@korajs/auth 1.0.0-beta.12 → 1.0.0-beta.13

package/src/passkey/passkey-server.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,779 @@
+import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
+import { KoraError } from '@korajs/core'
+import { fromBase64Url, toBase64Url } from '../device/device-identity'
+import { decodeCbor } from './passkey-client'
+
+// ============================================================================
+// Server-side passkey errors
+// ============================================================================
+
+/**
+ * Thrown when server-side passkey verification fails.
+ */
+export class PasskeyVerificationError extends KoraError {
+	constructor(message: string, context?: Record<string, unknown>) {
+		super(message, 'PASSKEY_VERIFICATION_ERROR', context)
+		this.name = 'PasskeyVerificationError'
+	}
+}
+
+// ============================================================================
+// Registration options generation
+// ============================================================================
+
+/** Options returned by generateRegistrationOptions for the client. */
+export interface RegistrationOptions {
+	/** Base64url-encoded random challenge (32 bytes) */
+	challenge: string
+	/** Relying party ID (domain) */
+	rpId: string
+	/** Relying party display name */
+	rpName: string
+	/** Base64url-encoded user ID */
+	userId: string
+	/** User's email or username */
+	userName: string
+	/** Human-readable display name */
+	userDisplayName: string
+	/** Credential IDs to exclude (prevents re-registration) */
+	excludeCredentialIds: string[]
+	/** Authenticator selection criteria */
+	authenticatorSelection: {
+		authenticatorAttachment: 'platform'
+		residentKey: 'preferred'
+		userVerification: 'required'
+	}
+	/** Timeout in milliseconds */
+	timeout: number
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate registration options for creating a new passkey.
+ *
+ * Creates a cryptographically random challenge and assembles the options
+ * object that should be sent to the client for `createPasskeyCredential()`.
+ *
+ * The server must store the challenge (keyed by user session or similar)
+ * for later verification when the client responds.
+ *
+ * @param params - Registration parameters
+ * @param params.rpId - Relying party ID (your domain, e.g. "example.com")
+ * @param params.rpName - Relying party display name
+ * @param params.userId - Unique user identifier
+ * @param params.userName - User's email or username
+ * @param params.userDisplayName - Human-readable display name
+ * @param params.existingCredentialIds - Base64url credential IDs to exclude
+ * @returns Registration options to send to the client, including the challenge
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```typescript
+ * const options = generateRegistrationOptions({
+ *   rpId: 'example.com',
+ *   rpName: 'My App',
+ *   userId: user.id,
+ *   userName: user.email,
+ *   userDisplayName: user.name,
+ * })
+ * // Store options.challenge in session for later verification
+ * // Send options to client
+ * ```
+ */
+export function generateRegistrationOptions(params: {
+	rpId: string
+	rpName: string
+	userId: string
+	userName: string
+	userDisplayName: string
+	existingCredentialIds?: string[]
+}): RegistrationOptions {
+	// Generate a 32-byte cryptographically random challenge
+	const challengeBytes = randomBytes(32)
+	const challenge = toBase64Url(
+		challengeBytes.buffer.slice(
+			challengeBytes.byteOffset,
+			challengeBytes.byteOffset + challengeBytes.byteLength,
+		),
+	)
+
+	return {
+		challenge,
+		rpId: params.rpId,
+		rpName: params.rpName,
+		userId: params.userId,
+		userName: params.userName,
+		userDisplayName: params.userDisplayName,
+		excludeCredentialIds: params.existingCredentialIds ?? [],
+		authenticatorSelection: {
+			authenticatorAttachment: 'platform',
+			residentKey: 'preferred',
+			userVerification: 'required',
+		},
+		timeout: 60000,
+	}
+}
+
+// ============================================================================
+// Registration verification
+// ============================================================================
+
+/** Result of verifying a registration response. */
+export interface RegistrationVerificationResult {
+	/** Whether the registration response was verified successfully */
+	verified: boolean
+	/** Base64url-encoded credential ID */
+	credentialId: string
+	/** Base64url-encoded COSE public key (store this for future authentication) */
+	publicKey: string
+	/** Initial signature counter from the authenticator */
+	signCount: number
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify a registration response from the client.
+ *
+ * Validates the attestation object and clientDataJSON returned by the browser's
+ * `navigator.credentials.create()` call. Extracts and returns the public key
+ * and credential ID to store in your database.
+ *
+ * This implementation supports the "none" attestation format, which is the most
+ * common and does not require trust in any attestation CA. For higher assurance
+ * scenarios, extend this to verify packed/tpm/android attestation formats.
+ *
+ * @param params - Verification parameters
+ * @param params.credential - The credential response from the client
+ * @param params.expectedChallenge - The challenge that was sent to the client (base64url)
+ * @param params.expectedOrigin - The expected origin (e.g. "https://example.com")
+ * @param params.expectedRpId - The expected relying party ID (e.g. "example.com")
+ * @returns Verification result with the credential ID and public key to store
+ * @throws {PasskeyVerificationError} If the response is invalid or tampered with
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```typescript
+ * const result = await verifyRegistrationResponse({
+ *   credential: clientResponse,
+ *   expectedChallenge: storedChallenge,
+ *   expectedOrigin: 'https://example.com',
+ *   expectedRpId: 'example.com',
+ * })
+ * if (result.verified) {
+ *   // Store result.credentialId, result.publicKey, result.signCount
+ * }
+ * ```
+ */
+export async function verifyRegistrationResponse(params: {
+	credential: {
+		credentialId: string
+		publicKey: string
+		clientDataJSON: string
+		attestationObject: string
+	}
+	expectedChallenge: string
+	expectedOrigin: string
+	expectedRpId: string
+	/**
+	 * Require the User Verified (UV) flag. Kora's options request
+	 * `userVerification: 'required'`, so the response must honour it.
+	 * @default true
+	 */
+	requireUserVerification?: boolean
+}): Promise<RegistrationVerificationResult> {
+	const { credential, expectedChallenge, expectedOrigin, expectedRpId } = params
+	const requireUserVerification = params.requireUserVerification ?? true
+
+	// Step 1: Decode and verify clientDataJSON
+	const clientDataBytes = fromBase64Url(credential.clientDataJSON)
+	const clientDataText = new TextDecoder().decode(clientDataBytes)
+	let clientData: { type: string; challenge: string; origin: string }
+	try {
+		clientData = JSON.parse(clientDataText) as {
+			type: string
+			challenge: string
+			origin: string
+		}
+	} catch {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			'Failed to parse clientDataJSON. The response may be malformed.',
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Verify the type is "webauthn.create"
+	if (clientData.type !== 'webauthn.create') {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			`Expected clientData.type "webauthn.create" but received "${clientData.type}".`,
+			{ type: clientData.type },
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Verify the challenge matches what we sent
+	if (clientData.challenge !== expectedChallenge) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			'Challenge mismatch. The response does not match the expected challenge. ' +
+				'This may indicate a replay attack or session mismatch.',
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Verify the origin matches
+	if (clientData.origin !== expectedOrigin) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			`Origin mismatch. Expected "${expectedOrigin}" but received "${clientData.origin}".`,
+			{ expected: expectedOrigin, received: clientData.origin },
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Step 2: Decode the attestation object (CBOR)
+	const attestationBytes = fromBase64Url(credential.attestationObject)
+	const attestationResult = decodeCbor(attestationBytes, 0)
+	const attestationMap = attestationResult.value as Map<string, unknown>
+
+	// Verify attestation format
+	const fmt = attestationMap.get('fmt')
+	if (fmt !== 'none') {
+		// For Phase 3, we only support "none" attestation.
+		// Other formats (packed, tpm, android-key, etc.) can be added later.
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			`Unsupported attestation format "${String(fmt)}". Only "none" attestation is currently supported.`,
+			{ format: String(fmt) },
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Step 3: Parse the authenticator data
+	const authData = attestationMap.get('authData')
+	if (!(authData instanceof Uint8Array)) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			'Invalid attestation object: authData is missing or not a byte string.',
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Verify the RP ID hash (first 32 bytes of authData)
+	const rpIdHash = authData.slice(0, 32)
+	const expectedRpIdHash = await sha256(new TextEncoder().encode(expectedRpId))
+	if (!constantTimeEqual(rpIdHash, new Uint8Array(expectedRpIdHash))) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			'RP ID hash mismatch. The authenticator data does not match the expected relying party.',
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Parse flags (byte 32)
+	const flags = authData[32] as number
+
+	// Bit 0: User Present (UP) - must be set
+	if ((flags & 0x01) === 0) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			'User Present flag is not set in authenticator data. ' +
+				'The authenticator did not confirm user presence.',
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Bit 2: User Verified (UV) - required unless explicitly relaxed (AUTH-14)
+	if (requireUserVerification && (flags & 0x04) === 0) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			'User Verified flag is not set in authenticator data, but user verification is required.',
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Bit 6: Attested Credential Data (AT) - must be set for registration
+	if ((flags & 0x40) === 0) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			'Attested Credential Data flag is not set. ' +
+				'The authenticator did not include credential data.',
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Parse sign count (bytes 33-36, big-endian uint32)
+	const signCount =
+		((authData[33] as number) << 24) |
+		((authData[34] as number) << 16) |
+		((authData[35] as number) << 8) |
+		(authData[36] as number)
+
+	// Parse attested credential data
+	// Skip rpIdHash (32) + flags (1) + signCount (4) = 37 bytes
+	let offset = 37
+
+	// aaguid: 16 bytes (we skip it — not needed for "none" attestation)
+	offset += 16
+
+	// credentialIdLength: 2 bytes, big-endian
+	const credentialIdLength = ((authData[offset] as number) << 8) | (authData[offset + 1] as number)
+	offset += 2
+
+	// credentialId: credentialIdLength bytes
+	const credentialIdBytes = authData.slice(offset, offset + credentialIdLength)
+	offset += credentialIdLength
+
+	// Verify the credential ID matches what the client sent
+	const expectedCredentialId = toBase64Url(credentialIdBytes.buffer as unknown as ArrayBuffer)
+	if (expectedCredentialId !== credential.credentialId) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			'Credential ID mismatch between attestation object and client response.',
+		)
+	}
+
+	// The remaining bytes are the COSE-encoded public key
+	const coseKeyResult = decodeCbor(authData, offset)
+	const coseKeyBytes = authData.slice(offset, coseKeyResult.offset)
+
+	// Verify the public key matches what the client sent
+	const publicKeyFromAttestation = toBase64Url(coseKeyBytes.buffer as unknown as ArrayBuffer)
+	if (publicKeyFromAttestation !== credential.publicKey) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			'Public key mismatch between attestation object and client response.',
+		)
+	}
+
+	return {
+		verified: true,
+		credentialId: credential.credentialId,
+		publicKey: credential.publicKey,
+		signCount: signCount >>> 0,
+	}
+}
+
+// ============================================================================
+// Authentication options generation
+// ============================================================================
+
+/** Options returned by generateAuthenticationOptions for the client. */
+export interface AuthenticationOptions {
+	/** Base64url-encoded random challenge (32 bytes) */
+	challenge: string
+	/** Relying party ID */
+	rpId: string
+	/** Credential IDs to allow (limit to specific credentials) */
+	allowCredentialIds?: string[]
+	/** User verification requirement */
+	userVerification: 'preferred'
+	/** Timeout in milliseconds */
+	timeout: number
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate authentication options for signing in with a passkey.
+ *
+ * Creates a cryptographically random challenge and assembles the options
+ * object that should be sent to the client for `authenticateWithPasskey()`.
+ *
+ * The server must store the challenge for later verification.
+ *
+ * @param params - Authentication parameters
+ * @param params.rpId - Relying party ID (your domain)
+ * @param params.allowCredentialIds - Base64url credential IDs to allow (optional)
+ * @returns Authentication options to send to the client
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```typescript
+ * const options = generateAuthenticationOptions({
+ *   rpId: 'example.com',
+ *   allowCredentialIds: user.credentialIds,
+ * })
+ * // Store options.challenge in session
+ * // Send options to client
+ * ```
+ */
+export function generateAuthenticationOptions(params: {
+	rpId: string
+	allowCredentialIds?: string[]
+}): AuthenticationOptions {
+	const challengeBytes = randomBytes(32)
+	const challenge = toBase64Url(
+		challengeBytes.buffer.slice(
+			challengeBytes.byteOffset,
+			challengeBytes.byteOffset + challengeBytes.byteLength,
+		),
+	)
+
+	return {
+		challenge,
+		rpId: params.rpId,
+		allowCredentialIds: params.allowCredentialIds,
+		userVerification: 'preferred',
+		timeout: 60000,
+	}
+}
+
+// ============================================================================
+// Authentication verification
+// ============================================================================
+
+/** Result of verifying an authentication response. */
+export interface AuthenticationVerificationResult {
+	/** Whether the authentication response was verified successfully */
+	verified: boolean
+	/** Updated signature counter (store this to detect cloned authenticators) */
+	newSignCount: number
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify an authentication response from the client.
+ *
+ * Validates the signed assertion returned by the browser's
+ * `navigator.credentials.get()` call. Checks the signature against the
+ * stored public key, verifies the challenge and origin, and validates
+ * the signature counter to detect cloned authenticators.
+ *
+ * This implementation supports ECDSA P-256 (ES256, COSE algorithm -7)
+ * signatures, which is the most common algorithm used by platform
+ * authenticators (Touch ID, Face ID, Windows Hello).
+ *
+ * @param params - Verification parameters
+ * @param params.assertion - The assertion response from the client
+ * @param params.expectedChallenge - The challenge that was sent to the client (base64url)
+ * @param params.expectedOrigin - The expected origin (e.g. "https://example.com")
+ * @param params.expectedRpId - The expected relying party ID
+ * @param params.publicKey - The stored COSE public key (base64url, from registration)
+ * @param params.previousSignCount - The previously stored signature counter
+ * @returns Verification result with the new signature counter
+ * @throws {PasskeyVerificationError} If the assertion is invalid
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```typescript
+ * const result = await verifyAuthenticationResponse({
+ *   assertion: clientAssertion,
+ *   expectedChallenge: storedChallenge,
+ *   expectedOrigin: 'https://example.com',
+ *   expectedRpId: 'example.com',
+ *   publicKey: storedCredential.publicKey,
+ *   previousSignCount: storedCredential.signCount,
+ * })
+ * if (result.verified) {
+ *   // Update stored sign count: storedCredential.signCount = result.newSignCount
+ *   // Issue session tokens
+ * }
+ * ```
+ */
+export async function verifyAuthenticationResponse(params: {
+	assertion: {
+		credentialId: string
+		authenticatorData: string
+		clientDataJSON: string
+		signature: string
+		userHandle: string | null
+	}
+	expectedChallenge: string
+	expectedOrigin: string
+	expectedRpId: string
+	publicKey: string
+	previousSignCount: number
+	/**
+	 * Require the User Verified (UV) flag. Kora's options request
+	 * `userVerification: 'required'`, so the assertion must honour it.
+	 * @default true
+	 */
+	requireUserVerification?: boolean
+}): Promise<AuthenticationVerificationResult> {
+	const {
+		assertion,
+		expectedChallenge,
+		expectedOrigin,
+		expectedRpId,
+		publicKey,
+		previousSignCount,
+	} = params
+
+	// Step 1: Decode and verify clientDataJSON
+	const clientDataBytes = fromBase64Url(assertion.clientDataJSON)
+	const clientDataText = new TextDecoder().decode(clientDataBytes)
+	let clientData: { type: string; challenge: string; origin: string }
+	try {
+		clientData = JSON.parse(clientDataText) as {
+			type: string
+			challenge: string
+			origin: string
+		}
+	} catch {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			'Failed to parse clientDataJSON. The assertion may be malformed.',
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Verify the type is "webauthn.get"
+	if (clientData.type !== 'webauthn.get') {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			`Expected clientData.type "webauthn.get" but received "${clientData.type}".`,
+			{ type: clientData.type },
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Verify the challenge matches
+	if (clientData.challenge !== expectedChallenge) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			'Challenge mismatch. The assertion does not match the expected challenge.',
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Verify the origin matches
+	if (clientData.origin !== expectedOrigin) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			`Origin mismatch. Expected "${expectedOrigin}" but received "${clientData.origin}".`,
+			{ expected: expectedOrigin, received: clientData.origin },
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Step 2: Parse authenticator data
+	const authDataBytes = fromBase64Url(assertion.authenticatorData)
+
+	// Verify RP ID hash (first 32 bytes)
+	const rpIdHash = authDataBytes.slice(0, 32)
+	const expectedRpIdHash = await sha256(new TextEncoder().encode(expectedRpId))
+	if (!constantTimeEqual(rpIdHash, new Uint8Array(expectedRpIdHash))) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			'RP ID hash mismatch. The authenticator data does not match the expected relying party.',
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Parse flags (byte 32)
+	const flags = authDataBytes[32] as number
+
+	// Bit 0: User Present (UP) - must be set
+	if ((flags & 0x01) === 0) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError('User Present flag is not set in authenticator data.')
+	}
+
+	// Bit 2: User Verified (UV) - required unless explicitly relaxed (AUTH-14)
+	if ((params.requireUserVerification ?? true) && (flags & 0x04) === 0) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			'User Verified flag is not set in authenticator data, but user verification is required.',
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Parse sign count (bytes 33-36, big-endian uint32)
+	const signCount =
+		(((authDataBytes[33] as number) << 24) |
+			((authDataBytes[34] as number) << 16) |
+			((authDataBytes[35] as number) << 8) |
+			(authDataBytes[36] as number)) >>>
+		0
+
+	// Step 3: Validate sign count to detect cloned authenticators
+	// If both are 0, the authenticator doesn't support counters — skip check.
+	// If the new count is not greater than the previous, it may be cloned.
+	if (previousSignCount > 0 || signCount > 0) {
+		if (signCount <= previousSignCount) {
+			throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+				`Signature counter did not increase. This may indicate a cloned authenticator. Previous count: ${previousSignCount}, received count: ${signCount}.`,
+				{
+					previousSignCount,
+					receivedSignCount: signCount,
+				},
+			)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Step 4: Verify the signature
+	// The signature is over: authData || SHA-256(clientDataJSON)
+	const clientDataHash = await sha256(clientDataBytes)
+	const signedData = new Uint8Array(authDataBytes.length + clientDataHash.byteLength)
+	signedData.set(authDataBytes, 0)
+	signedData.set(new Uint8Array(clientDataHash), authDataBytes.length)
+
+	// Decode the COSE public key to get the raw EC key parameters
+	const coseKeyBytes = fromBase64Url(publicKey)
+	const coseKeyResult = decodeCbor(coseKeyBytes, 0)
+	const coseKeyMap = coseKeyResult.value as Map<number, unknown>
+
+	// COSE key map labels:
+	// 1: kty (key type) — 2 = EC2
+	// 3: alg (algorithm) — -7 = ES256
+	// -1: crv (curve) — 1 = P-256
+	// -2: x coordinate (byte string, 32 bytes)
+	// -3: y coordinate (byte string, 32 bytes)
+
+	const kty = coseKeyMap.get(1)
+	const alg = coseKeyMap.get(3)
+
+	if (kty !== 2) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			`Unsupported COSE key type ${String(kty)}. Only EC2 (kty=2) is supported.`,
+			{ kty: String(kty) },
+		)
+	}
+
+	if (alg !== -7) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			`Unsupported COSE algorithm ${String(alg)}. Only ES256 (alg=-7) is supported.`,
+			{ alg: String(alg) },
+		)
+	}
+
+	const xCoord = coseKeyMap.get(-2) as Uint8Array
+	const yCoord = coseKeyMap.get(-3) as Uint8Array
+
+	if (
+		!(xCoord instanceof Uint8Array) ||
+		!(yCoord instanceof Uint8Array) ||
+		xCoord.length !== 32 ||
+		yCoord.length !== 32
+	) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			'Invalid COSE public key: x and y coordinates must be 32-byte arrays.',
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Import the public key as an ECDSA P-256 key for verification.
+	// We use the "raw" format: 0x04 || x || y (uncompressed point).
+	const rawPublicKey = new Uint8Array(65)
+	rawPublicKey[0] = 0x04 // Uncompressed point indicator
+	rawPublicKey.set(xCoord, 1)
+	rawPublicKey.set(yCoord, 33)
+
+	let cryptoKey: CryptoKey
+	try {
+		cryptoKey = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(
+			'raw',
+			rawPublicKey.buffer as unknown as ArrayBuffer,
+			{ name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256' },
+			false,
+			['verify'],
+		)
+	} catch (error) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			'Failed to import COSE public key for signature verification.',
+			{ cause: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error) },
+		)
+	}
+
+	// The WebAuthn signature is in ASN.1 DER format.
+	// Web Crypto's ECDSA verify expects the signature in IEEE P1363 format (r || s).
+	// Convert from DER to P1363.
+	const signatureBytes = fromBase64Url(assertion.signature)
+	const p1363Signature = derToP1363(signatureBytes, 32)
+
+	let verified: boolean
+	try {
+		verified = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.verify(
+			{ name: 'ECDSA', hash: { name: 'SHA-256' } },
+			cryptoKey,
+			p1363Signature.buffer as unknown as ArrayBuffer,
+			signedData.buffer as unknown as ArrayBuffer,
+		)
+	} catch (error) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError('Signature verification operation failed.', {
+			cause: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
+		})
+	}
+
+	if (!verified) {
+		return { verified: false, newSignCount: signCount }
+	}
+
+	return { verified: true, newSignCount: signCount }
+}
+
+// ============================================================================
+// Internal helpers
+// ============================================================================
+
+/**
+ * Compute SHA-256 hash of the given data using Web Crypto API.
+ */
+async function sha256(data: Uint8Array): Promise<ArrayBuffer> {
+	return globalThis.crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', data as unknown as ArrayBuffer)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Constant-time comparison of two byte arrays.
+ * Prevents timing attacks when comparing hashes or signatures.
+ */
+function constantTimeEqual(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array): boolean {
+	if (a.length !== b.length) {
+		return false
+	}
+	let result = 0
+	for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {
+		result |= (a[i] as number) ^ (b[i] as number)
+	}
+	return result === 0
+}
+
+/**
+ * Convert an ASN.1 DER-encoded ECDSA signature to IEEE P1363 format.
+ *
+ * DER format: 0x30 <len> 0x02 <r-len> <r> 0x02 <s-len> <s>
+ * P1363 format: <r-padded-to-n-bytes> <s-padded-to-n-bytes>
+ *
+ * This conversion is necessary because WebAuthn authenticators produce
+ * DER-encoded signatures, but the Web Crypto API expects P1363 format.
+ *
+ * @param derSignature - The DER-encoded signature bytes
+ * @param componentLength - The expected length of each component (32 for P-256)
+ * @returns The P1363-formatted signature
+ */
+function derToP1363(derSignature: Uint8Array, componentLength: number): Uint8Array {
+	// Parse the DER structure
+	let offset = 0
+
+	// SEQUENCE tag (0x30)
+	if (derSignature[offset] !== 0x30) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError('Invalid DER signature: expected SEQUENCE tag (0x30).')
+	}
+	offset += 1
+
+	// SEQUENCE length (may be 1 or 2 bytes)
+	if ((derSignature[offset] as number) & 0x80) {
+		// Long form: the lower 7 bits give the number of length bytes
+		const lengthBytes = (derSignature[offset] as number) & 0x7f
+		offset += 1 + lengthBytes
+	} else {
+		offset += 1
+	}
+
+	// First INTEGER (r)
+	if (derSignature[offset] !== 0x02) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			'Invalid DER signature: expected INTEGER tag (0x02) for r component.',
+		)
+	}
+	offset += 1
+
+	const rLength = derSignature[offset] as number
+	offset += 1
+
+	const rBytes = derSignature.slice(offset, offset + rLength)
+	offset += rLength
+
+	// Second INTEGER (s)
+	if (derSignature[offset] !== 0x02) {
+		throw new PasskeyVerificationError(
+			'Invalid DER signature: expected INTEGER tag (0x02) for s component.',
+		)
+	}
+	offset += 1
+
+	const sLength = derSignature[offset] as number
+	offset += 1
+
+	const sBytes = derSignature.slice(offset, offset + sLength)
+
+	// Pad or trim r and s to componentLength bytes.
+	// DER integers may have a leading 0x00 byte to indicate positive sign,
+	// or may be shorter than componentLength if the leading bytes are zero.
+	const result = new Uint8Array(componentLength * 2)
+	copyComponentToP1363(rBytes, result, 0, componentLength)
+	copyComponentToP1363(sBytes, result, componentLength, componentLength)
+
+	return result
+}
+
+/**
+ * Copy a DER integer component into a fixed-width P1363 buffer.
+ * Handles leading zero padding (DER sign byte) and right-alignment.
+ */
+function copyComponentToP1363(
+	component: Uint8Array,
+	target: Uint8Array,
+	targetOffset: number,
+	componentLength: number,
+): void {
+	if (component.length === componentLength) {
+		// Exact fit
+		target.set(component, targetOffset)
+	} else if (component.length > componentLength) {
+		// DER may have a leading 0x00 sign byte — strip it
+		const excess = component.length - componentLength
+		target.set(component.slice(excess), targetOffset)
+	} else {
+		// Component is shorter — right-align with zero padding
+		const padding = componentLength - component.length
+		target.set(component, targetOffset + padding)
+	}
+}