@korajs/auth 1.0.0-beta.12 → 1.0.0-beta.14

package/src/client/quickstart.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+import type { DeviceKeyStore } from '../device/device-store'
+import { AuthClient, type AuthClientConfig, type AuthTokenStorage } from './auth-client'
+import type { AuthDeviceIdentityProvider } from './device-session'
+import { createPersistentDeviceIdentity } from './device-session'
+import {
+	type AuthKeyValueStorage,
+	createAuthTokenStorage,
+	createWebStorageAuthTokenStorage,
+} from './storage'
+
+export interface CreateKoraAuthOptions
+	extends Omit<AuthClientConfig, 'storage' | 'deviceIdentity'> {
+	/**
+	 * Complete token storage adapter. Use this for fully custom runtimes.
+	 * If omitted, `credentialStore` is adapted automatically.
+	 */
+	storage?: AuthTokenStorage
+	/**
+	 * Runtime credential store used for tokens and stable device ID.
+	 * Examples: Tauri secure storage, Expo SecureStore, iOS Keychain, Android Keystore.
+	 */
+	credentialStore?: AuthKeyValueStorage
+	/**
+	 * Explicit device identity provider. Set to `false` to disable automatic
+	 * device binding during sign-up/sign-in.
+	 */
+	deviceIdentity?: AuthDeviceIdentityProvider | false
+	/**
+	 * Device key store for runtimes without IndexedDB, such as React Native.
+	 */
+	deviceKeyStore?: DeviceKeyStore
+}
+
+/**
+ * Create a production-shaped Kora auth client with minimal setup.
+ *
+ * Defaults:
+ * - browser/Tauri WebView: localStorage for tokens, IndexedDB for device keys
+ * - desktop/mobile: pass `credentialStore` and optionally `deviceKeyStore`
+ * - automatic device identity is enabled when a persistent device ID store exists
+ */
+export function createKoraAuth(options: CreateKoraAuthOptions): AuthClient {
+	const storage =
+		options.storage ??
+		(options.credentialStore
+			? createAuthTokenStorage({
+					store: options.credentialStore,
+					prefix: options.storageKey,
+				})
+			: tryCreateDefaultTokenStorage(options.storageKey))
+
+	const deviceIdentity =
+		options.deviceIdentity === false
+			? undefined
+			: (options.deviceIdentity ??
+				tryCreateDefaultDeviceIdentity(options.credentialStore, options.deviceKeyStore))
+
+	return new AuthClient({
+		serverUrl: options.serverUrl,
+		storageKey: options.storageKey,
+		storage,
+		fetch: options.fetch,
+		deviceIdentity,
+		requestTimeoutMs: options.requestTimeoutMs,
+		maxOfflineGraceMs: options.maxOfflineGraceMs,
+		refreshBackoff: options.refreshBackoff,
+	})
+}
+
+function tryCreateDefaultTokenStorage(
+	storageKey: string | undefined,
+): AuthTokenStorage | undefined {
+	const storage = tryGetBrowserStorage()
+	return storage ? createWebStorageAuthTokenStorage(storage, storageKey) : undefined
+}
+
+function tryCreateDefaultDeviceIdentity(
+	credentialStore: AuthKeyValueStorage | undefined,
+	deviceKeyStore: DeviceKeyStore | undefined,
+): AuthDeviceIdentityProvider | undefined {
+	const storage = credentialStore ?? tryGetBrowserStorage()
+	if (!storage) {
+		return undefined
+	}
+
+	try {
+		return createPersistentDeviceIdentity({
+			storage,
+			keyStore: deviceKeyStore,
+		})
+	} catch {
+		return undefined
+	}
+}
+
+function tryGetBrowserStorage(): Storage | null {
+	try {
+		if (typeof globalThis.localStorage === 'undefined') {
+			return null
+		}
+		const key = '__kora_auth_quickstart_test__'
+		globalThis.localStorage.setItem(key, '1')
+		globalThis.localStorage.removeItem(key)
+		return globalThis.localStorage
+	} catch {
+		return null
+	}
+}

package/src/client/storage.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+import type { AuthTokenStorage } from './auth-client'
+
+type MaybePromise<T> = T | Promise<T>
+
+/**
+ * Minimal key-value credential storage interface used by Kora auth adapters.
+ *
+ * This intentionally matches the shape of secure stores across runtimes:
+ * browser Storage, Tauri secure storage plugins, Expo SecureStore, iOS Keychain,
+ * Android Keystore wrappers, and encrypted desktop stores.
+ */
+export interface AuthKeyValueStorage {
+	getItem(key: string): MaybePromise<string | null>
+	setItem(key: string, value: string): MaybePromise<void>
+	removeItem(key: string): MaybePromise<void>
+}
+
+export interface AuthTokenStorageOptions {
+	/** Backing credential store. */
+	store: AuthKeyValueStorage
+	/** Storage key prefix. Defaults to `kora_auth`. */
+	prefix?: string
+}
+
+/**
+ * Creates an `AuthTokenStorage` adapter from a runtime key-value store.
+ *
+ * Use this with platform credential stores instead of wiring `AuthClient`
+ * directly to browser localStorage in desktop and mobile apps.
+ */
+export function createAuthTokenStorage(options: AuthTokenStorageOptions): AuthTokenStorage {
+	const prefix = options.prefix ?? 'kora_auth'
+	const accessKey = `${prefix}_access_token`
+	const refreshKey = `${prefix}_refresh_token`
+	const store = options.store
+
+	return {
+		getAccessToken: () => store.getItem(accessKey),
+		getRefreshToken: () => store.getItem(refreshKey),
+		async setTokens(accessToken: string, refreshToken: string): Promise<void> {
+			await store.setItem(accessKey, accessToken)
+			await store.setItem(refreshKey, refreshToken)
+		},
+		async clear(): Promise<void> {
+			await store.removeItem(accessKey)
+			await store.removeItem(refreshKey)
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Creates an in-memory token storage adapter.
+ *
+ * Useful for tests, demos, and SSR. Production desktop and mobile apps should
+ * prefer a secure platform-backed store.
+ */
+export function createMemoryAuthTokenStorage(): AuthTokenStorage {
+	let accessToken: string | null = null
+	let refreshToken: string | null = null
+
+	return {
+		getAccessToken: () => accessToken,
+		getRefreshToken: () => refreshToken,
+		setTokens(access: string, refresh: string): void {
+			accessToken = access
+			refreshToken = refresh
+		},
+		clear(): void {
+			accessToken = null
+			refreshToken = null
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Adapts Web Storage-compatible APIs such as `localStorage` or `sessionStorage`.
+ */
+export function createWebStorageAuthTokenStorage(
+	storage: Storage,
+	prefix?: string,
+): AuthTokenStorage {
+	return createAuthTokenStorage({
+		prefix,
+		store: {
+			getItem: (key) => storage.getItem(key),
+			setItem: (key, value) => {
+				storage.setItem(key, value)
+			},
+			removeItem: (key) => {
+				storage.removeItem(key)
+			},
+		},
+	})
+}

package/src/device/device-identity.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
+import { KoraError } from '@korajs/core'
+
+// --- Auth-specific errors ---
+
+/**
+ * Thrown when the Web Crypto API is not available in the current environment.
+ * This can happen in older Node.js versions or SSR environments without crypto support.
+ */
+export class CryptoUnavailableError extends KoraError {
+	constructor() {
+		super(
+			'Web Crypto API (crypto.subtle) is not available in this environment. ' +
+				'Device identity requires crypto.subtle, which is available in modern browsers and Node.js 20+. ' +
+				'If running in SSR, ensure your runtime provides the Web Crypto API.',
+			'CRYPTO_UNAVAILABLE',
+		)
+		this.name = 'CryptoUnavailableError'
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Thrown when a device identity operation fails (key generation, signing, verification).
+ */
+export class DeviceIdentityError extends KoraError {
+	constructor(message: string, context?: Record<string, unknown>) {
+		super(message, 'DEVICE_IDENTITY_ERROR', context)
+		this.name = 'DeviceIdentityError'
+	}
+}
+
+// --- Encoding helpers ---
+
+/**
+ * Encodes an ArrayBuffer as a base64url string (no padding).
+ *
+ * @param buffer - The binary data to encode
+ * @returns A base64url-encoded string without padding characters
+ */
+export function toBase64Url(buffer: ArrayBuffer): string {
+	const bytes = new Uint8Array(buffer)
+	let binary = ''
+	for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) {
+		binary += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i] as number)
+	}
+	// Standard base64, then convert to base64url (no padding)
+	return btoa(binary).replace(/\+/g, '-').replace(/\//g, '_').replace(/=+$/, '')
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decodes a base64url string (no padding) into a Uint8Array.
+ *
+ * @param str - A base64url-encoded string (with or without padding)
+ * @returns The decoded binary data as a Uint8Array
+ */
+export function fromBase64Url(str: string): Uint8Array {
+	// Convert base64url back to standard base64
+	let base64 = str.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/')
+	// Add padding if necessary
+	const paddingNeeded = (4 - (base64.length % 4)) % 4
+	base64 += '='.repeat(paddingNeeded)
+
+	const binary = atob(base64)
+	const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length)
+	for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) {
+		bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i)
+	}
+	return bytes
+}
+
+// --- Internal helpers ---
+
+/**
+ * Asserts that `crypto.subtle` is available, throwing a clear error if not.
+ */
+function assertCryptoAvailable(): void {
+	if (typeof globalThis.crypto === 'undefined' || typeof globalThis.crypto.subtle === 'undefined') {
+		throw new CryptoUnavailableError()
+	}
+}
+
+/** ECDSA algorithm parameters used throughout the module. */
+const ECDSA_ALGORITHM: EcKeyGenParams = {
+	name: 'ECDSA',
+	namedCurve: 'P-256',
+}
+
+/** Signing algorithm parameters: ECDSA with SHA-256. */
+const ECDSA_SIGN_ALGORITHM: EcdsaParams = {
+	name: 'ECDSA',
+	hash: { name: 'SHA-256' },
+}
+
+// --- Public API ---
+
+/**
+ * Generates an ECDSA P-256 key pair for device identity.
+ *
+ * The private key is marked as non-extractable, ensuring it cannot be
+ * exported from the browser's crypto subsystem. This provides
+ * proof-of-possession: only code running on this device can sign with the key.
+ *
+ * @returns A CryptoKeyPair containing the public and private ECDSA P-256 keys
+ * @throws {CryptoUnavailableError} If `crypto.subtle` is not available
+ * @throws {DeviceIdentityError} If key generation fails
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```typescript
+ * const keyPair = await generateDeviceKeyPair()
+ * // keyPair.publicKey can be exported; keyPair.privateKey stays on device
+ * ```
+ */
+export async function generateDeviceKeyPair(): Promise<CryptoKeyPair> {
+	assertCryptoAvailable()
+
+	try {
+		const keyPair = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.generateKey(
+			ECDSA_ALGORITHM,
+			// extractable: false makes the private key non-extractable.
+			// The public key is always extractable regardless of this flag.
+			false,
+			['sign', 'verify'],
+		)
+		return keyPair
+	} catch (cause) {
+		throw new DeviceIdentityError(
+			'Failed to generate ECDSA P-256 device key pair. ' +
+				'Ensure the runtime supports the ECDSA algorithm with the P-256 curve.',
+			{ cause: cause instanceof Error ? cause.message : String(cause) },
+		)
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Exports the public key from a key pair as a JSON Web Key (JWK).
+ *
+ * The JWK can be safely transmitted to a server or other devices to identify
+ * this device. It contains only the public component of the key pair.
+ *
+ * @param keyPair - The CryptoKeyPair whose public key should be exported
+ * @returns The public key in JWK format
+ * @throws {CryptoUnavailableError} If `crypto.subtle` is not available
+ * @throws {DeviceIdentityError} If the export operation fails
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```typescript
+ * const keyPair = await generateDeviceKeyPair()
+ * const jwk = await exportPublicKeyJwk(keyPair)
+ * // jwk contains { kty: 'EC', crv: 'P-256', x: '...', y: '...' }
+ * ```
+ */
+export async function exportPublicKeyJwk(keyPair: CryptoKeyPair): Promise<JsonWebKey> {
+	assertCryptoAvailable()
+
+	try {
+		const jwk = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.exportKey('jwk', keyPair.publicKey)
+		return jwk
+	} catch (cause) {
+		throw new DeviceIdentityError(
+			'Failed to export public key as JWK. ' +
+				'The key pair may be invalid or the public key may not support JWK export.',
+			{ cause: cause instanceof Error ? cause.message : String(cause) },
+		)
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Signs a challenge string with the device's private key.
+ *
+ * Used for proof-of-possession during authentication: the server sends a
+ * random challenge, and the device proves it holds the private key by signing it.
+ *
+ * @param privateKey - The device's private CryptoKey (ECDSA P-256)
+ * @param challenge - The challenge string to sign (typically a random nonce from the server)
+ * @returns A base64url-encoded ECDSA signature (no padding)
+ * @throws {CryptoUnavailableError} If `crypto.subtle` is not available
+ * @throws {DeviceIdentityError} If the signing operation fails
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```typescript
+ * const keyPair = await generateDeviceKeyPair()
+ * const signature = await signChallenge(keyPair.privateKey, 'server-nonce-abc123')
+ * // signature is a base64url string like 'MEUCIQDx...'
+ * ```
+ */
+export async function signChallenge(privateKey: CryptoKey, challenge: string): Promise<string> {
+	assertCryptoAvailable()
+
+	try {
+		const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(challenge)
+		const signatureBuffer = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.sign(
+			ECDSA_SIGN_ALGORITHM,
+			privateKey,
+			encoded,
+		)
+		return toBase64Url(signatureBuffer)
+	} catch (cause) {
+		throw new DeviceIdentityError(
+			'Failed to sign challenge. ' +
+				'Ensure the key is a valid ECDSA P-256 private key with "sign" usage.',
+			{ cause: cause instanceof Error ? cause.message : String(cause) },
+		)
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a challenge signature against a public key.
+ *
+ * Used server-side (or on any verifying party) to confirm that a device
+ * holds the private key corresponding to the given public key.
+ *
+ * @param publicKeyJwk - The device's public key in JWK format
+ * @param challenge - The original challenge string that was signed
+ * @param signature - The base64url-encoded signature to verify
+ * @returns `true` if the signature is valid, `false` otherwise
+ * @throws {CryptoUnavailableError} If `crypto.subtle` is not available
+ * @throws {DeviceIdentityError} If the verification operation fails due to an invalid key or format
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```typescript
+ * const isValid = await verifyChallenge(publicKeyJwk, 'server-nonce-abc123', signature)
+ * if (isValid) {
+ *   // Device proved possession of the private key
+ * }
+ * ```
+ */
+export async function verifyChallenge(
+	publicKeyJwk: JsonWebKey,
+	challenge: string,
+	signature: string,
+): Promise<boolean> {
+	assertCryptoAvailable()
+
+	try {
+		const publicKey = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(
+			'jwk',
+			publicKeyJwk,
+			ECDSA_ALGORITHM,
+			true,
+			['verify'],
+		)
+
+		const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(challenge)
+		const signatureBytes = fromBase64Url(signature)
+
+		const isValid = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.verify(
+			ECDSA_SIGN_ALGORITHM,
+			publicKey,
+			signatureBytes as unknown as ArrayBuffer,
+			encoded,
+		)
+		return isValid
+	} catch (cause) {
+		throw new DeviceIdentityError(
+			'Failed to verify challenge signature. ' +
+				'The public key JWK or signature format may be invalid.',
+			{
+				cause: cause instanceof Error ? cause.message : String(cause),
+				publicKeyKty: publicKeyJwk.kty,
+				publicKeyCrv: publicKeyJwk.crv,
+			},
+		)
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes a SHA-256 thumbprint of a JWK public key.
+ *
+ * The thumbprint is computed per RFC 7638: the JWK members required for the key
+ * type are serialized in lexicographic order, then hashed with SHA-256. For EC keys
+ * (kty: "EC"), the required members are `crv`, `kty`, `x`, and `y`.
+ *
+ * This thumbprint serves as a compact, stable identifier for the device's public key
+ * (used as the `dpk` claim in device credentials).
+ *
+ * @param publicKeyJwk - The public key in JWK format (must be an EC P-256 key)
+ * @returns A base64url-encoded SHA-256 thumbprint (no padding)
+ * @throws {CryptoUnavailableError} If `crypto.subtle` is not available
+ * @throws {DeviceIdentityError} If the thumbprint computation fails or the JWK is missing required fields
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```typescript
+ * const keyPair = await generateDeviceKeyPair()
+ * const jwk = await exportPublicKeyJwk(keyPair)
+ * const thumbprint = await computePublicKeyThumbprint(jwk)
+ * // thumbprint is a base64url string, e.g., 'NzbLsXh8uDCcd-6MNwXF4W_7noWXFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs'
+ * ```
+ */
+export async function computePublicKeyThumbprint(publicKeyJwk: JsonWebKey): Promise<string> {
+	assertCryptoAvailable()
+
+	// RFC 7638 requires specific members in lexicographic order for each key type.
+	// For EC (kty: "EC"), the required members are: crv, kty, x, y.
+	if (publicKeyJwk.kty !== 'EC') {
+		throw new DeviceIdentityError(
+			`Expected JWK key type "EC" but received "${publicKeyJwk.kty ?? 'undefined'}". Only ECDSA public keys are supported for device identity.`,
+			{ kty: publicKeyJwk.kty },
+		)
+	}
+
+	if (!publicKeyJwk.crv || !publicKeyJwk.x || !publicKeyJwk.y) {
+		throw new DeviceIdentityError(
+			'JWK is missing required EC fields. ' +
+				'An EC public key JWK must include "crv", "x", and "y" members.',
+			{
+				hasCrv: Boolean(publicKeyJwk.crv),
+				hasX: Boolean(publicKeyJwk.x),
+				hasY: Boolean(publicKeyJwk.y),
+			},
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Build the canonical JSON with only the required members in lexicographic order.
+	// Per RFC 7638, no whitespace, keys in sorted order.
+	const canonicalJson = JSON.stringify({
+		crv: publicKeyJwk.crv,
+		kty: publicKeyJwk.kty,
+		x: publicKeyJwk.x,
+		y: publicKeyJwk.y,
+	})
+
+	try {
+		const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(canonicalJson)
+		const hashBuffer = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', encoded)
+		return toBase64Url(hashBuffer)
+	} catch (cause) {
+		throw new DeviceIdentityError('Failed to compute SHA-256 thumbprint of the public key JWK.', {
+			cause: cause instanceof Error ? cause.message : String(cause),
+		})
+	}
+}