@junghanacs/entwurf 0.21.0 → 0.23.0

package/pi-extensions/lib/codex-fresh-preflight.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,15 @@ import * as fs from "node:fs";
 import * as path from "node:path";
 import { parse } from "smol-toml";
 
+import {
+	CODEX_BIRTH_EVENT,
+	classifyOwnedPath,
+	entwurfDeclarationCommand,
+	selectEntwurfDeclaration,
+	statOwnedPath,
+	trustReceiptKey,
+} from "./codex-declaration.js";
+
 import {
 	type CodexProtocolOpener,
 	type CodexRpcProtocol,
@@ -29,9 +38,52 @@ export const CODEX_PREFLIGHT_HINT: Record<CodexPreflightRejectReason, string> =
 	"codex-visible-identity-missing":
 		"Codex tui.status_line does not include thread-title; run `entwurf install-codex-statusline`, then `entwurf doctor-codex-statusline`",
 	"codex-app-server-unavailable":
-		"the operator-owned Codex app-server default socket is absent or unsafe; start `codex app-server --listen unix://$CODEX_HOME/app-server-control/app-server-control.sock` and retry",
+		"the operator-owned Codex app-server default socket is absent or unsafe; start it with `entwurf codex-app-server` from a detached tmux session (one that is NOT where you work), then retry",
+};
+
+/**
+ * THE CALLER AXIS, AND IT IS NOT THE ONE ABOVE. Everything above asks "can a Codex sibling be
+ * OPENED on this host" — birth unit, vendor trust, MCP hand, visible identity, app-server. This
+ * asks the opposite question: "can the Codex citizen DOING the opening be located", which is a
+ * fact about the CALLER's own config and is required no matter which backend it opens (#95
+ * lane B). Keeping them apart is the point: a Pi caller opening a Codex sibling needs the five
+ * above and none of this, and a Codex caller opening a Pi sibling needs this and none of those.
+ * Folding either into the other would refuse one operator for the other's missing repair.
+ */
+export type CodexCallerPreflightRejectReason = "codex-caller-title-missing";
+
+/**
+ * THE LAUNCH-DIRECTORY AXIS, AND IT IS A THIRD QUESTION AGAIN. The target axis asks "can a Codex
+ * sibling be opened on this host", the caller axis asks "can the Codex citizen doing the opening
+ * be located", and this asks "will the vendor START A TURN in the directory this launch names" —
+ * a fact about ONE directory rather than about the host or the caller, so it is the only axis
+ * that needs the resolved launch cwd and the only one that can pass for one call and refuse the
+ * next on an unchanged host.
+ */
+export type CodexLaunchCwdPreflightRejectReason = "codex-launch-cwd-undecided" | "codex-launch-cwd-untrusted-ancestor";
+
+export const CODEX_LAUNCH_CWD_PREFLIGHT_HINT: Record<CodexLaunchCwdPreflightRejectReason, string> = {
+	"codex-launch-cwd-undecided":
+		"Codex has recorded NO decision for the directory this sibling would start in, so the window would open on the vendor's folder-consent screen and WAIT for a human instead of running its first turn — no rollout, no callback, and nothing to address; either launch in a directory this Codex has already been answered for, or open a plain `codex -C <dir>` there once and answer it, then retry",
+	"codex-launch-cwd-untrusted-ancestor":
+		"this directory sits inside a project the operator marked `untrusted`, and on this rail the vendor does not offer a consent screen for that — it refuses the startup outright with `pass the repository root explicitly with --cd`, so answering a prompt at this directory would only reproduce that error; launch at that untrusted project's own root instead, or change that project's recorded decision",
 };
 
+export const CODEX_CALLER_PREFLIGHT_HINT: Record<CodexCallerPreflightRejectReason, string> = {
+	"codex-caller-title-missing":
+		"this Codex caller's tui.terminal_title does not include thread-id, so the multiplexer reports no pane title naming this thread and there is no caller seat to open the sibling beside; run `entwurf install-codex-terminal-title`, then `entwurf doctor-codex-terminal-title` (an explicit placement.tmuxSession skips this check entirely, because it never needs the seat)",
+};
+
+/**
+ * What `codex-birth-install-state/v2` records ABOUT the declaration — the normalized digest of
+ * entwurf's own `SessionStart` group and the command string that selects it. Never a file digest:
+ * hooks.json is shared, and its bytes are not this unit's to certify.
+ */
+interface RecordedDeclaration {
+	command: string;
+	sha256: string;
+}
+
 export interface CodexUnitPaths {
 	hooksFile: string;
 	helperDir: string;
@@ -75,28 +127,22 @@ const CODEX_MCP_ENV_VARS = [
 	"TMUX_PANE",
 ] as const;
 
+/**
+ * ONE POLICY, FOUR SURFACES. The predicate itself lives in `codex-declaration.js` (sol B3,
+ * 2026-09-18) because the installer, the inverse and the doctor decide about the SAME shared
+ * hooks.json and used to decide differently: they checked symlink-and-regular, this checked owner
+ * and mode as well, and the doctor checked neither. That split let an install and a doctor say yes
+ * about bytes every fresh call then refused. The executable bit stays HERE — it is this rail's
+ * question about the launcher codex is going to exec, not a fact about shared ownership.
+ */
 function isSafeOwnedFile(file: string, expectedUid: number, executable = false): boolean {
-	try {
-		const stat = fs.lstatSync(file);
-		return (
-			stat.isFile() &&
-			!stat.isSymbolicLink() &&
-			stat.uid === expectedUid &&
-			(stat.mode & 0o022) === 0 &&
-			(!executable || (stat.mode & 0o111) !== 0)
-		);
-	} catch {
-		return false;
-	}
+	const stat = statOwnedPath(fs, file);
+	if (classifyOwnedPath(stat, expectedUid) !== "ok") return false;
+	return !executable || (stat.mode & 0o111) !== 0;
 }
 
 function isSafeOwnedDir(dir: string, expectedUid: number): boolean {
-	try {
-		const stat = fs.lstatSync(dir);
-		return stat.isDirectory() && !stat.isSymbolicLink() && stat.uid === expectedUid && (stat.mode & 0o022) === 0;
-	} catch {
-		return false;
-	}
+	return classifyOwnedPath(statOwnedPath(fs, dir), expectedUid, { kind: "directory" }) === "ok";
 }
 
 /**
@@ -104,21 +150,37 @@ function isSafeOwnedDir(dir: string, expectedUid: number): boolean {
  * EXIST prove nothing: the launcher codex is about to exec must be the one this unit
  * published, so every recorded member is compared to its recorded digest before a sibling
  * is opened. No digest is computed for the VENDOR here — that is a different axis below.
+ *
+ * WHAT THIS NO LONGER READS (#117): a WHOLE-FILE `hooksSha256`. `codex-birth-install-state/v2`
+ * records the normalized digest of entwurf's own declaration instead, because hooks.json is a
+ * file this unit SHARES — a neighbouring integration appending its own `SessionStart` group
+ * changes every byte of that file and none of our declaration's meaning. The declaration axis
+ * lives in `birthDeclaration` below, which needs the live document anyway to find where our group
+ * currently sits.
  */
-function closureDriftedFromState(paths: CodexUnitPaths, expectedUid: number): boolean {
+function certifiedState(paths: CodexUnitPaths, expectedUid: number): RecordedDeclaration | null {
 	// The directory holding the state carries the state's authority: anyone who can write it
 	// can replace the inventory every digest below is compared against.
-	if (!isSafeOwnedDir(path.dirname(paths.stateFile), expectedUid)) return true;
-	if (!isSafeOwnedDir(path.dirname(path.dirname(paths.stateFile)), expectedUid)) return true;
-	if (!isSafeOwnedFile(paths.stateFile, expectedUid)) return true;
+	if (!isSafeOwnedDir(path.dirname(paths.stateFile), expectedUid)) return null;
+	if (!isSafeOwnedDir(path.dirname(path.dirname(paths.stateFile)), expectedUid)) return null;
+	if (!isSafeOwnedFile(paths.stateFile, expectedUid)) return null;
 	let state: Record<string, unknown>;
 	try {
 		state = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(paths.stateFile, "utf8")) as Record<string, unknown>;
 	} catch {
-		return true;
+		return null;
 	}
-	if (state.schema !== "codex-birth-install-state/v1" || state.status !== "installed") return true;
-	if (state.hooksFile !== paths.hooksFile || state.helperDir !== paths.helperDir) return true;
+	// v2 ONLY, and a v1 state is refused rather than read leniently: v1 recorded a whole-file
+	// digest, so a reader that tolerated it would be certifying an authority nobody holds any
+	// more. `entwurf install-codex-birth` supersedes it — that is the one forward path.
+	if (state.schema !== "codex-birth-install-state/v2" || state.status !== "installed") return null;
+	if (state.hooksFile !== paths.hooksFile || state.helperDir !== paths.helperDir) return null;
+	const declaration = state.declaration;
+	if (declaration === null || typeof declaration !== "object" || Array.isArray(declaration)) return null;
+	const recorded = declaration as Record<string, unknown>;
+	if (recorded.event !== CODEX_BIRTH_EVENT) return null;
+	if (typeof recorded.command !== "string" || typeof recorded.sha256 !== "string") return null;
+	if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(recorded.sha256)) return null;
 	const digest = (file: string): string | null => {
 		try {
 			return crypto.createHash("sha256").update(fs.readFileSync(file)).digest("hex");
@@ -126,9 +188,8 @@ function closureDriftedFromState(paths: CodexUnitPaths, expectedUid: number): bo
 			return null;
 		}
 	};
-	if (typeof state.hooksSha256 !== "string" || digest(paths.hooksFile) !== state.hooksSha256) return true;
 	const members = state.helperFiles;
-	if (!Array.isArray(members)) return true;
+	if (!Array.isArray(members)) return null;
 	// Exactly the closure the installer publishes: a short inventory would leave a member
 	// nothing compares, which is the same hole as not checking digests at all.
 	const named = members.map((raw) => (raw as Record<string, unknown>)?.path);
@@ -140,21 +201,38 @@ function closureDriftedFromState(paths: CodexUnitPaths, expectedUid: number): bo
 		"lib/session-id.js",
 		"entwurf-capabilities.json",
 	];
-	if (named.length !== expected.length) return true;
-	if (expected.some((name) => !named.includes(name))) return true;
-	if (named.some((name, index) => named.indexOf(name) !== index)) return true;
+	if (named.length !== expected.length) return null;
+	if (expected.some((name) => !named.includes(name))) return null;
+	if (named.some((name, index) => named.indexOf(name) !== index)) return null;
 	for (const raw of members) {
 		const member = raw as Record<string, unknown>;
 		const rel = member.path;
 		if (typeof rel !== "string" || rel.length === 0 || rel.startsWith("/") || rel.split("/").includes("..")) {
-			return true;
+			return null;
 		}
-		if (typeof member.sha256 !== "string" || digest(path.join(paths.helperDir, rel)) !== member.sha256) return true;
+		if (typeof member.sha256 !== "string" || digest(path.join(paths.helperDir, rel)) !== member.sha256) return null;
 	}
-	return false;
+	return { command: recorded.command, sha256: recorded.sha256 };
 }
 
-function birthMissing(paths: CodexUnitPaths, expectedUid: number): boolean {
+/**
+ * WHERE ENTWURF'S DECLARATION CURRENTLY SITS, or nothing.
+ *
+ * `null` here means the SAME reject as before — `codex-birth-unit-missing` — but the question
+ * it answers is narrower than it used to be (#117). It no longer asks "is hooks.json exactly the
+ * file we wrote"; it asks "is entwurf's own `SessionStart` group present exactly once, shaped the
+ * way the operator approved, and still the declaration this unit recorded". A Herdr (or any
+ * other) integration declaring its own group beside ours changes neither answer.
+ *
+ * The POSITION is the return value rather than a side note because the vendor keys its trust
+ * receipt by index: a declaration that has been renumbered by a neighbour's install needs its
+ * receipt read at the new index, and reading the old one would report a NEIGHBOUR's approval as
+ * our own.
+ */
+function birthDeclaration(
+	paths: CodexUnitPaths,
+	expectedUid: number,
+): { groupIndex: number; handlerIndex: number } | null {
 	const launcher = path.join(paths.helperDir, "codex-birth-launch.sh");
 	const directories = [
 		path.dirname(paths.hooksFile),
@@ -162,8 +240,8 @@ function birthMissing(paths: CodexUnitPaths, expectedUid: number): boolean {
 		path.join(paths.helperDir, "lib"),
 		path.join(paths.helperDir, "lib", "native-push"),
 	];
-	if (directories.some((dir) => !isSafeOwnedDir(dir, expectedUid))) return true;
-	if (!isSafeOwnedFile(paths.hooksFile, expectedUid)) return true;
+	if (directories.some((dir) => !isSafeOwnedDir(dir, expectedUid))) return null;
+	if (!isSafeOwnedFile(paths.hooksFile, expectedUid)) return null;
 	const closure = [
 		[launcher, true],
 		[path.join(paths.helperDir, "meta-bridge-hook-codex.ts"), false],
@@ -172,20 +250,23 @@ function birthMissing(paths: CodexUnitPaths, expectedUid: number): boolean {
 		[path.join(paths.helperDir, "lib", "session-id.js"), false],
 		[path.join(paths.helperDir, "entwurf-capabilities.json"), false],
 	] as const;
-	if (closure.some(([file, executable]) => !isSafeOwnedFile(file, expectedUid, executable))) return true;
+	if (closure.some(([file, executable]) => !isSafeOwnedFile(file, expectedUid, executable))) return null;
+	const recorded = certifiedState(paths, expectedUid);
+	if (recorded === null) return null;
+	// The state's own account of what it certified must be the declaration these paths produce;
+	// a receipt bound to a different launcher is a receipt for a different unit.
+	if (recorded.command !== entwurfDeclarationCommand(launcher)) return null;
+	let selected: ReturnType<typeof selectEntwurfDeclaration>;
 	try {
-		const parsed = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(paths.hooksFile, "utf8")) as Record<string, unknown>;
-		const events = (parsed.hooks as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)?.SessionStart;
-		if (!Array.isArray(events) || events.length !== 1) return true;
-		const group = events[0] as Record<string, unknown>;
-		if ("matcher" in group || !Array.isArray(group.hooks) || group.hooks.length !== 1) return true;
-		const hook = group.hooks[0] as Record<string, unknown>;
-		if (Object.keys(hook).sort().join(",") !== "command,timeout,type") return true;
-		if (hook.type !== "command" || hook.command !== `'${launcher}'` || hook.timeout !== 30) return true;
+		selected = selectEntwurfDeclaration(JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(paths.hooksFile, "utf8")), launcher);
 	} catch {
-		return true;
+		return null;
 	}
-	return closureDriftedFromState(paths, expectedUid);
+	if (!selected.ok) return null;
+	// The NORMALIZED digest, so a neighbour re-serializing the document (measured: Herdr does)
+	// cannot make our intact declaration look edited — and an edit to our own handler still can.
+	if (selected.digest !== recorded.sha256) return null;
+	return { groupIndex: selected.groupIndex, handlerIndex: selected.handlerIndex };
 }
 
 /**
@@ -194,13 +275,19 @@ function birthMissing(paths: CodexUnitPaths, expectedUid: number): boolean {
  * `trusted_hash` of the shape `sha256:<64 hex>`. What this asserts is that a receipt EXISTS
  * for our declaration identity — never that the hash is correct, which only the vendor can
  * say, and never by launching Codex to find out.
+ *
+ * THE KEY IS MEASURED, NOT ASSUMED (#117). It used to be spelled `…:session_start:0:0`, which
+ * was true only while entwurf was the sole declaration in the file. With a neighbour at index 0
+ * that constant reads THEIR receipt and calls it ours — a false green for a hook the vendor has
+ * never been asked to run. The caller passes the key built from the position our declaration was
+ * just found at.
  */
-function trustReceiptMissing(config: Record<string, unknown>, hooksFile: string): boolean {
+function trustReceiptMissing(config: Record<string, unknown>, key: string): boolean {
 	const hooks = config.hooks;
 	if (hooks == null || typeof hooks !== "object" || Array.isArray(hooks)) return true;
 	const state = (hooks as Record<string, unknown>).state;
 	if (state == null || typeof state !== "object" || Array.isArray(state)) return true;
-	const entry = (state as Record<string, unknown>)[`${hooksFile}:session_start:0:0`];
+	const entry = (state as Record<string, unknown>)[key];
 	if (entry == null || typeof entry !== "object" || Array.isArray(entry)) return true;
 	const digest = (entry as Record<string, unknown>).trusted_hash;
 	return typeof digest !== "string" || !/^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(digest);
@@ -250,6 +337,190 @@ function visibleIdentityMissing(config: Record<string, unknown>): boolean {
 	return !Array.isArray(statusLine) || !statusLine.includes("thread-title");
 }
 
+/** `[tui].terminal_title` membership, the exact axis `entwurf doctor-codex-terminal-title`
+ * judges. Same shape as `visibleIdentityMissing` and a DIFFERENT key: `status_line` is what a
+ * human reads inside the TUI, `terminal_title` is what the multiplexer reports back as
+ * `#{pane_title}`. Neither substitutes for the other. */
+function callerTitleMissing(config: Record<string, unknown>): boolean {
+	const tui = config.tui;
+	if (tui == null || typeof tui !== "object" || Array.isArray(tui)) return true;
+	const terminalTitle = (tui as Record<string, unknown>).terminal_title;
+	return !Array.isArray(terminalTitle) || !terminalTitle.includes("thread-id");
+}
+
+/**
+ * The CALLER-side capability, pre-mutation and synchronous.
+ *
+ * Synchronous because it reads one config file and nothing else: there is no app-server axis
+ * here and there must not be one — whether the operator's app-server is up says nothing about
+ * whether a caller's pane can be found, and asking would make a placement check fail for a
+ * delivery reason.
+ *
+ * Call it only when the anchor will actually be USED — a codex caller that named an explicit
+ * `placement` never consults the title, so refusing it for a missing `thread-id` would be a
+ * refusal for an unused capability.
+ */
+export function codexCallerFreshPreflight(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): CodexCallerPreflightRejectReason | null {
+	const config = readConfig(env);
+	if (config === null || callerTitleMissing(config)) return "codex-caller-title-missing";
+	return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The launch directory's own capability, pre-mutation and synchronous — and DELIBERATELY NARROWER
+ * than the vendor's own decision, because the leaf that decides here reads one TOML file while the
+ * vendor asks its app-server. Read this whole comment as the scope statement it is: what follows
+ * says what this answers, and then says what it refuses to claim.
+ *
+ * WHY THE AXIS EXISTS. `[source rust-v0.153.4]` a fresh call always passes `--remote`, so the TUI
+ * resolves `AppServerTarget::Remote` and startup ALWAYS runs `check_directory_trust` on the `-C`
+ * value (`tui/src/lib.rs:1699-1725`). Nothing on that path consults the approval or sandbox policy
+ * (`tui/src/onboarding/directory_trust.rs:33-130`), which is why the
+ * `--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox` token this argv already carries does NOT cover it:
+ * approvals and folder consent are two different gates. A directory with no recorded decision
+ * renders the consent screen and blocks, and a blocked TUI has started no turn — no rollout, no
+ * birth, no callback, and the caller waits out its whole timeout on a window that is merely
+ * waiting to be answered. `[측정 2026-09-16]` the two release-gate runs that failed launched in
+ * `…-2zznHl` and `…-kSsoAn`, neither of which had an entry; the two that passed launched in
+ * `…-db65N2` and `…-pBXxOJ`, both of which did. Unattended, the failure is silent.
+ *
+ * THE THREE VENDOR OUTCOMES THIS LEAF MODELS, in the vendor's own order
+ * (`tui/src/config_update.rs:290-371`, `ProjectTrustHost::Remote`):
+ *
+ *   1. A DIRECT decision on the exact cwd starts a turn, and BOTH recorded answers do. `trusted`
+ *      returns before any screen (`:346-354`); a saved `untrusted` is explicitly skipped for a
+ *      remote target — `if target.uses_remote_workspace() && trust_level == Some(Untrusted) {
+ *      continue; }` (`onboarding/directory_trust.rs:94-96`), and `uses_remote_workspace()` is
+ *      exactly `matches!(self, Self::Remote { .. })` (`tui/src/lib.rs:307-309`). Refusing a
+ *      deliberate `untrusted` would be entwurf inventing a policy the vendor does not have.
+ *      The key is the exact cwd — `cwd_keys = vec![cwd_key]` (`:290-296`), no root marker, no git
+ *      root, no parent, all three of which exist only on the Local host. `[측정 2026-09-16]`
+ *      `~/.codex/config.toml` carried a trusted `/tmp` and still recorded two separate
+ *      `/tmp/entwurf-codex-fresh-live-*` entries, one per run a human answered.
+ *   2. With NO direct decision, an enabled PROJECT LAYER consents on the directory's behalf
+ *      (`trust_level.is_none() && disabled_project.is_none() && project_layers.any(no
+ *      disabledReason)` → `Ok(None)`, `:346-354`). Those layers come from the app-server's
+ *      `ConfigRead { include_layers: true }` answer, which this leaf does not have. A layer that
+ *      is present but DISABLED is a fourth outcome — the vendor preserves an unknown or untrusted
+ *      project layer as disabled rather than dropping it, and that path falls through to the
+ *      screen — and this leaf cannot tell the two apart either. So wherever a layer could exist at
+ *      all it answers `null`, which folds both outcomes into "proceed".
+ *   3. With no direct decision and NO layers, a cwd inside an explicitly `untrusted` ancestor is
+ *      not a consent screen at all: the remote branch returns an ERROR
+ *      (`"remote project directory is inside an explicitly untrusted project; pass the repository
+ *      root explicitly with --cd"`, `:357-371`). That is a different failure with a different
+ *      repair, so it gets its own reason — answering `Trust` at the child would only reproduce the
+ *      same vendor error. Note the vendor's own precondition there is `project_layers.is_empty()`,
+ *      which is why this reason is only reachable after step 2 has found no layer anywhere.
+ *
+ * WHAT THIS LEAF IS FOR, AND WHAT IT IS NOT. It is NOT equivalent to the vendor's judgment and
+ * must not be described as asking "the same question": it reads the operator's own `config.toml`,
+ * while the vendor reads an EFFECTIVE config — system, managed and cloud layers merged around that
+ * user layer (`config/src/loader/mod.rs:258-290`, `:430-460`) — through its app-server.
+ *
+ * That gap is affordable because NOTHING HERE REFUSES A LAUNCH. `freshCall` prints what this leaf
+ * saw and opens the window anyway: the consent screen is self-repairing when a human is there, and
+ * one answer teaches the vendor the directory for good. The one caller that treats the answer as a
+ * precondition is `smoke-codex-fresh-live`, where nobody is at the keyboard and a named
+ * precondition is worth more than a callback timeout — that gate owns one directory, answered
+ * once.
+ *
+ * So read a non-null answer as "the vendor will probably stop here, and this is the repair", never
+ * as a verdict. Absence is not evidence either way, and every case this leaf cannot see resolves
+ * to `null`.
+ */
+export function codexLaunchCwdFreshPreflight(
+	env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,
+	launchCwd: string,
+): CodexLaunchCwdPreflightRejectReason | null {
+	// THREE NON-ANSWERS, AND EVERY ONE OF THEM PROCEEDS. Each is a case where this leaf holds no
+	// evidence about what the vendor will do, and a refusal without evidence is exactly the false
+	// refusal this axis promises not to produce:
+	//
+	//   - A RELATIVE directory. It cannot match a stored key here, but the vendor does not give up
+	//     on one — it asks its app-server for a cwd and joins (`config_update.rs:203-224`), so the
+	//     joined path may well be answered. In production this branch is unreachable anyway: the
+	//     shared cwd leaf already refuses a non-absolute request as `cwd-not-absolute`, which is a
+	//     better reason than anything this axis could give.
+	//   - NO READABLE USER CONFIG. A missing `config.toml` is not "no decisions": the vendor loads
+	//     an empty user table and merges system, managed and cloud layers around it
+	//     (`config/src/loader/mod.rs:258-290`, `:430-460`, `:520-610`), any of which can carry the
+	//     decision or the layer that starts the turn.
+	//   - NO `projects` TABLE. Same reason: it says the USER layer records nothing, not that the
+	//     effective config does.
+	if (!path.isAbsolute(launchCwd)) return null;
+	const config = readConfig(env);
+	if (config === null) return null;
+	const projects = config.projects;
+	if (projects == null || typeof projects !== "object" || Array.isArray(projects)) {
+		return null;
+	}
+	const table = projects as Record<string, unknown>;
+	const levelOf = (key: string): string | null => {
+		const entry = table[key];
+		if (entry == null || typeof entry !== "object" || Array.isArray(entry)) return null;
+		const level = (entry as Record<string, unknown>).trust_level;
+		// An unrecognised value leaves `trust_level` as `None` on the vendor side too, and `None`
+		// with no project layer is precisely the case that renders the screen.
+		return level === "trusted" || level === "untrusted" ? level : null;
+	};
+	// Outcome 1: a direct decision, either answer.
+	if (levelOf(launchCwd) !== null) return null;
+	// Outcome 2: a PROJECT LAYER may consent with no entry at all, and this leaf cannot enumerate
+	// layers — they come from the app-server's `ConfigRead { include_layers: true }` answer. What
+	// it CAN decide is the negative: a `.codex` anywhere from the directory upward is the only
+	// place such a layer comes from, so when none exists the vendor's `project_layers` really is
+	// empty and the two remaining outcomes below are computable. Where one could exist, answer
+	// `null`.
+	//
+	// EXISTENCE, not ownership, and the weaker predicate is the load-bearing one. The vendor
+	// admits a layer on its own terms — an unknown or untrusted one is preserved as a DISABLED
+	// layer, not dropped — and none of that consults owner/mode/symlink safety. Asking for a
+	// safely-owned directory here would let a layer the vendor sees go unseen by this leaf, which
+	// would then synthesise an `untrusted-ancestor` refusal for a launch the vendor was going to
+	// run. That is the false refusal this axis must never produce, so the check is the widest
+	// thing that still means "a layer could live here".
+	//
+	// The operator's own CODEX HOME is excluded, and excluding it is what keeps this axis from
+	// being a no-op: `~/.codex` is an ancestor of nearly every directory anyone launches a sibling
+	// in, and it is the USER config root rather than a project layer — the vendor names those
+	// apart (`layer.name.dotCodexFolder` for a project, the home for the user layer). Counting it
+	// would answer `null` for every path under `$HOME` and the check would never fire in real use.
+	const codexHome = path.resolve(env.CODEX_HOME?.trim() || path.join(env.HOME ?? "", ".codex"));
+	for (let dir = launchCwd; ; ) {
+		const candidate = path.join(dir, ".codex");
+		if (candidate !== codexHome && fs.existsSync(candidate)) return null;
+		const parent = path.dirname(dir);
+		if (parent === dir) break;
+		dir = parent;
+	}
+	// Outcome 3: no layer anywhere and an explicitly untrusted ancestor — the vendor's own
+	// precondition for that branch is exactly `project_layers.is_empty()`, which the loop above
+	// has now established. It is reported as its own failure because its repair is to launch at
+	// that root, never to answer a prompt at the child.
+	//
+	// The MATCH IS NOT THE VENDOR'S and is not claimed to be. The vendor compares path URIs
+	// (`LegacyAppPathString` → `PathUri::starts_with`, segment-aware, fail-closed on encoded
+	// separators); this compares plain strings on a separator boundary. Where the two could
+	// disagree — a key or a cwd that is not a plain POSIX path — this answers `undecided` rather
+	// than `untrusted-ancestor`. Be exact about what that buys: BOTH are refusals, so this is NOT
+	// the launch-permissive direction. What it weakens is the SPECIFIC-ERROR claim — the ancestor
+	// reason names another directory as the repair, and naming the wrong one is worse than saying
+	// "no decision here". Neither vendor outcome on this branch starts a turn, so the guarantee
+	// above is untouched either way.
+	const plainPosixPath = (value: string): boolean =>
+		!value.includes("%") && !value.includes("\\") && !value.split("/").some((seg) => seg === "." || seg === "..");
+	if (plainPosixPath(launchCwd)) {
+		for (const key of Object.keys(table)) {
+			if (levelOf(key) !== "untrusted" || !plainPosixPath(key)) continue;
+			if (launchCwd === key || launchCwd.startsWith(key.endsWith("/") ? key : `${key}/`)) {
+				return "codex-launch-cwd-untrusted-ancestor";
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return "codex-launch-cwd-undecided";
+}
+
 const DEFAULT_APP_SERVER_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;
 
 function withTimeout<T>(promise: Promise<T>, timeoutMs: number): Promise<T> {
@@ -341,14 +612,16 @@ export async function codexFreshPreflight(
 	if (!path.isAbsolute(paths.hooksFile) || !path.isAbsolute(paths.helperDir) || !path.isAbsolute(paths.stateFile)) {
 		return "codex-birth-unit-missing";
 	}
-	if (birthMissing(paths, deps.operatorUid ?? process.getuid?.() ?? -1)) {
+	const declaration = birthDeclaration(paths, deps.operatorUid ?? process.getuid?.() ?? -1);
+	if (declaration === null) {
 		return "codex-birth-unit-missing";
 	}
 	const config = readConfig(env);
 	// The vendor receipt is a SEPARATE reject from our bytes: perfect bytes the vendor will
 	// not run and absent bytes are two different repairs, and folding them would send the
 	// operator to the installer for something only they can answer in their own Codex.
-	if (config === null || trustReceiptMissing(config, paths.hooksFile)) return "codex-birth-trust-missing";
+	const key = trustReceiptKey(paths.hooksFile, declaration.groupIndex, declaration.handlerIndex);
+	if (config === null || trustReceiptMissing(config, key)) return "codex-birth-trust-missing";
 	if (mcpMissing(config)) return "codex-mcp-hand-missing";
 	if (visibleIdentityMissing(config)) return "codex-visible-identity-missing";
 	const socketPath = resolveCodexDefaultSocketPath(env);

package/pi-extensions/lib/entwurf-control-rpc.ts

@@ -102,6 +102,52 @@ export interface RpcGetInfoCommand {
 
 export type RpcCommand = RpcSendCommand | RpcGetMessageCommand | RpcClearCommand | RpcAbortCommand | RpcGetInfoCommand;
 
+// ============================================================================
+// Accepted-connection disconnect policy (server half of the same wire)
+// ============================================================================
+
+/** The two codes that mean THE PEER WENT AWAY, and nothing else. `EPIPE` is a write to a pipe the
+ * far side already closed; `ECONNRESET` is the far side resetting it. Both describe the client, not
+ * this process's state, which is why they are absorbed rather than diagnosed. */
+const PEER_DISCONNECT_CODES = new Set(["EPIPE", "ECONNRESET"]);
+
+export function isPeerDisconnect(error: NodeJS.ErrnoException): boolean {
+	return typeof error.code === "string" && PEER_DISCONNECT_CODES.has(error.code);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Install the disconnect policy on a connection this process ACCEPTED. Must run before any data
+ * handler and before any response can be written back.
+ *
+ * `[측정 2026-09-14, .agent-reports/116-c4-live-blocker-20260914.md]` a resident pi DIED without
+ * this. A sibling's control-socket send timed out while the receiving session was mid-turn, the
+ * sender closed its end, and the server then wrote its late response to a socket whose peer was
+ * gone. That EPIPE does NOT arrive as a throw — `writeResponse`'s synchronous try/catch cannot see
+ * it — it arrives asynchronously as an `error` event, and an `error` event with no listener is an
+ * uncaught exception, so Node terminated the whole session. The citizen then simply read as `dead`
+ * and the stale socket it left behind was the only trace.
+ *
+ * A client that went away is a BOUNDED environment condition, not invalid state: Rule 15's "crash,
+ * don't warn" governs states we cannot reason about, and losing an entire resident session because
+ * someone hung up is itself the silent failure. Same policy the MCP probe already carries for an
+ * async EPIPE on a child's stdin (`scripts/probe-bridge-command.ts:88-97`).
+ *
+ * Anything that is NOT a peer hanging up is diagnosed exactly once with its code and message and
+ * then served on. Swallowing every error would hide the class this listener is not here to absorb;
+ * rethrowing from an event callback would be the crash this whole function exists to prevent.
+ *
+ * `diagnose` is injected so a gate can count diagnostics without capturing global stderr.
+ */
+export function attachAcceptedSocketDisconnectPolicy(
+	socket: net.Socket,
+	diagnose: (line: string) => void = (line) => console.error(line),
+): void {
+	socket.on("error", (error: NodeJS.ErrnoException) => {
+		if (isPeerDisconnect(error)) return;
+		diagnose(`[entwurf-control] control socket error (${error.code ?? "no code"}): ${error.message}`);
+	});
+}
+
 export interface RpcClientOptions {
 	timeout?: number;
 }

package/pi-extensions/lib/entwurf-fact-provider.ts

@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ import {
 	resolveFactList,
 	UNOBSERVED_PEER,
 } from "./entwurf-facts.ts";
-import { observePeerFacts } from "./entwurf-peer-observe.ts";
+import { makeObservePeerFacts, readHerdrPlacementIndex } from "./entwurf-peer-observe.ts";
 import { isLivenessSupported } from "./entwurf-v2-contract.ts";
+import type { HerdrPlacementIndex } from "./herdr-placement.ts";
 import {
 	type ActiveStoreEntry,
 	FRESH_CUT_PRESCRIPTION,
@@ -105,6 +106,12 @@ export interface EntwurfFactsDeps {
 	 * wiring sites (MCP + pi-native) cannot drift by each passing their own observer, and a
 	 * gate still drives the assembly with a fake and no filesystem. */
 	observe?: PeerObserver;
+	/** Placement axis (#116 S1): the ONE placement-owner read this listing is allowed.
+	 * Injected so a gate drives the whole assembly with no herdr binary and no child
+	 * process. `undefined` uses the real read; a reader that returns `null` is the
+	 * no-herdr host and every row then says `unobserved`. Deliberately a READ, not a
+	 * per-citizen lookup: a per-citizen hook would invite one child process per record. */
+	readPlacementIndex?: () => HerdrPlacementIndex | null;
 	/** Optional presentation budget. Undefined preserves the generic fact provider's full
 	 * observation contract; peers surfaces pass their shared render limit. Older machine
 	 * payload rows then say `unobserved` rather than fabricating `active` / `exists`. */
@@ -209,7 +216,11 @@ export async function listEntwurfFacts(deps: EntwurfFactsDeps): Promise<EntwurfF
 	//    not performed becomes `unobserved`.
 	const cleanIdentities = identities.filter((i) => !conflictGids.has(i.gardenId));
 	const cleanProbes = probes.filter((p) => !conflictGids.has(p.gardenId));
-	const observe = deps.observe ?? observePeerFacts;
+	// The placement owner is read EXACTLY ONCE per listing, before any row is shaped, and
+	// never again for this call. That single read is the anti-watcher rule in code: herdr
+	// publishes no "the session reference landed" event, and a retry loop around that gap
+	// is the discovery watcher `docs/mux-launch-rail.md` §7 refuses by name.
+	const observe = deps.observe ?? makeObservePeerFacts((deps.readPlacementIndex ?? readHerdrPlacementIndex)());
 	let selectedObserve = observe;
 	if (deps.observationLimit !== undefined) {
 		if (!Number.isSafeInteger(deps.observationLimit) || deps.observationLimit < 0) {

package/pi-extensions/lib/entwurf-facts.ts

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
  */
 
 import { type FactLiveness, factLivenessOf, isLivenessSupported } from "./entwurf-v2-contract.ts";
+import { type PlacementObservation, UNOBSERVED_PLACEMENT } from "./herdr-placement.ts";
 import type { MetaCitizenBackend, MetaIdentity } from "./meta-session.ts";
 import type { SocketLiveness } from "./socket-probe.ts";
 
@@ -57,6 +58,12 @@ export interface PeerFact {
 	//   "the newest record in this cwd" picked the phantom as often as the real one.
 	receiver: ReceiverObservation;
 	transcript: TranscriptObservation;
+	// — the third observed axis (#116 S1): WHERE a citizen is visible, when a
+	//   placement owner reported it on a key we independently own. A pane is an
+	//   ephemeral view (Hard Rule 16), so this sits beside `receiver`/`transcript`
+	//   as evidence and never beside `liveness` as a claim about being alive: a
+	//   pane can outlive its process and a process can outlive its pane.
+	placement: PlacementObservation;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -79,11 +86,16 @@ export type TranscriptObservation = "exists" | "absent" | "unobserved";
 export interface PeerObservations {
 	receiver: ReceiverObservation;
 	transcript: TranscriptObservation;
+	placement: PlacementObservation;
 }
 
 /** What a caller that measured nothing must say. Explicit and greppable — a row that
  * silently defaulted to `none`/`absent` would be a fabricated fact. */
-export const UNOBSERVED_PEER: PeerObservations = { receiver: "unobserved", transcript: "unobserved" };
+export const UNOBSERVED_PEER: PeerObservations = {
+	receiver: "unobserved",
+	transcript: "unobserved",
+	placement: UNOBSERVED_PLACEMENT,
+};
 
 /** Measure the two observed axes for one citizen. Injected, so this module stays pure. */
 export type PeerObserver = (identity: MetaIdentity) => PeerObservations;
@@ -116,6 +128,7 @@ export function resolvePeerFact(
 		liveness: factLivenessOf(identity.backend, socket),
 		receiver: observations.receiver,
 		transcript: observations.transcript,
+		placement: observations.placement,
 	};
 }