@jidekaixin2dian/dsh-file-actions 0.1.11 → 0.1.13

package/SECURITY.md

@@ -1,28 +1,30 @@
-# Security
-
-File operations use the host's existing Session and WorkspaceFiles remotes. The
-plugin adds no command execution endpoint or filesystem permissions. File reads
-can include paths outside a workspace when the host's composed filesystem permits
-them; the workspace label is not a containment guarantee.
-
-Browser previews run in a sandboxed iframe with an opaque origin. Scripts and
-forms can run, but file content cannot access the enclosing DSH document, its
-cookies, or its opener. Relative resources beside a file are not served by a
-Blob URL. Opening the same file externally delegates trust to the chosen app.
-
-Versions through 0.1.5 opened active HTML/SVG directly at the DSH Blob origin.
-Preview isolation is included in release 0.1.7 and later. Historical release
-assets have not been replaced.
-
-Preferred applications are stored locally in the browser, by extension. Only
-application IDs are saved; a preference must match a currently returned Host
-association before it can be used. Preferences neither execute commands nor
-change OS file associations.
-
-Automated host tests serve only synthetic files on loopback. Optional full-Web
-drivers require a separate `DFA_HOME`; they do not copy personal profiles, and
-stop only a recorded launcher with matching creation time and command line.
-Launch URLs and files under `test-e2e/run/` are private, ignored test state.
-
-Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub where available. Do not include
-real file contents, cookies, API keys or authenticated launch URLs in an issue.
+# Security
+
+File operations use the host's existing Session and WorkspaceFiles remotes. The
+plugin adds no command execution endpoint or filesystem permissions. File reads
+can include paths outside a workspace when the host's composed filesystem permits
+them; the workspace label is not a containment guarantee. Copying the contents of
+a file outside the session workspace requires an explicit confirmation, because
+chat text can plant absolute paths; a declined copy reads no bytes.
+
+Browser previews run in a sandboxed iframe with an opaque origin. Scripts and
+forms can run, but file content cannot access the enclosing DSH document, its
+cookies, or its opener. Relative resources beside a file are not served by a
+Blob URL. Opening the same file externally delegates trust to the chosen app.
+
+Versions through 0.1.5 opened active HTML/SVG directly at the DSH Blob origin.
+Preview isolation is included in release 0.1.7 and later. Historical release
+assets have not been replaced.
+
+Preferred applications are stored locally in the browser, by extension. Only
+application IDs are saved; a preference must match a currently returned Host
+association before it can be used. Preferences neither execute commands nor
+change OS file associations.
+
+Automated host tests serve only synthetic files on loopback. Optional full-Web
+drivers require a separate `DFA_HOME`; they do not copy personal profiles, and
+stop only a recorded launcher with matching creation time and command line.
+Launch URLs and files under `test-e2e/run/` are private, ignored test state.
+
+Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub where available. Do not include
+real file contents, cookies, API keys or authenticated launch URLs in an issue.