e.consumed = true; // synchronous compare-and-set — the event loop serializes concurrent claims\n return true;\n }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAmCA,MAAa,qBAAqB;AAClC,MAAa,kCAAkC;;AA+C/C,eAAsB,kBACpB,MACA,eAC8B;CAC9B,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,UAAU,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,UAAU,KAAK,OAAO,GACnE,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,8DAA8D;CAEhF,IAAI,KAAK,WAAW,KAAK,SACvB,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,+CAA+C;CAEjE,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK,eACtB,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,wCAAoE,UAAU;CAGhG,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,eAAe,OAAO;CAClD,MAAM,SAAqB;EACzB,aAAa,KAAK;EAClB,UAAU,KAAK;EACf,OAAO,KAAK;CACd;CACA,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK;CAChC,IAAI,KAAK,eAAe,OAAO,gBAAgB,KAAK;CAgBpD,OAAO;EAAE,WAdS,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM,CAAC,CAClC,mBAAmB;GAClB,KAAK;GACL,KAAK,GAAG,KAAK,YAAY;GACzB,KAAK;EACP,CAAC,CAAC,CACD,UAAU,KAAK,WAAW,CAAC,CAC3B,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC,CACzB,YAAY,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC,CAC1B,OAAO,KAAK,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAC9B,4BAAY,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,UAAU,GAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAC1C,kCAAkB,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,UAAU,GAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAChD,KAAK,GAAG;EAEG;CAAK;AACrB;;AAGA,eAAsB,oBAAoB,MAIH;CACrC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,UAAU,eAAe;CAExC,MAAM,cAAc,OAAO,MAAM;CACjC,IAAI,OAAO,gBAAgB,YAAY,YAAY,WAAW,GAC5D,OAAO;EAAE,OAAO;EAAO,QAAQ;CAAuB;CAGxD,IAAI,eAAwC;CAC5C,IAAI;EACF,eAAe,MAAM,WAAW,WAAW;CAC7C,QAAQ;EACN,OAAO;GAAE,OAAO;GAAO,QAAQ;EAA0B;CAC3D;CACA,IAAI,CAAC,cACH,OAAO;EAAE,OAAO;EAAO,QAAQ;CAA0B;CAG3D,IAAI;EACF,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,cAAc,OAAO;EACjD,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,oBAAoB,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK;GACnE,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO;GACpB,QAAQ;GACR,UAAU,SAAS;GACnB,GAAI,SAAS,QAAQ,SAAY,EAAE,6BAAa,IAAI,KAAK,SAAS,MAAM,GAAI,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;EACrF,CAAC;EAED,IAAI,gBAAgB,8BAClB,OAAO;GAAE,OAAO;GAAO,QAAQ;EAAU;EAE3C,IAAI,QAAQ,gBAAgB,SAAS,aACnC,OAAO;GAAE,OAAO;GAAO,QAAQ;EAAwB;EAEzD,IAAI,QAAQ,UAAU,SAAS,OAC7B,OAAO;GAAE,OAAO;GAAO,QAAQ;EAAiB;EAElD,IAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ,SAAS,UAC3B,OAAO;GAAE,OAAO;GAAO,QAAQ;EAAiB;EAElD,IAAI,QAAQ,aAAa,WACvB,OAAO;GAAE,OAAO;GAAO,QAAQ;EAAe;EAGhD,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ;EACpB,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ;EACpB,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO,QAAQ,UAC5C,OAAO;GAAE,OAAO;GAAO,QAAQ;EAAgB;EAEjD,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,SAAS,wBACxB,OAAO;GAAE,OAAO;GAAO,QAAQ;EAAoB;EAErD,IACE,MAAM,KAAK,gBAAgB,QAAQ,eACnC,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,QAAQ,SAC7B,MAAM,KAAK,aAAa,QAAQ,OAChC,MAAM,KAAK,aAAa,QAAQ,OAChC,MAAM,KAAK,aAAa,QAAQ,YAChC,MAAM,KAAK,gBAAgB,QAAQ,KAEnC,OAAO;GAAE,OAAO;GAAO,QAAQ;EAAgB;EAGjD,OAAO;GAAE,OAAO;GAAM;EAAY;CACpC,QAAQ;EACN,OAAO;GAAE,OAAO;GAAO,QAAQ;EAAgB;CACjD;AACF;;;;;;;AAeA,eAAsB,2BAA2B,MAMjB;CAC9B,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,UAAU,QAAQ,YAAY,eAAe;CAE7D,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI,GAC5C,OAAO;EAAE,WAAW;EAAO,QAAQ;CAAiB;CAEtD,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,UAAU,WAAW,GAElE,OAAO;EAAE,WAAW;EAAO,QAAQ;CAAe;CAGpD,MAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAQ,SAAS,WAAW;CACrD,IAAI,CAAC,OAEH,OAAO;EAAE,WAAW;EAAO,QAAQ;CAA2B;CAGhE,MAAM,4BAAY,IAAI,IAAY;CAClC,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,QAAQ;EAC1B,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,oBAAoB;GAClC;GACA,UAAU;IACR,aAAa,SAAS;IACtB,UAAU,SAAS;IACnB,UAAU,SAAS;IACnB;IACA,GAAI,SAAS,QAAQ,SAAY,EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC;GAC5D;GACA;EACF,CAAC;EACD,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,aAAa;EAChC,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,UAAU,SAAS,EAAE,WAAW,GAAG;EAC/C,UAAU,IAAI,EAAE,WAAW;CAC7B;CAEA,IAAI,UAAU,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;EAK9B,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS,WAAW,GAC7C,OAAO;GAAE,WAAW;GAAO,QAAQ;EAAyB;EAE9D,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,KAAK;CAC3B;CACA,OAAO;EAAE,WAAW;EAAO,QAAQ,kBAAkB,UAAU,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO;CAAI;AACpF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AC1NA,SAAS,gBAAwB;CAC/B,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,WAAW,OAAO,gCAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;AAC/E;AAEA,IAAa,6BAAb,MAAsE;CACpE,AAAiB,yBAAS,IAAI,IAG5B;CAEF,MAAM,aAAqB,cAAkD;EAC3E,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI;EACxC,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI,WAAW;EAI5C,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC,SAAS,YAAY,SAAS,aAAa,KAC1D,OAAO,SAAS;EAElB,MAAM,QAAQ,cAAc;EAC5B,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI,aAAa;GAAE;GAAO,UAAU;GAAO,WAAW,MAAM;EAAO,CAAC;EAChF,OAAO;CACT;CAEA,QAAQ,aAAoC;EAC1C,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI,WAAW;EACrC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,YAAY,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI,GAAG,OAAO;EAC5E,OAAO,EAAE;CACX;CAEA,WAAW,aAA8B;EACvC,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI,WAAW;EACrC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,YAAY,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI,GAAG,OAAO;EAC5E,EAAE,WAAW;EACb,OAAO;CACT;AACF"}