@keyboxed/cli 0.3.0 → 0.3.2

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@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Docs: https://keybox.space/docs
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  1. **Never see a key value.** Do not `cat`, `grep`, `head`, `source` or open `.env` files or anything that may hold a credential. To see what a file holds, list names only: `cut -d= -f1 .env`. Do not print environment variables (`env`, `printenv`, `echo $X`).
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  2. **Never put a key on a command line.** Values go in only through `keybox migrate`, `keybox secrets add` (hidden prompt, pipe, or `--from` reference), or the dashboard. Never write `keybox secrets add X <<< "sk-…"` with a value you typed.
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- 3. **Never read `~/.config/keybox/config.json`.** It holds the admin token.
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+ 3. **Never read `~/.config/keybox/config.json`.** It holds this machine's device key. Inside `keybox run` it is hidden on purpose, and Keybox admin commands fail there; do not try to get around that.
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  4. **Ask before** you change the user's Cloudflare account, edit a file that holds secrets, delete anything, or widen access. Show the exact command first.
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  5. **Do not work around a refusal.** If Keybox returns `blocked`, `not_allowed` or `network_denied`, report it and propose a narrower rule. Never suggest putting the key back in the environment to "make it work".
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  6. **Do not run `keybox ui --print`** or open login links yourself. Ask the user to run `keybox ui`.
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ Confirm the expected calls show as allowed and nothing is refused by mistake. Co
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  | Code | Meaning | What to do |
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  | --- | --- | --- |
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- | `not_allowed` | No rule allows this method/host/path | Propose the narrowest rule that covers it; ask first |
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+ | `not_allowed` | No rule allows this method/host/path | The message names the fix. Show the user `keybox agents suggest NAME` (reviews every refused call) or the narrowest `keybox agents allow NAME 'RULE'`; ask first. Never propose `**` to silence it |
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  | `blocked` | Built-in list: the call would mint a key or grant access | Explain; there is no override |
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  | `network_denied` | The caller's IP or country is outside the access rules | Show `keybox access`; let the user decide |
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  | `ambiguous_secret` | Several keys could apply | Send header `x-keybox-secret: NAME` or prefix rules |
package/assets/worker.js CHANGED
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ async function verifyAccess(jwt, cfg) {
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  }
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  // src/types.ts
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- var VERSION = "0.3.0";
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+ var VERSION = "0.3.2";
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  function keyboxError(status, code, message) {
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  return Response.json({ type: "error", error: { type: "keybox_error", code, message } }, { status });
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  }
@@ -510,6 +510,20 @@ async function removeMember(env, who, id) {
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  ]);
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  return Response.json({ removed: true });
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  }
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+ async function setRole(req, env, who, id) {
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+ check(roleOf(who) === "owner", "Only an owner can change a role.");
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+ const b = await body(req);
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+ check(b.role === "admin" || b.role === "member", "role is admin or member");
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+ const m = await env.DB.prepare("SELECT id AS member_id, role FROM members WHERE id = ? AND role != 'removed'").bind(id).first();
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+ check(m, "No such member.");
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+ check(m.role !== "owner", "An owner keeps the owner role. Remove them to change that.");
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+ check(m.member_id !== who.member, "You cannot change your own role.");
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+ await env.DB.batch([
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+ env.DB.prepare("UPDATE members SET role = ? WHERE id = ?").bind(b.role, id),
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+ env.DB.prepare("DELETE FROM sessions WHERE kind LIKE '%:' || ?").bind(id)
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+ ]);
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+ return Response.json({ id, role: b.role });
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+ }
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  async function logEvent(env, who, method, path) {
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  await env.DB.prepare("INSERT INTO events (ts, member_id, device_id, via, action) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)").bind(Date.now(), who.member ?? null, who.device ?? null, who.via, `${method} ${path}`.slice(0, 200)).run().catch(() => {
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  });
@@ -831,6 +845,7 @@ async function route(req, env, path, policy, who) {
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  if (a === "members" && !b && m === "GET") return listMembers(env);
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  if (a === "members" && !b && m === "POST") return invite(req, env, who);
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  if (a === "members" && b && !c && m === "DELETE") return removeMember(env, who, b);
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+ if (a === "members" && b && !c && m === "PATCH") return setRole(req, env, who, b);
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  if (a === "events" && !b && m === "GET") return listEvents(req, env);
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  if (a === "policy" && !b && m === "GET") return Response.json(policy);
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  if (a === "policy" && !b && m === "PUT") {
@@ -933,7 +948,17 @@ async function route(req, env, path, policy, who) {
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  const q = new URL(req.url).searchParams;
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  const after = Number(q.get("after") ?? 0);
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  const limit = Math.min(Math.max(Number(q.get("limit") ?? 100), 1), 500);
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- const stmt = after > 0 ? env.DB.prepare("SELECT * FROM audit WHERE id > ? ORDER BY id ASC LIMIT ?").bind(after, limit) : env.DB.prepare("SELECT * FROM (SELECT * FROM audit ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT ?) ORDER BY id ASC").bind(limit);
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+ const where = [];
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+ const binds = [];
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+ for (const col of ["agent", "reason"]) {
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+ const v = q.get(col);
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+ if (v) {
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+ where.push(`${col} = ?`);
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+ binds.push(v.slice(0, 64));
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+ }
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+ }
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+ const filter = where.length ? ` AND ${where.join(" AND ")}` : "";
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+ const stmt = after > 0 ? env.DB.prepare(`SELECT * FROM audit WHERE id > ?${filter} ORDER BY id ASC LIMIT ?`).bind(after, ...binds, limit) : env.DB.prepare(`SELECT * FROM (SELECT * FROM audit WHERE 1=1${filter} ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT ?) ORDER BY id ASC`).bind(...binds, limit);
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  return Response.json((await stmt.all()).results);
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  }
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  if (a === "blocked" && !b && m === "GET") {
@@ -1279,7 +1304,10 @@ async function proxy(req, env, ctx) {
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  if (g.allow.some(hit)) candidates.add(g.secret);
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  }
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  if (candidates.size === 0) {
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- return deny(403, "not_allowed", `Agent ${auth.agent} has no rule allowing ${method} ${host}${path}.`);
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+ const pasteable = /^[A-Za-z0-9._~\-/%:@,+=]*$/.test(path);
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+ const review = `keybox agents suggest ${auth.agent}`;
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+ const fix = auth.share ? "This share does not cover that call." : pasteable ? `To allow it, a Keybox admin runs: keybox agents allow ${auth.agent} '${method} ${host}${path}' (or \`${review}\` to review every refused call).` : `A Keybox admin can review refused calls with \`${review}\`.`;
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+ return deny(403, "not_allowed", `Agent ${auth.agent} has no rule allowing ${method} ${host}${path}. ${fix}`);
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  }
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  let pick = [...candidates][0];
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  if (candidates.size > 1) {