@join-pantheon/cli 0.29.1 → 0.30.0

package/README.md

@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ That gives you a verified account and a unique username no one else can claim,
 across every space on the hosted relay. A second machine joins the same account
 with `pantheon login --email you@work.com`. See your devices and sign any of them
 out with `pantheon sessions`; every identity and membership event is in `pantheon
-audit`. (Self-hosting or on a LAN/tailnet? Accounts are optional — skip straight
-to `pantheon start`.)
+audit`. (Self-hosting or on a LAN/tailnet? Accounts are optional there — skip
+signing up and point `start` at your own relay: `pantheon start --relay ws://<host>:8787`.)
 
 **Then, from your project's repo — or anywhere, if there is no repo yet (see below):**
 
@@ -76,8 +76,8 @@ That's it — one command each sets up the **whole machine**: a relay and space
 (them), pantheon wired into whichever agents each of you already has (**user scope** — every project,
 every Conductor window, nothing to commit), the wake-up hook so an agent finishes what a peer is
 waiting for, the **worker** so the machine answers the team even while its human is away (on by
-default when run inside a git repo; `--no-worker` opts out — and a peer still needs an explicit
-`--may-wake` grant before they can use it), native decision alerts, and the menu bar. Each command
+default when run inside a git repo; `--no-worker` opts out — and a peer can use it only once you
+approve them on this machine with `pantheon wake allow <name>`), native decision alerts, and the menu bar. Each command
 ends with a "You're set" summary, then a short guided setup on a terminal: three questions — your
 name, your role, and (inside a repo) whether a run a teammate wakes may execute commands — and one
 screen of defaults to keep or change: who may wake your machine while you are away, which alerts you
@@ -108,10 +108,10 @@ so and asks for a fresh invite; a relay that cannot be reached asks you for the
 Already a member — new laptop, or just pulled a newer build? The same full setup is one command:
 `pantheon install --user` (from your project's repo if you have one).
 
-**Consent happens once, here.** Setup pre-approves exactly the six pantheon *message* tools in
+**Consent happens once, here.** Setup pre-approves exactly the nine pantheon tools — messages, status and reads — in
 each agent's own permission system (Claude Code `permissions.allow`, Cursor `Mcp()` tokens,
 Codex per-server approval), so day-to-day coordination never interrupts you with "allow
-pantheon_wait?" again. Nothing that executes is pre-approved: `--may-wake` and `--allow-bash`
+pantheon_wait?" again. Nothing that executes is pre-approved: wake rights and `--allow-bash`
 keep their prompts on purpose — they are the two decisions worth reading. `pantheon leave`
 removes the grants. What remains is one one-time click per editor that only it can ask for
 (folder trust in Claude Code, MCP enable in Cursor, `/hooks` approval in Codex).
@@ -198,8 +198,8 @@ product itself; you read it, and you decide.
 
 <details><summary>The long way round, if you want to control each piece</summary>
 
-`pantheon relay` · `pantheon init` · `pantheon join` · `pantheon members` · `pantheon admit <who> --may-wake`
-· `pantheon install` (project-scope: commits a `.mcp.json`, so `pantheon` must be on PATH). Membership by explicit
+`pantheon relay` · `pantheon init` · `pantheon join` · `pantheon members` · `pantheon admit <who>` ·
+`pantheon wake allow <who>` · `pantheon install` (project-scope: commits a `.mcp.json`, so `pantheon` must be on PATH). Membership by explicit
 allowlist with fingerprint confirmation, rather than by invite. Everything the two-command path
 does, one step at a time.
 
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ pantheon service uninstall
 ```
 
 A terminal window is not "while you are asleep", so use `pantheon service install` for anything
-real. Logs land in `.pantheon/worker.log`.
+real. Logs land in `~/.pantheon/logs/worker.log` (`pantheon logs worker -f`).
 
 ### The menu bar (macOS)
 
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ pantheon directory                        # shared responsibility and authority
 pantheon approvals                        # decisions waiting on you
 pantheon approvals answer <id> 'Approved because…'
 pantheon profile delegate --to alex --domains technical \
-  --until 2026-09-05T18:00:00Z          # expires automatically; max 30 days
+  --until <ISO time, e.g. 2026-11-01T18:00:00Z>   # expires automatically; at most 30 days ahead
 pantheon profile undelegate --to alex     # revoke early
 ```
 
@@ -347,16 +347,27 @@ domain is a conflict, not a committee — routing blocks until one of them drops
 it or delegates. Decide domain ownership out loud before publishing; shared
 decisions belong to whoever answers for them, with delegation covering absence.
 
-When a peer you granted `--may-wake` asks something and no session of yours picks it up, the
+When a teammate you approved to wake this machine asks something and no session of yours picks it up, the
 worker spawns a headless agent run to handle it. Verified end to end: an `ASK` from an idle
 peer's machine was answered in **31 seconds with no human involved**, and:
 
 - the run happens in a **dedicated git worktree on a `pantheon/<goal>` branch** — your checkout and
   your uncommitted work are never touched, and nothing is merged
-- it runs with **only the six pantheon message tools** approved; bash stays gated unless you pass
-  `--allow-bash`
-- the relay — not the daemon — enforces who may wake you, so a peer without `--may-wake` is
-  refused even if your worker tries
+- it runs with **only the pantheon message tools** approved; commands stay gated unless a person on
+  this machine grants them (`pantheon policy grant run-commands`, or answering the worker's own request
+  from `pantheon approvals` or the menu bar — never from the ledger) or you pass `--allow-bash`
+- two conditions, both enforced: the team must let the peer wake workers at all (the relay's per-member
+  `may_wake`, set by `pantheon admit <who> --may-wake` — the relay refuses a claim without it), and,
+  unless you chose wake "anyone", a person on THIS machine must have approved them:
+  `pantheon wake allow <who>` (`wake deny`, `wake list`). That list lives only on this machine and
+  nothing about it is sent to the team. Nobody is approved until you approve them.
+- upgrading keeps what you had said: teammates you admitted with `--may-wake` are carried over; so is
+  everyone the team lets wake if you had chosen "anyone" (or never chose, on a machine set up before
+  0.30, when that was the default); a joiner who was never asked keeps the team's founder. The worker
+  says who was carried and why. Against a relay older than 0.30 (it cannot say who admitted whom) the
+  team's `may_wake` keeps deciding until the relay upgrades, so upgrading the CLI first is safe.
+- the agent's environment carries no identity secret; the run is its own process group, killed whole
+  on timeout, `pantheon stop` and `pantheon panic`
 - a human who is actually working wins — but presence is not attention. The rule, in order:
   1. a turn in flight in any of your windows (your wake-up hook reports it) → the worker waits
   2. …unless that report is over **30 minutes** old with nothing after it. Claude Code runs no
@@ -412,14 +423,26 @@ signed in, the first on PATH runs and the alert says exactly that, with the sign
 `pantheon doctor` shows the same choice (`worker agent`). Each backend is driven the way it
 actually works, with the same "no shell unless you said so" rule spelled in its own dialect:
 
-| backend | bash gated (default) | with `--allow-bash` |
+| backend | bash gated (default) | with the command grant (`run-commands` or `--allow-bash`) |
 |---|---|---|
-| claude-code | `acceptEdits` + the six pantheon tools | `bypassPermissions` |
-| codex | `--sandbox read-only` (codex has no edits-without-shell mode) | `--sandbox workspace-write` |
-| cursor | proposes edits, never applies (`-p` without `--force`) | `--force` |
-| copilot | `--allow-tool=pantheon-worker --allow-tool=write` (edits without shell, Copilot's `write` kind) | `--allow-all-tools` |
+| claude-code | `acceptEdits`, no shell, reads held to the worktree, `~/.ssh` `~/.aws` `~/.config/gh` `~/.pantheon` and similar denied; the repo's own `.claude` settings never load (`--setting-sources user`) | the same file rules, plus Claude Code's OS sandbox (macOS/Linux): commands may write only the worktree, its git data and temp dirs, may not read the secret paths, and a run whose sandbox cannot start does not start. Commands: git subcommands (with its run-a-program options denied), the repo's scripts via npm/pnpm/yarn/bun, make, cargo, go, pytest, mvn/gradle, dotnet, plus the committed `.pantheon/commands` on the base branch (one per line; shells, wrappers, package runners like `npx`, and inline code are refused — use `./node_modules/.bin/vitest`). The run names any command it needed that was refused. On Windows, or a Claude Code too old for these settings, the list is all there is — it is not a boundary |
+| codex | `--sandbox read-only` (codex has no edits-without-shell mode; reads are not restricted) | `--approve-for-me` (Codex's workspace-write sandbox, its auto-reviewer approves; any command) |
+| cursor | proposes edits, never applies (`-p` without `--force`) | `--force` (any command, no allowlist, no sandbox) |
+| copilot | `--allow-tool=pantheon-worker --allow-tool=write` (edits without shell, Copilot's `write` kind) | `--allow-all-tools` (any command, no allowlist, no sandbox) |
 | kiro | an agent whose tools are pantheon's plus `read`, `write`, `grep`, `glob` — all pre-approved | the same, plus `shell` |
 
+**What the command grant really means.** A run allowed to run commands can edit the repo's own
+scripts and then run them through a listed command (`npm test` runs whatever `package.json` says), so
+the command list alone never contains it. Where Claude Code's sandbox runs (macOS, Linux) that
+sandbox is the boundary. Everywhere else, a command run can do what you can. After every run
+Pantheon checks for the plain ways it could have widened what the NEXT run may do — a grant or wake
+approval it added, a loosened wake setting, a changed relay address, a queued menu-bar action —
+takes them back and tells you. That is a check after the fact, not a boundary: a run that can do
+what you can could change something it does not look at. Pantheon also refuses to send an act that
+holds this machine's key, a team token, or text in the shape of a common secret (a private key, a
+cloud or API token) — a guard against a pasted secret, not against one a run takes care to disguise.
+What keeps your secrets from a run is that it cannot read them: the denies and the sandbox above.
+
 Claude Code, Cursor and Codex are verified with **real live woken runs** — an idle machine answering a
 peer's ASK end to end. Codex quirks the tooling handles for
 you: no per-run approval flag exists in `codex exec`, MCP arrives via `-c` overrides (a worktree
@@ -564,7 +587,7 @@ All enforced in the relay, not in a prompt — a prompt can be argued out of its
 | Membership | explicit allowlist, ed25519 | the token is not a credential; a name needs its key |
 | Invites | single-use, expiring | a leaked link is inert once redeemed or timed out |
 | Claims | one session per obligation | parallel Conductor workspaces cannot duplicate work |
-| Wake rights | `--may-wake`, per member | only named peers may start a run on your machine |
+| Wake rights | `pantheon wake allow`, per machine; `--may-wake`, per member for the team | only peers the team lets wake AND you approved here may start a run on your machine |
 | Run budget | 12/hour, 1 concurrent | a peer cannot drain your tokens |
 | Personas | tighten-only | a persona file — even one a teammate committed — can lower caps and turn bash off, never the reverse |
 | Worktree hygiene | no secrets on disk | credentials reach a woken run through its environment only; run scratch files are git-excluded |
@@ -611,7 +634,7 @@ replayable.
 - **The space token is still a shared secret** for *reaching* the relay, even though membership is
   now key-based. Treat the relay endpoint as semi-public and rely on the allowlist.
 - **A woken run is trusted with your repo.** `--allow-bash` in particular means a peer's request
-  can execute commands on your machine. Grant `--may-wake` deliberately.
+  can execute commands on your machine. Approve wakers (`pantheon wake allow`) deliberately.
 
 ## Privacy, data, and support
 

package/bin/pantheon.js

@@ -11,6 +11,18 @@ import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
 import { dirname, resolve } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
 
+// Node first, before anything that needs a newer one is loaded. On an older
+// Node the first failure was deep and unreadable: node:sqlite missing (it is
+// behind a flag through 22.12), or — on Node 18 behind a proxy — undici 7
+// dying with "File is not defined" on import. This file must stay free of any
+// syntax newer than Node 16, so the check itself runs on the Node it rejects.
+var nodeVersion = process.versions.node.split(".").map(Number);
+var nodeMajor = nodeVersion[0], nodeMinor = nodeVersion[1];
+if (nodeMajor < 22 || (nodeMajor === 22 && nodeMinor < 13) || (nodeMajor === 23 && nodeMinor < 4)) {
+  console.error("pantheon needs Node 22.13 or newer (it uses node:sqlite); this is Node " + process.versions.node + ". Install a current Node LTS from https://nodejs.org and run pantheon again.");
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+
 const here = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
 const root = resolve(here, "..");
 const entry = resolve(root, "dist", "cli.js");

package/dist/accounts.js

@@ -1,13 +1,17 @@
 import { DEFAULT_PLANS, parsePlans, parseLimits, planLimits } from "./plans.js";
 import { createRequire } from "node:module";
 import { createHash, randomBytes, randomInt, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
-import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
+import { chmodSync, closeSync, mkdirSync, openSync, readdirSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
 import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
 import { fingerprint } from "./identity.js";
 const nodeRequire = createRequire(import.meta.url);
 const CODE_TTL_MS = 10 * 60 * 1_000;
 const CODE_RESEND_COOLDOWN_MS = 60 * 1_000;
 const MAX_ATTEMPTS = 5;
+export const MAX_FAILS_PER_KEY = 10;
+export const MAX_FAILS_PER_NETWORK = 50;
+export const FAIL_WINDOW_MS = 60 * 60 * 1_000;
+const MAX_PENDING_PER_EMAIL = 5;
 const now = () => Date.now();
 const newId = (p) => `${p}_${randomBytes(9).toString("base64url")}`;
 const sha = (s) => createHash("sha256").update(s).digest("hex");
@@ -27,7 +31,12 @@ export class Accounts {
     db;
     constructor(dbPath) {
         if (dbPath !== ":memory:") {
-            mkdirSync(dirname(dbPath), { recursive: true });
+            mkdirSync(dirname(dbPath), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+            try {
+                closeSync(openSync(dbPath, "a", 0o600));
+                chmodSync(dbPath, 0o600);
+            }
+            catch { }
         }
         let DB;
         try {
@@ -40,10 +49,12 @@ export class Accounts {
         this.db.exec("PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL; PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;");
         this.migrate();
         if (dbPath !== ":memory:") {
-            try {
-                chmodSync(dbPath, 0o600);
+            for (const f of [dbPath, `${dbPath}-wal`, `${dbPath}-shm`]) {
+                try {
+                    chmodSync(f, 0o600);
+                }
+                catch { }
             }
-            catch { }
         }
     }
     migrate() {
@@ -65,6 +76,11 @@ export class Accounts {
         created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
         last_seen INTEGER NOT NULL
       );
+      -- The table as 0.29.1 and earlier keep it, one code per email, left in
+      -- exactly that shape: a relay rolled back to one of them runs
+      -- INSERT ... ON CONFLICT(email) against it, which needs email to be the
+      -- key. This build keeps its codes in verifications_by_device below and
+      -- only drains this one (see migrate).
       CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS verifications (
         email TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
         code_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
@@ -76,6 +92,23 @@ export class Accounts {
         attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
         created_at INTEGER NOT NULL
       );
+      CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS verifications_by_device (
+        email TEXT NOT NULL,
+        code_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
+        purpose TEXT NOT NULL,
+        pending_username TEXT,
+        pending_pubkey TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+        pending_label TEXT,
+        expires_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
+        attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+        created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
+        PRIMARY KEY (email, pending_pubkey)
+      );
+      CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS verify_failures (
+        email TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+        window_start INTEGER NOT NULL,
+        fails INTEGER NOT NULL
+      );
       CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS sessions (
         id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
         account_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES accounts(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
@@ -128,6 +161,28 @@ export class Accounts {
             this.db.exec("ALTER TABLE sessions ADD COLUMN ended_at INTEGER");
         if (!scols.has("role"))
             this.db.exec("ALTER TABLE sessions ADD COLUMN role TEXT");
+        const spcols = new Set(this.db.prepare("PRAGMA table_info(spaces)").all().map((c) => c.name));
+        if (!spcols.has("owner_deleted_at"))
+            this.db.exec("ALTER TABLE spaces ADD COLUMN owner_deleted_at INTEGER");
+        const vcols = this.db.prepare("PRAGMA table_info(verifications)").all();
+        this.db.exec("BEGIN");
+        try {
+            this.db.exec(`INSERT OR IGNORE INTO verifications_by_device (email, code_hash, purpose, pending_username, pending_pubkey, pending_label, expires_at, attempts, created_at)
+        SELECT email, code_hash, purpose, pending_username, COALESCE(pending_pubkey, ''), pending_label, expires_at, attempts, created_at FROM verifications`);
+            if (vcols.some((c) => c.name === "pending_pubkey" && c.pk > 0)) {
+                this.db.exec(`DROP TABLE verifications;
+          CREATE TABLE verifications (email TEXT PRIMARY KEY, code_hash TEXT NOT NULL, purpose TEXT NOT NULL, pending_username TEXT,
+            pending_pubkey TEXT, pending_label TEXT, expires_at INTEGER NOT NULL, attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, created_at INTEGER NOT NULL);`);
+            }
+            else {
+                this.db.exec("DELETE FROM verifications");
+            }
+            this.db.exec("COMMIT");
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            this.db.exec("ROLLBACK");
+            throw e;
+        }
     }
     close() { this.db.close(); }
     accountByUsername(username) {
@@ -179,43 +234,91 @@ export class Accounts {
             if (!acct || acct.status !== "active")
                 return { ok: false, reason: "no_such_account" };
         }
-        const prev = this.db.prepare("SELECT created_at, expires_at, pending_pubkey FROM verifications WHERE email = ?").get(e);
-        if (prev && now() - prev.created_at < CODE_RESEND_COOLDOWN_MS)
+        if (this.deviceOfOtherAccount(e, opts.pubkey))
+            return { ok: false, reason: "device_other_account" };
+        const key = opts.pubkey;
+        const t = now();
+        const acct0 = this.accountByEmail(e);
+        const ownKey = !!acct0 && this.deviceByPubkey(key)?.account_id === acct0.id;
+        const prev = this.db.prepare(ownKey ? "SELECT MAX(created_at) created_at FROM verifications_by_device WHERE email = ? AND pending_pubkey = ?" : "SELECT MAX(created_at) created_at FROM verifications_by_device WHERE email = ? AND ? IS NOT NULL")
+            .get(e, key);
+        if (prev?.created_at && t - prev.created_at < CODE_RESEND_COOLDOWN_MS)
             return { ok: false, reason: "too_soon" };
-        if (prev && now() < prev.expires_at && prev.pending_pubkey && prev.pending_pubkey !== opts.pubkey) {
-            return { ok: false, reason: "in_progress_elsewhere" };
+        if (this.failsOf(`key:${e}|${key}`, t) >= MAX_FAILS_PER_KEY)
+            return { ok: false, reason: "locked" };
+        this.db.prepare("DELETE FROM verifications_by_device WHERE email = ? AND expires_at < ?").run(e, t);
+        if (ownKey) {
+            for (const r of this.db.prepare("SELECT pending_pubkey FROM verifications_by_device WHERE email = ? AND pending_pubkey != ?").all(e, key)) {
+                if (this.deviceByPubkey(r.pending_pubkey)?.account_id !== acct0.id)
+                    this.db.prepare("DELETE FROM verifications_by_device WHERE email = ? AND pending_pubkey = ?").run(e, r.pending_pubkey);
+            }
+        }
+        const others = this.db.prepare("SELECT pending_pubkey FROM verifications_by_device WHERE email = ? AND pending_pubkey != ? ORDER BY created_at ASC").all(e, key);
+        for (const r of others.slice(0, Math.max(0, others.length - (MAX_PENDING_PER_EMAIL - 1)))) {
+            this.db.prepare("DELETE FROM verifications_by_device WHERE email = ? AND pending_pubkey = ?").run(e, r.pending_pubkey);
         }
         const code = String(randomInt(0, 1_000_000)).padStart(6, "0");
         this.db.prepare(`
-      INSERT INTO verifications (email, code_hash, purpose, pending_username, pending_pubkey, pending_label, expires_at, attempts, created_at)
+      INSERT INTO verifications_by_device (email, code_hash, purpose, pending_username, pending_pubkey, pending_label, expires_at, attempts, created_at)
       VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 0, ?)
-      ON CONFLICT(email) DO UPDATE SET
+      ON CONFLICT(email, pending_pubkey) DO UPDATE SET
         code_hash = excluded.code_hash, purpose = excluded.purpose,
-        pending_username = excluded.pending_username, pending_pubkey = excluded.pending_pubkey,
+        pending_username = excluded.pending_username,
         pending_label = excluded.pending_label, expires_at = excluded.expires_at,
         attempts = 0, created_at = excluded.created_at
-    `).run(e, sha(code), purpose, purpose === "signup" ? normalizeUsername(opts.username) : null, opts.pubkey, opts.label, now() + CODE_TTL_MS, now());
+    `).run(e, sha(code), purpose, purpose === "signup" ? normalizeUsername(opts.username) : null, key, opts.label, t + CODE_TTL_MS, t);
         return { ok: true, code };
     }
-    verify(email, code, ip, pubkey) {
+    failsOf(key, t = now()) {
+        const f = this.db.prepare("SELECT window_start, fails FROM verify_failures WHERE email = ?").get(key);
+        return f && t - f.window_start < FAIL_WINDOW_MS ? f.fails : 0;
+    }
+    noteFail(key, t = now()) {
+        const f = this.db.prepare("SELECT window_start FROM verify_failures WHERE email = ?").get(key);
+        if (f && t - f.window_start < FAIL_WINDOW_MS)
+            this.db.prepare("UPDATE verify_failures SET fails = fails + 1 WHERE email = ?").run(key);
+        else
+            this.db.prepare("INSERT INTO verify_failures (email, window_start, fails) VALUES (?, ?, 1) ON CONFLICT(email) DO UPDATE SET window_start = excluded.window_start, fails = 1").run(key, t);
+    }
+    verify(email, code, ip, pubkey, net = null) {
         const e = normalizeEmail(email);
-        const v = this.db.prepare("SELECT * FROM verifications WHERE email = ?").get(e);
-        if (!v)
-            return { ok: false, reason: "no_pending" };
-        if (now() > v.expires_at) {
-            this.db.prepare("DELETE FROM verifications WHERE email = ?").run(e);
+        const t = now();
+        const rows = this.db.prepare("SELECT * FROM verifications_by_device WHERE email = ? ORDER BY created_at ASC").all(e);
+        let v;
+        if (pubkey) {
+            v = rows.find((r) => r.pending_pubkey === pubkey);
+            if (!v)
+                return { ok: false, reason: rows.some((r) => t <= r.expires_at) ? "other_device" : rows.length ? "expired" : "no_pending" };
+        }
+        else {
+            const live = rows.filter((r) => t <= r.expires_at);
+            if (live.length > 1)
+                return { ok: false, reason: "several_pending" };
+            v = live[0] ?? rows[rows.length - 1];
+            if (!v)
+                return { ok: false, reason: "no_pending" };
+        }
+        const where = "email = ? AND pending_pubkey = ?";
+        if (t > v.expires_at) {
+            this.db.prepare(`DELETE FROM verifications_by_device WHERE ${where}`).run(e, v.pending_pubkey);
             return { ok: false, reason: "expired" };
         }
         if (v.attempts >= MAX_ATTEMPTS)
             return { ok: false, reason: "too_many_attempts" };
-        if (pubkey && v.pending_pubkey && pubkey !== v.pending_pubkey)
-            return { ok: false, reason: "other_device" };
+        if (v.pending_pubkey && this.deviceOfOtherAccount(e, v.pending_pubkey))
+            return { ok: false, reason: "device_other_account" };
+        const keyId = `key:${e}|${v.pending_pubkey}`, netId = net ? `net:${net}` : null;
+        if (this.failsOf(keyId, t) >= MAX_FAILS_PER_KEY || (netId && this.failsOf(netId, t) >= MAX_FAILS_PER_NETWORK))
+            return { ok: false, reason: "locked" };
         const want = Buffer.from(v.code_hash, "hex");
         const got = Buffer.from(sha(code), "hex");
         const good = want.length === got.length && timingSafeEqual(want, got);
         if (!good) {
-            this.db.prepare("UPDATE verifications SET attempts = attempts + 1 WHERE email = ?").run(e);
-            return { ok: false, reason: "bad_code" };
+            this.db.prepare(`UPDATE verifications_by_device SET attempts = attempts + 1 WHERE ${where}`).run(e, v.pending_pubkey);
+            this.noteFail(keyId, t);
+            if (netId)
+                this.noteFail(netId, t);
+            return { ok: false, reason: "bad_code", tries_left: Math.max(0, MAX_ATTEMPTS - v.attempts - 1) };
         }
         const run = this.db.prepare.bind(this.db);
         this.db.exec("BEGIN");
@@ -243,7 +346,11 @@ export class Accounts {
             }
             const device = this.bindDevice(account.id, v.pending_pubkey, v.pending_label ?? "a device");
             const session = this.openSession(account.id, device.id, "", ip);
-            run("DELETE FROM verifications WHERE email = ?").run(e);
+            if (v.purpose === "signup")
+                run("DELETE FROM verifications_by_device WHERE email = ?").run(e);
+            else
+                run(`DELETE FROM verifications_by_device WHERE ${where}`).run(e, v.pending_pubkey);
+            run("DELETE FROM verify_failures WHERE email = ?").run(keyId);
             this.db.exec("COMMIT");
             this.audit({ actor_account: account.id, event: v.purpose === "signup" ? "email_verified" : "login", target: device.fingerprint, ip });
             return { ok: true, account, session, device };
@@ -253,8 +360,22 @@ export class Accounts {
             throw err;
         }
     }
+    deviceOfOtherAccount(email, pubkey) {
+        const dev = this.deviceByPubkey(pubkey);
+        if (!dev)
+            return false;
+        return dev.account_id !== this.accountByEmail(email)?.id;
+    }
+    isDeviceOf(email, pubkey) {
+        if (!pubkey)
+            return false;
+        const dev = this.deviceByPubkey(pubkey);
+        return !!dev && dev.account_id === this.accountByEmail(email)?.id;
+    }
     bindDevice(accountId, pubkey, label) {
         const existing = this.deviceByPubkey(pubkey);
+        if (existing && existing.account_id !== accountId)
+            throw new Error("this device key is bound to a different account");
         if (existing) {
             this.db.prepare("UPDATE devices SET last_seen = ? WHERE id = ?").run(now(), existing.id);
             return existing;
@@ -318,6 +439,7 @@ export class Accounts {
             return false;
         this.db.exec("BEGIN");
         try {
+            this.db.prepare("UPDATE spaces SET owner_deleted_at = ? WHERE owner_account = ?").run(now(), accountId);
             this.db.prepare("DELETE FROM accounts WHERE id = ?").run(accountId);
             this.db.exec("COMMIT");
         }
@@ -382,7 +504,7 @@ export class Accounts {
         return this.db.prepare("SELECT * FROM blocks ORDER BY created_at DESC").all();
     }
     recentVerifications(limit = 50) {
-        return this.db.prepare("SELECT email, purpose, created_at, expires_at, attempts FROM verifications ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT ?").all(limit);
+        return this.db.prepare("SELECT email, purpose, created_at, expires_at, attempts FROM verifications_by_device ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT ?").all(limit);
     }
     plans() {
         const row = this.db.prepare("SELECT json FROM settings WHERE key = 'plans'").get();
@@ -444,7 +566,7 @@ export class Accounts {
     }
     recordSpace(name, ownerAccount) {
         this.db.prepare("INSERT INTO spaces (name, owner_account, created_at, deleted_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, NULL) " +
-            "ON CONFLICT(name) DO UPDATE SET owner_account = excluded.owner_account, created_at = excluded.created_at, deleted_at = NULL WHERE spaces.deleted_at IS NOT NULL").run(name, ownerAccount, now());
+            "ON CONFLICT(name) DO UPDATE SET owner_account = excluded.owner_account, created_at = excluded.created_at, deleted_at = NULL, owner_deleted_at = NULL WHERE spaces.deleted_at IS NOT NULL").run(name, ownerAccount, now());
     }
     markSpaceDeleted(name) {
         this.db.prepare("UPDATE spaces SET deleted_at = ? WHERE name = ? AND deleted_at IS NULL").run(now(), name);
@@ -453,6 +575,9 @@ export class Accounts {
         const r = this.db.prepare("SELECT owner_account FROM spaces WHERE name = ? AND deleted_at IS NULL").get(name);
         return r?.owner_account ? this.accountById(r.owner_account) : null;
     }
+    spaceOrphaned(name) {
+        return !!this.db.prepare("SELECT 1 FROM spaces WHERE name = ? AND deleted_at IS NULL AND owner_account IS NULL AND owner_deleted_at IS NOT NULL").get(name);
+    }
     spacesOwned(accountId) {
         return this.db.prepare("SELECT name FROM spaces WHERE owner_account = ? AND deleted_at IS NULL ORDER BY created_at").all(accountId).map((r) => r.name);
     }