@jmtrin/opencode-kevin 1.2.0 → 1.4.0

package/dist/plugin/ChatBridge.js

@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-// v1.2.0 (K12-018 / plan §4.4 R3, D12-09) — chat-command bridge (universal actions).
-// Hot path: ONE regex test on non-match, allocation-free.
-import { verifyFresh, } from "./TuiActions.js";
-// Exact regex for approve/reject (require 16-hex token, optional note capture).
-// Ack variant is token-free (acknowledge is non-destructive, matches mailbox).
-const APPROVE_REJECT_RE = /^\/kevin-(approve|reject)\s+(\S+)\s+([0-9a-f]{16})(?:\s+([\s\S]+))?$/;
-const ACK_RE = /^\/kevin-ack\s+(\S+)\s*$/;
-// Combined pattern for documentation / static analysis (covers both forms).
-// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unused-vars
-const _DOC_RE = /^\/kevin-(approve|reject|ack)\s+(\S+)\s+([0-9a-f]{16})(?:\s+([\s\S]+))?$/;
-export function parseBridgeCommand(text) {
-    // Approve / reject — require token
-    const m = APPROVE_REJECT_RE.exec(text);
-    if (m) {
-        const type = m[1];
-        const proposalId = m[2];
-        const token = m[3];
-        const note = m[4] !== undefined ? m[4] : undefined;
-        if (type === "approve")
-            return {
-                type: "approve",
-                proposalId,
-                token,
-                ...(note !== undefined ? { note } : {}),
-            };
-        return {
-            type: "reject",
-            proposalId,
-            token,
-            ...(note !== undefined ? { note } : {}),
-        };
-    }
-    const ack = ACK_RE.exec(text);
-    if (ack) {
-        return { type: "ack", conflictId: ack[1] };
-    }
-    return null;
-}
-// Backward alias for tests that import by plan name
-export const KEVIN_COMMAND_RE = APPROVE_REJECT_RE;
-/**
- * Execute a chat message through the bridge.
- * - Non-matching → {handled:false} (byte-identical pass-through)
- * - Matching but stale/invalid → {handled:false, status:"stale_skipped"} (pass-through + counter)
- * - Valid → executes via deps handlers, {handled:true}
- *
- * Valid commands are SWALLOWED — caller must not forward to model.
- * Invalid/stale commands pass through untouched (D12-09).
- */
-export function handleBridgeCommand(text, deps) {
-    const parsed = parseBridgeCommand(text);
-    if (!parsed)
-        return { handled: false };
-    if (parsed.type === "ack") {
-        // Ack is non-destructive, no token verification — matches mailbox acknowledge semantics.
-        try {
-            deps.acknowledge(parsed.conflictId);
-            try {
-                deps.metrics?.incr("tui_actions_invoked", 1);
-            }
-            catch { }
-            return { handled: true, status: "applied" };
-        }
-        catch (err) {
-            const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
-            return { handled: true, status: "error", detail: msg };
-        }
-    }
-    // approve / reject — verify token against CURRENT pending state (same as mailbox)
-    const pending = deps.getPending();
-    const action = {
-        type: parsed.type,
-        proposalId: parsed.proposalId,
-        token: parsed.token,
-        ...(parsed.note !== undefined ? { note: parsed.note } : {}),
-    };
-    const fresh = verifyFresh(action, pending);
-    if (!fresh.ok) {
-        // Invalid/stale → pass-through untouched (do NOT swallow). Caller should forward byte-identically.
-        // Audit counter could be incremented here, but not as contract metric (blockedSnapshot-style internal).
-        return { handled: false, status: "stale_skipped", detail: fresh.reason };
-    }
-    try {
-        if (parsed.type === "approve") {
-            deps.approve(parsed.proposalId);
-            try {
-                deps.metrics?.incr("tui_actions_invoked", 1);
-            }
-            catch { }
-            return { handled: true, status: "applied" };
-        }
-        deps.reject(parsed.proposalId, parsed.note);
-        try {
-            deps.metrics?.incr("tui_actions_invoked", 1);
-        }
-        catch { }
-        return { handled: true, status: "rejected" };
-    }
-    catch (err) {
-        const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
-        return { handled: true, status: "error", detail: msg };
-    }
-}

package/dist/plugin/ConflictDetector.d.ts

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-import type { MemoryService } from "./MemoryService.js";
-import type { RepoTruth } from "./RepoTruth.js";
-import type { Store } from "./Store.js";
-import type { Metrics } from "./metrics.js";
-export type ConflictKind = "repo_truth" | "decision_pair" | "temporal";
-export interface Conflict {
-    readonly id: string;
-    readonly kind: ConflictKind;
-    readonly memoryA: string;
-    readonly memoryB?: string;
-    readonly factId?: string;
-    readonly detail: string;
-}
-export interface RepoTruthConflictInput {
-    readonly memoryId: string;
-    readonly factId?: string | null;
-    readonly reasons: readonly string[];
-}
-export declare class ConflictDetector {
-    private readonly store;
-    private readonly projectId;
-    private readonly repoTruth?;
-    private readonly memoryService?;
-    private readonly metrics;
-    constructor(store: Store, projectId: string, metrics?: Metrics | null, repoTruth?: RepoTruth | undefined, memoryService?: MemoryService | undefined);
-    detect(repoTruthInput?: readonly RepoTruthConflictInput[]): Conflict[];
-    acknowledge(id: string): void;
-    /** Human-only operation. It resolves the conflict row, never a memory. */
-    resolve(id: string, keepMemoryId: string): void;
-    private detectRepoTruth;
-    private repoTruthInputs;
-    private detectDecisionPairs;
-    private detectTemporal;
-    private insertIfNew;
-}

package/dist/plugin/ConflictDetector.js

@@ -1,260 +0,0 @@
-import { mapRow } from "./MemoryService.js";
-import { normalize } from "./fingerprint.js";
-import { STOP_WORDS } from "./query-tokenizer.js";
-import { uuidv7 } from "./uuid.js";
-const POLARITY_RULES = [
-    {
-        positive: ["use"],
-        negative: [
-            ["do", "not", "use"],
-            ["don't", "use"],
-            ["never", "use"],
-        ],
-    },
-    { positive: ["always"], negative: [["never"]] },
-    { positive: ["required"], negative: [["forbidden"], ["not", "required"]] },
-    { positive: ["enable"], negative: [["disable"]] },
-    { positive: ["prefer"], negative: [["avoid"]] },
-];
-const POLARITY_WORDS = new Set([
-    "use",
-    "do",
-    "not",
-    // "don't" tokenizes to ["don", "t"] (see tokens()); the lexicon phrase
-    // ["don't","use"] is matched by tokenizing the phrase the same way, so
-    // both fragments must be excluded from subjects() too (K7-014).
-    "don",
-    "t",
-    "never",
-    "always",
-    "required",
-    "forbidden",
-    "enable",
-    "disable",
-    "prefer",
-    "avoid",
-]);
-export class ConflictDetector {
-    store;
-    projectId;
-    repoTruth;
-    memoryService;
-    metrics;
-    constructor(store, projectId, metrics, repoTruth, memoryService) {
-        this.store = store;
-        this.projectId = projectId;
-        this.repoTruth = repoTruth;
-        this.memoryService = memoryService;
-        this.metrics = metrics ?? null;
-    }
-    detect(repoTruthInput) {
-        const detected = [];
-        detected.push(...this.detectRepoTruth(repoTruthInput));
-        detected.push(...this.detectDecisionPairs());
-        detected.push(...this.detectTemporal());
-        return detected;
-    }
-    acknowledge(id) {
-        this.store
-            .prepare("UPDATE memory_conflicts SET status = 'acknowledged' WHERE id = ? AND project_id = ? AND status = 'open'")
-            .run(id, this.projectId);
-    }
-    /** Human-only operation. It resolves the conflict row, never a memory. */
-    resolve(id, keepMemoryId) {
-        const row = this.store
-            .prepare(`SELECT memory_a, memory_b FROM memory_conflicts
-				 WHERE id = ? AND project_id = ? AND status <> 'resolved'`)
-            .get(id, this.projectId);
-        if (!row)
-            throw new Error(`conflict not found: ${id}`);
-        if (keepMemoryId !== row.memory_a && keepMemoryId !== row.memory_b) {
-            throw new Error("keep must identify one of the conflict memories");
-        }
-        this.store
-            .prepare("UPDATE memory_conflicts SET status = 'resolved', resolved_at = datetime('now') WHERE id = ? AND project_id = ?")
-            .run(id, this.projectId);
-    }
-    detectRepoTruth(input) {
-        const items = input ?? this.repoTruthInputs();
-        const out = [];
-        for (const item of items) {
-            for (const reason of item.reasons) {
-                this.memoryService?.applyTruthPenalty(item.memoryId, 0.5, reason);
-                const id = this.insertIfNew({
-                    kind: "repo_truth",
-                    memoryA: item.memoryId,
-                    memoryB: null,
-                    factId: item.factId ?? null,
-                    detail: reason,
-                });
-                if (id)
-                    out.push({
-                        id,
-                        kind: "repo_truth",
-                        memoryA: item.memoryId,
-                        factId: item.factId ?? undefined,
-                        detail: reason,
-                    });
-            }
-        }
-        // v0.7.0 (D7-03) — "recoverable by re-scanning": a memory whose
-        // contradiction has lapsed (the repo no longer contradicts it) is
-        // de-ranked no longer. The conflict row stays open — resolution is
-        // human-initiated only (D7-06) — but the score penalty lifts, so
-        // fixing the repo genuinely recovers the memory. Runs only on the
-        // production path (no explicit input): explicit-input callers control
-        // every write themselves.
-        if (!input && this.repoTruth && this.memoryService) {
-            const penalized = this.store
-                .prepare("SELECT id FROM memories WHERE project_id = ? AND truth_penalty > 0 AND status = 'active'")
-                .all(this.projectId);
-            for (const row of penalized) {
-                const memory = this.memoryService.getById(row.id);
-                if (!memory)
-                    continue;
-                if ((this.repoTruth.contradictions(memory) ?? []).length === 0) {
-                    this.memoryService.applyTruthPenalty(row.id, 0, "");
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        return out;
-    }
-    repoTruthInputs() {
-        if (!this.repoTruth)
-            return [];
-        const rows = this.store
-            .prepare(`SELECT id, type, content, scope, relevance_score, source_tool,
-				 source_session, metadata, created_at, updated_at, expires_at,
-				 project_id, fingerprint, origin, evidence_count, last_verified_at,
-				 status, fix_args, ignored, superseded_by, feedback_positive,
-				 feedback_negative, curated, curated_at, inferable,
-				 truth_penalty, contradicted_at
-				 FROM memories WHERE project_id = ? AND status = 'active'`)
-            .all(this.projectId);
-        return rows.flatMap((row) => {
-            // v1.1.0 (K11-014) — route through mapRow so metadata is parsed and confidence derived
-            const memory = mapRow(row);
-            const reasons = this.repoTruth?.contradictions(memory) ?? [];
-            return reasons.length > 0
-                ? [{ memoryId: row.id, reasons }]
-                : [];
-        });
-    }
-    detectDecisionPairs() {
-        const rows = this.store
-            .prepare(`SELECT id, type, content, fingerprint FROM memories
-				 WHERE project_id = ? AND status = 'active'
-				 AND type IN ('decision', 'rule') ORDER BY id`)
-            .all(this.projectId);
-        const out = [];
-        for (let i = 0; i < rows.length; i++) {
-            for (let j = i + 1; j < rows.length; j++) {
-                const a = rows[i];
-                const b = rows[j];
-                if (!a || !b || a.fingerprint === b.fingerprint)
-                    continue;
-                const pair = oppositePair(a.content, b.content);
-                if (!pair)
-                    continue;
-                const id = this.insertIfNew({
-                    kind: "decision_pair",
-                    memoryA: a.id,
-                    memoryB: b.id,
-                    factId: null,
-                    detail: pair,
-                });
-                if (id)
-                    out.push({
-                        id,
-                        kind: "decision_pair",
-                        memoryA: a.id,
-                        memoryB: b.id,
-                        detail: pair,
-                    });
-            }
-        }
-        return out;
-    }
-    detectTemporal() {
-        const rows = this.store
-            .prepare(`SELECT m.id,
-				 MAX(CASE WHEN i.outcome = 'effective' THEN i.injected_at END) AS effective_at,
-				 MAX(CASE WHEN i.outcome = 'ineffective' THEN i.injected_at END) AS ineffective_at
-				 FROM memories m JOIN kevin_injections i ON i.memory_id = m.id
-				 WHERE m.project_id = ? AND m.status = 'active'
-				 GROUP BY m.id
-				 HAVING effective_at IS NOT NULL AND ineffective_at IS NOT NULL
-				 AND ineffective_at > effective_at`)
-            .all(this.projectId);
-        const out = [];
-        for (const row of rows) {
-            const detail = `memory was effective at ${row.effective_at} and became ineffective at ${row.ineffective_at}`;
-            const id = this.insertIfNew({
-                kind: "temporal",
-                memoryA: row.id,
-                memoryB: null,
-                factId: null,
-                detail,
-            });
-            if (id)
-                out.push({ id, kind: "temporal", memoryA: row.id, detail });
-        }
-        return out;
-    }
-    insertIfNew(input) {
-        const existing = this.store
-            .prepare(`SELECT id FROM memory_conflicts
-				 WHERE project_id = ? AND kind = ? AND memory_a = ?
-				 AND (memory_b IS ? OR (memory_b IS NULL AND ? IS NULL))
-				 AND (fact_id IS ? OR (fact_id IS NULL AND ? IS NULL))
-				 AND status = 'open' LIMIT 1`)
-            .get(this.projectId, input.kind, input.memoryA, input.memoryB, input.memoryB, input.factId, input.factId);
-        if (existing)
-            return null;
-        const id = uuidv7();
-        this.store
-            .prepare(`INSERT INTO memory_conflicts
-				 (id, project_id, memory_a, memory_b, fact_id, kind, detail)
-				 VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`)
-            .run(id, this.projectId, input.memoryA, input.memoryB, input.factId, input.kind, input.detail);
-        this.metrics?.incr("conflicts_detected", 1);
-        return id;
-    }
-}
-function tokens(text) {
-    return normalize(text).match(/[a-z0-9@._/-]+/g) ?? [];
-}
-function hasPhrase(words, phrase) {
-    if (phrase.length === 1)
-        return words.includes(phrase[0] ?? "");
-    for (let i = 0; i <= words.length - phrase.length; i++) {
-        if (phrase.every((word, offset) => words[i + offset] === word))
-            return true;
-    }
-    return false;
-}
-function polarity(text, rule) {
-    const words = tokens(text);
-    // Lexicon phrases are run through the same tokenizer as the text: "don't
-    // use" → ["don","t","use"], which is exactly how the text's own apostrophe
-    // is split, so a phrase never becomes unreachable (K7-014).
-    const match = (phrase) => hasPhrase(words, tokens(phrase.join(" ")));
-    const negative = rule.negative.some(match);
-    return { positive: !negative && match(rule.positive), negative };
-}
-function subjects(text) {
-    return new Set(tokens(text).filter((token) => !STOP_WORDS.has(token) && !POLARITY_WORDS.has(token)));
-}
-function oppositePair(a, b) {
-    const shared = [...subjects(a)].some((token) => subjects(b).has(token));
-    if (!shared)
-        return null;
-    for (const rule of POLARITY_RULES) {
-        const pa = polarity(a, rule);
-        const pb = polarity(b, rule);
-        if ((pa.positive && pb.negative) || (pa.negative && pb.positive)) {
-            return `statements carry opposite ${rule.positive.join(" ")} polarity for shared subject ${shared}`;
-        }
-    }
-    return null;
-}

package/dist/plugin/ContextInjector.d.ts

@@ -1,222 +0,0 @@
-import type { InjectionLedger } from "./InjectionLedger.js";
-import type { MemoryService } from "./MemoryService.js";
-import { type GateReason } from "./QualityGate.js";
-import { type Metrics } from "./metrics.js";
-export declare const QUALITY_GATE_SETTING = "quality_gate_enabled";
-export declare const SNIPPET_INJECTION_SETTING = "lesson_snippet_injection";
-/**
- * v0.6.0 (K6-023 / plan §5.8) — the effective pre-prompt budget shared by
- * `ContextInjector.prePromptCap()` and `kevin_audit`'s channels block
- * (budget_tokens). Single source of truth for the K6-021 clamp:
- * default 400 when the raw value is missing/non-numeric, clamped to
- * [0, 4000]; 0 means "push off".
- */
-export declare function effectivePrePromptCap(raw: string | undefined): number;
-export interface ChatMessage {
-    role: string;
-    content: string;
-}
-export interface SystemTransformInput {
-    sessionID?: string;
-    messages: ChatMessage[];
-}
-export interface SystemTransformOutput {
-    system: string[];
-}
-export interface CompactingInput {
-    sessionID: string;
-    messages: ChatMessage[];
-}
-export interface CompactingOutput {
-    context: string[];
-}
-export interface InjectionPlanItem {
-    id: string;
-    type: string;
-    decision: "admitted" | "blocked";
-    /** Gate reason when blocked; null for admitted items. */
-    reason?: GateReason;
-    /** Estimated tokens this memory would contribute to the block. */
-    tokens: number;
-}
-export interface InjectionPlan {
-    query: string;
-    tag: "context" | "memory";
-    cap: number;
-    would_inject: boolean;
-    /** Estimated tokens of the block that WOULD be produced (0 when
-     * nothing would be injected). */
-    total_tokens: number;
-    admitted: InjectionPlanItem[];
-    blocked: InjectionPlanItem[];
-}
-export declare class ContextInjector {
-    private memoryService;
-    private metrics;
-    private ledger;
-    private lastRecurrenceCount;
-    /** v0.4.0 (K4-016) — session that produced the last recurrence set. */
-    private lastRecurredSession;
-    /** v0.4.0 (K4-017) — per-session seen-set (plan §5.1 rule 3). */
-    private readonly seenBySession;
-    constructor(memoryService: MemoryService, metrics?: Metrics | null, ledger?: InjectionLedger | null);
-    /**
-     * v0.4.0 (K4-017) — reset the per-session seen-set when a session is
-     * created (plan §5.1 rule 3). Wired from the `session.created` event.
-     */
-    onSessionCreated(sessionId: string): void;
-    /**
-     * v0.3.0 (K3-020) — notify the injector that the negative feedback half
-     * fired N times in the last session.idle. The next system.transform or
-     * compacting hook will prepend a HITL suggestion block.
-     * v0.4.0 (K4-016) — the session id enables the concrete suggestion:
-     * the most-recurred fingerprint's pattern + its fix_args.
-     */
-    setRecurrences(count: number, sessionId?: string): void;
-    /**
-     * v0.4.0 (K4-016) — generate a CONCRETE HITL suggestion block when
-     * recurrences occurred (plan §5.5): names the most-recurred pattern,
-     * its exact recurrence count, observed fix_args and confidence. The
-     * AGENTS.md draft line derives from the lesson's `Suggestion:` text —
-     * never a canned string, and never the anonymous "the same error
-     * pattern" without naming the pattern and count.
-     *
-     * BUG-012 — emits AT MOST ONCE per session: calling it resets the
-     * pending recurrence signal, so whichever hook (system.transform or
-     * compacting) runs first in a session consumes the block. Documented
-     * behavior; wire index.ts to match.
-     */
-    generateSuggestion(): string;
-    /**
-     * v0.4.0 (K4-016) — the AGENTS.md draft line derives from the lesson's
-     * `Suggestion:` text (kept verbatim in the pattern's `Original:` block).
-     */
-    private agentsDraftLine;
-    /**
-     * v0.2.0 (K2-024): origin-aware ranking at injection time is delegated
-     * to `MemoryService.getRelevant()` (K2-023, D2-13). The injector does
-     * NOT re-rank on its own — it consumes the already-ranked slice and
-     * applies the conditional-budget guard for opt-out (`protect: false`)
-     * callers. Plan §B6.5: "apply the same multiplier as
-     * MemoryService.recall so reflector lessons outrank agent-saved notes
-     * at injection time" — satisfied transitively via the getRelevant call.
-     *
-     * v0.4.0 (K4-017): after retrieval, every memory is filtered through
-     * `QualityGate.canInject` (session seen-set + recurrence + strength),
-     * and each admitted memory is recorded in the `InjectionLedger`
-     * (plan §5.2 — one row per injected memory).
-     *
-     * v0.5.0 (K5-014 / plan §8.10) — the pipeline is decomposed into
-     * `fetchSlice` (ranked retrieval + budget overflow) + `evaluate`
-     * (pure gate verdicts) + this orchestrator, so the read-only `plan()`
-     * can mirror it without any side effect (D5-08).
-     */
-    private inject;
-    /**
-     * v0.5.0 (K5-014 / plan §8.10) — the ranked-retrieval stage shared by
-     * `inject` and `plan`. With `dry = true` it is a strict read:
-     *
-     *  - the probe fetch never bumps (BUG-016), like the live path;
-     *  - the overflow retry ALSO fetches with `bump: false` (the live path
-     *    lets the retry fetch bump once — that is the only difference);
-     *  - the no-retry bump is skipped.
-     *
-     * This is what lets `plan()` predict the EXACT slice the live path
-     * would inject without mutating a single relevance score.
-     */
-    private fetchSlice;
-    /**
-     * v0.5.0 (K5-014 / plan §8.10, D5-08) — PUBLIC read-only prediction of
-     * what `inject` WOULD do for a query: same retrieval, same gate, zero
-     * side effects. Never moves a counter, never writes the seen-set, never
-     * bumps relevance, never records ledger rows. `kevin_trace` (K5-015)
-     * surfaces this to the agent; tests freeze the clock + settings around
-     * it.
-     */
-    plan(query: string, options?: {
-        tag?: "context" | "memory";
-        cap?: number;
-        sessionId?: string;
-    }): InjectionPlan;
-    /**
-     * v0.5.0 (K5-014 / plan §8.10) — PURE gate evaluation shared by `admit`
-     * (live path) and `plan` (read-only path): returns the verdict for every
-     * candidate plus the seen-set as it WOULD look afterwards. Never writes
-     * state — the caller decides whether to persist.
-     */
-    private evaluate;
-    /**
-     * v0.5.0 (K5-017 / plan §8.11, D5-11) — the effective pre-prompt cap,
-     * read at call time from `pre_prompt_budget_tokens` (seeded "900" by
-     * migration 006). Clamped to [100, 4000]; a non-numeric value falls
-     * back to 900. `kevin_trace` reports the value used via `plan().cap`.
-     *
-     * v0.6.0 (K6-021 / plan §5.8) — default becomes "400" and the lower
-     * clamp bound drops to **0**: the roadmap's kill criterion K1 prescribes
-     * cutting the push budget to zero when coverage is poor, and v0.5's
-     * [100, 4000] clamp made that response unimplementable. A non-numeric
-     * value falls back to 400. `onSystemTransform` treats 0 as off and
-     * returns before any retrieval (see K6-021 acceptance).
-     */
-    private prePromptCap;
-    /**
-     * v0.4.0 (K4-017) — QualityGate admission: filters the ranked slice to
-     * memories that may be injected this session, updating the session
-     * seen-set.
-     *
-     * v0.5.0 (K5-007 / plan §5.2, D5-04) — uses `canInjectVerdict` and
-     * increments the matching `injections_blocked_*` counter for every
-     * rejection, so gate policy becomes measurable. When `dryRun === true`
-     * the counters stay untouched (D5-08) — and so does the seen-set
-     * (a dry run is a strict read, K5-014).
-     *
-     * BUG-005 — strength/actionability now go through the REAL
-     * `QualityGate.evaluate` semantics (plan §5.1 rules 1-2), which this
-     * class had only re-derived from `metadata.dispatch`:
-     *   - dispatched code → strong + actionable (rescued errorType);
-     *   - generic fallback suggestion + no code → weak, NOT actionable
-     *     (the generic-suggestion ban is now enforced even for legacy
-     *     lessons without dispatch metadata, as long as the `Suggestion:`
-     *     text is available);
-     *   - specific suggestion without code → strong + actionable;
-     *   - no `Suggestion:` text at all (agent-saved note) → strong +
-     *     actionable — the agent explicitly asked to remember it;
-     *   - causal patterns (type='pattern') → always strong + actionable:
-     *     they are the FIXED form of a fingerprint (K4-025).
-     */
-    private admit;
-    /**
-     * BUG-005 — the single source of truth for a memory's lesson quality,
-     * shared by `admit` (the gate) and `format` (the K4-023 `(low
-     * confidence)` marker). Routes lessons through `QualityGate.evaluate`
-     * — the production call site that was previously missing.
-     */
-    private lessonQuality;
-    /**
-     * v0.4.0 (K4-017) — one ledger row per admitted memory (plan §5.2).
-     * Token attribution uses the memory's share of the final block.
-     *
-     * v0.8.0 (K8-024 / plan §5.7) — shared projections are recorded even
-     * though they carry NO fingerprint by design (K8-017 — it is a
-     * different identity dimension): the memory id is their identity in
-     * the ledger, and recording them is what makes `injections_from_shared`
-     * observable at all. No tool call can ever match a memory id, so
-     * settle() marks the row inconclusive — excluded from the precision
-     * denominator (K5-005) — and the BUG-015 skip is unchanged for local
-     * notes without a fingerprint.
-     */
-    private recordInjections;
-    /**
-     * v0.4.0 (K4-012) — snippet injection payload (plan §5.1 rule 5,
-     * D4-05): rows show `id:` + first 2 non-empty lines + `<protect>`
-     * instead of the full body. Gated by the `lesson_snippet_injection`
-     * setting (default `'1'`); when `'0'`, full content is restored.
-     * `escapeInjectedText` is applied to snippet content by the formatter.
-     * v0.4.0 (K4-023) — weak lessons admitted in debug mode are flagged so
-     * the formatter renders the `(low confidence)` marker.
-     */
-    private format;
-    deriveQuery(messages: ChatMessage[]): string;
-    onSystemTransform(input: SystemTransformInput, output: SystemTransformOutput): void;
-    onCompacting(input: CompactingInput, output: CompactingOutput): void;
-}