@kenhkl/agent-moss 0.15.4 → 0.15.7

package/dist/rules/l1_rules.json

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
       "reason": "检测到递归强制删除根目录 (rm -rf /)"
     },
     {
-      "pattern": "\\brm\\s+-[a-zA-Z]*[rf][a-zA-Z]*\\s+/(etc|var(?!/tmp)|home|usr|boot|root|opt|srv|sys|proc)\\b",
+      "pattern": "\\brm\\s+-[a-zA-Z]*[rf][a-zA-Z]*\\s+/(?:etc|var(?!/tmp)|usr|boot|root|opt|srv|sys|proc|home(?:/|/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+/?)?(?=[\\s;|&\\\"']|$))",
       "risk_level": "critical",
       "risk_type": "script_execution",
       "reason": "检测到删除关键系统目录"
@@ -73,16 +73,16 @@
       "reason": "检测到访问系统组密码文件 (/etc/gshadow)"
     },
     {
-      "pattern": "\\.ssh/id_rsa(?!\\.pub)",
+      "pattern": "dd\\s+if=/dev/zero.*\\bof\\s*=\\s*/(?:etc|var|usr|boot|root|opt|srv|sys|proc|home(?:/|/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+/?)?(?=[\\s;|&\\\"']|$))",
       "risk_level": "critical",
-      "risk_type": "file_access",
-      "reason": "检测到访问 SSH 私钥文件 (.ssh/id_rsa)"
+      "risk_type": "script_execution",
+      "reason": "检测到磁盘清零写入关键系统目录 (dd if=/dev/zero of=/系统目录)"
     },
     {
-      "pattern": "dd\\s+if=/dev/zero.*\\bof\\s*=\\s*/(etc|var|home|usr|boot|root|opt|srv|sys|proc)\\b",
+      "pattern": "\\.ssh/id_rsa(?!\\.pub)",
       "risk_level": "critical",
-      "risk_type": "script_execution",
-      "reason": "检测到磁盘清零写入关键系统目录 (dd if=/dev/zero of=/系统目录)"
+      "risk_type": "file_access",
+      "reason": "检测到访问 SSH 私钥文件 (.ssh/id_rsa)"
     },
     {
       "pattern": "mkfs\\.\\w+\\s+/dev/(sd|hd|nvme|vd|loop|mapper|md|dm)\\S+",
@@ -156,6 +156,12 @@
       "risk_type": "script_execution",
       "reason": "检测到远程下载脚本到本地 (curl -o script.sh)，存在后续执行风险"
     },
+    {
+      "pattern": "base64\\s+-d\\s+.*\\|\\s*bash",
+      "risk_level": "high",
+      "risk_type": "sensitive_action",
+      "reason": "base64 解码执行（编码绕过，下载或读取内容后解码执行）"
+    },
     {
       "pattern": "(?:curl|wget)\\s+\\S+.*\\b(?:chmod|chown)\\s+\\+x\\b",
       "risk_level": "high",
@@ -262,7 +268,7 @@
       "pattern": "curl\\s+.*\\|\\s*bash",
       "risk_level": "high",
       "risk_type": "sensitive_action",
-      "reason": "curl pipe bash 执行 (user_rules)"
+      "reason": "curl pipe bash 执行（下载远程脚本直接执行）"
     },
     {
       "pattern": "curl\\s+.*\\|\\s*(sh|zsh|dash)",
@@ -282,12 +288,6 @@
       "risk_type": "script_execution",
       "reason": "eval 远程代码执行"
     },
-    {
-      "pattern": "base64\\s+-d\\s+.*\\|\\s*bash",
-      "risk_level": "high",
-      "risk_type": "sensitive_action",
-      "reason": "base64 解码执行 (user_rules)"
-    },
     {
       "pattern": "/dev/tcp/|bash\\s+-i\\s+>&",
       "risk_level": "critical",
@@ -341,6 +341,42 @@
       "risk_level": "critical",
       "risk_type": "script_execution",
       "reason": "检测到命令替换隐藏执行（$(...)/反引号载荷含写/执行命令），可能产生文件系统副作用"
+    },
+    {
+      "pattern": "\\biptables\\s+-(?:[A-Za-z]*[FPIX][A-Za-z]*|[A-Za-z]*[FPIX]\\b)",
+      "risk_level": "high",
+      "risk_type": "script_execution",
+      "reason": "检测到修改防火墙规则（iptables -F/-P/-I/-X），可能关闭安全防护或建立隧道（ATT&CK T1562.004）"
+    },
+    {
+      "pattern": "\\b(?:ssh|scp)\\b[^;\\n]{0,200}?StrictHostKeyChecking\\s*=\\s*(?:no|accept-new)",
+      "risk_level": "high",
+      "risk_type": "lateral_movement",
+      "reason": "检测到 SSH/SCP 跳过主机密钥验证（-o StrictHostKeyChecking=no），允许中间人攻击，可能用于横向移动"
+    },
+    {
+      "pattern": "\\bwget\\s+(?:-\\S+\\s+)*--post-(?:data|file)\\s*=\\s*(?:\\$\\([^)]+\\)|[^ ]+|\\\"[^\\\"]+\\\"|'[^']+')\\s+(?!https?://(?:127\\.|localhost))https?://[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+",
+      "risk_level": "high",
+      "risk_type": "data_exfiltration",
+      "reason": "检测到 wget --post-data/--post-file 向外部地址发送数据（可能为数据外传，回环地址除外）"
+    },
+    {
+      "pattern": "\\bcurl\\b(?:[^;\\n]|&(?![&\\s]))*-X\\s+POST\\b[^;\\n]*https?://(?!(?:127\\.|localhost|\\[::1\\]))[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+",
+      "risk_level": "high",
+      "risk_type": "data_exfiltration",
+      "reason": "检测到 curl -X POST 到外部地址（可能为数据外传，回环地址除外）"
+    },
+    {
+      "pattern": "\\bcurl\\b[^;&\\n]*-F\\s+\\S+[^;&\\n]*https?://(?!(?:127\\.|localhost|\\[::1\\]))[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+",
+      "risk_level": "high",
+      "risk_type": "data_exfiltration",
+      "reason": "检测到 curl -F 表单上传到外部地址（可能为数据外传，回环地址除外）"
+    },
+    {
+      "pattern": "(?:@reboot|(?:[\\d*,\\-/]+\\s+){4}[\\d*,\\-/]+)\\s+(?:/tmp|/var/tmp|/dev/shm|/run/shm)/\\S+",
+      "risk_level": "high",
+      "risk_type": "persistence",
+      "reason": "检测到定时任务执行世界可写目录（/tmp、/var/tmp、/dev/shm）下的脚本（cron 持久化后门：任何用户可替换该脚本，重启/定时以任务属主身份执行）"
     }
   ],
   "injection_detection": [
@@ -683,6 +719,48 @@
       "deny_mode": "deny_write",
       "scope": "root"
     },
+    {
+      "path": "/etc/cron.hourly/",
+      "risk_level": "high",
+      "desc": "系统定时任务目录（小时级）——可放置脚本，重启/定时后以 root 执行",
+      "deny_mode": "deny_write",
+      "scope": "root"
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "/etc/cron.daily/",
+      "risk_level": "high",
+      "desc": "系统定时任务目录（日级）",
+      "deny_mode": "deny_write",
+      "scope": "root"
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "/etc/cron.weekly/",
+      "risk_level": "high",
+      "desc": "系统定时任务目录（周级）",
+      "deny_mode": "deny_write",
+      "scope": "root"
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "/etc/cron.monthly/",
+      "risk_level": "high",
+      "desc": "系统定时任务目录（月级）",
+      "deny_mode": "deny_write",
+      "scope": "root"
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "/etc/init.d/",
+      "risk_level": "high",
+      "desc": "SysV init 启动脚本目录——agent 写入脚本即持久化（重启后以 root 执行，不依赖 cron）",
+      "deny_mode": "deny_write",
+      "scope": "root"
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "/etc/rc*.d/",
+      "risk_level": "high",
+      "desc": "SysV init 运行级目录——指向 init.d 的符号链接，控制各运行级启动",
+      "deny_mode": "deny_write",
+      "scope": "root"
+    },
     {
       "path": "/var/spool/cron/",
       "risk_level": "high",
@@ -697,6 +775,20 @@
       "deny_mode": "deny_write",
       "scope": "root"
     },
+    {
+      "path": ".config/systemd/user/",
+      "risk_level": "high",
+      "desc": "用户级 systemd 服务目录——写 .service 并 enable 即用户级持久化（登录后运行）",
+      "deny_mode": "deny_write",
+      "scope": "home"
+    },
+    {
+      "path": ".config/autostart/",
+      "risk_level": "high",
+      "desc": "桌面自启动目录——写 .desktop 即登录自启动（Desktop Entry，持久化）",
+      "deny_mode": "deny_write",
+      "scope": "home"
+    },
     {
       "path": "/etc/ssh/sshd_config",
       "risk_level": "high",
@@ -872,5 +964,6 @@
       "deny_mode": "deny_write",
       "scope": "home"
     }
-  ]
-}
+  ],
+  "_comment": "\n2026-09-11 新增：iptables 防火墙规则修改（T1562.004）+ SSH 跳过密钥验证（横向移动），原在 user_rules.json 下沉至此——攻击形态清晰、可静态判定，user_rules 回归仅存用户自定义例外的本位。"
+}

package/dist/rules/mc_rules.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-  "_comment": "L2.2 模型检测规则单一事实源（Python + TS 共用）。原子命题正则 + LTL 公式（前缀 AST）。公式在事件迹位置 0 处评估：LTL 公式满足 = 攻击存在。对应站点 detection-l2-2.html 的 10 条 LTL + 5 条 CTL 规则（CTL 活性降级为 G(!φ) 安全不变量，见 docs/DETECTION_METHODS.md 5.4）。",
+  "_comment": "L2.2 模型检测规则单一事实源（Python + TS 共用）。原子命题正则 + LTL 公式（前缀 AST）。公式在事件迹位置 0 处评估：LTL 公式满足 = 攻击存在。对应站点 detection-l2-2.html 的 9 条 LTL + 5 条 CTL 规则（2026-09 移除 2 条单动作冗余：mc-ltl-010 F(install_persistence) 与 mc-ctl-001 F(clear_logs) —— 它们误伤正常运维，且攻击场景已由链式规则 006/007/008 覆盖）（CTL 活性降级为 G(!φ) 安全不变量，见 docs/DETECTION_METHODS.md 5.4）。",
   "ap_patterns": {
     "reads_credential": [
       "(?:cat|head|tail|less|more|sed|awk|strings|base64|dd)\\s+[^;&|\\n]*[~]?/\\.ssh(?:/[\\w.-]+)?\\b",
@@ -336,34 +336,6 @@
       "risk_level": "critical",
       "action": "block",
       "reason": "敏感数据→归档→外传（mc-ltl-009）"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "mc-ltl-010",
-      "type": "ltl",
-      "formula": [
-        "F",
-        [
-          "ap",
-          "install_persistence"
-        ]
-      ],
-      "risk_level": "medium",
-      "action": "approval",
-      "reason": "持久化机制安装，需审批（mc-ltl-010）"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "mc-ctl-001",
-      "type": "ltl",
-      "formula": [
-        "F",
-        [
-          "ap",
-          "clear_logs"
-        ]
-      ],
-      "risk_level": "critical",
-      "action": "block",
-      "reason": "安全不变量：任何情况不得清除日志（mc-ctl-001，AG(!clear_logs) 线性迹降级：违反 ⟺ 出现 clear_logs ⟺ F(clear_logs) 成立）"
     }
   ]
-}
+}

package/dist/rules/user_rules.json

@@ -1,77 +1,8 @@
 {
-  "sensitive_actions": [
-    {
-      "pattern": "写入系统文件",
-      "description": "写入 /etc, /usr, /boot 等系统目录下的文件"
-    },
-    {
-      "pattern": "发送外部邮件",
-      "description": "通过 email 工具发送邮件到外部地址"
-    },
-    {
-      "pattern": "危险 shell 命令",
-      "description": "执行 rm -rf, chmod 777, sudo 等危险命令"
-    },
-    {
-      "pattern": "修改全局配置",
-      "description": "修改系统级配置文件或环境变量"
-    },
-    {
-      "pattern": "支付操作",
-      "description": "涉及支付、转账等金融操作"
-    },
-    {
-      "pattern": "访问密钥文件",
-      "description": "访问 .ssh/id_rsa, .env, credentials 等密钥/凭证文件"
-    },
-    {
-      "pattern": "网络数据外传",
-      "description": "通过 HTTP/wget/curl 等方式将数据发送到外部服务器"
-    },
-    {
-      "pattern": "curl * -d *",
-      "description": "使用 curl 发送数据到外部服务器（可能为数据外传）"
-    },
-    {
-      "pattern": "curl * POST *",
-      "description": "使用 curl POST 请求发送数据到外部服务器"
-    },
-    {
-      "pattern": "wget *--post-data*",
-      "description": "使用 wget 发送 POST 数据到外部服务器"
-    },
-    {
-      "pattern": "crontab -e",
-      "description": "编辑定时任务（可能用于持久化后门）"
-    },
-    {
-      "pattern": "crontab -r",
-      "description": "删除定时任务（可能用于清除审计痕迹）"
-    },
-    {
-      "pattern": "* | crontab",
-      "description": "管道方式安装/修改定时任务（可能用于持久化后门）"
-    },
-    {
-      "pattern": "iptables -",
-      "description": "修改防火墙规则（可能用于关闭安全防护）"
-    },
-    {
-      "pattern": "ssh* -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no",
-      "description": "SSH 跳过主机密钥验证（可能用于横向移动）"
-    },
-    {
-      "pattern": "base64 -d * bash",
-      "description": "Base64 解码后执行（可能用于编码绕过）"
-    },
-    {
-      "pattern": "curl * | bash",
-      "description": "下载远程脚本并执行（远程代码执行风险）"
-    }
-  ],
+  "sensitive_actions": [],
   "sensitive_tools": [
     "eval",
     "exec",
     "system"
   ]
-}
+}

package/dist/server.js

@@ -407,6 +407,9 @@ function isLiteralTextCommand(command) {
       return false;
     }
   }
+  if (/\|\s*\b(?:tee|tac|install)\b/i.test(command)) {
+    return false;
+  }
   return true;
 }
 function extractInlineCode(command) {
@@ -1307,22 +1310,45 @@ var init_logic_rules = __esm({
   }
 });
 
+// src/engine/asset-dir.ts
+import { existsSync as existsSync3 } from "fs";
+import { resolve as resolve2 } from "path";
+function assetDirCandidates(moduleDir, name) {
+  return [
+    resolve2(moduleDir, name),
+    resolve2(moduleDir, "../../..", "agent_moss", name)
+  ];
+}
+function resolveAssetDir(moduleDir, name) {
+  for (const dir of assetDirCandidates(moduleDir, name)) {
+    if (existsSync3(dir)) return dir;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+var init_asset_dir = __esm({
+  "src/engine/asset-dir.ts"() {
+    "use strict";
+    init_esm_shims();
+  }
+});
+
 // src/engine/skill-loader.ts
-import { readFileSync as readFileSync3, readdirSync as readdirSync2, existsSync as existsSync3 } from "fs";
-import { resolve as resolve2, dirname as dirname2 } from "path";
+import { readFileSync as readFileSync3, readdirSync as readdirSync2 } from "fs";
+import { resolve as resolve3, dirname as dirname2 } from "path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath4 } from "url";
 function loadAllSkills() {
   if (cachedSkills) return cachedSkills;
   cachedSkills = {};
-  const dir = existsSync3(SKILLS_DIR) ? SKILLS_DIR : SKILLS_DIR_FALLBACK;
-  if (!existsSync3(dir)) {
-    console.warn("[AgentMoss] Skills directory not found:", SKILLS_DIR, "and fallback:", SKILLS_DIR_FALLBACK);
+  const dir = resolveAssetDir(__dirname3, "skills");
+  if (!dir) {
+    const [primary, fallback] = assetDirCandidates(__dirname3, "skills");
+    console.warn("[AgentMoss] Skills directory not found:", primary, "and fallback:", fallback);
     return cachedSkills;
   }
   const files = readdirSync2(dir).filter((f) => f.endsWith(".md"));
   for (const f of files) {
     const name = f.replace(".md", "");
-    cachedSkills[name] = readFileSync3(resolve2(dir, f), "utf-8");
+    cachedSkills[name] = readFileSync3(resolve3(dir, f), "utf-8");
   }
   console.log(`[AgentMoss] Loaded ${Object.keys(cachedSkills).length} skills from ${dir}`);
   return cachedSkills;
@@ -1376,16 +1402,15 @@ function formatSkillsForPrompt(skills) {
 ${s.skillContent}`
   ).join("\n\n---\n\n");
 }
-var __filename3, __dirname3, SKILLS_DIR, SKILLS_DIR_FALLBACK, SKILL_KEYWORD_MAP, cachedSkills;
+var __filename3, __dirname3, SKILL_KEYWORD_MAP, cachedSkills;
 var init_skill_loader = __esm({
   "src/engine/skill-loader.ts"() {
     "use strict";
     init_esm_shims();
     init_rules_loader();
+    init_asset_dir();
     __filename3 = fileURLToPath4(import.meta.url);
     __dirname3 = dirname2(__filename3);
-    SKILLS_DIR = resolve2(__dirname3, "../skills");
-    SKILLS_DIR_FALLBACK = resolve2(__dirname3, "../../../agent_moss/skills");
     SKILL_KEYWORD_MAP = (() => {
       const map = {};
       const cats = loadL3();
@@ -2555,7 +2580,7 @@ var init_runtime_config = __esm({
 
 // src/agents/index.ts
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync5, existsSync as existsSync5 } from "fs";
-import { resolve as resolve3, dirname as dirname4 } from "path";
+import { resolve as resolve4, dirname as dirname4 } from "path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath6 } from "url";
 function resolveAgentsDir() {
   if (existsSync5(AGENTS_DIR_PROD)) return AGENTS_DIR_PROD;
@@ -2575,7 +2600,7 @@ function getAgentExtensions(agentId) {
   }
   if (ext === null) {
     const agentsDir = resolveAgentsDir();
-    const rulesFile = resolve3(agentsDir, agentId, "rules.json");
+    const rulesFile = resolve4(agentsDir, agentId, "rules.json");
     if (!existsSync5(rulesFile)) {
       cache.set(agentId, null);
       return null;
@@ -2622,15 +2647,15 @@ var init_agents = __esm({
     init_esm_shims();
     __filename4 = fileURLToPath6(import.meta.url);
     __dirname5 = dirname4(__filename4);
-    AGENTS_DIR_PROD = resolve3(__dirname5, "agents");
-    AGENTS_DIR_DEV_FALLBACK = resolve3(__dirname5, "../../../agent_moss/agents");
+    AGENTS_DIR_PROD = resolve4(__dirname5, "agents");
+    AGENTS_DIR_DEV_FALLBACK = resolve4(__dirname5, "../../../agent_moss/agents");
     cache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
   }
 });
 
 // src/scenarios/index.ts
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync6, existsSync as existsSync6 } from "fs";
-import { resolve as resolve4, dirname as dirname5 } from "path";
+import { resolve as resolve5, dirname as dirname5 } from "path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath7 } from "url";
 function resolveScenariosDir() {
   if (existsSync6(SCENARIOS_DIR_PROD)) return SCENARIOS_DIR_PROD;
@@ -2650,7 +2675,7 @@ function getScenarioExtensions(scenarioId) {
   }
   if (ext === null) {
     const scenariosDir = resolveScenariosDir();
-    const rulesFile = resolve4(scenariosDir, scenarioId, "rules.json");
+    const rulesFile = resolve5(scenariosDir, scenarioId, "rules.json");
     if (!existsSync6(rulesFile)) {
       cache2.set(scenarioId, null);
       return null;
@@ -2703,8 +2728,8 @@ var init_scenarios = __esm({
     init_agents();
     __filename5 = fileURLToPath7(import.meta.url);
     __dirname6 = dirname5(__filename5);
-    SCENARIOS_DIR_PROD = resolve4(__dirname6, "scenarios");
-    SCENARIOS_DIR_DEV_FALLBACK = resolve4(__dirname6, "../../../agent_moss/scenarios");
+    SCENARIOS_DIR_PROD = resolve5(__dirname6, "scenarios");
+    SCENARIOS_DIR_DEV_FALLBACK = resolve5(__dirname6, "../../../agent_moss/scenarios");
     cache2 = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
   }
 });
@@ -2891,7 +2916,7 @@ function buildPathContext(actionDetail) {
 }
 function stripLiteralTextSegments(actionDetail) {
   const writeScriptExec = />\s*[/~]\S*\.(sh|py|pl|rb)\b/.test(actionDetail) && /(?:&&|\|\||;|\n|\|)\s*(?:bash|sh|zsh|dash|python|perl|ruby|node)/.test(actionDetail);
-  const pipeToInterpreter = /\|\s*(?:bash|sh|zsh|dash|python|perl|ruby|node)\b/.test(actionDetail);
+  const pipeToInterpreter = /\|\s*(?:bash|sh|zsh|dash|python|perl|ruby|node|crontab|at)\b/.test(actionDetail);
   if (writeScriptExec || pipeToInterpreter) {
     return actionDetail;
   }
@@ -4032,13 +4057,13 @@ var require_backup = __commonJS({
     var runBackup = (backup, handler) => {
       let rate = 0;
       let useDefault = true;
-      return new Promise((resolve9, reject) => {
+      return new Promise((resolve10, reject) => {
         setImmediate(function step() {
           try {
             const progress = backup.transfer(rate);
             if (!progress.remainingPages) {
               backup.close();
-              resolve9(progress);
+              resolve10(progress);
               return;
             }
             if (useDefault) {
@@ -4517,25 +4542,25 @@ init_skill_loader();
 
 // src/engine/template-loader.ts
 init_esm_shims();
+init_asset_dir();
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync7, existsSync as existsSync7 } from "fs";
-import { resolve as resolve5, dirname as dirname6 } from "path";
+import { resolve as resolve6, dirname as dirname6 } from "path";
 import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath8 } from "url";
 var __filename6 = fileURLToPath8(import.meta.url);
 var __dirname7 = dirname6(__filename6);
-var TEMPLATES_DIR = resolve5(__dirname7, "../templates");
-var TEMPLATES_DIR_FALLBACK = resolve5(__dirname7, "../../../agent_moss/templates");
 var TEMPLATE_FILES = ["prompt1_template.txt", "prompt2_template.txt", "security_judge_template.txt"];
 var cachedTemplates = null;
 function loadTemplates() {
   if (cachedTemplates) return cachedTemplates;
   cachedTemplates = {};
-  const dir = existsSync7(TEMPLATES_DIR) ? TEMPLATES_DIR : TEMPLATES_DIR_FALLBACK;
-  if (!existsSync7(dir)) {
-    console.warn("[AgentMoss] Templates directory not found:", TEMPLATES_DIR, "and fallback:", TEMPLATES_DIR_FALLBACK);
+  const dir = resolveAssetDir(__dirname7, "templates");
+  if (!dir) {
+    const [primary, fallback] = assetDirCandidates(__dirname7, "templates");
+    console.warn("[AgentMoss] Templates directory not found:", primary, "and fallback:", fallback);
     return cachedTemplates;
   }
   for (const file of TEMPLATE_FILES) {
-    const filePath = resolve5(dir, file);
+    const filePath = resolve6(dir, file);
     if (existsSync7(filePath)) {
       const key = file.replace(".txt", "").replace("_template", "");
       cachedTemplates[key] = readFileSync7(filePath, "utf-8");
@@ -4548,7 +4573,7 @@ function loadTemplates() {
 // src/engine/script-analyzer.ts
 init_esm_shims();
 import { readFileSync as readFileSync8 } from "fs";
-import { resolve as resolve6, join as join4 } from "path";
+import { resolve as resolve7, join as join4 } from "path";
 var SUSPICIOUS_PATTERNS = [
   // Network exfiltration (curl/wget POST in scripts is almost never legitimate)
   { name: "curl POST", pattern: /curl\s+(.*\s)?-X\s+POST/i },
@@ -4681,7 +4706,7 @@ function assessKeywordCombinationRisk(matchedKeywords, scriptContent) {
 }
 function readScriptContent(scriptPath, maxLines = 500) {
   try {
-    const expandedPath = scriptPath.startsWith("~") ? join4(process.env.HOME || "/home/user", scriptPath.slice(2)) : resolve6(scriptPath);
+    const expandedPath = scriptPath.startsWith("~") ? join4(process.env.HOME || "/home/user", scriptPath.slice(2)) : resolve7(scriptPath);
     const raw = readFileSync8(expandedPath, "utf-8");
     const lines = raw.split("\n").slice(0, maxLines);
     return { content: lines.join("\n"), lineCount: lines.length, error: "" };
@@ -4738,7 +4763,7 @@ init_heuristic();
 init_logic_rules();
 init_inline_analyzer();
 import { statSync as statSync3, existsSync as existsSync9 } from "fs";
-import { resolve as resolve8, join as join6, isAbsolute as isAbsolute2 } from "path";
+import { resolve as resolve9, join as join6, isAbsolute as isAbsolute2 } from "path";
 import { homedir as homedir4 } from "os";
 
 // src/engine/script-engine/tracker.ts
@@ -6441,7 +6466,7 @@ function resolvePath2(p) {
   if (expanded.startsWith("~/") || expanded === "~") {
     expanded = join6(homedir4(), expanded.slice(1));
   }
-  return resolve8(expanded);
+  return resolve9(expanded);
 }
 function scanScriptChainWithL1(chain, input) {
   for (const node of chain.nodes) {
@@ -6817,7 +6842,7 @@ async function analyzeWithLLM(prompt, config) {
       }
       if (attempt < maxRetries) {
         console.error(`[AgentMoss] LLM call failed (attempt ${attempt + 1}/${maxRetries + 1}), retrying in ${retryCfg.retryInterval}s:`, err.message);
-        await new Promise((resolve9) => setTimeout(resolve9, retryCfg.retryInterval * 1e3));
+        await new Promise((resolve10) => setTimeout(resolve10, retryCfg.retryInterval * 1e3));
       } else {
         clearTimeout(totalTimeoutTimer);
         console.error("[AgentMoss] LLM call failed after all retries:", err.message);
@@ -10046,12 +10071,12 @@ function createApp() {
 }
 async function findFreePort(startPort, host = "127.0.0.1", scan = 100) {
   for (let port = startPort; port < startPort + scan; port++) {
-    const free = await new Promise((resolve9) => {
+    const free = await new Promise((resolve10) => {
       const server = net.createServer();
       server.listen(port, host, () => {
-        server.close(() => resolve9(true));
+        server.close(() => resolve10(true));
       });
-      server.on("error", () => resolve9(false));
+      server.on("error", () => resolve10(false));
     });
     if (free) {
       if (port !== startPort) {
@@ -10092,4 +10117,3 @@ export {
 //!   P6 mc-ltl-rules                 LTL 模型检测
 //!   P7 low-integrity-command-exec   低完整性命令执行
 //!   P8 sensitive-data-aggregation   敏感数据聚合外传
-//# sourceMappingURL=server.js.map

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@kenhkl/agent-moss",
-  "version": "0.15.4",
+  "version": "0.15.7",
   "description": "Multi-layer security analysis engine for AI agents (TypeScript)",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "dist/server.js",
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
   },
   "files": [
     "dist",
+    "!dist/**/*.map",
     "README.md"
   ],
   "scripts": {