@juspay/neurolink 11.13.0 → 11.13.2

package/dist/lib/utils/logSanitize.js

@@ -1,555 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Shared log-sanitization helpers.
- *
- * Centralises truncate + secret-redaction patterns so every provider stays
- * consistent and any regex improvements only need one change.
- *
- * Coverage:
- *   - `Authorization: Bearer <token>` (with required whitespace)
- *   - `Authorization: Token <token>` (Replicate uses this, not Bearer)
- *   - `Authorization: Basic <base64>` (D-ID and similar)
- *   - Bare tokens by known provider prefix:
- *     sk-/pk- (OpenAI, Anthropic, Stability),
- *     r8_ (Replicate), gsk_ (Groq), xai- (xAI), tgp_ (Together),
- *     fw_ (Fireworks), pplx- (Perplexity), pa- (Voyage),
- *     jina_ (Jina), fish- (Fish Audio)
- *   - Generic key=value pairs: api_key=…, access_token: …, secret_key=…
- */
-import { createHash } from "crypto";
-import { basename, resolve as resolvePath } from "path";
-const TOKEN_PREFIXES = [
-    "sk",
-    "pk",
-    "r8",
-    "gsk",
-    "xai",
-    "tgp",
-    "fw",
-    "pplx",
-    "pa",
-    "jina",
-    "fish",
-];
-const PREFIX_PATTERN = TOKEN_PREFIXES.join("|");
-/**
- * Pattern matching common bearer/API-key tokens in plain text.
- *
- * Case-insensitive (`i` flag) since header names ("Authorization") and scheme
- * names ("Bearer", "Token", "Basic") are sometimes lower-cased in error
- * bodies. `g` flag for replace-all.
- */
-const SECRET_PATTERN = new RegExp(
-// Authorization schemes — required whitespace between scheme and value
-"\\bBearer\\s+[A-Za-z0-9_\\-\\.]{8,}\\b" +
-    "|\\bToken\\s+[A-Za-z0-9_\\-\\.]{8,}\\b" +
-    "|\\bBasic\\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{12,}\\b" +
-    // Bare tokens by known prefix (e.g. `sk-abc…`, `r8_xyz…`)
-    `|\\b(?:${PREFIX_PATTERN})[_\\-][A-Za-z0-9_\\-\\.]{8,}\\b` +
-    // Generic key=value pairs (URL params, JSON bodies, header dumps)
-    "|\\b(?:api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|secret[_-]?key|refresh[_-]?token)\\s*[:=]\\s*['\"]?[^\\s,;'\"&]+", "gi");
-/** Header names that should always be redacted regardless of value shape. */
-const SENSITIVE_HEADER_NAMES = [
-    "authorization",
-    "cookie",
-    "set-cookie",
-    "x-api-key",
-    "api-key",
-    "apikey",
-    "x-auth-token",
-    "x-csrf-token",
-];
-/** Object keys that should always be redacted regardless of value shape. */
-const SENSITIVE_OBJECT_KEYS = [
-    "apikey",
-    "api_key",
-    "apiKey",
-    "access_token",
-    "accessToken",
-    "refresh_token",
-    "refreshToken",
-    "secret",
-    "secretkey",
-    "secret_key",
-    "secretKey",
-    "password",
-    "authorization",
-    "oauth",
-    "oauthToken",
-    "credentials",
-    "authContext",
-    "authToken",
-    "sessionToken",
-    "serviceAccountKey",
-    "secretAccessKey",
-    // PII, not a secret — but it has no business in debug log dumps.
-    "userEmail",
-];
-/**
- * Truncate `text` to `maxLen` chars then replace embedded secrets with `***`.
- *
- * Use this for free-form text logged from response/request bodies. For
- * structured data (records, headers) prefer {@link sanitizeRecord} and
- * {@link sanitizeHeaders} which know to redact by key name as well.
- *
- * @param text   - Raw text to sanitize (typically an HTTP response body).
- * @param maxLen - Maximum number of characters to keep (default 500).
- */
-export function sanitizeForLog(text, maxLen = 500) {
-    if (!text) {
-        return text;
-    }
-    return text.slice(0, maxLen).replace(SECRET_PATTERN, "***");
-}
-/**
- * Stringify non-string message/tool content without ever throwing.
- * JSON.stringify on a giant multimodal/tool-result payload can exceed V8's
- * maximum string length and throw `RangeError: Invalid string length` — a
- * generation turn must degrade to a placeholder, not abort, when that
- * happens. Shared by the SDK core and providers (single source of truth).
- */
-export function stringifyContentSafe(content) {
-    if (typeof content === "string") {
-        return content;
-    }
-    try {
-        return JSON.stringify(content) ?? String(content);
-    }
-    catch {
-        return "[content too large to serialize]";
-    }
-}
-/**
- * Serialize an arbitrary value for a debug log without ever throwing or
- * producing an unbounded string.
- *
- * `JSON.stringify` on a full options object (conversation history + tool
- * outputs) can exceed V8's maximum string length and throw
- * `RangeError: Invalid string length`, which — when evaluated eagerly inside
- * a logger call — aborts the surrounding generation turn (observed in
- * production). This helper caps the output and converts any stringify
- * failure (RangeError, circular structure, BigInt, …) into a placeholder.
- *
- * Callers MUST still gate on `logger.shouldLog("debug")` per the Logger
- * Guard rule — this helper makes serialization safe, not free.
- *
- * @param value  - Arbitrary value to serialize.
- * @param maxLen - Maximum number of characters to keep (default 10 000).
- */
-export function safeDebugSerialize(value, maxLen = 10_000) {
-    try {
-        const json = JSON.stringify(value);
-        if (json === undefined) {
-            return String(value);
-        }
-        return json.length > maxLen
-            ? `${json.slice(0, maxLen)}…[truncated ${json.length - maxLen} chars]`
-            : json;
-    }
-    catch (error) {
-        return `[unserializable: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}]`;
-    }
-}
-/**
- * Strip embedded `user:pass@` credentials from a URL's authority component
- * before logging it or surfacing it in a user-facing error.
- *
- * Turns `https://user:secret@host/path` into `https://***@host/path` while
- * leaving credential-free URLs untouched, so the host/port/path stay useful
- * for diagnostics. Use this for any `baseURL`/endpoint a caller may have
- * supplied with inline credentials. The match is global, so every `//…@`
- * authority in the string is redacted (e.g. a proxy chain or a URL embedded
- * in a query parameter), not just the first. IPv6 literal hosts (`//u:p@[::1]/x`)
- * and percent-encoded userinfo (`//u:p%40x@host/x`) are handled naturally —
- * neither `[`/`]` nor `%` stop either pass below, so the bracketed host or
- * encoded byte just rides along as part of the (non-redacted) remainder.
- *
- * This is best-effort defense-in-depth for free-form logging, deliberately
- * regex-based so it can scrub *multiple* embedded authorities out of
- * arbitrary text (a real URL parser only ever parses one URL at a time).
- * It is NOT the primary protection for user-facing errors — that's
- * {@link redactUrlForError}, which parses the single input via `new URL()`
- * and reconstructs from protocol+host+pathname, never touching userinfo at
- * all. Prefer that function whenever the input is known to be exactly one
- * URL.
- *
- * Two passes, deliberately:
- *  1. Well-formed authorities — credentials with no raw `/` — bounded at the
- *     authority's first `/` (or string end). Greedy backtracking naturally
- *     absorbs multiple `@` segments within one authority (e.g. `//a@b@host`
- *     → `//***@host`) while leaving a second, separate `//...@` authority
- *     elsewhere in the string (e.g. one embedded in a query parameter)
- *     untouched, because pass 1's own exclusion of `/` stops it at the first
- *     `/`, before it can ever reach a nested authority.
- *  2. Malformed authorities whose credentials contain an unescaped `/`
- *     (e.g. `//user:sec/ret@host/path`) — pass 1 can't find an `@` before
- *     hitting that `/`, so this pass allows `/` and redacts up to the last
- *     remaining `@`. It stops before any *nested* `//` (via a negative
- *     lookahead) rather than excluding a specific character like `*` —
- *     excluding a literal character is what let a password containing both
- *     `/` and `*` (e.g. `//user:pa*ss/word@host/path`, legal under RFC 3986)
- *     slip through both passes entirely in an earlier version of this
- *     function.
- *
- * @param url - The URL (or URL-shaped string) to redact.
- */
-export function redactUrlCredentials(url) {
-    const wellFormed = url.replace(/\/\/[^/\s"'<>]*@/g, "//***@");
-    return wellFormed.replace(/\/\/(?:(?!\/\/)[^\s"'<>])*@/g, "//***@");
-}
-/**
- * Reduce a URL to its origin + pathname for safe inclusion in error messages
- * and logs, dropping the query string and fragment — where presigned-URL
- * signatures, SAS tokens, and other secrets commonly live — while keeping
- * enough of the URL (scheme, host, path) for the error to stay diagnostic.
- *
- * Falls back to a best-effort redacted string (query/fragment and
- * `user:pass@` stripped) when the input isn't a parseable absolute URL.
- * Either way the result is capped at 200 chars so a very long host/path
- * can't blow up the error message.
- *
- * @param url - The URL (or URL-shaped string) to redact.
- */
-export function redactUrlForError(url) {
-    const truncate = (s) => s.length > 200 ? `${s.slice(0, 200)}…` : s;
-    try {
-        const parsed = new URL(url);
-        // Reconstruct explicitly from protocol + host + pathname — never
-        // parsed.username/parsed.password, and never parsed.href (which
-        // re-serializes any embedded userinfo) — so a `user:pass@host` in the
-        // input can't leak into a diagnostic error message.
-        return truncate(`${parsed.protocol}//${parsed.host}${parsed.pathname}`);
-    }
-    catch {
-        // Unparseable input: `new URL()` gave us nothing to work with, so
-        // best-effort drop the query/fragment (where secrets like tokens live)
-        // and strip any `//user:pass@` segment before falling back to the raw
-        // string — never echo the input completely unredacted.
-        const withoutQueryOrFragment = url.split(/[?#]/)[0];
-        return truncate(redactUrlCredentials(withoutQueryOrFragment));
-    }
-}
-/**
- * Query-parameter names that commonly carry authentication/signature
- * secrets in presigned URLs, matched case-insensitively: generic
- * `token`/`signature`, AWS SigV4 (`X-Amz-Signature`, `X-Amz-Credential`,
- * `X-Amz-Security-Token`, and the legacy `AWSAccessKeyId`/`Signature`/
- * `Expires` query-auth params), Azure SAS (`sig`/`se`/`sp`/`sr`/`sv`), and
- * GCS V4 signed URLs (`X-Goog-Signature`, `X-Goog-Credential`,
- * `X-Goog-Algorithm`, `X-Goog-Date`, `X-Goog-Expires`,
- * `X-Goog-SignedHeaders`).
- *
- * Unlike {@link redactUrlForError} (which drops the *entire* query string
- * for a one-off error message), this is used where a URL is normalized
- * into a long-lived in-memory cache key — content-varying query params
- * must survive so distinct resources still get distinct keys, but a
- * presigned URL's secret must never persist as a Map key for the process
- * lifetime.
- */
-export const SENSITIVE_URL_QUERY_PARAM_DENYLIST = [
-    "token",
-    "signature",
-    "x-amz-signature",
-    "x-amz-credential",
-    "x-amz-security-token",
-    "awsaccesskeyid",
-    "expires",
-    "sig",
-    "se",
-    "sp",
-    "sr",
-    "sv",
-    "x-goog-signature",
-    "x-goog-credential",
-    "x-goog-algorithm",
-    "x-goog-date",
-    "x-goog-expires",
-    "x-goog-signedheaders",
-];
-/** Common tracking/analytics query params that don't affect the fetched
- * content, so two URLs differing only by these should map to the same
- * cache key rather than missing each other. */
-const TRACKING_URL_QUERY_PARAMS = [
-    "utm_source",
-    "utm_medium",
-    "utm_campaign",
-    "utm_term",
-    "utm_content",
-    "fbclid",
-    "gclid",
-    "_ga",
-];
-/**
- * Strip common tracking/analytics query params (`utm_*`, `fbclid`, `gclid`,
- * `_ga`) from `parsed` in place, so callers that build a cache key from a
- * URL don't miss a cache hit solely because two otherwise-identical URLs
- * carry different tracking noise.
- *
- * Shared by `ImageCache.normalizeUrl` and `fileDetector.cacheKeyForUrl` —
- * both build a long-lived in-memory cache key from a URL and should
- * normalize tracking params the same way. Call this before
- * {@link stripSensitiveUrlParamsForCacheKey} so both normalizations apply
- * consistently regardless of caller.
- *
- * @param parsed - A `URL` instance to strip tracking params from in place.
- */
-export function stripTrackingParams(parsed) {
-    TRACKING_URL_QUERY_PARAMS.forEach((param) => parsed.searchParams.delete(param));
-}
-/**
- * Build a secret-free, but still auth-context-distinct, cache key from a
- * URL that may carry presigned-URL secrets in its query string.
- *
- * Naively stripping {@link SENSITIVE_URL_QUERY_PARAM_DENYLIST} params before
- * using a URL as a long-lived cache key (an earlier version of this code did
- * exactly that) creates a correctness bug, not just a hygiene one: two
- * *different* presigned URLs for the same underlying object — e.g. one
- * whose signature has since expired or been revoked, and a fresh one —
- * strip down to the *same* key and collide. A cache populated under the
- * first would silently serve its bytes back for the second, without ever
- * revalidating against the origin.
- *
- * Fix: still remove the sensitive params from `parsed` in place (so the
- * plaintext key never retains a raw secret — the original goal), but fold a
- * short, non-reversible hash of the *removed* key=value pairs into the
- * returned suffix whenever any were present, so distinct auth contexts keep
- * distinct cache keys. Two requests presenting the exact same secret value
- * still collide (correct — that's genuinely the same authorized request);
- * two different secret values for the same object no longer do.
- *
- * Callers combine the return value with the now-stripped `parsed.toString()`
- * to form the final cache key (see `ImageCache.normalizeUrl` and
- * `fileDetector.cacheKeyForUrl`), rather than this function returning the
- * full key itself, so each caller can apply its own additional
- * normalization (e.g. tracking-param removal) in between.
- *
- * Matching against {@link SENSITIVE_URL_QUERY_PARAM_DENYLIST} is
- * case-insensitive (both the denylist lookup and the value folded into the
- * hash lower-case the param name), so the original casing of a sensitive
- * param's name is not preserved anywhere in the returned key. That's fine
- * here — this produces a cache key, not a user-facing URL, and the same
- * lower-cased name always hashes to the same suffix for the same value
- * regardless of how the caller happened to case it (`Token=` vs `token=`).
- * Non-sensitive params left on `parsed` keep their original casing untouched.
- *
- * @param parsed - A `URL` instance to strip sensitive params from in place.
- * @returns "" when no sensitive params were present; otherwise a short hex
- *   suffix — prefixed with `\0` (a byte `URL#toString()` never emits, since
- *   every URL component is percent-encoded, so it can't collide with real
- *   URL content) — to append to the caller's cache key.
- */
-export function stripSensitiveUrlParamsForCacheKey(parsed) {
-    const strippedPairs = [];
-    const keysToDelete = [];
-    for (const [key, value] of parsed.searchParams.entries()) {
-        if (SENSITIVE_URL_QUERY_PARAM_DENYLIST.includes(key.toLowerCase())) {
-            strippedPairs.push(`${key.toLowerCase()}=${value}`);
-            keysToDelete.push(key);
-        }
-    }
-    if (strippedPairs.length === 0) {
-        return "";
-    }
-    keysToDelete.forEach((key) => parsed.searchParams.delete(key));
-    // Sort so key order in the original URL doesn't affect the hash — the
-    // same *set* of secret values must always hash to the same suffix.
-    strippedPairs.sort();
-    const hash = createHash("sha256")
-        .update(strippedPairs.join("&"))
-        .digest("hex")
-        .slice(0, 16);
-    return `\0auth=${hash}`;
-}
-/**
- * Build a secret-free, auth-context-distinct cache key from a URL, for any
- * caller that needs a long-lived in-memory Map key derived from a URL.
- *
- * Centralizes the exact sequence both existing callers used independently:
- * parse via `new URL()`, strip tracking noise ({@link stripTrackingParams}),
- * then strip and hash-suffix sensitive auth params
- * ({@link stripSensitiveUrlParamsForCacheKey}) so distinct presigned URLs for
- * the same object don't collide (see that function's doc comment for why a
- * naive strip-only approach is a correctness bug, not just a hygiene one).
- *
- * Shared by `ImageCache.normalizeUrl` and `fileDetector.cacheKeyForUrl` — both
- * build a cache key from a URL and must normalize it identically, or the same
- * URL could hash to two different keys depending on which cache looked it up.
- *
- * Falls back to the raw `url` string unchanged when it isn't a parseable
- * absolute URL (mirrors both callers' pre-existing catch behavior).
- *
- * @param url - The URL (or URL-shaped string) to normalize into a cache key.
- */
-export function normalizeUrlForCache(url) {
-    try {
-        const parsed = new URL(url);
-        stripTrackingParams(parsed);
-        const authSuffix = stripSensitiveUrlParamsForCacheKey(parsed);
-        return parsed.toString() + authSuffix;
-    }
-    catch {
-        return url;
-    }
-}
-/**
- * Scrub any embedded absolute URLs out of free-form text — typically the
- * `.message` of an underlying network/DNS/TLS error thrown by `fetch`,
- * undici's `request()`, or Node's resolver, all of which frequently embed
- * the full request URL (query string, credentials, and all) verbatim.
- * Interpolating that message raw into a thrown or logged error would leak a
- * presigned URL's token even after the explicit URL argument was already
- * redacted via {@link redactUrlForError}. Finds each `scheme://…` run in the
- * text and replaces it with its redacted form.
- *
- * @param text - Free-form text (typically `Error.message`) to scrub.
- */
-export function redactUrlsInText(text) {
-    return text.replace(/[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*:\/\/[^\s"'<>)]+/g, (match) => redactUrlForError(match));
-}
-/**
- * Redact every occurrence of `filePath` from an error message, checking both
- * the path exactly as given and its `path.resolve()`'d form.
- *
- * Node's own fs errors (ENOENT/EACCES) embed the exact string passed to the
- * fs call, so a plain substring match usually suffices — but wrapped or
- * lower-level errors sometimes normalize the path first (relative→absolute,
- * trailing-slash variations), which an exact-match-only redaction would miss.
- * This is defense-in-depth, not a guarantee: a `realpath`-resolved (symlink-
- * following) variant can still differ from both forms and would slip through.
- *
- * @param message  - The error message to scrub.
- * @param filePath - The path to redact (both as given and resolved).
- */
-export function redactPathFromMessage(message, filePath) {
-    const safeName = basename(filePath);
-    // Longest-first: the resolved (absolute) form always contains the relative
-    // form as a substring, so redacting the relative form first would only
-    // strip the trailing segment of an absolute path and leave its parent
-    // directory behind (e.g. "/Users/me/project/foo/bar.png" redacting
-    // "foo/bar.png" first leaves "/Users/me/project/bar.png"). Redacting the
-    // longer resolved variant first removes the whole absolute path in one
-    // pass, so the shorter relative pass below has nothing left to match.
-    return message
-        .split(resolvePath(filePath))
-        .join(safeName)
-        .split(filePath)
-        .join(safeName);
-}
-/**
- * Build a sanitized copy of a network/URL/file error, safe to attach as
- * `Error.cause` on a rethrow.
- *
- * Redacting only the OUTER thrown error's message isn't enough: if the RAW
- * underlying error is attached as `cause`, anything that walks the cause
- * chain (cause-aware logging, telemetry spans) can still recover an
- * unredacted URL/path/secret via `error.cause.message`. This returns a NEW
- * `Error` whose message has been through {@link redactUrlsInText} — and,
- * when `options.filePath` is supplied, {@link redactPathFromMessage} too, so
- * a filesystem error's ENOENT/EACCES text doesn't leak the host's directory
- * layout via the cause chain the way the outer message already avoids.
- * `.name` and `.code` (`NodeJS.ErrnoException`) are copied over so retry
- * classification (e.g. `isRetryableNetworkError`) still works when it
- * inspects the cause. The raw original is never referenced by the result.
- *
- * Handles non-`Error` thrown values too (a raw string/object can just as
- * easily carry an unredacted URL or path) by running their `String()` form
- * through the same redaction before wrapping.
- *
- * @param error   - The raw underlying error (or thrown value) to sanitize.
- * @param options - `filePath`: a known filesystem path to redact to its
- *                  basename, in addition to URL redaction.
- */
-export function sanitizeErrorCause(error, options) {
-    const redact = (text) => {
-        const urlSafe = redactUrlsInText(text);
-        return options?.filePath
-            ? redactPathFromMessage(urlSafe, options.filePath)
-            : urlSafe;
-    };
-    if (!(error instanceof Error)) {
-        return new Error(redact(String(error)));
-    }
-    const sanitized = new Error(redact(error.message));
-    sanitized.name = error.name;
-    const code = error.code;
-    if (code !== undefined) {
-        sanitized.code = code;
-    }
-    return sanitized;
-}
-/**
- * Recursively sanitize a record/array, returning a structurally identical
- * value with sensitive keys redacted and string values run through
- * {@link sanitizeForLog}.
- *
- * Safe to call on any JSON-shaped data. Cycles are detected and replaced
- * with the string `"[Circular]"` to avoid infinite recursion when logging
- * mid-stream objects that reference themselves.
- *
- * @param value - The value to sanitize.
- * @param maxStringLen - Per-string truncation cap (default 1000).
- */
-export function sanitizeRecord(value, maxStringLen = 1000) {
-    const seen = new WeakSet();
-    const walk = (v) => {
-        if (v === null || v === undefined) {
-            return v;
-        }
-        if (typeof v === "string") {
-            return sanitizeForLog(v, maxStringLen);
-        }
-        if (typeof v !== "object") {
-            return v;
-        }
-        if (seen.has(v)) {
-            return "[Circular]";
-        }
-        seen.add(v);
-        if (Array.isArray(v)) {
-            return v.map(walk);
-        }
-        const out = {};
-        for (const [k, val] of Object.entries(v)) {
-            if (SENSITIVE_OBJECT_KEYS.some((name) => name.toLowerCase() === k.toLowerCase())) {
-                out[k] = "***";
-            }
-            else {
-                out[k] = walk(val);
-            }
-        }
-        return out;
-    };
-    return walk(value);
-}
-/**
- * Sanitize an HTTP headers object — redacts sensitive header names entirely
- * (`***`) and applies {@link sanitizeForLog} to remaining values.
- *
- * Accepts both `Headers` instances and plain-object header maps so providers
- * can log either shape uniformly.
- */
-export function sanitizeHeaders(headers) {
-    if (!headers) {
-        return {};
-    }
-    const out = {};
-    const set = (name, value) => {
-        if (value === undefined || value === null) {
-            return;
-        }
-        const lower = name.toLowerCase();
-        if (SENSITIVE_HEADER_NAMES.includes(lower)) {
-            out[name] = "***";
-            return;
-        }
-        out[name] = sanitizeForLog(value, 500);
-    };
-    if (headers instanceof Headers) {
-        headers.forEach((value, key) => set(key, value));
-        return out;
-    }
-    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {
-        set(key, value);
-    }
-    return out;
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=logSanitize.js.map