@koda-sl/baker-cli 0.204.0 → 0.209.0

package/dist/{chunk-KHHD26LZ.js → chunk-FUSTYLP5.js}

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 import {
   ApiError,
   apiGet
-} from "./chunk-2R2DEPG7.js";
+} from "./chunk-CRXSLYEX.js";
 import {
   getEnv
-} from "./chunk-6NZG2TCM.js";
+} from "./chunk-IRNM3T6B.js";
 
 // src/error-handler.ts
 var REQUEST_CONNECTION_PLATFORM = {
@@ -295,4 +295,4 @@ export {
   writeAdsOutput,
   resolveCustomerId
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-KHHD26LZ.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-FUSTYLP5.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-6NZG2TCM.js → chunk-IRNM3T6B.js}

@@ -318,6 +318,10 @@ function captureBudgetMs() {
 function captureProxyCredentials() {
   return readProxyCredentials(process.env);
 }
+function captureVimeoCookie() {
+  const raw = process.env.VIMEO_COOKIE?.trim();
+  return raw ? raw : void 0;
+}
 function childEnvWith(extra) {
   return { ...process.env, ...extra };
 }
@@ -337,6 +341,7 @@ export {
   resolveChatId,
   captureBudgetMs,
   captureProxyCredentials,
+  captureVimeoCookie,
   childEnvWith
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-6NZG2TCM.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IRNM3T6B.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-6NZG2TCM.js.map → chunk-IRNM3T6B.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../proxy/src/challenge.ts","../../proxy/src/tiers.ts","../../proxy/src/credentials.ts","../../proxy/src/escalate.ts","../../proxy/src/privateAddress.ts","../../proxy/src/publicAddress.ts","../../proxy/src/route.ts","../../proxy/src/ladder.ts","../src/env.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Was that a page, or the wall in front of it?\n *\n * A bot filter answers 200. The body parses, it has a title, and every check\n * downstream — `response.ok`, the status, the content type — says the read\n * succeeded. So a challenge is the one block that cannot be seen from the\n * status line, and the only place it is visible is the bytes.\n *\n * This lives in `@baker/proxy` rather than beside any one caller because the\n * escalation ladder is only coherent if every surface agrees on what \"blocked\"\n * means: the rung that gets climbed is chosen from this answer, and a detector\n * that differs per caller would mean the same wall costs money on one surface\n * and is filed as content on another.\n *\n * Pure and dependency-free, so it stays reachable from Convex's V8 runtime\n * through the package barrel.\n */\n\n/**\n * Phrases that only appear on a block or challenge page.\n *\n * Deliberately specific — \"access denied\" alone would match a page *about*\n * access control, so each phrase is one a real marketing page has no reason to\n * use as its title.\n */\nconst CHALLENGE_PHRASES = [\n  \"just a moment\",\n  \"attention required\",\n  \"verify you are human\",\n  \"checking your browser\",\n  \"enable javascript and cookies to continue\",\n  \"unusual traffic\",\n  \"access denied\",\n  \"you have been blocked\",\n  \"request unsuccessful\",\n  \"are you a robot\",\n  \"security check\",\n  \"ddos protection\",\n  \"captcha\",\n];\n\n/** Vendors whose block pages carry a fingerprint even when the title does not. */\nconst CHALLENGE_MARKERS = [\"cf-browser-verification\", \"cf_chl_\", \"px-captcha\", \"_incapsula_\", \"distil_r_captcha\"];\n\n/**\n * How long a response may be and still be judged by its *wording*.\n *\n * Phrases like \"captcha\" or \"access denied\" are ordinary English that a real\n * article can legitimately contain, so matching them anywhere would refuse\n * pages we read perfectly well. Length is the precision guard: a page that is\n * mostly content is content.\n */\nexport const CHALLENGE_LENGTH_CEILING = 2_000;\n\n/**\n * Whether these bytes are a bot wall rather than the thing that was asked for.\n *\n * Reads only what the caller already paid for. Nothing here issues a request —\n * asking the host again would deepen the very block this is detecting.\n *\n * The two lists are searched differently, and that asymmetry is the point.\n * Phrases are judged only on a short response, for the precision reason above.\n * Vendor markers are fingerprints nothing but the vendor emits, so they are\n * searched at any length — which is what makes a real interstitial detectable\n * at all. Cloudflare's is 5–15 KB of inlined script wrapped around one visible\n * sentence, so gating markers behind the same length ceiling as the phrases put\n * every genuine large wall in a dead band where neither list could reach it.\n */\nexport function isChallengeBody(content: string, title?: string | null): boolean {\n  if (content.length <= CHALLENGE_LENGTH_CEILING) {\n    const haystack = `${title ?? \"\"}\\n${content}`.toLowerCase();\n    if (CHALLENGE_PHRASES.some((phrase) => haystack.includes(phrase))) return true;\n  }\n\n  const whole = content.toLowerCase();\n  return CHALLENGE_MARKERS.some((marker) => whole.includes(marker));\n}\n","/**\n * The two Oxylabs products, and everything that differs between them.\n *\n * They are NOT credential-swappable. Endpoint, username prefix, geo token and\n * sticky-session mechanism all differ, so \"same URL, other username/password\"\n * fails — and it fails as a 407, which Chromium reports as a plain network\n * error. Before this module existed there was no code path that could tell that\n * apart from the site refusing us, so the failure would have been recorded\n * against the page rather than against our own configuration.\n *\n * That asymmetry is the reason this table exists in exactly one place. Every\n * caller builds its route through `buildProxyRoute`; nobody concatenates an\n * Oxylabs URL by hand.\n */\n\nexport type ProxyTier = \"datacenter\" | \"residential\";\n\nexport interface ProxyTierSpec {\n  readonly tier: ProxyTier;\n  readonly host: string;\n  readonly port: number;\n  /** Oxylabs requires this in front of the account name. The two differ. */\n  readonly usernamePrefix: \"user-\" | \"customer-\";\n  /** Country targeting token. `-country-` on datacenter, `-cc-` on residential. */\n  readonly countryKey: \"-country-\" | \"-cc-\";\n  /**\n   * Sticky-session token, or null when the product has none.\n   *\n   * Datacenter does stickiness by *port* (8001 for IP #1, 8002 for #2), not by\n   * username. We do not implement that: a capture is a single page load, so a\n   * reusable IP buys nothing and the knob would only add a way to get it wrong.\n   */\n  readonly sessionKey: \"-sessid-\" | null;\n}\n\nexport const PROXY_TIERS: Readonly<Record<ProxyTier, ProxyTierSpec>> = {\n  datacenter: {\n    tier: \"datacenter\",\n    host: \"dc.oxylabs.io\",\n    port: 8000,\n    usernamePrefix: \"user-\",\n    countryKey: \"-country-\",\n    sessionKey: null,\n  },\n  residential: {\n    tier: \"residential\",\n    host: \"pr.oxylabs.io\",\n    port: 7777,\n    usernamePrefix: \"customer-\",\n    countryKey: \"-cc-\",\n    sessionKey: \"-sessid-\",\n  },\n};\n\n/**\n * Cheapest useful route first, and the ladder never skips a rung.\n *\n * Residential costs materially more than datacenter, so it is only ever reached\n * because datacenter was tried and refused — never as a first guess and never\n * speculatively.\n */\nexport const ESCALATION_ORDER = [\"datacenter\", \"residential\"] as const satisfies readonly ProxyTier[];\n\n/** Every prefix this module knows, used to spot a credential in the wrong slot. */\nexport const KNOWN_USERNAME_PREFIXES = [\"user-\", \"customer-\"] as const;\n","import type { ProxyTier } from \"./tiers.ts\";\nimport { ESCALATION_ORDER } from \"./tiers.ts\";\n\n/**\n * The four environment variable names, in one place.\n *\n * Convex holds these and hands them to the sandbox; the CLI reads them back\n * out. A typo on either side is a *silent* no-op — the capability appears to\n * ship, every fetch quietly takes the direct route, and nothing fails. That is\n * the worst failure mode available to this feature, so the names are a shared\n * constant with a contract test rather than eight string literals spread across\n * two packages.\n */\nexport const PROXY_ENV_VARS = {\n  datacenter: { username: \"OXYLABS_DATACENTER_USERNAME\", password: \"OXYLABS_DATACENTER_PASSWORD\" },\n  residential: { username: \"OXYLABS_RESIDENTIAL_USERNAME\", password: \"OXYLABS_RESIDENTIAL_PASSWORD\" },\n} as const satisfies Record<ProxyTier, { username: string; password: string }>;\n\nexport interface TierCredentials {\n  readonly username: string;\n  readonly password: string;\n}\n\nexport type ProxyCredentials = Partial<Readonly<Record<ProxyTier, TierCredentials>>>;\n\n/**\n * Read whichever tiers are fully configured.\n *\n * Takes the env record rather than reading `process.env` itself, so the whole\n * package stays pure and the Convex and CLI sides can be tested identically.\n *\n * Half a pair is not a credential. A username with no password would build a\n * route that authenticates as nobody, and Oxylabs answers that with the same\n * 407 as a wrong password — so it would look like a broken proxy rather than an\n * unconfigured one. Dropping it here means `configuredTiers` tells the truth.\n */\nexport function readProxyCredentials(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): ProxyCredentials {\n  const credentials: { -readonly [K in ProxyTier]?: TierCredentials } = {};\n  for (const tier of ESCALATION_ORDER) {\n    const username = env[PROXY_ENV_VARS[tier].username]?.trim();\n    const password = env[PROXY_ENV_VARS[tier].password]?.trim();\n    if (username && password) credentials[tier] = { username, password };\n  }\n  return credentials;\n}\n\n/**\n * The inverse of `readProxyCredentials`: credentials back out as env vars.\n *\n * The writing side used to be a loop inside one Convex function, which is how\n * the ladder came to exist everywhere and work in one place. That loop ran only\n * for `baker landing inspiration scrape`, so every other CLI fetch surface in a\n * Session — `images download`, canvas `ingest`, the two scaffolders, yt-dlp —\n * read four variables nobody had set and went direct, silently, exactly as\n * `PROXY_ENV_VARS` warns.\n *\n * Pairing it with the reader here is the point: the round trip is a test, so the\n * two sides cannot drift into agreeing about three variables out of four.\n */\nexport function proxyCredentialEnvs(credentials: ProxyCredentials): Record<string, string> {\n  const envs: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const tier of ESCALATION_ORDER) {\n    const held = credentials[tier];\n    if (!held) continue;\n    envs[PROXY_ENV_VARS[tier].username] = held.username;\n    envs[PROXY_ENV_VARS[tier].password] = held.password;\n  }\n  return envs;\n}\n\n/**\n * Which tiers this process could actually reach, cheapest first.\n *\n * There is no ceiling to apply. A deployment holding both pairs may climb to\n * residential, full stop — the brake is the credential itself. Removing\n * `OXYLABS_RESIDENTIAL_PASSWORD` takes effect on the next restart, needs no\n * deploy, and withholds the tier by the same mechanism a ceiling would have,\n * so the valve that used to sit here only added a second way to say it. It was\n * also never wired into ad-dna's task definition, which is the highest-volume\n * egress in the repo — a control that could not be turned where it mattered\n * most.\n */\nexport function configuredTiers(credentials: ProxyCredentials): ProxyTier[] {\n  return ESCALATION_ORDER.filter((tier) => credentials[tier] !== undefined);\n}\n\n/** Whether there is any proxy to escalate to at all. */\nexport function proxyEscalationConfigured(credentials: ProxyCredentials): boolean {\n  return configuredTiers(credentials).length > 0;\n}\n","/**\n * When is a failure worth spending a more expensive route on?\n *\n * The ladder only ever climbs on evidence that *who we are* was the problem. A\n * page that 404s, a domain that does not resolve, a certificate that will not\n * negotiate and a site that timed out all fail identically from every IP on\n * earth, so retrying them through a metered exit buys a second identical\n * failure and a bill. That asymmetry — cheap to be wrong in one direction,\n * expensive in the other — is why this is a closed allow-list rather than\n * \"escalate unless we recognise the error\".\n *\n * Shared deliberately: the capture engine, the image fetchers and the ad-media\n * downloaders all have to agree on what \"blocked\" means, or the corpus and the\n * bill disagree about the same event.\n */\n\n/** What one attempt observed, normalised across Playwright and `fetch`. */\nexport interface BlockSignal {\n  /** Main-document / response status, when there was one. */\n  readonly status?: number | null;\n  /** Chromium `net::` name or a Node error code, when the attempt threw one. */\n  readonly netError?: string | null;\n  /** A challenge body was detected behind an otherwise successful response. */\n  readonly challenge?: boolean;\n  /** The attempt ran out of time rather than being refused. */\n  readonly timedOut?: boolean;\n}\n\n/** \"We don't like *you*\" — a different exit IP is a different you. */\nconst ESCALATABLE_STATUSES = new Set([403, 429, 451]);\n\n/**\n * A TCP reset on ClientHello is how a WAF null-routes a datacenter range.\n *\n * Today all three of these collapse into one \"site didn't respond\" message and\n * are filed non-retryable, which is precisely why this class of block has been\n * invisible: it looks identical to a site that is genuinely down.\n */\nconst ESCALATABLE_NET_ERRORS = new Set([\"ERR_CONNECTION_RESET\", \"ERR_CONNECTION_CLOSED\", \"ERR_EMPTY_RESPONSE\"]);\n\n/**\n * Failures that belong to our route, not to the site.\n *\n * A 407 cannot come from an origin server — only something speaking proxy\n * produces one — so this needs no \"was this attempt proxied\" flag to be safe.\n */\nconst PROXY_NET_ERRORS = new Set([\n  \"ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED\",\n  \"ERR_PROXY_CONNECTION_FAILED\",\n  \"ERR_PROXY_AUTH_REQUESTED\",\n  \"ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATE_INVALID\",\n  \"ERR_UNEXPECTED_PROXY_AUTH\",\n  \"ERR_MANDATORY_PROXY_CONFIGURATION_FAILED\",\n  \"ERR_HTTPS_PROXY_TUNNEL_RESPONSE_REDIRECT\",\n]);\n\nexport function isProxyFailure(signal: BlockSignal): boolean {\n  if (signal.status === 407) return true;\n  return signal.netError ? PROXY_NET_ERRORS.has(signal.netError) : false;\n}\n\nexport function shouldEscalate(signal: BlockSignal): boolean {\n  // Our own broken route never advances the ladder — it degrades it. Climbing\n  // here would spend a more expensive rung reproducing our misconfiguration.\n  if (isProxyFailure(signal)) return false;\n  if (signal.timedOut) return false;\n  if (signal.challenge) return true;\n  if (signal.status != null && ESCALATABLE_STATUSES.has(signal.status)) return true;\n  return signal.netError ? ESCALATABLE_NET_ERRORS.has(signal.netError) : false;\n}\n","/**\n * The same question as `refuseNonPublicUrl`, asked of an address instead of a name.\n *\n * A URL carries a hostname, and a hostname is not an address. `localtest.me`\n * and `127.0.0.1.nip.io` are public names, with public DNS records, that\n * resolve to `127.0.0.1` — and nothing stops an attacker pointing a domain they\n * own at `169.254.169.254`. Proven against a real loopback server: the hostname\n * guard passed `http://localtest.me:4321/secret.txt` straight through, the bytes\n * were downloaded, and only the image parser complained afterwards.\n *\n * IPv6 is parsed rather than pattern-matched, and that is the second lesson\n * here. The first version tested prefixes with regexes and unwrapped an\n * IPv4-mapped address only when it still had a dot in it — but a URL parser\n * normalises `::ffff:127.0.0.1` to `::ffff:7f00:1`, so the dot is gone by the\n * time anyone looks. `[::ffff:169.254.169.254]` therefore read as public and the\n * ladder returned the metadata body with `outcome: \"ok\"`. One address has many\n * spellings; comparing spellings is the wrong operation.\n *\n * Anything unparseable is treated as private. This is a safety gate, and the\n * only safe reading of \"I do not know what this is\" is \"do not fetch it\".\n */\n\n/** Every IPv4 range that is not routable on the public internet. */\nfunction isPrivateIpv4Octets(octets: readonly number[]): boolean {\n  const [a, b] = octets as [number, number, number, number];\n  if (a === 0) return true; // \"this network\" — 0.0.0.0/8\n  if (a === 10) return true; // private\n  if (a === 127) return true; // loopback\n  if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true; // link-local, and the cloud metadata address\n  if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true; // private /12 — NOT all of 172.*\n  if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true; // private\n  if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) return true; // carrier-grade NAT\n  if (a >= 224) return true; // multicast and reserved\n  return false;\n}\n\n/** Dotted-quad to octets, or `null` when it is not one. */\nfunction parseIpv4(value: string): number[] | null {\n  const parts = value.split(\".\");\n  if (parts.length !== 4) return null;\n  const octets = parts.map((part) => (/^\\d{1,3}$/.test(part) ? Number(part) : Number.NaN));\n  if (octets.some((octet) => !Number.isInteger(octet) || octet < 0 || octet > 255)) return null;\n  return octets;\n}\n\n/**\n * One side of a `::` to its 16-bit groups, or `null` if any part is not one.\n *\n * A trailing dotted-quad stands for the final two groups and is only legal in\n * last position — that is the spelling `::ffff:127.0.0.1` uses before a URL\n * parser rewrites it to `::ffff:7f00:1`.\n */\nfunction expandGroups(part: string): number[] | null {\n  if (part === \"\") return [];\n  const chunks = part.split(\":\");\n  const groups: number[] = [];\n  for (let index = 0; index < chunks.length; index++) {\n    const chunk = chunks[index] as string;\n    if (chunk.includes(\".\")) {\n      if (index !== chunks.length - 1) return null;\n      const octets = parseIpv4(chunk);\n      if (!octets) return null;\n      groups.push(((octets[0] as number) << 8) | (octets[1] as number));\n      groups.push(((octets[2] as number) << 8) | (octets[3] as number));\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (!/^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/.test(chunk)) return null;\n    groups.push(Number.parseInt(chunk, 16));\n  }\n  return groups;\n}\n\n/**\n * IPv6 to its eight 16-bit groups, or `null` when it is not one.\n *\n * Handles the `::` elision and a trailing dotted-quad, which together are why\n * one address has so many spellings.\n */\nfunction parseIpv6(value: string): number[] | null {\n  const halves = value.split(\"::\");\n  if (halves.length > 2) return null;\n\n  const head = expandGroups(halves[0] as string);\n  const tail = halves.length === 2 ? expandGroups(halves[1] as string) : [];\n  if (head === null || tail === null) return null;\n\n  if (halves.length === 1) return head.length === 8 ? head : null;\n  const missing = 8 - head.length - tail.length;\n  if (missing < 1) return null;\n  return [...head, ...new Array<number>(missing).fill(0), ...tail];\n}\n\nexport function isPrivateAddress(ip: string): boolean {\n  const address = ip.trim().toLowerCase();\n  if (!address) return true;\n\n  const v4 = parseIpv4(address);\n  if (v4) return isPrivateIpv4Octets(v4);\n\n  const v6 = parseIpv6(address);\n  // Not an address we can read. A safety gate may not guess.\n  if (!v6) return true;\n\n  const [g0, g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6, g7] = v6 as [number, number, number, number, number, number, number, number];\n\n  // `::` (unspecified) and `::1` (loopback).\n  if (g0 === 0 && g1 === 0 && g2 === 0 && g3 === 0 && g4 === 0 && g5 === 0 && g6 === 0) return true;\n\n  // IPv4-mapped (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) and IPv4-translated (`::ffff:0:a.b.c.d`).\n  // The whole point: by the time this is read the tail is hex, not dotted.\n  const mappedV4 = g0 === 0 && g1 === 0 && g2 === 0 && g3 === 0;\n  if (mappedV4 && g4 === 0 && g5 === 0xffff) {\n    return isPrivateIpv4Octets([g6 >> 8, g6 & 0xff, g7 >> 8, g7 & 0xff]);\n  }\n  if (mappedV4 && g4 === 0xffff && g5 === 0) {\n    return isPrivateIpv4Octets([g6 >> 8, g6 & 0xff, g7 >> 8, g7 & 0xff]);\n  }\n\n  if ((g0 & 0xfe00) === 0xfc00) return true; // fc00::/7 unique-local\n  if ((g0 & 0xffc0) === 0xfe80) return true; // fe80::/10 link-local\n  return false;\n}\n","/**\n * Addresses that must never be fetched, and must never be proxied.\n *\n * Lifted from `convex/landingLibrary/utils.ts`, where these three regexes were\n * the only copy in the repo — reachable from Convex and from nowhere else. That\n * was survivable while the capture ran one hop after the check. It is not\n * survivable now: the CLI can be invoked directly, two Convex paths enqueue\n * without re-validating, and a proxy adds a rung where \"which network am I on\"\n * stops being rhetorical.\n *\n * Two distinct reasons live here, and both point the same way:\n *\n * - **There is nothing to read.** A private address only resolves from inside\n *   the network asking, so a capture of one produces a screenshot of an error.\n * - **There is something to read, and we must not.** `169.254.169.254` is the\n *   cloud metadata endpoint that every capture runner has a route to.\n *\n * The rule for the proxy is *refuse*, not *bypass*. Bypassing would leave a\n * request that still happens, just unproxied; refusing means there is no\n * request to route. That is a stronger guarantee and a simpler one to check.\n */\n\nimport { isPrivateAddress } from \"./privateAddress.ts\";\n\n/**\n * Names — not addresses. Anything that looks like an address goes to\n * `isPrivateAddress`, which parses it instead of matching its spelling.\n */\nconst PRIVATE_HOST = /^(localhost|.*\\.localhost|.*\\.local)$/;\n/** Where a Session's own preview is served while the page is being built. */\nconst SANDBOX_HOST = /\\.e2b\\.(app|dev)$/;\n\n/**\n * A bracketed IPv6 literal, unwrapped.\n *\n * `new URL(\"http://[::1]/\").hostname` keeps the brackets, so a hostname check\n * that does not strip them is comparing against a string no address will ever\n * equal. The previous version tried to absorb that with `\\[?::1\\]?` and caught\n * exactly one address out of the whole of IPv6 — `[::ffff:169.254.169.254]`\n * sailed through and the ladder returned the metadata body with `outcome: \"ok\"`.\n */\nfunction unwrapIpLiteral(host: string): string | null {\n  if (host.startsWith(\"[\") && host.endsWith(\"]\")) return host.slice(1, -1);\n  // A bare v4 literal, or a v6 one that arrived without brackets.\n  if (/^[0-9.]+$/.test(host) || host.includes(\":\")) return host;\n  return null;\n}\n\nexport function isPrivateHostname(hostname: string): boolean {\n  const host = hostname.trim().toLowerCase();\n  if (!host) return true;\n  if (PRIVATE_HOST.test(host) || SANDBOX_HOST.test(host)) return true;\n\n  // Every address form — v4, v6, bracketed, mapped, elided — is decided by one\n  // parser. Spelling an address in a regex is what let four of them through.\n  const literal = unwrapIpLiteral(host);\n  return literal === null ? false : isPrivateAddress(literal);\n}\n\n/**\n * The same rule again, in the only notation a browser's proxy settings speak.\n *\n * Chromium — and so Playwright and `agent-browser` — matches a bypass entry\n * against the hostname and understands one wildcard and no CIDR at all. The\n * ranges above therefore cannot be handed over as regexes; `172.16/12` has to\n * become sixteen entries, and there is no way to express \"any private address\".\n *\n * That makes this a second copy of one fact, which is worth stating plainly:\n * the day it disagrees with `isPrivateHostname` is the day a Session's own\n * preview at `localhost:4321` goes out through a metered exit and comes back\n * refused. Its test pins the correspondence.\n *\n * Note the direction reverses here, and deliberately. Everywhere else the rule\n * for a private address is *refuse*, because a request that still happens is\n * not a guarantee. A browser the agent drives has to reach `localhost:4321` —\n * that is its main job — so here the private address is the legitimate traffic\n * and the list says \"go direct\", not \"do not go\".\n */\nexport const BROWSER_PROXY_BYPASS = [\n  \"localhost\",\n  \"*.localhost\",\n  \"127.0.0.1\",\n  \"0.0.0.0\",\n  \"::1\",\n  \"*.local\",\n  // A Session's own preview, which is served from the sandbox's public host —\n  // public in DNS, ours in every sense that matters here.\n  \"*.e2b.app\",\n  \"*.e2b.dev\",\n  \"10.*\",\n  \"192.168.*\",\n  \"169.254.*\",\n  ...Array.from({ length: 16 }, (_, i) => `172.${16 + i}.*`),\n].join(\",\");\n\nexport type NonPublicReason = \"not_public\" | \"unparseable\";\n\n/**\n * `null` when the URL is safe to fetch; a reason when it must be refused.\n *\n * Anything that is not plain http(s) is refused too. A capture is handed URLs\n * from agents and from stored rows, and `file:` reaching a browser we launched\n * is a local file read wearing a URL.\n */\nexport function refuseNonPublicUrl(url: string): NonPublicReason | null {\n  let parsed: URL;\n  try {\n    parsed = new URL(url);\n  } catch {\n    return \"unparseable\";\n  }\n  if (parsed.protocol !== \"http:\" && parsed.protocol !== \"https:\") return \"not_public\";\n  return isPrivateHostname(parsed.hostname) ? \"not_public\" : null;\n}\n","import type { ProxyCredentials } from \"./credentials.ts\";\nimport type { ProxyTier, ProxyTierSpec } from \"./tiers.ts\";\nimport { KNOWN_USERNAME_PREFIXES, PROXY_TIERS } from \"./tiers.ts\";\n\n/**\n * How one attempt reaches the internet.\n *\n * Credentials stay in separate fields instead of being embedded in the URL:\n * Playwright's `proxy` option wants them that way, undici's `ProxyAgent` takes\n * them as a header we build once, and — the real reason — a password that never\n * exists as a substring of a URL cannot be leaked by anything that logs a URL.\n */\nexport type ProxyRoute =\n  | { readonly kind: \"direct\" }\n  | {\n      readonly kind: \"proxy\";\n      readonly tier: ProxyTier;\n      /** e.g. `http://dc.oxylabs.io:8000` */\n      readonly server: string;\n      readonly username: string;\n      readonly password: string;\n    };\n\nexport const DIRECT_ROUTE: ProxyRoute = { kind: \"direct\" };\n\nexport interface RouteOptions {\n  /** ISO-3166 alpha-2, upper-cased here. Omit for \"wherever\" — the default. */\n  readonly country?: string;\n  /** Sticky-session id. Ignored by a tier whose product has no session syntax. */\n  readonly session?: string;\n}\n\nexport type RouteProblem = \"missing\" | \"wrong_prefix\";\n\nexport type RouteResult = { ok: true; route: ProxyRoute } | { ok: false; problem: RouteProblem };\n\n/**\n * Put the account name into the shape this specific product expects.\n *\n * Three cases, and the third is the one worth being strict about:\n *\n * 1. Bare (`acme`) — someone pasted the account name. Prepend the prefix.\n * 2. Already correct (`user-acme` in the datacenter slot) — someone pasted the\n *    full Oxylabs username. Leave it alone.\n * 3. Carrying the OTHER product's prefix (`customer-acme` in the datacenter\n *    slot) — refuse.\n *\n * Case 3 must not be \"helpfully\" rewritten. A `customer-` value in the\n * datacenter slot means the residential credentials were pasted into the wrong\n * variable, and rewriting the prefix would authenticate a residential account\n * against the datacenter endpoint. That either 407s — wasting the cheap rung\n * for no reason — or it works, and bills residential rates from the tier whose\n * entire purpose is to be the cheap one. Refusing is the only answer that\n * cannot silently cost money.\n */\nexport function proxyUsername(\n  spec: ProxyTierSpec,\n  rawUsername: string,\n  options?: RouteOptions,\n): { ok: true; username: string } | { ok: false; problem: \"wrong_prefix\" } {\n  const raw = rawUsername.trim();\n  const foreignPrefix = KNOWN_USERNAME_PREFIXES.find(\n    (prefix) => prefix !== spec.usernamePrefix && raw.startsWith(prefix),\n  );\n  if (foreignPrefix) return { ok: false, problem: \"wrong_prefix\" };\n\n  let username = raw.startsWith(spec.usernamePrefix) ? raw : `${spec.usernamePrefix}${raw}`;\n  // Geo before session — Oxylabs reads the username left to right and rejects\n  // the pair in the other order.\n  if (options?.country) username += `${spec.countryKey}${options.country.toUpperCase()}`;\n  if (options?.session && spec.sessionKey) username += `${spec.sessionKey}${options.session}`;\n  return { ok: true, username };\n}\n\n/** Build the route for one tier, or say why there isn't one. */\nexport function buildProxyRoute(tier: ProxyTier, credentials: ProxyCredentials, options?: RouteOptions): RouteResult {\n  const held = credentials[tier];\n  if (!held) return { ok: false, problem: \"missing\" };\n\n  const spec = PROXY_TIERS[tier];\n  const username = proxyUsername(spec, held.username, options);\n  if (!username.ok) return username;\n\n  return {\n    ok: true,\n    route: {\n      kind: \"proxy\",\n      tier,\n      server: `http://${spec.host}:${spec.port}`,\n      username: username.username,\n      password: held.password,\n    },\n  };\n}\n","import type { ProxyCredentials } from \"./credentials.ts\";\nimport { configuredTiers } from \"./credentials.ts\";\nimport { refuseNonPublicUrl } from \"./publicAddress.ts\";\nimport type { ProxyRoute, RouteOptions } from \"./route.ts\";\nimport { buildProxyRoute, DIRECT_ROUTE } from \"./route.ts\";\n\n/**\n * Every route this URL is allowed to be attempted on, in the order to try them.\n *\n * Direct is always first and always present: an unblocked page must cost\n * nothing, and a deployment with no credentials has to behave exactly as it did\n * before any of this existed.\n *\n * A tier whose credentials are malformed is *skipped*, not fatal. One\n * mis-pasted variable should cost the use of that rung, not the whole ladder —\n * the alternative is that a typo in the cheap tier silently disables the\n * expensive one that would have worked.\n */\nexport function plannedRoutes(url: string, credentials: ProxyCredentials, options?: RouteOptions): ProxyRoute[] {\n  // A private address is refused upstream; if one reaches here anyway it must\n  // not become a billed request, and there is no exit node on earth from which\n  // `localhost` means us.\n  if (refuseNonPublicUrl(url) !== null) return [DIRECT_ROUTE];\n\n  const routes: ProxyRoute[] = [DIRECT_ROUTE];\n  for (const tier of configuredTiers(credentials)) {\n    const built = buildProxyRoute(tier, credentials, options);\n    if (built.ok) routes.push(built.route);\n  }\n  return routes;\n}\n","import type { ProxyCredentials } from \"@baker/proxy\";\nimport { readProxyCredentials } from \"@baker/proxy\";\nimport { createEnv } from \"@t3-oss/env-core\";\nimport { z } from \"zod\";\n\ntype Env = {\n  BAKER_API_KEY: string;\n  BAKER_API_URL: string;\n  BAKER_CHAT_ID?: string;\n  BAKER_ACTING_USER_ID?: string;\n  BAKER_GOOGLE_ADS_CUSTOMER_ID?: string;\n  BAKER_GA4_PROPERTY_ID?: string;\n  BAKER_GSC_SITE_URL?: string;\n  BAKER_X_ADS_ACCOUNT_ID?: string;\n  BAKER_META_AD_ACCOUNT_ID?: string;\n  BAKER_LINKEDIN_AD_ACCOUNT_ID?: string;\n};\n\nlet cached: Env | undefined;\n\nexport function getEnv(): Env {\n  if (!cached) {\n    cached = createEnv({\n      server: {\n        BAKER_API_KEY: z.string().startsWith(\"bk_\", \"API key must start with 'bk_'\"),\n        BAKER_API_URL: z.url(\"BAKER_API_URL must be a valid URL\"),\n        BAKER_CHAT_ID: z.string().optional(),\n        BAKER_ACTING_USER_ID: z.string().optional(),\n        BAKER_GOOGLE_ADS_CUSTOMER_ID: z\n          .string()\n          .regex(/^\\d{10}$/)\n          .optional(),\n        BAKER_GA4_PROPERTY_ID: z.string().optional(),\n        BAKER_GSC_SITE_URL: z.string().optional(),\n        BAKER_X_ADS_ACCOUNT_ID: z\n          .string()\n          .regex(/^[a-z0-9]+$/, \"X Ads account ID must be a base36 string\")\n          .optional(),\n        BAKER_META_AD_ACCOUNT_ID: z.string().optional(),\n        BAKER_LINKEDIN_AD_ACCOUNT_ID: z\n          .string()\n          .regex(/^\\d+$/, \"LinkedIn ad account ID must be the numeric portion of urn:li:sponsoredAccount:N\")\n          .optional(),\n      },\n      runtimeEnv: process.env,\n    });\n  }\n  return cached;\n}\n\n// Read directly (not via the validated schema): debug logging must work even when\n// the required BAKER_API_KEY/BAKER_API_URL are missing or malformed.\nexport function debugLogSetting(): string | undefined {\n  const raw = process.env.BAKER_DEBUG_LOG?.trim();\n  return raw ? raw : undefined;\n}\n\nexport function requireChatId(): string {\n  const env = getEnv();\n  if (!env.BAKER_CHAT_ID) {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"BAKER_CHAT_ID is not set. This command stages changes against a chat — run it from a chat-attached environment.\",\n    );\n  }\n  return env.BAKER_CHAT_ID;\n}\n\n/**\n * Which chat a *read* addresses. A `--chat` value names another chat in the same company — how an\n * earlier chat's staged changes are recovered verbatim instead of rebuilt from a summary — and with\n * no flag it is this session's own chat.\n *\n * Read paths only. Staging, amending and discarding keep calling `requireChatId`, so one session can\n * never edit another's draft; the backend enforces the same thing twice over, since every mutating\n * internal requires the draft be `active` and every route checks the chat belongs to the caller's\n * company.\n */\nexport function resolveChatId(chat?: unknown): string {\n  return typeof chat === \"string\" && chat.length > 0 ? chat : requireChatId();\n}\n\n/**\n * Wall clock the whole capture may spend, when the caller bounded it.\n *\n * Read from the environment rather than taken as a flag, deliberately. A\n * `--budget-ms` argument would land in the command schema, and the schema is\n * what the agent reads — one question away from \"what is the budget for?\", and\n * from there the escalation ladder stops being invisible to it.\n *\n * Kept out of `getEnv()` because that validator is for a chat-attached run; the\n * capture engine also runs where none of those variables exist.\n */\nexport function captureBudgetMs(): number | null {\n  const raw = Number(process.env.BAKER_CAPTURE_BUDGET_MS);\n  return Number.isFinite(raw) && raw > 0 ? raw : null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Egress-proxy credentials for a capture, or none at all.\n *\n * These arrive as sandbox *command* env, never as arguments — a credential in\n * argv is readable by any `ps` sharing the sandbox. With none set,\n * `plannedRoutes` yields the direct route alone and a capture behaves exactly\n * as it did before the ladder existed.\n *\n * Whichever pairs arrive are the rungs this process may climb; there is nothing\n * to filter. A tier the deployment withholds is simply absent from this env, so\n * a ceiling read on this side could only ever disagree with the one place that\n * decides.\n */\nexport function captureProxyCredentials(): ProxyCredentials {\n  return readProxyCredentials(process.env);\n}\n\n/**\n * This process's environment plus `extra`, for handing to a child.\n *\n * Lives here because `process.env` reads belong in this file — but it earns its\n * place beyond the lint rule: `spawn`'s `env` *replaces* the environment rather\n * than extending it, so a caller that passes only its additions silently strips\n * `PATH` and the child fails to start for a reason that looks nothing like the\n * cause.\n */\nexport function childEnvWith(extra: Record<string, string>): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {\n  return { ...process.env, ...extra 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So a challenge is the one block that cannot be seen from the\n * status line, and the only place it is visible is the bytes.\n *\n * This lives in `@baker/proxy` rather than beside any one caller because the\n * escalation ladder is only coherent if every surface agrees on what \"blocked\"\n * means: the rung that gets climbed is chosen from this answer, and a detector\n * that differs per caller would mean the same wall costs money on one surface\n * and is filed as content on another.\n *\n * Pure and dependency-free, so it stays reachable from Convex's V8 runtime\n * through the package barrel.\n */\n\n/**\n * Phrases that only appear on a block or challenge page.\n *\n * Deliberately specific — \"access denied\" alone would match a page *about*\n * access control, so each phrase is one a real marketing page has no reason to\n * use as its title.\n */\nconst CHALLENGE_PHRASES = [\n  \"just a moment\",\n  \"attention required\",\n  \"verify you are human\",\n  \"checking your browser\",\n  \"enable javascript and cookies to continue\",\n  \"unusual traffic\",\n  \"access denied\",\n  \"you have been blocked\",\n  \"request unsuccessful\",\n  \"are you a robot\",\n  \"security check\",\n  \"ddos protection\",\n  \"captcha\",\n];\n\n/** Vendors whose block pages carry a fingerprint even when the title does not. */\nconst CHALLENGE_MARKERS = [\"cf-browser-verification\", \"cf_chl_\", \"px-captcha\", \"_incapsula_\", \"distil_r_captcha\"];\n\n/**\n * How long a response may be and still be judged by its *wording*.\n *\n * Phrases like \"captcha\" or \"access denied\" are ordinary English that a real\n * article can legitimately contain, so matching them anywhere would refuse\n * pages we read perfectly well. Length is the precision guard: a page that is\n * mostly content is content.\n */\nexport const CHALLENGE_LENGTH_CEILING = 2_000;\n\n/**\n * Whether these bytes are a bot wall rather than the thing that was asked for.\n *\n * Reads only what the caller already paid for. Nothing here issues a request —\n * asking the host again would deepen the very block this is detecting.\n *\n * The two lists are searched differently, and that asymmetry is the point.\n * Phrases are judged only on a short response, for the precision reason above.\n * Vendor markers are fingerprints nothing but the vendor emits, so they are\n * searched at any length — which is what makes a real interstitial detectable\n * at all. Cloudflare's is 5–15 KB of inlined script wrapped around one visible\n * sentence, so gating markers behind the same length ceiling as the phrases put\n * every genuine large wall in a dead band where neither list could reach it.\n */\nexport function isChallengeBody(content: string, title?: string | null): boolean {\n  if (content.length <= CHALLENGE_LENGTH_CEILING) {\n    const haystack = `${title ?? \"\"}\\n${content}`.toLowerCase();\n    if (CHALLENGE_PHRASES.some((phrase) => haystack.includes(phrase))) return true;\n  }\n\n  const whole = content.toLowerCase();\n  return CHALLENGE_MARKERS.some((marker) => whole.includes(marker));\n}\n","/**\n * The two Oxylabs products, and everything that differs between them.\n *\n * They are NOT credential-swappable. Endpoint, username prefix, geo token and\n * sticky-session mechanism all differ, so \"same URL, other username/password\"\n * fails — and it fails as a 407, which Chromium reports as a plain network\n * error. Before this module existed there was no code path that could tell that\n * apart from the site refusing us, so the failure would have been recorded\n * against the page rather than against our own configuration.\n *\n * That asymmetry is the reason this table exists in exactly one place. Every\n * caller builds its route through `buildProxyRoute`; nobody concatenates an\n * Oxylabs URL by hand.\n */\n\nexport type ProxyTier = \"datacenter\" | \"residential\";\n\nexport interface ProxyTierSpec {\n  readonly tier: ProxyTier;\n  readonly host: string;\n  readonly port: number;\n  /** Oxylabs requires this in front of the account name. 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A typo on either side is a *silent* no-op — the capability appears to\n * ship, every fetch quietly takes the direct route, and nothing fails. That is\n * the worst failure mode available to this feature, so the names are a shared\n * constant with a contract test rather than eight string literals spread across\n * two packages.\n */\nexport const PROXY_ENV_VARS = {\n  datacenter: { username: \"OXYLABS_DATACENTER_USERNAME\", password: \"OXYLABS_DATACENTER_PASSWORD\" },\n  residential: { username: \"OXYLABS_RESIDENTIAL_USERNAME\", password: \"OXYLABS_RESIDENTIAL_PASSWORD\" },\n} as const satisfies Record<ProxyTier, { username: string; password: string }>;\n\nexport interface TierCredentials {\n  readonly username: string;\n  readonly password: string;\n}\n\nexport type ProxyCredentials = Partial<Readonly<Record<ProxyTier, TierCredentials>>>;\n\n/**\n * Read whichever tiers are fully configured.\n *\n * Takes the env record rather than reading `process.env` itself, so the whole\n * package stays pure and the Convex and CLI sides can be tested identically.\n *\n * Half a pair is not a credential. A username with no password would build a\n * route that authenticates as nobody, and Oxylabs answers that with the same\n * 407 as a wrong password — so it would look like a broken proxy rather than an\n * unconfigured one. Dropping it here means `configuredTiers` tells the truth.\n */\nexport function readProxyCredentials(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): ProxyCredentials {\n  const credentials: { -readonly [K in ProxyTier]?: TierCredentials } = {};\n  for (const tier of ESCALATION_ORDER) {\n    const username = env[PROXY_ENV_VARS[tier].username]?.trim();\n    const password = env[PROXY_ENV_VARS[tier].password]?.trim();\n    if (username && password) credentials[tier] = { username, password };\n  }\n  return credentials;\n}\n\n/**\n * The inverse of `readProxyCredentials`: credentials back out as env vars.\n *\n * The writing side used to be a loop inside one Convex function, which is how\n * the ladder came to exist everywhere and work in one place. That loop ran only\n * for `baker landing inspiration scrape`, so every other CLI fetch surface in a\n * Session — `images download`, canvas `ingest`, the two scaffolders, yt-dlp —\n * read four variables nobody had set and went direct, silently, exactly as\n * `PROXY_ENV_VARS` warns.\n *\n * Pairing it with the reader here is the point: the round trip is a test, so the\n * two sides cannot drift into agreeing about three variables out of four.\n */\nexport function proxyCredentialEnvs(credentials: ProxyCredentials): Record<string, string> {\n  const envs: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const tier of ESCALATION_ORDER) {\n    const held = credentials[tier];\n    if (!held) continue;\n    envs[PROXY_ENV_VARS[tier].username] = held.username;\n    envs[PROXY_ENV_VARS[tier].password] = held.password;\n  }\n  return envs;\n}\n\n/**\n * Which tiers this process could actually reach, cheapest first.\n *\n * There is no ceiling to apply. A deployment holding both pairs may climb to\n * residential, full stop — the brake is the credential itself. Removing\n * `OXYLABS_RESIDENTIAL_PASSWORD` takes effect on the next restart, needs no\n * deploy, and withholds the tier by the same mechanism a ceiling would have,\n * so the valve that used to sit here only added a second way to say it. It was\n * also never wired into ad-dna's task definition, which is the highest-volume\n * egress in the repo — a control that could not be turned where it mattered\n * most.\n */\nexport function configuredTiers(credentials: ProxyCredentials): ProxyTier[] {\n  return ESCALATION_ORDER.filter((tier) => credentials[tier] !== undefined);\n}\n\n/** Whether there is any proxy to escalate to at all. */\nexport function proxyEscalationConfigured(credentials: ProxyCredentials): boolean {\n  return configuredTiers(credentials).length > 0;\n}\n","/**\n * When is a failure worth spending a more expensive route on?\n *\n * The ladder only ever climbs on evidence that *who we are* was the problem. A\n * page that 404s, a domain that does not resolve, a certificate that will not\n * negotiate and a site that timed out all fail identically from every IP on\n * earth, so retrying them through a metered exit buys a second identical\n * failure and a bill. That asymmetry — cheap to be wrong in one direction,\n * expensive in the other — is why this is a closed allow-list rather than\n * \"escalate unless we recognise the error\".\n *\n * Shared deliberately: the capture engine, the image fetchers and the ad-media\n * downloaders all have to agree on what \"blocked\" means, or the corpus and the\n * bill disagree about the same event.\n */\n\n/** What one attempt observed, normalised across Playwright and `fetch`. */\nexport interface BlockSignal {\n  /** Main-document / response status, when there was one. */\n  readonly status?: number | null;\n  /** Chromium `net::` name or a Node error code, when the attempt threw one. */\n  readonly netError?: string | null;\n  /** A challenge body was detected behind an otherwise successful response. */\n  readonly challenge?: boolean;\n  /** The attempt ran out of time rather than being refused. */\n  readonly timedOut?: boolean;\n}\n\n/** \"We don't like *you*\" — a different exit IP is a different you. */\nconst ESCALATABLE_STATUSES = new Set([403, 429, 451]);\n\n/**\n * A TCP reset on ClientHello is how a WAF null-routes a datacenter range.\n *\n * Today all three of these collapse into one \"site didn't respond\" message and\n * are filed non-retryable, which is precisely why this class of block has been\n * invisible: it looks identical to a site that is genuinely down.\n */\nconst ESCALATABLE_NET_ERRORS = new Set([\"ERR_CONNECTION_RESET\", \"ERR_CONNECTION_CLOSED\", \"ERR_EMPTY_RESPONSE\"]);\n\n/**\n * Failures that belong to our route, not to the site.\n *\n * A 407 cannot come from an origin server — only something speaking proxy\n * produces one — so this needs no \"was this attempt proxied\" flag to be safe.\n */\nconst PROXY_NET_ERRORS = new Set([\n  \"ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED\",\n  \"ERR_PROXY_CONNECTION_FAILED\",\n  \"ERR_PROXY_AUTH_REQUESTED\",\n  \"ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATE_INVALID\",\n  \"ERR_UNEXPECTED_PROXY_AUTH\",\n  \"ERR_MANDATORY_PROXY_CONFIGURATION_FAILED\",\n  \"ERR_HTTPS_PROXY_TUNNEL_RESPONSE_REDIRECT\",\n]);\n\nexport function isProxyFailure(signal: BlockSignal): boolean {\n  if (signal.status === 407) return true;\n  return signal.netError ? PROXY_NET_ERRORS.has(signal.netError) : false;\n}\n\nexport function shouldEscalate(signal: BlockSignal): boolean {\n  // Our own broken route never advances the ladder — it degrades it. Climbing\n  // here would spend a more expensive rung reproducing our misconfiguration.\n  if (isProxyFailure(signal)) return false;\n  if (signal.timedOut) return false;\n  if (signal.challenge) return true;\n  if (signal.status != null && ESCALATABLE_STATUSES.has(signal.status)) return true;\n  return signal.netError ? ESCALATABLE_NET_ERRORS.has(signal.netError) : false;\n}\n","/**\n * The same question as `refuseNonPublicUrl`, asked of an address instead of a name.\n *\n * A URL carries a hostname, and a hostname is not an address. `localtest.me`\n * and `127.0.0.1.nip.io` are public names, with public DNS records, that\n * resolve to `127.0.0.1` — and nothing stops an attacker pointing a domain they\n * own at `169.254.169.254`. Proven against a real loopback server: the hostname\n * guard passed `http://localtest.me:4321/secret.txt` straight through, the bytes\n * were downloaded, and only the image parser complained afterwards.\n *\n * IPv6 is parsed rather than pattern-matched, and that is the second lesson\n * here. The first version tested prefixes with regexes and unwrapped an\n * IPv4-mapped address only when it still had a dot in it — but a URL parser\n * normalises `::ffff:127.0.0.1` to `::ffff:7f00:1`, so the dot is gone by the\n * time anyone looks. `[::ffff:169.254.169.254]` therefore read as public and the\n * ladder returned the metadata body with `outcome: \"ok\"`. One address has many\n * spellings; comparing spellings is the wrong operation.\n *\n * Anything unparseable is treated as private. This is a safety gate, and the\n * only safe reading of \"I do not know what this is\" is \"do not fetch it\".\n */\n\n/** Every IPv4 range that is not routable on the public internet. */\nfunction isPrivateIpv4Octets(octets: readonly number[]): boolean {\n  const [a, b] = octets as [number, number, number, number];\n  if (a === 0) return true; // \"this network\" — 0.0.0.0/8\n  if (a === 10) return true; // private\n  if (a === 127) return true; // loopback\n  if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true; // link-local, and the cloud metadata address\n  if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true; // private /12 — NOT all of 172.*\n  if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true; // private\n  if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) return true; // carrier-grade NAT\n  if (a >= 224) return true; // multicast and reserved\n  return false;\n}\n\n/** Dotted-quad to octets, or `null` when it is not one. */\nfunction parseIpv4(value: string): number[] | null {\n  const parts = value.split(\".\");\n  if (parts.length !== 4) return null;\n  const octets = parts.map((part) => (/^\\d{1,3}$/.test(part) ? Number(part) : Number.NaN));\n  if (octets.some((octet) => !Number.isInteger(octet) || octet < 0 || octet > 255)) return null;\n  return octets;\n}\n\n/**\n * One side of a `::` to its 16-bit groups, or `null` if any part is not one.\n *\n * A trailing dotted-quad stands for the final two groups and is only legal in\n * last position — that is the spelling `::ffff:127.0.0.1` uses before a URL\n * parser rewrites it to `::ffff:7f00:1`.\n */\nfunction expandGroups(part: string): number[] | null {\n  if (part === \"\") return [];\n  const chunks = part.split(\":\");\n  const groups: number[] = [];\n  for (let index = 0; index < chunks.length; index++) {\n    const chunk = chunks[index] as string;\n    if (chunk.includes(\".\")) {\n      if (index !== chunks.length - 1) return null;\n      const octets = parseIpv4(chunk);\n      if (!octets) return null;\n      groups.push(((octets[0] as number) << 8) | (octets[1] as number));\n      groups.push(((octets[2] as number) << 8) | (octets[3] as number));\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (!/^[0-9a-f]{1,4}$/.test(chunk)) return null;\n    groups.push(Number.parseInt(chunk, 16));\n  }\n  return groups;\n}\n\n/**\n * IPv6 to its eight 16-bit groups, or `null` when it is not one.\n *\n * Handles the `::` elision and a trailing dotted-quad, which together are why\n * one address has so many spellings.\n */\nfunction parseIpv6(value: string): number[] | null {\n  const halves = value.split(\"::\");\n  if (halves.length > 2) return null;\n\n  const head = expandGroups(halves[0] as string);\n  const tail = halves.length === 2 ? expandGroups(halves[1] as string) : [];\n  if (head === null || tail === null) return null;\n\n  if (halves.length === 1) return head.length === 8 ? head : null;\n  const missing = 8 - head.length - tail.length;\n  if (missing < 1) return null;\n  return [...head, ...new Array<number>(missing).fill(0), ...tail];\n}\n\nexport function isPrivateAddress(ip: string): boolean {\n  const address = ip.trim().toLowerCase();\n  if (!address) return true;\n\n  const v4 = parseIpv4(address);\n  if (v4) return isPrivateIpv4Octets(v4);\n\n  const v6 = parseIpv6(address);\n  // Not an address we can read. A safety gate may not guess.\n  if (!v6) return true;\n\n  const [g0, g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6, g7] = v6 as [number, number, number, number, number, number, number, number];\n\n  // `::` (unspecified) and `::1` (loopback).\n  if (g0 === 0 && g1 === 0 && g2 === 0 && g3 === 0 && g4 === 0 && g5 === 0 && g6 === 0) return true;\n\n  // IPv4-mapped (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) and IPv4-translated (`::ffff:0:a.b.c.d`).\n  // The whole point: by the time this is read the tail is hex, not dotted.\n  const mappedV4 = g0 === 0 && g1 === 0 && g2 === 0 && g3 === 0;\n  if (mappedV4 && g4 === 0 && g5 === 0xffff) {\n    return isPrivateIpv4Octets([g6 >> 8, g6 & 0xff, g7 >> 8, g7 & 0xff]);\n  }\n  if (mappedV4 && g4 === 0xffff && g5 === 0) {\n    return isPrivateIpv4Octets([g6 >> 8, g6 & 0xff, g7 >> 8, g7 & 0xff]);\n  }\n\n  if ((g0 & 0xfe00) === 0xfc00) return true; // fc00::/7 unique-local\n  if ((g0 & 0xffc0) === 0xfe80) return true; // fe80::/10 link-local\n  return false;\n}\n","/**\n * Addresses that must never be fetched, and must never be proxied.\n *\n * Lifted from `convex/landingLibrary/utils.ts`, where these three regexes were\n * the only copy in the repo — reachable from Convex and from nowhere else. That\n * was survivable while the capture ran one hop after the check. It is not\n * survivable now: the CLI can be invoked directly, two Convex paths enqueue\n * without re-validating, and a proxy adds a rung where \"which network am I on\"\n * stops being rhetorical.\n *\n * Two distinct reasons live here, and both point the same way:\n *\n * - **There is nothing to read.** A private address only resolves from inside\n *   the network asking, so a capture of one produces a screenshot of an error.\n * - **There is something to read, and we must not.** `169.254.169.254` is the\n *   cloud metadata endpoint that every capture runner has a route to.\n *\n * The rule for the proxy is *refuse*, not *bypass*. Bypassing would leave a\n * request that still happens, just unproxied; refusing means there is no\n * request to route. That is a stronger guarantee and a simpler one to check.\n */\n\nimport { isPrivateAddress } from \"./privateAddress.ts\";\n\n/**\n * Names — not addresses. Anything that looks like an address goes to\n * `isPrivateAddress`, which parses it instead of matching its spelling.\n */\nconst PRIVATE_HOST = /^(localhost|.*\\.localhost|.*\\.local)$/;\n/** Where a Session's own preview is served while the page is being built. */\nconst SANDBOX_HOST = /\\.e2b\\.(app|dev)$/;\n\n/**\n * A bracketed IPv6 literal, unwrapped.\n *\n * `new URL(\"http://[::1]/\").hostname` keeps the brackets, so a hostname check\n * that does not strip them is comparing against a string no address will ever\n * equal. The previous version tried to absorb that with `\\[?::1\\]?` and caught\n * exactly one address out of the whole of IPv6 — `[::ffff:169.254.169.254]`\n * sailed through and the ladder returned the metadata body with `outcome: \"ok\"`.\n */\nfunction unwrapIpLiteral(host: string): string | null {\n  if (host.startsWith(\"[\") && host.endsWith(\"]\")) return host.slice(1, -1);\n  // A bare v4 literal, or a v6 one that arrived without brackets.\n  if (/^[0-9.]+$/.test(host) || host.includes(\":\")) return host;\n  return null;\n}\n\nexport function isPrivateHostname(hostname: string): boolean {\n  const host = hostname.trim().toLowerCase();\n  if (!host) return true;\n  if (PRIVATE_HOST.test(host) || SANDBOX_HOST.test(host)) return true;\n\n  // Every address form — v4, v6, bracketed, mapped, elided — is decided by one\n  // parser. Spelling an address in a regex is what let four of them through.\n  const literal = unwrapIpLiteral(host);\n  return literal === null ? false : isPrivateAddress(literal);\n}\n\n/**\n * The same rule again, in the only notation a browser's proxy settings speak.\n *\n * Chromium — and so Playwright and `agent-browser` — matches a bypass entry\n * against the hostname and understands one wildcard and no CIDR at all. The\n * ranges above therefore cannot be handed over as regexes; `172.16/12` has to\n * become sixteen entries, and there is no way to express \"any private address\".\n *\n * That makes this a second copy of one fact, which is worth stating plainly:\n * the day it disagrees with `isPrivateHostname` is the day a Session's own\n * preview at `localhost:4321` goes out through a metered exit and comes back\n * refused. Its test pins the correspondence.\n *\n * Note the direction reverses here, and deliberately. Everywhere else the rule\n * for a private address is *refuse*, because a request that still happens is\n * not a guarantee. A browser the agent drives has to reach `localhost:4321` —\n * that is its main job — so here the private address is the legitimate traffic\n * and the list says \"go direct\", not \"do not go\".\n */\nexport const BROWSER_PROXY_BYPASS = [\n  \"localhost\",\n  \"*.localhost\",\n  \"127.0.0.1\",\n  \"0.0.0.0\",\n  \"::1\",\n  \"*.local\",\n  // A Session's own preview, which is served from the sandbox's public host —\n  // public in DNS, ours in every sense that matters here.\n  \"*.e2b.app\",\n  \"*.e2b.dev\",\n  \"10.*\",\n  \"192.168.*\",\n  \"169.254.*\",\n  ...Array.from({ length: 16 }, (_, i) => `172.${16 + i}.*`),\n].join(\",\");\n\nexport type NonPublicReason = \"not_public\" | \"unparseable\";\n\n/**\n * `null` when the URL is safe to fetch; a reason when it must be refused.\n *\n * Anything that is not plain http(s) is refused too. A capture is handed URLs\n * from agents and from stored rows, and `file:` reaching a browser we launched\n * is a local file read wearing a URL.\n */\nexport function refuseNonPublicUrl(url: string): NonPublicReason | null {\n  let parsed: URL;\n  try {\n    parsed = new URL(url);\n  } catch {\n    return \"unparseable\";\n  }\n  if (parsed.protocol !== \"http:\" && parsed.protocol !== \"https:\") return \"not_public\";\n  return isPrivateHostname(parsed.hostname) ? \"not_public\" : null;\n}\n","import type { ProxyCredentials } from \"./credentials.ts\";\nimport type { ProxyTier, ProxyTierSpec } from \"./tiers.ts\";\nimport { KNOWN_USERNAME_PREFIXES, PROXY_TIERS } from \"./tiers.ts\";\n\n/**\n * How one attempt reaches the internet.\n *\n * Credentials stay in separate fields instead of being embedded in the URL:\n * Playwright's `proxy` option wants them that way, undici's `ProxyAgent` takes\n * them as a header we build once, and — the real reason — a password that never\n * exists as a substring of a URL cannot be leaked by anything that logs a URL.\n */\nexport type ProxyRoute =\n  | { readonly kind: \"direct\" }\n  | {\n      readonly kind: \"proxy\";\n      readonly tier: ProxyTier;\n      /** e.g. `http://dc.oxylabs.io:8000` */\n      readonly server: string;\n      readonly username: string;\n      readonly password: string;\n    };\n\nexport const DIRECT_ROUTE: ProxyRoute = { kind: \"direct\" };\n\nexport interface RouteOptions {\n  /** ISO-3166 alpha-2, upper-cased here. Omit for \"wherever\" — the default. */\n  readonly country?: string;\n  /** Sticky-session id. Ignored by a tier whose product has no session syntax. */\n  readonly session?: string;\n}\n\nexport type RouteProblem = \"missing\" | \"wrong_prefix\";\n\nexport type RouteResult = { ok: true; route: ProxyRoute } | { ok: false; problem: RouteProblem };\n\n/**\n * Put the account name into the shape this specific product expects.\n *\n * Three cases, and the third is the one worth being strict about:\n *\n * 1. Bare (`acme`) — someone pasted the account name. Prepend the prefix.\n * 2. Already correct (`user-acme` in the datacenter slot) — someone pasted the\n *    full Oxylabs username. Leave it alone.\n * 3. Carrying the OTHER product's prefix (`customer-acme` in the datacenter\n *    slot) — refuse.\n *\n * Case 3 must not be \"helpfully\" rewritten. A `customer-` value in the\n * datacenter slot means the residential credentials were pasted into the wrong\n * variable, and rewriting the prefix would authenticate a residential account\n * against the datacenter endpoint. That either 407s — wasting the cheap rung\n * for no reason — or it works, and bills residential rates from the tier whose\n * entire purpose is to be the cheap one. Refusing is the only answer that\n * cannot silently cost money.\n */\nexport function proxyUsername(\n  spec: ProxyTierSpec,\n  rawUsername: string,\n  options?: RouteOptions,\n): { ok: true; username: string } | { ok: false; problem: \"wrong_prefix\" } {\n  const raw = rawUsername.trim();\n  const foreignPrefix = KNOWN_USERNAME_PREFIXES.find(\n    (prefix) => prefix !== spec.usernamePrefix && raw.startsWith(prefix),\n  );\n  if (foreignPrefix) return { ok: false, problem: \"wrong_prefix\" };\n\n  let username = raw.startsWith(spec.usernamePrefix) ? raw : `${spec.usernamePrefix}${raw}`;\n  // Geo before session — Oxylabs reads the username left to right and rejects\n  // the pair in the other order.\n  if (options?.country) username += `${spec.countryKey}${options.country.toUpperCase()}`;\n  if (options?.session && spec.sessionKey) username += `${spec.sessionKey}${options.session}`;\n  return { ok: true, username };\n}\n\n/** Build the route for one tier, or say why there isn't one. */\nexport function buildProxyRoute(tier: ProxyTier, credentials: ProxyCredentials, options?: RouteOptions): RouteResult {\n  const held = credentials[tier];\n  if (!held) return { ok: false, problem: \"missing\" };\n\n  const spec = PROXY_TIERS[tier];\n  const username = proxyUsername(spec, held.username, options);\n  if (!username.ok) return username;\n\n  return {\n    ok: true,\n    route: {\n      kind: \"proxy\",\n      tier,\n      server: `http://${spec.host}:${spec.port}`,\n      username: username.username,\n      password: held.password,\n    },\n  };\n}\n","import type { ProxyCredentials } from \"./credentials.ts\";\nimport { configuredTiers } from \"./credentials.ts\";\nimport { refuseNonPublicUrl } from \"./publicAddress.ts\";\nimport type { ProxyRoute, RouteOptions } from \"./route.ts\";\nimport { buildProxyRoute, DIRECT_ROUTE } from \"./route.ts\";\n\n/**\n * Every route this URL is allowed to be attempted on, in the order to try them.\n *\n * Direct is always first and always present: an unblocked page must cost\n * nothing, and a deployment with no credentials has to behave exactly as it did\n * before any of this existed.\n *\n * A tier whose credentials are malformed is *skipped*, not fatal. One\n * mis-pasted variable should cost the use of that rung, not the whole ladder —\n * the alternative is that a typo in the cheap tier silently disables the\n * expensive one that would have worked.\n */\nexport function plannedRoutes(url: string, credentials: ProxyCredentials, options?: RouteOptions): ProxyRoute[] {\n  // A private address is refused upstream; if one reaches here anyway it must\n  // not become a billed request, and there is no exit node on earth from which\n  // `localhost` means us.\n  if (refuseNonPublicUrl(url) !== null) return [DIRECT_ROUTE];\n\n  const routes: ProxyRoute[] = [DIRECT_ROUTE];\n  for (const tier of configuredTiers(credentials)) {\n    const built = buildProxyRoute(tier, credentials, options);\n    if (built.ok) routes.push(built.route);\n  }\n  return routes;\n}\n","import type { ProxyCredentials } from \"@baker/proxy\";\nimport { readProxyCredentials } from \"@baker/proxy\";\nimport { createEnv } from \"@t3-oss/env-core\";\nimport { z } from \"zod\";\n\ntype Env = {\n  BAKER_API_KEY: string;\n  BAKER_API_URL: string;\n  BAKER_CHAT_ID?: string;\n  BAKER_ACTING_USER_ID?: string;\n  BAKER_GOOGLE_ADS_CUSTOMER_ID?: string;\n  BAKER_GA4_PROPERTY_ID?: string;\n  BAKER_GSC_SITE_URL?: string;\n  BAKER_X_ADS_ACCOUNT_ID?: string;\n  BAKER_META_AD_ACCOUNT_ID?: string;\n  BAKER_LINKEDIN_AD_ACCOUNT_ID?: string;\n};\n\nlet cached: Env | undefined;\n\nexport function getEnv(): Env {\n  if (!cached) {\n    cached = createEnv({\n      server: {\n        BAKER_API_KEY: z.string().startsWith(\"bk_\", \"API key must start with 'bk_'\"),\n        BAKER_API_URL: z.url(\"BAKER_API_URL must be a valid URL\"),\n        BAKER_CHAT_ID: z.string().optional(),\n        BAKER_ACTING_USER_ID: z.string().optional(),\n        BAKER_GOOGLE_ADS_CUSTOMER_ID: z\n          .string()\n          .regex(/^\\d{10}$/)\n          .optional(),\n        BAKER_GA4_PROPERTY_ID: z.string().optional(),\n        BAKER_GSC_SITE_URL: z.string().optional(),\n        BAKER_X_ADS_ACCOUNT_ID: z\n          .string()\n          .regex(/^[a-z0-9]+$/, \"X Ads account ID must be a base36 string\")\n          .optional(),\n        BAKER_META_AD_ACCOUNT_ID: z.string().optional(),\n        BAKER_LINKEDIN_AD_ACCOUNT_ID: z\n          .string()\n          .regex(/^\\d+$/, \"LinkedIn ad account ID must be the numeric portion of urn:li:sponsoredAccount:N\")\n          .optional(),\n      },\n      runtimeEnv: process.env,\n    });\n  }\n  return cached;\n}\n\n// Read directly (not via the validated schema): debug logging must work even when\n// the required BAKER_API_KEY/BAKER_API_URL are missing or malformed.\nexport function debugLogSetting(): string | undefined {\n  const raw = process.env.BAKER_DEBUG_LOG?.trim();\n  return raw ? raw : undefined;\n}\n\nexport function requireChatId(): string {\n  const env = getEnv();\n  if (!env.BAKER_CHAT_ID) {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"BAKER_CHAT_ID is not set. This command stages changes against a chat — run it from a chat-attached environment.\",\n    );\n  }\n  return env.BAKER_CHAT_ID;\n}\n\n/**\n * Which chat a *read* addresses. A `--chat` value names another chat in the same company — how an\n * earlier chat's staged changes are recovered verbatim instead of rebuilt from a summary — and with\n * no flag it is this session's own chat.\n *\n * Read paths only. Staging, amending and discarding keep calling `requireChatId`, so one session can\n * never edit another's draft; the backend enforces the same thing twice over, since every mutating\n * internal requires the draft be `active` and every route checks the chat belongs to the caller's\n * company.\n */\nexport function resolveChatId(chat?: unknown): string {\n  return typeof chat === \"string\" && chat.length > 0 ? chat : requireChatId();\n}\n\n/**\n * Wall clock the whole capture may spend, when the caller bounded it.\n *\n * Read from the environment rather than taken as a flag, deliberately. A\n * `--budget-ms` argument would land in the command schema, and the schema is\n * what the agent reads — one question away from \"what is the budget for?\", and\n * from there the escalation ladder stops being invisible to it.\n *\n * Kept out of `getEnv()` because that validator is for a chat-attached run; the\n * capture engine also runs where none of those variables exist.\n */\nexport function captureBudgetMs(): number | null {\n  const raw = Number(process.env.BAKER_CAPTURE_BUDGET_MS);\n  return Number.isFinite(raw) && raw > 0 ? raw : null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Egress-proxy credentials for a capture, or none at all.\n *\n * These arrive as sandbox *command* env, never as arguments — a credential in\n * argv is readable by any `ps` sharing the sandbox. With none set,\n * `plannedRoutes` yields the direct route alone and a capture behaves exactly\n * as it did before the ladder existed.\n *\n * Whichever pairs arrive are the rungs this process may climb; there is nothing\n * to filter. A tier the deployment withholds is simply absent from this env, so\n * a ceiling read on this side could only ever disagree with the one place that\n * decides.\n */\nexport function captureProxyCredentials(): ProxyCredentials {\n  return readProxyCredentials(process.env);\n}\n\n/**\n * The Vimeo session cookie the deployment supplied, or undefined.\n *\n * Absent is the normal, supported state: a deployment that has not configured\n * one gets the same \"download it and upload the file\" refusal Vimeo gave before\n * this existed. 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