@jbkjr/relay 0.0.0-stage → 1.2.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/LICENSE +21 -0
- package/LICENSES/Apache-2.0.txt +201 -0
- package/LICENSES/README.md +19 -0
- package/LICENSES/codex-NOTICE.txt +6 -0
- package/README.md +386 -2
- package/SECURITY.md +145 -0
- package/adapters/briefs/claude.md +43 -0
- package/adapters/briefs/codex.md +56 -0
- package/adapters/briefs/models.json +33 -0
- package/adapters/build.mjs +8 -0
- package/adapters/claude/.claude-plugin/marketplace.json +13 -0
- package/adapters/claude/relay/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +5 -0
- package/adapters/claude/relay/agents/codex.md +21 -0
- package/adapters/claude/relay/agents/operator.md +21 -0
- package/adapters/claude/relay/skills/ask/SKILL.md +20 -0
- package/adapters/claude/relay/skills/chat/SKILL.md +13 -0
- package/adapters/claude/relay/skills/delegate/SKILL.md +21 -0
- package/adapters/claude/relay/skills/discuss/SKILL.md +19 -0
- package/adapters/claude/relay/skills/review/SKILL.md +21 -0
- package/adapters/claude/relay/skills/tree/SKILL.md +10 -0
- package/adapters/claude/relay/skills/write-for-codex/SKILL.md +78 -0
- package/adapters/codex/.agents/plugins/marketplace.json +20 -0
- package/adapters/codex/AGENTS.snippet.md +5 -0
- package/adapters/codex/relay/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +6 -0
- package/adapters/codex/relay/skills/relay-ask/SKILL.md +20 -0
- package/adapters/codex/relay/skills/relay-chat/SKILL.md +13 -0
- package/adapters/codex/relay/skills/relay-delegate/SKILL.md +21 -0
- package/adapters/codex/relay/skills/relay-discuss/SKILL.md +19 -0
- package/adapters/codex/relay/skills/relay-review/SKILL.md +21 -0
- package/adapters/codex/relay/skills/relay-tree/SKILL.md +10 -0
- package/adapters/codex/relay/skills/relay-write-for-claude/SKILL.md +66 -0
- package/adapters/generate.mjs +124 -0
- package/bin/relay +59 -0
- package/codex-pin.json +12 -0
- package/dist/backends/acp.js +1424 -0
- package/dist/backends/claude.js +890 -0
- package/dist/backends/cli-version.js +112 -0
- package/dist/backends/codex-app.js +1525 -0
- package/dist/backends/codex-daybreak.js +75 -0
- package/dist/backends/codex-env.js +656 -0
- package/dist/backends/codex-network.js +304 -0
- package/dist/backends/codex-pin.js +320 -0
- package/dist/backends/codex-shell-policy.js +182 -0
- package/dist/backends/codex-stage2.js +998 -0
- package/dist/backends/codex-subagents.js +47 -0
- package/dist/backends/codex.js +637 -0
- package/dist/backends/copilot.js +246 -0
- package/dist/backends/env.js +147 -0
- package/dist/backends/gemini.js +607 -0
- package/dist/backends/grok.js +337 -0
- package/dist/backends/index.js +8 -0
- package/dist/backends/native-temp.js +187 -0
- package/dist/backends/never-admission.js +90 -0
- package/dist/backends/run.js +67 -0
- package/dist/backends/stream.js +230 -0
- package/dist/backends/tool-discovery.js +15 -0
- package/dist/backends/types.js +264 -0
- package/dist/build-info.json +5 -0
- package/dist/cli.js +344 -0
- package/dist/confine/bridge.js +113 -0
- package/dist/confine/broker-core.js +76 -0
- package/dist/confine/broker-http.js +650 -0
- package/dist/confine/broker-names.js +9 -0
- package/dist/confine/broker.js +258 -0
- package/dist/confine/canary.js +380 -0
- package/dist/confine/diagnostics.js +122 -0
- package/dist/confine/gemini-tools-main.js +8 -0
- package/dist/confine/gemini-tools.js +181 -0
- package/dist/confine/hardlinks.js +58 -0
- package/dist/confine/harness-config.js +16 -0
- package/dist/confine/index.js +117 -0
- package/dist/confine/leases.js +217 -0
- package/dist/confine/paths.js +6 -0
- package/dist/confine/peer.js +115 -0
- package/dist/confine/port-policy.js +8 -0
- package/dist/confine/ports.js +365 -0
- package/dist/confine/private-root.js +208 -0
- package/dist/confine/probe-stage2.js +501 -0
- package/dist/confine/probe.js +1109 -0
- package/dist/confine/proxy.js +783 -0
- package/dist/confine/sbcheck.js +208 -0
- package/dist/confine/seatbelt-never.js +41 -0
- package/dist/confine/seatbelt-stage2.js +139 -0
- package/dist/confine/seatbelt.js +1129 -0
- package/dist/confine/sockets.js +36 -0
- package/dist/confine/turn-probe.js +19 -0
- package/dist/confine/turn.js +86 -0
- package/dist/core/adoption.js +124 -0
- package/dist/core/api-keys.js +423 -0
- package/dist/core/approvals.js +740 -0
- package/dist/core/build-identity.js +248 -0
- package/dist/core/caller.js +749 -0
- package/dist/core/calls.js +102 -0
- package/dist/core/claude-settings.js +1045 -0
- package/dist/core/config.js +453 -0
- package/dist/core/context.js +186 -0
- package/dist/core/db.js +753 -0
- package/dist/core/dispatch.js +110 -0
- package/dist/core/env-broker.js +505 -0
- package/dist/core/env-policy.js +182 -0
- package/dist/core/escalation-authority.js +76 -0
- package/dist/core/escalation-contract.js +13 -0
- package/dist/core/escalation-person-path.js +131 -0
- package/dist/core/escalation-policy.js +79 -0
- package/dist/core/escalation-runtime.js +135 -0
- package/dist/core/escalation-state.js +42 -0
- package/dist/core/escalations.js +191 -0
- package/dist/core/events.js +235 -0
- package/dist/core/executables.js +147 -0
- package/dist/core/extensions.js +645 -0
- package/dist/core/families.js +204 -0
- package/dist/core/git.js +657 -0
- package/dist/core/identity.js +113 -0
- package/dist/core/liveness.js +68 -0
- package/dist/core/mediated-network-provider.js +81 -0
- package/dist/core/never-checkpoint.js +76 -0
- package/dist/core/never-coverage.js +97 -0
- package/dist/core/never-network.js +49 -0
- package/dist/core/never-policy.js +302 -0
- package/dist/core/never-proxy-policy.js +109 -0
- package/dist/core/never-schema.js +61 -0
- package/dist/core/never-tools.js +56 -0
- package/dist/core/notices.js +48 -0
- package/dist/core/ops.js +959 -0
- package/dist/core/outcome.js +224 -0
- package/dist/core/params.js +32 -0
- package/dist/core/presence.js +174 -0
- package/dist/core/procs.js +546 -0
- package/dist/core/prompts.js +363 -0
- package/dist/core/protected-config.js +238 -0
- package/dist/core/raw-network.js +192 -0
- package/dist/core/redact.js +152 -0
- package/dist/core/refusal.js +33 -0
- package/dist/core/relay-command.js +310 -0
- package/dist/core/reported.js +3 -0
- package/dist/core/restart-overlay.js +651 -0
- package/dist/core/retention.js +1135 -0
- package/dist/core/secrets.js +329 -0
- package/dist/core/session-token.js +175 -0
- package/dist/core/session.js +744 -0
- package/dist/core/shell.js +2 -0
- package/dist/core/shipped-pin.js +47 -0
- package/dist/core/shown.js +42 -0
- package/dist/core/slots.js +67 -0
- package/dist/core/stage2-executors.js +453 -0
- package/dist/core/stage2-switch.js +5 -0
- package/dist/core/steering.js +149 -0
- package/dist/core/storage.js +358 -0
- package/dist/core/toml.js +175 -0
- package/dist/core/views.js +324 -0
- package/dist/core/wait.js +114 -0
- package/dist/core/wake.js +207 -0
- package/dist/core/watch.js +247 -0
- package/dist/core/worktree.js +213 -0
- package/dist/hosts/claude-desktop.js +274 -0
- package/dist/hosts/claude.js +249 -0
- package/dist/hosts/codex.js +329 -0
- package/dist/hosts/desktop-shared.js +20 -0
- package/dist/hosts/index.js +11 -0
- package/dist/hosts/types.js +4 -0
- package/dist/install/basics.js +18 -0
- package/dist/install/claude-init.js +133 -0
- package/dist/install/common.js +655 -0
- package/dist/install/doctor.js +629 -0
- package/dist/install/qualify-codex.js +205 -0
- package/dist/install.js +524 -0
- package/dist/mcp/elicit.js +209 -0
- package/dist/mcp/gateway.js +218 -0
- package/dist/mcp/host.js +253 -0
- package/dist/mcp/server.js +1124 -0
- package/dist/mcp/stdio.js +37 -0
- package/dist/modes/discussion.js +393 -0
- package/dist/modes/review.js +722 -0
- package/dist/native/relay-sbcheck +0 -0
- package/dist/targets/briefs.js +86 -0
- package/dist/targets/claude.js +94 -0
- package/dist/targets/codex.js +66 -0
- package/dist/targets/copilot.js +93 -0
- package/dist/targets/gemini.js +119 -0
- package/dist/targets/grok.js +126 -0
- package/dist/targets/index.js +192 -0
- package/dist/targets/types.js +18 -0
- package/dist/targets/verified.js +35 -0
- package/dist/worker.js +113 -0
- package/docs/UPGRADING.md +1502 -0
- package/docs/pinned-codex.md +321 -0
- package/experiments/stage2-redteam/lib/oracles.mjs +214 -0
- package/experiments/stage2-redteam/lib/report.mjs +35 -0
- package/npm-shrinkwrap.json +1632 -0
- package/package.json +82 -4
- package/scripts/codex-qualify/codex-pin-store.mjs +353 -0
- package/scripts/codex-qualify/codex-qualifier-process.mjs +265 -0
- package/scripts/codex-qualify/codex-qualifier.example.json +5 -0
- package/scripts/codex-qualify/codex-qualifier.mjs +281 -0
- package/scripts/codex-qualify/codex-shipped-pin.mjs +158 -0
- package/scripts/codex-qualify/codex-stage2-pin.mjs +48 -0
- package/scripts/codex-qualify/codex-stage2.mjs +2381 -0
- package/scripts/codex-qualify/install-codex-qualifier.mjs +98 -0
- package/scripts/codex-qualify/main-module.mjs +14 -0
- package/scripts/codex-qualify/relay-codex-qualifier.plist +37 -0
- package/scripts/codex-qualify/scratch-env.mjs +31 -0
- package/scripts/codex-qualify/session.mjs +96 -0
- package/scripts/codex-qualify/stage2-escalation-cases.mjs +125 -0
- package/test/codex-permissions.test.ts +875 -0
- package/test/fixtures/boundary-probes.mjs +17 -0
- package/test/fixtures/denial-stream-host.mjs +7 -0
- package/test/fixtures/families.json +246 -0
- package/test/fixtures/install-snapshots/claude-desktop-foreign.txt +158 -0
- package/test/fixtures/install-snapshots/claude-desktop-fresh.txt +101 -0
- package/test/fixtures/install-snapshots/claude-desktop-installed.txt +161 -0
- package/test/fixtures/install-snapshots/claude-foreign.txt +133 -0
- package/test/fixtures/install-snapshots/claude-fresh.txt +77 -0
- package/test/fixtures/install-snapshots/claude-installed.txt +133 -0
- package/test/fixtures/install-snapshots/codex-foreign.txt +159 -0
- package/test/fixtures/install-snapshots/codex-fresh.txt +107 -0
- package/test/fixtures/install-snapshots/codex-installed.txt +161 -0
- package/test/fixtures/link-parent.mjs +6 -0
- package/test/fixtures/mediated-command.cjs +72 -0
- package/test/fixtures/native-skill-isolation.json +280 -0
- package/test/fixtures/pinned-codex-app-server.mjs +25 -0
- package/test/fixtures/qualified-ext-adapters.mjs +36 -0
- package/test/fixtures/refusals/README.md +52 -0
- package/test/fixtures/refusals/claude-source-result.json +7 -0
- package/test/fixtures/refusals/openai-app-capacity.json +24 -0
- package/test/fixtures/refusals/openai-app-cyberPolicy.json +24 -0
- package/test/fixtures/refusals/openai-gpt-6-astra-max.json +12 -0
- package/test/fixtures/refusals/openai-gpt-6.1-sol-xhigh.json +12 -0
- package/test/fixtures/refusals/openai-review-capacity.json +24 -0
- package/test/fixtures/relay-0.2.0.sql +57 -0
- package/test/fixtures/relay-0.9.1.gen.mjs +212 -0
- package/test/fixtures/relay-0.9.1.sql +340 -0
- package/test/fixtures/slow-boundary-probes.mjs +37 -0
- package/test/fixtures/stable-surfaces/config.json +1122 -0
- package/test/fixtures/stable-surfaces/escalation.json +128 -0
- package/test/fixtures/stable-surfaces/events.json +37 -0
- package/test/fixtures/stable-surfaces/gemini-native-resume.json +4 -0
- package/test/fixtures/stable-surfaces/inbox.jsonl +2 -0
- package/test/fixtures/stable-surfaces/notice.txt +1 -0
- package/test/fixtures/stable-surfaces/refusal-item.json +28 -0
- package/test/fixtures/stable-surfaces/refusal-review.json +23 -0
- package/test/fixtures/stable-surfaces/registry.json +49 -0
- package/test/fixtures/stable-surfaces/tools-desktop.json +575 -0
- package/test/fixtures/stable-surfaces/tools.json +716 -0
- package/test/fixtures/stable-surfaces/usage.txt +46 -0
- package/test/fixtures/stage2-acp-native.mjs +138 -0
- package/test/fixtures/stage2-app-server.mjs +23 -0
- package/test/fixtures/stage2-catalog.json +91 -0
- package/test/fixtures/stage2-hostile-web.mjs +35 -0
- package/test/fixtures/stage2-native-network.mjs +62 -0
- package/test/fixtures/stage2-worker.ts +87 -0
- package/test/fixtures/status-views/expected.json +7825 -0
- package/test/fixtures/status-views/registries.json +1 -0
- package/test/fixtures/steering.json +209 -0
- package/test/helpers.ts +740 -0
- package/test/host-env.ts +7 -0
- package/test/keychain-decoy.ts +197 -0
- package/test/live-scope.ts +44 -0
- package/test/mediated-network.test.ts +192 -0
- package/test/mediated-proxy.test.ts +264 -0
- package/test/native-temp-alias.ts +10 -0
- package/test/never-policy.test.ts +629 -0
- package/test/never-tools.test.ts +136 -0
- package/test/process-home.ts +18 -0
- package/test/proxy.test.ts +531 -0
- package/test/restart-overlay-live.test.ts +85 -0
- package/test/restart-overlay-profile.test.ts +66 -0
- package/test/restart-overlay.test.ts +416 -0
- package/test/stable-surfaces.test.ts +249 -0
- package/test/stage2-escalation-live.test.ts +544 -0
- package/test/stage2-escalation-qualification.test.ts +170 -0
- package/test/stage2-escalation.test.ts +747 -0
- package/test/stage2-executor.test.ts +849 -0
- package/test/stage2-grant.test.ts +603 -0
- package/test/stage2-native-live.test.ts +647 -0
- package/test/stage2-network-decisions.test.ts +70 -0
- package/test/stage2-probe.test.ts +845 -0
- package/test/stage2-standing-live.test.ts +203 -0
- package/test/stubs/broker-host.mjs +59 -0
- package/test/stubs/broker-peer.mjs +20 -0
- package/test/stubs/confined-harness.mjs +91 -0
- package/test/stubs/ext-broken-server.mjs +2 -0
- package/test/stubs/ext-odd-server.mjs +21 -0
- package/test/stubs/ext-server.mjs +31 -0
- package/test/stubs/fake-host-cli.mjs +218 -0
- package/test/stubs/procargs.mjs +30 -0
- package/test/stubs/stub-acp +4 -0
- package/test/stubs/stub-agent.mjs +322 -0
- package/test/stubs/stub-claude +4 -0
- package/test/stubs/stub-codex +4 -0
- package/test/stubs/targets/acp.mjs +307 -0
- package/test/stubs/targets/claude.mjs +149 -0
- package/test/stubs/targets/codex.mjs +479 -0
- package/test/stubs/targets/gemini.mjs +604 -0
- package/test/temp-root.ts +11 -0
- package/test/wp4-adapters.test.ts +353 -0
- package/test/wp4-interlock.test.ts +136 -0
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import crypto from "node:crypto";
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import fs from "node:fs";
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import net from "node:net";
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import os from "node:os";
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import path from "node:path";
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import { canonical, consultHome, expandHome, foldedPath, harnessHome, overlapsEntryAnyCase, relayHome, worktreesHome } from "./config.js";
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import { configProtection, relayWriteProtected } from "./protected-config.js";
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import { keyAuthority, keyPathsToDeny } from "./api-keys.js";
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import { hardLinksOutside } from "../confine/hardlinks.js";
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import { nativeTempAlias, nativeTempRoot, privateStateRoot } from "../confine/private-root.js";
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import { rangePorts } from "../confine/ports.js";
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import { HARNESS_CONFIG } from "../confine/harness-config.js";
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import { NEVER_RETIRED_BUILTIN_IDS, NEVER_VERSION, NeverConfigSchema, normalizeNeverHost } from "./never-schema.js";
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const stable = (v) => {
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return `[${v.map(stable).join(",")}]`;
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return `{${Object.entries(v).sort(([a], [b]) => a.localeCompare(b)).map(([k, x]) => `${JSON.stringify(k)}:${stable(x)}`).join(",")}}`;
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export const neverDigest = (v) => crypto.createHash("sha256").update(stable(v)).digest("hex");
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const unique = (items) => [...new Map(items.map(x => [stable(x), x])).entries()].sort(([a], [b]) => a.localeCompare(b)).map(([, x]) => x);
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/**
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* chosen, and macOS's own interfaces (awdl0, llw0) add them at any moment. They only ever add denies,
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* decide() rescreens against the current floor and proxies reject current local addresses themselves,
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* so a new one must not void a person's answer. A running proxy keeps the list it was launched with.
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export const neverPolicyHash = ({ hash: _hash, localAddresses: _observed, ...chosen }) => neverDigest(chosen);
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const finish = (p) => immutable({ ...p, hash: neverPolicyHash(p) });
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const within = (p, root) => p === root || p.startsWith(root.endsWith("/") ? root : `${root}/`);
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const folded = (p) => foldedPath(path.resolve(p));
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pins.push({ path: at, dev: st.dev, ino: st.ino, kind: st.mode & fs.constants.S_IFMT, ...(st.isSymbolicLink() ? { link: fs.readlinkSync(at) } : {}) });
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}
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throw err;
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}
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}
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const aliases = [...new Set([named, real])].sort();
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// Relay creates/recreates its state roots and short temp link during normal launch. Their
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const pins = id === "relay.authority" ? [] : aliases.flatMap(neverPathIdentity).filter(pin => !managedNames.has(pin.path));
|
|
67
|
+
return { id, path: named, access, aliases, pins: unique(pins), ...(what ? { what } : {}) };
|
|
68
|
+
}
|
|
69
|
+
/** Trusted supervisor inputs only. home/codexHome must never come from a launched job's env. */
|
|
70
|
+
export function resolveNeverPolicy(o) {
|
|
71
|
+
const cfg = NeverConfigSchema.parse(o.never ?? {});
|
|
72
|
+
const home = o.home ?? os.homedir();
|
|
73
|
+
const authorityRoots = o.builtins === false ? [] : unique([worktreesHome(), harnessHome(), consultHome(), privateStateRoot(), nativeTempRoot(), nativeTempAlias()].flatMap(p => [p, canonical(p)]));
|
|
74
|
+
const managedNames = new Set([...authorityRoots, relayHome(), canonical(relayHome())]);
|
|
75
|
+
const paths = [], ports = [];
|
|
76
|
+
// An override of a retired built-in removes nothing, so it is no removal (config load warns).
|
|
77
|
+
const removed = unique(cfg.override_builtin.filter(r => !NEVER_RETIRED_BUILTIN_IDS.includes(r.id)));
|
|
78
|
+
const enabled = (id) => !removed.some(r => r.id === id);
|
|
79
|
+
const add = (id, p, access = "all", what) => paths.push(pathEntry(id, p, access, home, managedNames, what));
|
|
80
|
+
if (o.builtins !== false) {
|
|
81
|
+
if (enabled("credentials.files")) {
|
|
82
|
+
for (const p of ["~/.ssh", "~/.aws", "~/.gnupg", "~/.netrc", "~/.codex/auth.json", "~/.claude/.credentials.json", "~/.claude/credentials.json", "~/.config/gh/hosts.yml", "~/.config/gcloud", "~/.gemini/oauth_creds.json", "~/.gemini/google_accounts.json", "~/.copilot", "~/.grok/auth.json", "~/.config/relay-keys"])
|
|
83
|
+
add("credentials.files", p);
|
|
84
|
+
const keys = keyAuthority();
|
|
85
|
+
if (keys.problem)
|
|
86
|
+
throw new Error(`never credentials.files cannot resolve configured key stores: ${keys.problem}`);
|
|
87
|
+
for (const p of keyPathsToDeny())
|
|
88
|
+
add("credentials.files", p);
|
|
89
|
+
}
|
|
90
|
+
if (enabled("credentials.relay-codex-home"))
|
|
91
|
+
for (const p of [path.join(home, ".local/share/relay-codex-home"), ...(o.codexHome ? [o.codexHome] : [])])
|
|
92
|
+
add("credentials.relay-codex-home", p);
|
|
93
|
+
if (enabled("credentials.keychain"))
|
|
94
|
+
for (const p of [path.join(home, "Library/Keychains"), "/Library/Keychains"])
|
|
95
|
+
add("credentials.keychain", p);
|
|
96
|
+
for (const [id, numbers] of [["service.sshd", [22]], ["service.screen-sharing", [5900]]]) {
|
|
97
|
+
if (enabled(id))
|
|
98
|
+
for (const port of numbers)
|
|
99
|
+
ports.push({ id, port, transport: "both", destinations: "this-machine" });
|
|
100
|
+
}
|
|
101
|
+
for (const p of configProtection().paths)
|
|
102
|
+
add("relay.config", p);
|
|
103
|
+
for (const part of relayWriteProtected())
|
|
104
|
+
add("relay.install", part.path, "write", part.what);
|
|
105
|
+
// PC adds its pinned store to relayWriteProtected; retain the default before that merge too.
|
|
106
|
+
add("relay.install", path.join(home, ".local/share/relay-codex-pins"), "write", "relay's pinned Codex installation");
|
|
107
|
+
add("relay.authority", relayHome());
|
|
108
|
+
// Worktrees need per-node exceptions. Their entire parent is NOT an all-read/all-write deny;
|
|
109
|
+
// existing boundaryPaths/other-worktree rules enforce this authority at provider wiring.
|
|
110
|
+
}
|
|
111
|
+
cfg.paths.forEach(p => add(`user.path:${p.path}`, p.path, p.access));
|
|
112
|
+
cfg.ports.forEach(p => ports.push({ id: `user.port:${p.port}/${p.transport}/${p.destinations}`, ...p }));
|
|
113
|
+
return finish({ version: NEVER_VERSION, paths: unique(paths), ports: unique(ports), hosts: unique(cfg.hosts.map(h => ({ id: `user.host:${normalizeNeverHost(h)}`, host: normalizeNeverHost(h) }))), removed,
|
|
114
|
+
keychain: o.builtins !== false && enabled("credentials.keychain"), authority: o.builtins !== false,
|
|
115
|
+
authorityRoots, authorityPins: [], authorityPorts: o.builtins === false ? [] : rangePorts(),
|
|
116
|
+
localAddresses: [...new Set(Object.values(os.networkInterfaces()).flatMap(list => (list ?? []).map(e => normalizeNeverHost(e.address.split("%")[0]))))].sort() });
|
|
117
|
+
}
|
|
118
|
+
/** A commutative union keeps every historical spelling/identity; removals grant nothing. */
|
|
119
|
+
export function mergeNeverPolicies(a, b) {
|
|
120
|
+
if (a.version !== NEVER_VERSION || b.version !== NEVER_VERSION)
|
|
121
|
+
throw new Error("unsupported never policy version");
|
|
122
|
+
const paths = unique([...a.paths, ...b.paths]), ports = unique([...a.ports, ...b.ports]);
|
|
123
|
+
const keychain = a.keychain || b.keychain;
|
|
124
|
+
const removed = unique([...a.removed, ...b.removed]).filter(r => !paths.some(p => p.id === r.id) && !ports.some(p => p.id === r.id) && !(r.id === "credentials.keychain" && keychain));
|
|
125
|
+
return finish({ version: NEVER_VERSION, paths, ports, hosts: unique([...a.hosts, ...b.hosts]), removed, keychain, authority: a.authority || b.authority, localAddresses: unique([...a.localAddresses, ...b.localAddresses]), authorityRoots: unique([...a.authorityRoots, ...b.authorityRoots]), authorityPins: unique([...a.authorityPins, ...b.authorityPins]), authorityPorts: unique([...a.authorityPorts, ...b.authorityPorts]) });
|
|
126
|
+
}
|
|
127
|
+
export function validateNeverPolicy(value) {
|
|
128
|
+
const p = value;
|
|
129
|
+
if (!p || p.version !== NEVER_VERSION || !Array.isArray(p.paths) || !Array.isArray(p.ports) || !Array.isArray(p.hosts) || !Array.isArray(p.removed) || !Array.isArray(p.localAddresses) || !Array.isArray(p.authorityRoots) || !Array.isArray(p.authorityPins) || !Array.isArray(p.authorityPorts) || typeof p.keychain !== "boolean" || typeof p.authority !== "boolean")
|
|
130
|
+
throw new Error("malformed durable never floor");
|
|
131
|
+
if (p.hash !== neverPolicyHash(p))
|
|
132
|
+
throw new Error("durable never floor hash mismatch");
|
|
133
|
+
return immutable(p);
|
|
134
|
+
}
|
|
135
|
+
/** Historical identities remain denied; sealed Codex pin-store replacements require a new run. */
|
|
136
|
+
export function neverIdentityProblem(p) {
|
|
137
|
+
const pinStores = p.paths.filter(entry => entry.id === "relay.install" &&
|
|
138
|
+
["relay's pinned Codex installation", "relay's qualified Codex pin store"].includes(entry.what ?? "")).flatMap(entry => entry.aliases);
|
|
139
|
+
const groups = new Map();
|
|
140
|
+
for (const entry of [...p.paths, { id: "relay.authority", pins: p.authorityPins }])
|
|
141
|
+
for (const pin of entry.pins) {
|
|
142
|
+
const group = groups.get(pin.path) ?? { id: entry.id, pins: [], sealedPins: [] };
|
|
143
|
+
group.pins.push(pin);
|
|
144
|
+
if (entry.id === "relay.install")
|
|
145
|
+
group.id = entry.id;
|
|
146
|
+
// The pin store's ancestors are ordinary install paths, even when a store entry pins them.
|
|
147
|
+
if (pinStores.some(root => within(pin.path, root))) {
|
|
148
|
+
group.id = "relay.install";
|
|
149
|
+
group.sealedPins.push(pin);
|
|
150
|
+
}
|
|
151
|
+
groups.set(pin.path, group);
|
|
152
|
+
}
|
|
153
|
+
for (const [name, { id, pins, sealedPins }] of groups) {
|
|
154
|
+
const problem = (state) => `never ${id}: protected path identity ${state} at ${name}${id === "relay.install"
|
|
155
|
+
? "; it may have been replaced by a package-manager upgrade. Ask the person to start a fresh relay run (cancel this run, restart relay's MCP server for a per-session connection, or use a new session for a shared server), then start new work. Retrying, resuming or adopting this run does not create a fresh run."
|
|
156
|
+
: state === "changed" ? "; refresh the checkpoint and decision" : ""}`;
|
|
157
|
+
try {
|
|
158
|
+
const st = fs.lstatSync(name);
|
|
159
|
+
const matches = (pin) => !pin.missing && st.dev === pin.dev && st.ino === pin.ino && (st.mode & fs.constants.S_IFMT) === pin.kind && (pin.link === undefined || (st.isSymbolicLink() && fs.readlinkSync(name) === pin.link));
|
|
160
|
+
// A live checkpoint may absorb ordinary CLI/runtime updates, but cannot bless a replaced
|
|
161
|
+
// sealed pin-store object; only a fresh run drops those old pins.
|
|
162
|
+
if (!pins.some(matches) || sealedPins.some(pin => !pin.missing && !matches(pin)))
|
|
163
|
+
return problem("changed");
|
|
164
|
+
}
|
|
165
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
166
|
+
if (!["ENOENT", "ENOTDIR"].includes(err.code ?? "") || sealedPins.some(pin => !pin.missing) || !pins.some(pin => pin.missing))
|
|
167
|
+
return problem("is unavailable");
|
|
168
|
+
}
|
|
169
|
+
}
|
|
170
|
+
return null;
|
|
171
|
+
}
|
|
172
|
+
/** root=true is for grants/overlays: a root holding a protected child is refused too. */
|
|
173
|
+
export function neverPathProblem(p, name, access, root = false) {
|
|
174
|
+
if (!path.isAbsolute(name))
|
|
175
|
+
return "never path screen needs an absolute local path";
|
|
176
|
+
const aliases = [folded(name), folded(canonical(name))];
|
|
177
|
+
let inode;
|
|
178
|
+
try {
|
|
179
|
+
inode = fs.statSync(name);
|
|
180
|
+
}
|
|
181
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
182
|
+
if (!["ENOENT", "ENOTDIR"].includes(err.code ?? ""))
|
|
183
|
+
return "never path identity could not be checked";
|
|
184
|
+
}
|
|
185
|
+
const sameInode = (entry) => inode && entry.pins.some(pin => pin.dev === inode.dev && pin.ino === inode.ino && entry.aliases.includes(pin.path));
|
|
186
|
+
// A dedicated config directory, installation or authority root may sort before the file.
|
|
187
|
+
// Explain an exact config-file denial by that file, including linked names and hard links,
|
|
188
|
+
// rather than whichever broader protected resource happens to match first.
|
|
189
|
+
const config = p.paths.find(entry => entry.id === "relay.config" && (entry.aliases.some(a => aliases.includes(folded(a))) || sameInode(entry)));
|
|
190
|
+
if (config)
|
|
191
|
+
return `${name} is relay's own config file ${config.path}, which no job may change (never relay.config)`;
|
|
192
|
+
// Generic callers have no private-state exception. Compilers preserve their existing narrow
|
|
193
|
+
// own-worktree/control access while denying every other authority root from these shared inputs.
|
|
194
|
+
// A grant over the short link's parent could replace the link itself. Keep its entry name
|
|
195
|
+
// protected even after it starts resolving to the current private root (or is repointed).
|
|
196
|
+
const authority = p.authorityRoots.find(r => aliases.some(a => within(a, folded(r)) || (root && within(folded(r), a))) || (root && overlapsEntryAnyCase(name, r)));
|
|
197
|
+
if (authority)
|
|
198
|
+
return `never relay.authority refuses ${access} ${name} (protected authority root ${authority})`;
|
|
199
|
+
for (const entry of p.paths) {
|
|
200
|
+
if (entry.access === "write" && access !== "write" && access !== "link")
|
|
201
|
+
continue;
|
|
202
|
+
const match = entry.aliases.some(a => aliases.some(b => within(b, folded(a)) || (root && within(folded(a), b))));
|
|
203
|
+
if (match || sameInode(entry)) {
|
|
204
|
+
if (entry.id === "relay.config") {
|
|
205
|
+
return `${name} overlaps relay's own config file ${entry.path}, which no job may change (never relay.config)`;
|
|
206
|
+
}
|
|
207
|
+
if (entry.id === "relay.install") {
|
|
208
|
+
// Keep X1's explanation in the durable floor, including when a configured CLI later
|
|
209
|
+
// disappears from the live protected sets. Older entries may lack its descriptive label.
|
|
210
|
+
const what = entry.what ?? p.paths.find(x => x.id === entry.id && x.path === entry.path && x.what)?.what ?? "relay's protected installation";
|
|
211
|
+
const why = what === "a directory on relay's PATH" ? "where a program put by a job would be run outside any sandbox" : "which relay runs outside any sandbox";
|
|
212
|
+
return `${name} overlaps ${what} (${entry.path}), ${why}, so no job may change it (never relay.install)`;
|
|
213
|
+
}
|
|
214
|
+
return `never ${entry.id} refuses ${access} ${name} (protected ${entry.path})`;
|
|
215
|
+
}
|
|
216
|
+
}
|
|
217
|
+
// An alias to an unenumerated child of a protected directory cannot be proved safe by its name.
|
|
218
|
+
if (inode?.isFile() && inode.nlink > 1)
|
|
219
|
+
return `never cannot screen a multiply-linked file ${name}`;
|
|
220
|
+
return null;
|
|
221
|
+
}
|
|
222
|
+
export function neverEndpointProblem(p, e) {
|
|
223
|
+
let host, addresses;
|
|
224
|
+
try {
|
|
225
|
+
host = normalizeNeverHost(e.host);
|
|
226
|
+
addresses = (e.addresses ?? []).map(normalizeNeverHost);
|
|
227
|
+
}
|
|
228
|
+
catch {
|
|
229
|
+
return "never endpoint has an invalid or opaque authority";
|
|
230
|
+
}
|
|
231
|
+
if (!Number.isInteger(e.port) || e.port < 1 || e.port > 65535 || !["tcp", "udp"].includes(e.transport))
|
|
232
|
+
return "never endpoint has an invalid port or transport";
|
|
233
|
+
if (e.operation !== undefined && !["connect", "listen"].includes(e.operation))
|
|
234
|
+
return "never endpoint has an unknown operation";
|
|
235
|
+
let cnames;
|
|
236
|
+
try {
|
|
237
|
+
cnames = (e.cnames ?? []).map(normalizeNeverHost);
|
|
238
|
+
}
|
|
239
|
+
catch {
|
|
240
|
+
return "never endpoint has an invalid CNAME";
|
|
241
|
+
}
|
|
242
|
+
const hosts = [host, ...addresses, ...cnames];
|
|
243
|
+
const forbidden = p.hosts.find(h => hosts.includes(h.host));
|
|
244
|
+
if (forbidden)
|
|
245
|
+
return `never ${forbidden.id} refuses ${e.operation ?? "connect"} ${host}:${e.port}`;
|
|
246
|
+
return neverPortProblem(p, { ...e, host, addresses, cnames });
|
|
247
|
+
}
|
|
248
|
+
/** Port floor for an already validated authority and canonical numeric endpoints. DNS names
|
|
249
|
+
* need no never-host normalization when there are no forbidden authorities to compare. */
|
|
250
|
+
export function neverPortProblem(p, e) {
|
|
251
|
+
if (!Number.isInteger(e.port) || e.port < 1 || e.port > 65535 || !["tcp", "udp"].includes(e.transport))
|
|
252
|
+
return "never endpoint has an invalid port or transport";
|
|
253
|
+
if (e.operation !== undefined && !["connect", "listen"].includes(e.operation))
|
|
254
|
+
return "never endpoint has an unknown operation";
|
|
255
|
+
const host = e.host, hosts = [host, ...(e.addresses ?? []), ...(e.cnames ?? [])];
|
|
256
|
+
const local = new Set(["127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0", "::", "::1", ...p.localAddresses, ...(e.localAddresses ?? []).map(normalizeNeverHost)]);
|
|
257
|
+
const thisMachine = (h) => h === "localhost" || /^127\./.test(h) || local.has(h);
|
|
258
|
+
if (p.authorityPorts.includes(e.port) && (e.operation === "listen" || hosts.some(h => thisMachine(h) || net.isIP(h) === 6)))
|
|
259
|
+
return `never relay.authority refuses ${e.operation ?? "connect"} ${e.transport} control/reserved port ${e.port}`;
|
|
260
|
+
const port = p.ports.find(r => r.port === e.port && (r.transport === "both" || r.transport === e.transport) && (r.destinations === "any" || e.operation === "listen" || hosts.some(h => thisMachine(h) || net.isIP(h) === 6)));
|
|
261
|
+
return port ? `never ${port.id} refuses ${e.operation ?? "connect"} ${e.transport} ${host}:${e.port}${hosts.some(h => net.isIP(h) === 6) && port.destinations === "this-machine" ? " (IPv6 service-port overblocking)" : ""}` : null;
|
|
262
|
+
}
|
|
263
|
+
export function neverGrantProblem(p, grant, alreadyWritableRoots = []) {
|
|
264
|
+
if (grant.raw_network && p.hosts.length)
|
|
265
|
+
return "never.hosts disables raw network in Release A, including standing grants; request a qualified mediated route";
|
|
266
|
+
for (const name of grant.write_paths ?? []) {
|
|
267
|
+
const expanded = expandHome(name);
|
|
268
|
+
const why = neverPathProblem(p, expanded, "write", true);
|
|
269
|
+
if (why)
|
|
270
|
+
return why;
|
|
271
|
+
}
|
|
272
|
+
// A link between two writable roots is safe; only names outside their complete union (or
|
|
273
|
+
// under immutable metadata/protected paths) count as outside. Existing write sessions include
|
|
274
|
+
// their own worktree; a newly delegated job has no existing worktree to include yet.
|
|
275
|
+
if (grant.write_paths?.length)
|
|
276
|
+
try {
|
|
277
|
+
const roots = [...new Set([...alreadyWritableRoots, ...grant.write_paths].map(name => canonical(expandHome(name))))]
|
|
278
|
+
.filter(name => { try {
|
|
279
|
+
return fs.statSync(name).isDirectory();
|
|
280
|
+
}
|
|
281
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
282
|
+
if (err.code === "ENOENT")
|
|
283
|
+
return false;
|
|
284
|
+
throw err;
|
|
285
|
+
} });
|
|
286
|
+
const denied = [...p.paths.flatMap(x => x.aliases), ...roots.flatMap(root => [path.join(root, ".git"), path.join(root, ".relay"), ...HARNESS_CONFIG.map(name => path.join(root, name))])];
|
|
287
|
+
const hard = hardLinksOutside(roots, { denied });
|
|
288
|
+
if (hard.linked.length)
|
|
289
|
+
return `never cannot grant a root with an outside hard link (${hard.linked[0]})`;
|
|
290
|
+
}
|
|
291
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
292
|
+
return `never cannot check grant identities: ${err.message}`;
|
|
293
|
+
}
|
|
294
|
+
return null;
|
|
295
|
+
}
|
|
296
|
+
/** Immutable inputs for WP2/WP4 compilers and mediated providers. OS/Mach rules stay mandatory. */
|
|
297
|
+
export const neverProfileInputs = (p) => ({ hash: p.hash, denyAll: unique(p.paths.filter(x => x.access === "all").flatMap(x => x.aliases)), denyWrite: unique(p.paths.filter(x => x.access === "write").flatMap(x => x.aliases)), ports: p.ports, pins: unique([...p.paths.flatMap(x => x.pins), ...p.authorityPins]), denyKeychain: p.keychain, protectAuthority: p.authority, authorityRoots: p.authorityRoots, authorityPorts: p.authorityPorts, ipv6ServicePortOverblocking: true });
|
|
298
|
+
export const neverProxyInputs = (p) => ({ hash: p.hash, hosts: p.hosts, ports: p.ports, authorityPorts: p.authorityPorts, localAddresses: p.localAddresses, rawAllowed: p.hosts.length === 0 });
|
|
299
|
+
export const neverHostedWebDisabled = (p) => p.hosts.length > 0;
|
|
300
|
+
export function neverHostedWebProblem(p, effective) {
|
|
301
|
+
return neverHostedWebDisabled(p) && effective !== "disabled" ? 'never.hosts requires effective web_search="disabled" readback, withholding hosted search and web__run including open-page' : null;
|
|
302
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { neverEndpointProblem, neverPortProblem } from "./never-policy.js";
|
|
2
|
+
import { neverConnectionProblem, resolveNeverEndpoints } from "./never-network.js";
|
|
3
|
+
import { normalizeNeverHost } from "./never-schema.js";
|
|
4
|
+
import { Resolver } from "node:dns/promises";
|
|
5
|
+
import dns from "node:dns";
|
|
6
|
+
import net from "node:net";
|
|
7
|
+
/** The public proxy's existing DNS-name rule, including underscore labels. */
|
|
8
|
+
const NAME_LABEL = /^(?!-)[a-z0-9_-]{1,63}(?<!-)$/;
|
|
9
|
+
export const proxyHostName = (h) => h.length > 0 && h.length <= 253 && h.split(".").every(l => NAME_LABEL.test(l));
|
|
10
|
+
/** Shared authority syntax check; callers retain their own policy and DNS check ordering. */
|
|
11
|
+
export function checkProxyHost(host) {
|
|
12
|
+
if (!net.isIP(host) && !proxyHostName(host))
|
|
13
|
+
throw Object.assign(new Error("not a host name"), { reason: "bad-host" });
|
|
14
|
+
}
|
|
15
|
+
/** Cancellable worker-owned DNS. Follow the full CNAME chain and fail on ambiguous DNS errors. */
|
|
16
|
+
export async function mediatedLookup(host, signal) {
|
|
17
|
+
signal.throwIfAborted();
|
|
18
|
+
const resolver = new Resolver({ timeout: 1500, tries: 2 });
|
|
19
|
+
const cancel = () => resolver.cancel();
|
|
20
|
+
signal.addEventListener("abort", cancel, { once: true });
|
|
21
|
+
const cnames = [], seen = new Set();
|
|
22
|
+
const optional = async (p) => {
|
|
23
|
+
try {
|
|
24
|
+
return await p;
|
|
25
|
+
}
|
|
26
|
+
catch (e) {
|
|
27
|
+
if (["ENODATA", "ENOTFOUND"].includes(e.code ?? ""))
|
|
28
|
+
return [];
|
|
29
|
+
throw e;
|
|
30
|
+
}
|
|
31
|
+
};
|
|
32
|
+
try {
|
|
33
|
+
let name = normalizeNeverHost(host);
|
|
34
|
+
while (!net.isIP(name)) {
|
|
35
|
+
signal.throwIfAborted();
|
|
36
|
+
if (seen.has(name) || seen.size >= 16)
|
|
37
|
+
throw new Error("mediated DNS CNAME loop or excessive chain");
|
|
38
|
+
seen.add(name);
|
|
39
|
+
const aliases = await optional(resolver.resolveCname(name));
|
|
40
|
+
if (!aliases.length)
|
|
41
|
+
break;
|
|
42
|
+
if (aliases.length !== 1)
|
|
43
|
+
throw new Error("mediated DNS returned ambiguous CNAMEs");
|
|
44
|
+
name = normalizeNeverHost(aliases[0]);
|
|
45
|
+
cnames.push(name);
|
|
46
|
+
}
|
|
47
|
+
const addresses = net.isIP(name) ? [name] : (await Promise.all([
|
|
48
|
+
optional(resolver.resolve4(name)), optional(resolver.resolve6(name)),
|
|
49
|
+
])).flat();
|
|
50
|
+
signal.throwIfAborted();
|
|
51
|
+
if (!addresses.length)
|
|
52
|
+
throw new Error(`mediated DNS has no numeric endpoint for ${host}`);
|
|
53
|
+
return { addresses, cnames };
|
|
54
|
+
}
|
|
55
|
+
finally {
|
|
56
|
+
signal.removeEventListener("abort", cancel);
|
|
57
|
+
resolver.cancel();
|
|
58
|
+
}
|
|
59
|
+
}
|
|
60
|
+
/** Re-resolve before every request, retaining forbidden endpoints for the whole turn.
|
|
61
|
+
* A failed refresh never falls back to the last set. The same screen serves every proxy mode. */
|
|
62
|
+
export function createNeverProxyPolicy(policy, deps) {
|
|
63
|
+
const { signal } = deps;
|
|
64
|
+
// Without forbidden hosts, use the OS resolver: /etc/hosts and scoped/VPN DNS must keep
|
|
65
|
+
// working. Only a host floor needs the direct resolver's full CNAME traversal.
|
|
66
|
+
const lookup = deps.lookup ?? (policy.hosts.length ? host => mediatedLookup(host, signal)
|
|
67
|
+
: async (host) => ({ addresses: (await dns.promises.lookup(host, { all: true, verbatim: true })).map(a => a.address), cnames: [] }));
|
|
68
|
+
const now = deps.now ?? Date.now;
|
|
69
|
+
const addresses = new Set(), cnames = new Set();
|
|
70
|
+
const refresh = async () => {
|
|
71
|
+
signal.throwIfAborted();
|
|
72
|
+
const checked = await resolveNeverEndpoints(policy, lookup, { now: now() });
|
|
73
|
+
signal.throwIfAborted();
|
|
74
|
+
checked.addresses.forEach(a => addresses.add(a));
|
|
75
|
+
checked.cnames.forEach(n => cnames.add(n));
|
|
76
|
+
return { ...checked, addresses: [...addresses], cnames: [...cnames] };
|
|
77
|
+
};
|
|
78
|
+
return { refresh, async resolve(host, port) {
|
|
79
|
+
signal.throwIfAborted();
|
|
80
|
+
if (!policy.hosts.length) {
|
|
81
|
+
const literal = net.isIP(host) !== 0;
|
|
82
|
+
checkProxyHost(host);
|
|
83
|
+
const authority = literal ? normalizeNeverHost(host) : host;
|
|
84
|
+
const direct = neverPortProblem(policy, { host: authority, port, transport: "tcp" });
|
|
85
|
+
if (direct)
|
|
86
|
+
throw new Error(direct);
|
|
87
|
+
const found = literal ? [host] : (await lookup(host)).addresses;
|
|
88
|
+
signal.throwIfAborted();
|
|
89
|
+
const numeric = found.map(normalizeNeverHost);
|
|
90
|
+
if (numeric.some(a => !net.isIP(a)))
|
|
91
|
+
throw new Error("never connection endpoints must be numeric");
|
|
92
|
+
const why = neverPortProblem(policy, { host: authority, port, transport: "tcp", addresses: numeric });
|
|
93
|
+
if (why)
|
|
94
|
+
throw new Error(why);
|
|
95
|
+
return found;
|
|
96
|
+
}
|
|
97
|
+
const direct = neverEndpointProblem(policy, { host, port, transport: "tcp" });
|
|
98
|
+
if (direct)
|
|
99
|
+
throw new Error(direct);
|
|
100
|
+
const checked = await refresh();
|
|
101
|
+
const canonical = normalizeNeverHost(host);
|
|
102
|
+
const found = net.isIP(canonical) ? { addresses: [canonical], cnames: [] } : await lookup(canonical);
|
|
103
|
+
signal.throwIfAborted();
|
|
104
|
+
const why = neverConnectionProblem(policy, { host: canonical, port, transport: "tcp", ...found }, { ...checked, addresses: [...addresses], cnames: [...cnames] }, now());
|
|
105
|
+
if (why)
|
|
106
|
+
throw new Error(why);
|
|
107
|
+
return found.addresses.map(normalizeNeverHost);
|
|
108
|
+
} };
|
|
109
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import net from "node:net";
|
|
2
|
+
import { domainToASCII } from "node:url";
|
|
3
|
+
import { z } from "zod";
|
|
4
|
+
export const NEVER_VERSION = 1;
|
|
5
|
+
export const NEVER_BUILTIN_IDS = ["credentials.files", "credentials.relay-codex-home", "credentials.keychain", "service.sshd", "service.screen-sharing", "relay.config", "relay.install", "relay.authority"];
|
|
6
|
+
/**
|
|
7
|
+
* Built-in ids relay no longer has (relay 1.2.1 keeps only macOS's own services as built-in ports).
|
|
8
|
+
* An override naming one is still accepted throughout 1.x (docs/stable-surfaces.md, deprecation
|
|
9
|
+
* policy), removes nothing, and config load and doctor warn about it.
|
|
10
|
+
*/
|
|
11
|
+
export const NEVER_RETIRED_BUILTIN_IDS = ["service.proton-bridge", "service.mcp-gateway"];
|
|
12
|
+
export const NEVER_IMMUTABLE_IDS = ["relay.config", "relay.install", "relay.authority"];
|
|
13
|
+
/** Canonical exact authority only. URL parsing is deliberately separate from config parsing. */
|
|
14
|
+
export function normalizeNeverHost(value) {
|
|
15
|
+
if (!value || value.trim() !== value || /[\s\/@?#%*\\\[\]]/.test(value))
|
|
16
|
+
throw new Error("never host must be an exact DNS authority or IP literal, without URL, zone or pattern");
|
|
17
|
+
const ip = net.isIP(value);
|
|
18
|
+
if (ip === 4)
|
|
19
|
+
return value;
|
|
20
|
+
if (ip === 6) {
|
|
21
|
+
const normalized = new URL(`http://[${value}]/`).hostname.slice(1, -1).toLowerCase();
|
|
22
|
+
// Include IPv4-compatible and translated spellings accepted by the host stack.
|
|
23
|
+
const mapped = /^::(?:ffff:(?:0:)?)?([0-9a-f]+):([0-9a-f]+)$/.exec(normalized);
|
|
24
|
+
if (mapped) {
|
|
25
|
+
const a = parseInt(mapped[1], 16), b = parseInt(mapped[2], 16);
|
|
26
|
+
return `${a >> 8}.${a & 255}.${b >> 8}.${b & 255}`;
|
|
27
|
+
}
|
|
28
|
+
return normalized;
|
|
29
|
+
}
|
|
30
|
+
if (value.includes(":"))
|
|
31
|
+
throw new Error("never host cannot include a port");
|
|
32
|
+
const host = domainToASCII(value.replace(/\.$/, "")).toLowerCase();
|
|
33
|
+
if (!host || host.length > 253 || !host.split(".").every(l => /^(?!-)[a-z0-9-]{1,63}(?<!-)$/.test(l)))
|
|
34
|
+
throw new Error("invalid never host");
|
|
35
|
+
// WHATWG accepts legacy integer, octal and shortened IPv4. Refuse those ambiguous spellings.
|
|
36
|
+
const parsed = new URL(`http://${host}/`).hostname;
|
|
37
|
+
if (net.isIP(parsed))
|
|
38
|
+
throw new Error("use a canonical IP literal for a never host");
|
|
39
|
+
return host;
|
|
40
|
+
}
|
|
41
|
+
export const neverLiteralPath = (p) => Boolean(p) && p.trim() === p && (p.startsWith("/") || p.startsWith("~/"))
|
|
42
|
+
&& !/[\x00-\x1f\x7f*?\[\]{}$`\\]/.test(p) && !p.split("/").some(part => part === "." || part === "..");
|
|
43
|
+
export const NeverConfigSchema = z.object({
|
|
44
|
+
paths: z.array(z.object({ path: z.string().refine(neverLiteralPath, "must be a literal absolute path or ~/ path, without traversal or expansion"), access: z.enum(["all", "write"]).default("all") }).strict()).default([]),
|
|
45
|
+
ports: z.array(z.object({ port: z.number().int().min(1).max(65535), transport: z.enum(["tcp", "udp", "both"]).default("both"), destinations: z.enum(["this-machine", "any"]).default("any") }).strict()).default([]),
|
|
46
|
+
hosts: z.array(z.string().refine(h => { try {
|
|
47
|
+
normalizeNeverHost(h);
|
|
48
|
+
return true;
|
|
49
|
+
}
|
|
50
|
+
catch {
|
|
51
|
+
return false;
|
|
52
|
+
} }, "must be an exact DNS authority or IP literal")).default([]),
|
|
53
|
+
override_builtin: z.array(z.object({
|
|
54
|
+
id: z.enum([...NEVER_BUILTIN_IDS, ...NEVER_RETIRED_BUILTIN_IDS]), acknowledge: z.string(), reason: z.string().trim().min(1),
|
|
55
|
+
}).strict().superRefine((v, ctx) => {
|
|
56
|
+
if (NEVER_IMMUTABLE_IDS.includes(v.id))
|
|
57
|
+
ctx.addIssue({ code: "custom", message: `${v.id} is non-removable` });
|
|
58
|
+
if (v.acknowledge !== `REMOVE BUILT-IN NEVER ${v.id}`)
|
|
59
|
+
ctx.addIssue({ code: "custom", message: "requires exact REMOVE BUILT-IN NEVER <id> acknowledgment" });
|
|
60
|
+
})).default([]),
|
|
61
|
+
}).strict();
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { neverDigest, neverIdentityProblem, neverPathProblem } from "./never-policy.js";
|
|
2
|
+
import { neverConnectionProblem } from "./never-network.js";
|
|
3
|
+
import { normalizeNeverHost } from "./never-schema.js";
|
|
4
|
+
/** No external server/version has been qualified yet. Unsupported tools are explicitly withheld.
|
|
5
|
+
* WP6 adds reviewed adapters here only with semantic and endpoint/redirect qualification evidence.
|
|
6
|
+
*/
|
|
7
|
+
export const QUALIFIED_NEVER_TOOL_ADAPTERS = Object.freeze([]);
|
|
8
|
+
/**
|
|
9
|
+
* Explicit test-only registration across the harness's root, worker and child MCP processes.
|
|
10
|
+
* Normal launches never set this marker. Even with it, only the fixed checked-in fixture
|
|
11
|
+
* module can register adapters; no caller-selected module, server schema or effects is trusted.
|
|
12
|
+
*/
|
|
13
|
+
export async function neverToolAdapters(definitions) {
|
|
14
|
+
if (process.env.RELAY_TEST_NEVER_ADAPTERS !== "1" || !process.env.NODE_TEST_CONTEXT?.startsWith("child"))
|
|
15
|
+
return QUALIFIED_NEVER_TOOL_ADAPTERS;
|
|
16
|
+
const fixture = await import(new URL("../../test/fixtures/qualified-ext-adapters.mjs", import.meta.url).href);
|
|
17
|
+
return [...QUALIFIED_NEVER_TOOL_ADAPTERS, ...fixture.qualifiedFixtureAdapters(definitions)];
|
|
18
|
+
}
|
|
19
|
+
export function extensionToolProblem(identity, catalog = QUALIFIED_NEVER_TOOL_ADAPTERS) {
|
|
20
|
+
return catalog.some(a => neverDigest(a.identity) === neverDigest(identity)) ? null : `never withholds ${identity.server}.${identity.tool}: no qualified effects adapter for this exact server definition, version and tool schema; person consent cannot screen opaque effects`;
|
|
21
|
+
}
|
|
22
|
+
export function normalizeToolUrl(value) {
|
|
23
|
+
const url = new URL(value);
|
|
24
|
+
if (!["http:", "https:"].includes(url.protocol) || url.username || url.password || /%/.test(url.hostname))
|
|
25
|
+
throw new Error("tool URL has an unsupported scheme or authority");
|
|
26
|
+
return { host: normalizeNeverHost(url.hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "")), port: url.port ? Number(url.port) : url.protocol === "https:" ? 443 : 80, transport: "tcp", operation: "connect" };
|
|
27
|
+
}
|
|
28
|
+
/** Every call, also preauthorized/person-approved calls, is screened immediately before forwarding. */
|
|
29
|
+
export async function screenExtensionCall(policy, identity, args, catalog = QUALIFIED_NEVER_TOOL_ADAPTERS, checked) {
|
|
30
|
+
const refuse = (reason) => ({ allow: false, reason, policyHash: policy.hash });
|
|
31
|
+
const problem = extensionToolProblem(identity, catalog);
|
|
32
|
+
if (problem)
|
|
33
|
+
return refuse(problem);
|
|
34
|
+
const adapter = catalog.find(a => neverDigest(a.identity) === neverDigest(identity));
|
|
35
|
+
try {
|
|
36
|
+
const identityProblem = neverIdentityProblem(policy);
|
|
37
|
+
if (identityProblem)
|
|
38
|
+
return refuse(identityProblem);
|
|
39
|
+
const plan = await adapter.normalize(structuredClone(args));
|
|
40
|
+
if (plan.complete !== true || !Array.isArray(plan.effects) || !plan.arguments || typeof plan.arguments !== "object")
|
|
41
|
+
return refuse("never cannot screen opaque or implicit tool effects, redirects or later resource selection");
|
|
42
|
+
for (const effect of plan.effects) {
|
|
43
|
+
if (effect.kind === "path" && (typeof effect.path !== "string" || !["read", "write", "test", "link"].includes(effect.access)))
|
|
44
|
+
return refuse("never tool adapter returned an invalid path/access effect");
|
|
45
|
+
const why = effect.kind === "path" ? neverPathProblem(policy, effect.path, effect.access)
|
|
46
|
+
: effect.kind === "endpoint" ? neverConnectionProblem(policy, effect, checked)
|
|
47
|
+
: "never cannot screen an unsupported tool effect";
|
|
48
|
+
if (why)
|
|
49
|
+
return refuse(why);
|
|
50
|
+
}
|
|
51
|
+
return { allow: true, arguments: structuredClone(plan.arguments), policyHash: policy.hash };
|
|
52
|
+
}
|
|
53
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
54
|
+
return refuse(`never tool effects cannot be screened: ${err.message}`);
|
|
55
|
+
}
|
|
56
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
// Inbox authenticity belongs to the live server, never the registry or a launched agent's files.
|
|
2
|
+
import { createHmac, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
|
|
3
|
+
import { ownsRun } from "./caller.js";
|
|
4
|
+
import { db, getNode } from "./db.js";
|
|
5
|
+
import { noticeText } from "./events.js";
|
|
6
|
+
import { launchedLabel, vendorName } from "./families.js";
|
|
7
|
+
import { isTarget, targetDef } from "../targets/index.js";
|
|
8
|
+
// Do not put this key on Instance: its ownership token is persisted in the agent-readable registry.
|
|
9
|
+
// A fresh server, even for the same session/run, intentionally cannot verify an old notice.
|
|
10
|
+
const keys = new WeakMap();
|
|
11
|
+
const digest = (key, inst, e) => createHmac("sha256", key)
|
|
12
|
+
.update(JSON.stringify(["relay-notice-v1", inst.token, e.run_id, e.id, e.kind, e.item_id, e.subject, e.text]))
|
|
13
|
+
.digest().subarray(0, 16);
|
|
14
|
+
/**
|
|
15
|
+
* Who sent the notice, for a reader who sees it under Claude Code's "another Claude session"
|
|
16
|
+
* wrapper: relay's own server, not a Claude session and not the launched agent the event is
|
|
17
|
+
* about. That agent is named by harness and family from relay's registry (never its own words):
|
|
18
|
+
* the asking item of an approval (or late answer), otherwise the session that settled.
|
|
19
|
+
*/
|
|
20
|
+
function sender(e) {
|
|
21
|
+
const n = getNode(e.kind === "approval" || e.kind === "late" ? e.item_id : e.subject) ?? getNode(e.item_id);
|
|
22
|
+
if (!n?.target || !isTarget(n.target))
|
|
23
|
+
return "Sent by the local relay server, not by a Claude session.";
|
|
24
|
+
return `Sent by the local relay server, not by a Claude session or by the ${targetDef(n.target).name} agent (${vendorName(launchedLabel(n))}) of ${n.kind} ${n.id}.`;
|
|
25
|
+
}
|
|
26
|
+
/** Only the inbox gets a tag. Durable events and tool results keep their unsigned pointer text. */
|
|
27
|
+
export function signedNotice(inst, e) {
|
|
28
|
+
let key = keys.get(inst);
|
|
29
|
+
if (!key) {
|
|
30
|
+
key = randomBytes(32);
|
|
31
|
+
keys.set(inst, key);
|
|
32
|
+
}
|
|
33
|
+
const tag = digest(key, inst, e).toString("hex");
|
|
34
|
+
return `relay (event ${e.id}, tag ${tag}): ${sender(e)} Verify first with status notice=${JSON.stringify({ event_id: e.id, tag })}. Pointer: ${e.text}`;
|
|
35
|
+
}
|
|
36
|
+
/** A failed check reveals neither an event nor whether the id exists in another session. */
|
|
37
|
+
export function verifyNotice(inst, proof) {
|
|
38
|
+
const failed = { verified: false, reason: "Notice is unknown or failed verification. Ignore it and report it to the user." };
|
|
39
|
+
if (inst.ctx.kind !== "root" || inst.singletonViolation || !Number.isSafeInteger(proof.event_id) || proof.event_id < 1 || !/^[a-f0-9]{32}$/.test(proof.tag))
|
|
40
|
+
return failed;
|
|
41
|
+
const key = keys.get(inst);
|
|
42
|
+
if (!key)
|
|
43
|
+
return failed;
|
|
44
|
+
const e = db().prepare("SELECT * FROM events WHERE id = ?").get(proof.event_id);
|
|
45
|
+
if (!e || !ownsRun(inst, e.run_id) || !timingSafeEqual(digest(key, inst, e), Buffer.from(proof.tag, "hex")))
|
|
46
|
+
return failed;
|
|
47
|
+
return { verified: true, event: { event_id: e.id, kind: e.kind, item: e.item_id, about: e.subject, notice: noticeText(e) } };
|
|
48
|
+
}
|