@jinn-network/client 0.1.2 → 0.1.3-canary.262e5cda

package/dist/conformance/checks/artifacts.js

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/**
+ * Layer 1 artifact vocabulary + trajectory↔artifact linkage checks.
+ *
+ * Scope: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-04-23-jinn-execution-envelope-tee-scope.md
+ * §3.1 K9 (artifactType vocabulary) + K5 (trajectory↔artifact bidirectional linkage).
+ *
+ * Two checks:
+ *   checkArtifactVocabulary  — required artifactType values present
+ *   checkArtifactLinkage     — bidirectional span↔artifact linkage
+ */
+// ─── Vocabulary check ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/**
+ * Check id: `artifacts.vocabulary`
+ * Layer: 1
+ *
+ * Required artifact types per scope §3.1 K9:
+ *   - `output.<kind>` — always required for restoration role
+ *   - `system_snapshot` — always required for restoration role
+ *   - `trajectory` — required when envelope.trajectory is non-null
+ *
+ * Custom artifact types are permitted (vocabulary is extensible).
+ * Verdict-role envelopes are skipped — no output artifact is expected.
+ */
+export function checkArtifactVocabulary(ctx) {
+    const id = 'artifacts.vocabulary';
+    const layer = 1;
+    const env = ctx.envelope;
+    if (!env)
+        return { id, layer, passed: false, detail: 'envelope not loaded' };
+    // Verdict envelopes have no output artifacts — skip vocabulary check.
+    if (env.role === 'verdict') {
+        return { id, layer, passed: true, skipped: true, detail: 'verdict role — no output artifacts required' };
+    }
+    const types = new Set(env.artifacts.map((a) => a.artifactType));
+    const missing = [];
+    // output.<kind> is always required for restoration
+    const outputType = `output.${env.kind}`;
+    if (!types.has(outputType))
+        missing.push(outputType);
+    // system_snapshot required for restoration
+    if (!types.has('system_snapshot'))
+        missing.push('system_snapshot');
+    // trajectory required when envelope.trajectory is non-null
+    if (env.trajectory != null && !types.has('trajectory'))
+        missing.push('trajectory');
+    if (missing.length > 0) {
+        return {
+            id,
+            layer,
+            passed: false,
+            detail: `missing required artifactTypes: ${missing.join(', ')}`,
+        };
+    }
+    return { id, layer, passed: true };
+}
+/**
+ * Check id: `artifacts.linkage`
+ * Layer: 1
+ *
+ * Bidirectional linkage per scope §3.1 K5:
+ *   1. Every artifact with `metadata.producedBy.spanId` must reference a
+ *      span id that exists in the trajectory.
+ *   2. Every `jinn.artifact.emit` span's `jinn.artifact.sha256` attribute must
+ *      reference a sha256 that is present in `envelope.artifacts[]`.
+ *
+ * Skipped when no trajectory is present.
+ */
+export function checkArtifactLinkage(ctx) {
+    const id = 'artifacts.linkage';
+    const layer = 1;
+    const env = ctx.envelope;
+    const traj = ctx.trajectory;
+    if (!env)
+        return { id, layer, passed: false, detail: 'envelope not loaded' };
+    if (!traj) {
+        return { id, layer, passed: true, skipped: true, detail: 'trajectory not present' };
+    }
+    const spanIds = new Set(traj.spans.map((s) => s.spanId));
+    const artifactSha256s = new Set(env.artifacts.map((a) => a.sha256));
+    const failures = [];
+    // 1. Every artifact with producedBy.spanId must reference a real span.
+    for (const art of env.artifacts) {
+        const producedBy = art.metadata
+            ?.producedBy;
+        if (producedBy?.spanId && !spanIds.has(producedBy.spanId)) {
+            failures.push(`artifact ${art.sha256} references nonexistent spanId=${producedBy.spanId}`);
+        }
+    }
+    // 2. Every jinn.artifact.emit span must reference a real artifact sha256.
+    for (const span of traj.spans) {
+        if (span.attributes['jinn.span.kind'] === 'jinn.artifact.emit') {
+            const sha256 = span.attributes['jinn.artifact.sha256'];
+            if (!sha256) {
+                failures.push(`span ${span.spanId} (jinn.artifact.emit) has no jinn.artifact.sha256 attribute`);
+            }
+            else if (!artifactSha256s.has(sha256)) {
+                failures.push(`span ${span.spanId} references artifact sha256 ${sha256} not in envelope.artifacts`);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (failures.length === 0)
+        return { id, layer, passed: true };
+    return {
+        id,
+        layer,
+        passed: false,
+        detail: failures.slice(0, 5).join('; '),
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=artifacts.js.map

package/dist/conformance/checks/artifacts.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/conformance/checks/envelope-schema.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/**
+ * Layer 1 envelope check: schema conformance.
+ *
+ * Scope: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-04-23-jinn-execution-envelope-tee-scope.md §4.10.
+ *
+ * Validates the full envelope against `SignedEnvelopeSchema`. Runs at every
+ * evidence tier — it is the first structural gate.
+ */
+import type { CheckResult, ConformanceContext } from '../types.js';
+/**
+ * Check id: `envelope.schema`
+ * Layer: 1
+ *
+ * Runs `SignedEnvelopeSchema.safeParse(ctx.envelope)`. Returns pass if valid,
+ * fail with a human-readable Zod issue summary on error.
+ */
+export declare function checkEnvelopeSchema(ctx: ConformanceContext): CheckResult;

package/dist/conformance/checks/envelope-schema.js

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/**
+ * Layer 1 envelope check: schema conformance.
+ *
+ * Scope: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-04-23-jinn-execution-envelope-tee-scope.md §4.10.
+ *
+ * Validates the full envelope against `SignedEnvelopeSchema`. Runs at every
+ * evidence tier — it is the first structural gate.
+ */
+import { SignedEnvelopeSchema } from '../../types/envelope.js';
+/**
+ * Check id: `envelope.schema`
+ * Layer: 1
+ *
+ * Runs `SignedEnvelopeSchema.safeParse(ctx.envelope)`. Returns pass if valid,
+ * fail with a human-readable Zod issue summary on error.
+ */
+export function checkEnvelopeSchema(ctx) {
+    const id = 'envelope.schema';
+    const layer = 1;
+    if (!ctx.envelope) {
+        return { id, layer, passed: false, detail: 'envelope not loaded' };
+    }
+    const result = SignedEnvelopeSchema.safeParse(ctx.envelope);
+    if (result.success) {
+        return { id, layer, passed: true };
+    }
+    return {
+        id,
+        layer,
+        passed: false,
+        detail: result.error.issues
+            .map((i) => `${i.path.join('.')}: ${i.message}`)
+            .join('; '),
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=envelope-schema.js.map

package/dist/conformance/checks/envelope-schema.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"envelope-schema.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/conformance/checks/envelope-schema.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;GAOG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AAG/D;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,mBAAmB,CAAC,GAAuB;IACzD,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,iBAAiB,CAAC;IAC7B,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,CAAU,CAAC;IAEzB,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;QAClB,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,CAAC;IACrE,CAAC;IAED,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,oBAAoB,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5D,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QACnB,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;IACrC,CAAC;IAED,OAAO;QACL,EAAE;QACF,KAAK;QACL,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK;QACb,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM;aACxB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;aAC/C,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;KACd,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC"}

package/dist/conformance/checks/hash-signature.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/**
+ * Layer 1 envelope check: canonical hash + signature validity.
+ *
+ * Scope: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-04-23-jinn-execution-envelope-tee-scope.md §4.10.
+ *
+ * Two assertions combined into one check:
+ *   1. Hash integrity — recompute keccak256(JCS(envelope minus signature)) and
+ *      verify it matches envelope.signature.hash.
+ *   2. Signature validity — recover the signer from (hash, sig) via secp256k1
+ *      ECDSA and verify it matches envelope.signature.signer.
+ *
+ * Both must pass for the check to pass.
+ */
+import type { CheckResult, ConformanceContext } from '../types.js';
+/**
+ * Check id: `envelope.hash-signature`
+ * Layer: 1
+ *
+ * Steps:
+ *   1. Strip `signature` from the envelope object.
+ *   2. Compute `keccak256(toBytes(canonicalJson(envelopeMinusSignature)))`.
+ *   3. Compare to `envelope.signature.hash` — fail if mismatch.
+ *   4. Call `recoverAddress({ hash, signature: sig })` — fail if throws or
+ *      recovered address does not match `envelope.signature.signer`.
+ */
+export declare function checkHashAndSignature(ctx: ConformanceContext): Promise<CheckResult>;

package/dist/conformance/checks/hash-signature.js

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/**
+ * Layer 1 envelope check: canonical hash + signature validity.
+ *
+ * Scope: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-04-23-jinn-execution-envelope-tee-scope.md §4.10.
+ *
+ * Two assertions combined into one check:
+ *   1. Hash integrity — recompute keccak256(JCS(envelope minus signature)) and
+ *      verify it matches envelope.signature.hash.
+ *   2. Signature validity — recover the signer from (hash, sig) via secp256k1
+ *      ECDSA and verify it matches envelope.signature.signer.
+ *
+ * Both must pass for the check to pass.
+ */
+import { keccak256, toBytes, recoverAddress } from 'viem';
+import { canonicalJson } from '../../restorer/engine/canonical-json.js';
+/**
+ * Check id: `envelope.hash-signature`
+ * Layer: 1
+ *
+ * Steps:
+ *   1. Strip `signature` from the envelope object.
+ *   2. Compute `keccak256(toBytes(canonicalJson(envelopeMinusSignature)))`.
+ *   3. Compare to `envelope.signature.hash` — fail if mismatch.
+ *   4. Call `recoverAddress({ hash, signature: sig })` — fail if throws or
+ *      recovered address does not match `envelope.signature.signer`.
+ */
+export async function checkHashAndSignature(ctx) {
+    const id = 'envelope.hash-signature';
+    const layer = 1;
+    if (!ctx.envelope) {
+        return { id, layer, passed: false, detail: 'envelope not loaded' };
+    }
+    const { signature, ...unsigned } = ctx.envelope;
+    // Step 1: Recompute hash over the unsigned fields (JCS → keccak256).
+    const recomputed = keccak256(toBytes(canonicalJson(unsigned)));
+    // Step 2: Verify the stored hash matches the recomputed hash.
+    if (recomputed.toLowerCase() !== signature.hash.toLowerCase()) {
+        return {
+            id,
+            layer,
+            passed: false,
+            detail: `signature.hash ${signature.hash} does not match keccak256(JCS(envelope-signature))=${recomputed}`,
+        };
+    }
+    // Step 3: Recover signer from (hash, sig) and compare to declared signer.
+    try {
+        const recovered = await recoverAddress({
+            hash: signature.hash,
+            signature: signature.sig,
+        });
+        if (recovered.toLowerCase() !== signature.signer.toLowerCase()) {
+            return {
+                id,
+                layer,
+                passed: false,
+                detail: `recovered signer ${recovered} does not match declared signer ${signature.signer}`,
+            };
+        }
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        return {
+            id,
+            layer,
+            passed: false,
+            detail: `signature recovery failed: ${err.message}`,
+        };
+    }
+    return { id, layer, passed: true };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=hash-signature.js.map

package/dist/conformance/checks/hash-signature.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/conformance/checks/payload.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/**
+ * Layer 1 envelope check: payload validity.
+ *
+ * Scope: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-04-23-jinn-execution-envelope-tee-scope.md §4.10.
+ *
+ * Validates the envelope payload against the KIND_PAYLOADS registry using
+ * `validatePayload(kind, role, payload)`. The payload must conform to the
+ * schema registered for the (kind, role) pair in the payload registry.
+ */
+import type { CheckResult, ConformanceContext } from '../types.js';
+/**
+ * Check id: `envelope.payload`
+ * Layer: 1
+ *
+ * Uses `KIND_PAYLOADS[kind][role].safeParse(envelope.payload)`.
+ * Returns pass if valid, fail with a human-readable issue summary on error.
+ * Fails immediately if kind is not in the registry or role has no schema.
+ */
+export declare function checkPayload(ctx: ConformanceContext): CheckResult;

package/dist/conformance/checks/payload.js

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/**
+ * Layer 1 envelope check: payload validity.
+ *
+ * Scope: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-04-23-jinn-execution-envelope-tee-scope.md §4.10.
+ *
+ * Validates the envelope payload against the KIND_PAYLOADS registry using
+ * `validatePayload(kind, role, payload)`. The payload must conform to the
+ * schema registered for the (kind, role) pair in the payload registry.
+ */
+import { KIND_PAYLOADS } from '../../types/payloads/index.js';
+/**
+ * Check id: `envelope.payload`
+ * Layer: 1
+ *
+ * Uses `KIND_PAYLOADS[kind][role].safeParse(envelope.payload)`.
+ * Returns pass if valid, fail with a human-readable issue summary on error.
+ * Fails immediately if kind is not in the registry or role has no schema.
+ */
+export function checkPayload(ctx) {
+    const id = 'envelope.payload';
+    const layer = 1;
+    if (!ctx.envelope) {
+        return { id, layer, passed: false, detail: 'envelope not loaded' };
+    }
+    const env = ctx.envelope;
+    const bucket = KIND_PAYLOADS[env.kind];
+    if (!bucket) {
+        return { id, layer, passed: false, detail: `unknown kind: ${env.kind}` };
+    }
+    const schema = bucket[env.role];
+    if (!schema) {
+        return {
+            id,
+            layer,
+            passed: false,
+            detail: `no payload schema for (${env.kind}, ${env.role})`,
+        };
+    }
+    const result = schema.safeParse(env.payload);
+    if (result.success) {
+        return { id, layer, passed: true };
+    }
+    return {
+        id,
+        layer,
+        passed: false,
+        detail: result.error.issues
+            .map((i) => `${i.path.join('.')}: ${i.message}`)
+            .join('; '),
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=payload.js.map

package/dist/conformance/checks/payload.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"payload.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/conformance/checks/payload.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;GAQG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,+BAA+B,CAAC;AAG9D;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,CAAC,GAAuB;IAClD,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC;IAC9B,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,CAAU,CAAC;IAEzB,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;QAClB,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,CAAC;IACrE,CAAC;IAED,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;IACzB,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,aAAa,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IACvC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QACZ,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,iBAAiB,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;IAC3E,CAAC;IAED,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAChC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QACZ,OAAO;YACL,EAAE;YACF,KAAK;YACL,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK;YACb,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG;SAC3D,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IAED,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IAC7C,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QACnB,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;IACrC,CAAC;IAED,OAAO;QACL,EAAE;QACF,KAAK;QACL,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK;QACb,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM;aACxB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;aAC/C,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;KACd,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC"}

package/dist/conformance/checks/secret-scrub.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/**
+ * Layer 1 V1 minimum secret-scrub compliance.
+ *
+ * Scope: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-04-23-jinn-execution-envelope-tee-scope.md §4.3.
+ *
+ * For every span attribute (and event attribute) whose NAME matches a sensitive
+ * pattern (*.authorization, *.apiKey, *.bearer, *.password, *.secret, *.token,
+ * *.privateKey), the VALUE must NOT match well-known raw credential patterns:
+ *   - Bearer/JWT tokens (eyJ... or "Bearer ..." headers)
+ *   - Anthropic API keys (sk-ant-...)
+ *   - OpenAI API keys (sk-...)
+ *   - Raw 64-hex private keys (0x[0-9a-f]{64}) — gated to *.privateKey attrs only
+ *
+ * Properly scrubbed values (<redacted:name> markers) and empty strings pass.
+ * This is a V1-minimum safety net, not a full IP-protection gating layer.
+ *
+ * Skipped when no trajectory is present.
+ */
+import type { CheckResult, ConformanceContext } from '../types.js';
+/**
+ * Check id: `secret-scrub.compliance`
+ * Layer: 1
+ *
+ * Walks every span's attributes AND every span event's attributes. For keys
+ * whose name matches a sensitive pattern (via `isSecretKey`), verifies that
+ * the value is either:
+ *   - a redaction marker (<redacted:...>), or
+ *   - an empty string, or
+ *   - does NOT match any well-known raw credential pattern.
+ *
+ * Reports up to 5 failures per run to bound message length.
+ */
+export declare function checkSecretScrub(ctx: ConformanceContext): CheckResult;

package/dist/conformance/checks/secret-scrub.js

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/**
+ * Layer 1 V1 minimum secret-scrub compliance.
+ *
+ * Scope: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-04-23-jinn-execution-envelope-tee-scope.md §4.3.
+ *
+ * For every span attribute (and event attribute) whose NAME matches a sensitive
+ * pattern (*.authorization, *.apiKey, *.bearer, *.password, *.secret, *.token,
+ * *.privateKey), the VALUE must NOT match well-known raw credential patterns:
+ *   - Bearer/JWT tokens (eyJ... or "Bearer ..." headers)
+ *   - Anthropic API keys (sk-ant-...)
+ *   - OpenAI API keys (sk-...)
+ *   - Raw 64-hex private keys (0x[0-9a-f]{64}) — gated to *.privateKey attrs only
+ *
+ * Properly scrubbed values (<redacted:name> markers) and empty strings pass.
+ * This is a V1-minimum safety net, not a full IP-protection gating layer.
+ *
+ * Skipped when no trajectory is present.
+ */
+import { isSecretKey } from '../../trajectory/secret-scrub.js';
+// ─── Credential pattern matchers ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+const REDACTED_MARKER = /^<redacted:[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+>$/;
+/**
+ * Patterns that indicate a raw credential leaked through.
+ * The privateKey-only pattern is tagged so we can gate it per attribute.
+ */
+const CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS = [
+    { pattern: /^Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._\-]{10,}/i, privateKeyOnly: false },
+    { pattern: /^sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{20,}/, privateKeyOnly: false },
+    { pattern: /^sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/, privateKeyOnly: false },
+    { pattern: /^eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]+$/, privateKeyOnly: false }, // JWT
+    { pattern: /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/, privateKeyOnly: true }, // raw hex private key
+];
+function looksLikeRawCredential(attrName, value) {
+    if (value === '' || value == null)
+        return false;
+    if (REDACTED_MARKER.test(value))
+        return false;
+    const lowerKey = attrName.toLowerCase();
+    const isPrivateKey = lowerKey.endsWith('.privatekey') ||
+        lowerKey.endsWith('.private_key') ||
+        lowerKey.endsWith('.private-key') ||
+        lowerKey === 'privatekey' ||
+        lowerKey === 'private_key' ||
+        lowerKey === 'private-key';
+    for (const { pattern, privateKeyOnly } of CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS) {
+        if (privateKeyOnly && !isPrivateKey)
+            continue;
+        if (pattern.test(value))
+            return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+/**
+ * Check id: `secret-scrub.compliance`
+ * Layer: 1
+ *
+ * Walks every span's attributes AND every span event's attributes. For keys
+ * whose name matches a sensitive pattern (via `isSecretKey`), verifies that
+ * the value is either:
+ *   - a redaction marker (<redacted:...>), or
+ *   - an empty string, or
+ *   - does NOT match any well-known raw credential pattern.
+ *
+ * Reports up to 5 failures per run to bound message length.
+ */
+export function checkSecretScrub(ctx) {
+    const id = 'secret-scrub.compliance';
+    const layer = 1;
+    const traj = ctx.trajectory;
+    if (!traj) {
+        return { id, layer, passed: true, skipped: true };
+    }
+    const failures = [];
+    for (const span of traj.spans) {
+        // Walk span attributes
+        for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(span.attributes)) {
+            if (!isSecretKey(key))
+                continue;
+            if (typeof value !== 'string')
+                continue;
+            if (looksLikeRawCredential(key, value)) {
+                failures.push(`span ${span.spanId} attr "${key}" appears to contain a raw credential`);
+                if (failures.length >= 5)
+                    break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (failures.length >= 5)
+            break;
+        // Walk event attributes — span events can carry secret-keyed attributes
+        // (e.g. an MCP event with an authorization field).
+        for (const event of span.events ?? []) {
+            for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(event.attributes ?? {})) {
+                if (!isSecretKey(key))
+                    continue;
+                if (typeof value !== 'string')
+                    continue;
+                if (looksLikeRawCredential(key, value)) {
+                    failures.push(`span ${span.spanId} event attr "${key}" appears to contain a raw credential`);
+                    if (failures.length >= 5)
+                        break;
+                }
+            }
+            if (failures.length >= 5)
+                break;
+        }
+        if (failures.length >= 5)
+            break;
+    }
+    if (failures.length === 0)
+        return { id, layer, passed: true };
+    return {
+        id,
+        layer,
+        passed: false,
+        detail: failures.join('; '),
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=secret-scrub.js.map

package/dist/conformance/checks/secret-scrub.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/conformance/checks/source-runtime.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/**
+ * Layer 2 — runtime conformance stubs.
+ *
+ * Scope: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-04-23-jinn-execution-envelope-tee-scope.md
+ * §3.2 traced-I/O boundary + §4.10 (V2 TEE integration plug-in points).
+ *
+ * V1 does not implement runtime enforcement (that requires a TEE sandbox with
+ * seccomp-bpf, Linux namespaces, and TLS transcript capture). These stubs
+ * return `skipped: true` in V1 so operators can see the full attested-tier
+ * picture in the ConformanceReport without needing a V2 runtime.
+ *
+ * When V2 ships, replace each stub body with a real implementation that reads
+ * the executor runtime manifest, queries the TEE attestation quote, and
+ * verifies the captured TLS transcripts. See Plan V2 for the full spec.
+ */
+import type { CheckResult, ConformanceContext } from '../types.js';
+/**
+ * Check id: `runtime.seccomp`
+ * Layer: 2
+ *
+ * V1 stub — always skipped. V2 will verify that the executor's seccomp-bpf
+ * policy matches the reference policy in the TEE attestation manifest,
+ * confirming that only the declared system-call surface is available.
+ */
+export declare function checkSeccompPolicy(_ctx: ConformanceContext): CheckResult;
+/**
+ * Check id: `runtime.namespace`
+ * Layer: 2
+ *
+ * V1 stub — always skipped. V2 will verify that the executor runs inside a
+ * Linux user namespace / network namespace policy that matches the declared
+ * TEE isolation profile (no unexpected network interfaces, bind-mounts, etc.).
+ */
+export declare function checkNamespacePolicy(_ctx: ConformanceContext): CheckResult;
+/**
+ * Check id: `runtime.tls-transcript`
+ * Layer: 2
+ *
+ * V1 stub — always skipped. V2 will verify that the captured TLS transcripts
+ * (BoringSSL SSLKEYLOGFILE or eBPF tap) cover all outbound connections and
+ * that every connection's SNI appears in the declared egress allowlist.
+ */
+export declare function checkTlsTranscriptCapture(_ctx: ConformanceContext): CheckResult;

package/dist/conformance/checks/source-runtime.js

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/**
+ * Layer 2 — runtime conformance stubs.
+ *
+ * Scope: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-04-23-jinn-execution-envelope-tee-scope.md
+ * §3.2 traced-I/O boundary + §4.10 (V2 TEE integration plug-in points).
+ *
+ * V1 does not implement runtime enforcement (that requires a TEE sandbox with
+ * seccomp-bpf, Linux namespaces, and TLS transcript capture). These stubs
+ * return `skipped: true` in V1 so operators can see the full attested-tier
+ * picture in the ConformanceReport without needing a V2 runtime.
+ *
+ * When V2 ships, replace each stub body with a real implementation that reads
+ * the executor runtime manifest, queries the TEE attestation quote, and
+ * verifies the captured TLS transcripts. See Plan V2 for the full spec.
+ */
+const V2_NOTE = 'V2 TEE integration plug-in point — see Plan V2';
+/**
+ * Check id: `runtime.seccomp`
+ * Layer: 2
+ *
+ * V1 stub — always skipped. V2 will verify that the executor's seccomp-bpf
+ * policy matches the reference policy in the TEE attestation manifest,
+ * confirming that only the declared system-call surface is available.
+ */
+export function checkSeccompPolicy(_ctx) {
+    return {
+        id: 'runtime.seccomp',
+        layer: 2,
+        passed: true,
+        skipped: true,
+        detail: V2_NOTE,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Check id: `runtime.namespace`
+ * Layer: 2
+ *
+ * V1 stub — always skipped. V2 will verify that the executor runs inside a
+ * Linux user namespace / network namespace policy that matches the declared
+ * TEE isolation profile (no unexpected network interfaces, bind-mounts, etc.).
+ */
+export function checkNamespacePolicy(_ctx) {
+    return {
+        id: 'runtime.namespace',
+        layer: 2,
+        passed: true,
+        skipped: true,
+        detail: V2_NOTE,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Check id: `runtime.tls-transcript`
+ * Layer: 2
+ *
+ * V1 stub — always skipped. V2 will verify that the captured TLS transcripts
+ * (BoringSSL SSLKEYLOGFILE or eBPF tap) cover all outbound connections and
+ * that every connection's SNI appears in the declared egress allowlist.
+ */
+export function checkTlsTranscriptCapture(_ctx) {
+    return {
+        id: 'runtime.tls-transcript',
+        layer: 2,
+        passed: true,
+        skipped: true,
+        detail: V2_NOTE,
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=source-runtime.js.map

package/dist/conformance/checks/source-runtime.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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