@kasufinance/kasu-sdk 2.10.1 → 2.10.3

package/dist/bundle.cjs.js

@@ -24219,9 +24219,10 @@ class SdkConfig {
 }
 
 /**
- * The single-call `LendingPoolManager` requests a sponsored relay may carry,
- * encoded by the SDK so no application hand-builds calldata or hand-maps the
- * relay's `kind` for them.
+ * The single-call requests a sponsored relay may carry — the four
+ * `LendingPoolManager` requests, plus the stable asset's own `transfer` (P2P
+ * Send) — encoded by the SDK so no application hand-builds calldata or
+ * hand-maps the relay's `kind` for them.
  *
  * Every function here is PURE: addresses and ids in, `{ kind, call }` out.
  * Reading the chain (the shares a withdrawal is for) is the facade's job —
@@ -24249,6 +24250,11 @@ const SPONSORED_CALL_KINDS = [
     'cancel_withdrawal',
     /** `LendingPoolManager.requestFixedTermDepositWithdrawal(pool, lockId)`. */
     'withdraw_at_expiry',
+    /**
+     * `stableAsset.transfer(to, amount)` — P2P Send, to the chain's stable
+     * asset rather than the manager. See {@link encodeStableTransfer}.
+     */
+    'transfer',
 ];
 /**
  * Widened to the plain `Interface`: the typechain one overloads
@@ -24256,7 +24262,9 @@ const SPONSORED_CALL_KINDS = [
  * `FUNCTION_OF`.
  */
 const LENDING_POOL_MANAGER$2 = ILendingPoolManagerAbi__factory.createInterface();
-/** The `LendingPoolManager` function behind each kind. */
+/** The generated ERC-20 interface — the `transfer` kind's one function. */
+const ERC20$2 = IERC20MetadataAbi__factory.createInterface();
+/** The `LendingPoolManager` function behind each manager kind. */
 const FUNCTION_OF = Object.freeze({
     withdrawal: 'requestWithdrawal',
     cancel_deposit: 'cancelDepositRequest',
@@ -24265,14 +24273,16 @@ const FUNCTION_OF = Object.freeze({
 });
 /**
  * The 4-byte selector of each kind's function, DERIVED from the generated
- * `ILendingPoolManager` ABI — never typed in by hand, so an ABI change moves
- * it and the cross-check spec against the relay's own pins goes red.
+ * ABIs (`ILendingPoolManager`, and `IERC20Metadata` for `transfer`) — never
+ * typed in by hand, so an ABI change moves it and the cross-check spec
+ * against the relay's own pins goes red.
  */
 const SPONSORED_CALL_SELECTORS = Object.freeze({
     withdrawal: LENDING_POOL_MANAGER$2.getSighash(FUNCTION_OF.withdrawal),
     cancel_deposit: LENDING_POOL_MANAGER$2.getSighash(FUNCTION_OF.cancel_deposit),
     cancel_withdrawal: LENDING_POOL_MANAGER$2.getSighash(FUNCTION_OF.cancel_withdrawal),
     withdraw_at_expiry: LENDING_POOL_MANAGER$2.getSighash(FUNCTION_OF.withdraw_at_expiry),
+    transfer: ERC20$2.getSighash('transfer'),
 });
 /**
  * What an encoder throws for an input it will not encode. `code` names the
@@ -24371,6 +24381,53 @@ function encodeWithdrawAtExpiryCall(lendingPoolManager, poolId, fixedTermDeposit
         toUint256(fixedTermDepositId, 'lock-id'),
     ]);
 }
+/**
+ * `stableAsset.transfer(to, amount)` — `transfer`: P2P Send of the chain's
+ * stable asset from the sender's own account (`msg.sender`) to `to`.
+ *
+ * `amount` is in the token's BASE units (6 decimals for USDC), and must be
+ * greater than zero. `to` must be a well-formed, non-zero address (a
+ * mixed-case one with a valid EIP-55 checksum). That is
+ * ALL this encoder judges, because it is all a pure function can know.
+ *
+ * The recipient POLICY is the relay's job and is deliberately not restated
+ * here: it refuses the sender's own account, the stable asset, the
+ * `LendingPoolManager`, the precompile range, any address with contract code
+ * (read on chain at submission), a sender our identity store does not hold
+ * as verified, and anything over the sender's daily count and amount caps.
+ * A call this encoder accepts can therefore still be refused — the app maps
+ * the relay's refusal codes to its own words.
+ *
+ * Pass `stableAsset` from the chain config (`CHAIN_CONFIGS[chain].stableAsset
+ * .address`) — the relay compares `to` against its own configured token and
+ * refuses any other contract.
+ */
+function encodeStableTransfer(input) {
+    assertAddress(input.stableAsset, 'stable-asset');
+    assertAddress(input.to, 'recipient');
+    // A mixed-case recipient carries an EIP-55 checksum, and one that does not
+    // match is a mistyped address: refuse it as `recipient` here rather than
+    // let the ABI coder throw its own error at the encode below.
+    try {
+        ethers.utils.getAddress(input.to);
+    }
+    catch (_a) {
+        throw new SponsoredCallInputError('recipient');
+    }
+    if (ethers.BigNumber.from(input.to).isZero()) {
+        throw new SponsoredCallInputError('zero-recipient');
+    }
+    const amount = toUint256(input.amount, 'amount');
+    if (amount.isZero())
+        throw new SponsoredCallInputError('zero-amount');
+    return {
+        kind: 'transfer',
+        call: {
+            to: input.stableAsset,
+            data: ERC20$2.encodeFunctionData('transfer', [input.to, amount]),
+        },
+    };
+}
 
 const ADDRESS_RE$1 = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/;
 /**
@@ -25102,26 +25159,33 @@ function sameAmount(a, b) {
  * this run's deposit.
  */
 function decodeCanonical(iface, name, data, code) {
-    let parsed;
-    try {
-        parsed = iface.parseTransaction({ data });
-    }
-    catch (_a) {
-        return mismatch(code);
-    }
-    if (parsed.name !== name)
-        return mismatch(code);
+    // Decode AND re-encode against the interface's OWN fragment for `name`,
+    // never through `parseTransaction`. ethers v5's `TransactionDescription`
+    // deep-copies its fields, and a fragment whose `inputs` array is not
+    // frozen comes out as a plain object. Under the CommonJS build (Node,
+    // jest) that copy still carries `format()`, because ES5 prototype methods
+    // are enumerable; under the ES-module build a browser bundler resolves
+    // (`lib.esm`, real classes) it carries no methods at all, so re-encoding
+    // `parsed.functionFragment` threw and EVERY batch was refused as
+    // `approve-call` in the browser (2.10.0, 2.10.1). With no description in
+    // the path, nothing here depends on which copied fields survive.
+    //
+    // `decodeFunctionData` refuses data whose selector is not this
+    // fragment's, so a call to any other function is `code`, as before.
+    let args;
     let canonical;
     try {
-        canonical = iface.encodeFunctionData(parsed.functionFragment, parsed.args);
+        const fragment = iface.getFunction(name);
+        args = iface.decodeFunctionData(fragment, data);
+        canonical = iface.encodeFunctionData(fragment, args);
     }
-    catch (_b) {
+    catch (_a) {
         return mismatch(code);
     }
     if (canonical.toLowerCase() !== data.toLowerCase()) {
         return mismatch('non-canonical-encoding');
     }
-    return parsed.args;
+    return args;
 }
 /**
  * Pin a deposit batch to the run that produced it — PURE; throws a
@@ -25595,7 +25659,10 @@ function checkBatchOutcome(transactionId, expect, ports) {
         }
         if (read.kind === 'reverted')
             return 'not-deposited';
-        if (read.kind !== 'mined' || typeof read.txHash !== 'string') {
+        // An empty hash is not an answer — `waitForMined` reads it the same way.
+        if (read.kind !== 'mined' ||
+            typeof read.txHash !== 'string' ||
+            read.txHash === '') {
             return 'unknown';
         }
         try {
@@ -25612,10 +25679,60 @@ function checkBatchOutcome(transactionId, expect, ports) {
         }
     });
 }
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// One sponsored call — withdraw, cancel, withdraw at expiry, transfer
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * `checkBatchOutcome` for ONE sponsored call — ONE status read, no polling —
+ * for an app's guard against sending the same request twice (a P2P transfer
+ * whose earlier submission ended PENDING, say):
+ *
+ * - `executed` — mined, and the receipt proves the sender's operation
+ *   succeeded (`proveUserOperationInReceipt`);
+ * - `not-executed` — definitively reverted (vendor status or the operation's
+ *   own flag);
+ * - `unknown` — anything else, including a read or receipt that failed, or a
+ *   receipt that does not show the sender's operation.
+ *
+ * Only `not-executed` may let a new attempt proceed unprompted; `executed`
+ * means the earlier one landed and the user should be told.
+ */
+function checkSponsoredCallOutcome(transactionId, expect, ports) {
+    return __awaiter(this, void 0, void 0, function* () {
+        var _a;
+        let read;
+        try {
+            read = yield ports.getStatus(transactionId);
+        }
+        catch (_b) {
+            return 'unknown';
+        }
+        if (read.kind === 'reverted')
+            return 'not-executed';
+        // An empty hash is not an answer — `waitForMined` reads it the same way.
+        if (read.kind !== 'mined' ||
+            typeof read.txHash !== 'string' ||
+            read.txHash === '') {
+            return 'unknown';
+        }
+        try {
+            const receipt = yield ports.getReceipt(read.txHash);
+            const proof = proveUserOperationInReceipt(receipt, Object.assign(Object.assign({}, expect), { userOperationHash: (_a = read.userOperationHash) !== null && _a !== void 0 ? _a : null }));
+            if (proof.kind === 'executed')
+                return 'executed';
+            if (proof.kind === 'reverted')
+                return 'not-executed';
+            return 'unknown';
+        }
+        catch (_c) {
+            return 'unknown';
+        }
+    });
+}
 /**
- * `submitBatch` for ONE sponsored `LendingPoolManager` call — the body of a
- * `WithdrawFlow` `submitCall` port, and of an app's cancel or
- * withdraw-at-expiry action. Same post, same polling policy, same outcome
+ * `submitBatch` for ONE sponsored call — the body of a `WithdrawFlow`
+ * `submitCall` port, of an app's cancel or withdraw-at-expiry action, and of
+ * a P2P transfer (`encodeStableTransfer`). Same post, same polling policy, same outcome
  * table; the proof is `proveUserOperationInReceipt` (the sender's operation
  * succeeded) instead of the deposit proof, and an unproven receipt is
  * `call_unproven:<reason>`.
@@ -25631,7 +25748,8 @@ function checkBatchOutcome(transactionId, expect, ports) {
  * The call is checked against its kind before anything is posted — a known
  * kind, exactly `{ to, data }`, and `data` opening with that kind's selector —
  * and a mismatch is `BatchSubmissionError('call_mismatch', 'failed')`: nothing
- * was sent. Build calls with `kasu.calls`, and this never fires.
+ * was sent. Build calls with `kasu.calls` (or `encodeStableTransfer`), and
+ * this never fires.
  *
  * As on the deposit path, nothing after the post ever produces `failed`.
  */
@@ -27610,7 +27728,9 @@ class StrategiesFacade {
         return {
             id: pool.id,
             name: pool.poolName,
+            subheading: nonEmptyOrUndefined(pool.subheading),
             description: pool.description,
+            liteDescription: nonEmptyOrUndefined(pool.liteDescription),
             isActive: pool.isActive,
             apy: pool.apy,
             tvl: pool.totalValueLocked,
@@ -27625,6 +27745,16 @@ class StrategiesFacade {
         };
     }
 }
+/**
+ * A CMS text field as a string, or `undefined` when it is absent, not a
+ * string, or empty (blank included) — the CMS stores an emptied field as `''`, and an empty
+ * subheading must read as "none", not render an empty line.
+ */
+function nonEmptyOrUndefined(value) {
+    return typeof value === 'string' && value.trim().length > 0
+        ? value
+        : undefined;
+}
 /**
  * A CMS "numeric" field as a finite number, or `null`. An empty or blank
  * string is UNAUTHORED, not zero.
@@ -29025,6 +29155,7 @@ exports.buildLoanAgreementSignMessage = buildLoanAgreementSignMessage;
 exports.cancelDeadline = cancelDeadline;
 exports.ceilToCents = ceilToCents;
 exports.checkBatchOutcome = checkBatchOutcome;
+exports.checkSponsoredCallOutcome = checkSponsoredCallOutcome;
 exports.classifyWalletFailure = classifyWalletFailure;
 exports.compareTrancheSeniority = compareTrancheSeniority;
 exports.computeSettlementWindow = computeSettlementWindow;
@@ -29038,6 +29169,7 @@ exports.encodeCancelDepositCall = encodeCancelDepositCall;
 exports.encodeCancelWithdrawalCall = encodeCancelWithdrawalCall;
 exports.encodeDepositData = encodeDepositData;
 exports.encodeRequestWithdrawalCall = encodeRequestWithdrawalCall;
+exports.encodeStableTransfer = encodeStableTransfer;
 exports.encodeWithdrawAtExpiryCall = encodeWithdrawAtExpiryCall;
 exports.epochRateToApy = epochRateToApy;
 exports.explorerAddressUrl = explorerAddressUrl;

package/dist/bundle.esm.js

@@ -24217,9 +24217,10 @@ class SdkConfig {
 }
 
 /**
- * The single-call `LendingPoolManager` requests a sponsored relay may carry,
- * encoded by the SDK so no application hand-builds calldata or hand-maps the
- * relay's `kind` for them.
+ * The single-call requests a sponsored relay may carry — the four
+ * `LendingPoolManager` requests, plus the stable asset's own `transfer` (P2P
+ * Send) — encoded by the SDK so no application hand-builds calldata or
+ * hand-maps the relay's `kind` for them.
  *
  * Every function here is PURE: addresses and ids in, `{ kind, call }` out.
  * Reading the chain (the shares a withdrawal is for) is the facade's job —
@@ -24247,6 +24248,11 @@ const SPONSORED_CALL_KINDS = [
     'cancel_withdrawal',
     /** `LendingPoolManager.requestFixedTermDepositWithdrawal(pool, lockId)`. */
     'withdraw_at_expiry',
+    /**
+     * `stableAsset.transfer(to, amount)` — P2P Send, to the chain's stable
+     * asset rather than the manager. See {@link encodeStableTransfer}.
+     */
+    'transfer',
 ];
 /**
  * Widened to the plain `Interface`: the typechain one overloads
@@ -24254,7 +24260,9 @@ const SPONSORED_CALL_KINDS = [
  * `FUNCTION_OF`.
  */
 const LENDING_POOL_MANAGER$2 = ILendingPoolManagerAbi__factory.createInterface();
-/** The `LendingPoolManager` function behind each kind. */
+/** The generated ERC-20 interface — the `transfer` kind's one function. */
+const ERC20$2 = IERC20MetadataAbi__factory.createInterface();
+/** The `LendingPoolManager` function behind each manager kind. */
 const FUNCTION_OF = Object.freeze({
     withdrawal: 'requestWithdrawal',
     cancel_deposit: 'cancelDepositRequest',
@@ -24263,14 +24271,16 @@ const FUNCTION_OF = Object.freeze({
 });
 /**
  * The 4-byte selector of each kind's function, DERIVED from the generated
- * `ILendingPoolManager` ABI — never typed in by hand, so an ABI change moves
- * it and the cross-check spec against the relay's own pins goes red.
+ * ABIs (`ILendingPoolManager`, and `IERC20Metadata` for `transfer`) — never
+ * typed in by hand, so an ABI change moves it and the cross-check spec
+ * against the relay's own pins goes red.
  */
 const SPONSORED_CALL_SELECTORS = Object.freeze({
     withdrawal: LENDING_POOL_MANAGER$2.getSighash(FUNCTION_OF.withdrawal),
     cancel_deposit: LENDING_POOL_MANAGER$2.getSighash(FUNCTION_OF.cancel_deposit),
     cancel_withdrawal: LENDING_POOL_MANAGER$2.getSighash(FUNCTION_OF.cancel_withdrawal),
     withdraw_at_expiry: LENDING_POOL_MANAGER$2.getSighash(FUNCTION_OF.withdraw_at_expiry),
+    transfer: ERC20$2.getSighash('transfer'),
 });
 /**
  * What an encoder throws for an input it will not encode. `code` names the
@@ -24369,6 +24379,53 @@ function encodeWithdrawAtExpiryCall(lendingPoolManager, poolId, fixedTermDeposit
         toUint256(fixedTermDepositId, 'lock-id'),
     ]);
 }
+/**
+ * `stableAsset.transfer(to, amount)` — `transfer`: P2P Send of the chain's
+ * stable asset from the sender's own account (`msg.sender`) to `to`.
+ *
+ * `amount` is in the token's BASE units (6 decimals for USDC), and must be
+ * greater than zero. `to` must be a well-formed, non-zero address (a
+ * mixed-case one with a valid EIP-55 checksum). That is
+ * ALL this encoder judges, because it is all a pure function can know.
+ *
+ * The recipient POLICY is the relay's job and is deliberately not restated
+ * here: it refuses the sender's own account, the stable asset, the
+ * `LendingPoolManager`, the precompile range, any address with contract code
+ * (read on chain at submission), a sender our identity store does not hold
+ * as verified, and anything over the sender's daily count and amount caps.
+ * A call this encoder accepts can therefore still be refused — the app maps
+ * the relay's refusal codes to its own words.
+ *
+ * Pass `stableAsset` from the chain config (`CHAIN_CONFIGS[chain].stableAsset
+ * .address`) — the relay compares `to` against its own configured token and
+ * refuses any other contract.
+ */
+function encodeStableTransfer(input) {
+    assertAddress(input.stableAsset, 'stable-asset');
+    assertAddress(input.to, 'recipient');
+    // A mixed-case recipient carries an EIP-55 checksum, and one that does not
+    // match is a mistyped address: refuse it as `recipient` here rather than
+    // let the ABI coder throw its own error at the encode below.
+    try {
+        utils$2.getAddress(input.to);
+    }
+    catch (_a) {
+        throw new SponsoredCallInputError('recipient');
+    }
+    if (BigNumber.from(input.to).isZero()) {
+        throw new SponsoredCallInputError('zero-recipient');
+    }
+    const amount = toUint256(input.amount, 'amount');
+    if (amount.isZero())
+        throw new SponsoredCallInputError('zero-amount');
+    return {
+        kind: 'transfer',
+        call: {
+            to: input.stableAsset,
+            data: ERC20$2.encodeFunctionData('transfer', [input.to, amount]),
+        },
+    };
+}
 
 const ADDRESS_RE$1 = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/;
 /**
@@ -25100,26 +25157,33 @@ function sameAmount(a, b) {
  * this run's deposit.
  */
 function decodeCanonical(iface, name, data, code) {
-    let parsed;
-    try {
-        parsed = iface.parseTransaction({ data });
-    }
-    catch (_a) {
-        return mismatch(code);
-    }
-    if (parsed.name !== name)
-        return mismatch(code);
+    // Decode AND re-encode against the interface's OWN fragment for `name`,
+    // never through `parseTransaction`. ethers v5's `TransactionDescription`
+    // deep-copies its fields, and a fragment whose `inputs` array is not
+    // frozen comes out as a plain object. Under the CommonJS build (Node,
+    // jest) that copy still carries `format()`, because ES5 prototype methods
+    // are enumerable; under the ES-module build a browser bundler resolves
+    // (`lib.esm`, real classes) it carries no methods at all, so re-encoding
+    // `parsed.functionFragment` threw and EVERY batch was refused as
+    // `approve-call` in the browser (2.10.0, 2.10.1). With no description in
+    // the path, nothing here depends on which copied fields survive.
+    //
+    // `decodeFunctionData` refuses data whose selector is not this
+    // fragment's, so a call to any other function is `code`, as before.
+    let args;
     let canonical;
     try {
-        canonical = iface.encodeFunctionData(parsed.functionFragment, parsed.args);
+        const fragment = iface.getFunction(name);
+        args = iface.decodeFunctionData(fragment, data);
+        canonical = iface.encodeFunctionData(fragment, args);
     }
-    catch (_b) {
+    catch (_a) {
         return mismatch(code);
     }
     if (canonical.toLowerCase() !== data.toLowerCase()) {
         return mismatch('non-canonical-encoding');
     }
-    return parsed.args;
+    return args;
 }
 /**
  * Pin a deposit batch to the run that produced it — PURE; throws a
@@ -25593,7 +25657,10 @@ function checkBatchOutcome(transactionId, expect, ports) {
         }
         if (read.kind === 'reverted')
             return 'not-deposited';
-        if (read.kind !== 'mined' || typeof read.txHash !== 'string') {
+        // An empty hash is not an answer — `waitForMined` reads it the same way.
+        if (read.kind !== 'mined' ||
+            typeof read.txHash !== 'string' ||
+            read.txHash === '') {
             return 'unknown';
         }
         try {
@@ -25610,10 +25677,60 @@ function checkBatchOutcome(transactionId, expect, ports) {
         }
     });
 }
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// One sponsored call — withdraw, cancel, withdraw at expiry, transfer
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * `checkBatchOutcome` for ONE sponsored call — ONE status read, no polling —
+ * for an app's guard against sending the same request twice (a P2P transfer
+ * whose earlier submission ended PENDING, say):
+ *
+ * - `executed` — mined, and the receipt proves the sender's operation
+ *   succeeded (`proveUserOperationInReceipt`);
+ * - `not-executed` — definitively reverted (vendor status or the operation's
+ *   own flag);
+ * - `unknown` — anything else, including a read or receipt that failed, or a
+ *   receipt that does not show the sender's operation.
+ *
+ * Only `not-executed` may let a new attempt proceed unprompted; `executed`
+ * means the earlier one landed and the user should be told.
+ */
+function checkSponsoredCallOutcome(transactionId, expect, ports) {
+    return __awaiter(this, void 0, void 0, function* () {
+        var _a;
+        let read;
+        try {
+            read = yield ports.getStatus(transactionId);
+        }
+        catch (_b) {
+            return 'unknown';
+        }
+        if (read.kind === 'reverted')
+            return 'not-executed';
+        // An empty hash is not an answer — `waitForMined` reads it the same way.
+        if (read.kind !== 'mined' ||
+            typeof read.txHash !== 'string' ||
+            read.txHash === '') {
+            return 'unknown';
+        }
+        try {
+            const receipt = yield ports.getReceipt(read.txHash);
+            const proof = proveUserOperationInReceipt(receipt, Object.assign(Object.assign({}, expect), { userOperationHash: (_a = read.userOperationHash) !== null && _a !== void 0 ? _a : null }));
+            if (proof.kind === 'executed')
+                return 'executed';
+            if (proof.kind === 'reverted')
+                return 'not-executed';
+            return 'unknown';
+        }
+        catch (_c) {
+            return 'unknown';
+        }
+    });
+}
 /**
- * `submitBatch` for ONE sponsored `LendingPoolManager` call — the body of a
- * `WithdrawFlow` `submitCall` port, and of an app's cancel or
- * withdraw-at-expiry action. Same post, same polling policy, same outcome
+ * `submitBatch` for ONE sponsored call — the body of a `WithdrawFlow`
+ * `submitCall` port, of an app's cancel or withdraw-at-expiry action, and of
+ * a P2P transfer (`encodeStableTransfer`). Same post, same polling policy, same outcome
  * table; the proof is `proveUserOperationInReceipt` (the sender's operation
  * succeeded) instead of the deposit proof, and an unproven receipt is
  * `call_unproven:<reason>`.
@@ -25629,7 +25746,8 @@ function checkBatchOutcome(transactionId, expect, ports) {
  * The call is checked against its kind before anything is posted — a known
  * kind, exactly `{ to, data }`, and `data` opening with that kind's selector —
  * and a mismatch is `BatchSubmissionError('call_mismatch', 'failed')`: nothing
- * was sent. Build calls with `kasu.calls`, and this never fires.
+ * was sent. Build calls with `kasu.calls` (or `encodeStableTransfer`), and
+ * this never fires.
  *
  * As on the deposit path, nothing after the post ever produces `failed`.
  */
@@ -27608,7 +27726,9 @@ class StrategiesFacade {
         return {
             id: pool.id,
             name: pool.poolName,
+            subheading: nonEmptyOrUndefined(pool.subheading),
             description: pool.description,
+            liteDescription: nonEmptyOrUndefined(pool.liteDescription),
             isActive: pool.isActive,
             apy: pool.apy,
             tvl: pool.totalValueLocked,
@@ -27623,6 +27743,16 @@ class StrategiesFacade {
         };
     }
 }
+/**
+ * A CMS text field as a string, or `undefined` when it is absent, not a
+ * string, or empty (blank included) — the CMS stores an emptied field as `''`, and an empty
+ * subheading must read as "none", not render an empty line.
+ */
+function nonEmptyOrUndefined(value) {
+    return typeof value === 'string' && value.trim().length > 0
+        ? value
+        : undefined;
+}
 /**
  * A CMS "numeric" field as a finite number, or `null`. An empty or blank
  * string is UNAUTHORED, not zero.
@@ -28963,4 +29093,4 @@ function weightedAverageApy(slices) {
     return weighted / totalBalance;
 }
 
-export { APXIUM, AU_ALPHA3, AU_MIN_CUMULATIVE_BY_STABLE, BatchPendingError, BatchRevertedError, BatchSubmissionError, CHAIN_CONFIGS, CLEARING_WINDOW_SECONDS, CONTRACT_TTL_MS, CallsFacade, DAYS_PER_EPOCH, DAYS_PER_MONTH, DEFAULT_BATCH_POLLING_POLICY, DepositBatchMismatchError, DepositFlow, DepositsFacade, ENTRY_POINT_V07, EPOCHS_IN_YEAR, Flow, FlowStore, FlowsFacade, INVALID_ACCEPTANCE_SIGNATURE_MESSAGE, INVALID_AUTH_SIGNATURE_MESSAGE, INVOICEMATE, Kasu, KasuSdk, MAX_LENDING_AMOUNT_FALLBACK, MIN_DAYS_FOR_MONTHS, MIN_LENDING_AMOUNT_FALLBACK, MIN_TRANCHE_CAPACITY, NOT_A_WITHDRAWAL_CALL_MESSAGE, NO_DIRECTUS_URL_MESSAGE, NO_KYC_PARAMS_MESSAGE, NO_SPENDER_MESSAGE, NO_WITHDRAWAL_ENCODER_MESSAGE, PortfolioFacade, READ_ONLY_MESSAGE, RIXON_CAPITAL, SECONDS_PER_WEEK, SPONSORED_CALL_KINDS, SPONSORED_CALL_SELECTORS, SdkConfig, SponsoredCallInputError, StrategiesFacade, UPPER_MEZZANINE, WithdrawFlow, accruedInterest, apyToEpochRate, asContractType, auMinimumRemaining, auThresholdFor, availableFixedTermConfigs, batchOutcomeOf, buildContractVersionType, buildFullNameRequestMessage, buildLegacyContractRequestMessage, buildLoanAgreementSignMessage, cancelDeadline, ceilToCents, checkBatchOutcome, classifyWalletFailure, compareTrancheSeniority, computeSettlementWindow, countSubmissions, dailyInterest, decodeRevert, deriveCycleDates, derivePoolStatus, deriveRequestState, encodeCancelDepositCall, encodeCancelWithdrawalCall, encodeDepositData, encodeRequestWithdrawalCall, encodeWithdrawAtExpiryCall, epochRateToApy, explorerAddressUrl, explorerTxUrl, extractRevertData, fetchUnusedPoolIds, firstSubmissionTimestamp, floorToCents, formatSignTimestampUtc, getCreditOriginator, getInstitutionalLender, getStrategyRegion, getTrancheDisplayName, isAuMinimumExempt, isAustralianKyc, isBelowMinimumCapacity, isCycleClosed, isDefinitivelyNotSubmitted, isFixedTermConfigId, isUnpredictableGas, isUserRejected, lastEventTimestamp, lockDurationDays, lockDurationMonths, maxNetRateCeiling, netEffectiveApy, netTrancheApyBounds, nextCycleBoundary, parseFormattedMessage, parseMinorUnits, parseTrancheBound, pickDefaultTrancheId, pickHighestYieldTranche, poolAllTranchesFull, poolMaxApy, projectedAnnualEarnings, proveDepositInReceipt, proveUserOperationInReceipt, resolveBoundShortcuts, resolveDepositBounds, selectVisiblePools, submissionEvents, submitBatch, submitSponsoredCall, trancheApyBounds, trancheHasCapacity, trancheRiskRank, validateDepositBatchCalls, weeklyInterest, weightedAverageApy };
+export { APXIUM, AU_ALPHA3, AU_MIN_CUMULATIVE_BY_STABLE, BatchPendingError, BatchRevertedError, BatchSubmissionError, CHAIN_CONFIGS, CLEARING_WINDOW_SECONDS, CONTRACT_TTL_MS, CallsFacade, DAYS_PER_EPOCH, DAYS_PER_MONTH, DEFAULT_BATCH_POLLING_POLICY, DepositBatchMismatchError, DepositFlow, DepositsFacade, ENTRY_POINT_V07, EPOCHS_IN_YEAR, Flow, FlowStore, FlowsFacade, INVALID_ACCEPTANCE_SIGNATURE_MESSAGE, INVALID_AUTH_SIGNATURE_MESSAGE, INVOICEMATE, Kasu, KasuSdk, MAX_LENDING_AMOUNT_FALLBACK, MIN_DAYS_FOR_MONTHS, MIN_LENDING_AMOUNT_FALLBACK, MIN_TRANCHE_CAPACITY, NOT_A_WITHDRAWAL_CALL_MESSAGE, NO_DIRECTUS_URL_MESSAGE, NO_KYC_PARAMS_MESSAGE, NO_SPENDER_MESSAGE, NO_WITHDRAWAL_ENCODER_MESSAGE, PortfolioFacade, READ_ONLY_MESSAGE, RIXON_CAPITAL, SECONDS_PER_WEEK, SPONSORED_CALL_KINDS, SPONSORED_CALL_SELECTORS, SdkConfig, SponsoredCallInputError, StrategiesFacade, UPPER_MEZZANINE, WithdrawFlow, accruedInterest, apyToEpochRate, asContractType, auMinimumRemaining, auThresholdFor, availableFixedTermConfigs, batchOutcomeOf, buildContractVersionType, buildFullNameRequestMessage, buildLegacyContractRequestMessage, buildLoanAgreementSignMessage, cancelDeadline, ceilToCents, checkBatchOutcome, checkSponsoredCallOutcome, classifyWalletFailure, compareTrancheSeniority, computeSettlementWindow, countSubmissions, dailyInterest, decodeRevert, deriveCycleDates, derivePoolStatus, deriveRequestState, encodeCancelDepositCall, encodeCancelWithdrawalCall, encodeDepositData, encodeRequestWithdrawalCall, encodeStableTransfer, encodeWithdrawAtExpiryCall, epochRateToApy, explorerAddressUrl, explorerTxUrl, extractRevertData, fetchUnusedPoolIds, firstSubmissionTimestamp, floorToCents, formatSignTimestampUtc, getCreditOriginator, getInstitutionalLender, getStrategyRegion, getTrancheDisplayName, isAuMinimumExempt, isAustralianKyc, isBelowMinimumCapacity, isCycleClosed, isDefinitivelyNotSubmitted, isFixedTermConfigId, isUnpredictableGas, isUserRejected, lastEventTimestamp, lockDurationDays, lockDurationMonths, maxNetRateCeiling, netEffectiveApy, netTrancheApyBounds, nextCycleBoundary, parseFormattedMessage, parseMinorUnits, parseTrancheBound, pickDefaultTrancheId, pickHighestYieldTranche, poolAllTranchesFull, poolMaxApy, projectedAnnualEarnings, proveDepositInReceipt, proveUserOperationInReceipt, resolveBoundShortcuts, resolveDepositBounds, selectVisiblePools, submissionEvents, submitBatch, submitSponsoredCall, trancheApyBounds, trancheHasCapacity, trancheRiskRank, validateDepositBatchCalls, weeklyInterest, weightedAverageApy };

package/dist/domain/batch-proof.js

@@ -98,26 +98,33 @@ function sameAmount(a, b) {
  * this run's deposit.
  */
 function decodeCanonical(iface, name, data, code) {
-    let parsed;
-    try {
-        parsed = iface.parseTransaction({ data });
-    }
-    catch (_a) {
-        return mismatch(code);
-    }
-    if (parsed.name !== name)
-        return mismatch(code);
+    // Decode AND re-encode against the interface's OWN fragment for `name`,
+    // never through `parseTransaction`. ethers v5's `TransactionDescription`
+    // deep-copies its fields, and a fragment whose `inputs` array is not
+    // frozen comes out as a plain object. Under the CommonJS build (Node,
+    // jest) that copy still carries `format()`, because ES5 prototype methods
+    // are enumerable; under the ES-module build a browser bundler resolves
+    // (`lib.esm`, real classes) it carries no methods at all, so re-encoding
+    // `parsed.functionFragment` threw and EVERY batch was refused as
+    // `approve-call` in the browser (2.10.0, 2.10.1). With no description in
+    // the path, nothing here depends on which copied fields survive.
+    //
+    // `decodeFunctionData` refuses data whose selector is not this
+    // fragment's, so a call to any other function is `code`, as before.
+    let args;
     let canonical;
     try {
-        canonical = iface.encodeFunctionData(parsed.functionFragment, parsed.args);
+        const fragment = iface.getFunction(name);
+        args = iface.decodeFunctionData(fragment, data);
+        canonical = iface.encodeFunctionData(fragment, args);
     }
-    catch (_b) {
+    catch (_a) {
         return mismatch(code);
     }
     if (canonical.toLowerCase() !== data.toLowerCase()) {
         return mismatch('non-canonical-encoding');
     }
-    return parsed.args;
+    return args;
 }
 /**
  * Pin a deposit batch to the run that produced it — PURE; throws a