npm - @jant/core - Versions diffs - 0.6.9 → 0.6.11 - Mend

@jant/core 0.6.9 → 0.6.11

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Files changed (69) hide show

package/dist/{app-C-jxWmAV.js → app-CpmficmQ.js} +912 -423
package/dist/app-DqKkZenB.js +6 -0
package/dist/client/.vite/manifest.json +3 -3
package/dist/client/_assets/client-BhHHVvSY.css +2 -0
package/dist/client/_assets/{client-DWy1LEEk.js → client-Dd9U383b.js} +1 -1
package/dist/client/_assets/{client-auth-Blg-a5Ep.js → client-auth-DkpSdIDz.js} +101 -99
package/dist/{export-C2DIB7mm.js → export-Ba7NJImL.js} +93 -93
package/dist/{github-sync-7XQ5ZM6z.js → github-sync-BD4w2m8-.js} +2 -2
package/dist/{github-sync-BEFCfLKK.js → github-sync-Cb4_6_i7.js} +1 -1
package/dist/index.js +3 -3
package/dist/node.js +4 -4
package/package.json +1 -1
package/src/client/components/__tests__/jant-compose-editor-rehost-notice.test.ts +62 -0
package/src/client/components/__tests__/jant-settings-avatar.test.ts +3 -0
package/src/client/components/__tests__/jant-settings-general.test.ts +9 -4
package/src/client/components/compose-types.ts +4 -0
package/src/client/components/jant-compose-editor.ts +111 -0
package/src/client/components/jant-settings-general.ts +18 -3
package/src/client/components/settings-types.ts +2 -0
package/src/client/compose-bridge.ts +25 -8
package/src/client/tiptap/__tests__/inline-image-upload.test.ts +143 -0
package/src/client/tiptap/__tests__/link-toolbar.test.ts +41 -0
package/src/client/tiptap/__tests__/paste-rehost-e2e.test.ts +65 -0
package/src/client/tiptap/__tests__/rehost-images.test.ts +139 -0
package/src/client/tiptap/create-editor.ts +3 -0
package/src/client/tiptap/extensions.ts +4 -0
package/src/client/tiptap/inline-image-upload.ts +174 -50
package/src/client/tiptap/link-toolbar.ts +63 -1
package/src/client/tiptap/rehost-images.ts +104 -0
package/src/i18n/locales/public/en.po +10 -0
package/src/i18n/locales/public/en.ts +1 -1
package/src/i18n/locales/public/zh-Hans.po +10 -0
package/src/i18n/locales/public/zh-Hans.ts +1 -1
package/src/i18n/locales/public/zh-Hant.po +10 -0
package/src/i18n/locales/public/zh-Hant.ts +1 -1
package/src/i18n/locales/settings/en.po +258 -18
package/src/i18n/locales/settings/en.ts +1 -1
package/src/i18n/locales/settings/zh-Hans.po +258 -18
package/src/i18n/locales/settings/zh-Hans.ts +1 -1
package/src/i18n/locales/settings/zh-Hant.po +258 -18
package/src/i18n/locales/settings/zh-Hant.ts +1 -1
package/src/lib/__tests__/feed.test.ts +5 -1
package/src/lib/__tests__/upload-sideload.test.ts +78 -0
package/src/lib/__tests__/url-fetch.test.ts +181 -0
package/src/lib/feed.ts +6 -3
package/src/lib/upload.ts +111 -0
package/src/lib/url-fetch.ts +263 -0
package/src/routes/api/__tests__/uploads.test.ts +63 -1
package/src/routes/api/uploads.ts +52 -0
package/src/routes/dash/settings.tsx +7 -2
package/src/routes/feed/__tests__/feed.test.ts +58 -19
package/src/routes/feed/feed.ts +37 -28
package/src/routes/pages/featured.tsx +17 -0
package/src/routes/pages/latest.tsx +25 -0
package/src/services/__tests__/media.test.ts +168 -1
package/src/services/media.ts +111 -0
package/src/services/post.ts +1 -1
package/src/styles/tokens.css +15 -0
package/src/styles/ui.css +45 -2
package/src/ui/__tests__/color-themes.test.ts +2 -2
package/src/ui/color-themes.ts +32 -0
package/src/ui/compose/ComposeDialog.tsx +16 -0
package/src/ui/dash/appearance/ColorThemeContent.tsx +264 -29
package/src/ui/dash/settings/GeneralContent.tsx +16 -0
package/src/ui/dash/settings/__tests__/GeneralContent.test.tsx +3 -2
package/src/ui/layouts/BaseLayout.tsx +14 -2
package/src/ui/layouts/__tests__/BaseLayout.test.tsx +4 -4
package/dist/app-DqHzOwL5.js +0 -6
package/dist/client/_assets/client-CGf2m3qp.css +0 -2

package/src/lib/__tests__/upload-sideload.test.ts ADDED Viewed

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import {
+  imageExtensionForMimeType,
+  isAllowedSideloadImageType,
+  sniffImageMimeType,
+} from "../upload.js";
+describe("isAllowedSideloadImageType", () => {
+  it("accepts the full set of displayable image types", () => {
+    for (const type of [
+      "image/jpeg",
+      "image/png",
+      "image/gif",
+      "image/webp",
+      "image/svg+xml",
+      "image/avif",
+      "image/bmp",
+      "image/x-icon",
+    ]) {
+      expect(isAllowedSideloadImageType(type)).toBe(true);
+    }
+  });
+  it("rejects non-image and unknown types", () => {
+    expect(isAllowedSideloadImageType("text/html")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isAllowedSideloadImageType("application/octet-stream")).toBe(false);
+    expect(isAllowedSideloadImageType("image/tiff")).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+describe("imageExtensionForMimeType", () => {
+  it("maps types to extensions", () => {
+    expect(imageExtensionForMimeType("image/jpeg")).toBe("jpg");
+    expect(imageExtensionForMimeType("image/svg+xml")).toBe("svg");
+    expect(imageExtensionForMimeType("image/x-icon")).toBe("ico");
+  });
+  it("returns null for unsupported types", () => {
+    expect(imageExtensionForMimeType("text/html")).toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+describe("sniffImageMimeType", () => {
+  const cases: Array<[string, number[]]> = [
+    ["image/jpeg", [0xff, 0xd8, 0xff, 0xe0]],
+    ["image/png", [0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a]],
+    ["image/gif", [...new TextEncoder().encode("GIF89a")]],
+    [
+      "image/webp",
+      [0x52, 0x49, 0x46, 0x46, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x57, 0x45, 0x42, 0x50],
+    ],
+    ["image/bmp", [0x42, 0x4d, 0x00, 0x00]],
+    ["image/x-icon", [0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00]],
+  ];
+  it.each(cases)("detects %s from magic bytes", (expected, bytes) => {
+    expect(sniffImageMimeType(new Uint8Array(bytes))).toBe(expected);
+  });
+  it("detects AVIF via the ftyp brand", () => {
+    const bytes = new Uint8Array(16);
+    bytes.set([...new TextEncoder().encode("ftyp")], 4);
+    bytes.set([...new TextEncoder().encode("avif")], 8);
+    expect(sniffImageMimeType(bytes)).toBe("image/avif");
+  });
+  it("detects SVG from an <svg> root", () => {
+    const svg = new TextEncoder().encode(
+      '<?xml version="1.0"?>\n<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"></svg>',
+    );
+    expect(sniffImageMimeType(svg)).toBe("image/svg+xml");
+  });
+  it("returns null for non-image bytes (e.g. HTML)", () => {
+    const html = new TextEncoder().encode("<!doctype html><html></html>");
+    expect(sniffImageMimeType(html)).toBeNull();
+  });
+});

package/src/lib/__tests__/url-fetch.test.ts ADDED Viewed

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import { assertPublicHttpUrl, fetchImageBytes } from "../url-fetch.js";
+import { ValidationError } from "../errors.js";
+describe("assertPublicHttpUrl", () => {
+  it("accepts public http(s) URLs", () => {
+    expect(assertPublicHttpUrl("https://example.com/a.png").href).toBe(
+      "https://example.com/a.png",
+    );
+    expect(assertPublicHttpUrl("http://cdn.example.com/b.jpg").hostname).toBe(
+      "cdn.example.com",
+    );
+  });
+  it.each([
+    ["ftp scheme", "ftp://example.com/a.png"],
+    ["data scheme", ""],
+    ["embedded credentials", "https://user:pass@example.com/a.png"],
+    ["localhost", "http://localhost/a.png"],
+    ["sub.localhost", "http://api.localhost/a.png"],
+    ["0.0.0.0", "http://0.0.0.0/a.png"],
+    ["loopback v4", "http://127.0.0.1/a.png"],
+    ["private 10/8", "http://10.0.0.5/a.png"],
+    ["private 172.16/12", "http://172.16.5.5/a.png"],
+    ["private 192.168/16", "http://192.168.1.1/a.png"],
+    ["CGNAT 100.64/10", "http://100.64.0.1/a.png"],
+    ["link-local / metadata", "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data"],
+    ["loopback v6", "http://[::1]/a.png"],
+    ["link-local v6", "http://[fe80::1]/a.png"],
+    ["ULA v6", "http://[fd00::1]/a.png"],
+    ["v4-mapped private v6", "http://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]/a.png"],
+  ])("rejects %s", (_label, url) => {
+    expect(() => assertPublicHttpUrl(url)).toThrow(ValidationError);
+  });
+  it("rejects a non-URL string", () => {
+    expect(() => assertPublicHttpUrl("not a url")).toThrow(ValidationError);
+  });
+});
+describe("fetchImageBytes", () => {
+  afterEach(() => {
+    vi.restoreAllMocks();
+  });
+  function pngBytes(length = 64): Uint8Array {
+    const bytes = new Uint8Array(length);
+    bytes.set([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a]);
+    return bytes;
+  }
+  it("returns the bytes and content-type on success", async () => {
+    const bytes = pngBytes();
+    vi.stubGlobal(
+      "fetch",
+      vi.fn(
+        async () =>
+          new Response(bytes, {
+            headers: { "content-type": "image/png" },
+          }),
+      ),
+    );
+    const result = await fetchImageBytes(new URL("https://example.com/a.png"), {
+      maxBytes: 1024,
+      timeoutMs: 5000,
+    });
+    expect(result.contentType).toBe("image/png");
+    expect(result.bytes.byteLength).toBe(bytes.byteLength);
+  });
+  it("sends a Referer matching the image origin (hotlink protection)", async () => {
+    const fetchMock = vi.fn(
+      async () =>
+        new Response(pngBytes(), { headers: { "content-type": "image/png" } }),
+    );
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchMock);
+    await fetchImageBytes(
+      new URL("https://img9.doubanio.com/view/photo/p1.webp"),
+      { maxBytes: 1024, timeoutMs: 5000 },
+    );
+    const headers = fetchMock.mock.calls[0]?.[1]?.headers as
+      | Record<string, string>
+      | undefined;
+    expect(headers?.Referer).toBe("https://img9.doubanio.com/");
+  });
+  it("rejects via the Content-Length precheck", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal(
+      "fetch",
+      vi.fn(
+        async () =>
+          new Response(pngBytes(16), {
+            headers: {
+              "content-type": "image/png",
+              "content-length": "999999",
+            },
+          }),
+      ),
+    );
+    await expect(
+      fetchImageBytes(new URL("https://example.com/a.png"), {
+        maxBytes: 1024,
+        timeoutMs: 5000,
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/too large/i);
+  });
+  it("aborts when the streamed body exceeds maxBytes (no Content-Length)", async () => {
+    const stream = new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({
+      start(controller) {
+        controller.enqueue(new Uint8Array(2048));
+        controller.close();
+      },
+    });
+    vi.stubGlobal(
+      "fetch",
+      vi.fn(
+        async () =>
+          new Response(stream, {
+            headers: { "content-type": "image/png" },
+          }),
+      ),
+    );
+    await expect(
+      fetchImageBytes(new URL("https://example.com/a.png"), {
+        maxBytes: 1024,
+        timeoutMs: 5000,
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/too large/i);
+  });
+  it("re-validates redirect targets and rejects a hop to a private address", async () => {
+    vi.stubGlobal(
+      "fetch",
+      vi.fn(
+        async () =>
+          new Response(null, {
+            status: 302,
+            headers: { location: "http://169.254.169.254/" },
+          }),
+      ),
+    );
+    await expect(
+      fetchImageBytes(new URL("https://example.com/a.png"), {
+        maxBytes: 1024,
+        timeoutMs: 5000,
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toThrow(ValidationError);
+  });
+  it("follows a redirect to a public target", async () => {
+    const bytes = pngBytes();
+    const fetchMock = vi
+      .fn()
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(
+        new Response(null, {
+          status: 302,
+          headers: { location: "https://cdn.example.com/final.png" },
+        }),
+      )
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(
+        new Response(bytes, { headers: { "content-type": "image/png" } }),
+      );
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchMock);
+    const result = await fetchImageBytes(new URL("https://example.com/a.png"), {
+      maxBytes: 1024,
+      timeoutMs: 5000,
+    });
+    expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+    expect(result.bytes.byteLength).toBe(bytes.byteLength);
+  });
+});

package/src/lib/feed.ts CHANGED Viewed

@@ -187,9 +187,12 @@ function renderMediaItem(item: MediaView, postPermalinkUrl?: string): string {
         : "";
     // Prefix the caption with a ▶ glyph as a video cue. A CSS overlay would
     // be stripped by most feed-reader sanitizers, so a plain-text play
-    // character is the only marker that renders reliably everywhere.
-    const label = `▶ Watch video${meta ? ` · ${meta}` : ""}`;
-    return `<figure><a href="${url}"><img src="${escapeXml(poster)}" alt="${escapeXml(altText || name)}"${dims}/></a><figcaption>${escapeXml(label)}</figcaption></figure>`;
+    // character is the only marker that renders reliably everywhere. Link
+    // only the "Watch video" action label (so it's clickable like the
+    // thumbnail and reads cleanly to screen readers); metadata stays outside
+    // the link in parens, matching the audio/text/document attachment style.
+    const metaSuffix = meta ? ` (${escapeXml(meta)})` : "";
+    return `<figure><a href="${url}"><img src="${escapeXml(poster)}" alt="${escapeXml(altText || name)}"${dims}/></a><figcaption><a href="${url}">▶ Watch video</a>${metaSuffix}</figcaption></figure>`;
   }
   if (category === "audio") {

package/src/lib/upload.ts CHANGED Viewed

@@ -277,6 +277,117 @@ export function isImageMimeType(mimeType: string): boolean {
   return mimeType.startsWith("image/");
 }
+/** Image MIME types accepted by the remote-image sideload path. */
+const SIDELOAD_IMAGE_MIME_TYPES = new Set<string>(IMAGE_MIME_TYPES);
+/** Map of sideload-accepted image MIME types to their file extensions. */
+const IMAGE_MIME_EXTENSIONS: Record<string, string> = {
+  "image/jpeg": "jpg",
+  "image/png": "png",
+  "image/gif": "gif",
+  "image/webp": "webp",
+  "image/svg+xml": "svg",
+  "image/avif": "avif",
+  "image/bmp": "bmp",
+  "image/x-icon": "ico",
+};
+/**
+ * Whether a MIME type may be rehosted via remote-image sideload.
+ *
+ * Unlike {@link getStoredUploadPolicy} (which only allows webp/png/jpeg because
+ * the normal upload path re-encodes everything to WebP client-side), the
+ * sideload path stores the original remote bytes, so it accepts the full set of
+ * image formats Jant can display.
+ *
+ * @param contentType - The MIME type to check
+ * @returns Whether the type is an accepted sideload image
+ * @example
+ * ```ts
+ * isAllowedSideloadImageType("image/gif"); // true
+ * isAllowedSideloadImageType("text/html"); // false
+ * ```
+ */
+export function isAllowedSideloadImageType(contentType: string): boolean {
+  return SIDELOAD_IMAGE_MIME_TYPES.has(contentType);
+}
+/**
+ * Returns the file extension for a sideload-accepted image MIME type.
+ *
+ * @param contentType - The image MIME type
+ * @returns Extension without a dot, or null if the type isn't sideloadable
+ * @example
+ * ```ts
+ * imageExtensionForMimeType("image/jpeg"); // "jpg"
+ * ```
+ */
+export function imageExtensionForMimeType(contentType: string): string | null {
+  return IMAGE_MIME_EXTENSIONS[contentType] ?? null;
+}
+/**
+ * Identify an image format from its leading bytes (magic numbers), so a remote
+ * sideload can trust the actual content rather than the server's content-type
+ * header. Recognizes every {@link isAllowedSideloadImageType} format.
+ *
+ * @param bytes - The leading bytes of the file (≥ ~256 bytes recommended)
+ * @returns The detected image MIME type, or null if unrecognized
+ * @example
+ * ```ts
+ * sniffImageMimeType(pngBytes); // "image/png"
+ * ```
+ */
+export function sniffImageMimeType(bytes: Uint8Array): string | null {
+  if (
+    bytes.length >= 3 &&
+    bytes[0] === 0xff &&
+    bytes[1] === 0xd8 &&
+    bytes[2] === 0xff
+  ) {
+    return "image/jpeg";
+  }
+  if (
+    bytes.length >= 8 &&
+    bytes[0] === 0x89 &&
+    readAscii(bytes, 1, 3) === "PNG"
+  ) {
+    return "image/png";
+  }
+  if (bytes.length >= 6 && /^GIF8[79]a$/.test(readAscii(bytes, 0, 6))) {
+    return "image/gif";
+  }
+  if (
+    bytes.length >= 12 &&
+    readAscii(bytes, 0, 4) === "RIFF" &&
+    readAscii(bytes, 8, 4) === "WEBP"
+  ) {
+    return "image/webp";
+  }
+  if (bytes.length >= 12 && readAscii(bytes, 4, 4) === "ftyp") {
+    const brand = readAscii(bytes, 8, 4);
+    if (brand === "avif" || brand === "avis") return "image/avif";
+  }
+  if (bytes.length >= 2 && bytes[0] === 0x42 && bytes[1] === 0x4d) {
+    return "image/bmp";
+  }
+  if (
+    bytes.length >= 4 &&
+    bytes[0] === 0x00 &&
+    bytes[1] === 0x00 &&
+    bytes[2] === 0x01 &&
+    bytes[3] === 0x00
+  ) {
+    return "image/x-icon";
+  }
+  // SVG is text — look for an <svg> root in the leading bytes.
+  const head = new TextDecoder().decode(bytes.subarray(0, 1024)).toLowerCase();
+  if (head.includes("<svg")) {
+    return "image/svg+xml";
+  }
+  return null;
+}
 export interface ValidateUploadOptions {
   /** When true, only image MIME types are accepted (e.g. for avatar uploads). */
   imagesOnly?: boolean;

package/src/lib/url-fetch.ts ADDED Viewed

@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+/**
+ * Safe remote URL fetching for server-side image sideloading.
+ *
+ * When an author pastes an article from another site, its `<img>` tags point at
+ * remote URLs. To rehost those images into the site's own storage the server
+ * must fetch the bytes itself (a browser `fetch` of a third-party image is
+ * blocked by CORS for most hosts). Because the URL comes from pasted HTML it is
+ * attacker-influenced, so every fetch passes through an SSRF guard and a bounded
+ * reader that caps size and time.
+ *
+ * Note: DNS is not resolvable from a Cloudflare Worker, so the IP-literal checks
+ * here are defense-in-depth for self-hosted (Node) deployments and for URLs that
+ * embed a literal address. They are not a substitute for network-level egress
+ * controls.
+ */
+import { ValidationError } from "./errors.js";
+/** A browser-like UA — many CDNs serving article images block unknown bots. */
+const FETCH_USER_AGENT =
+  "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Jant image sideloader) AppleWebKit/537.36";
+export interface FetchedImage {
+  bytes: Uint8Array;
+  /** Lowercased content-type with parameters stripped, or null if absent. */
+  contentType: string | null;
+}
+export interface FetchImageBytesOptions {
+  /** Reject (and abort) once the body exceeds this many bytes. */
+  maxBytes: number;
+  /** Abort the whole request after this many milliseconds. */
+  timeoutMs: number;
+  /** Maximum redirect hops to follow (each re-validated). Default 3. */
+  maxRedirects?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Validate that a string is a public http(s) URL safe to fetch server-side.
+ *
+ * Throws {@link ValidationError} for non-http(s) protocols, embedded
+ * credentials, localhost names, and private/loopback/link-local/ULA/CGNAT IP
+ * literals (including the `169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata address).
+ *
+ * @param raw - The candidate URL string
+ * @returns The parsed {@link URL}
+ * @example
+ * ```ts
+ * const url = assertPublicHttpUrl("https://example.com/photo.jpg");
+ * ```
+ */
+export function assertPublicHttpUrl(raw: string): URL {
+  let url: URL;
+  try {
+    url = new URL(raw);
+  } catch {
+    throw new ValidationError("That doesn't look like a valid image URL.");
+  }
+  if (url.protocol !== "http:" && url.protocol !== "https:") {
+    throw new ValidationError("Only http and https image URLs can be fetched.");
+  }
+  if (url.username || url.password) {
+    throw new ValidationError("Image URLs can't include credentials.");
+  }
+  const host = url.hostname.toLowerCase();
+  if (
+    host === "localhost" ||
+    host.endsWith(".localhost") ||
+    host === "0.0.0.0" ||
+    isPrivateIpv4(host) ||
+    isPrivateIpv6(host)
+  ) {
+    throw new ValidationError("That image URL points to a private address.");
+  }
+  return url;
+}
+/**
+ * Fetch a remote image with an SSRF-checked redirect chain, a size cap, and a
+ * timeout. Reads the body in chunks and aborts the moment it exceeds `maxBytes`
+ * so an untrusted host can't exhaust memory.
+ *
+ * @param startUrl - A URL already validated by {@link assertPublicHttpUrl}
+ * @param options - Size cap, timeout, and redirect budget
+ * @returns The raw bytes and the response content-type
+ * @example
+ * ```ts
+ * const { bytes, contentType } = await fetchImageBytes(url, {
+ *   maxBytes: 25 * 1024 * 1024,
+ *   timeoutMs: 15000,
+ * });
+ * ```
+ */
+export async function fetchImageBytes(
+  startUrl: URL,
+  options: FetchImageBytesOptions,
+): Promise<FetchedImage> {
+  const maxRedirects = options.maxRedirects ?? 3;
+  const controller = new AbortController();
+  const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), options.timeoutMs);
+  try {
+    let url = startUrl;
+    let response: Response | null = null;
+    for (let hop = 0; hop <= maxRedirects; hop++) {
+      response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
+        method: "GET",
+        redirect: "manual",
+        signal: controller.signal,
+        headers: {
+          Accept: "image/*,*/*;q=0.8",
+          "User-Agent": FETCH_USER_AGENT,
+          // Many CDNs (Douban, WeChat, etc.) reject hotlinked image requests
+          // that lack a Referer. Sending the image's own origin satisfies the
+          // common "referer must be same-site" hotlink check.
+          Referer: `${url.origin}/`,
+        },
+      }).catch((error) => {
+        if (controller.signal.aborted) {
+          throw new ValidationError("Timed out fetching the image.");
+        }
+        throw new ValidationError(
+          error instanceof Error
+            ? `Couldn't fetch the image: ${error.message}`
+            : "Couldn't fetch the image.",
+        );
+      });
+      if (response.status >= 300 && response.status < 400) {
+        const location = response.headers.get("location");
+        if (!location) break; // No target — fall through to the (failing) checks.
+        if (hop === maxRedirects) {
+          throw new ValidationError("Too many redirects fetching the image.");
+        }
+        // Re-validate every hop so a redirect can't escape the SSRF guard.
+        url = assertPublicHttpUrl(new URL(location, url).toString());
+        continue;
+      }
+      break;
+    }
+    if (!response) {
+      throw new ValidationError("Couldn't fetch the image.");
+    }
+    if (!response.ok) {
+      throw new ValidationError(
+        `Couldn't fetch the image (HTTP ${response.status}).`,
+      );
+    }
+    const declared = Number(response.headers.get("content-length"));
+    if (Number.isFinite(declared) && declared > options.maxBytes) {
+      throw new ValidationError("That image is too large.");
+    }
+    const contentType = normalizeContentType(
+      response.headers.get("content-type"),
+    );
+    const bytes = await readBounded(response, options.maxBytes);
+    return { bytes, contentType };
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(timer);
+  }
+}
+async function readBounded(
+  response: Response,
+  maxBytes: number,
+): Promise<Uint8Array> {
+  const body = response.body;
+  if (!body) {
+    const buffer = new Uint8Array(await response.arrayBuffer());
+    if (buffer.byteLength > maxBytes) {
+      throw new ValidationError("That image is too large.");
+    }
+    return buffer;
+  }
+  const reader = body.getReader();
+  const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
+  let total = 0;
+  for (;;) {
+    const { done, value } = await reader.read();
+    if (done) break;
+    if (!value) continue;
+    total += value.byteLength;
+    if (total > maxBytes) {
+      await reader.cancel().catch(() => {});
+      throw new ValidationError("That image is too large.");
+    }
+    chunks.push(value);
+  }
+  const out = new Uint8Array(total);
+  let offset = 0;
+  for (const chunk of chunks) {
+    out.set(chunk, offset);
+    offset += chunk.byteLength;
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+function normalizeContentType(raw: string | null): string | null {
+  if (!raw) return null;
+  const type = raw.split(";")[0]?.trim().toLowerCase();
+  return type || null;
+}
+/**
+ * True when a canonicalized IPv4 dotted-quad host is in a private, loopback,
+ * link-local, CGNAT, or otherwise non-public range. The WHATWG URL parser
+ * already normalizes decimal/octal/hex IPv4 forms to dotted-quad, so checking
+ * `url.hostname` is sufficient.
+ */
+function isPrivateIpv4(host: string): boolean {
+  const match = host.match(/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/);
+  if (!match) return false;
+  const octets = match.slice(1, 5).map(Number);
+  if (octets.some((part) => part > 255)) return true; // Malformed → unsafe.
+  const a = octets[0] ?? 0;
+  const b = octets[1] ?? 0;
+  if (a === 0) return true; // 0.0.0.0/8 "this" network
+  if (a === 10) return true; // 10/8 private
+  if (a === 127) return true; // 127/8 loopback
+  if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true; // 169.254/16 link-local (metadata)
+  if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true; // 172.16/12 private
+  if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true; // 192.168/16 private
+  if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) return true; // 100.64/10 CGNAT
+  if (a === 255 && b === 255) return true; // broadcast
+  return false;
+}
+/** True when an IPv6 host (bracketed or bare) is loopback/link-local/ULA/mapped-private. */
+function isPrivateIpv6(host: string): boolean {
+  let inner = host;
+  if (inner.startsWith("[") && inner.endsWith("]")) {
+    inner = inner.slice(1, -1);
+  }
+  if (!inner.includes(":")) return false;
+  const lower = inner.toLowerCase();
+  if (lower === "::" || lower === "::1") return true; // unspecified / loopback
+  // IPv4-mapped, dotted form (::ffff:1.2.3.4).
+  const dotted = lower.match(/^::ffff:(\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})$/);
+  if (dotted?.[1]) return isPrivateIpv4(dotted[1]);
+  // IPv4-mapped, hex form (::ffff:a00:1) — what the URL parser normalizes to.
+  const hex = lower.match(/^::ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/);
+  if (hex) {
+    const hi = parseInt(hex[1] ?? "0", 16);
+    const lo = parseInt(hex[2] ?? "0", 16);
+    const v4 = `${(hi >> 8) & 0xff}.${hi & 0xff}.${(lo >> 8) & 0xff}.${lo & 0xff}`;
+    return isPrivateIpv4(v4);
+  }
+  if (/^fe[89ab]/.test(lower)) return true; // fe80::/10 link-local
+  if (/^f[cd]/.test(lower)) return true; // fc00::/7 unique local
+  return false;
+}