@junghanacs/entwurf 0.20.1 → 0.21.0

package/pi-extensions/lib/entwurf-fact-provider.ts

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import {
 	isOutOfSocketDomainGardenIdConflict,
 	type PeerObserver,
 	resolveFactList,
+	UNOBSERVED_PEER,
 } from "./entwurf-facts.ts";
 import { observePeerFacts } from "./entwurf-peer-observe.ts";
 import { isLivenessSupported } from "./entwurf-v2-contract.ts";
@@ -102,9 +103,12 @@ export interface EntwurfFactsDeps {
 	/** Observation axis (#101): per-citizen receiver + transcript facts. Defaults to the
 	 * REAL measurement — the same seam shape `makeProductionEntwurfV2Deps` uses, so the two
 	 * wiring sites (MCP + pi-native) cannot drift by each passing their own observer, and a
-	 * gate still drives the assembly with a fake and no filesystem. A caller that injects
-	 * nothing gets facts; a caller that injects `() => UNOBSERVED_PEER` says so on every row. */
+	 * gate still drives the assembly with a fake and no filesystem. */
 	observe?: PeerObserver;
+	/** Optional presentation budget. Undefined preserves the generic fact provider's full
+	 * observation contract; peers surfaces pass their shared render limit. Older machine
+	 * payload rows then say `unobserved` rather than fabricating `active` / `exists`. */
+	observationLimit?: number;
 }
 
 function diagnosticSortKey(d: EntwurfDiagnostic): string {
@@ -195,9 +199,31 @@ export async function listEntwurfFacts(deps: EntwurfFactsDeps): Promise<EntwurfF
 	// 4. resolveFactList over CLEAN inputs only. Its throws (duplicate identity /
 	//    unprobed in-domain citizen) are impossible wiring invariants — left to
 	//    fire as the last line of defense, never caught here.
+	//
+	//    A peers surface may bound observation to its SAME newest rendered rows. Receiver
+	//    observation can inspect process state and historical Claude markers, so doing it
+	//    for every retained record made bounded text grow linearly with history. The generic
+	//    provider stays unbounded when no limit is supplied. Either way the full clean
+	//    identity/probe arrays reach the core: certification, duplicate detection,
+	//    diagnostics, liveness, and the machine payload remain complete. Only an observation
+	//    not performed becomes `unobserved`.
 	const cleanIdentities = identities.filter((i) => !conflictGids.has(i.gardenId));
 	const cleanProbes = probes.filter((p) => !conflictGids.has(p.gardenId));
-	const facts: FactList = resolveFactList(cleanIdentities, cleanProbes, deps.observe ?? observePeerFacts);
+	const observe = deps.observe ?? observePeerFacts;
+	let selectedObserve = observe;
+	if (deps.observationLimit !== undefined) {
+		if (!Number.isSafeInteger(deps.observationLimit) || deps.observationLimit < 0) {
+			throw new Error("listEntwurfFacts: observationLimit must be a non-negative safe integer");
+		}
+		const observedGardenIds = new Set(
+			[...cleanIdentities]
+				.sort((a, b) => (a.gardenId < b.gardenId ? -1 : a.gardenId > b.gardenId ? 1 : 0))
+				.slice(Math.max(0, cleanIdentities.length - deps.observationLimit))
+				.map((identity) => identity.gardenId),
+		);
+		selectedObserve = (identity) => (observedGardenIds.has(identity.gardenId) ? observe(identity) : UNOBSERVED_PEER);
+	}
+	const facts: FactList = resolveFactList(cleanIdentities, cleanProbes, selectedObserve);
 
 	// 5. #50 C4 demotion: a record-less socket is a diagnostic, not a listing
 	//    section. One diagnostic per socket (subjects aggregate at render, F8);

package/pi-extensions/lib/entwurf-peers-render.ts

@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ export interface EntwurfPeersRender {
 	payload: EntwurfPeersPayload;
 }
 
+/** Human rows and expensive provider observations share this one presentation budget. */
+export const ENTWURF_PEERS_RENDER_LIMIT = 32;
+
 // `receiver` and `transcript` are OBSERVED facts, not routing (#101): they say what was
 // found on disk for this citizen, and a caller still asks entwurf_v2 what may be done
 // about it. They earn a column because for every claude-code row `liveness` reads
@@ -124,7 +127,7 @@ function renderDiagnosticLines(diagnostics: EntwurfDiagnostic[]): string[] {
 	return lines;
 }
 
-function compactLines(lines: string[], max: number = 32): string[] {
+function compactLines(lines: string[], max: number = ENTWURF_PEERS_RENDER_LIMIT): string[] {
 	if (lines.length <= max) return lines;
 	const omitted = lines.length - max;
 	return [`  … (${omitted} older entries omitted; showing latest ${max})`, ...lines.slice(-max)];

package/pi-extensions/lib/entwurf-v2-contract.ts

@@ -122,13 +122,12 @@ export function isLivenessSupported(backend: string): boolean {
 
 // ── Native-push backend domain (봉인 2/4) ───────────────────────────────────
 // A backend whose liveness is measured by the SEPARATE native-push adapter rail (a
-// live app-server conversation probe — antigravity's LS gRPC), NOT a control
-// socket. This domain is DISJOINT from LIVENESS_DOMAIN_BACKENDS: an agy session
-// is `unsupported` on the socket FACT axis (entwurf_peers) yet fully
-// measured + deliverable on the native-push axis. The two are separate rails on
-// purpose — check-entwurf-facts pins both sets and asserts their intersection is ∅
-// (a backend can never be in both domains).
-export const NATIVE_PUSH_BACKENDS = ["antigravity"] as const;
+// live vendor app-server target probe), NOT a control socket. This domain is DISJOINT
+// from LIVENESS_DOMAIN_BACKENDS: an Antigravity or Codex session is `unsupported` on
+// the socket FACT axis (entwurf_peers) yet independently measured on the native-push
+// axis. The two are separate rails on purpose — check-entwurf-facts pins both sets
+// and asserts their intersection is ∅ (a backend can never be in both domains).
+export const NATIVE_PUSH_BACKENDS = ["antigravity", "codex"] as const;
 export type NativePushBackend = (typeof NATIVE_PUSH_BACKENDS)[number];
 
 export function nativePushSupported(backend: string): backend is NativePushBackend {

package/pi-extensions/lib/entwurf-v2-native-push.ts

@@ -5,11 +5,10 @@
  * ROUTING (the NATIVE_PUSH_DISPATCH_TABLE did) and carries NO release seam — a native-push
  * plan is the LOCK-FREE path (봉인 4), so a lock leak is structurally impossible here.
  *
- * This is where the 1-shot retry lives — NOT in the adapter leaf (봉인 3). The decider
- * probed a fresh route and planted it in the plan; the executor sends over it, and on a
- * failure it re-probes ONCE (the volatile LS port may have shifted between decide and
- * execute) and re-sends. A second failure is fail-loud (no infinite loop). This mirrors the
- * control-socket send-fallback pattern: the decider stays pure, the hand owns the retry.
+ * Retry is an adapter capability, not a rail-wide assumption. Antigravity re-probes once
+ * because its volatile LS port can shift before send. Codex never retries: `codex queue`
+ * may have accepted the message before its receipt failed, so replay could duplicate it.
+ * The decider stays pure; this hand enforces the adapter's declared policy.
  *
  * A native-push send has NO in-band refuse (there is no live receiver to answer
  * success:false) — like a mailbox enqueue, it either succeeds or THROWS. The hand never
@@ -18,6 +17,7 @@
 
 import type { ExecutionPlan } from "./entwurf-v2-decider.ts";
 import type { LockClaim } from "./entwurf-v2-lock.ts";
+import { formatMetaMailboxBody, type MailboxSenderEnvelope } from "./meta-mailbox-body.ts";
 import { type NativePushAdapter, type NativePushRoute, resolveNativePushAdapter } from "./native-push/adapter.ts";
 
 /** The native-push slice of the ExecutionPlan union (the decider plants it, this consumes it). */
@@ -25,16 +25,14 @@ export type NativePushPlan = Extract<ExecutionPlan, { transport: "native-push" }
 
 export interface NativePushSendResult {
 	success: true;
-	/** Whether the 1-shot re-probe→re-send fired (the first send over the planted route failed). */
+	/** Whether the adapter's one permitted re-probe→re-send fired. */
 	retried: boolean;
 }
 
 /**
- * Deliver `content` into the conversation, owning the 1-shot retry (봉인 3). Send over the
- * planted (decider-probed) route first; on failure re-probe ONCE and re-send over the fresh
- * route; a second failure PROPAGATES (fail-loud). If the re-probe finds the target no longer
- * alive, throw — a failed send into a now-dead conversation is an honest non-delivery, never
- * a silent success. The re-probe is the ONLY re-derivation of the volatile route.
+ * Deliver `content` through the decider-probed route. A non-retriable adapter propagates
+ * the first failure unchanged. A retriable adapter re-probes once and sends once more only
+ * when the target is still alive; no adapter gets a third attempt.
  */
 export async function deliverViaNativePush(
 	adapter: NativePushAdapter,
@@ -46,8 +44,8 @@ export async function deliverViaNativePush(
 		await adapter.send(route, nativeSessionId, content);
 		return { success: true, retried: false };
 	} catch (firstErr) {
-		// 1-shot re-probe → re-send: the volatile LS route may have shifted since the decider
-		// probed it. Re-discover it fresh and retry exactly once.
+		if (!adapter.retriable) throw firstErr;
+		// One re-probe and one retry for adapters whose send boundary is safe to replay.
 		const reprobe = await adapter.probe(nativeSessionId);
 		if (reprobe.status !== "alive") {
 			throw new Error(
@@ -65,22 +63,41 @@ export async function deliverViaNativePush(
  *  registry). Injected so the 5d gate proves the wiring with a fake adapter. */
 export interface NativePushSendDeps {
 	resolveAdapter?: (backend: string) => NativePushAdapter;
+	/** The SAME provider the mailbox hand receives (`makeProductionEntwurfV2Deps` passes one
+	 * `opts.senderProvider` to both). When it yields an envelope, the injected content is the
+	 * mailbox-serialized body — see the render note on `makeNativePushSend`. Absent/undefined
+	 * preserves the raw `plan.message`. */
+	senderProvider?: () => MailboxSenderEnvelope | undefined;
 }
 
 /**
  * Build the production `sendNativePush(plan, lock)` adapter the runner consumes. It IGNORES
- * `lock` entirely (a native-push plan is lock-free, 봉인 4) — the field exists only to match
- * the DispatchExecutorDeps hand signature. It resolves the adapter from the plan's backend
- * and delivers with the 1-shot retry. A delivery throw surfaces as a REJECTED promise (the
- * runner's try/catch maps it to execution-failed).
+ * `lock` entirely (a native-push plan is lock-free, 봉인 4), resolves the adapter, then applies
+ * that adapter's retry policy. A delivery throw surfaces as a REJECTED promise (the runner's
+ * try/catch maps it to execution-failed).
+ *
+ * SENDER ENVELOPE (measured #95). Direct injection used to hand the adapter the raw
+ * `plan.message`, so a native-push citizen received a body with no sender. The #95 A LIVE run
+ * measured what that costs: a fresh Pi's nonce-only callback landed in the Codex thread as
+ * bare text, and Codex could not name who called it — the callback was uncorrelatable. The
+ * control-socket rail carries the envelope in its RPC framing and the mailbox rail serializes
+ * it into the body; this rail has neither, so it renders the SAME `formatMetaMailboxBody` SSOT
+ * the mailbox uses. Rendered ONCE, before `deliverViaNativePush`, so an Antigravity re-probe
+ * retry replays byte-identical content (including its timestamp) instead of a second render.
+ * The adapter stays a dumb pipe — its signature is unchanged and it never learns about senders.
  */
 export function makeNativePushSend(
 	deps: NativePushSendDeps = {},
 ): (plan: NativePushPlan, lock: LockClaim | null) => Promise<NativePushSendResult> {
 	const resolveAdapter = deps.resolveAdapter ?? resolveNativePushAdapter;
+	const senderProvider = deps.senderProvider;
 	// `_lock` is named for the hand contract but NEVER read — native-push owns/releases no lock.
 	return async (plan: NativePushPlan, _lock: LockClaim | null): Promise<NativePushSendResult> => {
+		// Resolve the sender BEFORE the adapter is resolved or touched: a provider throw must
+		// reject this send with nothing injected, not leave a half-delivered conversation.
+		const sender = senderProvider?.();
+		const content = sender ? formatMetaMailboxBody(sender, plan.message, plan.wantsReply) : plan.message;
 		const adapter = resolveAdapter(plan.backend);
-		return deliverViaNativePush(adapter, plan.route, plan.nativeSessionId, plan.message);
+		return deliverViaNativePush(adapter, plan.route, plan.nativeSessionId, content);
 	};
 }

package/pi-extensions/lib/entwurf-v2-production.ts

@@ -137,8 +137,9 @@ export interface ProductionEntwurfV2Seams {
 export interface ProductionEntwurfV2Opts {
 	/** Built at the wiring site from `buildLocalSenderEnvelope(ctx)`, decorated with its
 	 * HONEST pi-session replyability (SE-1 2e-a: `replyable` reflects whether the canonical
-	 * control socket actually exists, not a hardcoded true). ONE provider feeds the
-	 * control-socket RPC sender AND the meta-mailbox body sender (they share the envelope). */
+	 * control socket actually exists, not a hardcoded true). ONE provider feeds ALL THREE
+	 * rails — the control-socket RPC sender, the meta-mailbox body sender, and the
+	 * native-push injected body sender — so no rail can present a different who-sent-it. */
 	senderProvider: () => SenderEnvelope | undefined;
 	lockDir?: string;
 	sessionsDir?: string;
@@ -339,7 +340,13 @@ export function makeProductionEntwurfV2Deps(opts: ProductionEntwurfV2Opts): Entw
 		sendMailbox: (plan, _lock) => sendViaMailbox(plan as MetaMailboxPlan, _lock as LockClaim),
 		// native-push (봉인 4): the SAME injected adapter resolver drives the executor send,
 		// so the decider's probe and the delivery use one adapter. Lock-free (lock ignored).
-		sendNativePush: makeNativePushSend({ resolveAdapter: io.resolveNativePushAdapter }),
+		// It also receives the SAME `opts.senderProvider` the mailbox hand got — one envelope
+		// source for all three rails, so a native-push citizen can name its sender exactly as
+		// a mailbox citizen does (#95: an envelope-less direct injection is uncorrelatable).
+		sendNativePush: makeNativePushSend({
+			resolveAdapter: io.resolveNativePushAdapter,
+			senderProvider: opts.senderProvider,
+		}),
 	};
 
 	return {

package/pi-extensions/lib/entwurf-v2-surface.ts

@@ -100,11 +100,14 @@ export function actionableRejectHint(reason: string): string | undefined {
 				"that garden id by a session that died without cleaning up."
 			);
 		case "native-push-target-dead":
-			// The adapter probe found no live host process for the conversation.
-			return "native-push conversation is not live (no host process found). Re-open the conversation, then retry — there is nothing to inject into.";
+			// The adapter probe found no live native host serving this conversation/thread. Stays
+			// backend-neutral: agy speaks conversations over an LS port, Codex threads over an
+			// app-server socket, and this hint is read by callers of both.
+			return "the native-push conversation/thread is not live — no native host (harness process or app-server) answered the probe for it. Re-open that conversation/thread in its own harness, then retry; there is nothing to inject into.";
 		case "native-push-probe-indeterminate":
-			// Host up, but no LS port served the conversation — inconclusive, not a hard dead.
-			return "native-push host is up but no port served this conversation (probe inconclusive). Retry once the conversation is loaded, or verify the conversation id.";
+			// Native host up, but nothing served this conversation/thread — inconclusive, not a
+			// hard dead. Backend-neutral for the same reason as the dead cell above.
+			return "the native host (harness process or app-server) is up, but nothing served this conversation/thread, so the probe is INCONCLUSIVE — not a measured death. Retry once it is loaded, or verify the conversation/thread id.";
 		case "record-less-socket":
 			// #50 C4: name the true cause AND the fix — a bare socket is a diagnostic
 			// state, not an addressable citizen (the record is the address).

package/pi-extensions/lib/meta-mailbox-body.ts

@@ -1,26 +1,33 @@
 /**
  * meta-mailbox-body — the SINGLE source for rendering an entwurf message as a
- * meta-bridge mailbox body. Both transports that can deliver to a garden citizen
- * with no live control socket use this:
+ * meta-bridge mailbox body. Every transport that can deliver to a garden citizen
+ * with no live control socket uses this:
  *   - the MCP bridge entwurf_v2 (mcp/entwurf-bridge) — external/Claude-host sends
  *   - the pi-native entwurf_v2 (pi-extensions/entwurf-control.ts) — pi-session sends
+ *   - the native-push rail (pi-extensions/lib/entwurf-v2-native-push.ts) — direct
+ *     injection into an Antigravity conversation or a loaded Codex thread. Its
+ *     THIRD consumer, added after the #95 A LIVE run measured what an envelope-less
+ *     injection costs: a nonce-only callback arrived in a Codex thread as bare text
+ *     and the receiving citizen could not name who had called it.
  *
  * The control-socket path carries the sender envelope inside its RPC framing; the
- * mailbox path is just a file, so the envelope must be SERIALIZED INTO the body —
- * else a receiver reading entwurf_inbox_read would not know who sent it, whether
- * the sender is replyable (and at which sessionId), or whether a reply was wanted.
- * The render mirrors the live "[entwurf received ⟵]" header so a transcript reads
- * the same whether the message arrived over a socket or a mailbox.
+ * mailbox path is just a file and direct injection is just a string, so for both the
+ * envelope must be SERIALIZED INTO the body —
+ * else a receiver — reading entwurf_inbox_read, or reading an injected turn in its own
+ * conversation — would not know who sent it, whether the sender is replyable (and at
+ * which sessionId), or whether a reply was wanted. The render mirrors the live
+ * "[entwurf received ⟵]" header so a transcript reads the same whether the message
+ * arrived over a socket, a mailbox, or direct injection.
  *
  * No filesystem/network IO and no mutation — the only ambient read is
  * process.env.HOME for display abbreviation (so not strictly referentially pure,
- * but deterministic per environment). Extracted so the two senders cannot drift
- * in how a mailbox message presents who-sent-it — the field that round-trips
- * garden-id replies.
+ * but deterministic per environment). Extracted so the three consumers cannot
+ * drift in how a delivered message presents who-sent-it — the field that
+ * round-trips garden-id replies.
  */
 
-/** The fields a mailbox body needs from a sender. Structurally compatible with
- * the SenderEnvelope of both entwurf_v2 surfaces. */
+/** The fields a sender-envelope presentation needs from a sender. Structurally
+ * compatible with the SenderEnvelope of both entwurf_v2 surfaces. */
 export interface MailboxSenderEnvelope {
 	sessionId: string;
 	agentId: string;
@@ -53,7 +60,9 @@ function formatKstTimestamp(iso: string): string {
 }
 
 /**
- * Render the full mailbox body: header envelope + separator + message. A
+ * Render the full body: header envelope + separator + message. The mailbox writes this
+ * into its message file and the native-push rail injects it directly into a live
+ * conversation; both present the sender identically. A
  * replyable sender (pi-session, or a trusted meta-session) advertises its
  * sessionId as the reply address; a non-replyable sender says so WITHOUT
  * losing its origin — a record-backed meta-session that is currently inactive

package/pi-extensions/lib/meta-sender-identity.ts

@@ -34,15 +34,31 @@
  * Every candidate is collected and validated BEFORE one is chosen. A first-match loop would make
  * the answer depend on which pid or backend happened to be read first; here lookup order carries
  * no meaning, and two live identities are a refusal rather than a race.
+ *
+ * A SECOND RAIL LIVES BELOW THE MARKER RAIL, and it does not share this one's join key.
+ * Codex names its caller on EVERY `tools/call` (`_meta.threadId` plus an
+ * `x-codex-turn-metadata.{session_id,thread_id}` block), and its parent pid cannot separate
+ * citizens at all: in the delivery-capable launch mode every hook and every MCP child of N
+ * live threads resolves to the ONE app-server pid, so a pid marker would be one marker for N
+ * citizens — exactly what the store's `nativeSessionId` uniqueness forbids (measured
+ * 2026-09-08, `scripts/raw-codex-measure/README.md` S1b-C/S1b-D). So the codex resolver is
+ * REQUEST-scoped, not process-scoped: see {@link resolveCodexRequestSenderIdentity}. The two
+ * rails never merge — `codex` is deliberately absent from {@link META_SENDER_BACKENDS}, since
+ * a backend listed there is one whose hook writes a pid marker, and codex birth writes none.
  */
 
 import {
+	defaultMetaSessionsDir,
+	describe,
 	isPlausibleOwnerPid,
+	listAllMetaIdentities,
 	type MetaBackend,
 	type MetaIdentity,
 	type MetaSenderMarker,
+	makeStoreRecordReader,
 	metaRecordExistsByGardenId,
 	parentPid,
+	readActiveStoreEntries,
 	readMetaIdentityByGardenId,
 	readMetaSenderMarker,
 } from "./meta-session.ts";
@@ -211,3 +227,292 @@ export async function probeNativeSenderAlive(
 	const probe = await resolveAdapter(identity.backend).probe(identity.nativeSessionId);
 	return probe.status === "alive";
 }
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// REQUEST-SCOPED SENDER IDENTITY — codex
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * The provenance label the MANAGED codex MCP entry carries (`ENTWURF_BRIDGE_NATIVE_HOST=codex`
+ * under `[mcp_servers.entwurf-bridge]` in the codex config the entwurf config writer owns).
+ *
+ * It is an OWNERSHIP/DRIFT atom, not authentication: any process able to write that config, or
+ * to set that env on a child, can spell it. What it buys is the thing a codex bridge child
+ * genuinely cannot observe otherwise — that THIS child was launched from an entwurf-managed
+ * entry, so the request-scoped rail below is admitted deliberately rather than by sniffing.
+ * The value travels to this resolver as an EXPLICIT ARGUMENT: nothing here reads the
+ * environment, and in particular nothing here reads `ENTWURF_BRIDGE_EXTERNAL_AGENT_ID`, which
+ * is the omp root-policy label with its own policy attached (`applyOmpBridgeChildRootPolicy`)
+ * and must never double as a codex admission.
+ */
+export const CODEX_BRIDGE_PROVENANCE_LABEL = "codex";
+
+/**
+ * `clientInfo.name` every codex MCP client sends, and it is a FIXED VENDOR LITERAL —
+ * `Implementation::new("codex-mcp-client", CARGO_PKG_VERSION).with_title("Codex")`
+ * (`codex-mcp/src/rmcp_client.rs:1035-1039`, read at 0.153.4). `initialize` carries no
+ * identity at all and is byte-identical between two children of two different threads, so this
+ * name is a HOST-KIND gate and never an identity: it says "the peer on this stdio is a codex
+ * client", which is precisely as much as startup can honestly say.
+ */
+export const CODEX_MCP_CLIENT_NAME = "codex-mcp-client";
+
+/** The `_meta` member carrying the vendor turn-metadata block (`core/src/mcp_tool_call.rs`
+ * `build_mcp_tool_call_request_meta`, :1238-1263). A dash-cased key, hence the string form. */
+const CODEX_TURN_METADATA_KEY = "x-codex-turn-metadata";
+
+/**
+ * The codex caller's identity metadata is PRESENT but does not hold together: a `threadId` that
+ * is not a nonempty string, a missing/foreign turn-metadata block, or three ids that disagree.
+ *
+ * WHY THIS IS LOUD AND NOT `null`. `null` on this rail means "no identity claim reached me" —
+ * the bridge then refuses the send as anonymous, and the prescription is "open the session
+ * through the installed codex birth hook". A HALF claim is a different fact with a different
+ * cause (a vendor `_meta` shape that moved, or something imitating the codex client), and both
+ * ids exist precisely so neither has to be trusted alone: `threadId` and
+ * `x-codex-turn-metadata.session_id` are built by two different vendor call sites, and the
+ * hook's `session_id` is byte-identical to both (measured 2026-09-08, S1b-D/D3). Selecting a
+ * record from one field while its corroborator is absent or disagrees would address a citizen on
+ * an unverified id — the SE-1 shape — so the disagreement is reported instead.
+ */
+export class EntwurfCodexIdentityMetadataError extends Error {
+	constructor(reason: string) {
+		super(
+			"entwurf-bridge refused: this codex tool call carries identity metadata that does not hold " +
+				`together — ${reason} A codex caller names itself on every call with THREE ids that must be one ` +
+				`string: \`_meta.threadId\`, \`_meta.${CODEX_TURN_METADATA_KEY}.session_id\` and \`.thread_id\`. ` +
+				"Selecting a garden citizen from a partial or self-contradicting claim would send under an " +
+				"identity nothing vouched for. Report it; do not work around it — if the vendor `_meta` shape " +
+				"moved, the measurement in scripts/raw-codex-measure/README.md (S1b-D) must be re-taken.",
+		);
+		this.name = "EntwurfCodexIdentityMetadataError";
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * The codex `threadId` selected exactly one V3 record — and that record is NOT a codex citizen.
+ *
+ * This is corruption of the native→garden mapping, never a miss: the store says some other
+ * backend's session carries this exact native id. Returning `null` would report "no record for
+ * this thread" and prescribe re-opening the session, which would mint a SECOND record for the
+ * same `nativeSessionId` and turn a readable defect into the duplicate the certification
+ * refuses. Sending under the foreign citizen is worse still — it would attribute a codex
+ * caller's message to a claude-code/agy/pi session.
+ */
+export class EntwurfCodexIdentityBackendError extends Error {
+	readonly gardenId: string;
+	constructor(identity: MetaIdentity) {
+		super(
+			`entwurf-bridge refused: codex thread ${identity.nativeSessionId} selected meta-record ` +
+				`${identity.gardenId}, but that citizen's backend is "${identity.backend}", not "codex". One ` +
+				"native id is bound to one backend for the life of the record, so this store cannot say who the " +
+				"caller is — and neither re-opening the codex session nor sending under the foreign citizen is a " +
+				"fix. The record must be corrected (a fresh generation) before this thread can send.",
+		);
+		this.name = "EntwurfCodexIdentityBackendError";
+		this.gardenId = identity.gardenId;
+	}
+}
+
+/** A JSON OBJECT, as a narrowing guard — `typeof value === "object"` alone admits `null` and
+ * arrays, and every codex identity field is read through a member access that both would
+ * survive silently (`[]._meta` is `undefined`, not a type error). */
+function isJsonObject(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
+	return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+
+/** What the resolver is handed. Every field is UNKNOWN on purpose: three of them come off the
+ * wire (an MCP peer may send any JSON) and the fourth is a config-written label, so none of
+ * them may be typed as trusted at the boundary. */
+export interface ResolveCodexRequestSenderOptions {
+	/** The managed-entry provenance, supplied EXPLICITLY by the bridge (never read here). */
+	provenance?: unknown;
+	/** The peer's `initialize` `clientInfo` — a host-kind gate, never an identity. */
+	clientInfo?: unknown;
+	/** THIS request's `params._meta`. Per-call, because identity on codex is per-call. */
+	requestMeta?: unknown;
+	/** Record store override (gates isolate it; production reads the SSOT default). */
+	sessionsDir?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The one codex caller a request names, as the RECORD describes it.
+ *
+ * `identity` is the whole answer: gardenId, cwd, model, transcriptPath and backend all come from
+ * the record, never from the wire. `_meta` carries a `workspaces` map and a `model` field, and
+ * both are IGNORED here — a caller that can name its own cwd/model can relabel a citizen by
+ * asking, which is a write disguised as a read. `threadId` is retained only because it is the
+ * SELECTOR that was proven equal to `identity.nativeSessionId`; it adds no new authority.
+ */
+export interface CodexRequestSender {
+	identity: MetaIdentity;
+	/** The wire id that selected the record; `=== identity.nativeSessionId` by construction. */
+	threadId: string;
+	/** The provenance that admitted this rail — always the codex label past the gate. */
+	provenance: typeof CODEX_BRIDGE_PROVENANCE_LABEL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the caller's thread id out of ONE request, or refuse.
+ *
+ * `null` — this is not an admitted codex identity claim at all: no managed provenance, a peer
+ * that is not the codex client, no `_meta` object, or an `_meta` with no `threadId` member
+ * (`tools/list`, `initialize`, a non-turn call). All four are ordinary and carry no defect.
+ *
+ * THROWS {@link EntwurfCodexIdentityMetadataError} — a claim exists and is broken. The line
+ * between the two is the PRESENCE of `threadId`: absent is a call that never claimed identity,
+ * present-but-unusable is a claim that failed, and collapsing them would report "no identity"
+ * for a caller that named itself.
+ *
+ * Pure: no fs, no env, no clock. The store lookup is the next function's job on purpose — this
+ * half is the wire contract and can be pinned without a store at all.
+ */
+export function readCodexRequestThreadId(
+	opts: Pick<ResolveCodexRequestSenderOptions, "provenance" | "clientInfo" | "requestMeta">,
+): string | null {
+	if (opts.provenance !== CODEX_BRIDGE_PROVENANCE_LABEL) return null;
+	if (!isJsonObject(opts.clientInfo) || opts.clientInfo.name !== CODEX_MCP_CLIENT_NAME) return null;
+	const meta = opts.requestMeta;
+	if (!isJsonObject(meta)) return null;
+	if (!("threadId" in meta)) return null;
+
+	const threadId = meta.threadId;
+	if (typeof threadId !== "string" || threadId.length === 0) {
+		throw new EntwurfCodexIdentityMetadataError(
+			`\`_meta.threadId\` is present but is not a nonempty string (got ${describe(threadId)}).`,
+		);
+	}
+	const turn = meta[CODEX_TURN_METADATA_KEY];
+	if (!isJsonObject(turn)) {
+		throw new EntwurfCodexIdentityMetadataError(
+			`\`_meta.threadId\` names ${threadId} but \`_meta.${CODEX_TURN_METADATA_KEY}\` is ${describe(turn)}, not an ` +
+				"object, so the second, independently-built id that corroborates it is missing.",
+		);
+	}
+	const sessionId = turn.session_id;
+	const turnThreadId = turn.thread_id;
+	if (typeof sessionId !== "string" || sessionId.length === 0) {
+		throw new EntwurfCodexIdentityMetadataError(
+			`\`_meta.${CODEX_TURN_METADATA_KEY}.session_id\` is not a nonempty string (got ${describe(sessionId)}) — ` +
+				"that field is the one the birth hook also sees, so without it nothing joins the wire to a record.",
+		);
+	}
+	if (typeof turnThreadId !== "string" || turnThreadId.length === 0) {
+		throw new EntwurfCodexIdentityMetadataError(
+			`\`_meta.${CODEX_TURN_METADATA_KEY}.thread_id\` is not a nonempty string (got ${describe(turnThreadId)}).`,
+		);
+	}
+	if (sessionId !== threadId || turnThreadId !== threadId) {
+		throw new EntwurfCodexIdentityMetadataError(
+			`the three ids disagree (threadId=${threadId}, session_id=${sessionId}, thread_id=${turnThreadId}); ` +
+				"on a healthy codex turn they are one byte-identical string.",
+		);
+	}
+	return threadId;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve the ONE codex citizen a request names, or refuse.
+ *
+ * `null` — no admitted claim ({@link readCodexRequestThreadId}), or no record holds that
+ * `nativeSessionId`. The second case is the ordinary pre-birth window: codex birth is
+ * first-turn, not window-open, so a thread whose hook has not minted a record yet simply has no
+ * citizen, and the bridge's default anonymous refusal already names the fix.
+ *
+ * THROWS — every knowable defect, unfolded: a broken claim
+ * ({@link EntwurfCodexIdentityMetadataError}), a foreign-backend record
+ * ({@link EntwurfCodexIdentityBackendError}), or a store that cannot be certified
+ * (`MetaRecordError` from the strict listing — an unreadable/previous-generation record
+ * anywhere in the store, a duplicated `nativeSessionId`, or a store this process cannot read).
+ *
+ * THE LOOKUP IS THE STRICT STORE-WIDE LISTING, NOT A NARROW SCAN. `nativeSessionId` → garden id
+ * is the store's own authority (there is no index, by design), and the same reason
+ * `upsertMetaSession` certifies the WHOLE store before writing applies to a read that turns an
+ * id into an ADDRESS: a narrow "find my thread" pass would answer happily beside a duplicate,
+ * drifted or symlinked neighbour that the doctor refuses, so the runtime would hold the weaker
+ * contract exactly where a message gets attributed. `mode: "strict"` is what makes an
+ * unreadable record a refusal instead of an invisible one — a duplicate of THIS thread's id
+ * would otherwise be dropped from `identities` and read as "no record".
+ */
+export function resolveCodexRequestSenderIdentity(
+	opts: ResolveCodexRequestSenderOptions = {},
+): CodexRequestSender | null {
+	const threadId = readCodexRequestThreadId(opts);
+	if (threadId === null) return null;
+
+	const dir = opts.sessionsDir ?? defaultMetaSessionsDir();
+	const { identities } = listAllMetaIdentities(readActiveStoreEntries(dir), makeStoreRecordReader(dir), {
+		mode: "strict",
+	});
+	const identity = identities.find((record) => record.nativeSessionId === threadId);
+	if (!identity) return null;
+	if (identity.backend !== "codex") throw new EntwurfCodexIdentityBackendError(identity);
+	return { identity, threadId, provenance: CODEX_BRIDGE_PROVENANCE_LABEL };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The three rails an entwurf-bridge child can learn WHO is calling from. Named as a type so a
+ * reconciliation can report which rails spoke without any of them being privileged by position.
+ */
+export type SenderIdentityRail = "pi-session" | "meta-sender-marker" | "codex-request";
+
+/** One rail's answer: the address it names (a pi session id, or a garden id). */
+export interface SenderIdentityClaim {
+	rail: SenderIdentityRail;
+	id: string;
+}
+
+/** One address, plus every rail that named it. Rails are sorted and de-duplicated, so this
+ * answer never depends on the order the caller collected its claims in. */
+export interface ReconciledSenderIdentity {
+	id: string;
+	rails: SenderIdentityRail[];
+}
+
+/**
+ * Two rails claim this MCP process for DIFFERENT addresses. Sibling of
+ * {@link EntwurfSenderIdentityAmbiguityError} and deliberately not the same error: that one is
+ * about two pid MARKERS on one owner pid, while this is about rails that do not even share a
+ * join key — a planted `PI_SESSION_ID` in a native host's environment, a pid marker inherited
+ * from a host whose child we are not, a codex `_meta` naming a thread while a marker names
+ * someone else. Which is right is unknowable here, and both are visible, so neither is used.
+ */
+export class EntwurfSenderIdentityConflictError extends Error {
+	readonly claims: SenderIdentityClaim[];
+	constructor(claims: readonly SenderIdentityClaim[]) {
+		super(
+			"entwurf-bridge refused: conflicting sender identity. This MCP process holds authoritative " +
+				`identity claims from more than one rail, naming DIFFERENT addresses (${claims
+					.map((claim) => `${claim.rail}=${claim.id}`)
+					.join(", ")}), so which one is calling cannot be determined. A send under the wrong identity ` +
+				"is worse than no send. Report it; do not work around it.",
+		);
+		this.name = "EntwurfSenderIdentityConflictError";
+		this.claims = [...claims];
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Fold every rail's answer into ONE address, or refuse.
+ *
+ * 0 claims → `null` (anonymous; the bridge's default refusal owns that outcome).
+ * 1+ claims that AGREE on the id → that address, carrying every rail that named it. Agreement is
+ *   the normal shape of an overlap, not a conflict: a codex citizen's request-scoped claim and a
+ *   pid marker for the same garden id are two views of one identity.
+ * claims that DISAGREE → throw {@link EntwurfSenderIdentityConflictError}.
+ *
+ * Every claim is collected and compared BEFORE one is chosen — the same rule the marker rail
+ * holds one layer up. A rail-priority order would answer even when the truth is unknown, which
+ * is the failure this exists to prevent, so callers must pass ALL rails they resolved rather
+ * than short-circuiting on the first one that answered.
+ */
+export function reconcileSenderIdentityClaims(claims: readonly SenderIdentityClaim[]): ReconciledSenderIdentity | null {
+	if (claims.length === 0) return null;
+	const ids = new Set(claims.map((claim) => claim.id));
+	if (ids.size > 1) throw new EntwurfSenderIdentityConflictError(claims);
+	const [id] = ids;
+	return {
+		id,
+		rails: [...new Set(claims.map((claim) => claim.rail))].sort(),
+	};
+}