@kasufinance/kasu-sdk 2.7.0 → 2.7.1

package/dist/bundle.esm.js

@@ -20835,12 +20835,12 @@ function toURLEncodedForm(data, options) {
   });
 }
 
-const MAX_DEPTH = DEFAULT_FORM_DATA_MAX_DEPTH;
+const MAX_DEPTH$1 = DEFAULT_FORM_DATA_MAX_DEPTH;
 
 function throwIfDepthExceeded(index) {
-  if (index > MAX_DEPTH) {
+  if (index > MAX_DEPTH$1) {
     throw new AxiosError$1(
-      'FormData field is too deeply nested (' + index + ' levels). Max depth: ' + MAX_DEPTH,
+      'FormData field is too deeply nested (' + index + ' levels). Max depth: ' + MAX_DEPTH$1,
       AxiosError$1.ERR_FORM_DATA_DEPTH_EXCEEDED
     );
   }
@@ -24804,6 +24804,193 @@ function buildFullNameRequestMessage(address, timestampMs) {
     return `I request my full name for ${address.toLowerCase()} at ${timestampMs}.`;
 }
 
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// The selector tables
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * OpenZeppelin v5's ERC-20 errors. They are not in either Kasu ABI because no
+ * Kasu contract declares them — they arrive from the TOKEN, through the
+ * manager's `transferFrom`, and they are the modern spelling of the string
+ * reverts below.
+ */
+const ERC20_ERROR_ABI = [
+    'error ERC20InsufficientBalance(address sender, uint256 balance, uint256 needed)',
+    'error ERC20InsufficientAllowance(address spender, uint256 allowance, uint256 needed)',
+];
+/**
+ * The protocol errors that mean the ERC-20 transfer failed rather than the
+ * protocol refusing.
+ *
+ * `SafeERC20FailedOperation` is OpenZeppelin's wrapper around a token call
+ * that returned false or reverted, which on this path IS the `transferFrom`;
+ * `AddressInsufficientBalance` is its native-value sibling. Both belong with
+ * the balance case, not with the pool conditions — a lender who sees one of
+ * them really does need to fund or re-approve.
+ */
+const ERC20_FAMILY_NAMES = new Set([
+    'AddressInsufficientBalance',
+    'ERC20InsufficientAllowance',
+    'ERC20InsufficientBalance',
+    'SafeERC20FailedOperation',
+]);
+/** Solidity's `Error(string)`, the selector every `require` reason arrives under. */
+const STRING_REVERT_SELECTOR = '0x08c379a0';
+/**
+ * The `require` reasons that are a balance or an allowance, across the token
+ * implementations in circulation: OpenZeppelin v4's sentences, and the
+ * shorthand the minimal implementations use.
+ */
+const ERC20_REASON_PATTERNS = [
+    /exceeds\s+balance/,
+    /exceeds\s+allowance/,
+    /insufficient\s+balance/,
+    /insufficient\s+allowance/,
+    /transfer_from_failed/,
+    /transferfrom\s+failed/,
+    /low-level\s+call\s+failed/,
+];
+/**
+ * selector → error name, built once on first use.
+ *
+ * Lazily, because a consumer that never sees a revert should not pay for three
+ * `Interface` constructions at import. The two Kasu tables are the GENERATED
+ * typechain ABIs, so this cannot drift from the contracts: regenerate the ABIs
+ * and the new errors are recognised with no edit here.
+ */
+let selectorTable = null;
+function selectors() {
+    if (selectorTable)
+        return selectorTable;
+    const table = new Map();
+    const interfaces = [
+        // The manager the deposit is called against, and the allow list it
+        // delegates the KYC and block-window checks to.
+        ILendingPoolManagerAbi__factory.createInterface(),
+        IKasuAllowListAbi__factory.createInterface(),
+        new ethers.utils.Interface(ERC20_ERROR_ABI),
+    ];
+    for (const iface of interfaces) {
+        for (const fragment of Object.values(iface.errors)) {
+            // First writer wins: the same name declared by both ABIs is the
+            // same selector, so the duplicate would be a no-op anyway.
+            const sighash = iface.getSighash(fragment);
+            if (!table.has(sighash))
+                table.set(sighash, fragment.name);
+        }
+    }
+    selectorTable = table;
+    return table;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Getting the bytes out of the envelope
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * How deep to look for the revert data. Providers nest it differently —
+ * ethers' own error wraps the provider's, which wraps the RPC body — and a
+ * bound is what keeps a self-referencing error object from being walked
+ * forever.
+ */
+const MAX_DEPTH = 6;
+/** The keys ethers and the providers under it put a wrapped error on. */
+const NESTED_KEYS = [
+    'data',
+    'error',
+    'originalError',
+    'info',
+    'cause',
+    'body',
+];
+/** At least a 4-byte selector, and a whole number of bytes. */
+function isRevertData(value) {
+    return (value.length >= 10 &&
+        value.length % 2 === 0 &&
+        /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(value));
+}
+/**
+ * Find the revert data on an error, wherever the provider left it.
+ *
+ * ethers v5 raises `UNPREDICTABLE_GAS_LIMIT` with the provider's own error
+ * attached, and each provider nests the bytes one layer differently:
+ * `error.data`, `error.error.data`, `error.data.originalError.data`, or only
+ * inside the JSON `body` of a `SERVER_ERROR`. Rather than enumerate the
+ * products, walk a fixed set of keys to a fixed depth and take the first value
+ * that is shaped like revert data.
+ */
+function extractRevertData(err) {
+    return walk(err, 0);
+}
+function walk(node, depth) {
+    if (node == null || depth > MAX_DEPTH)
+        return null;
+    if (typeof node === 'string') {
+        if (isRevertData(node))
+            return node;
+        // A `SERVER_ERROR`'s body: the RPC's JSON reply, verbatim.
+        if (!node.startsWith('{'))
+            return null;
+        try {
+            return walk(JSON.parse(node), depth + 1);
+        }
+        catch (_a) {
+            return null;
+        }
+    }
+    if (typeof node !== 'object')
+        return null;
+    const record = node;
+    for (const key of NESTED_KEYS) {
+        const found = walk(record[key], depth + 1);
+        if (found)
+            return found;
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Decoding
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Decode a failed call's revert into the error the contract named, or `null`
+ * when there is nothing recognisable to name.
+ *
+ * `null` is the honest answer for an unknown selector, an unrelated `require`
+ * string, or an error with no revert data at all — the caller keeps whatever
+ * it did before rather than inventing a diagnosis from bytes it cannot read.
+ */
+function decodeRevert(err) {
+    const data = extractRevertData(err);
+    if (!data)
+        return null;
+    const selector = data.slice(0, 10).toLowerCase();
+    if (selector === STRING_REVERT_SELECTOR) {
+        const reason = decodeStringRevert(data);
+        if (reason === null)
+            return null;
+        return isErc20Reason(reason)
+            ? { name: 'Error', family: 'erc20', reason }
+            : null;
+    }
+    const name = selectors().get(selector);
+    if (!name)
+        return null;
+    return {
+        name,
+        family: ERC20_FAMILY_NAMES.has(name) ? 'erc20' : 'protocol',
+    };
+}
+function decodeStringRevert(data) {
+    try {
+        const [reason] = ethers.utils.defaultAbiCoder.decode(['string'], `0x${data.slice(10)}`);
+        return reason;
+    }
+    catch (_a) {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+function isErc20Reason(reason) {
+    const lower = reason.toLowerCase();
+    return ERC20_REASON_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(lower));
+}
+
 /**
  * Wallet and RPC error predicates — pure functions over `unknown`.
  *
@@ -24963,6 +25150,22 @@ function classifyWalletFailure(step, err) {
 const CONTRACT_TTL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
 /** What a run without a spender, from either source, fails with. */
 const NO_SPENDER_MESSAGE = 'DepositFlow: no ERC-20 spender; build the flow with kasu.flows.deposit() or pass `spender` on the input';
+/** What a malformed auth signature fails the generate step with. */
+const INVALID_AUTH_SIGNATURE_MESSAGE = 'DepositFlow: the wallet returned a malformed authentication signature; expected 65 bytes of 0x-prefixed hex';
+/** What a malformed acceptance signature fails the confirm step with. */
+const INVALID_ACCEPTANCE_SIGNATURE_MESSAGE = 'DepositFlow: the wallet returned a malformed acceptance signature; expected 65 bytes of 0x-prefixed hex';
+/**
+ * Is this an EIP-191 personal sign, in the only shape the protocol accepts?
+ *
+ * 65 bytes — `r`, `s`, `v` — 0x-prefixed. Nothing downstream checks it: the
+ * ABI coder takes any even-length hex as `bytes`, so `'0x'` and a 64-byte
+ * string both encode happily into a `depositData` the agreements service then
+ * cannot verify against anything. The check has to happen where the signature
+ * is taken, which is here.
+ */
+function isPersonalSignature(signature) {
+    return utils$2.isHexString(signature, 65);
+}
 const INITIAL$1 = {
     phase: 'idle',
     step: null,
@@ -24987,13 +25190,32 @@ function badgeFor(step, approvalRequired) {
     };
 }
 /**
- * The request step has a third outcome. `UNPREDICTABLE_GAS_LIMIT` here is
- * almost always `transferFrom` reverting on a balance that cannot cover the
- * deposit, and it takes precedence: nothing was refused by the lender, so
- * inviting a retry would just reproduce it.
+ * The request step's extra outcomes, in the order the evidence supports.
+ *
+ * A revert is read for WHAT reverted before it is read as a shortfall.
+ * `requestDepositWithKyc` reverts for a whole family of declared reasons —
+ * `LendingPoolIsStopped`, `ClearingIsPending`, `UserNotKycd`, `UserBlocked`,
+ * `UserNotInAllowList`, `InvalidTranche`, `BlockExpired` — and every one of
+ * them used to arrive as `insufficient-balance`, which told a fully funded
+ * lender to top up a wallet that was never short while their pool was simply
+ * mid-clearing. So: a decoded protocol error is `reverted` and names itself.
+ *
+ * Only a token balance or allowance failure — or revert data nothing can
+ * decode, on the `UNPREDICTABLE_GAS_LIMIT` ethers raises for a failed gas
+ * estimate — is still `insufficient-balance`, which is the case that reason
+ * was named for and the one where topping up is genuinely the answer.
  */
 function classifyRequest(err) {
-    if (isUnpredictableGas(err)) {
+    const revert = decodeRevert(err);
+    if ((revert === null || revert === void 0 ? void 0 : revert.family) === 'protocol') {
+        return {
+            step: 'request',
+            reason: 'reverted',
+            revertError: revert.name,
+            error: err,
+        };
+    }
+    if (revert !== null || isUnpredictableGas(err)) {
         return { step: 'request', reason: 'insufficient-balance', error: err };
     }
     return classifyWalletFailure('request', err);
@@ -25045,6 +25267,18 @@ class DepositFlow extends Flow {
             this._store.patch(Object.assign({ phase: 'accepting-sign' }, badgeFor('confirm', this._store.state.approvalRequired)), token);
             try {
                 const signature = yield this._ports.signMessage(contract.contractMessage);
+                // Checked HERE, not at the encoder: this is the signature the
+                // agreements service verifies the deposit against, and a wallet
+                // that returned something other than 65 bytes has not signed
+                // anything. Failing the confirm step names the step that produced
+                // it; letting it through would put an unverifiable blob on chain.
+                if (!isPersonalSignature(signature)) {
+                    bridge.settle({
+                        kind: 'failed',
+                        error: new Error(INVALID_ACCEPTANCE_SIGNATURE_MESSAGE),
+                    });
+                    return;
+                }
                 bridge.settle({ kind: 'accepted', signature });
             }
             catch (err) {
@@ -25138,6 +25372,18 @@ class DepositFlow extends Flow {
                 this._fail(token, approvalRequired, classifyWalletFailure('generate', err));
                 return;
             }
+            // The same EIP-191 shape as the acceptance, and the same reason to
+            // check it: kasu-backend verifies this one to decide whether to issue
+            // an agreement at all, so a malformed signature is a 4xx that says
+            // nothing about which step produced it. Named here instead.
+            if (!isPersonalSignature(signature)) {
+                this._fail(token, approvalRequired, {
+                    step: 'generate',
+                    reason: 'failed',
+                    error: new Error(INVALID_AUTH_SIGNATURE_MESSAGE),
+                });
+                return;
+            }
             if (!this._store.isCurrent(token))
                 return;
             // 3. Generate — POST the request.
@@ -25194,12 +25440,29 @@ class DepositFlow extends Flow {
                 });
                 return;
             }
-            const depositData = encodeDepositData({
-                signature: outcome.signature,
-                timestamp: contract.timestamp,
-                contractVersion: contract.contractVersion,
-                contractType: asContractType(contract.contractType),
-            });
+            // The acceptance signature is already known to be 65 bytes, but the
+            // encoder also reads `timestamp`, `contractVersion` and
+            // `contractType` off a response the SDK did not produce. `start()`
+            // promises it does not reject, so anything that throws in here becomes
+            // a failure the consumer can render rather than an unhandled rejection
+            // in an application that was told it never had to catch one.
+            let depositData;
+            try {
+                depositData = encodeDepositData({
+                    signature: outcome.signature,
+                    timestamp: contract.timestamp,
+                    contractVersion: contract.contractVersion,
+                    contractType: asContractType(contract.contractType),
+                });
+            }
+            catch (err) {
+                this._fail(token, approvalRequired, {
+                    step: 'request',
+                    reason: 'failed',
+                    error: err,
+                });
+                return;
+            }
             // 6. Approve — the EXACT amount, never `MaxUint256`. House rule: an
             //    unlimited allowance outlives the deposit it was granted for, and a
             //    later exploit of the spender would drain a wallet that has long
@@ -26887,4 +27150,4 @@ function getTrancheDisplayName(trancheName, pool) {
         : trancheName;
 }
 
-export { APXIUM, AU_ALPHA3, AU_MIN_CUMULATIVE_BY_STABLE, CHAIN_CONFIGS, CLEARING_WINDOW_SECONDS, CONTRACT_TTL_MS, DepositFlow, DepositsFacade, EPOCHS_IN_YEAR, Flow, FlowStore, FlowsFacade, INVOICEMATE, Kasu, KasuSdk, MAX_LENDING_AMOUNT_FALLBACK, MIN_LENDING_AMOUNT_FALLBACK, MIN_TRANCHE_CAPACITY, NO_DIRECTUS_URL_MESSAGE, NO_KYC_PARAMS_MESSAGE, NO_SPENDER_MESSAGE, PortfolioFacade, READ_ONLY_MESSAGE, RIXON_CAPITAL, SdkConfig, StrategiesFacade, UPPER_MEZZANINE, WithdrawFlow, apyToEpochRate, asContractType, auMinimumRemaining, auThresholdFor, buildContractVersionType, buildFullNameRequestMessage, buildLegacyContractRequestMessage, buildLoanAgreementSignMessage, ceilToCents, classifyWalletFailure, compareTrancheSeniority, computeSettlementWindow, countSubmissions, deriveCycleDates, derivePoolStatus, deriveRequestState, encodeDepositData, epochRateToApy, fetchUnusedPoolIds, firstSubmissionTimestamp, floorToCents, formatSignTimestampUtc, getCreditOriginator, getInstitutionalLender, getTrancheDisplayName, isAuMinimumExempt, isAustralianKyc, isBelowMinimumCapacity, isCycleClosed, isUnpredictableGas, isUserRejected, lastEventTimestamp, maxNetRateCeiling, netEffectiveApy, netTrancheApyBounds, nextCycleBoundary, parseFormattedMessage, parseMinorUnits, parseTrancheBound, pickDefaultTrancheId, pickHighestYieldTranche, poolAllTranchesFull, poolMaxApy, resolveBoundShortcuts, resolveDepositBounds, selectVisiblePools, submissionEvents, trancheApyBounds, trancheHasCapacity, trancheRiskRank };
+export { APXIUM, AU_ALPHA3, AU_MIN_CUMULATIVE_BY_STABLE, CHAIN_CONFIGS, CLEARING_WINDOW_SECONDS, CONTRACT_TTL_MS, DepositFlow, DepositsFacade, EPOCHS_IN_YEAR, Flow, FlowStore, FlowsFacade, INVALID_ACCEPTANCE_SIGNATURE_MESSAGE, INVALID_AUTH_SIGNATURE_MESSAGE, INVOICEMATE, Kasu, KasuSdk, MAX_LENDING_AMOUNT_FALLBACK, MIN_LENDING_AMOUNT_FALLBACK, MIN_TRANCHE_CAPACITY, NO_DIRECTUS_URL_MESSAGE, NO_KYC_PARAMS_MESSAGE, NO_SPENDER_MESSAGE, PortfolioFacade, READ_ONLY_MESSAGE, RIXON_CAPITAL, SdkConfig, StrategiesFacade, UPPER_MEZZANINE, WithdrawFlow, apyToEpochRate, asContractType, auMinimumRemaining, auThresholdFor, buildContractVersionType, buildFullNameRequestMessage, buildLegacyContractRequestMessage, buildLoanAgreementSignMessage, ceilToCents, classifyWalletFailure, compareTrancheSeniority, computeSettlementWindow, countSubmissions, decodeRevert, deriveCycleDates, derivePoolStatus, deriveRequestState, encodeDepositData, epochRateToApy, extractRevertData, fetchUnusedPoolIds, firstSubmissionTimestamp, floorToCents, formatSignTimestampUtc, getCreditOriginator, getInstitutionalLender, getTrancheDisplayName, isAuMinimumExempt, isAustralianKyc, isBelowMinimumCapacity, isCycleClosed, isUnpredictableGas, isUserRejected, lastEventTimestamp, maxNetRateCeiling, netEffectiveApy, netTrancheApyBounds, nextCycleBoundary, parseFormattedMessage, parseMinorUnits, parseTrancheBound, pickDefaultTrancheId, pickHighestYieldTranche, poolAllTranchesFull, poolMaxApy, resolveBoundShortcuts, resolveDepositBounds, selectVisiblePools, submissionEvents, trancheApyBounds, trancheHasCapacity, trancheRiskRank };

package/dist/domain/index.d.ts

@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ export { maxNetRateCeiling, pickHighestYieldTranche, poolMaxApy, selectVisiblePo
 export type { BestTranche } from './pools';
 export { countSubmissions, deriveRequestState, firstSubmissionTimestamp, isCycleClosed, lastEventTimestamp, submissionEvents, } from './requests';
 export type { RequestKind, RequestState, RequestStatusCode, } from './requests';
+export { decodeRevert, extractRevertData } from './revert-errors';
+export type { DecodedRevert, RevertFamily } from './revert-errors';
 export { CLEARING_WINDOW_SECONDS, computeSettlementWindow, deriveCycleDates, nextCycleBoundary, } from './settlement';
 export type { CycleDates, SettlementWindowInput, SettlementWindowState, } from './settlement';
 export { getTrancheDisplayName, UPPER_MEZZANINE } from './tranche-display-name';

package/dist/domain/index.js

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ export { APXIUM, getCreditOriginator, getInstitutionalLender, INVOICEMATE, RIXON
 export { asContractType, buildContractVersionType, buildFullNameRequestMessage, buildLegacyContractRequestMessage, buildLoanAgreementSignMessage, encodeDepositData, formatSignTimestampUtc, parseFormattedMessage, } from './loan-contract';
 export { maxNetRateCeiling, pickHighestYieldTranche, poolMaxApy, selectVisiblePools, } from './pools';
 export { countSubmissions, deriveRequestState, firstSubmissionTimestamp, isCycleClosed, lastEventTimestamp, submissionEvents, } from './requests';
+export { decodeRevert, extractRevertData } from './revert-errors';
 export { CLEARING_WINDOW_SECONDS, computeSettlementWindow, deriveCycleDates, nextCycleBoundary, } from './settlement';
 export { getTrancheDisplayName, UPPER_MEZZANINE } from './tranche-display-name';
 export { compareTrancheSeniority, derivePoolStatus, MIN_TRANCHE_CAPACITY, netTrancheApyBounds, pickDefaultTrancheId, poolAllTranchesFull, trancheApyBounds, trancheHasCapacity, trancheRiskRank, } from './tranches';

package/dist/domain/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAoBG;AACH,OAAO,EACH,cAAc,EACd,cAAc,EACd,cAAc,EACd,eAAe,GAClB,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AAEjB,OAAO,EACH,SAAS,EACT,2BAA2B,EAC3B,kBAAkB,EAClB,cAAc,EACd,iBAAiB,EACjB,eAAe,EACf,eAAe,GAClB,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AAGtB,OAAO,EACH,WAAW,EACX,YAAY,EACZ,sBAAsB,EACtB,2BAA2B,EAC3B,2BAA2B,EAC3B,iBAAiB,EACjB,qBAAqB,EACrB,oBAAoB,GACvB,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAG1B,OAAO,EACH,MAAM,EACN,mBAAmB,EACnB,sBAAsB,EACtB,WAAW,EACX,aAAa,GAChB,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAGpB,OAAO,EACH,cAAc,EACd,wBAAwB,EACxB,2BAA2B,EAC3B,iCAAiC,EACjC,6BAA6B,EAC7B,iBAAiB,EACjB,sBAAsB,EACtB,qBAAqB,GACxB,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAYzB,OAAO,EACH,iBAAiB,EACjB,uBAAuB,EACvB,UAAU,EACV,kBAAkB,GACrB,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AAGjB,OAAO,EACH,gBAAgB,EAChB,kBAAkB,EAClB,wBAAwB,EACxB,aAAa,EACb,kBAAkB,EAClB,gBAAgB,GACnB,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAOpB,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAGlE,OAAO,EACH,uBAAuB,EACvB,uBAAuB,EACvB,gBAAgB,EAChB,iBAAiB,GACpB,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AAOtB,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAEhF,OAAO,EACH,uBAAuB,EACvB,gBAAgB,EAChB,oBAAoB,EACpB,mBAAmB,EACnB,oBAAoB,EACpB,mBAAmB,EACnB,gBAAgB,EAChB,kBAAkB,EAClB,eAAe,GAClB,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAOpB,OAAO,EACH,qBAAqB,EACrB,kBAAkB,EAClB,cAAc,GACjB,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC"}

package/dist/domain/revert-errors.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/**
+ * Revert decoding — turn the bytes a failed call came back with into the name
+ * the contract actually reverted with.
+ *
+ * `isUnpredictableGas` says only THAT the call would revert. That was enough
+ * while the answer was always the same one: a `transferFrom` failing on a
+ * balance that cannot cover the deposit. It is not enough any more, because
+ * `requestDepositWithKyc` reverts for a whole family of reasons the ABI
+ * declares and the lender can do nothing about — the pool is stopped, the pool
+ * is mid-clearing, their KYC lapsed, they are not on the allow list, the
+ * allow-list signature's block window closed. Every one of those was reported
+ * as "insufficient balance", so a fully funded lender was told to top up a
+ * wallet that was never short.
+ *
+ * The revert data carries the answer. This module extracts it from whatever
+ * envelope the provider wrapped it in and matches the 4-byte selector against
+ * the custom errors the protocol declares.
+ *
+ * Pure, like everything else in `domain/`: bytes in, a name out. It never
+ * decides what a lender is shown — `DepositFlow` maps the name to a code and
+ * the application maps the code to its own words.
+ */
+/**
+ * Which family a recognised revert belongs to, because the two are acted on
+ * differently.
+ *
+ * `erc20` is the case `insufficient-balance` was named for and still means:
+ * the token transfer itself failed, so the lender genuinely has to fund or
+ * re-approve. `protocol` is everything else the protocol declares — a
+ * condition of the pool or the lender's standing, which topping up cannot fix.
+ */
+export type RevertFamily = 'protocol' | 'erc20';
+export interface DecodedRevert {
+    /** The custom error's name, exactly as the ABI declares it. */
+    name: string;
+    family: RevertFamily;
+    /** The reason of a `require(..., "…")` revert, when it was one. */
+    reason?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Find the revert data on an error, wherever the provider left it.
+ *
+ * ethers v5 raises `UNPREDICTABLE_GAS_LIMIT` with the provider's own error
+ * attached, and each provider nests the bytes one layer differently:
+ * `error.data`, `error.error.data`, `error.data.originalError.data`, or only
+ * inside the JSON `body` of a `SERVER_ERROR`. Rather than enumerate the
+ * products, walk a fixed set of keys to a fixed depth and take the first value
+ * that is shaped like revert data.
+ */
+export declare function extractRevertData(err: unknown): string | null;
+/**
+ * Decode a failed call's revert into the error the contract named, or `null`
+ * when there is nothing recognisable to name.
+ *
+ * `null` is the honest answer for an unknown selector, an unrelated `require`
+ * string, or an error with no revert data at all — the caller keeps whatever
+ * it did before rather than inventing a diagnosis from bytes it cannot read.
+ */
+export declare function decodeRevert(err: unknown): DecodedRevert | null;

package/dist/domain/revert-errors.js

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+import { ethers } from 'ethers';
+import { IKasuAllowListAbi__factory } from '../contracts/factories/IKasuAllowListAbi__factory';
+import { ILendingPoolManagerAbi__factory } from '../contracts/factories/ILendingPoolManagerAbi__factory';
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// The selector tables
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * OpenZeppelin v5's ERC-20 errors. They are not in either Kasu ABI because no
+ * Kasu contract declares them — they arrive from the TOKEN, through the
+ * manager's `transferFrom`, and they are the modern spelling of the string
+ * reverts below.
+ */
+const ERC20_ERROR_ABI = [
+    'error ERC20InsufficientBalance(address sender, uint256 balance, uint256 needed)',
+    'error ERC20InsufficientAllowance(address spender, uint256 allowance, uint256 needed)',
+];
+/**
+ * The protocol errors that mean the ERC-20 transfer failed rather than the
+ * protocol refusing.
+ *
+ * `SafeERC20FailedOperation` is OpenZeppelin's wrapper around a token call
+ * that returned false or reverted, which on this path IS the `transferFrom`;
+ * `AddressInsufficientBalance` is its native-value sibling. Both belong with
+ * the balance case, not with the pool conditions — a lender who sees one of
+ * them really does need to fund or re-approve.
+ */
+const ERC20_FAMILY_NAMES = new Set([
+    'AddressInsufficientBalance',
+    'ERC20InsufficientAllowance',
+    'ERC20InsufficientBalance',
+    'SafeERC20FailedOperation',
+]);
+/** Solidity's `Error(string)`, the selector every `require` reason arrives under. */
+const STRING_REVERT_SELECTOR = '0x08c379a0';
+/**
+ * The `require` reasons that are a balance or an allowance, across the token
+ * implementations in circulation: OpenZeppelin v4's sentences, and the
+ * shorthand the minimal implementations use.
+ */
+const ERC20_REASON_PATTERNS = [
+    /exceeds\s+balance/,
+    /exceeds\s+allowance/,
+    /insufficient\s+balance/,
+    /insufficient\s+allowance/,
+    /transfer_from_failed/,
+    /transferfrom\s+failed/,
+    /low-level\s+call\s+failed/,
+];
+/**
+ * selector → error name, built once on first use.
+ *
+ * Lazily, because a consumer that never sees a revert should not pay for three
+ * `Interface` constructions at import. The two Kasu tables are the GENERATED
+ * typechain ABIs, so this cannot drift from the contracts: regenerate the ABIs
+ * and the new errors are recognised with no edit here.
+ */
+let selectorTable = null;
+function selectors() {
+    if (selectorTable)
+        return selectorTable;
+    const table = new Map();
+    const interfaces = [
+        // The manager the deposit is called against, and the allow list it
+        // delegates the KYC and block-window checks to.
+        ILendingPoolManagerAbi__factory.createInterface(),
+        IKasuAllowListAbi__factory.createInterface(),
+        new ethers.utils.Interface(ERC20_ERROR_ABI),
+    ];
+    for (const iface of interfaces) {
+        for (const fragment of Object.values(iface.errors)) {
+            // First writer wins: the same name declared by both ABIs is the
+            // same selector, so the duplicate would be a no-op anyway.
+            const sighash = iface.getSighash(fragment);
+            if (!table.has(sighash))
+                table.set(sighash, fragment.name);
+        }
+    }
+    selectorTable = table;
+    return table;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Getting the bytes out of the envelope
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * How deep to look for the revert data. Providers nest it differently —
+ * ethers' own error wraps the provider's, which wraps the RPC body — and a
+ * bound is what keeps a self-referencing error object from being walked
+ * forever.
+ */
+const MAX_DEPTH = 6;
+/** The keys ethers and the providers under it put a wrapped error on. */
+const NESTED_KEYS = [
+    'data',
+    'error',
+    'originalError',
+    'info',
+    'cause',
+    'body',
+];
+/** At least a 4-byte selector, and a whole number of bytes. */
+function isRevertData(value) {
+    return (value.length >= 10 &&
+        value.length % 2 === 0 &&
+        /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(value));
+}
+/**
+ * Find the revert data on an error, wherever the provider left it.
+ *
+ * ethers v5 raises `UNPREDICTABLE_GAS_LIMIT` with the provider's own error
+ * attached, and each provider nests the bytes one layer differently:
+ * `error.data`, `error.error.data`, `error.data.originalError.data`, or only
+ * inside the JSON `body` of a `SERVER_ERROR`. Rather than enumerate the
+ * products, walk a fixed set of keys to a fixed depth and take the first value
+ * that is shaped like revert data.
+ */
+export function extractRevertData(err) {
+    return walk(err, 0);
+}
+function walk(node, depth) {
+    if (node == null || depth > MAX_DEPTH)
+        return null;
+    if (typeof node === 'string') {
+        if (isRevertData(node))
+            return node;
+        // A `SERVER_ERROR`'s body: the RPC's JSON reply, verbatim.
+        if (!node.startsWith('{'))
+            return null;
+        try {
+            return walk(JSON.parse(node), depth + 1);
+        }
+        catch (_a) {
+            return null;
+        }
+    }
+    if (typeof node !== 'object')
+        return null;
+    const record = node;
+    for (const key of NESTED_KEYS) {
+        const found = walk(record[key], depth + 1);
+        if (found)
+            return found;
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Decoding
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Decode a failed call's revert into the error the contract named, or `null`
+ * when there is nothing recognisable to name.
+ *
+ * `null` is the honest answer for an unknown selector, an unrelated `require`
+ * string, or an error with no revert data at all — the caller keeps whatever
+ * it did before rather than inventing a diagnosis from bytes it cannot read.
+ */
+export function decodeRevert(err) {
+    const data = extractRevertData(err);
+    if (!data)
+        return null;
+    const selector = data.slice(0, 10).toLowerCase();
+    if (selector === STRING_REVERT_SELECTOR) {
+        const reason = decodeStringRevert(data);
+        if (reason === null)
+            return null;
+        return isErc20Reason(reason)
+            ? { name: 'Error', family: 'erc20', reason }
+            : null;
+    }
+    const name = selectors().get(selector);
+    if (!name)
+        return null;
+    return {
+        name,
+        family: ERC20_FAMILY_NAMES.has(name) ? 'erc20' : 'protocol',
+    };
+}
+function decodeStringRevert(data) {
+    try {
+        const [reason] = ethers.utils.defaultAbiCoder.decode(['string'], `0x${data.slice(10)}`);
+        return reason;
+    }
+    catch (_a) {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+function isErc20Reason(reason) {
+    const lower = reason.toLowerCase();
+    return ERC20_REASON_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(lower));
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=revert-errors.js.map

package/dist/domain/revert-errors.js.map

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