@kaditang/402sentinel-mcp 0.3.0 → 0.5.0

package/README.md

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ Tools — vet the **seller**:
 Tools — vet the **payment itself** (buyer-side):
 - `firewall` ($0.002) — should YOUR agent make THIS payment now? Catches fraudulent routing (payTo swapped vs the address you usually pay), drain velocity, overcharge, and injection-sourced instructions. Pass your payer wallet as `agent_id`.
 - `firewall_record` (free) — seed your agent's payment history so the firewall has a behavioural baseline.
+- `firewall_outcome` (free) — after a verdict, report what actually happened (fraud / legit / …) so the firewall learns which signals are predictive and downweights noisy ones (safety signals stay deterministic).
 
 It's a thin client for the hosted service at **https://402sentinel.com** — the
 scoring model and facilitator-identification logic live server-side (closed); this

package/dist/index.js

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ const TOOLS = [
     },
     {
         name: "firewall",
-        description: "Buyer-side payment firewall: should YOUR agent make THIS payment now? Where assess_counterparty vets the seller, this vets the payment instruction in the context of your agent's own history + provenance. Returns allow/hold/block + signals: routing_anomaly (payTo swapped vs the address you usually pay for this resource = fraudulent routing), velocity_anomaly (drain), amount_anomaly (overcharge), provenance_flag (injection/untrusted source), counterparty_risk. Pass your payer wallet as agent_id. Costs $0.002. Seed history free with firewall_record.",
+        description: "Buyer-side payment firewall: should YOUR agent make THIS payment now? Where assess_counterparty vets the seller, this vets the payment instruction in the context of your agent's own history + provenance. Returns allow/hold/block + signals: routing_anomaly (payTo swapped vs the address you usually pay = fraudulent routing), velocity_anomaly (drain), amount_anomaly (overcharge), provenance_flag, counterparty_risk, injection_destination (if the payTo appears in the untrusted page/tool-output you're acting on, the destination was injected — pass it as context.untrusted_text), intent_mismatch (pass context.intended={payto,max_amount} so a mid-flight redirect is caught), new_counterparty_burst, recurring_flagged (poisoned-memory loop). STRONGLY recommended: pass untrusted_text + intended to catch prompt-injection payments. Pass your payer wallet as agent_id. Costs $0.002. Seed history free with firewall_record.",
         inputSchema: {
             type: "object",
             required: ["agent_id", "payment"],
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ const TOOLS = [
                         source: { type: "string", enum: ["tool_output", "web_content", "user", "unknown"], description: "where the payTo/instruction came from" },
                         metadata: { type: "object", description: "x402 description/reason strings (scanned for injection)" },
                         expected_payto: { type: "string", description: "known-good address for this resource (optional)" },
+                        untrusted_text: { type: "string", description: "the page/tool-output content you're acting on — if the payTo appears in it, the destination was injected (hard block)" },
+                        intended: { type: "object", description: "what you meant to do: { payto, max_amount } — any deviation = mid-flight redirect (hard block)", properties: { payto: { type: "string" }, max_amount: { type: "number" } } },
                     },
                 },
                 policy: {
@@ -175,6 +177,20 @@ const TOOLS = [
         endpoint: "/api/firewall/record",
         paid: false,
     },
+    {
+        name: "firewall_outcome",
+        description: "FREE. After a firewall verdict, report what actually happened so 402Sentinel learns which signals are predictive and downweights noisy ones (hard-block safety signals stay deterministic). Pass the assessment_id (fw_…) from a prior firewall call.",
+        inputSchema: {
+            type: "object",
+            required: ["assessment_id", "outcome"],
+            properties: {
+                assessment_id: { type: "string", description: "the fw_… id from a prior firewall call" },
+                outcome: { type: "string", enum: ["fraud", "confirmed_fraud", "not_delivered", "overcharged", "drained", "scam", "delivered", "legit", "fine"], description: "bad: fraud/confirmed_fraud/not_delivered/overcharged/drained/scam · good: delivered/legit/fine" },
+            },
+        },
+        endpoint: "/api/firewall/outcome",
+        paid: false,
+    },
 ];
 function clientOrNull() {
     if (!RAW_PK || RAW_PK.startsWith("0xYour"))
@@ -183,7 +199,7 @@ function clientOrNull() {
     return new GatewayClient({ chain: "base", privateKey: pk });
 }
 async function main() {
-    const server = new Server({ name: "402sentinel", version: "0.3.0" }, { capabilities: { tools: {} } });
+    const server = new Server({ name: "402sentinel", version: "0.5.0" }, { capabilities: { tools: {} } });
     server.setRequestHandler(ListToolsRequestSchema, async () => ({
         tools: TOOLS.map(({ name, description, inputSchema }) => ({ name, description, inputSchema })),
     }));

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@kaditang/402sentinel-mcp",
-  "version": "0.3.0",
+  "version": "0.5.0",
   "description": "MCP tools for x402 payment safety — vet the counterparty (risk score, allow/review/block, spending policy) AND vet the payment itself (buyer-side firewall: routing/drain/injection). Thin client for 402sentinel.com.",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": { "402sentinel-mcp": "./dist/index.js" },