@jr2/orchestrator 0.3.0 → 0.5.1

package/src/sandbox-kube.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,1721 @@
+// The canonical SandboxPort (ADR-0012 / GAP(3)): drives the operator's Sandbox CRD through the
+// Orchestrator's own Kubernetes client (kube-client.ts, ADR-0063) — plain REST on built-in
+// `fetch`, no dependency — and reads it back through the one watch (sandbox-watch.ts). Every wait
+// that polled is now a watch event: the placing's node (ADR-0064), the provision's Ready,
+// Continuity and the Harness's restarts (ADR-0021). The Orchestrator never reads a Pod: the
+// operator owns it (ADR-0001) and publishes what this port needs on the Sandbox's status — the
+// scheduler's word or a quota's refusal, `Lost` with the pod's reason, the Harness container's
+// restarts and last end. The client and the watch are injectable, so the mapping is unit-testable against a
+// fake API server; the kind e2e tier exercises the real thing.
+//
+// Reachability: the orchestrator always runs in-cluster (ADR-0019), so it dials
+// `status.endpoint` (`http://<name>.<ns>.svc:…`) directly — stable across orchestrator
+// restarts by nature, which is what ADR-0012's "same endpoint" re-attach promise rides on.
+//
+// Every operation is idempotent (SandboxPort contract): apply is create-or-update, the attach is
+// the Harness's own `POST /attach`, which guards every clone and worktree (ADR-0063), delete
+// ignores absent.
+//
+// WHICH REPOS a Sandbox attaches arrive resolved from the `workspace()`'s Repo Slots (ADR-0051):
+// the CR names each by its cache key, the operator mounts the node's cache read-only at
+// `/repos/<key>` and gates Ready on it, and the Harness's attach clones off that mount. The one judgement
+// made here is the FENCE: a per-run url must match a `git.credentials` entry, or it is refused
+// before anything is applied.
+//
+// WHICH IMAGE a Sandbox runs is not an option here (ADR-0037/0038/0049). The request carries what
+// the `workspace()` wrapper statically declared — a `file:` docker context or a registry ref — and
+// the resolved key→ref map arrives as a mounted ConfigMap read on EVERY provision, so a `jr2 up`
+// that rebuilds an image reaches future Sandboxes without rolling this process.
+//
+// The pod's primary container is the Sandbox Image BYTE-FOR-BYTE (ADR-0037): no appended layers,
+// no rewritten Dockerfile, no jr2 knowledge inside it. jr2's runtime arrives at POD time instead —
+// an `image` volume of the kit's Harness image, its `/opt/jr2` mounted read-only at `/opt/jr2` —
+// and the container's COMMAND is overridden to start the Harness from that volume. The kubelet
+// mounts the image's own layers, so every Sandbox on a node reads one set of runtime pages. The
+// image's own `USER` and `HOME` are respected (the human who execs in lands in the environment its
+// author built); only its `ENTRYPOINT`/`CMD` do not run, because a container has one command and the
+// Harness must own it — its death must be the container's death, which is what the operator's
+// Ready probe and restart semantics at `:8080` mean. A process the image WANTS running is not
+// lost: it has its own seat, the User Container (ADR-0005), composed here when the wrapper's static
+// `user` option names an image (ADR-0049).
+//
+// So this module composes the whole pod — one volume from the kit, one init step, and up to three
+// containers:
+//
+//   volume        runtime     the kit's Harness image, as an `image` volume → /opt/jr2
+//   volume        conversations  an emptyDir → /conversations, the Harness container's alone
+//                             (ADR-0031: a Harness restart inside the pod keeps its conversations)
+//   initContainer preflight   the USER'S image + that volume → ADR-0037's probe, the thing that
+//                             proves a registry ref, whose first appearance is this provision
+//   container     harness     the Sandbox Image, command overridden, /work + /opt/jr2 mounted
+//   container     custodian   jr2-composed, the pod's only credential holder (below)
+//   container     user        optional, the image's own entrypoint, the checkouts (/work, plus
+//                             /repos and /opt/jr2 read-only) and NOTHING else
+//
+// and SIZES it (ADR-0060): the Workspace's Size, resolved down its chain, is the pod-level ceiling;
+// the Custodian takes a fixed slice, the User Container its split if the Machine states one, and
+// the Harness container the rest as its own limit. Every request equals its limit, so the pod is
+// Guaranteed and the CPU limit is enforced.
+//
+// This is also where the CUSTODIAN is composed (ADR-0013, ADR-0059). The operator needs no change
+// to carry it: ADR-0001 made `Sidecars` generic container fragments it schedules WITHOUT
+// understanding, so the Custodian is exactly that — a container with an image, its mounts, and a
+// readiness probe the pod's Ready waits on. What this module builds is the pod's asymmetry:
+//
+//   harness container     JR2_CUSTODIAN_URL + the Stand-in of every credential  (no credential)
+//   custodian container   the Sandbox token and the pod's held secrets, as files (the credentials)
+//
+// The Agent has code execution in the first and none in the second. The token is minted here — a
+// signed Sandbox name (see tokens.ts), so re-provisioning after a restart yields the SAME token and
+// the Secret re-applies as a no-op. What else the Custodian holds is `jr2 up`'s placement for THIS
+// Workspace — the Held secrets its `workspace()` lists and its Agents' providers claim (ADR-0059) —
+// read per provision from the `jr2-held` mount (custodian.ts builds both placements' pods alike).
+
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import {
+  matchCredential,
+  type GitCredential,
+  type HarnessEnvFromSource,
+  type HarnessEnvVar,
+  type SandboxPlacement,
+} from "./config.ts";
+import {
+  custodianBootstrap,
+  custodianComposition,
+  custodianScript,
+  CUSTODIAN_BOOTSTRAP_KEY,
+  CUSTODIAN_SCRIPT_KEY,
+  type CustodianComposition,
+} from "./custodian.ts";
+import { readHeldManifest, workspaceHeldPod, type HeldManifest } from "./held-secrets.ts";
+import {
+  effectorManifestKey,
+  readSandboxEffectorManifest,
+  SANDBOX_EFFECTOR_GIT_DIR,
+  sandboxEffectorKeySecret,
+  sandboxEffectorService,
+  type SandboxEffectorManifest,
+} from "./sandbox-effector.ts";
+import { GIT_PUSH_MANIFEST_KEY, placedPushRefusal, readGitPushManifest } from "./git-push.ts";
+import { readImageRefs, resolveSandboxImage, resolveUserImage, type HeldImageScope, type ImageRefs } from "./images.ts";
+import {
+  CONVERSATIONS_DIR,
+  CONVERSATIONS_DIR_ENV,
+  CONVERSATIONS_VOLUME,
+  HELD_MOUNT,
+  CA_CONFIGMAP,
+  heldManifestKey,
+  IMAGES_KEY,
+  IMAGES_MOUNT,
+  ORCHESTRATOR_PORT,
+  ORCHESTRATOR_SERVICE,
+  PRIORITY_CLASS_SANDBOX,
+  REPOS_MOUNT,
+  sandboxCustodianConfigMap,
+} from "./names.ts";
+import {
+  CONFIGMAPS,
+  SANDBOXES,
+  SECRETS,
+  SERVICES,
+  isNotFound,
+  kubeClient,
+  type KubeClient,
+  type KubeObject,
+} from "./kube-client.ts";
+import { repoIdentity } from "./repo-identity.ts";
+import type { RepoResources } from "./repos.ts";
+import { resolveSize, splitSize, type Size, type SizeSplit } from "./size.ts";
+import {
+  watchSandboxes,
+  type Condition,
+  type ContainerWaiting,
+  type SandboxObject,
+  type SandboxWatch,
+} from "./sandbox-watch.ts";
+import { effectorKey, harnessToken, harnessTokenDigest, sandboxToken } from "./tokens.ts";
+import type { AttachError, AttachRequest, AttachResponse } from "./wire.ts";
+import type { Continuity, MemoryKill, PlacingWait, ProvisionedRepo, SandboxLoss, SandboxPort } from "./workspace.ts";
+
+/** Where jr2's runtime lands in every container that gets it (ADR-0037). `/opt/jr2` and not `/app`
+ * because a stranger's base may already use `/app`, and one layout must serve both the stock
+ * Harness image and an arbitrary Sandbox Image. It is a PUBLISHED surface: `bin/` beside `lib/`
+ * (node's rpath is `$ORIGIN/../lib`), `src/main.ts`, `node_modules/`. */
+export const RUNTIME_MOUNT = "/opt/jr2";
+
+/** How every seat that holds the runtime mounts it (ADR-0037). The volume is the WHOLE harness
+ * image, so `subPath` narrows it to that image's own `/opt/jr2` — the published surface, laid out
+ * exactly as the Harness image runs it, so node's `$ORIGIN/../lib` holds with nothing rearranged.
+ * Read-only in every seat: an image volume is read-only anyway, and the Agent has code execution
+ * in the Harness container, so the CR says so rather than leaving it to the volume type. The
+ * layers stay owned by root and the Sandbox Image may run any uid, so the image's MODE is the
+ * guarantee that any uid reads it — the harness Dockerfile's build-time check holds it there. */
+const RUNTIME_VOLUME = "runtime";
+const RUNTIME_VOLUME_MOUNT = { name: RUNTIME_VOLUME, mountPath: RUNTIME_MOUNT, subPath: "opt/jr2", readOnly: true };
+
+/** The primary container's command (ADR-0037). Absolute, so it never depends on the image's
+ * `WORKDIR`, and identical to the stock Harness image's own `CMD` — one runtime, two placements.
+ * `tini` is PID 1 (ADR-0061): the Agent's processes are the Harness's children, and a tree the
+ * memory guard kills must leave no zombies behind. */
+const HARNESS_COMMAND = [
+  `${RUNTIME_MOUNT}/bin/tini`,
+  "--",
+  `${RUNTIME_MOUNT}/bin/node`,
+  `${RUNTIME_MOUNT}/src/main.ts`,
+];
+
+/** Where the Harness attaches (ADR-0004): the `work` volume's mount in every seat that holds the
+ * checkouts. Fixed, because the Harness's attach writes exactly here (ADR-0063). */
+const WORK_ROOT = "/work";
+
+/** ADR-0005's default work group. Convention, not config: the pod's `fsGroup` is granted to every
+ * container as a supplemental group, so the Harness writes `/work` whatever the number and no
+ * image's `/etc/group` needs to know it. The one override is the spec's `workGroup`. */
+const DEFAULT_WORK_GROUP = 2000;
+
+/**
+ * The isolation baseline for a jr2-owned seat, spelled out HERE for the init container because the
+ * operator's hardened default covers the primary container and the sidecars only (ADR-0001/0005) —
+ * init steps pass through verbatim, which is what keeps the operator agent-agnostic. Deliberately
+ * not applied to the `user` container: that seat's identity is "what jr2 does not own".
+ */
+const HARDENED = {
+  runAsNonRoot: true,
+  allowPrivilegeEscalation: false,
+  capabilities: { drop: ["ALL"] },
+  seccompProfile: { type: "RuntimeDefault" },
+};
+
+/** The Sandbox Effector's port in its pod (ADR-0068's default). */
+export const SANDBOX_EFFECTOR_PORT = 8082;
+
+export { sandboxEffectorSecret } from "./sandbox-effector.ts";
+
+/**
+ * The Sandbox Effector's container (ADR-0067, ADR-0068), for the Sandbox CR's `sidecars` beside the
+ * Custodian: the operator schedules it as it does any sidecar, and projects the CR's `gitCredentials`
+ * into it alone, by its name `effector`. The provision adds it for a `workspace()` whose body
+ * holds an Effect placed there (`push`, a file-body `http`, a credentialed `command`) — which `jr2 up` read
+ * off the Machines and declared in the pod's manifest. Its image is the Sandbox Image unless the
+ * `workspace()` names `effector: { image }`; its command is jr2's binary on the runtime volume; it
+ * runs as its image's own `USER`. Its mounts: `/work`, `/repos/<key>` and `/opt/jr2` read-only,
+ * the secrets its Effects name and the credentials its pushes spend at `/run/jr2/secrets` (0400),
+ * its per-pod key (derived from the Sandbox's name, like the Sandbox token) and `effector.json` at
+ * `/run/jr2/effector`, and an emptyDir scratch that is its `$HOME`. The push credentials are not
+ * the provision's to mount: the operator projects each entry Secret the CR's `gitCredentials`
+ * names into `/run/jr2/secrets/@git/<name>/` (ADR-0051). No Custodian, no `harness.env`, and no env
+ * beyond where its mounts are and the downward API's name, address and node — the node is what
+ * its Landlock refusal names. It says why it ended in its termination message, which the operator
+ * publishes on the Sandbox's status (`status.effector`).
+ */
+export function sandboxEffectorContainer(opts: {
+  image: string;
+  keys: readonly string[];
+  securityContext: Record<string, unknown>;
+  secretVolume: string;
+  keyVolume: string;
+  scratchVolume: string;
+  /** The instance's trust ConfigMap's volume, when it ships a caBundle (ADR-0020). */
+  caVolume?: string;
+}) {
+  const env = (name: string, value: string) => ({ name, value });
+  return {
+    name: "effector",
+    image: opts.image,
+    command: [`${RUNTIME_MOUNT}/bin/effector`],
+    env: [
+      env("JR2_EFFECTOR_PORT", String(SANDBOX_EFFECTOR_PORT)),
+      env("JR2_EFFECTOR_WORK", WORK_ROOT),
+      env("JR2_EFFECTOR_REPOS", REPOS_MOUNT),
+      env("JR2_EFFECTOR_KEY", "/run/jr2/effector/key"),
+      env("JR2_EFFECTOR_CONFIG", "/run/jr2/effector/effector.json"),
+      env("JR2_EFFECTOR_SECRETS", "/run/jr2/secrets"),
+      env("JR2_EFFECTOR_GIT", `/run/jr2/secrets/${SANDBOX_EFFECTOR_GIT_DIR}`),
+      env("JR2_EFFECTOR_SCRATCH", "/run/jr2/scratch"),
+      env("HOME", "/run/jr2/scratch"),
+      ...(opts.caVolume ? [env("JR2_CA_FILE", `${EFFECTOR_CA_MOUNT}/ca.crt`)] : []),
+      { name: "POD_NAME", valueFrom: { fieldRef: { fieldPath: "metadata.name" } } },
+      { name: "POD_IP", valueFrom: { fieldRef: { fieldPath: "status.podIP" } } },
+      { name: "NODE_NAME", valueFrom: { fieldRef: { fieldPath: "spec.nodeName" } } },
+    ],
+    ports: [{ name: "effector", containerPort: SANDBOX_EFFECTOR_PORT }],
+    // Pod Ready waits on it, and the Sandbox's Ready on pod Ready (ADR-0063): no Effect request is
+    // signed before the Effector process that verifies it started, which it would refuse, unsigned
+    // (ADR-0068). It answers only once it holds its key and listens. Every second, as the Harness's.
+    readinessProbe: { httpGet: { path: "/healthz", port: SANDBOX_EFFECTOR_PORT }, periodSeconds: 1 },
+    terminationMessagePolicy: "FallbackToLogsOnError",
+    volumeMounts: [
+      { name: "work", mountPath: WORK_ROOT, readOnly: true },
+      RUNTIME_VOLUME_MOUNT,
+      ...opts.keys.map((key) => ({ name: repoVolumeName(key), mountPath: repoMountPath(key), readOnly: true })),
+      { name: opts.secretVolume, mountPath: "/run/jr2/secrets", readOnly: true },
+      { name: opts.keyVolume, mountPath: "/run/jr2/effector", readOnly: true },
+      { name: opts.scratchVolume, mountPath: "/run/jr2/scratch" },
+      ...(opts.caVolume ? [{ name: opts.caVolume, mountPath: EFFECTOR_CA_MOUNT, readOnly: true }] : []),
+    ],
+    securityContext: opts.securityContext,
+  };
+}
+
+const EFFECTOR_CA_MOUNT = "/etc/jr2/effector-ca";
+
+/** The Sandbox Effector's volumes, by the names its container mounts. */
+export function sandboxEffectorVolumes(opts: {
+  sandbox: string;
+  manifest: SandboxEffectorManifest;
+  caBundle: boolean;
+}) {
+  return [
+    { name: "effector-secrets", projected: { defaultMode: 0o400, sources: opts.manifest.sources } },
+    {
+      name: "effector-own",
+      projected: {
+        defaultMode: 0o400,
+        sources: [
+          { secret: { name: sandboxEffectorKeySecret(opts.sandbox), items: [{ key: "key", path: "key" }] } },
+          { secret: { name: opts.manifest.secret, items: [{ key: "effector.json", path: "effector.json" }] } },
+        ],
+      },
+    },
+    { name: "effector-scratch", emptyDir: {} },
+    ...(opts.caBundle ? [{ name: "effector-ca", configMap: { name: CA_CONFIGMAP } }] : []),
+  ];
+}
+
+/**
+ * ADR-0037's fallback seat, for a BUILT image that declares no `USER` (the converge's `docker
+ * inspect` is what saw that; images.ts holds the record). jr2 sets `runAsUser` nowhere else — an
+ * image's own `USER` decides its seat's uid (ADR-0005) — so this applies only where the image
+ * chose nothing and the alternative is root, which the hardened context refuses.
+ *
+ * The home is a POD volume, not a directory in the image: uid 1000 on a stranger's base has no
+ * home at all, and the floor needs a writable one (`git config --global` writes `$HOME/.gitconfig`
+ * on every attach; a real toolchain wants `~/.npm`, `~/.cargo`, `~/.cache`). An emptyDir lands
+ * group-writable under the pod's fsGroup, so uid 1000 owns it in practice without jr2 chown-ing
+ * anything. `/home/jr2` and not `/home/node`: the number is jr2's choice here, so the path is too.
+ */
+const FALLBACK_UID = 1000;
+const FALLBACK_HOME = "/home/jr2";
+
+/**
+ * The CPU hints (ADR-0060), each the Harness container's own `limits.cpu` through the Downward API
+ * (divisor 1, so a fractional limit rounds UP to whole cpus). For the tools that read neither the
+ * cgroup's limit nor their affinity: `OMP_NUM_THREADS` also makes `nproc` answer N, and
+ * `PYTHON_CPU_COUNT` and `GOMAXPROCS` speak for their runtimes. `os.cpus()` still reports the node —
+ * a Machine that runs Playwright passes `--workers=$JR2_CPUS`.
+ *
+ * The Agent is told its CPU count and Size by the Briefing's standing part, never by the Frame
+ * (ADR-0060, ADR-0062) — and that needs no wire: the Harness reads `JR2_CPUS` from this env and its
+ * Size from its own cgroup, so the Orchestrator sends neither.
+ */
+const CPU_HINTS = ["JR2_CPUS", "OMP_NUM_THREADS", "PYTHON_CPU_COUNT", "GOMAXPROCS"] as const;
+const cpuHintEnv = (): HarnessEnvVar[] =>
+  CPU_HINTS.map((name) => ({ name, valueFrom: { resourceFieldRef: { resource: "limits.cpu", divisor: "1" } } }));
+
+/**
+ * How many times the Harness container may end before the provision stops waiting for it
+ * (ADR-0063). The operator publishes its restarts and last end on the Sandbox's status, so a
+ * Harness that dies on start — a Sandbox Image that misses ADR-0037's floor in a way the preflight
+ * did not catch, a runtime the image cannot run — fails the provision by NAME, with the kubelet's
+ * reason and exit code, instead of burning the whole Ready budget. Two, not one: a single restart
+ * on the way up (a memory kill during a heavy start, ADR-0061) is a pod that may still come up.
+ */
+const CRASH_LOOP_RESTARTS = 2;
+
+/**
+ * The kubelet's verdict on a container whose image resolves to root, or to a non-numeric user,
+ * under `runAsNonRoot` (ADR-0005). A BUILT image is judged at converge from its recorded USER; a
+ * brought registry ref is never inspected (ADR-0037), so this waiting reason is the only place
+ * its USER is known. Reason AND message: the reason alone also covers a missing Secret or
+ * ConfigMap key, a different fault with a different fix.
+ */
+const ROOT_IMAGE_REASON = "CreateContainerConfigError";
+const ROOT_IMAGE_MESSAGE = /runAsNonRoot/i;
+
+/** Waiting reasons that no retry mends: the kubelet will never start the container. A failing
+ * pull is not here — it may recover (a registry blip, node credentials), so the pod budget
+ * decides, and its expiry names it. */
+const TERMINAL_WAITING = new Set(["InvalidImageName", "ErrImageNeverPull"]);
+
+/** The kubelet's reason for a container the kernel killed at its memory limit (ADR-0061). */
+const OOM_KILLED = "OOMKilled";
+
+/** How long a lost conversation waits for the operator's word on a memory kill (ADR-0061). The
+ * Harness can be serving again — and answering 404 — a moment before the kubelet's status for its
+ * last run has reached the Sandbox, and this port never reads the Pod to learn it sooner. */
+const MEMORY_FAULT_GRACE_MS = 5_000;
+
+/** Clock skew allowed between a node's kubelet stamping `finishedAt` and this process's `since`. */
+const MEMORY_FAULT_SKEW_MS = 10_000;
+
+/** How long an attach keeps re-sending a request that never reached the Harness (ADR-0042): the
+ * attach is now the FIRST thing that dials a Sandbox's Service, and Ready is not routable. The
+ * same measured window the admission uses (harness-client.ts). */
+const ATTACH_WINDOW_MS = 90_000;
+
+/**
+ * ADR-0037's preflight, VERBATIM: git present · `$HOME` writable · glibc new enough for jr2's node
+ * (with the relocated `libstdc++`) · the vendored ripgrep, reached through the mounted `/opt/jr2`.
+ *
+ * The three commands are the floor, one each: `git config --global` proves git is on the system
+ * PATH AND that `$HOME` is writable for the image's user; `node -e ""` proves the glibc is no
+ * older than the one jr2's node was built against (this is where musl dies); `rg` UNQUALIFIED
+ * proves the vendored static binary resolves THROUGH PATH, which is what the Harness's own append
+ * buys at runtime.
+ *
+ * ONE prover, and this is it (ADR-0037/0041). A converge cannot hold an image to this floor: the
+ * floor is a HARNESS-SEAT obligation, a built context may equally be destined for the User
+ * Container seat — which owes no floor at all (ADR-0005) — and which seat a directory serves is
+ * workflow-internal and statically unrecoverable (ADR-0031). Here the seat is known, and here is
+ * also the only moment a registry ref exists at all, since jr2 never builds or inspects one.
+ */
+const SANDBOX_PREFLIGHT = `git config --global safe.directory "*" && ${RUNTIME_MOUNT}/bin/node -e "" && rg --version`;
+
+/**
+ * The probe as a shell line. The PATH append is mechanism, not part of the claim, and it is not
+ * optional: nothing bakes `/opt/jr2/bin` into the user's image any more, so a probe that skipped it
+ * would report `rg: not found` for every image on earth. APPENDED, never prepended — a toolchain
+ * the image pinned wins, which is as much the property being proved as `rg`'s presence (ADR-0037).
+ * The seat gets no login shell at either end, so `$PATH` is whatever the image itself set.
+ */
+function preflightShell(): string {
+  return `export PATH="$PATH:${RUNTIME_MOUNT}/bin"; ${SANDBOX_PREFLIGHT}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The preflight as an init step IN THE USER'S IMAGE with `/opt/jr2` mounted. It fails the pod
+ * before the Harness starts, instead of surfacing as a tool failure mid-turn on a pod nobody is
+ * watching.
+ *
+ * It PROVES, it does not set up: the `.gitconfig` it writes lives in this container's own
+ * ephemeral filesystem, so the attach script still runs the same line in the Harness container.
+ *
+ * `sh -c`, not `sh -ec`: the failure is handled below, because "node did not execute" is not
+ * actionable and the message has to name the fix.
+ */
+const PREFLIGHT_SCRIPT = [
+  `${preflightShell()} && exit 0`,
+  `echo "jr2: this Sandbox Image does not meet the floor (ADR-0037): a glibc base no older than ` +
+    `jr2's node (musl is out entirely), git on the system PATH, a writable HOME for the image's ` +
+    `USER, and /opt/jr2 + /work + :8080 unclaimed. jr2 vendors the rest." >&2`,
+  `exit 1`,
+].join("\n");
+
+export type KubeSandboxOptions = {
+  /** The mounted image map (ADR-0037/0038) — every ref this port can name, written by `jr2 up`.
+   * Default: the `jr2-images` ConfigMap's mount. No image option here: which image a Sandbox runs
+   * is the `workspace()` wrapper's static `image` option (ADR-0049) — carried on the Machine, read
+   * off it at invoke time, handed to `provision()` as a string — and resolved against this map at
+   * provision. The per-run spec never names one (ADR-0051). */
+  imagesPath?: string;
+  /** Where each Workspace's held manifest is (ADR-0059): `held-<pod>.json` per pod `jr2 up`
+   * placed, read per provision like the image map, so a held-secret edit reaches future Sandboxes
+   * without rolling this process. Default: the `jr2-held` ConfigMap's mount. */
+  heldDir?: string;
+  /** Extra env for the HARNESS container (`harness.env`) — merged ahead of the
+   * mechanism-owned vars, which win on collision. */
+  env?: HarnessEnvVar[];
+  /** Whole-Secret/ConfigMap env for the Harness container (`harness.envFrom`) — how a real
+   * Harness gets its model API key without the value ever touching jr2 config. */
+  envFrom?: HarnessEnvFromSource[];
+  /** Where a Sandbox may land (ADR-0052): the Instance's `sandbox.nodeSelector` and
+   * `sandbox.tolerations`, written on the CR verbatim and copied onto the pod by the operator, which
+   * merges nothing with them. Absent → wherever an ordinary pod lands. */
+  placement?: SandboxPlacement;
+  /** The Instance's default Size (`sandbox.resources`, ADR-0060): applied only to a Workspace
+   * that states no Size, never under or over a stated one. Absent → the kit default. */
+  defaultSize?: Size;
+  /** The Sandbox pod's PriorityClass (ADR-0060): `priorityClasses.sandbox`, or the `jr2-sandbox`
+   * class `jr2 up` creates. */
+  priorityClassName?: string;
+  /** The instance ships a private-CA bundle (ADR-0020): the HARNESS container trusts it, and the
+   * Custodian verifies a bound host with it (custodian.ts). */
+  caBundle?: boolean;
+  /** The key Sandbox tokens are signed with — from the instance Secret (ADR-0013/0019). */
+  signingKey?: Buffer;
+  /** Kube namespace for Sandbox CRs. Default `default`. */
+  namespace?: string;
+  /** CR `spec.idleTimeout` — the operator's abandoned-Sandbox GC backstop (ADR-0001). Default `30m`. */
+  idleTimeout?: string;
+  /** How often a workspace's lease actor renews (ADR-0001/0021): the cadence at which
+   * `jr2.dev/keepalive` is re-stamped, ±20%. Must be ≪ idleTimeout, since a lapsed lease is what
+   * lets the operator reap. Default 5m. */
+  leaseIntervalMs?: number;
+  /** Await-Ready budget for the POD: from the pod's scheduling until the operator reports it Ready
+   * (ADR-0064) — the wait for a node is `placing`'s, with no deadline, and spends none of it.
+   * Default 120s, measured against watch events. A pod that never comes up (an image that misses
+   * ADR-0037's floor) is what this bounds; a pod that is up and waiting on its Repos is
+   * `repoTimeoutMs`'s. */
+  readyTimeoutMs?: number;
+  /**
+   * Await-Ready budget for the REPOS (ADR-0051): once the operator holds a Sandbox whose pod is
+   * Ready on a Repo reason — the node's cache agent is cloning a cold node, or fetching before the
+   * attach — the wait is measured against this, from the same instant as the pod's. Sized for a
+   * clone, not a pod: the agent's clone budget is 20m, and this must exceed it so a clone that
+   * runs out of time fails BY NAME (`RepoCloneFailed`, git's words) instead of as this port's
+   * timeout. The Lease renews from the CR's write (ADR-0064), so the idle timeout does not bound
+   * it. Default 25m.
+   */
+  repoTimeoutMs?: number;
+  /**
+   * The Repo-resource port (ADR-0051, repos.ts): every Repo a provision names must exist as a
+   * `Repo` resource before the CR names it, or the operator reports it missing and the Sandbox
+   * never reaches Ready. So `provision` ensures each one here — a per-run url's resource is
+   * created at first attach, a bound one is found as the boot stated it — and REFUSES to run
+   * without the port: a Sandbox whose Repos nobody creates parks on `RepoMissing` for the whole
+   * Ready budget. The other operations (attach, renew, destroy) need no port, so it is optional
+   * at construction.
+   */
+  repos?: RepoResources;
+  /**
+   * The instance's `git.credentials` (ADR-0051) — THE FENCE. A per-run url is run input, a
+   * ticket field, and otherwise a way to spend the cluster's credential against any host: one
+   * whose identity matches no entry is refused here, before a Secret or a CR exists, naming the
+   * list. A bound url is code the instance typechecked and deployed, admitted without a match.
+   * Default: no entries, so every per-run url is refused.
+   */
+  credentials?: readonly GitCredential[];
+  /** The Kubernetes client (ADR-0063), shared with the Repo ports so one write cap covers the
+   * process. Default: the in-cluster client. */
+  client?: KubeClient;
+  /** The one Sandbox watch (ADR-0063), shared with the fetch ask. Default: one started on first
+   * use, over `client`, in `namespace`. */
+  watch?: SandboxWatch;
+  /** The transport the attach dials the Harness with (ADR-0063). Injectable for tests. Default:
+   * global `fetch`. */
+  harnessFetch?: typeof fetch;
+  /** How long an attach re-sends a request that never reached the Harness. Default 90s. */
+  attachWindowMs?: number;
+  /**
+   * The config-derived options, read on every use instead of the static ones above (ADR-0069). The
+   * config that applies is always the current Assembly's, and a publish swaps it without a new
+   * port. So the fence, the Harness env, the CA bundle, the placement, the default Size and the
+   * PriorityClass that a provision reads are the ones current when it runs.
+   */
+  settings?: () => KubeSandboxSettings;
+  /** The current Assembly's hash, read per provision (ADR-0069). A provision for a run under
+   * another Assembly (a held run) whose `file:` context is not in the image map fails naming both
+   * hashes, because the map holds the current Assembly's contexts only. Absent → no current
+   * Assembly is known, and such a failure names none. */
+  currentAssembly?: () => string | undefined;
+};
+
+/** The options of {@link KubeSandboxOptions} that come from the Instance's config. */
+export type KubeSandboxSettings = Pick<
+  KubeSandboxOptions,
+  "credentials" | "env" | "envFrom" | "caBundle" | "placement" | "defaultSize" | "priorityClassName"
+>;
+
+export function kubeSandbox(opts: KubeSandboxOptions = {}): SandboxPort {
+  // The config-derived options, read per use (ADR-0069): `cfg().credentials`, never a copy.
+  const cfg = (): KubeSandboxSettings => (opts.settings ? opts.settings() : opts);
+  const ns = opts.namespace ?? "default";
+  const imagesPath = opts.imagesPath ?? join(IMAGES_MOUNT, IMAGES_KEY);
+  const heldDir = opts.heldDir ?? HELD_MOUNT;
+  const readyTimeoutMs = opts.readyTimeoutMs ?? 120_000;
+  const repoTimeoutMs = opts.repoTimeoutMs ?? 25 * 60_000;
+  const leaseIntervalMs = opts.leaseIntervalMs ?? 5 * 60_000;
+  const harnessFetch = opts.harnessFetch ?? fetch;
+  const attachWindowMs = opts.attachWindowMs ?? ATTACH_WINDOW_MS;
+
+  // Built on first use, never at construction: a boot that builds this port has not yet reached
+  // the cluster, and must not need to (ADR-0048's stance for the Repos, held for the Sandboxes).
+  let client: KubeClient | undefined = opts.client;
+  const kube = () => (client ??= kubeClient());
+  let watch: SandboxWatch | undefined = opts.watch;
+  const sandboxes = () => (watch ??= watchSandboxes(kube(), { namespace: ns }));
+
+  /** The Sandbox's token Secret — mounted into the Custodian container, and nothing else in the pod. */
+  const secretName = (name: string) => `${name}-token`;
+
+  /**
+   * The User Container (ADR-0005): the opt-in third seat, composed only when the wrapper's static
+   * `user` option names an image (ADR-0049). The ZERO-CONTRACT seat — jr2 injects nothing, probes
+   * nothing, overrides nothing. So: no `command` (its own entrypoint runs, untouched), no `env`,
+   * no `envFrom`, no CA bundle, no ports, no resources. Every key jr2 forwarded would be a crack in
+   * "jr2 puts nothing in it", and widening the one authoring string to an object stays compatible
+   * if a concrete need ever argues its own way in. (Git's dubious-ownership guard is the line's
+   * cost, accepted with
+   * eyes open — ADR-0005: safe.directory is honored only from files this seat's image owns, so an
+   * image whose sessions run git carries its own line.)
+   *
+   * `/work` read-write plus the checkouts' two read-only halves are the single exception, and they
+   * are not an injection but the point: this seat and the Harness mount ONE worktree, so the human
+   * and the Agent see identical files — which is also why ADR-0005's cross-uid pair (the pod's
+   * `fsGroup`, the attach's default ACL) exists at all. The caches ride along because they are
+   * half of the same files: the worktrees are `--shared` clones whose alternates resolve objects
+   * from `/repos/<key>` (ADR-0004/0051), so a seat with `/work` alone holds checkouts whose every
+   * borrowed object is missing ("unable to normalize alternate object path"). `/opt/jr2` is the
+   * other half (ADR-0053): `origin`'s fetch url is a program on that volume, so a seat without it
+   * holds checkouts whose `git fetch` dies — and with it the human gets the same fetch as the
+   * Agent, with no credential of their own. Nothing else follows it in: `ext::` names the program
+   * by absolute path, so this seat still gets no env, no command, and no probe. The repo volumes
+   * are the operator's — it defines `repo-<key>` for every key the CR names — so this seat mounts
+   * them by name. The Custodian is deliberately not given any of the three: it reads no worktree, and it is the
+   * container holding the pod's credentials, so it gets the narrowest mount set that works.
+   * It also carries no `securityContext`, which the operator reads as the exemption — root is
+   * ALLOWED here, because hardening a seat whose identity is "what jr2 does not own" is an opinion,
+   * and the standard managed-access shape (a root sshd that setuids sessions down) must run
+   * unmodified.
+   */
+  const userSidecar = async (
+    refs: ImageRefs,
+    image: string,
+    keys: string[],
+    split: SizeSplit,
+    held: HeldImageScope | undefined,
+  ) => ({
+    name: "user",
+    image: await resolveUserImage(refs, image, held),
+    volumeMounts: [
+      { name: "work", mountPath: WORK_ROOT },
+      RUNTIME_VOLUME_MOUNT,
+      ...keys.map((key) => ({ name: repoVolumeName(key), mountPath: repoMountPath(key), readOnly: true })),
+    ],
+    // Its split of the Size, only when the Machine states one (ADR-0060) — a fact the Machine
+    // wrote, not an injection. Otherwise the seat has no limit of its own and shares the pod's.
+    ...(split.user ? { resources: split.user } : {}),
+  });
+
+  /** The pod's sidecar list (ADR-0001: opaque fragments the operator schedules verbatim). The
+   * Custodian is ALWAYS here: a Sandbox without one is a pod that comes up Ready and then parks its
+   * Machine forever on a Menu it cannot read (ADR-0013). The User Container joins it only when the
+   * spec named one. */
+  const sidecarsFor = async (
+    custodian: CustodianComposition,
+    refs: ImageRefs,
+    keys: string[],
+    split: SizeSplit,
+    held: HeldImageScope | undefined,
+    user?: string,
+    effector?: Record<string, unknown>,
+  ) => [
+    custodian.custodianContainer,
+    ...(user !== undefined ? [await userSidecar(refs, user, keys, split, held)] : []),
+    ...(effector !== undefined ? [effector] : []),
+  ];
+
+  /**
+   * The Sandbox Effector (ADR-0068), when `jr2 up` placed an Effect there: its
+   * container and volumes. Its image is the one the `workspace()` names, resolved like the User
+   * Container's (a `file:` context to its built ref), or the Sandbox Image; it runs as that image's
+   * own `USER` — the seat rule every jr2 seat follows, ADR-0037's fallback included — hardened.
+   */
+  const effectorFor = async (
+    req: { name: string; effector?: string },
+    refs: ImageRefs,
+    keys: string[],
+    seat: Seat,
+    manifest: SandboxEffectorManifest,
+    held: HeldImageScope | undefined,
+  ) => {
+    let image = seat.image;
+    let securityContext: Record<string, unknown> = seat.securityContext;
+    if (req.effector !== undefined) {
+      const named = await resolveSandboxImage(refs, req.effector, held);
+      if (named.refusedUser !== undefined) {
+        throw new Error(
+          `the Sandbox Effector's image "${req.effector}" declares \`USER ${named.refusedUser}\`, which cannot run a jr2 ` +
+            "seat: every jr2-owned container is `runAsNonRoot` with no `runAsUser`, so the kubelet needs a NUMERIC " +
+            "non-zero uid (ADR-0005). Change the Dockerfile's last `USER` to that uid, then re-run `jr2 up`.",
+        );
+      }
+      image = named.ref;
+      securityContext = named.fallbackSeat ? { ...HARDENED, runAsUser: FALLBACK_UID } : HARDENED;
+    }
+    return {
+      container: sandboxEffectorContainer({
+        image,
+        keys,
+        securityContext,
+        secretVolume: "effector-secrets",
+        keyVolume: "effector-own",
+        scratchVolume: "effector-scratch",
+        ...(cfg().caBundle ? { caVolume: "effector-ca" } : {}),
+      }),
+      volumes: sandboxEffectorVolumes({ sandbox: req.name, manifest, caBundle: cfg().caBundle === true }),
+    };
+  };
+
+  // The Harness container's env: the instance's passthrough (`harness.env` — e.g. model
+  // config) first, then the mechanism-owned vars (the Custodian's address and every Stand-in, the
+  // proxy and the trust bundles — custodian.ts), which win on collision. Note the asymmetry stands
+  // (ADR-0013): user env/envFrom land on the HARNESS container only — never on the Custodian, whose
+  // mounts are composed here and carry the pod's credentials.
+  //
+  // The gate rides LAST (ADR-0058): the digest of the bearer the Orchestrator derives for THIS
+  // Sandbox. A digest because the Agent reads this env; last because a `harness.env` entry of the
+  // same name must not be able to choose the Harness's credential.
+  const harnessEnv = (name: string, custodian: CustodianComposition, hints: HarnessEnvVar[]): HarnessEnvVar[] => {
+    if (!opts.signingKey) throw new Error("kubeSandbox: a Harness needs a signingKey to check its bearer");
+    return [
+      ...(cfg().env ?? []),
+      ...custodian.harnessEnv,
+      // The CPU hints (ADR-0060) are mechanism: they say what the Size gives, so they win over a
+      // `harness.env` entry of the same name.
+      ...hints,
+      // Where the Harness persists its conversations (ADR-0031) — the volume below, mechanism, so
+      // no `harness.env` entry chooses it.
+      { name: CONVERSATIONS_DIR_ENV, value: CONVERSATIONS_DIR },
+      { name: "JR2_HARNESS_TOKEN_SHA256", value: harnessTokenDigest(opts.signingKey, name) },
+    ];
+  };
+
+  /**
+   * The one init step (ADR-0037): `preflight`, the USER'S image with the runtime volume mounted,
+   * running the probe. It is a plain container fragment the operator schedules without
+   * understanding, exactly like a sidecar — the operator stays agent-agnostic (ADR-0001), so "how a
+   * Sandbox proves its image" is composed here, not reconciled there. Nothing populates the volume
+   * first: it is the kit's image, mounted (see `runtimeVolume`).
+   *
+   * It carries jr2's hardened context explicitly, and runs the probe in the SAME seat the Harness
+   * will get — the image's own user, or ADR-0037's fallback — because a probe that proved a
+   * different uid's `$HOME` proved nothing.
+   */
+  const initContainersFor = (seat: Seat, split: SizeSplit) => [
+    {
+      name: "preflight",
+      image: seat.image,
+      command: ["/bin/sh", "-c", PREFLIGHT_SCRIPT],
+      ...(seat.env.length ? { env: seat.env } : {}),
+      volumeMounts: [RUNTIME_VOLUME_MOUNT, ...seat.homeMount],
+      // Small and fixed, inside the pod's budget (ADR-0060): it runs before the others start.
+      resources: split.preflight,
+      securityContext: seat.securityContext,
+    },
+  ];
+
+  /**
+   * jr2's runtime (ADR-0037): the kit's Harness image as an `image` volume. This is what makes the
+   * runtime's version ride the VOLUME rather than the image: a kit edit moves the harness image's
+   * own tag and re-images future pods without touching a single Sandbox Image tag, which is the
+   * only way a registry-ref image could ever follow a kit update. A live pod keeps the image it
+   * started with — the same create-if-absent stance ADR-0038 takes for images. No `pullPolicy`:
+   * the kubelet's default for a volume is its default for a container, so the ref is pulled
+   * exactly as the cluster already pulls the Harness image, and the volume adds nothing to deliver.
+   */
+  const runtimeVolume = (refs: ImageRefs) => ({ name: RUNTIME_VOLUME, image: { reference: refs.harness } });
+
+  /**
+   * The primary container's seat: which image runs, as whom, and with what home. One value, built
+   * once per provision and shared by the Harness container and the preflight, so the probe cannot
+   * drift from the thing it proves.
+   */
+  type Seat = {
+    image: string;
+    env: HarnessEnvVar[];
+    homeVolume: Array<{ name: string; emptyDir: Record<string, never> }>;
+    homeMount: Array<{ name: string; mountPath: string }>;
+    securityContext: typeof HARDENED & { runAsUser?: number };
+  };
+
+  const seatFor = async (
+    refs: ImageRefs,
+    name: string | undefined,
+    held: HeldImageScope | undefined,
+  ): Promise<Seat> => {
+    // ONE resolution, so the ref and the two seat facts can never come off different legs of
+    // ADR-0037's chain (images.ts). It is async because a `file:` context is keyed by its content
+    // digest, which is a directory walk — the price of the host and the pod agreeing about an
+    // image without a path table (ADR-0049).
+    const { ref: image, fallbackSeat, refusedUser } = await resolveSandboxImage(refs, name, held);
+    // Fail HERE, before a Secret or a CR exists, on a `USER` the kubelet will refuse (images.ts).
+    // The alternative is the worst shape a failure has: the preflight container never starts, so
+    // it has no logs, and the whole 120s Ready budget burns before anything is said. The converge
+    // already inspected the image, so this is knowable at zero cost — and the message names the
+    // edit, because the fix is one line of the caller's own Dockerfile.
+    if (refusedUser !== undefined) {
+      throw new Error(
+        `the Sandbox Image "${name ?? "default"}" declares \`USER ${refusedUser}\`, which cannot run a jr2 seat: ` +
+          "every jr2-owned container is `runAsNonRoot` with no `runAsUser`, so the kubelet needs a NUMERIC " +
+          "non-zero uid it can check without reading the image (ADR-0005). Change the Dockerfile's last " +
+          "`USER` to that uid (e.g. `USER 1000`, or drop the line entirely and jr2 supplies uid 1000 with a " +
+          "writable HOME — ADR-0037), then re-run `jr2 up`.",
+      );
+    }
+    // The common case, and the one ADR-0037 is written around: the image chose its `USER` and its
+    // `HOME`, and jr2 touches neither — the human who execs in lands in the environment the
+    // image's author built, dotfiles included.
+    if (!fallbackSeat) {
+      return { image, env: [], homeVolume: [], homeMount: [], securityContext: HARDENED };
+    }
+    return {
+      image,
+      env: [{ name: "HOME", value: FALLBACK_HOME }],
+      homeVolume: [{ name: "home", emptyDir: {} }],
+      homeMount: [{ name: "home", mountPath: FALLBACK_HOME }],
+      securityContext: { ...HARDENED, runAsUser: FALLBACK_UID },
+    };
+  };
+
+  const crFor = async (
+    req: {
+      name: string;
+      runId: string;
+      workflow: string;
+      image?: string;
+      user?: string;
+      workGroup?: number;
+      userResources?: Size;
+      effector?: string;
+      assembly?: string;
+    },
+    refs: ImageRefs,
+    repos: FencedRepo[],
+    custodian: CustodianComposition,
+    split: SizeSplit,
+    effectorManifest?: SandboxEffectorManifest,
+    gitCredentials: readonly string[] = [],
+  ) => {
+    const placement = cfg().placement;
+    // A run under a held Assembly (ADR-0069): an image this map lacks is that case, not a stale
+    // deployment, and the failure says so, naming both hashes.
+    const current = opts.currentAssembly?.();
+    const held: HeldImageScope | undefined =
+      req.assembly !== undefined && req.assembly !== current
+        ? { runId: req.runId, assembly: req.assembly, current }
+        : undefined;
+    const seat = await seatFor(refs, req.image, held);
+    const keys = repos.map((r) => r.key);
+    const effector = effectorManifest ? await effectorFor(req, refs, keys, seat, effectorManifest, held) : undefined;
+    const sidecars = await sidecarsFor(custodian, refs, keys, split, held, req.user, effector?.container);
+    return {
+      apiVersion: "core.jr2.dev/v1alpha1",
+      kind: "Sandbox",
+      metadata: {
+        name: req.name,
+        namespace: ns,
+        // The run↔workspace link `jr2 ls` groups by (ADR-0009/0012) — readable without the host.
+        labels: { "jr2.dev/run": req.runId, "jr2.dev/workflow": req.workflow },
+      },
+      spec: {
+        // The Sandbox Image, unmodified (ADR-0037) — the user's tools, its own USER and HOME, and
+        // jr2's runtime arriving beside it on a volume. This container is both the Harness and the
+        // human's `exec` shell.
+        image: seat.image,
+        // The one thing jr2 takes from the image: its command. A container has exactly one, and it
+        // must be the Harness's — a pod whose main process is the user's entrypoint keeps
+        // "Running" through a Harness death, which makes the operator's Ready probe a lie.
+        command: HARNESS_COMMAND,
+        // Hardened, and the ONLY place jr2 ever names a uid: ADR-0037's fallback for an image that
+        // declared none. Stating the whole context here rather than leaving it to the operator's
+        // default is what makes that possible — the operator hardens only what says nothing.
+        securityContext: seat.securityContext,
+        idleTimeout: opts.idleTimeout ?? "30m",
+        // Placement (ADR-0052): the Instance's word on which nodes are Sandbox nodes, raw pod-spec
+        // shapes the operator copies verbatim. Absent keys are absent here too — the CR says
+        // nothing, and the pod lands wherever an ordinary pod lands. The operator's own soft
+        // affinity toward nodes holding this Sandbox's caches sits beside these untouched: a
+        // preference never conflicts with a requirement.
+        ...(placement?.nodeSelector ? { nodeSelector: placement.nodeSelector } : {}),
+        ...(placement?.tolerations?.length ? { tolerations: placement.tolerations } : {}),
+        // Priority (ADR-0060): a pod of ordinary priority cannot preempt a live Workspace, and a
+        // waiting Sandbox evicts nobody (the class's preemptionPolicy is Never).
+        priorityClassName: cfg().priorityClassName ?? PRIORITY_CLASS_SANDBOX,
+        // The Size (ADR-0060). `resources` is the HARNESS container's (the operator's contract):
+        // the rest of the Size after the Custodian and the User Container, requests = limits, plus
+        // the `/work` disk as an ephemeral-storage request with no limit. `podResources` is the
+        // whole Size, pod-level (KEP-2837) — the ceiling the pod never passes.
+        resources: split.harness,
+        podResources: split.pod,
+        // `/dev/shm` (ADR-0060): the operator mounts a memory-backed emptyDir there, in the Harness
+        // container only, with this `sizeLimit` — a quarter of the Harness share, minimum 64Mi.
+        // Charged inside the Harness container's limit, so it reserves nothing extra; full, it is
+        // ENOSPC or SIGBUS — a tool error, never a memory kill.
+        shmSize: split.shmSizeLimit,
+        // The work group (ADR-0005), the ownership half of cross-uid sharing on `/work`.
+        // Kubernetes grants it as a supplemental group to every container, and puts a setgid
+        // group on the volume root that propagates down; the WRITABILITY half is the default ACL
+        // the Harness's attach stamps on each repo root (ADR-0063), without which fsGroup gives
+        // group-READ, which is the trap. Both are inert when the uids match.
+        fsGroup: req.workGroup ?? DEFAULT_WORK_GROUP,
+        // Before any container starts: prove the image on the mounted `/opt/jr2`.
+        initContainers: initContainersFor(seat, split),
+        // Never empty: the Custodian's address is unconditional. The seat's own vars (the fallback
+        // `HOME`) come FIRST, so the instance's `harness.env` can still override them the way it
+        // overrides anything the image set.
+        env: [...seat.env, ...harnessEnv(req.name, custodian, cpuHintEnv())],
+        ...(cfg().envFrom?.length ? { envFrom: cfg().envFrom } : {}),
+        // What the AGENT gets: an address on its own loopback and a Stand-in for every credential,
+        // and no credential anywhere. The Custodian beside it holds them (ADR-0013, ADR-0059).
+        sidecars,
+        // The Repos this Sandbox attaches, by cache key (ADR-0051). The operator does the rest: a
+        // `repo-<key>` volume per entry — the node's cache, hostPath, read-only in the primary
+        // container at `/repos/<key>` — a soft affinity toward nodes already holding them, and
+        // `Ready` only once every one is present on the pod's node and fetched since this CR
+        // asked. Read-only is load-bearing twice (ADR-0004): no write contention, and nothing in
+        // a Sandbox can `gc` the object store its `--shared` clones borrow from.
+        repos: repos.map(({ key, url }) => ({ key, url })),
+        // The push Secret of each `git.credentials` entry this Sandbox's pushes spend (ADR-0051), by
+        // name, as a Repo CR's `secretRef` names one: the operator projects each into the Sandbox
+        // Effector alone, at `/run/jr2/secrets/@git/<name>/`. No value passes through here.
+        ...(gitCredentials.length ? { gitCredentials: gitCredentials.map((name) => ({ name })) } : {}),
+        volumes: [
+          // The worktree root is a POD volume, not a directory baked into the image. Two reasons,
+          // both load-bearing: every jr2-owned seat runs as an unprivileged uid, which cannot mkdir
+          // under `/` — so an image-owned `/work` would make every attach fail — and `/work` is
+          // the one thing all three containers share (ADR-0005), so human and Agent see identical
+          // files. An emptyDir lands group-writable under the pod's fsGroup, so it is writable
+          // whatever uid the Sandbox Image runs as: `/work` unclaimed is the only image contract.
+          { name: "work", emptyDir: {} },
+          // jr2's runtime (ADR-0037): the kit's Harness image, mounted.
+          runtimeVolume(refs),
+          // The conversations' directory (ADR-0031): a Harness container that restarts inside a
+          // living pod rebuilds its conversations from here. An emptyDir, so it goes with the pod —
+          // that Workspace is `Lost` (ADR-0021) — and mounted below into the Harness container
+          // ALONE: the User Container must not read an Agent's history.
+          { name: CONVERSATIONS_VOLUME, emptyDir: {} },
+          // Only for ADR-0037's fallback seat: uid 1000 on a stranger's base has no home at all.
+          ...seat.homeVolume,
+          // The Custodian's (its values, leaves and config), and the trust ConfigMap (ADR-0020).
+          ...custodian.volumes,
+          // The Sandbox Effector's (ADR-0068): its secrets, its key and config, its scratch.
+          ...(effector?.volumes ?? []),
+        ],
+        // CR-level volumeMounts land on the HARNESS container only (the operator's contract): the
+        // trust bundles, and none of the Custodian's volumes. The Repo caches are not listed: the
+        // operator mounts each `repo-<key>` into this container itself.
+        volumeMounts: [
+          { name: "work", mountPath: WORK_ROOT },
+          RUNTIME_VOLUME_MOUNT,
+          { name: CONVERSATIONS_VOLUME, mountPath: CONVERSATIONS_DIR },
+          ...seat.homeMount,
+          ...custodian.harnessMounts,
+        ],
+      },
+    };
+  };
+
+  const conditionOf = (sandbox: SandboxObject | undefined, type: string): Condition | undefined =>
+    sandbox?.status?.conditions?.find((c) => c.type === type);
+
+  /**
+   * Mint this Sandbox's token into a Secret, AFTER the CR exists and owned by it from birth
+   * (ADR-0001): the owner is the uid the CR's apply answered with, so Kubernetes reaps the Secret
+   * whenever the CR goes — the operator's idle-timeout GC, a `kubectl delete sandbox` by hand — and
+   * no path (an owner patch that fails, an Orchestrator that dies between two writes) leaves a
+   * token behind. The operator creates the pod the moment it sees the CR, so the pod may reach its
+   * mount first; kubelet retries the mount, and the Secret lands one API round trip after the CR,
+   * well before the scheduler and kubelet get there. Idempotent by construction: the token is the
+   * Sandbox's name, signed (tokens.ts), so a re-provision after an Orchestrator restart re-applies
+   * the SAME value and owner, and the Custodian that has been holding it all along stays valid.
+   * `data`, not `stringData`: a server-side apply owns the fields it names, and `stringData` is
+   * write-only — it never reads back as the field applied.
+   */
+  const applyTokenSecret = async (name: string, owner: KubeObject): Promise<void> => {
+    if (!opts.signingKey) throw new Error("kubeSandbox: a Custodian needs a signingKey to mint its Sandbox token");
+    const uid = owner.metadata?.uid;
+    if (!uid) throw new Error(`Sandbox "${name}": the CR's apply answered with no uid to own its token Secret`);
+    await kube().apply(SECRETS, ns, {
+      apiVersion: "v1",
+      kind: "Secret",
+      metadata: {
+        name: secretName(name),
+        namespace: ns,
+        labels: { "jr2.dev/sandbox": name },
+        ownerReferences: [
+          {
+            apiVersion: "core.jr2.dev/v1alpha1",
+            kind: "Sandbox",
+            name,
+            uid,
+            controller: true,
+            blockOwnerDeletion: false,
+          },
+        ],
+      },
+      type: "Opaque",
+      data: { JR2_SANDBOX_TOKEN: Buffer.from(sandboxToken(opts.signingKey, name)).toString("base64") },
+    });
+  };
+
+  /**
+   * This Sandbox's Effector key (ADR-0068): `effectorKey(signing key, <Sandbox name>)`,
+   * derived like the Sandbox token, so a re-provision re-applies the same value, and written into a
+   * Secret the CR owns, which only the `effector` container mounts.
+   */
+  const applyEffectorKey = async (name: string, owner: KubeObject): Promise<void> => {
+    if (!opts.signingKey) throw new Error("kubeSandbox: a Sandbox Effector needs a signingKey to derive its key");
+    const uid = owner.metadata?.uid;
+    if (!uid) throw new Error(`Sandbox "${name}": the CR's apply answered with no uid to own its Effector key`);
+    await kube().apply(SECRETS, ns, {
+      apiVersion: "v1",
+      kind: "Secret",
+      metadata: {
+        name: sandboxEffectorKeySecret(name),
+        namespace: ns,
+        labels: { "jr2.dev/sandbox": name },
+        ownerReferences: [
+          {
+            apiVersion: "core.jr2.dev/v1alpha1",
+            kind: "Sandbox",
+            name,
+            uid,
+            controller: true,
+            blockOwnerDeletion: false,
+          },
+        ],
+      },
+      type: "Opaque",
+      data: { key: Buffer.from(effectorKey(opts.signingKey, name)).toString("base64") },
+    });
+  };
+
+  /**
+   * This Sandbox's Effector Service (ADR-0068): headless, so its name resolves to the pod's own
+   * address — the one each request is signed for — and publishing an address that is not ready, so
+   * a restore asks the Effector for an Effect while the Harness beside it restarts. Owned by the
+   * CR, so it goes with the pod. Ingress is `jr2-sandbox-ingress`'s: the Orchestrator's alone.
+   */
+  const applyEffectorService = async (name: string, owner: KubeObject): Promise<void> => {
+    const uid = owner.metadata?.uid;
+    if (!uid) throw new Error(`Sandbox "${name}": the CR's apply answered with no uid to own its Effector Service`);
+    await kube().apply(SERVICES, ns, {
+      apiVersion: "v1",
+      kind: "Service",
+      metadata: {
+        name: sandboxEffectorService(name),
+        namespace: ns,
+        labels: { "jr2.dev/sandbox": name },
+        ownerReferences: [
+          {
+            apiVersion: "core.jr2.dev/v1alpha1",
+            kind: "Sandbox",
+            name,
+            uid,
+            controller: true,
+            blockOwnerDeletion: false,
+          },
+        ],
+      },
+      spec: {
+        clusterIP: "None",
+        publishNotReadyAddresses: true,
+        // The operator's label on every Sandbox pod (operator helpers.go `sandboxLabels`).
+        selector: { "sandbox.jr2.dev/name": name },
+        ports: [{ name: "effector", port: SANDBOX_EFFECTOR_PORT, targetPort: SANDBOX_EFFECTOR_PORT }],
+      },
+    });
+  };
+
+  /**
+   * This Sandbox's Custodian files — Envoy's bootstrap and the `HELD` table — rendered HERE, from
+   * the pod's manifest, into a ConfigMap owned by the CR like its token (ADR-0059). Who makes the
+   * pod renders its files: `jr2 up` declares what each pod holds and nothing per Workspace lands in
+   * `jr2-held`, so an Instance with many Workspaces never grows one object toward its 1 MiB limit.
+   * Names, hosts, headers — never a value — so a ConfigMap is the right kind. Same owner, same
+   * idempotence and same race as the token: the kubelet retries the mount until this lands.
+   */
+  const applyCustodianConfig = async (name: string, owner: KubeObject, manifest: HeldManifest): Promise<void> => {
+    const uid = owner.metadata?.uid;
+    if (!uid) throw new Error(`Sandbox "${name}": the CR's apply answered with no uid to own its Custodian ConfigMap`);
+    const orchestrator = { host: `${ORCHESTRATOR_SERVICE}.${ns}.svc`, port: ORCHESTRATOR_PORT };
+    await kube().apply(CONFIGMAPS, ns, {
+      apiVersion: "v1",
+      kind: "ConfigMap",
+      metadata: {
+        name: sandboxCustodianConfigMap(name),
+        namespace: ns,
+        labels: { "jr2.dev/sandbox": name },
+        ownerReferences: [
+          {
+            apiVersion: "core.jr2.dev/v1alpha1",
+            kind: "Sandbox",
+            name,
+            uid,
+            controller: true,
+            blockOwnerDeletion: false,
+          },
+        ],
+      },
+      data: {
+        [CUSTODIAN_BOOTSTRAP_KEY]: JSON.stringify(custodianBootstrap(manifest, orchestrator)),
+        [CUSTODIAN_SCRIPT_KEY]: custodianScript(manifest),
+      },
+    });
+  };
+
+  /**
+   * Every Repo the provision names, resolved to its identity and key — and FENCED (ADR-0051). A
+   * per-run url is the run's input; one no `git.credentials` entry admits is refused here, before
+   * anything is read or applied, naming the list. A bound url is admitted without a match: it is
+   * code the instance typechecked and deployed. Two slots spelling one repository collapse to one
+   * CR entry (first spelling wins) — one cache, however many slots borrow from it — and the
+   * resource is BOUND when any of those slots is the Machine's: a per-run slot alone leaves it on
+   * `jr2 gc`'s clock.
+   */
+  const fencedRepos = (name: string, repos: ProvisionedRepo[]): FencedRepo[] => {
+    const byKey = new Map<string, FencedRepo>();
+    for (const repo of repos) {
+      const { identity, key } = repoIdentity(repo.url);
+      if (repo.perRun && !matchCredential(identity, cfg().credentials ?? [])) {
+        const entries = (cfg().credentials ?? []).map((c) => c.match).join(", ") || "none";
+        throw new Error(
+          `Sandbox "${name}" refuses the per-run repo ${repo.url} for slot "${repo.slot}": no git.credentials ` +
+            `entry matches "${identity}" (entries: ${entries}). A per-run url can spend the cluster's credential ` +
+            "against any host, so jr2.config.ts must admit it by prefix (ADR-0051).",
+        );
+      }
+      const seen = byKey.get(key);
+      if (seen === undefined) byKey.set(key, { key, url: repo.url, identity, bound: !repo.perRun });
+      else seen.bound ||= !repo.perRun;
+    }
+    return [...byKey.values()];
+  };
+
+  /**
+   * The push Secrets a Sandbox's pushes spend (ADR-0051): for each pushed Repo Slot, the url
+   * this provision attaches — static, per-run or `customize()`-bound alike — matched to its
+   * `git.credentials` entry (longest prefix, the attach match), and that entry's Secret as `jr2 up`
+   * wrote it (`git-push.json`: names only). Refused with the fix, by the same rule `jr2 up` applies
+   * to a static Binding: no entry, a local path or `git://`, `http://`, an entry whose credentials
+   * the url's scheme cannot spend or that `jr2 up` placed none for, `sign` with no `sign` field, an
+   * unsigned squash on an entry with neither `sign` nor `committer`.
+   */
+  const gitCredentialsFor = async (
+    name: string,
+    repos: readonly ProvisionedRepo[],
+    pushes: ReadonlyArray<{ slot: string; sign: boolean; squash?: true }>,
+  ): Promise<string[]> => {
+    if (pushes.length === 0) return [];
+    const manifest = await readGitPushManifest(join(heldDir, GIT_PUSH_MANIFEST_KEY));
+    const names: string[] = [];
+    for (const { slot, sign, squash } of pushes) {
+      const repo = repos.find((r) => r.slot === slot);
+      if (repo === undefined) {
+        throw new Error(
+          `Sandbox "${name}" cannot be provisioned: its Workspace pushes Repo Slot "${slot}", which this ` +
+            "provision does not attach",
+        );
+      }
+      const at = `Sandbox "${name}" refuses the push of Repo Slot "${slot}" (${repo.url})`;
+      const out = placedPushRefusal(
+        { at, url: repo.url, sign, squash: squash === true },
+        cfg().credentials ?? [],
+        manifest,
+      );
+      if ("refusal" in out) throw new Error(out.refusal);
+      if (!names.includes(out.entry.secret)) names.push(out.entry.secret);
+    }
+    return names;
+  };
+
+  /**
+   * What the operator will hold this Sandbox's Ready on, and what an attach reads afterwards
+   * (ADR-0051). `Ready` with reason `RepoCloneFailed` is terminal for the provision — the cache
+   * agent could not clone onto the node the pod landed on, and the reason names it — so the wait
+   * fails on it by name rather than burning the budget. `ReposFresh=False` is the other verdict:
+   * the caches are there but a fetch since this CR asked failed, so the attach proceeds STALE and
+   * says so. Remembered per name until the Sandbox is destroyed, because the attach is a separate
+   * call. The operator takes that verdict once per pod and keeps it, so a provision re-run on
+   * snapshot restore reads the same one — unless the pod was replaced, which is the lease's news.
+   */
+  const staleByName = new Map<string, string>();
+
+  /** The Harness's `POST /attach` (ADR-0063), re-sent while it demonstrably never reached the
+   * Harness. Idempotent on the Harness's side (every step guarded, calls serialized), so a re-send
+   * after a request that DID land is harmless too — but only a transport failure is retried: an
+   * answer is an answer. */
+  const postAttach = async (name: string, endpoint: string, body: AttachRequest): Promise<AttachResponse> => {
+    if (!opts.signingKey) throw new Error("kubeSandbox: the attach needs a signingKey for the Harness bearer");
+    const url = new URL("/attach", endpoint).toString();
+    const headers = {
+      "content-type": "application/json",
+      authorization: `Bearer ${harnessToken(opts.signingKey, name)}`,
+    };
+    const until = Date.now() + attachWindowMs;
+    let backoff = 250;
+    for (;;) {
+      let res: Response;
+      try {
+        res = await harnessFetch(url, { method: "POST", headers, body: JSON.stringify(body) });
+      } catch (err) {
+        // Ready is not routable (ADR-0042): the EndpointSlice behind the Service is programmed after
+        // the pod passes its probe, and the attach is now the first thing that dials it.
+        if (Date.now() >= until) {
+          throw new Error(
+            `Sandbox "${name}": the attach never reached its Harness at ${endpoint}: ${(err as Error).message}`,
+          );
+        }
+        await sleep(backoff);
+        backoff = Math.min(backoff * 2, 5_000);
+        continue;
+      }
+      const text = await res.text();
+      if (res.ok) return JSON.parse(text) as AttachResponse;
+      // The Harness's own words: the slot, the step, and git's stderr.
+      let error = text;
+      try {
+        error = (JSON.parse(text) as AttachError).error ?? text;
+      } catch {
+        // not an AttachError: the raw body is the most there is
+      }
+      throw new Error(`Sandbox "${name}": the attach failed (${res.status}): ${error}`);
+    }
+  };
+
+  /**
+   * A wait, as watch events (ADR-0063): every change the operator publishes on this Sandbox is
+   * judged as it lands. `judge` answers a result, throws a named failure, or answers undefined to
+   * keep waiting. `budget`, when given, is a timer re-read after every judgement, because the Repo
+   * budget replaces the pod's the moment the operator holds the Sandbox on its Repos; without one
+   * the wait has no deadline (ADR-0064's `placing`). `signal` ends it early, rejecting with its
+   * reason.
+   */
+  const waitFor = <T>(
+    name: string,
+    judge: (sandbox: SandboxObject | undefined) => T | undefined,
+    budget?: () => { deadline: number; expire: (last: SandboxObject | undefined) => Error },
+    signal?: AbortSignal,
+  ): Promise<T> =>
+    new Promise<T>((resolve, reject) => {
+      let settled = false;
+      let last: SandboxObject | undefined;
+      let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
+      const finish = (fn: () => void) => {
+        if (settled) return;
+        settled = true;
+        clearTimeout(timer);
+        unsubscribe();
+        signal?.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort);
+        fn();
+      };
+      const onAbort = () => finish(() => reject(signal!.reason));
+      const arm = () => {
+        if (!budget) return;
+        clearTimeout(timer);
+        const { deadline, expire } = budget();
+        timer = setTimeout(() => finish(() => reject(expire(last))), Math.max(0, deadline - Date.now()));
+      };
+      const unsubscribe = sandboxes().subscribe(name, (sandbox) => {
+        last = sandbox;
+        try {
+          const out = judge(sandbox);
+          if (out !== undefined) return finish(() => resolve(out));
+        } catch (err) {
+          return finish(() => reject(err));
+        }
+        arm();
+      });
+      arm();
+      if (signal?.aborted) onAbort();
+      else signal?.addEventListener("abort", onAbort, { once: true });
+    });
+
+  /**
+   * A Sandbox the operator made Lost, or one the watch saw and then lost, fails the wait at once and
+   * by name (ADR-0021): it never comes back. `seen` is the caller's: a wait that began with the
+   * write may hear nothing before the watch lists the new CR, and that is not a deletion.
+   */
+  const judgeLoss = (name: string, sandbox: SandboxObject | undefined, seen: boolean, doing: string): void => {
+    if (sandbox === undefined) {
+      if (seen) throw new Error(`Sandbox "${name}" was deleted while it ${doing} (ADR-0021)`);
+      return;
+    }
+    const lost = lossOf(sandbox);
+    if (lost) {
+      throw new Error(
+        `Sandbox "${name}" is Lost while it ${doing}: ${lost.reason}: ${lost.message} — a Sandbox has one pod ` +
+          "for its life and the operator never gives it another (ADR-0021)",
+      );
+    }
+  };
+
+  return {
+    async place(req, { onWait, signal }) {
+      // The fence first: a refused url costs nothing — no map read, no Secret, no CR.
+      const repos = fencedRepos(req.name, req.repos);
+      // The Size next (ADR-0060), for the same price: the Machine's, then the Instance default, then
+      // the kit's, split inside the pod — or refused before anything exists. `jr2 up` makes the
+      // same refusal at the converge; this one covers a Machine it never walked.
+      let split: SizeSplit;
+      try {
+        split = splitSize(resolveSize(req.resources, cfg().defaultSize), req.userResources);
+      } catch (err) {
+        throw new Error(`Sandbox "${req.name}" cannot be provisioned: ${(err as Error).message}`);
+      }
+      if (opts.repos === undefined) {
+        throw new Error(
+          `Sandbox "${req.name}" cannot be provisioned: this port has no Repo-resource port (ADR-0051). The ` +
+            "operator holds a Sandbox's Ready until every Repo it names exists as a resource, and creating " +
+            "them is this provision's job — build the port with `repos: kubeRepos(...)`.",
+        );
+      }
+      // Read PER PROVISION, and next (ADR-0038). Not hoisted into `kubeSandbox()`: a boot-time
+      // read would freeze the map for the process lifetime, which is precisely the Deployment-env
+      // behavior the ConfigMap mount was chosen over — the point of the mount is that a `jr2 up`
+      // reaches future Sandboxes without rolling the Orchestrator. Reading before the Secret apply
+      // also means an unknown image name costs nothing: no Secret, no CR, nothing to clean up.
+      const refs = await readImageRefs(imagesPath);
+      // The same stance for what the Custodian holds (ADR-0059): `jr2 up` placed it host-side,
+      // where `.env` exists, per Workspace — the one its workflow and its route name — and this
+      // process reads that pod's manifest, never its own config, whose `.env` values are absent
+      // in-cluster. A Workspace `jr2 up` never walked has none, and is refused by name.
+      const pod = workspaceHeldPod({ workflow: req.workflow, route: req.route });
+      const manifest = await readHeldManifest(join(heldDir, heldManifestKey(pod)));
+      const custodian = custodianComposition(manifest, {
+        image: refs.custodian,
+        pod,
+        config: sandboxCustodianConfigMap(req.name),
+        token: { secret: secretName(req.name), key: "JR2_SANDBOX_TOKEN" },
+        sandbox: req.name,
+        caBundle: cfg().caBundle === true,
+        resources: split.custodian,
+      });
+      // The Sandbox Effector (ADR-0068): present when `jr2 up` placed an Effect of this Workspace
+      // there, and declared it in the pod's manifest beside the Held one; absent otherwise.
+      const effectorManifest = await readSandboxEffectorManifest(join(heldDir, effectorManifestKey(pod)));
+      // Its pushes' credentials (ADR-0051): each pushed slot's url, as this run binds it, is
+      // matched against the fence, and the entry's push Secret is named on the CR — or the push is
+      // refused here, before anything is written, as a per-run url outside the fence is.
+      const gitCredentials = await gitCredentialsFor(req.name, req.repos, effectorManifest?.pushes ?? []);
+      const cr = await crFor(req, refs, repos, custodian, split, effectorManifest, gitCredentials);
+
+      // The Repo resources, BEFORE the CR names them (ADR-0051): a bound one already exists from
+      // the boot and only its eviction clock moves — this run's spelling never rewrites the spec
+      // the boot stated; a per-run one is created here, at its first attach, and every later
+      // attach anywhere finds it and restates its credential, so the `git.credentials` fix
+      // `repoCloneError` names reaches the cache at the next run. After the image resolution, so
+      // a refused image still costs nothing; before the CR and its token Secret, so neither exists
+      // for a Sandbox whose Repo could not be recorded.
+      for (const repo of repos) await opts.repos.ensure(repo).catch(noOperator(req.name, "Repo"));
+
+      // The watch is started before the write (on first use), and it is level-based: whatever it
+      // holds when the wait below subscribes is the first thing judged, so no event about this
+      // Sandbox can fall between the write and the wait. Not awaited: an API server that cannot
+      // be reached fails the apply below at once, rather than hanging on a list.
+      sandboxes();
+      const applied = await kube().apply(SANDBOXES, ns, cr).catch(noOperator(req.name, "Sandbox"));
+      // After the CR: its uid owns both, so they go when it goes.
+      await applyTokenSecret(req.name, applied);
+      await applyCustodianConfig(req.name, applied, manifest);
+      if (effectorManifest) {
+        await applyEffectorKey(req.name, applied);
+        await applyEffectorService(req.name, applied);
+      }
+
+      // The wait for a node, with no deadline (ADR-0064): jr2 cannot tell "full now" from "never
+      // fits", so a bound is the Machine's `after`. Its reason — the scheduler's, or a quota's
+      // refusal of the pod create, which the operator keeps retrying — is said each time it changes.
+      let seen = false;
+      let said: PlacingWait | undefined;
+      await waitFor<true>(
+        req.name,
+        (sandbox) => {
+          judgeLoss(req.name, sandbox, seen, "waited for a node");
+          if (sandbox === undefined) return undefined;
+          seen = true;
+          // Scheduled, or an operator too old to say so that already reports Ready.
+          if (conditionOf(sandbox, "Scheduled")?.status === "True" || sandbox.status?.phase === "Ready") return true;
+          const wait = placingWaitOf(sandbox);
+          if (wait && (wait.on !== said?.on || wait.message !== said.message)) {
+            said = wait;
+            onWait(wait);
+          }
+          return undefined;
+        },
+        undefined,
+        signal,
+      );
+    },
+
+    async provision(name) {
+      // Two budgets from one instant — NOW, the pod scheduled (ADR-0064), so neither is spent on a
+      // wait for capacity: the pod's until the operator has seen the pod Ready, the Repos' from the
+      // first event that finds the Sandbox held on a Repo reason — which the operator reports only
+      // once the pod IS Ready, so the preflight has already passed and what remains is a clone or a
+      // fetch on the node. Sticky: a pod that came up once is not a pod that will never come up,
+      // whatever it does afterwards.
+      const at = Date.now();
+      let held = false;
+      return waitFor(
+        name,
+        (sandbox) => {
+          // The pod was placed, so the watch has held this Sandbox: absent now is deleted.
+          judgeLoss(name, sandbox, true, "provisioned");
+          const status = sandbox?.status;
+          const ready = conditionOf(sandbox, "Ready");
+          if (status?.phase !== "Ready") {
+            // A container the kubelet will never start (ADR-0063): no log, no termination — its
+            // waiting reason, published by the operator, is the only evidence. Named at once.
+            const fault = waitingFault(name, status?.waiting);
+            if (fault) throw new Error(fault);
+          }
+          // Terminal for THIS provision: the cache agent tried to clone onto the pod's node and git
+          // refused. The operator's message carries the key, the node, and git's own words; the
+          // agent keeps retrying on its own, so `jr2 status` will show the same error until it is fixed.
+          if (status?.phase !== "Ready" && ready?.reason === REPO_CLONE_FAILED) {
+            throw new Error(repoCloneError(name, ready.message ?? ready.reason));
+          }
+          // A Harness that keeps dying before it is ever Ready (ADR-0063): the kubelet's reason and
+          // exit code, published by the operator, instead of the rest of the budget.
+          const harness = status?.harness;
+          if (status?.phase !== "Ready" && (harness?.restartCount ?? 0) >= CRASH_LOOP_RESTARTS) {
+            throw new Error(crashLoopError(name, harness!));
+          }
+          // A Sandbox Effector that ended before the pod was ever Ready (ADR-0068): it ends only
+          // for a start it cannot serve — a node whose kernel cannot confine a credentialed
+          // command's child, a mount it cannot read — and says so in its termination message,
+          // which no retry mends. Named at once, before any Turn.
+          const effector = status?.effector?.lastTerminated;
+          if (status?.phase !== "Ready" && effector !== undefined) throw new Error(effectorStartError(name, effector));
+          if (ready?.reason !== undefined && REPO_HELD.has(ready.reason)) held = true;
+          if (status?.phase !== "Ready") return undefined;
+          // Only `phase: Ready` means serving — status.endpoint appears earlier (ADR-0001).
+          if (!status.endpoint) throw new Error(`Sandbox "${name}" is Ready but reports no endpoint`);
+          // Freshness degrades, absence does not (ADR-0051): Ready with `ReposFresh=False` is a
+          // Sandbox whose caches exist but could not be fetched since it asked. Remembered for the
+          // attach, which is where a slot can be named; forgotten when the caches are fresh.
+          const fresh = conditionOf(sandbox, "ReposFresh");
+          if (fresh?.status === "False" && fresh.message) staleByName.set(name, fresh.message);
+          else staleByName.delete(name);
+          return { endpoint: status.endpoint };
+        },
+        () => ({
+          deadline: at + (held ? repoTimeoutMs : readyTimeoutMs),
+          // A Sandbox the operator held on its Repos ran out the Repo budget: the pod is up and the
+          // preflight passed, so the hint about the image would be a lie. What is true is the
+          // operator's own verdict — which Repo, on which node — and that the agent is still at it.
+          expire: (last) =>
+            new Error(
+              held ? repoWaitError(name, repoTimeoutMs, conditionOf(last, "Ready")) : notReadyError(name, last),
+            ),
+        }),
+      );
+    },
+
+    async attach(req) {
+      // The Harness's own route (ADR-0063): the same bearer as every Harness call (ADR-0058), and
+      // the Repo's identity and cache key resolved HERE, so the cache the Harness clones from is
+      // the one the operator mounted, by construction (ADR-0051). The address is the Sandbox's
+      // own, off the watch — the one provision just waited on, or a restore's first list — or the
+      // API server's, for one the watch has not listed yet.
+      const sandbox = sandboxes().get(req.name) ?? (await kube().get<SandboxObject>(SANDBOXES, ns, req.name));
+      const endpoint = sandbox?.status?.endpoint;
+      if (!endpoint) throw new Error(`Sandbox "${req.name}" has no endpoint to attach through — is it gone?`);
+      if (req.repos.length === 0) {
+        throw new Error(
+          "the attach names no Repo Slot — nothing to attach (a Workspace with no Repo Slot skips the attach, ADR-0051)",
+        );
+      }
+      const body: AttachRequest = {
+        slots: req.repos.map((r) => {
+          const { identity, key } = repoIdentity(r.url);
+          return { slot: r.slot, url: r.url, identity, key, ...(r.ref !== undefined ? { ref: r.ref } : {}) };
+        }),
+        branch: req.spec.branch,
+        ...(req.spec.reviewSha ? { reviewSha: req.spec.reviewSha } : {}),
+      };
+      const { repos, review } = await postAttach(req.name, endpoint, body);
+      const stale = staleSlots(req.repos, staleByName.get(req.name));
+      return { repos, ...(review ? { review } : {}), ...(stale ? { stale } : {}) };
+    },
+
+    leaseIntervalMs,
+
+    async renew(name) {
+      // A write, and only that (ADR-0021): the stamp the operator's idle GC reads. What the
+      // workspace IS comes from the watch, never from this answer.
+      await kube().patch(SANDBOXES, ns, name, {
+        metadata: { annotations: { "jr2.dev/keepalive": new Date().toISOString() } },
+      });
+    },
+
+    continuity(name, listener) {
+      // The watch's word on this name (ADR-0063): the first list, then every event. A dropped
+      // watch says nothing, so this says nothing either — unknown is never loss.
+      return sandboxes().subscribe(name, (sandbox) => listener(continuityOf(sandbox)));
+    },
+
+    harnessRestarts(name, listener) {
+      // The same watch (ADR-0021): the operator publishes the Harness container's restarts and
+      // its last end on the Sandbox's status. A name the watch does not hold says nothing — that is
+      // Continuity's news, or the Instance Harness, which is not a Sandbox.
+      return sandboxes().subscribe(name, (sandbox) => {
+        const harness = sandbox?.status?.harness;
+        if (sandbox === undefined) return;
+        listener({
+          restartCount: harness?.restartCount ?? 0,
+          ...(harness?.lastTerminated ? { lastTerminated: harness.lastTerminated } : {}),
+        });
+      });
+    },
+
+    async memoryFault(name, since) {
+      // Only a Sandbox the watch knows: the Instance Harness is a StatefulSet, not a Sandbox, and
+      // waiting on a name that will never appear would only delay its fault (ADR-0031).
+      if (!sandboxes().get(name)) return undefined;
+      const judge = (sandbox: SandboxObject | undefined) => memoryFaultOf(sandbox, since);
+      const now = judge(sandboxes().get(name));
+      if (now !== undefined) return now;
+      // The operator's word can trail the Harness's restart; give it a moment, then call it lost.
+      return waitFor<MemoryKill>(name, judge, () => ({
+        deadline: Date.now() + MEMORY_FAULT_GRACE_MS,
+        expire: () => new Error("no memory kill"),
+      })).catch(() => undefined);
+    },
+
+    async destroy(name) {
+      staleByName.delete(name);
+      // The token Secret is the CR's child from birth, so deleting the CR reaps it (ADR-0001).
+      await kube().delete(SANDBOXES, ns, name);
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+/** A Sandbox as Continuity (ADR-0021): gone, or present — and Lost, when the operator says so. */
+function continuityOf(sandbox: SandboxObject | undefined): Continuity {
+  if (!sandbox) return { present: false };
+  const lost = lossOf(sandbox);
+  return lost ? { present: true, lost } : { present: true };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The operator's verdict that this Sandbox's one pod is gone or terminal (ADR-0021): phase `Lost`,
+ * with the `Lost` condition's reason and the pod's own words. Terminal — the operator never gives
+ * the Sandbox another pod, so nothing here waits for one.
+ */
+export function lossOf(sandbox: SandboxObject | undefined): SandboxLoss | undefined {
+  if (sandbox?.status?.phase !== "Lost") return undefined;
+  const condition = sandbox.status.conditions?.find((c) => c.type === "Lost");
+  return {
+    reason: condition?.reason || "Lost",
+    message: condition?.message || "the operator reports its pod gone or ended",
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Why a Sandbox with no node waits (ADR-0064), off the operator's `Scheduled` condition: `False`
+ * with `QuotaExceeded` is a ResourceQuota refusing the pod create, any other `False` the scheduler
+ * finding no node. `Unknown` (the scheduler has not looked yet) is no reason at all: most pods are
+ * placed in milliseconds, and a wait worth a feed line is one the cluster has explained.
+ */
+export function placingWaitOf(sandbox: SandboxObject | undefined): PlacingWait | undefined {
+  const scheduled = sandbox?.status?.conditions?.find((c) => c.type === "Scheduled");
+  if (scheduled?.status !== "False") return undefined;
+  return {
+    on: scheduled.reason === QUOTA_EXCEEDED ? "quota" : "node",
+    message: scheduled.message || scheduled.reason || "no reason given",
+  };
+}
+
+/** The operator's `Scheduled` reason while a ResourceQuota refuses the pod create (ADR-0064). */
+const QUOTA_EXCEEDED = "QuotaExceeded";
+
+/**
+ * The memory kill (ADR-0061), or undefined: the Harness container's last run ended
+ * `OOMKilled`, at or after `since` (less the skew a node's clock may carry). The prefix is FIXED —
+ * `memory limit` — so a Machine, `jr2 status` and the feed can tell a memory kill from a Turn lost
+ * to any other restart (ADR-0021) and from a conversation lost (a 404); the limit named is the
+ * Harness container's own, the one the kernel enforced. `limit` and `at` ride beside the reason as data: the next Turn's notice is made
+ * of them (ADR-0062), and `at` tells two Turns ended by one kill that it was one.
+ */
+export function memoryFaultOf(sandbox: SandboxObject | undefined, since: Date): MemoryKill | undefined {
+  const last = sandbox?.status?.harness?.lastTerminated;
+  if (last?.reason !== OOM_KILLED) return undefined;
+  const finished = last.finishedAt === undefined ? NaN : Date.parse(last.finishedAt);
+  if (Number.isNaN(finished) || finished < since.getTime() - MEMORY_FAULT_SKEW_MS) return undefined;
+  const limit = sandbox?.spec?.resources?.limits?.memory;
+  const reason =
+    `memory limit (${OOM_KILLED}${limit ? `, limit ${limit}` : ""}): the Workspace's processes passed the ` +
+    "Harness container's memory limit and the kernel killed the container, the conversation with it. " +
+    "Use fewer workers, or give the Workspace a larger Size (ADR-0060, ADR-0061).";
+  return { reason, ...(limit ? { limit } : {}), at: last.finishedAt! };
+}
+
+/** The pod volume the operator defines for one Repo's node cache, and where it lands in the
+ * primary container (ADR-0051). Two halves of one contract with the operator, spelled here so the
+ * User Container's mounts and the attach's clone source agree with it by construction. */
+export const repoVolumeName = (key: string): string => `repo-${key}`;
+export const repoMountPath = (key: string): string => `${REPOS_MOUNT}/${key}`;
+
+/** One Repo as the provision names it: the CR entry, plus what its resource records — the
+ * identity, and whether a Machine's slot (not only the run's) binds it. */
+type FencedRepo = { key: string; url: string; identity: string; bound: boolean };
+
+/** The operator's Ready reason when the cache agent could not clone onto the pod's node
+ * (sandbox_controller.go) — the one Ready verdict a provision cannot wait out. */
+const REPO_CLONE_FAILED = "RepoCloneFailed";
+
+/** The operator's Ready reasons that hold a Sandbox whose POD is Ready on its Repos
+ * (sandbox_controller.go, `reposReadiness`): the resource not yet seen, or the node's cache
+ * agent still cloning or fetching. The wait against them is the Repo budget, not the pod's. */
+const REPO_HELD: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(["RepoMissing", "RepoPending"]);
+
+/**
+ * The Repo budget ran out with the operator still holding the Sandbox. The pod is up, so the
+ * preflight is not the question; the verdict names the Repo and the node, and the port adds
+ * what the operator cannot say: the agent is still working, `jr2 status` shows it per node, and
+ * the budget is the port's, not the clone's.
+ */
+function repoWaitError(name: string, budgetMs: number, ready: Condition | undefined): string {
+  const verdict = ready?.message ? `${ready.reason ?? "?"}: ${ready.message}` : "no Ready condition reported";
+  return (
+    `Sandbox "${name}" waited ${Math.round(budgetMs / 60_000)}m for its Repos and the operator still holds it — ` +
+    `${verdict} (ADR-0051). The node's cache agent clones a cold node once and fetches before every attach; ` +
+    "`jr2 status` reports each Repo per node. Start the run again once the cache is present, or raise " +
+    "the port's `repoTimeoutMs` for a repository whose clone outlasts it."
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * The fix beside the symptom. The operator's message carries the Repo, the node, and git's own
+ * words; what it cannot say is that the cache agent keeps retrying, that `jr2 status` reports the
+ * same line per node, or where a credential is configured (ADR-0047/0051).
+ */
+function repoCloneError(name: string, verdict: string): string {
+  return (
+    `Sandbox "${name}" cannot start: ${verdict} (ADR-0051). The node's cache agent keeps retrying on its own — ` +
+    "fix the url or its git.credentials entry (an ssh url needs its deploy key registered with the host, " +
+    "ADR-0047), then start the run again; `jr2 status` reports the same error per node until it clears."
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * A Harness that never came up (ADR-0063): the kubelet's reason and exit code for its last run,
+ * as the operator published them, and where the rest is — the container's own log. A preflight
+ * that passes and a Harness that still dies is a Sandbox Image the floor did not fully prove, or
+ * a Harness that ran out of memory on the way up (ADR-0061).
+ */
+function crashLoopError(name: string, harness: NonNullable<NonNullable<SandboxObject["status"]>["harness"]>): string {
+  const last = harness.lastTerminated;
+  const how = last ? `${last.reason ?? "?"}, exit ${last.exitCode ?? "?"}` : "no reason reported";
+  // The Harness's own last words (ADR-0063): its termination message falls back to its last log
+  // lines (`FallbackToLogsOnError`, set by the operator), so the fault quotes them rather than
+  // sending the reader to a log a gone pod no longer has. Quoted, never interpreted.
+  const words = last?.message?.trim();
+  return (
+    `Sandbox "${name}" cannot start: its Harness has ended ${harness.restartCount} times before it was ever ` +
+    `Ready (last: ${how}).` +
+    (words
+      ? ` Its last output:\n${words
+          .split("\n")
+          .map((line) => `  ${line}`)
+          .join("\n")}\n`
+      : " ") +
+    `See its output: \`kubectl logs ${name} -c harness --previous\`` +
+    (last?.reason === OOM_KILLED
+      ? " — it passed its memory limit, so give the Workspace a larger Size (ADR-0060)."
+      : ".")
+  );
+}
+
+/** A Sandbox Effector that could not start, in its own words (its termination message). */
+function effectorStartError(
+  name: string,
+  last: NonNullable<NonNullable<NonNullable<SandboxObject["status"]>["effector"]>["lastTerminated"]>,
+): string {
+  const words = last.message?.trim();
+  return (
+    `Sandbox "${name}" cannot start: its Sandbox Effector ended before the pod was Ready ` +
+    `(${last.reason ?? "?"}, exit ${last.exitCode ?? "?"})` +
+    (words ? `: ${words}` : "") +
+    ` — see \`kubectl logs ${name} -c effector --previous\` (ADR-0068)`
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * The provision's verdict on a waiting container, or undefined to keep waiting (ADR-0063). Init
+ * containers come first in the list, and they run first: the `preflight` step runs the Sandbox
+ * Image before the Harness container exists, so that is where a root image dies.
+ */
+function waitingFault(name: string, waiting: ContainerWaiting[] | undefined): string | undefined {
+  for (const w of waiting ?? []) {
+    if (w.reason === ROOT_IMAGE_REASON && w.message && ROOT_IMAGE_MESSAGE.test(w.message)) {
+      return rootImageError(name, `container "${w.container}": ${w.message}`);
+    }
+    if (w.reason !== undefined && TERMINAL_WAITING.has(w.reason)) {
+      return `Sandbox "${name}" cannot start: container "${w.container}" ${w.reason}${w.message ? `: ${w.message}` : ""}`;
+    }
+  }
+  return undefined;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The fix, not the symptom. The kubelet's message says what it refused; it cannot say that the
+ * image is a Sandbox Image, that jr2 declined to patch a uid onto it, or where the one-line edit
+ * goes. Only a brought ref reaches here: a built image's USER was judged at converge, and one that
+ * declares none gets the uid fallback.
+ */
+function rootImageError(name: string, fault: string): string {
+  return (
+    `Sandbox "${name}" cannot start: its image runs as ROOT, and every jr2-owned seat is hardened ` +
+    `with runAsNonRoot (ADR-0005). The kubelet refused it — ${fault}\n` +
+    `  - the fix is one line in the image: a NUMERIC non-root \`USER <uid>\` (e.g. \`USER 1000\`)\n` +
+    `  - numeric because the kubelet does not read the image's /etc/passwd, so \`USER app\` is ` +
+    `refused too — it cannot prove that name is non-root\n` +
+    `  - jr2 does not supply a uid for a brought registry ref: it is never inspected and never ` +
+    `modified, which is what "bring your own image" means (ADR-0037). Only an image jr2 BUILDS, ` +
+    `and only one that declares no USER at all, gets the uid-${FALLBACK_UID} fallback.`
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * The pod budget ran out. The most likely cause is an image that misses ADR-0037's floor, and that
+ * failure is an INIT container's — invisible in the phase alone. A musl or git-less base dies
+ * INSIDE the preflight, on jr2's own message; a root image never starts it. The budget starts once
+ * the pod is scheduled (ADR-0064), so the scheduler is never the answer here.
+ */
+function notReadyError(name: string, last: SandboxObject | undefined): string {
+  const said = (c: Condition | undefined) => (c?.message ? `${c.reason ?? "?"}: ${c.message}` : undefined);
+  const ready = said(last?.status?.conditions?.find((c) => c.type === "Ready"));
+  // Routine waits (the init step still running) say nothing; anything else is what the kubelet
+  // was stuck on — a failing pull, a config error.
+  const stuck = (last?.status?.waiting ?? [])
+    .filter((w) => w.reason && w.reason !== "PodInitializing" && w.reason !== "ContainerCreating")
+    .map((w) => `\n  container "${w.container}" is waiting: ${w.reason}${w.message ? `: ${w.message}` : ""}`)
+    .join("");
+  return (
+    `Sandbox "${name}" never reached Ready (last phase: ${last?.status?.phase ?? "absent"}) — if its ` +
+    "Sandbox Image is new, check the preflight: `kubectl logs " +
+    name +
+    " -c preflight` (ADR-0037's floor: glibc, git, a writable HOME, a numeric non-root USER — an image " +
+    "that runs as root never starts it, and `kubectl describe pod` says so)." +
+    stuck +
+    (ready ? `\n  the operator's Ready condition says: ${ready}` : "")
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * The `ReposFresh=False` message, keyed back to SLOTS for the attach's `stale`. The operator
+ * writes one clause per stale Repo — `Repo "<key>" on node <n> is stale: <error>` — joined by
+ * `; `; each slot whose key a clause names gets that clause. A message that names no key at all
+ * lands on every slot: a verdict with no address is still a verdict.
+ */
+function staleSlots(
+  repos: Array<{ slot: string; url: string }>,
+  message: string | undefined,
+): Record<string, string> | undefined {
+  if (!message) return undefined;
+  const byKey = new Map<string, string>();
+  for (const clause of message.split("; ")) {
+    const key = /^Repo "([^"]+)"/.exec(clause)?.[1];
+    if (key !== undefined) byKey.set(key, clause);
+  }
+  const stale: Record<string, string> = {};
+  for (const repo of repos) {
+    const clause = byKey.size === 0 ? message : byKey.get(repoIdentity(repo.url).key);
+    if (clause !== undefined) stale[repo.slot] = clause;
+  }
+  return Object.keys(stale).length ? stale : undefined;
+}
+
+const sleep = (ms: number) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
+
+/**
+ * The refusal of a provision on a cluster with no operator (ADR-0069). The data plane is always
+ * wired, but the Repo and Sandbox kinds are the operator's to install: with none, the API server
+ * answers 404 on the first create of either, so the first Repo write fails before the Sandbox CR
+ * does. `jr2 up` deploys the operator on every converge unless `operator.manage: false`, so that
+ * setting is the one way to reach this, and the fix names it. Any other error passes through.
+ */
+function noOperator(sandbox: string, kind: "Repo" | "Sandbox"): (err: unknown) => never {
+  return (err) => {
+    if (!isNotFound(err)) throw err;
+    throw new Error(
+      `Sandbox "${sandbox}" cannot be provisioned: no operator on this cluster — install it, or remove ` +
+        `\`operator.manage: false\` so \`jr2 up\` deploys it (the API server does not serve the ${kind} kind: ` +
+        `${(err as Error).message})`,
+    );
+  };
+}