@jini-ai/agent-plugins 0.4.6 → 0.4.8

package/dist/admin-surfaces/sandbox.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/**
+ * @file The isolation contract a host applies when it renders and serves an admin surface: the
+ * iframe attributes, the Content-Security-Policy and headers for each served surface file, the mount
+ * nonce, and the short-lived, never-cached bootstrap envelope.
+ *
+ * Why these are pure helpers instead of host code: every host must apply the SAME strict values, and
+ * the values are the security boundary (no same-origin, no inline script, no direct network access
+ * unless the descriptor declared and validation accepted an https origin). Hosts call these and only
+ * choose routes.
+ */
+import type { AdminSurfaceDescriptor } from './descriptor.js';
+import { type AdminSurfaceBootstrap } from './protocol.js';
+/**
+ * The attributes for the `<iframe>` that renders a surface. `sandbox` is exactly `allow-scripts`:
+ * the frame gets an opaque origin, so it cannot read the host's cookies, storage or DOM.
+ * @complexity O(1).
+ */
+export declare function adminSurfaceFrameAttributes(required: {
+    readonly src: string;
+    readonly title: string;
+}, _optional?: Record<string, never>): {
+    readonly src: string;
+    readonly title: string;
+    readonly sandbox: "allow-scripts";
+    readonly referrerPolicy: "no-referrer";
+};
+/**
+ * The CSP for every file of one surface. Starts from `default-src 'none'`; scripts, styles, images
+ * and fonts may come from the surface's own files; `connect-src` and `frame-src` are closed unless the
+ * descriptor declared validated https origins. The `sandbox` directive keeps the document sandboxed
+ * even when opened directly rather than through the host's iframe.
+ * @complexity O(c) declared CSP sources.
+ */
+export declare function adminSurfaceContentSecurityPolicy(required: {
+    readonly descriptor: Pick<AdminSurfaceDescriptor, 'csp'>;
+}, _optional?: Record<string, never>): string;
+/**
+ * Response headers for one served surface file. Script files carry `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`
+ * because a module script requested by an opaque-origin document is a cross-origin CORS fetch; the
+ * files are static plugin code fetched without credentials, so they must never contain secrets.
+ * @complexity O(c) declared CSP sources.
+ */
+export declare function adminSurfaceFileHeaders(required: {
+    readonly descriptor: Pick<AdminSurfaceDescriptor, 'csp'>;
+    readonly path: string;
+}, _optional?: Record<string, never>): Readonly<Record<string, string>>;
+/** One rendered surface: the nonce its messages must echo (they must also come from origin "null").
+ * @complexity O(1). */
+export declare function createAdminSurfaceMount(required: {
+    readonly surfaceId: string;
+}, optional?: {
+    readonly randomBytes?: (input: {
+        readonly length: number;
+    }) => Uint8Array;
+}): {
+    surfaceId: string;
+    mountId: string;
+};
+/**
+ * The envelope a host server returns for one surface render. Its lifetime is fixed at
+ * {@link BOOTSTRAP_TTL_MS}, not caller-chosen: bootstrap data may include a short-lived access token.
+ * @complexity O(1).
+ */
+export declare function createAdminSurfaceBootstrap<D>(required: {
+    readonly surfaceId: string;
+    readonly data: D;
+    readonly nowMs: number;
+}, _optional?: Record<string, never>): AdminSurfaceBootstrap<D>;
+/** Headers for the bootstrap response: never stored by the browser or any intermediary cache.
+ * @complexity O(1). */
+export declare function adminSurfaceBootstrapHeaders(_required?: Record<string, never>, _optional?: Record<string, never>): Readonly<Record<string, string>>;
+/** True while the bootstrap may still be used.
+ * @complexity O(1). */
+export declare function isAdminSurfaceBootstrapCurrent(required: {
+    readonly bootstrap: Pick<AdminSurfaceBootstrap, 'expiresAt'>;
+    readonly nowMs: number;
+}, _optional?: Record<string, never>): boolean;
+//# sourceMappingURL=sandbox.d.ts.map

package/dist/admin-surfaces/sandbox.js

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+import { ADMIN_SURFACE_SANDBOX } from './protocol.js';
+/** Bootstrap data is meant to live for one render: one minute, fixed so no host can lengthen it. */
+const BOOTSTRAP_TTL_MS = 60_000;
+const CONTENT_TYPES = {
+    html: 'text/html; charset=utf-8',
+    mjs: 'text/javascript; charset=utf-8',
+    js: 'text/javascript; charset=utf-8',
+    css: 'text/css; charset=utf-8',
+    json: 'application/json; charset=utf-8',
+};
+/**
+ * The attributes for the `<iframe>` that renders a surface. `sandbox` is exactly `allow-scripts`:
+ * the frame gets an opaque origin, so it cannot read the host's cookies, storage or DOM.
+ * @complexity O(1).
+ */
+export function adminSurfaceFrameAttributes(required, _optional = {}) {
+    return { src: required.src, title: required.title, sandbox: ADMIN_SURFACE_SANDBOX, referrerPolicy: 'no-referrer' };
+}
+/**
+ * The CSP for every file of one surface. Starts from `default-src 'none'`; scripts, styles, images
+ * and fonts may come from the surface's own files; `connect-src` and `frame-src` are closed unless the
+ * descriptor declared validated https origins. The `sandbox` directive keeps the document sandboxed
+ * even when opened directly rather than through the host's iframe.
+ * @complexity O(c) declared CSP sources.
+ */
+export function adminSurfaceContentSecurityPolicy(required, _optional = {}) {
+    const extra = (directive) => required.descriptor.csp[directive] ?? [];
+    const own = (directive) => [`'self'`, ...extra(directive)].join(' ');
+    const closed = (directive) => (extra(directive).length ? extra(directive).join(' ') : `'none'`);
+    return [
+        `default-src 'none'`,
+        `script-src ${own('script-src')}`,
+        `style-src ${own('style-src')}`,
+        `img-src ${own('img-src')}`,
+        `font-src ${own('font-src')}`,
+        `connect-src ${closed('connect-src')}`,
+        `frame-src ${closed('frame-src')}`,
+        `form-action 'none'`,
+        `base-uri 'none'`,
+        `frame-ancestors 'self'`,
+        `sandbox ${ADMIN_SURFACE_SANDBOX}`,
+    ].join('; ');
+}
+/**
+ * Response headers for one served surface file. Script files carry `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`
+ * because a module script requested by an opaque-origin document is a cross-origin CORS fetch; the
+ * files are static plugin code fetched without credentials, so they must never contain secrets.
+ * @complexity O(c) declared CSP sources.
+ */
+export function adminSurfaceFileHeaders(required, _optional = {}) {
+    const extension = required.path.slice(required.path.lastIndexOf('.') + 1);
+    const script = extension === 'mjs' || extension === 'js';
+    return {
+        'Content-Type': CONTENT_TYPES[extension] ?? 'application/octet-stream',
+        'Content-Security-Policy': adminSurfaceContentSecurityPolicy({ descriptor: required.descriptor }),
+        'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff',
+        'Referrer-Policy': 'no-referrer',
+        'Cache-Control': 'no-cache',
+        ...(script ? { 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': '*' } : {}),
+    };
+}
+/** One rendered surface: the nonce its messages must echo (they must also come from origin "null").
+ * @complexity O(1). */
+export function createAdminSurfaceMount(required, optional = {}) {
+    const randomBytes = optional.randomBytes ?? (({ length }) => globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(length)));
+    const mountId = Array.from(randomBytes({ length: 16 }), (byte) => byte.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+    return { surfaceId: required.surfaceId, mountId };
+}
+/**
+ * The envelope a host server returns for one surface render. Its lifetime is fixed at
+ * {@link BOOTSTRAP_TTL_MS}, not caller-chosen: bootstrap data may include a short-lived access token.
+ * @complexity O(1).
+ */
+export function createAdminSurfaceBootstrap(required, _optional = {}) {
+    return { surfaceId: required.surfaceId, issuedAt: required.nowMs, expiresAt: required.nowMs + BOOTSTRAP_TTL_MS, data: required.data };
+}
+/** Headers for the bootstrap response: never stored by the browser or any intermediary cache.
+ * @complexity O(1). */
+export function adminSurfaceBootstrapHeaders(_required = {}, _optional = {}) {
+    return {
+        'Content-Type': 'application/json; charset=utf-8',
+        'Cache-Control': 'no-store',
+        Pragma: 'no-cache',
+        'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff',
+    };
+}
+/** True while the bootstrap may still be used.
+ * @complexity O(1). */
+export function isAdminSurfaceBootstrapCurrent(required, _optional = {}) {
+    return required.nowMs < required.bootstrap.expiresAt;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=sandbox.js.map

package/dist/admin-surfaces/settings-value.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/**
+ * @file The one check every plugin-written settings value passes before a host stores it: plugin
+ * state (`./surface-capabilities.ts`) and a delivery binding's config (`./delivery-bindings.ts`).
+ *
+ * Why it is shared: both are plugin-chosen JSON the host persists and later hands back (to the
+ * plugin's tools, or to the delivery adapter), so both need the same guarantees — plain JSON only,
+ * bounded depth and size, and never a token the plugin obtained — and must not drift apart.
+ */
+import { type AgentPluginCapabilityGate, type AgentPluginStateValue } from '../lifecycle/tools/capabilities.js';
+export declare const ADMIN_SURFACE_STATE_LIMITS: Readonly<{
+    maxKeyLength: 128;
+    maxValueBytes: number;
+    maxDepth: 16;
+}>;
+export declare const STATE_CREDENTIAL_MESSAGE = "The plugin tried to save a connection credential in its settings; nothing was saved.";
+/**
+ * The value the host stores: serialized once, scanned and size-checked on that text, then parsed
+ * back, so what is stored is exactly what was checked (the plugin cannot change it afterwards).
+ * @param required.gate - The call's capability gate (its token memory drives the scan).
+ * @param required.value - The plugin's value, unchecked.
+ * @throws Error when the value is not plain JSON, is too large, or mentions an obtained token.
+ * @complexity O(n) in the serialized size.
+ */
+export declare function storedStateValue(required: {
+    readonly gate: AgentPluginCapabilityGate;
+    readonly value: unknown;
+}, _optional?: Record<string, never>): AgentPluginStateValue;
+//# sourceMappingURL=settings-value.d.ts.map

package/dist/admin-surfaces/settings-value.js

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/**
+ * @file The one check every plugin-written settings value passes before a host stores it: plugin
+ * state (`./surface-capabilities.ts`) and a delivery binding's config (`./delivery-bindings.ts`).
+ *
+ * Why it is shared: both are plugin-chosen JSON the host persists and later hands back (to the
+ * plugin's tools, or to the delivery adapter), so both need the same guarantees — plain JSON only,
+ * bounded depth and size, and never a token the plugin obtained — and must not drift apart.
+ */
+import { PLUGIN_STATE_MAX_KEY_LENGTH } from '../lifecycle/tools/capabilities.js';
+export const ADMIN_SURFACE_STATE_LIMITS = Object.freeze({ maxKeyLength: PLUGIN_STATE_MAX_KEY_LENGTH, maxValueBytes: 16 * 1024, maxDepth: 16 });
+export const STATE_CREDENTIAL_MESSAGE = 'The plugin tried to save a connection credential in its settings; nothing was saved.';
+function isStateScalar(value) {
+    return value === null || typeof value === 'string' || typeof value === 'boolean' || (typeof value === 'number' && Number.isFinite(value));
+}
+/** True for plain JSON data only: no undefined, functions, NaN, class instances or deep nesting. @complexity O(n) nodes. */
+function isStateValue(value, depth) {
+    if (isStateScalar(value))
+        return true;
+    if (typeof value !== 'object' || depth >= ADMIN_SURFACE_STATE_LIMITS.maxDepth)
+        return false;
+    if (Array.isArray(value))
+        return value.every((item) => isStateValue(item, depth + 1));
+    const prototype = Object.getPrototypeOf(value);
+    return (prototype === Object.prototype || prototype === null) && Object.values(value).every((item) => isStateValue(item, depth + 1));
+}
+/**
+ * The value the host stores: serialized once, scanned and size-checked on that text, then parsed
+ * back, so what is stored is exactly what was checked (the plugin cannot change it afterwards).
+ * @param required.gate - The call's capability gate (its token memory drives the scan).
+ * @param required.value - The plugin's value, unchecked.
+ * @throws Error when the value is not plain JSON, is too large, or mentions an obtained token.
+ * @complexity O(n) in the serialized size.
+ */
+export function storedStateValue(required, _optional = {}) {
+    const { gate, value } = required;
+    if (!isStateValue(value, 0))
+        throw new Error('A settings value must be plain JSON data (no undefined, functions, NaN or class instances).');
+    const text = JSON.stringify(value);
+    if (new TextEncoder().encode(text).byteLength > ADMIN_SURFACE_STATE_LIMITS.maxValueBytes)
+        throw new Error(`A settings value may be at most ${ADMIN_SURFACE_STATE_LIMITS.maxValueBytes} bytes of JSON.`);
+    if (gate.mentionsToken({ value: text }))
+        throw new Error(STATE_CREDENTIAL_MESSAGE);
+    return JSON.parse(text);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=settings-value.js.map

package/dist/admin-surfaces/surface-capabilities.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+/**
+ * @file The host capability ports a plugin's admin-surface handlers receive, and the per-call
+ * session that wraps them. Jini defines the shapes and the checks; the host implements the ports
+ * (connections backed by its API-connection service, state by its own store, public config by its
+ * own settings) and Jini never names a provider.
+ *
+ * Why surfaces get more than tools: account actions (connect, reconnect, switch account, disconnect)
+ * and saving a chosen resource are admin actions a person takes on a settings screen, so they exist
+ * here and never on the executable-tool port. Why every check sits here and not only in the host:
+ * the surfaces file is the shipped, digest-checked allowlist, so the session refuses anything the
+ * surface did not declare (a connection, a start parameter, a callback field, a config name) before
+ * the host sees it, and a host that answers with more than the port promises (a connection ref, raw
+ * scopes, undeclared callback fields) is cut back to the declared shape. Like the tool session it
+ * revokes everything once the plugin is disabled and withholds results and errors that mention a
+ * token the plugin obtained (in this call, an earlier one, or one of its tools); it also refuses to persist
+ * such a token in plugin state.
+ */
+import { type AgentPluginStateReader, type AgentPluginStateValue, type AgentPluginToolCapabilities, type AgentPluginToolCapabilityScope, type IssuedTokenMemory } from '../lifecycle/tools/capabilities.js';
+import type { AdminSurfaceCapabilityDeclarations } from './capability-declarations.js';
+import { type AdminSurfaceDeliveryBindings } from './delivery-bindings.js';
+export { ADMIN_SURFACE_STATE_LIMITS, STATE_CREDENTIAL_MESSAGE } from './settings-value.js';
+/** Mirrors the API-connection lifecycle (`ApiConnectionStatus`); only `connected` serves access tokens. */
+export type AdminSurfaceConnectionState = 'connected' | 'reconnect-required' | 'revocation-pending' | 'disconnected';
+/**
+ * The API-connection start intent each account action maps to (`ApiConnectionIntent` in
+ * `@jini-ai/integrations/api-connections`, mirrored because agent-plugins does not depend on it), so a
+ * host passes `ADMIN_SURFACE_ACTION_INTENTS[action]` straight to `start`. `reconnect` and `add-scopes`
+ * are a same-account `connect` with the scope sets the handler passes (`add-scopes` re-consents for
+ * more of them); `switch` stages another account.
+ */
+export declare const ADMIN_SURFACE_ACTION_INTENTS: Readonly<{
+    readonly connect: "connect";
+    readonly reconnect: "connect";
+    readonly switch: "switch-account";
+    readonly 'add-scopes': "connect";
+}>;
+export type AdminSurfaceConnectionAction = keyof typeof ADMIN_SURFACE_ACTION_INTENTS;
+/**
+ * The honest remote outcome of a disconnect, the same values as `ApiConnectionRemoteRevocation`:
+ * never `confirmed` unless the provider confirmed it.
+ */
+export type AdminSurfaceRevocationOutcome = 'confirmed' | 'pending' | 'not-needed';
+/** Token-free status. Scope sets are the plugin's own ids, never raw provider scopes. */
+export interface AdminSurfaceConnectionStatus {
+    readonly connectionId: string;
+    readonly status: AdminSurfaceConnectionState;
+    readonly accountLabel: string | null;
+    readonly grantedScopeSetIds: readonly string[];
+    /** The account a staged switch would move to, awaiting `confirmSwitch`. */
+    readonly pendingSwitchAccountLabel: string | null;
+    /** Why the latest sign-in did not complete and what to do next, as the HOST's own lowercase
+     *  hyphenated codes (for example `access-denied` / `reconnect`), never provider text; `null` when
+     *  the latest attempt succeeded or none is recorded. A value that is not a safe code becomes `null`. */
+    readonly lastSignInAttempt: AdminSurfaceSignInAttempt | null;
+}
+/** The outcome codes of a sign-in attempt that did not complete. */
+export interface AdminSurfaceSignInAttempt {
+    readonly code: string;
+    readonly nextAction: string;
+}
+/** A sign-in the person opens (a button on hosted, the system browser on desktop). */
+export interface AdminSurfaceAuthorizationStart {
+    readonly authorizationUrl: string;
+    /** Opaque id for `takeCallbackFields` once the sign-in completed: the connection service's attempt
+     *  id, never the authorization `state`. */
+    readonly attemptId: string;
+    readonly expiresAt: string;
+}
+export interface AdminSurfaceConnections {
+    /** A fresh access token for one of the surface's declared connections; never a refresh token. */
+    getAccessToken(required: {
+        readonly connectionId: string;
+    }, optional?: Record<string, never>): Promise<string>;
+    status(required: {
+        readonly connectionId: string;
+    }, optional?: Record<string, never>): Promise<AdminSurfaceConnectionStatus>;
+    begin(required: {
+        readonly connectionId: string;
+        readonly action: AdminSurfaceConnectionAction;
+    }, optional?: {
+        readonly scopeSetIds?: readonly string[];
+        readonly startParams?: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;
+    }): Promise<AdminSurfaceAuthorizationStart>;
+    confirmSwitch(required: {
+        readonly connectionId: string;
+    }, optional?: Record<string, never>): Promise<AdminSurfaceConnectionStatus>;
+    cancelSwitch(required: {
+        readonly connectionId: string;
+    }, optional?: Record<string, never>): Promise<AdminSurfaceConnectionStatus>;
+    disconnect(required: {
+        readonly connectionId: string;
+    }, optional?: Record<string, never>): Promise<AdminSurfaceConnectionStatus & {
+        readonly revocation: AdminSurfaceRevocationOutcome;
+    }>;
+    /** The declared callback fields of a completed sign-in, once; `null` when absent, taken or not completed.
+     *  Still untrusted: verify them through the provider's API before saving anything. */
+    takeCallbackFields(required: {
+        readonly connectionId: string;
+        readonly attemptId: string;
+    }, optional?: Record<string, never>): Promise<Readonly<Record<string, string>> | null>;
+}
+export type AdminSurfaceStateValue = AgentPluginStateValue;
+/** Plugin- and workspace-scoped JSON values (the host keys them by the session's scope). The plugin's
+ *  tools read the same store through the read-only `AgentPluginStateReader`; only surfaces write. */
+export interface AdminSurfaceState extends AgentPluginStateReader {
+    set(required: {
+        readonly key: string;
+        readonly value: AdminSurfaceStateValue;
+    }, optional?: Record<string, never>): Promise<void>;
+    delete(required: {
+        readonly key: string;
+    }, optional?: Record<string, never>): Promise<void>;
+}
+/** Host-supplied public values (an app id, a browser key) for names the surface declares; `null` when unset. */
+export interface AdminSurfacePublicConfig {
+    get(required: {
+        readonly name: string;
+    }, optional?: Record<string, never>): Promise<string | null>;
+}
+/** Only form identity and display text, never fields, recipients or submission data. */
+export interface AdminSurfaceForm {
+    readonly slug: string;
+    readonly title: string;
+}
+/** Workspace-scoped discovery. The session returns at most 200 choices; titles are capped at 1024 characters. */
+export interface AdminSurfaceForms {
+    list(required: Record<string, never>, optional?: Record<string, never>): Promise<readonly AdminSurfaceForm[]>;
+}
+export type AdminSurfaceCapabilities = Pick<AgentPluginToolCapabilities, 'http' | 'limiter' | 'artifacts'> & {
+    readonly connections: AdminSurfaceConnections;
+    readonly state: AdminSurfaceState;
+    readonly publicConfig: AdminSurfacePublicConfig;
+    /** The workspace's form-delivery bindings (`./delivery-bindings.ts`). Optional for the host; a handler
+     *  gets it only when its surface declares `deliveryAdapters` and the host provides it. */
+    readonly deliveryBindings?: AdminSurfaceDeliveryBindings;
+    /** Absent unless both the host supplies it and this surface declares `forms: ["list"]`. */
+    readonly forms?: AdminSurfaceForms;
+};
+/** Host port: builds one call's capabilities for the loaded plugin, workspace and admin principal. */
+export type AdminSurfaceCapabilitiesPort = (required: AgentPluginToolCapabilityScope, optional?: Record<string, never>) => AdminSurfaceCapabilities;
+/**
+ * Opens the capability session for one admin-surface handler call.
+ * @param required.capabilities - The host's ports for this call (already scoped to plugin, workspace, principal).
+ * @param required.isLive - False once the plugin's surface handlers are revoked.
+ * @param required.declared - The surface's own capability declarations (the allowlists).
+ * @param required.issued - The plugin's token memory, shared by all its calls (tools included).
+ * @param optional.actorId - The signed-in admin; account actions are refused without one.
+ * @returns Wrapped capabilities plus the shared `release` (result) and `sanitize` (error) gates.
+ * @complexity O(1) to open; each check is bounded by the declared lists and the value caps.
+ */
+export declare function openAdminSurfaceCapabilitySession(required: {
+    readonly capabilities: AdminSurfaceCapabilities;
+    readonly isLive: () => boolean;
+    readonly declared: AdminSurfaceCapabilityDeclarations;
+    readonly issued: IssuedTokenMemory;
+}, optional?: {
+    readonly actorId?: string;
+}): {
+    capabilities: AdminSurfaceCapabilities;
+    release: <T>({ value }: {
+        readonly value: T;
+    }) => T;
+    sanitize: ({ error }: {
+        readonly error: unknown;
+    }) => unknown;
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=surface-capabilities.d.ts.map

package/dist/admin-surfaces/surface-capabilities.js

@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+/**
+ * @file The host capability ports a plugin's admin-surface handlers receive, and the per-call
+ * session that wraps them. Jini defines the shapes and the checks; the host implements the ports
+ * (connections backed by its API-connection service, state by its own store, public config by its
+ * own settings) and Jini never names a provider.
+ *
+ * Why surfaces get more than tools: account actions (connect, reconnect, switch account, disconnect)
+ * and saving a chosen resource are admin actions a person takes on a settings screen, so they exist
+ * here and never on the executable-tool port. Why every check sits here and not only in the host:
+ * the surfaces file is the shipped, digest-checked allowlist, so the session refuses anything the
+ * surface did not declare (a connection, a start parameter, a callback field, a config name) before
+ * the host sees it, and a host that answers with more than the port promises (a connection ref, raw
+ * scopes, undeclared callback fields) is cut back to the declared shape. Like the tool session it
+ * revokes everything once the plugin is disabled and withholds results and errors that mention a
+ * token the plugin obtained (in this call, an earlier one, or one of its tools); it also refuses to persist
+ * such a token in plugin state.
+ */
+import { checkedStateKey, guardSharedCapabilities, guardStateReader, openCapabilityGate, } from '../lifecycle/tools/capabilities.js';
+import { guardDeliveryBindings } from './delivery-bindings.js';
+import { storedStateValue } from './settings-value.js';
+// Moved to `./settings-value.ts` so delivery-binding config shares the exact checks; re-exported so callers keep importing them here.
+export { ADMIN_SURFACE_STATE_LIMITS, STATE_CREDENTIAL_MESSAGE } from './settings-value.js';
+/**
+ * The API-connection start intent each account action maps to (`ApiConnectionIntent` in
+ * `@jini-ai/integrations/api-connections`, mirrored because agent-plugins does not depend on it), so a
+ * host passes `ADMIN_SURFACE_ACTION_INTENTS[action]` straight to `start`. `reconnect` and `add-scopes`
+ * are a same-account `connect` with the scope sets the handler passes (`add-scopes` re-consents for
+ * more of them); `switch` stages another account.
+ */
+export const ADMIN_SURFACE_ACTION_INTENTS = Object.freeze({
+    connect: 'connect', reconnect: 'connect', switch: 'switch-account', 'add-scopes': 'connect',
+});
+const ACTIONS = Object.keys(ADMIN_SURFACE_ACTION_INTENTS);
+const SCOPE_SET_ID_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}$/;
+const ATTEMPT_ID_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,128}$/;
+const MAX_SCOPE_SETS = 16;
+const MAX_START_PARAM_LENGTH = 2048;
+/** Names in messages come from plugin code: cut them so a message stays a message. */
+const named = (value) => String(value).slice(0, 64);
+const isRecord = (value) => typeof value === 'object' && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
+function declaredConnection(declared, connectionId) {
+    const found = declared.find((connection) => connection.id === connectionId);
+    if (found === undefined)
+        throw new Error(`This admin surface does not declare connection '${named(connectionId)}', so its handlers cannot use it. Declare it in the surface's connections.`);
+    return found;
+}
+/** A copy of the start parameters, every name declared for this connection and every value a bounded string. @complexity O(p). */
+function checkedStartParams(connection, startParams) {
+    if (!isRecord(startParams))
+        throw new Error('Start parameters must be an object of strings.');
+    for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(startParams)) {
+        if (!connection.startParams.includes(name))
+            throw new Error(`Start parameter '${named(name)}' is not declared for connection '${connection.id}' on this admin surface.`);
+        if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length > MAX_START_PARAM_LENGTH)
+            throw new Error(`Start parameter '${name}' must be a string of at most ${MAX_START_PARAM_LENGTH} characters.`);
+    }
+    return { ...startParams };
+}
+function checkedScopeSetIds(scopeSetIds) {
+    const valid = Array.isArray(scopeSetIds) && scopeSetIds.length <= MAX_SCOPE_SETS && scopeSetIds.every((id) => typeof id === 'string' && SCOPE_SET_ID_PATTERN.test(id));
+    if (!valid)
+        throw new Error(`Scope sets must be at most ${MAX_SCOPE_SETS} short ids.`);
+    return [...scopeSetIds];
+}
+/** The begin options the host receives: only the ones the handler passed, checked and copied. */
+function beginOptions(connection, optional = {}) {
+    return {
+        ...(optional.scopeSetIds !== undefined && { scopeSetIds: checkedScopeSetIds(optional.scopeSetIds) }),
+        ...(optional.startParams !== undefined && { startParams: checkedStartParams(connection, optional.startParams) }),
+    };
+}
+const SAFE_CODE_PATTERN = /^[a-z0-9]+(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*$/;
+const MAX_SAFE_CODE_LENGTH = 64;
+const isSafeCode = (value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.length <= MAX_SAFE_CODE_LENGTH && SAFE_CODE_PATTERN.test(value);
+/** Only `code` and `nextAction`, and only when both are safe codes: a host that forwarded provider
+ * text (an error description) by mistake must not put it in front of the person or the plugin. */
+function toSignInAttempt(attempt) {
+    if (typeof attempt !== 'object' || attempt === null)
+        return null;
+    const { code, nextAction } = attempt;
+    return isSafeCode(code) && isSafeCode(nextAction) ? { code, nextAction } : null;
+}
+/** The status shape the port promises, whatever else the host's object carried. */
+function toStatus(connectionId, status) {
+    return {
+        connectionId, status: status.status, accountLabel: status.accountLabel ?? null,
+        grantedScopeSetIds: [...status.grantedScopeSetIds], pendingSwitchAccountLabel: status.pendingSwitchAccountLabel ?? null,
+        lastSignInAttempt: toSignInAttempt(status.lastSignInAttempt),
+    };
+}
+/** Only this connection's declared callback fields, as strings; anything else the host returned is dropped. */
+function declaredCallbackFields(connection, fields) {
+    if (fields === null)
+        return null;
+    return Object.fromEntries(connection.callbackFields.filter((name) => typeof fields[name] === 'string').map((name) => [name, fields[name]]));
+}
+/** Account actions run for a person; a call without one (a background route) is refused. */
+function requireActor(actorId) {
+    if (actorId === undefined)
+        throw new Error('Account actions need a signed-in admin. Open the surface from an authenticated admin page and retry.');
+}
+/**
+ * A token is handed out (to a handler, and through bootstrap data to the frame) only for a signed-in
+ * admin: a route without one must not mint a bearer token a frame keeps until it expires. Disabling
+ * the plugin cannot recall a token already handed out; disconnecting revokes it at the provider.
+ */
+function requireTokenActor(actorId) {
+    if (actorId === undefined)
+        throw new Error('Connection access needs a signed-in admin. Open the surface from an authenticated admin page and retry.');
+}
+/** The read side: a token (noted for the scans) and token-free status. */
+function readConnections({ gate, host, declared, actorId }) {
+    return {
+        getAccessToken: gate.guard(async ({ connectionId }) => {
+            const { id } = declaredConnection(declared, connectionId);
+            requireTokenActor(actorId);
+            return gate.noteToken({ token: await host.getAccessToken({ connectionId: id }) });
+        }),
+        status: gate.guard(async ({ connectionId }) => {
+            const { id } = declaredConnection(declared, connectionId);
+            return toStatus(id, await host.status({ connectionId: id }));
+        }),
+        takeCallbackFields: gate.guard(async ({ connectionId, attemptId }) => {
+            const connection = declaredConnection(declared, connectionId);
+            if (typeof attemptId !== 'string' || !ATTEMPT_ID_PATTERN.test(attemptId))
+                throw new Error('The sign-in attempt id is not valid; start the sign-in again.');
+            return declaredCallbackFields(connection, await host.takeCallbackFields({ connectionId: connection.id, attemptId }));
+        }),
+    };
+}
+/** The account actions: declared connection, declared start parameters, a signed-in admin. */
+function actConnections({ gate, host, declared, actorId }) {
+    const forActor = (connectionId) => { requireActor(actorId); return declaredConnection(declared, connectionId); };
+    const statusAction = (run) => gate.guard(async ({ connectionId }) => {
+        const { id } = forActor(connectionId);
+        return toStatus(id, await run({ connectionId: id }));
+    });
+    return {
+        begin: gate.guard(async ({ connectionId, action }, optional) => {
+            const connection = forActor(connectionId);
+            if (!ACTIONS.includes(action))
+                throw new Error(`Account action '${named(action)}' is not one of ${ACTIONS.join(', ')}.`);
+            const started = await host.begin({ connectionId: connection.id, action }, beginOptions(connection, optional));
+            return { authorizationUrl: started.authorizationUrl, attemptId: started.attemptId, expiresAt: started.expiresAt };
+        }),
+        confirmSwitch: statusAction((input) => host.confirmSwitch(input)),
+        cancelSwitch: statusAction((input) => host.cancelSwitch(input)),
+        disconnect: gate.guard(async ({ connectionId }) => {
+            const { id } = forActor(connectionId);
+            const outcome = await host.disconnect({ connectionId: id });
+            return { ...toStatus(id, outcome), revocation: outcome.revocation };
+        }),
+    };
+}
+function guardState(gate, host) {
+    return Object.freeze({
+        ...guardStateReader({ gate, state: host }),
+        set: gate.guard(async ({ key, value }) => host.set({ key: checkedStateKey({ key }), value: storedStateValue({ gate, value }) })),
+        delete: gate.guard(({ key }) => host.delete({ key: checkedStateKey({ key }) })),
+    });
+}
+function guardPublicConfig(gate, host, declared) {
+    return Object.freeze({
+        get: gate.guard(async ({ name }) => {
+            if (!declared.includes(name))
+                throw new Error(`This admin surface does not declare public config '${named(name)}'. Declare it in the surface's publicConfig.`);
+            return host.get({ name });
+        }),
+    });
+}
+/** Read-only discovery shares revocation and actor checks with other surface-only ports. Unknown
+ * host fields never reach a handler; collection and string caps bound the disclosure.
+ * @complexity O(min(f, 200)) time/space for f host forms, one workspace read. */
+function guardForms(required, optional = {}) {
+    const { gate, host } = required;
+    return Object.freeze({
+        list: gate.guard(async (_input, _options = {}) => {
+            requireActor(optional.actorId);
+            const forms = await host.list({});
+            return forms.slice(0, 200).map(({ slug, title }) => {
+                if (typeof slug !== 'string' || slug.length === 0 || slug.length > 64 || typeof title !== 'string')
+                    throw new Error('The forms host returned an invalid form choice.');
+                return { slug, title: title.slice(0, 1024) };
+            });
+        }),
+    });
+}
+/**
+ * Opens the capability session for one admin-surface handler call.
+ * @param required.capabilities - The host's ports for this call (already scoped to plugin, workspace, principal).
+ * @param required.isLive - False once the plugin's surface handlers are revoked.
+ * @param required.declared - The surface's own capability declarations (the allowlists).
+ * @param required.issued - The plugin's token memory, shared by all its calls (tools included).
+ * @param optional.actorId - The signed-in admin; account actions are refused without one.
+ * @returns Wrapped capabilities plus the shared `release` (result) and `sanitize` (error) gates.
+ * @complexity O(1) to open; each check is bounded by the declared lists and the value caps.
+ */
+export function openAdminSurfaceCapabilitySession(required, optional = {}) {
+    const { capabilities: host, isLive, declared, issued } = required;
+    const gate = openCapabilityGate({ isLive, issued });
+    const input = { gate, host: host.connections, declared: declared.connections ?? [], actorId: optional.actorId };
+    const { deliveryAdapters } = declared;
+    const deliveryBindings = deliveryAdapters === undefined || host.deliveryBindings === undefined ? undefined
+        : guardDeliveryBindings({ gate, host: host.deliveryBindings, adapterIds: deliveryAdapters, connectionIds: input.declared.map((connection) => connection.id) }, { actorId: optional.actorId });
+    const capabilities = Object.freeze({
+        ...guardSharedCapabilities({ gate, host }),
+        connections: Object.freeze({ ...readConnections(input), ...actConnections(input) }),
+        state: guardState(gate, host.state),
+        publicConfig: guardPublicConfig(gate, host.publicConfig, declared.publicConfig ?? []),
+        ...(deliveryBindings && { deliveryBindings }),
+        ...(declared.forms?.includes('list') && host.forms !== undefined && { forms: guardForms({ gate, host: host.forms }, optional) }),
+    });
+    return { capabilities, release: gate.release, sanitize: gate.sanitize };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=surface-capabilities.js.map