@kenhkl/agent-gate 0.8.2 → 0.9.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/config/trigger_rules.yaml +585 -0
- package/dist/shared/storage/db.d.ts +26 -9
- package/dist/shared/storage/db.js +281 -47
- package/dist/v1/cli.js +419 -64
- package/dist/v1/server.js +326 -64
- package/dist/v3/cli.js +545 -236
- package/package.json +1 -1
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# AgentGate Trigger Rules Configuration
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# 角色变更:从"黑名单触发 AgentMoss" → "白名单跳过 + 快速阻断兜底"
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#
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# 核心流程:
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# 1. 白名单规则(action: allow, _skip_agentmoss: true)→ 直接放行,不调 AgentMoss
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# 2. 快速阻断规则(action: block)→ 本地立即 Deny,不等 AgentMoss
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# 3. 以上都不匹配 → 默认送 AgentMoss 完整分析
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#
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# 规则来源:AgentMoss 三层防御体系
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# - Layer 1.1: 启发式检测(关键命令正则 + 注入关键词 + 用户规则)
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# - Layer 1.2: 逻辑规则(敏感路径 + read_before_write + 意图偏离等)
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# - Layer 1.3: LLM 语义分析(由 AgentMoss 完成,不在本文件中定义)
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#
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# 无论单独层还是组合融合,收集信息后统一触发 AgentMoss 判断。
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rules:
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# ======================================================================
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# 白名单 — 完全安全的操作,跳过 AgentMoss
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# action: allow, _skip_agentmoss: true
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# 适用:L1 Proxy + L2 PTY
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# ======================================================================
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# --- 安全只读 bash 命令 ---
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- name: "whitelist_bash_safe_readonly"
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description: "完全安全的 bash 只读命令 — 跳过 AgentMoss"
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action: allow
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severity: low
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_skip_agentmoss: true
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pattern:
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source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: "^(ls|dir|pwd|which|whereis|realpath|basename|dirname|file|stat|du|echo|printf|type|command|whoami|id|hostname|uname|date|env|printenv|tty|arch|uptime|groups|logname)\\b"
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- name: "whitelist_bash_safe_readonly_pty"
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description: "完全安全的 bash 只读命令 — PTY"
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action: allow
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severity: low
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_skip_agentmoss: true
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pattern:
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source_collector: "pty"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: "^(ls|dir|pwd|which|whereis|realpath|basename|dirname|file|stat|du|echo|printf|type|command|whoami|id|hostname|uname|date|env|printenv|tty|arch|uptime|groups|logname)\\b"
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# --- 安全只读操作工具 ---
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- name: "whitelist_safe_tools"
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description: "完全安全的工具操作 — 跳过 AgentMoss"
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action: allow
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severity: low
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_skip_agentmoss: true
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pattern:
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source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
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tool_name_matches: ["ask_user_question", "glob", "list_dir", "ls", "count_text_length", "filemgr-globfiles"]
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# --- 安全只读 bash 命令(可访问敏感路径,但本身安全)---
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# 这些命令会读取文件内容,需要保留 L2 敏感路径检查
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- name: "whitelist_bash_readonly_sensitive"
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description: "安全但可读敏感路径的 bash 命令 — 跳过 AgentMoss(需 L2 配合)"
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action: allow
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severity: low
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_skip_agentmoss: true
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pattern:
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source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: "^(cat|head|tail|less|more|wc|grep|find|ag|rg|awk|sed|cut|sort|uniq)\\b"
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# --- 安全只读工具(可访问敏感路径)---
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- name: "whitelist_readonly_sensitive_tools"
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description: "安全但可读敏感路径的工具 — 跳过 AgentMoss(需 L2 配合)"
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action: allow
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severity: low
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_skip_agentmoss: true
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pattern:
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source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
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tool_name_matches: ["read", "file_read", "read_file", "head", "tail", "grep", "filemgr-readfile", "filemgr-grepfiles"]
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# --- 内联脚本命令(假阳性防护 — 字符串字面量中的敏感路径)---
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# 这些命令的 file_access 模式可能是字符串误报,跳过本地阻断
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- name: "whitelist_inline_script"
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description: "内联脚本命令 — 跳过本地 quick-deny,交 AgentMoss 语义判断"
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action: allow
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severity: low
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_skip_agentmoss: false # 注意:不跳过 AgentMoss,只跳过本地 quick-deny
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pattern:
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source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: "(?:python|python3|python3\\.\\d+|perl|perl5|ruby|jruby|mruby|node|php|lua)\\s+-[a-zA-Z]*[cer][a-zA-Z]*\\s+"
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# ======================================================================
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# 快速阻断 — 明显危险操作,不等 AgentMoss 直接拒绝
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# action: block (local_block: true)
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# 适用:L1 Proxy + L2 PTY + L3 eBPF
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# ======================================================================
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# --- rm -rf 根目录 ---
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- name: "quick_deny_rm_rf_root"
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description: "rm -rf 根目录 — 立即阻止"
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action: block
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severity: critical
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pattern:
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source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: "\\brm\\s+-(?=[^\\s]*r)(?=[^\\s]*f)[a-zA-Z]*\\s+/"
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- name: "quick_deny_rm_rf_root_pty"
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description: "rm -rf 根目录 — PTY 立即阻止"
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action: block
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severity: critical
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pattern:
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source_collector: "pty"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: "\\brm\\s+-(?=[^\\s]*r)(?=[^\\s]*f)[a-zA-Z]*\\s+/"
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- name: "quick_deny_rm_rf_root_ebpf"
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description: "rm -rf 根目录 — eBPF 立即记录"
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action: block
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severity: critical
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pattern:
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event_type: "process_exec"
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argv_regex: "\\brm\\s+-(?=[^\\s]*r)(?=[^\\s]*f)[a-zA-Z]*\\s+/"
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# --- rm -rf 系统目录 ---
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- name: "quick_deny_rm_system_dir"
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description: "rm -rf 关键系统目录 — 立即阻止"
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action: block
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severity: critical
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pattern:
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source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: "\\brm\\s+-[a-zA-Z]*[rf][a-zA-Z]*\\s+/(etc|var|home|usr|boot|root|opt|srv|sys|proc)\\b"
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- name: "quick_deny_rm_system_dir_pty"
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description: "rm -rf 系统目录 — PTY"
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action: block
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severity: critical
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pattern:
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source_collector: "pty"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: "\\brm\\s+-[a-zA-Z]*[rf][a-zA-Z]*\\s+/(etc|var|home|usr|boot|root|opt|srv|sys|proc)\\b"
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# --- chmod 777 ---
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- name: "quick_deny_chmod_777"
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description: "chmod 777 — 立即阻止"
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action: block
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severity: critical
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pattern:
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source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: "chmod\\s+[0-7]*777[0-7]*"
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- name: "quick_deny_chmod_777_pty"
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description: "chmod 777 — PTY"
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action: block
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severity: critical
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pattern:
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source_collector: "pty"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: "chmod\\s+[0-7]*777[0-7]*"
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# --- curl | bash ---
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- name: "quick_deny_curl_pipe_bash"
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description: "curl | bash 远程下载执行 — 立即阻止"
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action: block
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severity: critical
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pattern:
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source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: "(?:curl|wget)\\s+.*\\|\\s*(?:bash|sh|zsh|dash)"
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- name: "quick_deny_curl_pipe_bash_pty"
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description: "curl | bash — PTY"
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action: block
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severity: critical
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pattern:
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source_collector: "pty"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: "(?:curl|wget)\\s+.*\\|\\s*(?:bash|sh|zsh|dash)"
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# --- dd if=/dev/zero ---
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- name: "quick_deny_dd_zero"
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description: "dd if=/dev/zero 磁盘清零 — 立即阻止"
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action: block
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severity: critical
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pattern:
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source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: "\\bdd\\s+if=/dev/zero"
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# --- mkfs ---
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- name: "quick_deny_mkfs"
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description: "mkfs 格式化 — 立即阻止"
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action: block
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severity: critical
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pattern:
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source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: "\\bmkfs\\b"
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- name: "quick_deny_mkfs_pty"
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description: "mkfs 格式化 — PTY"
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action: block
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severity: critical
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pattern:
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source_collector: "pty"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: "\\bmkfs\\b"
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# --- 覆盖写入 /etc/ ---
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- name: "quick_deny_overwrite_etc"
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description: "重定向覆盖 /etc/ — 立即阻止"
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action: block
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severity: critical
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pattern:
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source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: ">\\s*/etc/"
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- name: "quick_deny_overwrite_etc_pty"
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description: "重定向覆盖 /etc/ — PTY"
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action: block
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severity: critical
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pattern:
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source_collector: "pty"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: ">\\s*/etc/"
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# --- 反弹 Shell ---
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- name: "quick_deny_reverse_shell"
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description: "反弹 Shell 特征 — 立即阻止"
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action: block
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severity: critical
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pattern:
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source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: "\\bnc\\s+.*-e\\b|\\bncat\\s+.*-e\\b|/dev/tcp/|/dev/udp/"
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- name: "quick_deny_reverse_shell_pty"
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description: "反弹 Shell — PTY"
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action: block
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severity: critical
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pattern:
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source_collector: "pty"
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tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
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arguments_regex: "\\bnc\\s+.*-e\\b|\\bncat\\s+.*-e\\b|/dev/tcp/|/dev/udp/"
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# --- Docker socket ---
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- name: "quick_deny_docker_socket"
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description: "Docker socket 容器逃逸 — 立即阻止"
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action: block
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severity: critical
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pattern:
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source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
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arguments_regex: "/var/run/docker\\.sock"
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# ======================================================================
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# 触发分析规则 — 匹配到即触发 AgentMoss
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# action: trigger_analysis
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# 所有非白名单操作默认送 AgentMoss,但以下规则提供精确的 risk_type/severity
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259
|
+
# 适用:L1 Proxy + L2 PTY
|
|
260
|
+
# ======================================================================
|
|
261
|
+
|
|
262
|
+
# --- 敏感文件操作(L1)---
|
|
263
|
+
- name: "sensitive_file_shadow"
|
|
264
|
+
description: "访问 /etc/shadow — 触发 AgentMoss"
|
|
265
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
266
|
+
severity: critical
|
|
267
|
+
pattern:
|
|
268
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
269
|
+
arguments_regex: "/etc/shadow"
|
|
270
|
+
|
|
271
|
+
- name: "sensitive_file_shadow_pty"
|
|
272
|
+
description: "访问 /etc/shadow — PTY"
|
|
273
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
274
|
+
severity: critical
|
|
275
|
+
pattern:
|
|
276
|
+
source_collector: "pty"
|
|
277
|
+
arguments_regex: "/etc/shadow"
|
|
278
|
+
|
|
279
|
+
- name: "sensitive_file_passwd"
|
|
280
|
+
description: "访问 /etc/passwd"
|
|
281
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
282
|
+
severity: high
|
|
283
|
+
pattern:
|
|
284
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
285
|
+
arguments_regex: "/etc/passwd"
|
|
286
|
+
|
|
287
|
+
- name: "sensitive_file_ssh_key"
|
|
288
|
+
description: "访问 SSH 私钥"
|
|
289
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
290
|
+
severity: critical
|
|
291
|
+
pattern:
|
|
292
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
293
|
+
arguments_regex: "\\.ssh/id_rsa|\\.ssh/id_ed25519"
|
|
294
|
+
|
|
295
|
+
- name: "sensitive_file_sudoers"
|
|
296
|
+
description: "访问 sudo 配置"
|
|
297
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
298
|
+
severity: critical
|
|
299
|
+
pattern:
|
|
300
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
301
|
+
arguments_regex: "/etc/sudoers"
|
|
302
|
+
|
|
303
|
+
- name: "sensitive_file_credentials"
|
|
304
|
+
description: "访问凭据配置文件"
|
|
305
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
306
|
+
severity: high
|
|
307
|
+
pattern:
|
|
308
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
309
|
+
arguments_regex: "\\bcredentials\\.(yml|yaml)\\b|\\bsecrets\\.(yml|yaml)\\b|(?:^|[\\s/\\\\]\\.env\\b)"
|
|
310
|
+
|
|
311
|
+
# --- 危险命令(L1)---
|
|
312
|
+
- name: "dangerous_sudo"
|
|
313
|
+
description: "sudo 提权 — 触发 AgentMoss"
|
|
314
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
315
|
+
severity: high
|
|
316
|
+
pattern:
|
|
317
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
318
|
+
tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
|
|
319
|
+
arguments_regex: "\\bsudo\\s+"
|
|
320
|
+
|
|
321
|
+
- name: "dangerous_git_force_push"
|
|
322
|
+
description: "git push --force"
|
|
323
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
324
|
+
severity: high
|
|
325
|
+
pattern:
|
|
326
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
327
|
+
tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
|
|
328
|
+
arguments_regex: "git\\s+push\\s+.*--force"
|
|
329
|
+
|
|
330
|
+
- name: "dangerous_password_modify"
|
|
331
|
+
description: "非交互式密码修改"
|
|
332
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
333
|
+
severity: high
|
|
334
|
+
pattern:
|
|
335
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
336
|
+
tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
|
|
337
|
+
arguments_regex: "(\\|\\s*passwd\\b|passwd\\s+--stdin\\b|chpasswd\\b|newusers\\b|passwd\\s+-[a-zA-Z]*[dl]\\b)"
|
|
338
|
+
|
|
339
|
+
# --- Prompt 注入(L1)---
|
|
340
|
+
- name: "prompt_injection_ignore_previous"
|
|
341
|
+
description: "指令覆盖注入"
|
|
342
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
343
|
+
severity: critical
|
|
344
|
+
pattern:
|
|
345
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
346
|
+
arguments_regex: "ignore\\s+(previous|all\\s+previous)\\s+instructions|disregard\\s+all\\s+prior"
|
|
347
|
+
|
|
348
|
+
- name: "prompt_injection_role_hijack"
|
|
349
|
+
description: "角色劫持注入"
|
|
350
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
351
|
+
severity: high
|
|
352
|
+
pattern:
|
|
353
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
354
|
+
arguments_regex: "you\\s+are\\s+(now|no\\s+longer)|from\\s+now\\s+on,\\s+you|你现在是一个|你不再是一个"
|
|
355
|
+
|
|
356
|
+
- name: "prompt_injection_jailbreak"
|
|
357
|
+
description: "越狱/开发者模式"
|
|
358
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
359
|
+
severity: critical
|
|
360
|
+
pattern:
|
|
361
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
362
|
+
arguments_regex: "developer\\s+mode|DAN\\s+mode|jailbreak|开发者模式|越狱"
|
|
363
|
+
|
|
364
|
+
- name: "prompt_injection_bypass"
|
|
365
|
+
description: "绕过安全审计"
|
|
366
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
367
|
+
severity: critical
|
|
368
|
+
pattern:
|
|
369
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
370
|
+
arguments_regex: "bypass\\s+audit|skip\\s+security\\s+check|disable\\s+guard|绕过审计|禁用安全检查|关闭防护"
|
|
371
|
+
|
|
372
|
+
# --- 权限提升(L1)---
|
|
373
|
+
- name: "privilege_escalation"
|
|
374
|
+
description: "提权操作(su/chmod u+s)"
|
|
375
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
376
|
+
severity: high
|
|
377
|
+
pattern:
|
|
378
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
379
|
+
tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
|
|
380
|
+
arguments_regex: "\\bsu\\s+-|chmod\\s+u\\+s|setuid"
|
|
381
|
+
|
|
382
|
+
# --- 横向移动(L1)---
|
|
383
|
+
- name: "lateral_movement"
|
|
384
|
+
description: "SSH 到远程主机"
|
|
385
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
386
|
+
severity: medium
|
|
387
|
+
pattern:
|
|
388
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
389
|
+
tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
|
|
390
|
+
arguments_regex: "(?:ssh|scp|rsync)\\s+(?:-[\\w]+\\s+)*\\S+@\\S+"
|
|
391
|
+
|
|
392
|
+
# --- 持久化后门(L1)---
|
|
393
|
+
- name: "persistence_shell_config"
|
|
394
|
+
description: "修改 Shell 配置文件(持久化风险)"
|
|
395
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
396
|
+
severity: high
|
|
397
|
+
pattern:
|
|
398
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
399
|
+
tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
|
|
400
|
+
arguments_regex: ">>\\s*(~|/home/[^/]+)/(\\.bashrc|\\.zshrc|\\.profile|\\.bash_profile|\\.zprofile)"
|
|
401
|
+
|
|
402
|
+
- name: "persistence_crontab"
|
|
403
|
+
description: "编辑 crontab(持久化风险)"
|
|
404
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
405
|
+
severity: high
|
|
406
|
+
pattern:
|
|
407
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
408
|
+
arguments_regex: "crontab\\s+-[er]|\\|\\s*crontab\\b"
|
|
409
|
+
|
|
410
|
+
- name: "persistence_crontab_pty"
|
|
411
|
+
description: "编辑 crontab — PTY"
|
|
412
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
413
|
+
severity: high
|
|
414
|
+
pattern:
|
|
415
|
+
source_collector: "pty"
|
|
416
|
+
arguments_regex: "crontab\\s+-[er]|\\|\\s*crontab\\b"
|
|
417
|
+
|
|
418
|
+
# --- 数据外传(L1)---
|
|
419
|
+
- name: "data_exfil_curl_post"
|
|
420
|
+
description: "curl POST 外传敏感信息"
|
|
421
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
422
|
+
severity: high
|
|
423
|
+
pattern:
|
|
424
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
425
|
+
tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
|
|
426
|
+
arguments_regex: "curl\\s+.*-X\\s+POST.*\\b(env|environment|secret|key|token|password)\\b"
|
|
427
|
+
|
|
428
|
+
- name: "data_exfil_base64_bash"
|
|
429
|
+
description: "Base64 编码后管道执行(编码绕过)"
|
|
430
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
431
|
+
severity: high
|
|
432
|
+
pattern:
|
|
433
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
434
|
+
tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
|
|
435
|
+
arguments_regex: "base64\\s+(-d|--decode)\\s*\\|"
|
|
436
|
+
|
|
437
|
+
- name: "data_exfil_base64_bash_pty"
|
|
438
|
+
description: "Base64 编码绕过 — PTY"
|
|
439
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
440
|
+
severity: high
|
|
441
|
+
pattern:
|
|
442
|
+
source_collector: "pty"
|
|
443
|
+
tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
|
|
444
|
+
arguments_regex: "base64\\s+(-d|--decode)\\s*\\|"
|
|
445
|
+
|
|
446
|
+
# --- SSH 绕过(L1)---
|
|
447
|
+
- name: "ssh_skip_host_key_check"
|
|
448
|
+
description: "SSH 跳过主机密钥验证"
|
|
449
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
450
|
+
severity: high
|
|
451
|
+
pattern:
|
|
452
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
453
|
+
arguments_regex: "ssh\\s+.*StrictHostKeyChecking\\s*=\\s*no"
|
|
454
|
+
|
|
455
|
+
# --- iptables(L1)---
|
|
456
|
+
- name: "iptables_modify"
|
|
457
|
+
description: "修改 iptables 防火墙规则"
|
|
458
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
459
|
+
severity: high
|
|
460
|
+
pattern:
|
|
461
|
+
source_collector: "llm_api_proxy"
|
|
462
|
+
tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
|
|
463
|
+
arguments_regex: "iptables\\s+-"
|
|
464
|
+
|
|
465
|
+
- name: "iptables_modify_pty"
|
|
466
|
+
description: "修改 iptables — PTY"
|
|
467
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
468
|
+
severity: high
|
|
469
|
+
pattern:
|
|
470
|
+
source_collector: "pty"
|
|
471
|
+
tool_name_matches: ["bash", "executeBash", "execute_command", "Bash", "shell", "terminal-executebash"]
|
|
472
|
+
arguments_regex: "iptables\\s+-"
|
|
473
|
+
|
|
474
|
+
# ======================================================================
|
|
475
|
+
# L3 eBPF 规则(syscall 级,仅记录)
|
|
476
|
+
# ======================================================================
|
|
477
|
+
|
|
478
|
+
- name: "ebpf_sensitive_file_access"
|
|
479
|
+
description: "敏感文件访问 — eBPF 记录"
|
|
480
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
481
|
+
severity: high
|
|
482
|
+
pattern:
|
|
483
|
+
event_type: "file_access"
|
|
484
|
+
pathname_matches: [
|
|
485
|
+
"/etc/shadow", "/etc/passwd", "/etc/sudoers",
|
|
486
|
+
"/etc/crontab", "/etc/systemd/*", "/etc/ssh/sshd_config",
|
|
487
|
+
"/boot/*", "/proc/sys/*", "/sys/*",
|
|
488
|
+
"/root/.ssh/*",
|
|
489
|
+
"*.pem", "*.key", "credentials.yml", "credentials.yaml",
|
|
490
|
+
"secrets.yml", "secrets.yaml", ".env",
|
|
491
|
+
]
|
|
492
|
+
|
|
493
|
+
- name: "ebpf_device_file_access"
|
|
494
|
+
description: "设备文件访问 — eBPF 记录"
|
|
495
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
496
|
+
severity: high
|
|
497
|
+
pattern:
|
|
498
|
+
event_type: "file_access"
|
|
499
|
+
pathname_matches: ["/dev/zero", "/dev/random", "/dev/urandom", "/dev/full",
|
|
500
|
+
"/dev/core", "/dev/mem", "/dev/kmsg"]
|
|
501
|
+
|
|
502
|
+
- name: "ebpf_suspicious_network"
|
|
503
|
+
description: "可疑网络连接 — eBPF 记录"
|
|
504
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
505
|
+
severity: medium
|
|
506
|
+
pattern:
|
|
507
|
+
event_type: "network_connect"
|
|
508
|
+
condition:
|
|
509
|
+
remote_port_in: [22, 443, 8080, 8443]
|
|
510
|
+
remote_addr_not_in: ["10.*", "172.16.*", "172.17.*", "172.18.*", "172.19.*",
|
|
511
|
+
"172.20.*", "172.21.*", "172.22.*", "172.23.*", "172.24.*",
|
|
512
|
+
"172.25.*", "172.26.*", "172.27.*", "172.28.*", "172.29.*",
|
|
513
|
+
"172.30.*", "172.31.*", "192.168.*", "127.*"]
|
|
514
|
+
|
|
515
|
+
- name: "ebpf_sudo"
|
|
516
|
+
description: "sudo 执行 — eBPF 记录"
|
|
517
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
518
|
+
severity: high
|
|
519
|
+
pattern:
|
|
520
|
+
event_type: "process_exec"
|
|
521
|
+
argv_regex: "\\bsudo\\s+"
|
|
522
|
+
|
|
523
|
+
- name: "ebpf_modify_shell_config"
|
|
524
|
+
description: "修改 Shell 配置 — eBPF 记录"
|
|
525
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
526
|
+
severity: high
|
|
527
|
+
pattern:
|
|
528
|
+
event_type: "process_exec"
|
|
529
|
+
argv_regex: ">>\\s*(~|/home/[^/]+)/(\\.bashrc|\\.zshrc|\\.profile|\\.bash_profile|\\.zprofile)"
|
|
530
|
+
|
|
531
|
+
- name: "ebpf_password_operation"
|
|
532
|
+
description: "密码修改 — eBPF 记录"
|
|
533
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
534
|
+
severity: high
|
|
535
|
+
pattern:
|
|
536
|
+
event_type: "process_exec"
|
|
537
|
+
argv_regex: "(\\|\\s*passwd\\b|passwd\\s+--stdin\\b|chpasswd\\b|newusers\\b|passwd\\s+-[a-zA-Z]*[dl]\\b)"
|
|
538
|
+
|
|
539
|
+
- name: "ebpf_crontab"
|
|
540
|
+
description: "crontab 修改 — eBPF 记录"
|
|
541
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
542
|
+
severity: high
|
|
543
|
+
pattern:
|
|
544
|
+
event_type: "process_exec"
|
|
545
|
+
argv_regex: "crontab\\s+-[er]"
|
|
546
|
+
|
|
547
|
+
- name: "ebpf_iptables"
|
|
548
|
+
description: "iptables 修改 — eBPF 记录"
|
|
549
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
550
|
+
severity: high
|
|
551
|
+
pattern:
|
|
552
|
+
event_type: "process_exec"
|
|
553
|
+
argv_regex: "iptables\\s+-"
|
|
554
|
+
|
|
555
|
+
- name: "ebpf_base64_evasion"
|
|
556
|
+
description: "Base64 解码执行 — eBPF 记录"
|
|
557
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
558
|
+
severity: high
|
|
559
|
+
pattern:
|
|
560
|
+
event_type: "process_exec"
|
|
561
|
+
argv_regex: "base64\\s+(-d|--decode)\\s*\\|"
|
|
562
|
+
|
|
563
|
+
- name: "ebpf_ssh_skip_key_check"
|
|
564
|
+
description: "SSH 跳过密钥验证 — eBPF 记录"
|
|
565
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
566
|
+
severity: high
|
|
567
|
+
pattern:
|
|
568
|
+
event_type: "process_exec"
|
|
569
|
+
argv_regex: "ssh\\s+.*StrictHostKeyChecking\\s*=\\s*no"
|
|
570
|
+
|
|
571
|
+
- name: "ebpf_git_force_push"
|
|
572
|
+
description: "git push --force — eBPF 记录"
|
|
573
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
574
|
+
severity: high
|
|
575
|
+
pattern:
|
|
576
|
+
event_type: "process_exec"
|
|
577
|
+
argv_regex: "git\\s+push\\s+.*--force"
|
|
578
|
+
|
|
579
|
+
- name: "ebpf_data_exfil_curl"
|
|
580
|
+
description: "curl POST 外传 — eBPF 记录"
|
|
581
|
+
action: trigger_analysis
|
|
582
|
+
severity: high
|
|
583
|
+
pattern:
|
|
584
|
+
event_type: "process_exec"
|
|
585
|
+
argv_regex: "curl\\s+.*-X\\s+POST.*\\b(env|environment|secret|key|token|password)\\b"
|
|
@@ -4,6 +4,23 @@
|
|
|
4
4
|
* SQLite 和 JSON 文件存储各自实现此接口,
|
|
5
5
|
* 通过 AGENT_GATE_STORAGE 环境变量选择后端。
|
|
6
6
|
*/
|
|
7
|
+
/**
|
|
8
|
+
* `/tool_calls` 的过滤条件,双端对齐 Python
|
|
9
|
+
* `repository.query_tool_calls` / `count_tool_calls` 的入参。
|
|
10
|
+
*/
|
|
11
|
+
interface ToolCallFilter {
|
|
12
|
+
sessionId?: string;
|
|
13
|
+
/** 完整 agent_id(`<agent_type>:<hostname>`),精确匹配。 */
|
|
14
|
+
agentId?: string;
|
|
15
|
+
/** 逐 agent token 的隔离依据:只按 agent_type 过滤,不知道(也不该知道)别人 hostname。 */
|
|
16
|
+
agentType?: string;
|
|
17
|
+
decision?: string;
|
|
18
|
+
riskLevel?: string;
|
|
19
|
+
/** 时间下界(含),与 `called_at` 字符串比较。 */
|
|
20
|
+
fromTime?: string;
|
|
21
|
+
/** 时间上界(含)。 */
|
|
22
|
+
toTime?: string;
|
|
23
|
+
}
|
|
7
24
|
interface ToolCallRecord {
|
|
8
25
|
session_id: string;
|
|
9
26
|
seq: number;
|
|
@@ -61,20 +78,20 @@ interface StorageAdapter {
|
|
|
61
78
|
getNextSeq(sessionId: string): number;
|
|
62
79
|
insertToolCall(record: ToolCallRecord): number;
|
|
63
80
|
getActionHistory(sessionId: string, limit?: number): ActionEntry[];
|
|
64
|
-
queryToolCalls(params: {
|
|
65
|
-
sessionId?: string;
|
|
66
|
-
/** 逐 agent token 的隔离依据(agent_id 是 `<agent_type>:<hostname>`)。 */
|
|
67
|
-
agentType?: string;
|
|
68
|
-
decision?: string;
|
|
81
|
+
queryToolCalls(params: ToolCallFilter & {
|
|
69
82
|
limit?: number;
|
|
70
83
|
offset?: number;
|
|
71
84
|
}): ToolCallRich[];
|
|
72
|
-
countToolCalls(params:
|
|
73
|
-
decision?: string;
|
|
74
|
-
agentType?: string;
|
|
75
|
-
}): number;
|
|
85
|
+
countToolCalls(params: ToolCallFilter): number;
|
|
76
86
|
getStorageStats(): StorageStats;
|
|
77
87
|
clearToolCalls(): number;
|
|
88
|
+
/** 归档最老的记录到本地压缩文件,主库保留最近 keep 条。 */
|
|
89
|
+
archiveOldRecords(keep: number): {
|
|
90
|
+
archived: number;
|
|
91
|
+
file: string;
|
|
92
|
+
};
|
|
93
|
+
/** 真正释放磁盘(DELETE 不会让文件变小)。 */
|
|
94
|
+
vacuum(): void;
|
|
78
95
|
getAgentsList(agentType?: string): AgentSummary[];
|
|
79
96
|
getTimeline(limit?: number): TimelineEntry[];
|
|
80
97
|
/** 会话归属哪个 agent_type(跨 agent 读隔离校验用)。不存在返回 undefined。 */
|