@krizaka/auth 0.13.0 → 0.13.2

package/dist/index.js

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import {
   pkceChallenge,
   rolesSchema,
   sessionsSchema
-} from "./chunk-5CFOMWBN.js";
+} from "./chunk-2QUHBEBL.js";
 import {
   AccountError,
   EMAIL_CHANGE_TTL_HOURS,
@@ -29,13 +29,13 @@ import {
   linkToken,
   passwordResetMail,
   postgresAccounts
-} from "./chunk-3CLSDLXB.js";
+} from "./chunk-34CFR7EE.js";
 import {
   ROLES_CODE,
   RolesError,
   can,
   defineRoles
-} from "./chunk-2PWX2B4I.js";
+} from "./chunk-RWKBQE6N.js";
 
 // src/admin-gate.ts
 var ADMIN_REFUSAL = {
@@ -136,14 +136,18 @@ function landingRedirect(request, rule) {
   const path = `${target.pathname}${target.search}${target.hash}`;
   const base = rule.origin ? new URL(rule.origin).origin : null;
   const location = base && new URL(home, base).origin === base ? new URL(home, base).href : path;
-  return new Response(null, { status: 307, headers: { Location: location, "Cache-Control": "private, no-store", Vary: "Cookie" } });
+  return new Response(null, {
+    status: 307,
+    headers: { Location: location, "Cache-Control": "private, no-store", Vary: "Cookie" }
+  });
 }
 function sessionHint(response, request, options) {
   const session = Boolean(cookieValue(request.headers, options.cookie));
   const flagged = cookieValue(request.headers, SESSION_HINT_COOKIE) === "1";
   const base = `${SESSION_HINT_COOKIE}=${session ? "1" : ""}; Path=/; SameSite=Lax${options.secure ? "; Secure" : ""}`;
   if (session && !flagged) response.headers.append("Set-Cookie", base);
-  else if (!session && cookieValue(request.headers, SESSION_HINT_COOKIE) !== void 0) response.headers.append("Set-Cookie", `${base}; Max-Age=0`);
+  else if (!session && cookieValue(request.headers, SESSION_HINT_COOKIE) !== void 0)
+    response.headers.append("Set-Cookie", `${base}; Max-Age=0`);
   return response;
 }
 
@@ -157,8 +161,14 @@ function accountsMigration(options = {}) {
   return accountsSchema(options).migrations[0].sql({ schema: "public", tables: { accounts: "accounts" } });
 }
 function rolesMigration(roles, options = {}) {
-  const tables = { owner: ident(options.ownerTable ?? "accounts"), ...options.scopeTable ? { scope: ident(options.scopeTable) } : {} };
-  return rolesSchema(roles, { scoped: options.scopeTable !== void 0 }).migrations[0].sql({ schema: "public", tables });
+  const tables = {
+    owner: ident(options.ownerTable ?? "accounts"),
+    ...options.scopeTable ? { scope: ident(options.scopeTable) } : {}
+  };
+  return rolesSchema(roles, { scoped: options.scopeTable !== void 0 }).migrations[0].sql({
+    schema: "public",
+    tables
+  });
 }
 
 // src/password.ts
@@ -188,7 +198,12 @@ async function verifyPassword(password, stored) {
   const [scheme, n, r, p, salt, hash] = stored.split("$");
   if (scheme !== "scrypt" || !salt || !hash || password.length > PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH) return false;
   const expected = Buffer.from(hash, "base64url");
-  const given = await scrypt(password, Buffer.from(salt, "base64url"), expected.length, { N: Number(n), r: Number(r), p: Number(p), maxmem: MAXMEM });
+  const given = await scrypt(password, Buffer.from(salt, "base64url"), expected.length, {
+    N: Number(n),
+    r: Number(r),
+    p: Number(p),
+    maxmem: MAXMEM
+  });
   return given.length === expected.length && crypto2.timingSafeEqual(given, expected);
 }
 var decoy;
@@ -205,10 +220,16 @@ function createRoles(deps) {
     return role;
   };
   const newToken = deps.token ?? (() => `${deps.tokenPrefix}1.${crypto3.randomBytes(32).toString("base64url")}`);
-  const owners = (scopeId) => query("SELECT account_id FROM memberships WHERE scope_id = $1 AND role = $2", [scopeId, ownerRole()]);
+  const owners = (scopeId) => query("SELECT account_id FROM memberships WHERE scope_id = $1 AND role = $2", [
+    scopeId,
+    ownerRole()
+  ]);
   const ownerRole = () => model.roles.find((r) => model.roles.every((x) => model.manages[r].includes(x) || x === r)) ?? model.roles[0];
   async function roleOf(accountId, scopeId) {
-    const [row] = await query("SELECT role FROM memberships WHERE scope_id = $1 AND account_id = $2", [scopeId, accountId]);
+    const [row] = await query("SELECT role FROM memberships WHERE scope_id = $1 AND account_id = $2", [
+      scopeId,
+      accountId
+    ]);
     return row?.role ?? null;
   }
   return {
@@ -216,7 +237,10 @@ function createRoles(deps) {
     roleOf,
     /** Every scope the person belongs to, with their role in it. */
     async scopesOf(accountId) {
-      return (await query("SELECT scope_id, role FROM memberships WHERE account_id = $1 ORDER BY created_at", [accountId])).map((r) => ({ scopeId: r.scope_id, role: r.role }));
+      return (await query(
+        "SELECT scope_id, role FROM memberships WHERE account_id = $1 ORDER BY created_at",
+        [accountId]
+      )).map((r) => ({ scopeId: r.scope_id, role: r.role }));
     },
     /** The person's role in the scope if it holds the permission; otherwise `NOT_A_MEMBER` (404: nothing tells the scope exists) or `FORBIDDEN`. */
     async authorize(accountId, scopeId, permission) {
@@ -238,7 +262,13 @@ function createRoles(deps) {
         "SELECT m.account_id, a.email, a.name, m.role, m.created_at FROM memberships m JOIN accounts a ON a.id = m.account_id WHERE m.scope_id = $1 ORDER BY m.created_at",
         [scopeId]
       );
-      return rows.map((r) => ({ accountId: r.account_id, email: r.email, name: r.name, role: r.role, since: r.created_at }));
+      return rows.map((r) => ({
+        accountId: r.account_id,
+        email: r.email,
+        name: r.name,
+        role: r.role,
+        since: r.created_at
+      }));
     },
     /** Changes someone's role. The actor must manage both the current and the new role; the last owner can never be demoted. */
     async setRole(scopeId, actor, target, role) {
@@ -246,8 +276,10 @@ function createRoles(deps) {
       const mine = await roleOf(actor.id, scopeId);
       const current = await roleOf(target, scopeId);
       if (!mine || !current) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notMember);
-      if (!model.manages[mine].includes(current) || !model.manages[mine].includes(role)) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notAllowed);
-      if (current === ownerRole() && role !== current && (await owners(scopeId)).length <= 1) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.lastOwner);
+      if (!model.manages[mine].includes(current) || !model.manages[mine].includes(role))
+        throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notAllowed);
+      if (current === ownerRole() && role !== current && (await owners(scopeId)).length <= 1)
+        throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.lastOwner);
       await query("UPDATE memberships SET role = $3 WHERE scope_id = $1 AND account_id = $2", [scopeId, target, role]);
     },
     /** Removes someone from the scope (or leaves it, when the target is the actor). The last owner cannot go. */
@@ -266,22 +298,50 @@ function createRoles(deps) {
       if (!mine) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notMember);
       if (!model.manages[mine].includes(role)) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notAllowed);
       const email = input.email.trim().toLowerCase();
-      await query("UPDATE invitations SET used_at = $3 WHERE scope_id = $1 AND email = $2 AND used_at IS NULL", [scopeId, email, now]);
+      await query("UPDATE invitations SET used_at = $3 WHERE scope_id = $1 AND email = $2 AND used_at IS NULL", [
+        scopeId,
+        email,
+        now
+      ]);
       const token = newToken();
       const [row] = await query(
         "INSERT INTO invitations (id, scope_id, email, role, token_hash, invited_by, created_at, expires_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8) RETURNING id, created_at, expires_at",
-        [crypto3.randomUUID(), scopeId, email, role, deps.tokenHash(token), actor.id, now, addHours(now, deps.inviteTtlHours)]
+        [
+          crypto3.randomUUID(),
+          scopeId,
+          email,
+          role,
+          deps.tokenHash(token),
+          actor.id,
+          now,
+          addHours(now, deps.inviteTtlHours)
+        ]
       );
-      return { token, invitation: { id: row.id, email, role, createdAt: row.created_at, expiresAt: row.expires_at } };
+      return {
+        token,
+        invitation: { id: row.id, email, role, createdAt: row.created_at, expiresAt: row.expires_at }
+      };
     },
     async pendingInvitations(scopeId, now) {
-      const rows = await query("SELECT id, email, role, created_at, expires_at FROM invitations WHERE scope_id = $1 AND used_at IS NULL AND expires_at > $2 ORDER BY created_at", [scopeId, now]);
-      return rows.map((r) => ({ id: r.id, email: r.email, role: r.role, createdAt: r.created_at, expiresAt: r.expires_at }));
+      const rows = await query(
+        "SELECT id, email, role, created_at, expires_at FROM invitations WHERE scope_id = $1 AND used_at IS NULL AND expires_at > $2 ORDER BY created_at",
+        [scopeId, now]
+      );
+      return rows.map((r) => ({
+        id: r.id,
+        email: r.email,
+        role: r.role,
+        createdAt: r.created_at,
+        expiresAt: r.expires_at
+      }));
     },
     async revokeInvitation(scopeId, actor, invitationId, now) {
       const mine = await roleOf(actor.id, scopeId);
       if (!mine) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notMember);
-      const [row] = await query("SELECT role FROM invitations WHERE id = $1 AND scope_id = $2 AND used_at IS NULL", [invitationId, scopeId]);
+      const [row] = await query(
+        "SELECT role FROM invitations WHERE id = $1 AND scope_id = $2 AND used_at IS NULL",
+        [invitationId, scopeId]
+      );
       if (!row) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.inviteInvalid);
       if (!model.manages[mine].includes(row.role)) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notAllowed);
       await query("UPDATE invitations SET used_at = $2 WHERE id = $1", [invitationId, now]);
@@ -296,8 +356,15 @@ function createRoles(deps) {
       if (row.email !== account.email.trim().toLowerCase()) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.inviteWrongAccount);
       await query("UPDATE invitations SET used_at = $2 WHERE id = $1", [row.id, now]);
       const current = await roleOf(account.id, row.scope_id);
-      if (!current || model.manages[current].length < model.manages[row.role].length) await query("INSERT INTO memberships (scope_id, account_id, role, invited_by, created_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5) ON CONFLICT (scope_id, account_id) DO UPDATE SET role = excluded.role", [row.scope_id, account.id, row.role, row.invited_by, now]);
-      return { scopeId: row.scope_id, role: !current || model.manages[current].length < model.manages[row.role].length ? row.role : current };
+      if (!current || model.manages[current].length < model.manages[row.role].length)
+        await query(
+          "INSERT INTO memberships (scope_id, account_id, role, invited_by, created_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5) ON CONFLICT (scope_id, account_id) DO UPDATE SET role = excluded.role",
+          [row.scope_id, account.id, row.role, row.invited_by, now]
+        );
+      return {
+        scopeId: row.scope_id,
+        role: !current || model.manages[current].length < model.manages[row.role].length ? row.role : current
+      };
     }
   };
 }
@@ -308,7 +375,8 @@ var BODY = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/;
 var PREFIX = /^[a-z]{1,4}$/;
 var USER_AGENT_MAX = 300;
 function createSessions(deps) {
-  if (!PREFIX.test(deps.tokenPrefix)) throw new RangeError(`tokenPrefix must be 1 to 4 lower-case letters, got ${deps.tokenPrefix}`);
+  if (!PREFIX.test(deps.tokenPrefix))
+    throw new RangeError(`tokenPrefix must be 1 to 4 lower-case letters, got ${deps.tokenPrefix}`);
   const head = `${deps.tokenPrefix}1.`;
   const secret = () => typeof deps.secret === "function" ? deps.secret() : deps.secret;
   const isToken = (value) => !!value && value.startsWith(head) && BODY.test(value.slice(head.length));
@@ -320,12 +388,20 @@ function createSessions(deps) {
     tokenHash,
     async create(accountId, meta) {
       const days = typeof deps.sessionDays === "function" ? await deps.sessionDays() : deps.sessionDays;
-      if (!Number.isInteger(days) || days < 1) throw new RangeError(`sessionDays must be a whole number of days from 1, got ${days}`);
+      if (!Number.isInteger(days) || days < 1)
+        throw new RangeError(`sessionDays must be a whole number of days from 1, got ${days}`);
       const token = newToken();
       const createdAt = deps.clock.now();
       const expires = new Date(createdAt);
       expires.setUTCHours(expires.getUTCHours() + days * 24);
-      await deps.store.insert({ accountId, tokenHash: tokenHash(token), createdAt, expiresAt: expires, ip: meta.ip, userAgent: meta.userAgent?.slice(0, USER_AGENT_MAX) ?? null });
+      await deps.store.insert({
+        accountId,
+        tokenHash: tokenHash(token),
+        createdAt,
+        expiresAt: expires,
+        ip: meta.ip,
+        userAgent: meta.userAgent?.slice(0, USER_AGENT_MAX) ?? null
+      });
       return { token, expires };
     },
     async resolve(token) {
@@ -339,7 +415,15 @@ function createSessions(deps) {
   };
 }
 function sessionCookie(token, expires, options) {
-  return { name: options.name, value: token, httpOnly: true, secure: options.secure, sameSite: "lax", path: "/", expires };
+  return {
+    name: options.name,
+    value: token,
+    httpOnly: true,
+    secure: options.secure,
+    sameSite: "lax",
+    path: "/",
+    expires
+  };
 }
 function clearedSessionCookie(options, now) {
   return sessionCookie("", now, options);
@@ -385,7 +469,10 @@ function dbSessionStore(query, options) {
   const active = options.active ? ` AND a.${ident2(options.active.column)} = $3` : "";
   return {
     async insert(session) {
-      await query(`INSERT INTO ${sessions} (account_id, token_hash, created_at, expires_at, ip, user_agent) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)`, [session.accountId, session.tokenHash, session.createdAt, session.expiresAt, session.ip, session.userAgent]);
+      await query(
+        `INSERT INTO ${sessions} (account_id, token_hash, created_at, expires_at, ip, user_agent) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)`,
+        [session.accountId, session.tokenHash, session.createdAt, session.expiresAt, session.ip, session.userAgent]
+      );
     },
     async find(tokenHash, now) {
       const params = [tokenHash, now];
@@ -412,7 +499,8 @@ function parseExternalIdentity(body) {
   const o = body ?? {};
   const issuer = text(o.issuer);
   const subject = text(o.subject);
-  if (!issuer || !subject) throw new FederationError(FEDERATION_CODE.unavailable, "krizaka-users answered without an issuer and a subject");
+  if (!issuer || !subject)
+    throw new FederationError(FEDERATION_CODE.unavailable, "krizaka-users answered without an issuer and a subject");
   return { issuer, subject, email: text(o.email), emailVerified: o.email_verified === true, name: text(o.name) };
 }
 function usersIdentityProvider({ baseUrl, appUrl, fetch }) {
@@ -420,8 +508,10 @@ function usersIdentityProvider({ baseUrl, appUrl, fetch }) {
   const app = appUrl.replace(/\/+$/, "");
   return {
     async start(provider, returnTo, options = {}) {
-      if (!isFederatedProvider(provider)) throw new FederationError(FEDERATION_CODE.unknownProvider, `Unknown provider ${String(provider)}`);
-      if (!isLocalReturn(returnTo)) throw new FederationError(FEDERATION_CODE.badReturn, "That return address is not allowed");
+      if (!isFederatedProvider(provider))
+        throw new FederationError(FEDERATION_CODE.unknownProvider, `Unknown provider ${String(provider)}`);
+      if (!isLocalReturn(returnTo))
+        throw new FederationError(FEDERATION_CODE.badReturn, "That return address is not allowed");
       const state = crypto.randomUUID();
       const query = new URLSearchParams({ return_to: `${app}${returnTo}`, state });
       if (options.codeChallenge) {
@@ -436,8 +526,10 @@ function usersIdentityProvider({ baseUrl, appUrl, fetch }) {
         headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
         body: JSON.stringify({ code, ...options.codeVerifier ? { code_verifier: options.codeVerifier } : {} })
       });
-      if (response.status === 400 || response.status === 401 || response.status === 404 || response.status === 410) throw new FederationError(FEDERATION_CODE.invalidCode, "That code is not valid");
-      if (!response.ok) throw new FederationError(FEDERATION_CODE.unavailable, `krizaka-users answered ${response.status}`);
+      if (response.status === 400 || response.status === 401 || response.status === 404 || response.status === 410)
+        throw new FederationError(FEDERATION_CODE.invalidCode, "That code is not valid");
+      if (!response.ok)
+        throw new FederationError(FEDERATION_CODE.unavailable, `krizaka-users answered ${response.status}`);
       return parseExternalIdentity(await response.json());
     }
   };

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/admin-gate.ts","../src/client-ip.ts","../src/federated-sign-in.ts","../src/landing.ts","../src/migration.ts","../src/password.ts","../src/roles.ts","../src/sessions.ts","../src/sessions-memory.ts","../src/sessions-persistence.ts","../src/users-federation.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The administration's locks, as one pure decision every product shares (it was copied in each product's `lib/access.ts`): a session,\n * the ADMIN role, and an address on the allowed list. A pure function of its inputs: the product reads the session and the address\n * and maps the verdict to its own answer.\n */\n\n/** Stable codes of a refusal. */\nexport const ADMIN_REFUSAL = {\n  unauthenticated: \"UNAUTHENTICATED\",\n  forbidden: \"FORBIDDEN\",\n  ipNotAllowed: \"IP_NOT_ALLOWED\",\n  notFound: \"NOT_FOUND\",\n} as const;\nexport type AdminRefusal = (typeof ADMIN_REFUSAL)[keyof typeof ADMIN_REFUSAL];\n\n/** The verdict: let in, or the status and code to answer. */\nexport type AdminDecision = { ok: true } | { ok: false; status: 401 | 403 | 404; code: AdminRefusal };\n\n/**\n * The list the administration's address lock reads, from the environment's value (`AUTH_ALLOWED_IPS`): an empty list is « nobody » in\n * production and « anybody » in development, so a forgotten setting never opens the console.\n * @param list the configured addresses\n * @returns the list to hand to `requireAdmin`, or null (anybody)\n */\nexport function allowedIps(list: readonly string[], options: { production: boolean }): readonly string[] | null {\n  if (list.length > 0) return list;\n  return options.production ? [] : null;\n}\n\n/** Whether an address may use the administration: `null` allowed means anybody, an empty list nobody, and a missing address is never allowed by a list. */\nexport function ipAllowed(ip: string | null, allowed: readonly string[] | null): boolean {\n  if (allowed === null) return true;\n  return !!ip && allowed.includes(ip);\n}\n\nexport interface AdminGateInput {\n  /** The caller's session, or null when there is none. Only its account's role is read. */\n  session: { account: { role: string } } | null;\n  /** The caller's address (see `clientIp`). */\n  ip: string | null;\n  /** The addresses allowed (see `allowedIps`); null = anybody. */\n  allowedIps: readonly string[] | null;\n  /** `api` (default): 401 without a session, 403 with the reason. `page`: the administration does not announce itself, so every failed lock is a 404. */\n  surface?: \"api\" | \"page\";\n  /** The role that administers. Default `ADMIN`. */\n  role?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * The administration's three locks. The first that fails decides.\n * @returns `{ ok: true }`, or the status (401, 403 or 404 on a page) and the code to answer\n */\nexport function requireAdmin(input: AdminGateInput): AdminDecision {\n  const page = input.surface === \"page\";\n  const refuse = (status: 401 | 403, code: AdminRefusal): AdminDecision => (page ? { ok: false, status: 404, code: ADMIN_REFUSAL.notFound } : { ok: false, status, code });\n  if (!input.session) return refuse(401, ADMIN_REFUSAL.unauthenticated);\n  if (input.session.account.role !== (input.role ?? \"ADMIN\")) return refuse(403, ADMIN_REFUSAL.forbidden);\n  if (!ipAllowed(input.ip, input.allowedIps)) return refuse(403, ADMIN_REFUSAL.ipNotAllowed);\n  return { ok: true };\n}\n","/** How a deployment tells the client's address: the header its edge sets, and how many proxies append to `X-Forwarded-For`. */\nexport interface ClientIpRules {\n  /** A header the edge sets and overwrites with the client's address (`do-connecting-ip` on DigitalOcean App Platform, `cf-connecting-ip` behind Cloudflare). Read first when present. */\n  header?: string | undefined;\n  /** How many trusted proxies append to `X-Forwarded-For`: 1 (the default) to 10. */\n  trustedProxyHops?: number | undefined;\n}\n\nconst IPV4 = /^(?:\\d{1,3}\\.){3}\\d{1,3}$/;\nconst IPV6 = /^[0-9a-f:]+(?:%\\w+)?$/i;\nfunction isIp(value: string): boolean {\n  return (IPV4.test(value) && value.split(\".\").every((n) => Number(n) <= 255)) || (value.includes(\":\") && IPV6.test(value));\n}\n\n/**\n * The client's IP address, as far as this deployment can trust it. `X-Forwarded-For` is a list each proxy appends to: its LEFT end is\n * whatever the client sent (anyone can write `X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4`), so a limit keyed on it is a limit the attacker chooses. The\n * address the last trusted proxy saw is read from the RIGHT:\n *\n * - the `header` the edge sets and overwrites, when present;\n * - otherwise the entry `trustedProxyHops` (default 1: one proxy) from the right of `X-Forwarded-For`, then `X-Real-IP`;\n * - otherwise null (local development without a proxy).\n *\n * The product reads its environment (`ABUSE_CLIENT_IP_HEADER`, `ABUSE_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS`) and passes the values: this function reads none.\n * @param headers the request's headers\n * @returns a valid IPv4 or IPv6 address, or null\n */\nexport function clientIp(headers: Headers, rules: ClientIpRules = {}): string | null {\n  const custom = rules.header?.trim().toLowerCase();\n  if (custom) {\n    const value = headers.get(custom)?.split(\",\")[0]?.trim();\n    if (value && isIp(value)) return value;\n  }\n  const hops = Math.max(1, Math.min(10, Number(rules.trustedProxyHops) || 1));\n  const chain = (headers.get(\"x-forwarded-for\") ?? \"\")\n    .split(\",\")\n    .map((part) => part.trim())\n    .filter(Boolean);\n  const fromRight = chain[chain.length - hops];\n  if (fromRight && isIp(fromRight)) return fromRight;\n  const real = headers.get(\"x-real-ip\")?.trim();\n  if (real && isIp(real)) return real;\n  return null;\n}\n","import type { ExternalIdentity } from \"./federation\";\nimport type { IdentityLinkStore } from \"./identity-links\";\n\n/** What federated sign-in needs from the product's accounts: no second user table, just a look-up and, when registration is open, a creation. */\nexport interface FederatedAccounts {\n  /** The account that holds this address (lower case), and whether the product has verified it; null when none. */\n  findByEmail(email: string): Promise<{ id: string; emailVerified: boolean } | null>;\n  /** Creates an account for a person the provider vouches for (address verified, no password). Absent when registration is closed. */\n  create?(identity: ExternalIdentity & { email: string }): Promise<string>;\n}\n\n/** Why a sign-in was refused: a stable code the product maps to its words. */\nexport const FEDERATED_REFUSAL = {\n  /** The provider did not verify the address (or gave none): nothing is linked, nothing is created. */\n  emailNotVerified: \"EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED\",\n  /** An account holds the address but the product never verified it: linking would let a stranger take it over. */\n  accountEmailUnverified: \"ACCOUNT_EMAIL_UNVERIFIED\",\n  /** No account, and registration is closed. */\n  noAccount: \"NO_ACCOUNT\",\n} as const;\nexport type FederatedRefusal = (typeof FEDERATED_REFUSAL)[keyof typeof FEDERATED_REFUSAL];\n\nexport type FederatedSignInResult =\n  /** `via`: `link` already linked, `linked` attached to the account of that address now, `created` a new account. */\n  | { status: \"signed-in\"; accountId: string; via: \"link\" | \"linked\" | \"created\" }\n  | { status: \"refused\"; code: FederatedRefusal };\n\nexport interface FederatedSignInDeps {\n  links: IdentityLinkStore;\n  accounts: FederatedAccounts;\n  clock: { now(): Date };\n}\n\n/**\n * From a verified external identity to an account of the product. The rule that matters: an identity attaches to an EXISTING account\n * only when the address is verified on both sides — by the provider and by the product. Otherwise a stranger who registers at\n * Facebook with your address would sign in as you.\n */\nexport function createFederatedSignIn({ links, accounts, clock }: FederatedSignInDeps) {\n  return {\n    async signIn(identity: ExternalIdentity): Promise<FederatedSignInResult> {\n      const known = await links.find(identity.issuer, identity.subject);\n      if (known) return { status: \"signed-in\", accountId: known, via: \"link\" };\n\n      const email = identity.email?.trim().toLowerCase();\n      if (!email || !identity.emailVerified) return { status: \"refused\", code: FEDERATED_REFUSAL.emailNotVerified };\n\n      const existing = await accounts.findByEmail(email);\n      if (existing) {\n        if (!existing.emailVerified) return { status: \"refused\", code: FEDERATED_REFUSAL.accountEmailUnverified };\n        await links.link(existing.id, identity.issuer, identity.subject, clock.now());\n        return { status: \"signed-in\", accountId: existing.id, via: \"linked\" };\n      }\n\n      if (!accounts.create) return { status: \"refused\", code: FEDERATED_REFUSAL.noAccount };\n      const accountId = await accounts.create({ ...identity, email });\n      await links.link(accountId, identity.issuer, identity.subject, clock.now());\n      return { status: \"signed-in\", accountId, via: \"created\" };\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nexport type FederatedSignIn = ReturnType<typeof createFederatedSignIn>;\n","// The two proxy-side rules of « a signed-in person never sees the public side » (krizaka-ui#827), the same for every\n// product. Web-standard Request/Response only (a Next.js `proxy.ts` calls them). The cookie is a HINT: its presence\n// decides a redirect and a placeholder, never an authorization — the page and the API still resolve the session.\n\n/** The readable flag the proxy keeps next to the HttpOnly session cookie: « a session cookie exists », value `1`, never the token. */\nexport const SESSION_HINT_COOKIE = \"kz-session\";\n\nconst cookieValue = (headers: Headers, name: string): string | undefined => {\n  const prefix = `${name}=`;\n  return headers\n    .get(\"cookie\")\n    ?.split(\";\")\n    .map((part) => part.trim())\n    .find((part) => part.startsWith(prefix))\n    ?.slice(prefix.length);\n};\n\n/** Where a signed-in visitor of the landing route goes. */\nexport interface LandingRule {\n  /** The product's session cookie name (`yomizaka_session`). */\n  cookie: string;\n  /** The landing routes (`[\"/\", \"/fr\", \"/en\"]`): exact paths, a trailing slash tolerated. */\n  landing: readonly string[];\n  /** The signed-in start page, or a function of the request (the language of the address). */\n  home: string | ((request: Request) => string);\n  /**\n   * The product's own public origin (`https://dev.yomizaka.com`), from its declared environment (APP_URL), NEVER from the\n   * request: `Host` and `x-forwarded-*` are client-controlled. With it the Location is absolute on that origin (what a\n   * Next.js proxy accepts). Only the origin of the value is used. Optional outside production (the Location is then\n   * relative); REQUIRED in production, where a missing origin throws instead of falling back to the request's headers.\n   */\n  origin?: string;\n}\n\n// Linear on any input (a loop, not a `/\\/+$/` regular expression: CodeQL js/polynomial-redos on the request path).\nconst trimmed = (path: string) => {\n  let end = path.length;\n  while (end > 1 && path.charCodeAt(end - 1) === 47) end--;\n  return path.slice(0, end);\n};\n\n/**\n * The landing route with a session cookie answers 307 to the home before any HTML: private, never stored, varying with the\n * cookie. `null` for everything else (a signed-out visitor, another page, a write).\n */\nexport function landingRedirect(request: Request, rule: LandingRule): Response | null {\n  // Fail loudly at the first request of a misconfigured deployment, signed in or not: never a silent fallback.\n  if (!rule.origin && globalThis.process?.env?.NODE_ENV === \"production\") {\n    throw new Error(\"landingRedirect: `origin` (the app's declared public URL) is required in production\");\n  }\n  if (request.method !== \"GET\" && request.method !== \"HEAD\") return null;\n  if (!cookieValue(request.headers, rule.cookie)) return null;\n  const url = new URL(request.url);\n  if (!rule.landing.some((path) => trimmed(path) === trimmed(url.pathname))) return null;\n  const home = typeof rule.home === \"function\" ? rule.home(request) : rule.home;\n  // Never built from the request's Host or scheme (client-controlled: host-header injection, open redirect). Relative by\n  // default; absolute only on the origin the app configured, and a `home` that leaves that origin falls back to relative.\n  const target = new URL(home, url);\n  const path = `${target.pathname}${target.search}${target.hash}`;\n  const base = rule.origin ? new URL(rule.origin).origin : null;\n  const location = base && new URL(home, base).origin === base ? new URL(home, base).href : path;\n  return new Response(null, { status: 307, headers: { Location: location, \"Cache-Control\": \"private, no-store\", Vary: \"Cookie\" } });\n}\n\n/**\n * Keeps the hint flag in step with the session cookie on any response (pages stay static: the proxy runs on every request,\n * the HTML is the same for everyone). Sets it when the session cookie exists, clears it when it is gone, else touches nothing.\n */\nexport function sessionHint<T extends Response>(response: T, request: Request, options: { cookie: string; secure: boolean }): T {\n  const session = Boolean(cookieValue(request.headers, options.cookie));\n  const flagged = cookieValue(request.headers, SESSION_HINT_COOKIE) === \"1\";\n  const base = `${SESSION_HINT_COOKIE}=${session ? \"1\" : \"\"}; Path=/; SameSite=Lax${options.secure ? \"; Secure\" : \"\"}`;\n  if (session && !flagged) response.headers.append(\"Set-Cookie\", base);\n  else if (!session && cookieValue(request.headers, SESSION_HINT_COOKIE) !== undefined) response.headers.append(\"Set-Cookie\", `${base}; Max-Age=0`);\n  return response;\n}\n","import { accountsSchema, rolesSchema } from \"./schema\";\n\nconst IDENT = /^[a-z_][a-z0-9_]{0,62}$/;\nconst ident = (name: string) => {\n  if (!IDENT.test(name)) throw new Error(`not a safe SQL identifier: ${name}`);\n  return name;\n};\n\n/**\n * The SQL of version 1 of the accounts tables, for a product that runs it by hand (idempotent).\n * @deprecated Use `accountsSchema` with `emitMigration` or `adoptMigration` from `@krizaka/db`: the SQL gets a version, a checksum and a marker. Removed in the next major.\n */\nexport function accountsMigration(options: { backfillVerified?: boolean } = {}): string {\n  return accountsSchema(options).migrations[0]!.sql({ schema: \"public\", tables: { accounts: \"accounts\" } });\n}\n\n/**\n * The SQL of version 1 of the memberships and invitations tables, for a product that runs it by hand (idempotent).\n * @deprecated Use `rolesSchema` with `emitMigration` or `adoptMigration` from `@krizaka/db`. Removed in the next major.\n */\nexport function rolesMigration(roles: readonly string[], options: { ownerTable?: string; scopeTable?: string } = {}): string {\n  const tables = { owner: ident(options.ownerTable ?? \"accounts\"), ...(options.scopeTable ? { scope: ident(options.scopeTable) } : {}) };\n  return rolesSchema(roles, { scoped: options.scopeTable !== undefined }).migrations[0]!.sql({ schema: \"public\", tables });\n}\n","import crypto from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/** Called only when a password is hashed or checked: the module also loads in a browser bundle (the role model), where `crypto.scrypt` does not exist. */\nconst scrypt = (password: string, salt: Buffer, keylen: number, options: crypto.ScryptOptions): Promise<Buffer> =>\n  new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n    crypto.scrypt(password, salt, keylen, options, (error, key) => (error ? reject(error) : resolve(key)));\n  });\n\n/**\n * scrypt (N=2^15, r=8, p=1), a 16-byte salt, stored as `scrypt$N$r$p$salt$hash` (base64url). These are the parameters of the copies\n * the products carried (Yomizaka, Akinaza, Kachizaka, Yororis): a hash they stored verifies here, and one made here verifies there.\n */\n// @fixed: the cost of the algorithm is part of the stored format; changing it is a new scheme, not a setting\nconst N = 32768;\nconst R = 8;\nconst P = 1;\nconst KEYLEN = 32;\nconst MAXMEM = 64 * 1024 * 1024;\nconst OPTIONS = { N, r: R, p: P, maxmem: MAXMEM };\n\n/** The shortest password the products accept. */\n// @fixed: a security floor shared by every product, not a business parameter\nexport const PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH = 12;\n/** The longest: a longer one is refused before any work is done (a very long password is a way to make the server spend time). */\n// @fixed: bounds the work a request can make the server do\nexport const PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH = 256;\n\n/** Why a new password is refused, or null when its length is acceptable. */\nexport function passwordProblem(password: string): \"TOO_SHORT\" | \"TOO_LONG\" | null {\n  if (password.length < PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH) return \"TOO_SHORT\";\n  if (password.length > PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH) return \"TOO_LONG\";\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Hashes a password with a fresh salt.\n * @returns `scrypt$N$r$p$salt$hash`\n */\nexport async function hashPassword(password: string): Promise<string> {\n  const salt = crypto.randomBytes(16);\n  const hash = await scrypt(password, salt, KEYLEN, OPTIONS);\n  return `scrypt$${N}$${R}$${P}$${salt.toString(\"base64url\")}$${hash.toString(\"base64url\")}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Checks a password against a stored hash, in constant time. A hash of another scheme, a malformed one or an over-long password is `false`.\n * The cost parameters are read from the stored value, so an older hash still verifies after the default changes.\n */\nexport async function verifyPassword(password: string, stored: string): Promise<boolean> {\n  const [scheme, n, r, p, salt, hash] = stored.split(\"$\");\n  if (scheme !== \"scrypt\" || !salt || !hash || password.length > PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH) return false;\n  const expected = Buffer.from(hash, \"base64url\");\n  const given = await scrypt(password, Buffer.from(salt, \"base64url\"), expected.length, { N: Number(n), r: Number(r), p: Number(p), maxmem: MAXMEM });\n  return given.length === expected.length && crypto.timingSafeEqual(given, expected);\n}\n\nlet decoy: Promise<string> | undefined;\n/** A hash to verify against when the address has no account: the same work, the same time, the same answer. */\nexport const decoyHash = (): Promise<string> => (decoy ??= hashPassword(crypto.randomBytes(24).toString(\"base64url\")));\n","import crypto from \"node:crypto\";\n\nimport type { Query } from \"@krizaka/db\";\nimport { addHours } from \"date-fns\";\n\nimport { can, type RoleModel,ROLES_CODE, RolesError } from \"./roles-model\";\n\nexport { can, defineRoles, type RoleModel, ROLES_CODE, type RolesCode, RolesError } from \"./roles-model\";\n\n/** The SQL executor the roles take: `@krizaka/db`'s `Query`. */\nexport type RolesQuery = Query;\n\nexport interface RolesDeps<Role extends string, Permission extends string> {\n  query: RolesQuery;\n  model: RoleModel<Role, Permission>;\n  /** The invitation link's token prefix (`ai` → `ai1.<43>`) and how the product keeps a token (its keyed hash). */\n  tokenPrefix: string;\n  tokenHash: (token: string) => string;\n  /** Hours an invitation stays valid. */\n  inviteTtlHours: number;\n  token?: () => string;\n}\n\nexport interface Member<Role extends string> {\n  accountId: string;\n  email: string;\n  name: string | null;\n  role: Role;\n  since: Date;\n}\nexport interface Invitation<Role extends string> {\n  id: string;\n  email: string;\n  role: Role;\n  expiresAt: Date;\n  createdAt: Date;\n}\n\n/** Who may do what in a scope, over the product's PostgreSQL. */\nexport function createRoles<Role extends string, Permission extends string>(deps: RolesDeps<Role, Permission>) {\n  const { query, model } = deps;\n  const known = (role: string): role is Role => (model.roles as readonly string[]).includes(role);\n  const mustKnow = (role: string): Role => {\n    if (!known(role)) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.unknownRole);\n    return role;\n  };\n  const newToken = deps.token ?? (() => `${deps.tokenPrefix}1.${crypto.randomBytes(32).toString(\"base64url\")}`);\n  const owners = (scopeId: string) => query<{ account_id: string }>(\"SELECT account_id FROM memberships WHERE scope_id = $1 AND role = $2\", [scopeId, ownerRole()]);\n  /** The role that cannot disappear: the first of the model that manages every role. */\n  const ownerRole = (): Role => model.roles.find((r) => model.roles.every((x) => model.manages[r].includes(x) || x === r)) ?? model.roles[0]!;\n\n  async function roleOf(accountId: string, scopeId: string): Promise<Role | null> {\n    const [row] = await query<{ role: Role }>(\"SELECT role FROM memberships WHERE scope_id = $1 AND account_id = $2\", [scopeId, accountId]);\n    return row?.role ?? null;\n  }\n\n  return {\n    ownerRole,\n    roleOf,\n\n    /** Every scope the person belongs to, with their role in it. */\n    async scopesOf(accountId: string): Promise<{ scopeId: string; role: Role }[]> {\n      return (await query<{ scope_id: string; role: Role }>(\"SELECT scope_id, role FROM memberships WHERE account_id = $1 ORDER BY created_at\", [accountId])).map((r) => ({ scopeId: r.scope_id, role: r.role }));\n    },\n\n    /** The person's role in the scope if it holds the permission; otherwise `NOT_A_MEMBER` (404: nothing tells the scope exists) or `FORBIDDEN`. */\n    async authorize(accountId: string, scopeId: string, permission: Permission): Promise<Role> {\n      const role = await roleOf(accountId, scopeId);\n      if (!role) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notMember);\n      if (!can(model, role, permission)) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.forbidden);\n      return role;\n    },\n\n    /** Puts a person in a scope with a role (changing it if they are there): for a first owner, a seed, an accepted invitation. */\n    async grant(scopeId: string, accountId: string, role: string, invitedBy: string | null, now: Date): Promise<void> {\n      mustKnow(role);\n      await query(\n        \"INSERT INTO memberships (scope_id, account_id, role, invited_by, created_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5) ON CONFLICT (scope_id, account_id) DO UPDATE SET role = excluded.role\",\n        [scopeId, accountId, role, invitedBy, now],\n      );\n    },\n\n    async members(scopeId: string): Promise<Member<Role>[]> {\n      const rows = await query<{ account_id: string; email: string; name: string | null; role: Role; created_at: Date }>(\n        \"SELECT m.account_id, a.email, a.name, m.role, m.created_at FROM memberships m JOIN accounts a ON a.id = m.account_id WHERE m.scope_id = $1 ORDER BY m.created_at\",\n        [scopeId],\n      );\n      return rows.map((r) => ({ accountId: r.account_id, email: r.email, name: r.name, role: r.role, since: r.created_at }));\n    },\n\n    /** Changes someone's role. The actor must manage both the current and the new role; the last owner can never be demoted. */\n    async setRole(scopeId: string, actor: { id: string }, target: string, role: string): Promise<void> {\n      mustKnow(role);\n      const mine = await roleOf(actor.id, scopeId);\n      const current = await roleOf(target, scopeId);\n      if (!mine || !current) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notMember);\n      if (!model.manages[mine].includes(current) || !model.manages[mine].includes(role as Role)) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notAllowed);\n      if (current === ownerRole() && role !== current && (await owners(scopeId)).length <= 1) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.lastOwner);\n      await query(\"UPDATE memberships SET role = $3 WHERE scope_id = $1 AND account_id = $2\", [scopeId, target, role]);\n    },\n\n    /** Removes someone from the scope (or leaves it, when the target is the actor). The last owner cannot go. */\n    async remove(scopeId: string, actor: { id: string }, target: string): Promise<void> {\n      const mine = await roleOf(actor.id, scopeId);\n      const current = await roleOf(target, scopeId);\n      if (!mine || !current) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notMember);\n      if (actor.id !== target && !model.manages[mine].includes(current)) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notAllowed);\n      if (current === ownerRole() && (await owners(scopeId)).length <= 1) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.lastOwner);\n      await query(\"DELETE FROM memberships WHERE scope_id = $1 AND account_id = $2\", [scopeId, target]);\n    },\n\n    /** Invites an e-mail address with a role the actor manages. The token is in the answer once (the product mails it); only its hash is kept. A new invitation for the same address replaces the pending one. */\n    async invite(scopeId: string, actor: { id: string }, input: { email: string; role: string }, now: Date): Promise<{ token: string; invitation: Invitation<Role> }> {\n      const role = mustKnow(input.role);\n      const mine = await roleOf(actor.id, scopeId);\n      if (!mine) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notMember);\n      if (!model.manages[mine].includes(role)) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notAllowed);\n      const email = input.email.trim().toLowerCase();\n      await query(\"UPDATE invitations SET used_at = $3 WHERE scope_id = $1 AND email = $2 AND used_at IS NULL\", [scopeId, email, now]);\n      const token = newToken();\n      const [row] = await query<{ id: string; created_at: Date; expires_at: Date }>(\n        \"INSERT INTO invitations (id, scope_id, email, role, token_hash, invited_by, created_at, expires_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8) RETURNING id, created_at, expires_at\",\n        [crypto.randomUUID(), scopeId, email, role, deps.tokenHash(token), actor.id, now, addHours(now, deps.inviteTtlHours)],\n      );\n      return { token, invitation: { id: row!.id, email, role, createdAt: row!.created_at, expiresAt: row!.expires_at } };\n    },\n\n    async pendingInvitations(scopeId: string, now: Date): Promise<Invitation<Role>[]> {\n      const rows = await query<{ id: string; email: string; role: Role; created_at: Date; expires_at: Date }>(\"SELECT id, email, role, created_at, expires_at FROM invitations WHERE scope_id = $1 AND used_at IS NULL AND expires_at > $2 ORDER BY created_at\", [scopeId, now]);\n      return rows.map((r) => ({ id: r.id, email: r.email, role: r.role, createdAt: r.created_at, expiresAt: r.expires_at }));\n    },\n\n    async revokeInvitation(scopeId: string, actor: { id: string }, invitationId: string, now: Date): Promise<void> {\n      const mine = await roleOf(actor.id, scopeId);\n      if (!mine) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notMember);\n      const [row] = await query<{ role: Role }>(\"SELECT role FROM invitations WHERE id = $1 AND scope_id = $2 AND used_at IS NULL\", [invitationId, scopeId]);\n      if (!row) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.inviteInvalid);\n      if (!model.manages[mine].includes(row.role)) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notAllowed);\n      await query(\"UPDATE invitations SET used_at = $2 WHERE id = $1\", [invitationId, now]);\n    },\n\n    /** The signed-in account takes the invitation: it must have been sent to this account's address; the link works once and expires. */\n    async acceptInvitation(token: string, account: { id: string; email: string }, now: Date): Promise<{ scopeId: string; role: Role }> {\n      const [row] = await query<{ id: string; scope_id: string; email: string; role: Role; invited_by: string | null }>(\n        \"SELECT id, scope_id, email, role, invited_by FROM invitations WHERE token_hash = $1 AND used_at IS NULL AND expires_at > $2\",\n        [deps.tokenHash(token), now],\n      );\n      if (!row) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.inviteInvalid);\n      if (row.email !== account.email.trim().toLowerCase()) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.inviteWrongAccount);\n      await query(\"UPDATE invitations SET used_at = $2 WHERE id = $1\", [row.id, now]);\n      const current = await roleOf(account.id, row.scope_id);\n      // already in: keep the higher role (an invitation never demotes)\n      if (!current || (model.manages[current].length < model.manages[row.role].length)) await query(\"INSERT INTO memberships (scope_id, account_id, role, invited_by, created_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5) ON CONFLICT (scope_id, account_id) DO UPDATE SET role = excluded.role\", [row.scope_id, account.id, row.role, row.invited_by, now]);\n      return { scopeId: row.scope_id, role: (!current || model.manages[current].length < model.manages[row.role].length ? row.role : current) as Role };\n    },\n  };\n}\nexport type Roles<Role extends string = string, Permission extends string = string> = ReturnType<typeof createRoles<Role, Permission>>;\n","import crypto from \"node:crypto\";\n\nimport type { Clock } from \"@krizaka/db\";\n\n/**\n * Web sessions (the copies each product carried: Yomizaka `ys1.`, Akinaza `as1.`, Kachizaka `ks1.`). The cookie holds a random token\n * (`<prefix>1.` and 32 bytes); the store keeps only its keyed hash, so a leaked table opens nothing. The account is re-read on every\n * request (a suspension applies at once). The lifetime is the setting `auth.sessionDays`.\n */\n\n/** A live session and the account it signs in. `Account` is the product's own shape (id, e-mail, role, locale, name…). */\nexport interface Session<Account> {\n  id: string;\n  account: Account;\n}\n\n/** What a store keeps for a new session. */\nexport interface NewSession {\n  accountId: string;\n  tokenHash: string;\n  createdAt: Date;\n  expiresAt: Date;\n  ip: string | null;\n  userAgent: string | null;\n}\n\n/** Where sessions live. Adapters: the PostgreSQL store over the product's `sessions` table, and a memory one. */\nexport interface SessionStore<Account> {\n  insert(session: NewSession): Promise<void>;\n  /** The session of this hash, when it has not expired at `now` and its account is active; null otherwise. */\n  find(tokenHash: string, now: Date): Promise<Session<Account> | null>;\n  delete(tokenHash: string): Promise<void>;\n}\n\nexport interface SessionsDeps<Account> {\n  store: SessionStore<Account>;\n  clock: Clock;\n  /** The product's token letters: `ys` makes `ys1.<43 characters>`. Lower-case letters, 1 to 4. */\n  tokenPrefix: string;\n  /** What keys the stored hash (`AUTH_SESSION_SECRET`). A function lets the product read its environment when it is needed. */\n  secret: string | (() => string);\n  /** Days a new session lives: the setting `auth.sessionDays`, read for each new session. */\n  sessionDays: number | (() => number | Promise<number>);\n}\n\nexport interface Sessions<Account> {\n  /** A fresh token: shaped `<prefix>1.<43>`, random, never stored (only its hash is). */\n  newToken(): string;\n  isToken(value: string | undefined): value is string;\n  /** The keyed hash the store keeps for a token. */\n  tokenHash(token: string): string;\n  /** Opens a session: the token for the cookie (shown once) and when it expires. */\n  create(accountId: string, meta: { ip: string | null; userAgent: string | null }): Promise<{ token: string; expires: Date }>;\n  /** The session a token opens, or null (unknown, malformed, expired, account not active). */\n  resolve(token: string | undefined): Promise<Session<Account> | null>;\n  /** Ends the session of this token. A malformed token is ignored. */\n  revoke(token: string | undefined): Promise<void>;\n}\n\nconst BODY = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/;\nconst PREFIX = /^[a-z]{1,4}$/;\nconst USER_AGENT_MAX = 300;\n\n/**\n * The sessions service of a product.\n * @param deps the store, the clock, the token letters, the secret and the lifetime\n * @throws RangeError for a token prefix that is not 1 to 4 lower-case letters, or a lifetime that is not a whole number of days from 1\n */\nexport function createSessions<Account>(deps: SessionsDeps<Account>): Sessions<Account> {\n  if (!PREFIX.test(deps.tokenPrefix)) throw new RangeError(`tokenPrefix must be 1 to 4 lower-case letters, got ${deps.tokenPrefix}`);\n  const head = `${deps.tokenPrefix}1.`;\n  const secret = () => (typeof deps.secret === \"function\" ? deps.secret() : deps.secret);\n  const isToken = (value: string | undefined): value is string => !!value && value.startsWith(head) && BODY.test(value.slice(head.length));\n  const tokenHash = (token: string) => crypto.createHmac(\"sha256\", `session:${secret()}`).update(token).digest(\"hex\");\n  const newToken = () => `${head}${crypto.randomBytes(32).toString(\"base64url\")}`;\n  return {\n    newToken,\n    isToken,\n    tokenHash,\n    async create(accountId, meta) {\n      const days = typeof deps.sessionDays === \"function\" ? await deps.sessionDays() : deps.sessionDays;\n      if (!Number.isInteger(days) || days < 1) throw new RangeError(`sessionDays must be a whole number of days from 1, got ${days}`);\n      const token = newToken();\n      const createdAt = deps.clock.now();\n      // days of 24 hours, not calendar days: the same instant whatever the server's time zone (the copies added 86 400 000 ms a day)\n      const expires = new Date(createdAt);\n      expires.setUTCHours(expires.getUTCHours() + days * 24);\n      await deps.store.insert({ accountId, tokenHash: tokenHash(token), createdAt, expiresAt: expires, ip: meta.ip, userAgent: meta.userAgent?.slice(0, USER_AGENT_MAX) ?? null });\n      return { token, expires };\n    },\n    async resolve(token) {\n      if (!isToken(token)) return null;\n      return deps.store.find(tokenHash(token), deps.clock.now());\n    },\n    async revoke(token) {\n      if (!isToken(token)) return;\n      await deps.store.delete(tokenHash(token));\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/** The attributes of the session cookie, for the product's framework (`cookies().set(cookie)`, `NextResponse.cookies.set`…). */\nexport interface SessionCookie {\n  name: string;\n  value: string;\n  httpOnly: true;\n  secure: boolean;\n  sameSite: \"lax\";\n  path: \"/\";\n  expires: Date;\n}\n\n/**\n * The session cookie: HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, on the whole site, `Secure` where the product says (production).\n * @param options the cookie's name (`yomizaka_session`) and whether it is `Secure`\n */\nexport function sessionCookie(token: string, expires: Date, options: { name: string; secure: boolean }): SessionCookie {\n  return { name: options.name, value: token, httpOnly: true, secure: options.secure, sameSite: \"lax\", path: \"/\", expires };\n}\n\n/** The same cookie, expired now: what signing out sets. */\nexport function clearedSessionCookie(options: { name: string; secure: boolean }, now: Date): SessionCookie {\n  return sessionCookie(\"\", now, options);\n}\n\n/**\n * The session token of a request: the native apps' `Authorization: Bearer` (which wins over a stale cookie), else the web's cookie.\n * @param headers the request's headers\n * @param options the cookie's name; `bearer: false` for a product with no native app\n * @returns the raw token (not yet checked), or undefined\n */\nexport function sessionTokenOf(headers: Headers, options: { cookie: string; bearer?: boolean }): string | undefined {\n  if (options.bearer !== false) {\n    const bearer = /^bearer (\\S+)$/i.exec(headers.get(\"authorization\") ?? \"\")?.[1];\n    if (bearer) return bearer;\n  }\n  const prefix = `${options.cookie}=`;\n  return headers\n    .get(\"cookie\")\n    ?.split(\";\")\n    .map((part) => part.trim())\n    .find((part) => part.startsWith(prefix))\n    ?.slice(prefix.length);\n}\n","import type { NewSession, Session, SessionStore } from \"./sessions\";\n\n/**\n * An in-memory session store, for unit tests and demos. `accountOf` plays the accounts table: it answers the account of an id, or null\n * when it does not exist or is not active.\n */\nexport function memorySessionStore<Account>(accountOf: (accountId: string) => Account | null): SessionStore<Account> & { rows(): readonly NewSession[] } {\n  const rows = new Map<string, NewSession & { id: string }>();\n  let next = 0;\n  return {\n    async insert(session) {\n      if (rows.has(session.tokenHash)) throw new Error(\"duplicate session token hash\");\n      next += 1;\n      rows.set(session.tokenHash, { ...session, id: `session-${next}` });\n    },\n    async find(tokenHash, now): Promise<Session<Account> | null> {\n      const row = rows.get(tokenHash);\n      if (!row || row.expiresAt.getTime() <= now.getTime()) return null;\n      const account = accountOf(row.accountId);\n      return account === null ? null : { id: row.id, account };\n    },\n    async delete(tokenHash) {\n      rows.delete(tokenHash);\n    },\n    rows: () => [...rows.values()],\n  };\n}\n","import { ident, type Query } from \"@krizaka/db\";\n\nimport type { Session, SessionStore } from \"./sessions\";\n\nexport interface DbSessionStoreOptions<Account> {\n  /** The product's session table. Default `sessions` (`id`, `account_id`, `token_hash` unique, `created_at`, `expires_at`, `ip`, `user_agent`). */\n  sessions?: string;\n  /** The product's account table. Default `accounts`. */\n  accounts?: string;\n  /** The account columns the session carries (`id`, `email`, `role`, `locale`, `name`…): all checked, all read in one query with the session. */\n  columns: readonly string[];\n  /** Builds the product's account from a row holding exactly `columns`. */\n  toAccount: (row: Record<string, unknown>) => Account;\n  /** An account that is not active signs nobody in (a suspension applies at once): the column and the value it must have (`status` = `ACTIVE`). */\n  active?: { column: string; equals: string };\n}\n\n/**\n * The session store over the product's own tables (`sessions` joined to `accounts`): the declared tables and columns are checked by\n * `ident()` and nothing else reaches SQL. The expiry is compared with the clock's `now`, not the database's.\n * @param query the product's query\n * @param options the table names, the account columns and how the account is built\n * @throws DbError `DB_UNSAFE_IDENTIFIER` for a table or column name that is not a safe identifier\n */\nexport function dbSessionStore<Account>(query: Query, options: DbSessionStoreOptions<Account>): SessionStore<Account> {\n  const sessions = ident(options.sessions ?? \"sessions\");\n  const accounts = ident(options.accounts ?? \"accounts\");\n  const columns = options.columns.map((column) => `a.${ident(column)}`).join(\", \");\n  const active = options.active ? ` AND a.${ident(options.active.column)} = $3` : \"\";\n  return {\n    async insert(session) {\n      await query(`INSERT INTO ${sessions} (account_id, token_hash, created_at, expires_at, ip, user_agent) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)`, [session.accountId, session.tokenHash, session.createdAt, session.expiresAt, session.ip, session.userAgent]);\n    },\n    async find(tokenHash, now): Promise<Session<Account> | null> {\n      const params: unknown[] = [tokenHash, now];\n      if (options.active) params.push(options.active.equals);\n      const [row] = await query<Record<string, unknown> & { session_id: string }>(\n        `SELECT s.id AS session_id, ${columns} FROM ${sessions} s JOIN ${accounts} a ON a.id = s.account_id WHERE s.token_hash = $1 AND s.expires_at > $2${active}`,\n        params,\n      );\n      if (!row) return null;\n      const { session_id: id, ...account } = row;\n      return { id, account: options.toAccount(account) };\n    },\n    async delete(tokenHash) {\n      await query(`DELETE FROM ${sessions} WHERE token_hash = $1`, [tokenHash]);\n    },\n  };\n}\n","import { type CompleteOptions, type ExternalIdentity, type FederatedProvider, FEDERATION_CODE, FederationError, type IdentityProvider, isFederatedProvider, isLocalReturn, type StartedSignIn, type StartOptions } from \"./federation\";\n\n/** The `fetch` the adapter calls krizaka-users with (injected: no global, no network in tests). */\nexport type Fetcher = (url: string, init: { method: \"POST\"; headers: Record<string, string>; body: string }) => Promise<{ ok: boolean; status: number; json(): Promise<unknown> }>;\n\nexport interface UsersFederationOptions {\n  /** The tenant host of the product: `https://auth.dev.akinaza.com`. */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  /** The product's public address: the start URL sends the person back to it, so `returnTo` is absolute from it. */\n  appUrl: string;\n  fetch: Fetcher;\n}\n\nconst START = (base: string, provider: FederatedProvider) => `${base}/api/v1/auth/web/${provider}/start`;\nconst EXCHANGE = (base: string) => `${base}/api/v1/auth/web/exchange`;\n\nconst text = (value: unknown): string | null => (typeof value === \"string\" && value.length > 0 ? value : null);\n\n/** Reads krizaka-users' answer into an identity; anything that is not a complete identity is refused. */\nexport function parseExternalIdentity(body: unknown): ExternalIdentity {\n  const o = (body ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>;\n  const issuer = text(o.issuer);\n  const subject = text(o.subject);\n  if (!issuer || !subject) throw new FederationError(FEDERATION_CODE.unavailable, \"krizaka-users answered without an issuer and a subject\");\n  return { issuer, subject, email: text(o.email), emailVerified: o.email_verified === true, name: text(o.name) };\n}\n\n/**\n * The adapter for krizaka-users (`auth.<product>` tenant host, krizaka/krizaka-users#31): `start` builds the tenant's start address,\n * `complete` exchanges the one-time code (and the PKCE verifier of a native app) for the verified identity.\n */\nexport function usersIdentityProvider({ baseUrl, appUrl, fetch }: UsersFederationOptions): IdentityProvider {\n  const base = baseUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, \"\");\n  const app = appUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, \"\");\n  return {\n    async start(provider, returnTo, options: StartOptions = {}): Promise<StartedSignIn> {\n      if (!isFederatedProvider(provider)) throw new FederationError(FEDERATION_CODE.unknownProvider, `Unknown provider ${String(provider)}`);\n      if (!isLocalReturn(returnTo)) throw new FederationError(FEDERATION_CODE.badReturn, \"That return address is not allowed\");\n      const state = crypto.randomUUID();\n      const query = new URLSearchParams({ return_to: `${app}${returnTo}`, state });\n      if (options.codeChallenge) {\n        query.set(\"code_challenge\", options.codeChallenge);\n        query.set(\"code_challenge_method\", \"S256\");\n      }\n      return { url: `${START(base, provider)}?${query}`, state };\n    },\n    async complete(code, options: CompleteOptions = {}) {\n      const response = await fetch(EXCHANGE(base), {\n        method: \"POST\",\n        headers: { \"content-type\": \"application/json\" },\n        body: JSON.stringify({ code, ...(options.codeVerifier ? { code_verifier: options.codeVerifier } : {}) 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/admin-gate.ts","../src/client-ip.ts","../src/federated-sign-in.ts","../src/landing.ts","../src/migration.ts","../src/password.ts","../src/roles.ts","../src/sessions.ts","../src/sessions-memory.ts","../src/sessions-persistence.ts","../src/users-federation.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The administration's locks, as one pure decision every product shares (it was copied in each product's `lib/access.ts`): a session,\n * the ADMIN role, and an address on the allowed list. A pure function of its inputs: the product reads the session and the address\n * and maps the verdict to its own answer.\n */\n\n/** Stable codes of a refusal. */\nexport const ADMIN_REFUSAL = {\n  unauthenticated: \"UNAUTHENTICATED\",\n  forbidden: \"FORBIDDEN\",\n  ipNotAllowed: \"IP_NOT_ALLOWED\",\n  notFound: \"NOT_FOUND\",\n} as const;\nexport type AdminRefusal = (typeof ADMIN_REFUSAL)[keyof typeof ADMIN_REFUSAL];\n\n/** The verdict: let in, or the status and code to answer. */\nexport type AdminDecision = { ok: true } | { ok: false; status: 401 | 403 | 404; code: AdminRefusal };\n\n/**\n * The list the administration's address lock reads, from the environment's value (`AUTH_ALLOWED_IPS`): an empty list is « nobody » in\n * production and « anybody » in development, so a forgotten setting never opens the console.\n * @param list the configured addresses\n * @returns the list to hand to `requireAdmin`, or null (anybody)\n */\nexport function allowedIps(list: readonly string[], options: { production: boolean }): readonly string[] | null {\n  if (list.length > 0) return list;\n  return options.production ? [] : null;\n}\n\n/** Whether an address may use the administration: `null` allowed means anybody, an empty list nobody, and a missing address is never allowed by a list. */\nexport function ipAllowed(ip: string | null, allowed: readonly string[] | null): boolean {\n  if (allowed === null) return true;\n  return !!ip && allowed.includes(ip);\n}\n\nexport interface AdminGateInput {\n  /** The caller's session, or null when there is none. Only its account's role is read. */\n  session: { account: { role: string } } | null;\n  /** The caller's address (see `clientIp`). */\n  ip: string | null;\n  /** The addresses allowed (see `allowedIps`); null = anybody. */\n  allowedIps: readonly string[] | null;\n  /** `api` (default): 401 without a session, 403 with the reason. `page`: the administration does not announce itself, so every failed lock is a 404. */\n  surface?: \"api\" | \"page\";\n  /** The role that administers. Default `ADMIN`. */\n  role?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * The administration's three locks. The first that fails decides.\n * @returns `{ ok: true }`, or the status (401, 403 or 404 on a page) and the code to answer\n */\nexport function requireAdmin(input: AdminGateInput): AdminDecision {\n  const page = input.surface === \"page\";\n  const refuse = (status: 401 | 403, code: AdminRefusal): AdminDecision =>\n    page ? { ok: false, status: 404, code: ADMIN_REFUSAL.notFound } : { ok: false, status, code };\n  if (!input.session) return refuse(401, ADMIN_REFUSAL.unauthenticated);\n  if (input.session.account.role !== (input.role ?? \"ADMIN\")) return refuse(403, ADMIN_REFUSAL.forbidden);\n  if (!ipAllowed(input.ip, input.allowedIps)) return refuse(403, ADMIN_REFUSAL.ipNotAllowed);\n  return { ok: true };\n}\n","/** How a deployment tells the client's address: the header its edge sets, and how many proxies append to `X-Forwarded-For`. */\nexport interface ClientIpRules {\n  /** A header the edge sets and overwrites with the client's address (`do-connecting-ip` on DigitalOcean App Platform, `cf-connecting-ip` behind Cloudflare). Read first when present. */\n  header?: string | undefined;\n  /** How many trusted proxies append to `X-Forwarded-For`: 1 (the default) to 10. */\n  trustedProxyHops?: number | undefined;\n}\n\nconst IPV4 = /^(?:\\d{1,3}\\.){3}\\d{1,3}$/;\nconst IPV6 = /^[0-9a-f:]+(?:%\\w+)?$/i;\nfunction isIp(value: string): boolean {\n  return (\n    (IPV4.test(value) && value.split(\".\").every((n) => Number(n) <= 255)) || (value.includes(\":\") && IPV6.test(value))\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * The client's IP address, as far as this deployment can trust it. `X-Forwarded-For` is a list each proxy appends to: its LEFT end is\n * whatever the client sent (anyone can write `X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4`), so a limit keyed on it is a limit the attacker chooses. The\n * address the last trusted proxy saw is read from the RIGHT:\n *\n * - the `header` the edge sets and overwrites, when present;\n * - otherwise the entry `trustedProxyHops` (default 1: one proxy) from the right of `X-Forwarded-For`, then `X-Real-IP`;\n * - otherwise null (local development without a proxy).\n *\n * The product reads its environment (`ABUSE_CLIENT_IP_HEADER`, `ABUSE_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS`) and passes the values: this function reads none.\n * @param headers the request's headers\n * @returns a valid IPv4 or IPv6 address, or null\n */\nexport function clientIp(headers: Headers, rules: ClientIpRules = {}): string | null {\n  const custom = rules.header?.trim().toLowerCase();\n  if (custom) {\n    const value = headers.get(custom)?.split(\",\")[0]?.trim();\n    if (value && isIp(value)) return value;\n  }\n  const hops = Math.max(1, Math.min(10, Number(rules.trustedProxyHops) || 1));\n  const chain = (headers.get(\"x-forwarded-for\") ?? \"\")\n    .split(\",\")\n    .map((part) => part.trim())\n    .filter(Boolean);\n  const fromRight = chain[chain.length - hops];\n  if (fromRight && isIp(fromRight)) return fromRight;\n  const real = headers.get(\"x-real-ip\")?.trim();\n  if (real && isIp(real)) return real;\n  return null;\n}\n","import type { ExternalIdentity } from \"./federation\";\nimport type { IdentityLinkStore } from \"./identity-links\";\n\n/** What federated sign-in needs from the product's accounts: no second user table, just a look-up and, when registration is open, a creation. */\nexport interface FederatedAccounts {\n  /** The account that holds this address (lower case), and whether the product has verified it; null when none. */\n  findByEmail(email: string): Promise<{ id: string; emailVerified: boolean } | null>;\n  /** Creates an account for a person the provider vouches for (address verified, no password). Absent when registration is closed. */\n  create?(identity: ExternalIdentity & { email: string }): Promise<string>;\n}\n\n/** Why a sign-in was refused: a stable code the product maps to its words. */\nexport const FEDERATED_REFUSAL = {\n  /** The provider did not verify the address (or gave none): nothing is linked, nothing is created. */\n  emailNotVerified: \"EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED\",\n  /** An account holds the address but the product never verified it: linking would let a stranger take it over. */\n  accountEmailUnverified: \"ACCOUNT_EMAIL_UNVERIFIED\",\n  /** No account, and registration is closed. */\n  noAccount: \"NO_ACCOUNT\",\n} as const;\nexport type FederatedRefusal = (typeof FEDERATED_REFUSAL)[keyof typeof FEDERATED_REFUSAL];\n\nexport type FederatedSignInResult =\n  /** `via`: `link` already linked, `linked` attached to the account of that address now, `created` a new account. */\n  | { status: \"signed-in\"; accountId: string; via: \"link\" | \"linked\" | \"created\" }\n  | { status: \"refused\"; code: FederatedRefusal };\n\nexport interface FederatedSignInDeps {\n  links: IdentityLinkStore;\n  accounts: FederatedAccounts;\n  clock: { now(): Date };\n}\n\n/**\n * From a verified external identity to an account of the product. The rule that matters: an identity attaches to an EXISTING account\n * only when the address is verified on both sides — by the provider and by the product. Otherwise a stranger who registers at\n * Facebook with your address would sign in as you.\n */\nexport function createFederatedSignIn({ links, accounts, clock }: FederatedSignInDeps) {\n  return {\n    async signIn(identity: ExternalIdentity): Promise<FederatedSignInResult> {\n      const known = await links.find(identity.issuer, identity.subject);\n      if (known) return { status: \"signed-in\", accountId: known, via: \"link\" };\n\n      const email = identity.email?.trim().toLowerCase();\n      if (!email || !identity.emailVerified) return { status: \"refused\", code: FEDERATED_REFUSAL.emailNotVerified };\n\n      const existing = await accounts.findByEmail(email);\n      if (existing) {\n        if (!existing.emailVerified) return { status: \"refused\", code: FEDERATED_REFUSAL.accountEmailUnverified };\n        await links.link(existing.id, identity.issuer, identity.subject, clock.now());\n        return { status: \"signed-in\", accountId: existing.id, via: \"linked\" };\n      }\n\n      if (!accounts.create) return { status: \"refused\", code: FEDERATED_REFUSAL.noAccount };\n      const accountId = await accounts.create({ ...identity, email });\n      await links.link(accountId, identity.issuer, identity.subject, clock.now());\n      return { status: \"signed-in\", accountId, via: \"created\" };\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nexport type FederatedSignIn = ReturnType<typeof createFederatedSignIn>;\n","// The two proxy-side rules of « a signed-in person never sees the public side » (krizaka-ui#827), the same for every\n// product. Web-standard Request/Response only (a Next.js `proxy.ts` calls them). The cookie is a HINT: its presence\n// decides a redirect and a placeholder, never an authorization — the page and the API still resolve the session.\n\n/** The readable flag the proxy keeps next to the HttpOnly session cookie: « a session cookie exists », value `1`, never the token. */\nexport const SESSION_HINT_COOKIE = \"kz-session\";\n\nconst cookieValue = (headers: Headers, name: string): string | undefined => {\n  const prefix = `${name}=`;\n  return headers\n    .get(\"cookie\")\n    ?.split(\";\")\n    .map((part) => part.trim())\n    .find((part) => part.startsWith(prefix))\n    ?.slice(prefix.length);\n};\n\n/** Where a signed-in visitor of the landing route goes. */\nexport interface LandingRule {\n  /** The product's session cookie name (`yomizaka_session`). */\n  cookie: string;\n  /** The landing routes (`[\"/\", \"/fr\", \"/en\"]`): exact paths, a trailing slash tolerated. */\n  landing: readonly string[];\n  /** The signed-in start page, or a function of the request (the language of the address). */\n  home: string | ((request: Request) => string);\n  /**\n   * The product's own public origin (`https://dev.yomizaka.com`), from its declared environment (APP_URL), NEVER from the\n   * request: `Host` and `x-forwarded-*` are client-controlled. With it the Location is absolute on that origin (what a\n   * Next.js proxy accepts). Only the origin of the value is used. Optional outside production (the Location is then\n   * relative); REQUIRED in production, where a missing origin throws instead of falling back to the request's headers.\n   */\n  origin?: string;\n}\n\n// Linear on any input (a loop, not a `/\\/+$/` regular expression: CodeQL js/polynomial-redos on the request path).\nconst trimmed = (path: string) => {\n  let end = path.length;\n  while (end > 1 && path.charCodeAt(end - 1) === 47) end--;\n  return path.slice(0, end);\n};\n\n/**\n * The landing route with a session cookie answers 307 to the home before any HTML: private, never stored, varying with the\n * cookie. `null` for everything else (a signed-out visitor, another page, a write).\n */\nexport function landingRedirect(request: Request, rule: LandingRule): Response | null {\n  // Fail loudly at the first request of a misconfigured deployment, signed in or not: never a silent fallback.\n  if (!rule.origin && globalThis.process?.env?.NODE_ENV === \"production\") {\n    throw new Error(\"landingRedirect: `origin` (the app's declared public URL) is required in production\");\n  }\n  if (request.method !== \"GET\" && request.method !== \"HEAD\") return null;\n  if (!cookieValue(request.headers, rule.cookie)) return null;\n  const url = new URL(request.url);\n  if (!rule.landing.some((path) => trimmed(path) === trimmed(url.pathname))) return null;\n  const home = typeof rule.home === \"function\" ? rule.home(request) : rule.home;\n  // Never built from the request's Host or scheme (client-controlled: host-header injection, open redirect). Relative by\n  // default; absolute only on the origin the app configured, and a `home` that leaves that origin falls back to relative.\n  const target = new URL(home, url);\n  const path = `${target.pathname}${target.search}${target.hash}`;\n  const base = rule.origin ? new URL(rule.origin).origin : null;\n  const location = base && new URL(home, base).origin === base ? new URL(home, base).href : path;\n  return new Response(null, {\n    status: 307,\n    headers: { Location: location, \"Cache-Control\": \"private, no-store\", Vary: \"Cookie\" },\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Keeps the hint flag in step with the session cookie on any response (pages stay static: the proxy runs on every request,\n * the HTML is the same for everyone). Sets it when the session cookie exists, clears it when it is gone, else touches nothing.\n */\nexport function sessionHint<T extends Response>(\n  response: T,\n  request: Request,\n  options: { cookie: string; secure: boolean },\n): T {\n  const session = Boolean(cookieValue(request.headers, options.cookie));\n  const flagged = cookieValue(request.headers, SESSION_HINT_COOKIE) === \"1\";\n  const base = `${SESSION_HINT_COOKIE}=${session ? \"1\" : \"\"}; Path=/; SameSite=Lax${options.secure ? \"; Secure\" : \"\"}`;\n  if (session && !flagged) response.headers.append(\"Set-Cookie\", base);\n  else if (!session && cookieValue(request.headers, SESSION_HINT_COOKIE) !== undefined)\n    response.headers.append(\"Set-Cookie\", `${base}; Max-Age=0`);\n  return response;\n}\n","import { accountsSchema, rolesSchema } from \"./schema\";\n\nconst IDENT = /^[a-z_][a-z0-9_]{0,62}$/;\nconst ident = (name: string) => {\n  if (!IDENT.test(name)) throw new Error(`not a safe SQL identifier: ${name}`);\n  return name;\n};\n\n/**\n * The SQL of version 1 of the accounts tables, for a product that runs it by hand (idempotent).\n * @deprecated Use `accountsSchema` with `emitMigration` or `adoptMigration` from `@krizaka/db`: the SQL gets a version, a checksum and a marker. Removed in the next major.\n */\nexport function accountsMigration(options: { backfillVerified?: boolean } = {}): string {\n  return accountsSchema(options).migrations[0]!.sql({ schema: \"public\", tables: { accounts: \"accounts\" } });\n}\n\n/**\n * The SQL of version 1 of the memberships and invitations tables, for a product that runs it by hand (idempotent).\n * @deprecated Use `rolesSchema` with `emitMigration` or `adoptMigration` from `@krizaka/db`. Removed in the next major.\n */\nexport function rolesMigration(\n  roles: readonly string[],\n  options: { ownerTable?: string; scopeTable?: string } = {},\n): string {\n  const tables = {\n    owner: ident(options.ownerTable ?? \"accounts\"),\n    ...(options.scopeTable ? { scope: ident(options.scopeTable) } : {}),\n  };\n  return rolesSchema(roles, { scoped: options.scopeTable !== undefined }).migrations[0]!.sql({\n    schema: \"public\",\n    tables,\n  });\n}\n","import crypto from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/** Called only when a password is hashed or checked: the module also loads in a browser bundle (the role model), where `crypto.scrypt` does not exist. */\nconst scrypt = (password: string, salt: Buffer, keylen: number, options: crypto.ScryptOptions): Promise<Buffer> =>\n  new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n    crypto.scrypt(password, salt, keylen, options, (error, key) => (error ? reject(error) : resolve(key)));\n  });\n\n/**\n * scrypt (N=2^15, r=8, p=1), a 16-byte salt, stored as `scrypt$N$r$p$salt$hash` (base64url). These are the parameters of the copies\n * the products carried (Yomizaka, Akinaza): a hash they stored verifies here, and one made here verifies there.\n */\n// @fixed: the cost of the algorithm is part of the stored format; changing it is a new scheme, not a setting\nconst N = 32768;\nconst R = 8;\nconst P = 1;\nconst KEYLEN = 32;\nconst MAXMEM = 64 * 1024 * 1024;\nconst OPTIONS = { N, r: R, p: P, maxmem: MAXMEM };\n\n/** The shortest password the products accept. */\n// @fixed: a security floor shared by every product, not a business parameter\nexport const PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH = 12;\n/** The longest: a longer one is refused before any work is done (a very long password is a way to make the server spend time). */\n// @fixed: bounds the work a request can make the server do\nexport const PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH = 256;\n\n/** Why a new password is refused, or null when its length is acceptable. */\nexport function passwordProblem(password: string): \"TOO_SHORT\" | \"TOO_LONG\" | null {\n  if (password.length < PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH) return \"TOO_SHORT\";\n  if (password.length > PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH) return \"TOO_LONG\";\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Hashes a password with a fresh salt.\n * @returns `scrypt$N$r$p$salt$hash`\n */\nexport async function hashPassword(password: string): Promise<string> {\n  const salt = crypto.randomBytes(16);\n  const hash = await scrypt(password, salt, KEYLEN, OPTIONS);\n  return `scrypt$${N}$${R}$${P}$${salt.toString(\"base64url\")}$${hash.toString(\"base64url\")}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Checks a password against a stored hash, in constant time. A hash of another scheme, a malformed one or an over-long password is `false`.\n * The cost parameters are read from the stored value, so an older hash still verifies after the default changes.\n */\nexport async function verifyPassword(password: string, stored: string): Promise<boolean> {\n  const [scheme, n, r, p, salt, hash] = stored.split(\"$\");\n  if (scheme !== \"scrypt\" || !salt || !hash || password.length > PASSWORD_MAX_LENGTH) return false;\n  const expected = Buffer.from(hash, \"base64url\");\n  const given = await scrypt(password, Buffer.from(salt, \"base64url\"), expected.length, {\n    N: Number(n),\n    r: Number(r),\n    p: Number(p),\n    maxmem: MAXMEM,\n  });\n  return given.length === expected.length && crypto.timingSafeEqual(given, expected);\n}\n\nlet decoy: Promise<string> | undefined;\n/** A hash to verify against when the address has no account: the same work, the same time, the same answer. */\nexport const decoyHash = (): Promise<string> => (decoy ??= hashPassword(crypto.randomBytes(24).toString(\"base64url\")));\n","import crypto from \"node:crypto\";\n\nimport type { Query } from \"@krizaka/db\";\nimport { addHours } from \"date-fns\";\n\nimport { can, type RoleModel, ROLES_CODE, RolesError } from \"./roles-model\";\n\nexport { can, defineRoles, type RoleModel, ROLES_CODE, type RolesCode, RolesError } from \"./roles-model\";\n\n/** The SQL executor the roles take: `@krizaka/db`'s `Query`. */\nexport type RolesQuery = Query;\n\nexport interface RolesDeps<Role extends string, Permission extends string> {\n  query: RolesQuery;\n  model: RoleModel<Role, Permission>;\n  /** The invitation link's token prefix (`ai` → `ai1.<43>`) and how the product keeps a token (its keyed hash). */\n  tokenPrefix: string;\n  tokenHash: (token: string) => string;\n  /** Hours an invitation stays valid. */\n  inviteTtlHours: number;\n  token?: () => string;\n}\n\nexport interface Member<Role extends string> {\n  accountId: string;\n  email: string;\n  name: string | null;\n  role: Role;\n  since: Date;\n}\nexport interface Invitation<Role extends string> {\n  id: string;\n  email: string;\n  role: Role;\n  expiresAt: Date;\n  createdAt: Date;\n}\n\n/** Who may do what in a scope, over the product's PostgreSQL. */\nexport function createRoles<Role extends string, Permission extends string>(deps: RolesDeps<Role, Permission>) {\n  const { query, model } = deps;\n  const known = (role: string): role is Role => (model.roles as readonly string[]).includes(role);\n  const mustKnow = (role: string): Role => {\n    if (!known(role)) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.unknownRole);\n    return role;\n  };\n  const newToken = deps.token ?? (() => `${deps.tokenPrefix}1.${crypto.randomBytes(32).toString(\"base64url\")}`);\n  const owners = (scopeId: string) =>\n    query<{ account_id: string }>(\"SELECT account_id FROM memberships WHERE scope_id = $1 AND role = $2\", [\n      scopeId,\n      ownerRole(),\n    ]);\n  /** The role that cannot disappear: the first of the model that manages every role. */\n  const ownerRole = (): Role =>\n    model.roles.find((r) => model.roles.every((x) => model.manages[r].includes(x) || x === r)) ?? model.roles[0]!;\n\n  async function roleOf(accountId: string, scopeId: string): Promise<Role | null> {\n    const [row] = await query<{ role: Role }>(\"SELECT role FROM memberships WHERE scope_id = $1 AND account_id = $2\", [\n      scopeId,\n      accountId,\n    ]);\n    return row?.role ?? null;\n  }\n\n  return {\n    ownerRole,\n    roleOf,\n\n    /** Every scope the person belongs to, with their role in it. */\n    async scopesOf(accountId: string): Promise<{ scopeId: string; role: Role }[]> {\n      return (\n        await query<{ scope_id: string; role: Role }>(\n          \"SELECT scope_id, role FROM memberships WHERE account_id = $1 ORDER BY created_at\",\n          [accountId],\n        )\n      ).map((r) => ({ scopeId: r.scope_id, role: r.role }));\n    },\n\n    /** The person's role in the scope if it holds the permission; otherwise `NOT_A_MEMBER` (404: nothing tells the scope exists) or `FORBIDDEN`. */\n    async authorize(accountId: string, scopeId: string, permission: Permission): Promise<Role> {\n      const role = await roleOf(accountId, scopeId);\n      if (!role) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notMember);\n      if (!can(model, role, permission)) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.forbidden);\n      return role;\n    },\n\n    /** Puts a person in a scope with a role (changing it if they are there): for a first owner, a seed, an accepted invitation. */\n    async grant(scopeId: string, accountId: string, role: string, invitedBy: string | null, now: Date): Promise<void> {\n      mustKnow(role);\n      await query(\n        \"INSERT INTO memberships (scope_id, account_id, role, invited_by, created_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5) ON CONFLICT (scope_id, account_id) DO UPDATE SET role = excluded.role\",\n        [scopeId, accountId, role, invitedBy, now],\n      );\n    },\n\n    async members(scopeId: string): Promise<Member<Role>[]> {\n      const rows = await query<{\n        account_id: string;\n        email: string;\n        name: string | null;\n        role: Role;\n        created_at: Date;\n      }>(\n        \"SELECT m.account_id, a.email, a.name, m.role, m.created_at FROM memberships m JOIN accounts a ON a.id = m.account_id WHERE m.scope_id = $1 ORDER BY m.created_at\",\n        [scopeId],\n      );\n      return rows.map((r) => ({\n        accountId: r.account_id,\n        email: r.email,\n        name: r.name,\n        role: r.role,\n        since: r.created_at,\n      }));\n    },\n\n    /** Changes someone's role. The actor must manage both the current and the new role; the last owner can never be demoted. */\n    async setRole(scopeId: string, actor: { id: string }, target: string, role: string): Promise<void> {\n      mustKnow(role);\n      const mine = await roleOf(actor.id, scopeId);\n      const current = await roleOf(target, scopeId);\n      if (!mine || !current) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notMember);\n      if (!model.manages[mine].includes(current) || !model.manages[mine].includes(role as Role))\n        throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notAllowed);\n      if (current === ownerRole() && role !== current && (await owners(scopeId)).length <= 1)\n        throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.lastOwner);\n      await query(\"UPDATE memberships SET role = $3 WHERE scope_id = $1 AND account_id = $2\", [scopeId, target, role]);\n    },\n\n    /** Removes someone from the scope (or leaves it, when the target is the actor). The last owner cannot go. */\n    async remove(scopeId: string, actor: { id: string }, target: string): Promise<void> {\n      const mine = await roleOf(actor.id, scopeId);\n      const current = await roleOf(target, scopeId);\n      if (!mine || !current) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notMember);\n      if (actor.id !== target && !model.manages[mine].includes(current)) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notAllowed);\n      if (current === ownerRole() && (await owners(scopeId)).length <= 1) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.lastOwner);\n      await query(\"DELETE FROM memberships WHERE scope_id = $1 AND account_id = $2\", [scopeId, target]);\n    },\n\n    /** Invites an e-mail address with a role the actor manages. The token is in the answer once (the product mails it); only its hash is kept. A new invitation for the same address replaces the pending one. */\n    async invite(\n      scopeId: string,\n      actor: { id: string },\n      input: { email: string; role: string },\n      now: Date,\n    ): Promise<{ token: string; invitation: Invitation<Role> }> {\n      const role = mustKnow(input.role);\n      const mine = await roleOf(actor.id, scopeId);\n      if (!mine) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notMember);\n      if (!model.manages[mine].includes(role)) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notAllowed);\n      const email = input.email.trim().toLowerCase();\n      await query(\"UPDATE invitations SET used_at = $3 WHERE scope_id = $1 AND email = $2 AND used_at IS NULL\", [\n        scopeId,\n        email,\n        now,\n      ]);\n      const token = newToken();\n      const [row] = await query<{ id: string; created_at: Date; expires_at: Date }>(\n        \"INSERT INTO invitations (id, scope_id, email, role, token_hash, invited_by, created_at, expires_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8) RETURNING id, created_at, expires_at\",\n        [\n          crypto.randomUUID(),\n          scopeId,\n          email,\n          role,\n          deps.tokenHash(token),\n          actor.id,\n          now,\n          addHours(now, deps.inviteTtlHours),\n        ],\n      );\n      return {\n        token,\n        invitation: { id: row!.id, email, role, createdAt: row!.created_at, expiresAt: row!.expires_at },\n      };\n    },\n\n    async pendingInvitations(scopeId: string, now: Date): Promise<Invitation<Role>[]> {\n      const rows = await query<{ id: string; email: string; role: Role; created_at: Date; expires_at: Date }>(\n        \"SELECT id, email, role, created_at, expires_at FROM invitations WHERE scope_id = $1 AND used_at IS NULL AND expires_at > $2 ORDER BY created_at\",\n        [scopeId, now],\n      );\n      return rows.map((r) => ({\n        id: r.id,\n        email: r.email,\n        role: r.role,\n        createdAt: r.created_at,\n        expiresAt: r.expires_at,\n      }));\n    },\n\n    async revokeInvitation(scopeId: string, actor: { id: string }, invitationId: string, now: Date): Promise<void> {\n      const mine = await roleOf(actor.id, scopeId);\n      if (!mine) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notMember);\n      const [row] = await query<{ role: Role }>(\n        \"SELECT role FROM invitations WHERE id = $1 AND scope_id = $2 AND used_at IS NULL\",\n        [invitationId, scopeId],\n      );\n      if (!row) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.inviteInvalid);\n      if (!model.manages[mine].includes(row.role)) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.notAllowed);\n      await query(\"UPDATE invitations SET used_at = $2 WHERE id = $1\", [invitationId, now]);\n    },\n\n    /** The signed-in account takes the invitation: it must have been sent to this account's address; the link works once and expires. */\n    async acceptInvitation(\n      token: string,\n      account: { id: string; email: string },\n      now: Date,\n    ): Promise<{ scopeId: string; role: Role }> {\n      const [row] = await query<{ id: string; scope_id: string; email: string; role: Role; invited_by: string | null }>(\n        \"SELECT id, scope_id, email, role, invited_by FROM invitations WHERE token_hash = $1 AND used_at IS NULL AND expires_at > $2\",\n        [deps.tokenHash(token), now],\n      );\n      if (!row) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.inviteInvalid);\n      if (row.email !== account.email.trim().toLowerCase()) throw new RolesError(ROLES_CODE.inviteWrongAccount);\n      await query(\"UPDATE invitations SET used_at = $2 WHERE id = $1\", [row.id, now]);\n      const current = await roleOf(account.id, row.scope_id);\n      // already in: keep the higher role (an invitation never demotes)\n      if (!current || model.manages[current].length < model.manages[row.role].length)\n        await query(\n          \"INSERT INTO memberships (scope_id, account_id, role, invited_by, created_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5) ON CONFLICT (scope_id, account_id) DO UPDATE SET role = excluded.role\",\n          [row.scope_id, account.id, row.role, row.invited_by, now],\n        );\n      return {\n        scopeId: row.scope_id,\n        role: (!current || model.manages[current].length < model.manages[row.role].length ? row.role : current) as Role,\n      };\n    },\n  };\n}\nexport type Roles<Role extends string = string, Permission extends string = string> = ReturnType<\n  typeof createRoles<Role, Permission>\n>;\n","import crypto from \"node:crypto\";\n\nimport type { Clock } from \"@krizaka/db\";\n\n/**\n * Web sessions (the copies each product carried: Yomizaka `ys1.`, Akinaza `as1.`). The cookie holds a random token\n * (`<prefix>1.` and 32 bytes); the store keeps only its keyed hash, so a leaked table opens nothing. The account is re-read on every\n * request (a suspension applies at once). The lifetime is the setting `auth.sessionDays`.\n */\n\n/** A live session and the account it signs in. `Account` is the product's own shape (id, e-mail, role, locale, name…). */\nexport interface Session<Account> {\n  id: string;\n  account: Account;\n}\n\n/** What a store keeps for a new session. */\nexport interface NewSession {\n  accountId: string;\n  tokenHash: string;\n  createdAt: Date;\n  expiresAt: Date;\n  ip: string | null;\n  userAgent: string | null;\n}\n\n/** Where sessions live. Adapters: the PostgreSQL store over the product's `sessions` table, and a memory one. */\nexport interface SessionStore<Account> {\n  insert(session: NewSession): Promise<void>;\n  /** The session of this hash, when it has not expired at `now` and its account is active; null otherwise. */\n  find(tokenHash: string, now: Date): Promise<Session<Account> | null>;\n  delete(tokenHash: string): Promise<void>;\n}\n\nexport interface SessionsDeps<Account> {\n  store: SessionStore<Account>;\n  clock: Clock;\n  /** The product's token letters: `ys` makes `ys1.<43 characters>`. Lower-case letters, 1 to 4. */\n  tokenPrefix: string;\n  /** What keys the stored hash (`AUTH_SESSION_SECRET`). A function lets the product read its environment when it is needed. */\n  secret: string | (() => string);\n  /** Days a new session lives: the setting `auth.sessionDays`, read for each new session. */\n  sessionDays: number | (() => number | Promise<number>);\n}\n\nexport interface Sessions<Account> {\n  /** A fresh token: shaped `<prefix>1.<43>`, random, never stored (only its hash is). */\n  newToken(): string;\n  isToken(value: string | undefined): value is string;\n  /** The keyed hash the store keeps for a token. */\n  tokenHash(token: string): string;\n  /** Opens a session: the token for the cookie (shown once) and when it expires. */\n  create(\n    accountId: string,\n    meta: { ip: string | null; userAgent: string | null },\n  ): Promise<{ token: string; expires: Date }>;\n  /** The session a token opens, or null (unknown, malformed, expired, account not active). */\n  resolve(token: string | undefined): Promise<Session<Account> | null>;\n  /** Ends the session of this token. A malformed token is ignored. */\n  revoke(token: string | undefined): Promise<void>;\n}\n\nconst BODY = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/;\nconst PREFIX = /^[a-z]{1,4}$/;\nconst USER_AGENT_MAX = 300;\n\n/**\n * The sessions service of a product.\n * @param deps the store, the clock, the token letters, the secret and the lifetime\n * @throws RangeError for a token prefix that is not 1 to 4 lower-case letters, or a lifetime that is not a whole number of days from 1\n */\nexport function createSessions<Account>(deps: SessionsDeps<Account>): Sessions<Account> {\n  if (!PREFIX.test(deps.tokenPrefix))\n    throw new RangeError(`tokenPrefix must be 1 to 4 lower-case letters, got ${deps.tokenPrefix}`);\n  const head = `${deps.tokenPrefix}1.`;\n  const secret = () => (typeof deps.secret === \"function\" ? deps.secret() : deps.secret);\n  const isToken = (value: string | undefined): value is string =>\n    !!value && value.startsWith(head) && BODY.test(value.slice(head.length));\n  const tokenHash = (token: string) => crypto.createHmac(\"sha256\", `session:${secret()}`).update(token).digest(\"hex\");\n  const newToken = () => `${head}${crypto.randomBytes(32).toString(\"base64url\")}`;\n  return {\n    newToken,\n    isToken,\n    tokenHash,\n    async create(accountId, meta) {\n      const days = typeof deps.sessionDays === \"function\" ? await deps.sessionDays() : deps.sessionDays;\n      if (!Number.isInteger(days) || days < 1)\n        throw new RangeError(`sessionDays must be a whole number of days from 1, got ${days}`);\n      const token = newToken();\n      const createdAt = deps.clock.now();\n      // days of 24 hours, not calendar days: the same instant whatever the server's time zone (the copies added 86 400 000 ms a day)\n      const expires = new Date(createdAt);\n      expires.setUTCHours(expires.getUTCHours() + days * 24);\n      await deps.store.insert({\n        accountId,\n        tokenHash: tokenHash(token),\n        createdAt,\n        expiresAt: expires,\n        ip: meta.ip,\n        userAgent: meta.userAgent?.slice(0, USER_AGENT_MAX) ?? null,\n      });\n      return { token, expires };\n    },\n    async resolve(token) {\n      if (!isToken(token)) return null;\n      return deps.store.find(tokenHash(token), deps.clock.now());\n    },\n    async revoke(token) {\n      if (!isToken(token)) return;\n      await deps.store.delete(tokenHash(token));\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/** The attributes of the session cookie, for the product's framework (`cookies().set(cookie)`, `NextResponse.cookies.set`…). */\nexport interface SessionCookie {\n  name: string;\n  value: string;\n  httpOnly: true;\n  secure: boolean;\n  sameSite: \"lax\";\n  path: \"/\";\n  expires: Date;\n}\n\n/**\n * The session cookie: HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, on the whole site, `Secure` where the product says (production).\n * @param options the cookie's name (`yomizaka_session`) and whether it is `Secure`\n */\nexport function sessionCookie(token: string, expires: Date, options: { name: string; secure: boolean }): SessionCookie {\n  return {\n    name: options.name,\n    value: token,\n    httpOnly: true,\n    secure: options.secure,\n    sameSite: \"lax\",\n    path: \"/\",\n    expires,\n  };\n}\n\n/** The same cookie, expired now: what signing out sets. */\nexport function clearedSessionCookie(options: { name: string; secure: boolean }, now: Date): SessionCookie {\n  return sessionCookie(\"\", now, options);\n}\n\n/**\n * The session token of a request: the native apps' `Authorization: Bearer` (which wins over a stale cookie), else the web's cookie.\n * @param headers the request's headers\n * @param options the cookie's name; `bearer: false` for a product with no native app\n * @returns the raw token (not yet checked), or undefined\n */\nexport function sessionTokenOf(headers: Headers, options: { cookie: string; bearer?: boolean }): string | undefined {\n  if (options.bearer !== false) {\n    const bearer = /^bearer (\\S+)$/i.exec(headers.get(\"authorization\") ?? \"\")?.[1];\n    if (bearer) return bearer;\n  }\n  const prefix = `${options.cookie}=`;\n  return headers\n    .get(\"cookie\")\n    ?.split(\";\")\n    .map((part) => part.trim())\n    .find((part) => part.startsWith(prefix))\n    ?.slice(prefix.length);\n}\n","import type { NewSession, Session, SessionStore } from \"./sessions\";\n\n/**\n * An in-memory session store, for unit tests and demos. `accountOf` plays the accounts table: it answers the account of an id, or null\n * when it does not exist or is not active.\n */\nexport function memorySessionStore<Account>(\n  accountOf: (accountId: string) => Account | null,\n): SessionStore<Account> & { rows(): readonly NewSession[] } {\n  const rows = new Map<string, NewSession & { id: string }>();\n  let next = 0;\n  return {\n    async insert(session) {\n      if (rows.has(session.tokenHash)) throw new Error(\"duplicate session token hash\");\n      next += 1;\n      rows.set(session.tokenHash, { ...session, id: `session-${next}` });\n    },\n    async find(tokenHash, now): Promise<Session<Account> | null> {\n      const row = rows.get(tokenHash);\n      if (!row || row.expiresAt.getTime() <= now.getTime()) return null;\n      const account = accountOf(row.accountId);\n      return account === null ? null : { id: row.id, account };\n    },\n    async delete(tokenHash) {\n      rows.delete(tokenHash);\n    },\n    rows: () => [...rows.values()],\n  };\n}\n","import { ident, type Query } from \"@krizaka/db\";\n\nimport type { Session, SessionStore } from \"./sessions\";\n\nexport interface DbSessionStoreOptions<Account> {\n  /** The product's session table. Default `sessions` (`id`, `account_id`, `token_hash` unique, `created_at`, `expires_at`, `ip`, `user_agent`). */\n  sessions?: string;\n  /** The product's account table. Default `accounts`. */\n  accounts?: string;\n  /** The account columns the session carries (`id`, `email`, `role`, `locale`, `name`…): all checked, all read in one query with the session. */\n  columns: readonly string[];\n  /** Builds the product's account from a row holding exactly `columns`. */\n  toAccount: (row: Record<string, unknown>) => Account;\n  /** An account that is not active signs nobody in (a suspension applies at once): the column and the value it must have (`status` = `ACTIVE`). */\n  active?: { column: string; equals: string };\n}\n\n/**\n * The session store over the product's own tables (`sessions` joined to `accounts`): the declared tables and columns are checked by\n * `ident()` and nothing else reaches SQL. The expiry is compared with the clock's `now`, not the database's.\n * @param query the product's query\n * @param options the table names, the account columns and how the account is built\n * @throws DbError `DB_UNSAFE_IDENTIFIER` for a table or column name that is not a safe identifier\n */\nexport function dbSessionStore<Account>(query: Query, options: DbSessionStoreOptions<Account>): SessionStore<Account> {\n  const sessions = ident(options.sessions ?? \"sessions\");\n  const accounts = ident(options.accounts ?? \"accounts\");\n  const columns = options.columns.map((column) => `a.${ident(column)}`).join(\", \");\n  const active = options.active ? ` AND a.${ident(options.active.column)} = $3` : \"\";\n  return {\n    async insert(session) {\n      await query(\n        `INSERT INTO ${sessions} (account_id, token_hash, created_at, expires_at, ip, user_agent) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)`,\n        [session.accountId, session.tokenHash, session.createdAt, session.expiresAt, session.ip, session.userAgent],\n      );\n    },\n    async find(tokenHash, now): Promise<Session<Account> | null> {\n      const params: unknown[] = [tokenHash, now];\n      if (options.active) params.push(options.active.equals);\n      const [row] = await query<Record<string, unknown> & { session_id: string }>(\n        `SELECT s.id AS session_id, ${columns} FROM ${sessions} s JOIN ${accounts} a ON a.id = s.account_id WHERE s.token_hash = $1 AND s.expires_at > $2${active}`,\n        params,\n      );\n      if (!row) return null;\n      const { session_id: id, ...account } = row;\n      return { id, account: options.toAccount(account) };\n    },\n    async delete(tokenHash) {\n      await query(`DELETE FROM ${sessions} WHERE token_hash = $1`, [tokenHash]);\n    },\n  };\n}\n","import {\n  type CompleteOptions,\n  type ExternalIdentity,\n  type FederatedProvider,\n  FEDERATION_CODE,\n  FederationError,\n  type IdentityProvider,\n  isFederatedProvider,\n  isLocalReturn,\n  type StartedSignIn,\n  type StartOptions,\n} from \"./federation\";\n\n/** The `fetch` the adapter calls krizaka-users with (injected: no global, no network in tests). */\nexport type Fetcher = (\n  url: string,\n  init: { method: \"POST\"; headers: Record<string, string>; body: string },\n) => Promise<{ ok: boolean; status: number; json(): Promise<unknown> }>;\n\nexport interface UsersFederationOptions {\n  /** The tenant host of the product: `https://auth.dev.akinaza.com`. */\n  baseUrl: string;\n  /** The product's public address: the start URL sends the person back to it, so `returnTo` is absolute from it. */\n  appUrl: string;\n  fetch: Fetcher;\n}\n\nconst START = (base: string, provider: FederatedProvider) => `${base}/api/v1/auth/web/${provider}/start`;\nconst EXCHANGE = (base: string) => `${base}/api/v1/auth/web/exchange`;\n\nconst text = (value: unknown): string | null => (typeof value === \"string\" && value.length > 0 ? value : null);\n\n/** Reads krizaka-users' answer into an identity; anything that is not a complete identity is refused. */\nexport function parseExternalIdentity(body: unknown): ExternalIdentity {\n  const o = (body ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>;\n  const issuer = text(o.issuer);\n  const subject = text(o.subject);\n  if (!issuer || !subject)\n    throw new FederationError(FEDERATION_CODE.unavailable, \"krizaka-users answered without an issuer and a subject\");\n  return { issuer, subject, email: text(o.email), emailVerified: o.email_verified === true, name: text(o.name) };\n}\n\n/**\n * The adapter for krizaka-users (`auth.<product>` tenant host, krizaka/krizaka-users#31): `start` builds the tenant's start address,\n * `complete` exchanges the one-time code (and the PKCE verifier of a native app) for the verified identity.\n */\nexport function usersIdentityProvider({ baseUrl, appUrl, fetch }: UsersFederationOptions): IdentityProvider {\n  const base = baseUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, \"\");\n  const app = appUrl.replace(/\\/+$/, \"\");\n  return {\n    async start(provider, returnTo, options: StartOptions = {}): Promise<StartedSignIn> {\n      if (!isFederatedProvider(provider))\n        throw new FederationError(FEDERATION_CODE.unknownProvider, `Unknown provider ${String(provider)}`);\n      if (!isLocalReturn(returnTo))\n        throw new FederationError(FEDERATION_CODE.badReturn, \"That return address is not allowed\");\n      const state = crypto.randomUUID();\n      const query = new URLSearchParams({ return_to: `${app}${returnTo}`, state });\n      if (options.codeChallenge) {\n        query.set(\"code_challenge\", options.codeChallenge);\n        query.set(\"code_challenge_method\", \"S256\");\n      }\n      return { url: `${START(base, provider)}?${query}`, state };\n    },\n    async complete(code, options: CompleteOptions = {}) {\n      const response = await fetch(EXCHANGE(base), {\n        method: \"POST\",\n        headers: { \"content-type\": \"application/json\" },\n        body: JSON.stringify({ code, ...(options.codeVerifier ? { code_verifier: options.codeVerifier } : {}) }),\n      });\n      if (response.status === 400 || response.status === 401 || response.status === 404 || response.status === 410)\n        throw new FederationError(FEDERATION_CODE.invalidCode, \"That code is not valid\");\n      if (!response.ok)\n        throw new FederationError(FEDERATION_CODE.unavailable, `krizaka-users answered ${response.status}`);\n      return parseExternalIdentity(await response.json());\n    },\n  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package/dist/{sessions-Btl3NgOB.d.ts → sessions-DZXjHjzd.d.ts}

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ declare function identityLinksMigration(): string;
 declare function dbIdentityLinks(query: Query): IdentityLinkStore;
 
 /**
- * Web sessions (the copies each product carried: Yomizaka `ys1.`, Akinaza `as1.`, Kachizaka `ks1.`). The cookie holds a random token
+ * Web sessions (the copies each product carried: Yomizaka `ys1.`, Akinaza `as1.`). The cookie holds a random token
  * (`<prefix>1.` and 32 bytes); the store keeps only its keyed hash, so a leaked table opens nothing. The account is re-read on every
  * request (a suspension applies at once). The lifetime is the setting `auth.sessionDays`.
  */

package/dist/settings.js

@@ -2,14 +2,18 @@ import {
   PASSWORD_RESET_MAX_MINUTES,
   PASSWORD_RESET_MIN_MINUTES,
   PASSWORD_RESET_TTL_MINUTES
-} from "./chunk-3CLSDLXB.js";
+} from "./chunk-34CFR7EE.js";
 
 // src/settings.ts
 import { integer } from "@krizaka/settings";
 var authSettings = {
   // @fixed: two weeks by default, as the products' copies had; the admin chooses between one day and ninety.
   "auth.sessionDays": integer("auth", 14, { min: 1, max: 90, unit: "days" }),
-  "auth.passwordResetMinutes": integer("auth", PASSWORD_RESET_TTL_MINUTES, { min: PASSWORD_RESET_MIN_MINUTES, max: PASSWORD_RESET_MAX_MINUTES, unit: "minutes" })
+  "auth.passwordResetMinutes": integer("auth", PASSWORD_RESET_TTL_MINUTES, {
+    min: PASSWORD_RESET_MIN_MINUTES,
+    max: PASSWORD_RESET_MAX_MINUTES,
+    unit: "minutes"
+  })
 };
 export {
   authSettings