@jaguilar87/gaia 5.0.9 → 5.0.10

package/dist/gaia-security/hooks/modules/tools/bash_validator.py

@@ -911,6 +911,57 @@ class BashValidator:
             reason="Safe by elimination (not blocked, not mutative)",
         )
 
+    def _is_ungranted_t3_component(
+        self, component: str, session_id: str
+    ) -> bool:
+        """Classify a chain component as ungranted-T3 WITHOUT minting or consuming.
+
+        Returns True when the component is a T3 (mutative-verb or
+        flag-dependent) operation for which NO active grant exists -- i.e. the
+        component would, on its own, be blocked pending approval. This is a
+        read-only probe used by the chain COMMAND_SET intake (AC-8) to decide
+        whether >= 2 sub-commands need grouping under ONE consent, BEFORE any
+        per-component minting happens.
+
+        It deliberately does NOT call decide_t3_outcome (no pending minted) and
+        does NOT consume any grant (match_command_set_grant /
+        check_approval_grant are pure lookups; consumption happens later in the
+        real _validate_single_command pass at retry). A component that already
+        matches a COMMAND_SET or semantic grant is treated as NOT ungranted, so
+        it is excluded from a fresh batch.
+        """
+        component = component.strip()
+        if not component:
+            return False
+
+        # Is this T3 (mutative verb or flag-dependent mutation)?
+        detect = detect_mutative_command(component)
+        is_t3 = detect.is_mutative
+        if not is_t3:
+            flag_result = classify_by_flags(component)
+            if (
+                flag_result is not None
+                and flag_result.outcome == FLAG_MUTATIVE
+                and not flag_result.command_family.startswith("git_")
+            ):
+                is_t3 = True
+        if not is_t3:
+            return False
+
+        # Already covered by an active grant? Then it is NOT ungranted -- exclude
+        # it from a fresh batch (pure lookups, no consumption).
+        try:
+            if match_command_set_grant(component) is not None:
+                return False
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        try:
+            if check_approval_grant(component, session_id=session_id) is not None:
+                return False
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        return True
+
     def _validate_compound_command(
         self,
         components: List[str],
@@ -918,9 +969,68 @@ class BashValidator:
         session_id: str = "",
         agent_type: str = "",
     ) -> BashValidationResult:
-        """Validate a compound command (multiple components)."""
+        """Validate a compound command (multiple components).
+
+        Chain COMMAND_SET intake (AC-8): when a chain ``a && b && c`` has TWO OR
+        MORE sub-commands that are ungranted T3, classifying them one-at-a-time
+        mints a single-signature pending for the FIRST and short-circuits -- so
+        one approval covers only the first sub-command and the next re-blocks
+        (the double-approval the user hit). To group them, a NON-MINTING
+        classification pass runs FIRST (``_is_ungranted_t3_component``); if >= 2
+        sub-commands are ungranted-T3 (and we are a subagent under the
+        orchestrator), ONE COMMAND_SET pending is minted over exactly those T3
+        sub-commands via ``decide_t3_outcome(command_set=...)``. One approval
+        then covers the chain; each sub-command is still consumed byte-for-byte
+        by its own signature at retry (no consent is widened -- the commands are
+        only grouped). Critically, the per-component minting path
+        (_validate_single_command) is NEVER entered for the batch, so no stray
+        single pendings are minted alongside the COMMAND_SET.
+
+        For every other shape (0 or 1 ungranted-T3, no orchestrator above, or a
+        component that is hard-blocked) the original per-component pass runs
+        unchanged: a hard block fails the chain fast, a lone T3 keeps the
+        singular grant path, and an all-granted/safe chain is allowed.
+        """
         logger.info(f"Compound command detected with {len(components)} components")
 
+        # NON-MINTING pre-pass: which components are ungranted T3? (AC-8)
+        if is_subagent and is_ops_mode():
+            ungranted_t3_idx = [
+                idx
+                for idx, comp in enumerate(components)
+                if self._is_ungranted_t3_component(comp, session_id)
+            ]
+            if len(ungranted_t3_idx) >= 2:
+                chain_set = [
+                    {"command": components[idx].strip(), "rationale": ""}
+                    for idx in ungranted_t3_idx
+                ]
+                first_cmd = chain_set[0]["command"]
+                first_detect = detect_mutative_command(first_cmd)
+                verb = first_detect.verb or "command"
+                category = first_detect.category or "MUTATIVE"
+                native_ask_reason = (
+                    f"[T3_APPROVAL_REQUIRED] Chain of {len(chain_set)} T3 commands.\n"
+                    f"Commands:\n"
+                    + "\n".join(f"  - {it['command']}" for it in chain_set)
+                )
+                logger.info(
+                    "Chain COMMAND_SET intake: %d T3 sub-commands grouped under "
+                    "one consent (chain=%s)",
+                    len(chain_set),
+                    " && ".join(it["command"][:30] for it in chain_set),
+                )
+                return decide_t3_outcome(
+                    first_cmd,
+                    verb=verb,
+                    category=category,
+                    has_orchestrator_above=True,
+                    native_ask_reason=native_ask_reason,
+                    session_id=session_id,
+                    agent_type=agent_type,
+                    command_set=chain_set,
+                )
+
         component_results: List[BashValidationResult] = []
         for i, component in enumerate(components, 1):
             result = self._validate_single_command(
@@ -1385,6 +1495,7 @@ def decide_t3_outcome(
     native_ask_reason: str,
     session_id: str = "",
     agent_type: str = "",
+    command_set: list | None = None,
 ) -> BashValidationResult:
     """Single decision point for the outcome of a T3 (state-mutating) command.
 
@@ -1416,34 +1527,68 @@ def decide_t3_outcome(
         native_ask_reason: Reason text for the native-ask fallback branch.
         session_id: Session ID for pending-approval scoping.
         agent_type: Originating agent name (for the sealed payload).
+        command_set: Optional list of ``{command, rationale}`` dicts. When it
+            carries MORE THAN ONE item, this T3 decision covers a chain
+            (``a && b && c``) whose sub-commands are all T3, and the pending is
+            minted as ONE COMMAND_SET envelope (the chain-intake path, AC-8)
+            instead of a single semantic-signature pending. ONE user approval
+            then covers the whole chain; each sub-command is still consumed
+            byte-for-byte by its own signature at retry. A None / single-item
+            set keeps the singular behaviour. Only honoured in the
+            subagent-under-orchestrator branch (the native-ask branch has no
+            COMMAND_SET concept).
 
     Returns:
         A blocked BashValidationResult (allowed=False, tier T3) whose
         block_response is either a "deny" (with approval_id) or an "ask".
     """
+    # A genuine multi-command chain is a set of >= 2 items. Anything else
+    # collapses to the singular path so we never mint a COMMAND_SET for one
+    # command (mirrors _build_sealed_payload's is_command_set guard).
+    _normalized_set: list = []
+    if command_set:
+        for _item in command_set:
+            if isinstance(_item, dict) and _item.get("command"):
+                _normalized_set.append(
+                    {
+                        "command": _item["command"],
+                        "rationale": _item.get("rationale", ""),
+                    }
+                )
+    is_chain_command_set = len(_normalized_set) > 1
+
     if has_orchestrator_above:
         # Subagent-under-orchestrator: deny + persisted approval_id so the
         # orchestrator can run the approval cycle.  Reuse an existing pending
         # approval on retry to avoid generating duplicates while the user reviews.
-        approval_id = _find_pending_in_db(session_id or "", command)
-        if approval_id:
-            logger.info(
-                "Reusing pending approval_id=%s for retry: %s",
-                approval_id, command[:80],
-            )
-            reason = build_t3_blocked_denial_message(
-                approval_id=approval_id,
-                command=command,
-                verb=verb,
-                category=category,
-            )
-            hook_deny = build_hook_permission_response("deny", reason)
-            return BashValidationResult(
-                allowed=False,
-                tier=SecurityTier.T3_BLOCKED,
-                reason=f"T3 {category.lower()} command: {command[:60]}",
-                block_response=hook_deny,
-            )
+        #
+        # For a COMMAND_SET chain the pending id is CONTENT-derived (matching the
+        # plan-first intake), so a retry of the same chain produces the same id
+        # and the fingerprint-dedup in insert_requested reuses the pending. The
+        # singular reuse probe (_find_pending_in_db) matches a SINGLE command's
+        # signature and must NOT be consulted for the chain -- it would match one
+        # leftover single pending of a sub-command and degrade the chain back to
+        # a single grant. So the chain path skips it entirely.
+        if not is_chain_command_set:
+            approval_id = _find_pending_in_db(session_id or "", command)
+            if approval_id:
+                logger.info(
+                    "Reusing pending approval_id=%s for retry: %s",
+                    approval_id, command[:80],
+                )
+                reason = build_t3_blocked_denial_message(
+                    approval_id=approval_id,
+                    command=command,
+                    verb=verb,
+                    category=category,
+                )
+                hook_deny = build_hook_permission_response("deny", reason)
+                return BashValidationResult(
+                    allowed=False,
+                    tier=SecurityTier.T3_BLOCKED,
+                    reason=f"T3 {category.lower()} command: {command[:60]}",
+                    block_response=hook_deny,
+                )
 
         # No existing pending -- insert via DB (D16: exclusive path).
         sealed_payload = _build_sealed_payload(
@@ -1451,13 +1596,25 @@ def decide_t3_outcome(
             verb=verb,
             category=category,
             agent_type=agent_type,
+            command_set=_normalized_set if is_chain_command_set else None,
         )
         try:
             from gaia.approvals.store import insert_requested
+            # COMMAND_SET chains use a CONTENT-derived id (deterministic over the
+            # sub-command list) so a retry of the same chain reproduces the same
+            # id and reuses the pending via fingerprint dedup -- identical to the
+            # plan-first intake in handoff_persister. Singular T3 keeps uuid4.
+            supplied_id = None
+            if is_chain_command_set:
+                from gaia.approvals.store import derive_command_set_id
+                supplied_id = derive_command_set_id(
+                    [it["command"] for it in _normalized_set]
+                )
             approval_id = insert_requested(
                 sealed_payload,
                 agent_id=agent_type or None,
                 session_id=session_id or None,
+                approval_id=supplied_id,
             )
         except Exception as _store_err:
             logger.warning(

package/gaia/briefs/__init__.py

@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ from gaia.briefs.store import (
     upsert_brief,
     list_briefs,
     get_brief,
+    get_brief_by_id,
+    find_brief_workspaces,
     close_brief,
     get_dependencies,
     search_briefs,
@@ -49,6 +51,8 @@ __all__ = [
     "upsert_brief",
     "list_briefs",
     "get_brief",
+    "get_brief_by_id",
+    "find_brief_workspaces",
     "close_brief",
     "get_dependencies",
     "search_briefs",

package/gaia/briefs/store.py

@@ -268,6 +268,97 @@ def list_briefs(
 # get_brief
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
+def get_brief_by_id(
+    brief_id: int,
+    *,
+    db_path: Path | None = None,
+) -> dict | None:
+    """Return the full brief dict by numeric primary key, or None.
+
+    Like :func:`get_brief` but resolves by ``id`` instead of
+    ``(workspace, name)``. Used by ``gaia brief show <int>`` so users can
+    look up a brief by its DB id without knowing which workspace it lives in.
+    """
+    con = _connect(db_path)
+    try:
+        row = con.execute(
+            "SELECT * FROM briefs WHERE id = ?",
+            (brief_id,),
+        ).fetchone()
+        if row is None:
+            return None
+
+        brief: dict[str, Any] = dict(row)
+        brief.pop("workspace", None)
+
+        ac_rows = con.execute(
+            "SELECT ac_id, description, evidence_type, evidence_shape, artifact_path "
+            "FROM acceptance_criteria WHERE brief_id = ? ORDER BY id",
+            (brief["id"],),
+        ).fetchall()
+        acs: list[dict] = []
+        for ar in ac_rows:
+            shape = ar["evidence_shape"]
+            if shape:
+                try:
+                    shape = json.loads(shape)
+                except Exception:
+                    pass
+            acs.append({
+                "ac_id": ar["ac_id"],
+                "description": ar["description"],
+                "evidence_type": ar["evidence_type"],
+                "evidence_shape": shape,
+                "artifact_path": ar["artifact_path"],
+            })
+        brief["acceptance_criteria"] = acs
+
+        ms_rows = con.execute(
+            "SELECT order_num, name, description FROM milestones "
+            "WHERE brief_id = ? ORDER BY order_num",
+            (brief["id"],),
+        ).fetchall()
+        brief["milestones"] = [
+            {"order_num": m["order_num"], "name": m["name"],
+             "description": m["description"]}
+            for m in ms_rows
+        ]
+
+        dep_rows = con.execute(
+            "SELECT b2.name FROM brief_dependencies bd "
+            "JOIN briefs b2 ON b2.id = bd.depends_on_id "
+            "WHERE bd.brief_id = ? ORDER BY b2.name",
+            (brief["id"],),
+        ).fetchall()
+        brief["dependencies"] = [r["name"] for r in dep_rows]
+
+        return brief
+    finally:
+        con.close()
+
+
+def find_brief_workspaces(
+    name: str,
+    *,
+    db_path: Path | None = None,
+) -> list[str]:
+    """Return all workspace names that contain a brief with the given slug.
+
+    Used by ``gaia brief show`` to emit a helpful cross-workspace hint when
+    a brief is not found in the resolved workspace.  Returns an empty list
+    when no brief with that name exists anywhere.
+    """
+    con = _connect(db_path)
+    try:
+        rows = con.execute(
+            "SELECT workspace FROM briefs WHERE name = ? ORDER BY workspace",
+            (name,),
+        ).fetchall()
+        return [r["workspace"] for r in rows]
+    finally:
+        con.close()
+
+
 def get_brief(
     workspace: str,
     name: str,

package/hooks/modules/core/plugin_setup.py

@@ -347,11 +347,6 @@ def setup_project_permissions() -> bool:
     existing["permissions"]["deny"] = merged_deny
     existing["permissions"].setdefault("ask", [])
 
-    # Add env vars (smart merge: add if not present, don't overwrite)
-    env = existing.setdefault("env", {})
-    if "CLAUDE_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL_AGENT_TEAMS" not in env:
-        env["CLAUDE_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL_AGENT_TEAMS"] = "1"
-
     claude_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
     settings_path.write_text(json.dumps(existing, indent=2) + "\n")
     logger.info("Merged gaia %s permissions and env into %s", mode, settings_path)

package/hooks/modules/security/capability_classes.py

@@ -42,12 +42,21 @@ as follows:
 1. If a redirect-input token (``<``) or a pipe-input is present, the
    payload is considered external and uninspected -- keep MUTATIVE.
 2. If a positional argument starts with a sqlite-style dot-command that
-   loads a script (``.read``, ``.import``, ``.restore``), keep MUTATIVE.
-3. If a flag override matches (e.g. ``-readonly``), classify as READ_ONLY.
-4. If the command exposes an inline payload via a recognised flag pair
+   loads or executes a script / writes to disk (``.read``, ``.import``,
+   ``.restore``, ``.clone``, ``.load``, ``.system``, ``.shell``, ``.save``),
+   keep MUTATIVE.
+3. If every dot-command present is a strictly read-only sqlite3 schema /
+   metadata command (``.schema``, ``.tables``, ``.databases``,
+   ``.indexes`` / ``.indices``, ``.dbinfo``, ``.show``, ``.fullschema``),
+   classify as READ_ONLY.  This check runs *after* rule 2, so the
+   write-capable dot-commands above are caught first and never downgraded;
+   ``.dump`` / ``.output`` / ``.once`` / ``.backup`` are deliberately left
+   out of the read-only set (conservative) and fall through to MUTATIVE.
+4. If a flag override matches (e.g. ``-readonly``), classify as READ_ONLY.
+5. If the command exposes an inline payload via a recognised flag pair
    (``-c``, ``-e``, ``--eval``) and the payload matches the read-only
    regex, classify as READ_ONLY.
-5. Otherwise return ``default_intent`` (MUTATIVE).
+6. Otherwise return ``default_intent`` (MUTATIVE).
 
 A future Nivel 2 (`sql_payload_analyzer.py`) will parse external SQL files
 and inline payloads into an AST and downgrade more cases -- e.g., a file
@@ -105,6 +114,29 @@ _SQLITE_MUTATIVE_DOT_COMMANDS: FrozenSet[str] = frozenset({
     ".read", ".import", ".restore", ".clone", ".load", ".system", ".shell", ".save",
 })
 
+#: SQLite dot-commands that are strictly read-only schema/metadata introspection.
+#: These produce no side effects on the database file and write nothing to disk.
+#:
+#: NOT included (remain MUTATIVE):
+#:   .import, .restore, .backup, .clone, .save  -- write to db/file
+#:   .read                                       -- executes an arbitrary script
+#:   .output / .once                             -- redirects output to a file
+#:   .load                                       -- loads a native extension (exec)
+#:   .system / .shell                            -- arbitrary OS command execution
+#:   .dump                                       -- NOT included: commonly piped to
+#:                                                  files and by default prints the
+#:                                                  full db; conservative exclusion.
+_SQLITE_READONLY_DOT_COMMANDS: FrozenSet[str] = frozenset({
+    ".schema",      # prints CREATE statements for tables/indexes
+    ".tables",      # lists tables in the database
+    ".databases",   # lists attached databases
+    ".indexes",     # lists indexes for a table or all tables
+    ".indices",     # alias for .indexes
+    ".dbinfo",      # prints low-level metadata about the db file
+    ".show",        # prints current settings (not data)
+    ".fullschema",  # prints CREATE statements including schema_table
+})
+
 #: Tokens shlex emits for unquoted shell redirects.  Their presence in the
 #: positional argument stream means the inline command was fed from an
 #: external source -- the payload is uninspected at Nivel 1.
@@ -258,6 +290,29 @@ def _has_sqlite_load_dot_command(tokens: Tuple[str, ...]) -> bool:
     return False
 
 
+def _has_sqlite_readonly_dot_command(tokens: Tuple[str, ...]) -> bool:
+    """Return True when ALL dot-commands present in the tokens are
+    strictly read-only schema/metadata commands.
+
+    Returns False (falls through) when no dot-command is present so the
+    regular inline-payload and default rules continue to apply.
+    Returns False when a dot-command outside the read-only allowlist is
+    found -- the caller should treat those as MUTATIVE.
+    """
+    dot_cmds_found = []
+    for tok in tokens:
+        stripped = tok.strip().strip('"').strip("'")
+        first_word = stripped.split(None, 1)[0] if stripped else ""
+        if first_word.startswith("."):
+            dot_cmds_found.append(first_word.lower())
+
+    if not dot_cmds_found:
+        return False
+
+    # Every dot-command present must be in the read-only set.
+    return all(cmd in _SQLITE_READONLY_DOT_COMMANDS for cmd in dot_cmds_found)
+
+
 # ============================================================================
 # Main entry point
 # ============================================================================
@@ -271,8 +326,16 @@ def classify_capability(semantics: CommandSemantics) -> CapabilityResult:
 
     Resolution order (mirrors module docstring):
 
-    1. External payload (redirect ``<`` or sqlite ``.read``-style command)
-       -> MUTATIVE.
+    1. External payload (redirect ``<``) -> MUTATIVE.
+    1b. sqlite write-capable dot-command (``.read`` / ``.import`` /
+        ``.restore`` / ``.clone`` / ``.load`` / ``.system`` / ``.shell`` /
+        ``.save``) -> MUTATIVE.
+    1c. sqlite read-only schema/metadata dot-command (``.schema`` /
+        ``.tables`` / ``.databases`` / ``.indexes`` / ``.indices`` /
+        ``.dbinfo`` / ``.show`` / ``.fullschema``) -> READ_ONLY.  Runs after
+        1b so write-capable dot-commands are never downgraded; ``.dump`` /
+        ``.output`` / ``.once`` / ``.backup`` are excluded (conservative)
+        and fall through to the default.
     2. Flag override -> READ_ONLY.
     3. Inline-payload override -> READ_ONLY.
     4. Default -> ``default_intent`` (always MUTATIVE today).
@@ -314,6 +377,20 @@ def classify_capability(semantics: CommandSemantics) -> CapabilityResult:
             ),
         )
 
+    # --- Rule 1c: sqlite read-only dot-commands -> READ_ONLY ----------------
+    # Must run after the mutative-dot-command check so that write-capable
+    # dot-commands (.read, .import, ...) are never downgraded here.
+    if base_cmd in {"sqlite3", "sqlite"} and _has_sqlite_readonly_dot_command(tokens):
+        return CapabilityResult(
+            matched=True,
+            capability_class=class_name,
+            intent=CATEGORY_READ_ONLY,
+            reason=(
+                f"{class_name}: sqlite dot-command is a read-only schema/metadata "
+                "introspection command (.schema / .tables / .databases / ...)"
+            ),
+        )
+
     # --- Rule 2: flag-based overrides ---------------------------------------
     flag_overrides = [
         rule["flag"] for rule in overrides