@jaguilar87/gaia 5.0.7 → 5.0.9

package/dist/gaia-ops/hooks/modules/tools/bash_validator.py

@@ -90,6 +90,11 @@ class BashValidationResult:
     # plain error string (exit 2).  Used for structured block responses that
     # should correct the agent rather than terminate execution.
     block_response: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None
+    # When a T3 command is allowed because it matched (and consumed) an active
+    # grant, this carries the approval_id of that grant. The adapter stashes it
+    # in HookState so PostToolUse can append an EXECUTED/FAILED event to the
+    # approval_events chain for this approval. None for non-T3 / no-grant paths.
+    consumed_approval_id: Optional[str] = None
 
     def __post_init__(self):
         if self.suggestions is None:
@@ -667,6 +672,7 @@ class BashValidator:
                     allowed=True,
                     tier=SecurityTier.T3_BLOCKED,
                     reason="Command-set grant matched",
+                    consumed_approval_id=cs_approval_id,
                 )
 
             # DB-primary + filesystem-fallback grant check.
@@ -720,6 +726,7 @@ class BashValidator:
                         allowed=True,
                         tier=SecurityTier.T3_BLOCKED,
                         reason="Grant confirmed",
+                        consumed_approval_id=db_approval_id,
                     )
                 else:
                     # Filesystem grant exists, not yet confirmed -- GAIA approved,
@@ -733,6 +740,7 @@ class BashValidator:
                         allowed=True,
                         tier=SecurityTier.T3_BLOCKED,
                         reason="Grant active, pending confirmation",
+                        consumed_approval_id=db_approval_id,
                     )
             else:
                 # Converge on the single T3 decision point.  When there is an
@@ -808,6 +816,7 @@ class BashValidator:
                             allowed=True,
                             tier=SecurityTier.T3_BLOCKED,
                             reason="Command-set grant matched",
+                            consumed_approval_id=cs_approval_id,
                         )
 
                     grant = check_approval_grant(command, session_id=session_id)
@@ -859,6 +868,7 @@ class BashValidator:
                                 allowed=True,
                                 tier=SecurityTier.T3_BLOCKED,
                                 reason="Grant confirmed",
+                                consumed_approval_id=db_approval_id,
                             )
                         else:
                             logger.info(
@@ -870,6 +880,7 @@ class BashValidator:
                                 allowed=True,
                                 tier=SecurityTier.T3_BLOCKED,
                                 reason="Grant active, pending confirmation",
+                                consumed_approval_id=db_approval_id,
                             )
 
                     # No grant matched -- converge on the single T3 decision
@@ -939,10 +950,18 @@ class BashValidator:
             key=lambda t: tier_order.index(t.value),
         )
 
+        # Propagate the consumed approval_id from whichever component matched a
+        # grant, so PostToolUse can append EXECUTED/FAILED for that approval.
+        consumed_approval_id = next(
+            (r.consumed_approval_id for r in component_results if r.consumed_approval_id),
+            None,
+        )
+
         return BashValidationResult(
             allowed=True,
             tier=highest_tier,
             reason=f"All {len(components)} components validated",
+            consumed_approval_id=consumed_approval_id,
         )
 
     def _phase4_check_composition(

package/dist/gaia-ops/hooks/post_compact.py

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ def _handle_post_compact(event) -> None:
 
     response = {
         "hookSpecificOutput": {
+            "hookEventName": "PostCompact",
             "additionalContext": context,
         }
     }

package/dist/gaia-ops/hooks/pre_compact.py

@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ def _handle_pre_compact(event) -> None:
 
     response = {
         "hookSpecificOutput": {
+            "hookEventName": "PreCompact",
             "additionalContext": context,
         }
     }

package/dist/gaia-ops/hooks/user_prompt_submit.py

@@ -194,6 +194,26 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
             else:
                 logger.info("Could not extract user prompt from stdin, skipping routing")
 
+            # Per-turn VERIFIED pending approvals. Lets the orchestrator present
+            # a pending approval for consent directly from injected context,
+            # WITHOUT dispatching a subagent to derive/verify it (that dispatch's
+            # SubagentStop caused a pending-revocation bug). Emits "" when there
+            # are no verified pendings, so a turn with nothing pending injects
+            # nothing -- this is what keeps the per-turn injection quiet, unlike
+            # the one-shot SessionStart summary it deliberately does not re-emit.
+            try:
+                from modules.session.session_manifest import (
+                    build_per_turn_pending_approvals_block,
+                )
+                pending_block = build_per_turn_pending_approvals_block()
+                if pending_block:
+                    context_parts.append(pending_block)
+            except Exception as _pa_exc:
+                logger.debug(
+                    "per-turn pending approvals injection failed (non-fatal): %s",
+                    _pa_exc,
+                )
+
         additional_context = "\n\n".join(context_parts)
         logger.info("Context injected: %s mode (%d chars)", mode, len(additional_context))
 

package/dist/gaia-ops/skills/agent-approval-protocol/SKILL.md

@@ -14,6 +14,20 @@ through the hook layer, to the orchestrator when a T3 command is blocked: the
 the status and event vocabularies, and how to confirm a grant is active. The
 tables below are the canonical schema -- relay them verbatim, do not author them.
 
+The orchestrator presents this contract to the user from a **trusted source**,
+never by dispatching a subagent to verify or derive it (it has no shell). The
+primary source is the per-turn `[PENDING-APPROVALS-VERIFIED]` block injected at
+`UserPromptSubmit` (`build_verified_pending_approvals` in
+`hooks/modules/session/session_manifest.py`), which carries every pending that
+has survived >= 1 turn, each already DB-read and fingerprint-verified
+(`verified: true`). For a pending emitted in the current turn -- not yet in the
+block -- the fallback is the subagent's relayed `approval_request`. The
+**integrity boundary is grant activation**, not presentation:
+`verify_fingerprint` (`gaia/approvals/chain.py`) runs when the user selects the
+Approve label, so a tampered payload fails to form a grant regardless of how it
+was presented. See `Skill('orchestrator-present-approval')` for the presentation
+discipline.
+
 For the universal response envelope (`plan_status` states, `evidence_report`),
 see `agent-protocol`. For the deep mechanics -- fingerprint canonicalization,
 the hash chain, grant activation, reading a granted approval from Python -- see
@@ -21,10 +35,20 @@ the hash chain, grant activation, reading a granted approval from Python -- see
 
 ## approval_id format
 
+For a **singular** T3 approval (the hook-block path),
 `store._generate_approval_id()` returns `P-{uuid4().hex}` (e.g.
-`P-b1bdfbb0b9474bf5b3f86b1f6a213f7a`). The `P-` prefix is mandatory: without it
-the PostToolUse hook cannot do targeted grant activation. The first 8 hex chars
-after `P-` are the nonce prefix shown in option labels: `[P-b1bdfbb0]`.
+`P-b1bdfbb0b9474bf5b3f86b1f6a213f7a`) -- a random, unique id the subagent relays
+verbatim. For a **plan-first `COMMAND_SET`** the id is instead **content-derived**
+by `store.derive_command_set_id()`: `P-<first 32 hex of
+sha256(canonical(command strings))>`. The two share the `P-` prefix and 32-hex
+length but differ in origin -- the command_set id is deterministic (minted at
+SubagentStop intake), and once the pending has survived a turn the orchestrator
+reads that id directly from the injected `[PENDING-APPROVALS-VERIFIED]` block
+(no derive-dispatch, no DB search); the singular id is random and the subagent
+relays it directly for the same-turn case. The `P-` prefix is mandatory in both
+cases: without it the PostToolUse
+hook cannot do targeted grant activation. The first 8 hex chars after `P-` are
+the nonce prefix shown in option labels: `[P-b1bdfbb0]`.
 
 ## APPROVAL_REQUEST contract shape
 
@@ -55,8 +79,11 @@ becomes `rollback` in the contract; `commands` (`[exact_content]`) and
 }
 ```
 
-There is no `batch_scope` field: the `verb_family` grant was removed, so each
-blocked command gets its own single-use grant. See
+There is no `batch_scope` field: the `verb_family` grant was removed. For a
+single blocked command, each gets its own single-use `SCOPE_SEMANTIC_SIGNATURE`
+grant. For a batch of >= 2 T3 commands known up-front, emit a `command_set`
+list and **no** `approval_id` -- the SubagentStop intake mints a single
+`COMMAND_SET` grant (one consent covers all). See
 `Skill('orchestrator-present-approval')` for the orchestrator side.
 
 ## Status vocabularies -- distinct columns, opposite casing, never collapse
@@ -69,8 +96,8 @@ blocked command gets its own single-use grant. See
 ## Event chain
 
 The `approval_events.event_type` CHECK admits nine values: `REQUESTED` `SHOWN`
-`APPROVED` `REJECTED` `EXECUTED` `FAILED` `NOOP` `REVOKED` `REVERTED`. Only these
-are written by production code today:
+`APPROVED` `REJECTED` `EXECUTED` `FAILED` `NOOP` `REVOKED` `REVERTED`. These are
+written by production code today:
 
 | Event | Who writes it | When |
 |-------|--------------|------|
@@ -78,11 +105,16 @@ are written by production code today:
 | `SHOWN` | ElicitationResult hook via `activate_db_pending_by_prefix()` | User selects an Approve `[P-xxx]` label |
 | `APPROVED` | ElicitationResult hook (same call as `SHOWN`) | Immediately after `SHOWN` |
 | `REJECTED` / `REVOKED` | `gaia approvals` CLI via `store.reject()` / `store.revoke()` | User rejects or admin cancels |
+| `EXECUTED` / `FAILED` | PostToolUse adapter (`_record_t3_outcome_event`) via `store.record_event()` | An approved T3 command runs under a consumed grant -- `EXECUTED` on clean exit, `FAILED` otherwise |
 
-`EXECUTED` `FAILED` `NOOP` `REVERTED` are valid in the CHECK and are *read* by
-`store.get_executed_payload()` and `revert.py`, but no production hook *writes*
-them today -- treat them as a designed extension point, not a live invariant. Do
-not assume an `EXECUTED` event exists after a command runs.
+The PostToolUse path closes the audit cycle: PreToolUse stashes the consumed
+grant's `approval_id` in `HookState`, and PostToolUse appends `EXECUTED` or
+`FAILED` for that approval, continuing the hash chain through `record_event()`.
+`store.get_executed_payload()` and `gaia approvals replay` read the `EXECUTED`
+payload to re-present the commands that ran. `NOOP` and `REVERTED` remain valid
+in the CHECK but are **inert** -- no production code writes them (the revert
+feature was removed). Do not assume an `EXECUTED` event exists for an approval
+whose command never ran, or that ran through the redirect-sanitized path.
 
 ## Key invariants
 
@@ -90,9 +122,13 @@ not assume an `EXECUTED` event exists after a command runs.
 - `SHOWN` precedes `APPROVED`; the activation path writes them together.
 - `approval_events` is append-only -- the `bu_approval_events_immutable` and
   `bd_approval_events_immutable` triggers `RAISE(ABORT)` on UPDATE/DELETE.
-- The orchestrator MUST re-verify a relayed payload via
-  `chain.verify_fingerprint(approval_id, payload_json, con)` before presenting;
-  a mismatch raises `ChainTamperError` and the approval aborts.
+- The payload's integrity is enforced at grant **activation**, not at
+  presentation: `chain.verify_fingerprint(approval_id, payload_json, con)` runs
+  when the user selects the Approve label, and a mismatch raises
+  `ChainTamperError` so the grant never forms. The orchestrator presents from a
+  trusted source (the injected `[PENDING-APPROVALS-VERIFIED]` block, already
+  fingerprint-verified by the hook; or a same-turn relayed `approval_request`)
+  and never dispatches a subagent to verify or derive the approval.
 
 For the grant activation walk-through, fingerprint internals, reading a granted
 approval from Python, and the retry-blocked-again diagnosis, see `reference.md`.

package/dist/gaia-ops/skills/agent-approval-protocol/reference.md

@@ -12,12 +12,17 @@ canonical string. `store.insert_requested()` stores both the canonical JSON
 (`payload_json`) and the hex fingerprint on the `approvals` row and on the
 `REQUESTED` event.
 
-The orchestrator MUST re-verify via
-`chain.verify_fingerprint(approval_id, payload_json, con)` before presenting.
-That function re-parses and re-canonicalizes the relayed `payload_json`,
-recomputes the fingerprint, and compares it against the fingerprint stored on
-the `REQUESTED` event. A mismatch raises `ChainTamperError` and the approval
-aborts -- this is a security boundary, not a recoverable UX issue.
+The fingerprint is verified at grant **activation**, not at presentation.
+`chain.verify_fingerprint(approval_id, payload_json, con)` re-parses and
+re-canonicalizes the payload, recomputes the fingerprint, and compares it
+against the fingerprint stored on the `REQUESTED` event; a mismatch raises
+`ChainTamperError` and the grant never forms -- a security boundary, not a
+recoverable UX issue. The per-turn `[PENDING-APPROVALS-VERIFIED]` builder
+(`build_verified_pending_approvals`) applies the same check when assembling the
+injected block, so only fingerprint-clean pendings reach the orchestrator marked
+`verified: true`. The orchestrator therefore presents from that already-verified
+block (or a same-turn relayed `approval_request`) and never dispatches to verify
+the payload itself.
 
 ## Hash chain
 
@@ -27,9 +32,11 @@ Each event links to the previous via `prev_hash` -> `this_hash`
 Because `approval_events` is append-only (UPDATE/DELETE blocked by the
 `bu_approval_events_immutable` and `bd_approval_events_immutable` triggers),
 `this_hash` is computed in the application layer before INSERT, inside
-`chain.insert_event()` -- not by a DB trigger. `REVERTED` events, when written,
-carry the original `event_id` in `metadata_json` per the revert design (D14);
-see `gaia/approvals/revert.py`.
+`chain.insert_event()` -- not by a DB trigger. `EXECUTED` / `FAILED` events,
+appended by the PostToolUse adapter through `store.record_event()` after an
+approved T3 command runs, extend the same chain. `REVERTED` remains a valid
+CHECK value but is **inert** -- the revert feature was removed, so no code
+writes it.
 
 ## Grant activation walk-through
 

package/dist/gaia-ops/skills/agent-protocol/examples.md

@@ -330,4 +330,15 @@ The agent discovered a project fact a section it owns did not yet hold, and writ
 
 ## Notes on multi-command APPROVAL_REQUEST sweeps
 
-There is no batch/multi-use grant in the current code: the legacy `verb_family` grant was removed (`hooks/modules/security/approval_grants.py`) and its `COMMAND_SET` replacement has no production activation path yet. Do **not** emit a `batch_scope` field -- it is ignored. When one intent expands into many T3 commands, each blocked command produces its own single-use approval; emit one `APPROVAL_REQUEST` per blocked command (shape identical to example 4 above) and let the user approve each.
+**Just-in-time (unknown batch):** when T3 commands appear one at a time as the
+agent works, each blocked command produces its own `APPROVAL_REQUEST` with an
+`approval_id` (shape identical to example 4 above). Do not emit `batch_scope`
+-- it is ignored.
+
+**Plan-first (known batch):** when the agent knows >= 2 T3 commands up-front,
+emit ONE `APPROVAL_REQUEST` carrying a `command_set` list of `{command,
+rationale}` items and **no** `approval_id`. The SubagentStop intake
+(`handoff_persister._intake_command_set_pending`) mints a single `COMMAND_SET`
+approval; the orchestrator presents it as one consent covering all N commands.
+Each command then runs on its own retry, byte-for-byte matched and consumed
+individually.

package/dist/gaia-ops/skills/gaia-patterns/reference.md

@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ The package ships a single `gaia` binary (`bin/gaia.js`) that dispatches to Pyth
 | `gaia memory` | `bin/cli/memory.py` | Episodic memory: FTS5 search, show episode, health checks |
 | `gaia metrics` | `bin/cli/metrics.py` | Usage analytics: tier classification, agent invocations, anomaly counters |
 | `gaia paths` | `bin/cli/paths.py` | Inspect canonical Gaia storage paths (DB, plugin root, workspace) |
-| `gaia plans` | `bin/cli/plans.py` | List and display briefs/plans with status info |
+| `gaia plan` | `bin/cli/plan.py` | Manage plans (one per brief, DB-canonical): save, show, list, status |
 | `gaia workspace` | `bin/cli/workspace.py` | Workspace identity and consolidate operations |
 | `gaia scan` | `bin/cli/scan.py` | In-process project scan: detect stack, sync results to ~/.gaia/gaia.db (DB-canonical; no project-context.json written) |
 | `gaia status` | `bin/cli/status.py` | Quick installation snapshot: version, mode, DB path, registered workspace, last scan |
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ After `npm install -g @jaguilar87/gaia` (or via the local symlink) the dispatche
 | `gaia history` | Session history viewer | Debugging past sessions |
 | `gaia memory` | Episodic memory inspect/search | Recall past episodes, memory health |
 | `gaia approvals` | List/accept/reject pending T3 approvals | Approval workflow |
-| `gaia brief` / `gaia plans` | Brief and plan management against the DB substrate | Planning, brief lifecycle |
+| `gaia brief` / `gaia plan` | Brief and plan management against the DB substrate | Planning, brief lifecycle |
 | `gaia context` | Display and refresh project context | Audit context state |
 | `gaia paths` | Print resolved storage paths | Path debugging |
 | `gaia workspace` | Workspace identity and consolidate operations | Multi-workspace setups |

package/dist/gaia-ops/skills/orchestrator-present-approval/SKILL.md

@@ -15,11 +15,13 @@ names the specific action. No exceptions. No brevity shortcuts.
 ```
 
 `orchestrator-present-approval` is the discipline the orchestrator follows when
-a subagent emits `APPROVAL_REQUEST` with an `approval_id`: relay the
-`sealed_payload` into AskUserQuestion -- fingerprint check, mandatory fields in
-the question, mandatory nonce in the option label. For the subagent side that
-produced the payload see `subagent-request-approval`; for the data contract
-itself see `agent-approval-protocol`.
+an approval needs the user's consent: relay the sealed fields into
+AskUserQuestion -- mandatory fields in the question, mandatory nonce in the
+option label. The orchestrator has no shell, so it never dispatches a subagent
+to derive or verify an approval; it presents from a trusted source it already
+holds. For the subagent side that produced the payload see
+`subagent-request-approval`; for the data contract itself see
+`agent-approval-protocol`.
 
 ## Mental Model
 
@@ -27,19 +29,53 @@ The orchestrator sits between the subagent and the user. The user cannot make
 an informed decision on data they have not seen -- a summary, a reference to
 "the plan above", or an offer to show details on request all push the decision
 without the data needed to decide. The job is **verbatim relay, not
-re-authoring**: rewriting any of the 7 sealed fields breaks the fingerprint and
-`verify_fingerprint` (`gaia/approvals/chain.py`) raises `ChainTamperError`.
-
-## Step 0 -- Verify the approval against the DB (mandatory before SHOWN)
-
-A subagent's reported `approval_id` is an unverified claim, not a fact. The agent runs in its own context and can relay an id that is stale, from another session, or simply wrong -- and a stale id presented as a fresh block walks the user into consenting to nothing real (or to a grant that no longer exists). The DB is the source of truth; the agent's report is a pointer into it that you must resolve, never the authority itself.
-
-So before AskUserQuestion, two checks against the DB, in order:
-
-1. **The approval exists, is fresh, and is from the current session.** Query `gaia approvals pending --session "$CLAUDE_SESSION_ID"` (or `--json` for parsing). The reported `approval_id` MUST appear in that result. If it appears only under `--all-sessions` but not the current session, it is leakage from another session (a test session such as `e2e-sim`, a prior run) -- **do not present**. If it does not appear at all, it does not exist or was already consumed/rejected -- **do not present**. Freshness is the `created_at` of the pending row plus its presence as still-`pending`; an id the agent reports that is not currently pending in *this* session is not a fresh block, whatever the agent says.
-2. **The payload is untampered.** Call `verify_fingerprint(approval_id, payload_json, con) -> bool` from `gaia/approvals/chain.py`. It raises `ChainTamperError` if the payload was modified between subagent emission and your relay (security boundary, do not present), and `ValueError` if no REQUESTED event exists for this `approval_id`. Either case: **do not present**, report the failure, stop.
-
-**For a `command_set` (plan-first batch) the agent does not know the id at all.** The hook mints the `approval_id` at SubagentStop (`_intake_command_set_pending` -- see Rule 3); the subagent emits the `command_set` with **no** `approval_id`. So you do not have an agent-reported id to trust even if you wanted to -- you ALWAYS recover the freshly minted id from `gaia approvals pending` for the current session. This is the general shape made unavoidable: the DB mints, the orchestrator recovers, the agent never owns the id.
+re-authoring**: rewriting any of the sealed fields would change the consent
+surface from what was recorded. Integrity of the payload is enforced at grant
+**activation** (`verify_fingerprint` in `gaia/approvals/chain.py`, called when
+the user selects the Approve label), not at presentation -- so presentation
+itself never needs a verify-dispatch.
+
+## Step 0 -- Present from a trusted source; never dispatch to verify or derive
+
+The orchestrator has no shell. It MUST NOT dispatch a subagent solely to derive
+or verify an approval before presenting -- that dispatch is both unnecessary
+(the integrity check runs at activation, below) and harmful (its SubagentStop
+can sweep the very pending being verified). Instead, present from one of two
+**trusted** sources:
+
+1. **Primary -- the injected `[PENDING-APPROVALS-VERIFIED]` block.** A per-turn
+   hook (`hooks/modules/session/session_manifest.py`) injects, on every
+   `UserPromptSubmit`, every pending that has survived >= 1 turn. Each row in
+   that block has already been DB-read and fingerprint-verified by the hook
+   (`build_verified_pending_approvals` -- only rows whose payload re-canonicalizes
+   to the fingerprint stored on their `REQUESTED` event appear, each marked
+   `verified: true`). **Present directly from this block** -- the fields, the
+   full `approval_id`, and (for batches) the whole `command_set` with its minted
+   id are all there. No DB query, no `derive-id`, no dispatch.
+2. **Fallback -- same-turn relay.** A pending a subagent emits during the
+   CURRENT turn will not be in this turn's block yet: the block is built at
+   `UserPromptSubmit`, before the subagent ran. For that case present from the
+   subagent's relayed `approval_request`. This is justified because the pending
+   was freshly minted in THIS session by a trusted dispatch, AND integrity is
+   enforced at grant **activation** (`verify_fingerprint` fires when the user
+   selects the Approve label), not at presentation. The old pre-presentation
+   verify was redundant belt-and-suspenders; it is removed.
+
+Once the pending survives a turn it appears in the injected block, so the relay
+is only ever needed for the same-turn case.
+
+**For a `command_set` (plan-first batch) you do not derive the id -- you read it
+from the block.** The hook mints the `approval_id` at SubagentStop
+(`_intake_command_set_pending` -- see Rule 3) from the **content** of the
+command_set (`derive_command_set_id` in `gaia/approvals/store.py`,
+`P-<first 32 hex of sha256(canonical(command list))>`). Once that pending has
+survived a turn, the `[PENDING-APPROVALS-VERIFIED]` block carries it with its
+minted `approval_id` and all N commands already attached -- so you read the id
+and the commands straight from the block. **No `gaia approvals derive-id`
+dispatch is needed.** For a command_set emitted in the CURRENT turn (not yet in
+the block), present from the subagent's relayed `approval_request`, which carries
+the same `command_set`; the content-derived id reaches you when the pending
+appears in the next turn's block.
 
 ## Mandatory presentation -- 5 labeled fields + nonce-suffixed label
 
@@ -66,7 +102,13 @@ whose `id` starts with `P-{prefix}`. Without the suffix no grant is created.
 See `template.md` for the canonical layout and `reference.md` -> "GOOD vs BAD
 Examples" for full presentations.
 
-Fields above are extracted from the DB-stored canonical payload (`payload_json` on the REQUESTED row), not from the subagent's relayed `approval_request` — that's why `rollback_hint` is the field name here while the subagent contract uses `rollback`.
+Fields above are extracted from your trusted source. From the injected
+`[PENDING-APPROVALS-VERIFIED]` block (the primary path) they appear under the
+canonical names shown here (`operation`, `exact_content`, `scope`, `risk_level`,
+`rationale`, `rollback_hint`). From a same-turn relayed `approval_request` (the
+fallback) the rollback field arrives under the key `rollback` -- map it to
+ROLLBACK the same way. Either way you copy values verbatim; you do not re-author
+them.
 
 ## Rules
 
@@ -84,7 +126,12 @@ Fields above are extracted from the DB-stored canonical payload (`payload_json`
    `APPROVAL_REQUEST` carrying a `command_set` of >= 2 `{command, rationale}`
    items and **no** `approval_id`, the SubagentStop processor
    (`handoff_persister._intake_command_set_pending`) mints ONE pending
-   `COMMAND_SET` with one `approval_id`. You present that single approval: list
+   `COMMAND_SET` with one content-derived `approval_id`. Once that pending has
+   survived a turn it appears in the injected `[PENDING-APPROVALS-VERIFIED]`
+   block with its minted `approval_id` and all N commands -- **read the id and
+   commands from the block; do not dispatch `gaia approvals derive-id`.** (A
+   command_set emitted in the current turn is presented from the subagent's
+   relayed `approval_request`.) You present that single approval: list
    **all N commands** in the question body, but use **one** Approve label with
    **one** `[P-{nonce8}]` suffix -- one consent covers the whole batch. On
    approval, `activate_db_pending_by_prefix` Step 3b creates a single
@@ -120,5 +167,5 @@ wording, see `reference.md` -> "GOOD vs BAD Examples", "Option Label Patterns",
 | "Similar command, slightly different path -- I'll reuse / wrap it" | Grants match the statement signature byte-for-byte. Any wrapper, redirect, flag, or path drift is a different signature and a fresh re-block. |
 | "The same command emitted a new approval_id" | Grants are single-use and consumed on the first retry. A second run is a new APPROVAL_REQUEST -- approve again. |
 | "I'll set batch_scope to approve many at once" | `batch_scope` is ignored -- but a real batch path exists: a plan-first `command_set` (>= 2 items, no `approval_id`) is intaken into ONE pending `COMMAND_SET`. Present that single approval (N commands shown, one `[P-...]` nonce, one consent), not N separate approvals. |
-| "I can paraphrase a field before relaying" | The fingerprint covers all 7 sealed fields; any modification raises `ChainTamperError` in Step 0 and the presentation is refused. |
-| **"The agent reported an `approval_id`, so it's a real fresh block"** -- trusting a nonce relayed by the subagent | The agent's reported id is an unverified pointer, not a fact. It can be stale or belong to another session -- subagents have presented a STALE nonce from a test session (`e2e-sim`) as if it were a fresh block. Resolve every reported id against `gaia approvals pending --session "$CLAUDE_SESSION_ID"` (Step 0): it must be currently pending in *this* session. Visible only under `--all-sessions`, or absent entirely, means do not present. For `command_set` the hook mints the id and the agent never has one -- you always recover it from the DB. |
+| "I can paraphrase a field before relaying" | The fingerprint covers all sealed fields and is checked at grant **activation** (`verify_fingerprint`, when the user selects the Approve label); a paraphrase there raises `ChainTamperError` and the grant never forms. Relay verbatim so activation succeeds. |
+| **"I'll dispatch a subagent to verify or derive the approval before presenting"** | The orchestrator has no shell and must NEVER dispatch to verify or derive an approval. The pending arrives **already verified** in the injected `[PENDING-APPROVALS-VERIFIED]` block (DB-read + fingerprint-checked by the per-turn hook, `verified: true`) -- present from it. For a same-turn pending not yet in the block, present from the subagent's relayed `approval_request`. A verify/derive dispatch is unnecessary (integrity is enforced at activation) and harmful (its SubagentStop can sweep the very pending). For `command_set`, read the minted `approval_id` and all commands from the block -- do not run `gaia approvals derive-id`. |

package/dist/gaia-ops/skills/orchestrator-present-approval/reference.md

@@ -151,6 +151,16 @@ commands** in the question body, with **one** Approve label carrying **one**
 `[P-{nonce8}]` suffix. The user gives one consent; each command then runs on its
 own retry within the 60-minute window. You do NOT issue N separate approvals.
 
+**Reading the batch id and commands -- from the block, not by dispatch.** Once
+the minted `COMMAND_SET` pending has survived a turn, it appears in the injected
+`[PENDING-APPROVALS-VERIFIED]` block with its content-derived `approval_id` and
+all N commands attached (`build_verified_pending_approvals` in
+`hooks/modules/session/session_manifest.py`). Read the id and the commands
+straight from that block -- the orchestrator has no shell and must NOT dispatch
+`gaia approvals derive-id` or any verify command. For a command_set emitted in
+the CURRENT turn (not yet in the block), present from the subagent's relayed
+`approval_request`, which carries the same `command_set`.
+
 ## Grant Activation Mechanics
 
 When the hook blocks a T3 Bash command in subagent context,
@@ -161,9 +171,12 @@ generates a `P-{uuid4_hex}` `approval_id`, fingerprints the payload, inserts an
 message ends with `approval_id: P-{...}` (`build_t3_blocked_denial_message` in
 `hooks/modules/security/approval_messages.py`).
 
-The subagent relays that `approval_id` in its `approval_request`. The
-orchestrator presents via AskUserQuestion with the `[P-xxxxxxxx]` label. When
-the user selects the Approve label, the **ElicitationResult hook**
+The orchestrator presents via AskUserQuestion with the `[P-xxxxxxxx]` label,
+reading the `approval_id` and fields from the injected
+`[PENDING-APPROVALS-VERIFIED]` block (primary) or, for a same-turn pending not
+yet in the block, from the subagent's relayed `approval_request` (fallback). It
+does not dispatch to verify or derive. When the user selects the Approve label,
+the **ElicitationResult hook**
 (`hooks/elicitation_result.py`) fires and calls
 `activate_db_pending_by_prefix()`, which:
 

package/dist/gaia-ops/skills/orchestrator-present-approval/template.md

@@ -1,8 +1,12 @@
 # AskUserQuestion Template
 
 Use this layout verbatim when presenting an approval to the user. Replace
-`{...}` placeholders with values extracted from the subagent's `sealed_payload`
-and `approval_request`. Do not paraphrase, summarize, or omit any field.
+`{...}` placeholders with values read from your trusted source -- the injected
+`[PENDING-APPROVALS-VERIFIED]` block (primary; already DB-read and
+fingerprint-verified by the per-turn hook) or, for a same-turn pending not yet
+in the block, the subagent's relayed `approval_request` (fallback). Never
+dispatch a subagent to derive or verify the approval. Do not paraphrase,
+summarize, or omit any field.
 
 ## Standard Approval (single command)
 
@@ -23,19 +27,21 @@ AskUserQuestion(
 )
 ```
 
-Where `approval_id_prefix8` is the first 8 characters of the `approval_id`
-field from the subagent's `approval_request` (after the `P-` prefix).
+Where `approval_id_prefix8` is the first 8 characters (after the `P-` prefix) of
+the `approval_id` read from the `[PENDING-APPROVALS-VERIFIED]` block, or from the
+subagent's `approval_request` for a same-turn pending.
 
-## No batch template
+## Batch template (COMMAND_SET)
 
-There is no batch/multi-use approval in the current code. The `verb_family` grant
-was removed (see the module docstring of
-`hooks/modules/security/approval_grants.py`) and the `COMMAND_SET` replacement
-has no production activation path (`create_command_set_grant` has no production
-caller). The word "batch" in a label and a `batch_scope` field are both ignored.
-For a sweep of N commands, present each command with its own single-command
-approval (the template above), once per `approval_id`. See `reference.md` ->
-"On batch intents".
+When the subagent emits a plan-first `APPROVAL_REQUEST` with a `command_set`
+of >= 2 `{command, rationale}` items and **no** `approval_id`, the
+SubagentStop intake mints ONE pending `COMMAND_SET` approval. Present it as
+a single approval: list all N commands in the question body, one Approve
+label with one `[P-{nonce8}]` suffix. See `reference.md` -> "On batch
+intents" for the full layout.
+
+A `batch_scope` field and the word "batch" in an option label are both
+ignored -- the signal is the presence of `command_set` in the contract.
 
 ## Field Extraction Reference
 
@@ -46,4 +52,4 @@ approval (the template above), once per `approval_id`. See `reference.md` ->
 | SCOPE | `sealed_payload.scope` |
 | RIESGO | `sealed_payload.risk_level` + `sealed_payload.rationale` |
 | ROLLBACK | `sealed_payload.rollback_hint` (null -> "NOT REVERSIBLE") |
-| Option nonce suffix | `approval_request.approval_id` first 8 chars after `P-` |
+| Option nonce suffix | `approval_id` first 8 chars after `P-` (from the `[PENDING-APPROVALS-VERIFIED]` block, or `approval_request.approval_id` for a same-turn pending) |

package/dist/gaia-ops/skills/pending-approvals/SKILL.md

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ report "rejected" when nothing actually changed.
 | `gaia approvals list` | DB grants + filesystem pendings | `cmd_list` (mixed) |
 | `gaia approvals reject NONCE` | filesystem only | `reject_pending` in `hooks/modules/security/approval_grants.py` |
 | `gaia approvals reject-all` | filesystem only | loops `reject_pending` |
-| `gaia approvals clean` | filesystem only | `cleanup_expired_grants` |
+| `gaia approvals clean` | DB (cross-session stale pendings) + filesystem | `cmd_clean` in `bin/cli/approvals.py`: calls `store.list_pending(all_sessions=True)`, transitions every pending older than `DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MINUTES` (24 h) to `revoked` via `store.revoke()`, then calls `cleanup_expired_grants` for filesystem files |
 
 The practical consequence: `revoke` is the DB-aware single-id verb; `reject` and
 `reject-all` only touch the legacy filesystem queue. If you need to mark a DB
@@ -105,15 +105,19 @@ Offer bulk cleanup when the user says "limpia todos los pendings", "borra los
 pendientes", or when SessionStart surfaces 5+ orphaned pendings the user has
 not engaged with.
 
-- `gaia approvals reject-all` -- bulk reject across the **filesystem** queue.
-  Returns "0 rejected" when the queue is empty.
-- `gaia approvals clean` -- removes expired/stale **filesystem** files.
+- `gaia approvals reject-all` -- bulk soft-reject across the **filesystem** queue.
+  Returns "0 rejected" when the queue is empty. Does not touch DB rows.
+- `gaia approvals clean` -- the first-class cross-session bulk drain for stale
+  DB pendings: `cmd_clean` calls `store.list_pending(all_sessions=True)` and
+  transitions every pending older than 24 h (`DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MINUTES`) to
+  `revoked` via `store.revoke()`, then runs `cleanup_expired_grants` to clean
+  expired filesystem grant files. Runs without a T3 prompt (consent-reducing,
+  listed in `CONSENT_REDUCING_SUBCOMMAND_EXCEPTIONS`). Use this when
+  `gaia approvals pending --all-sessions` shows a backlog of stale rows.
 
-There is no first-class bulk-revoke for the DB queue. If `gaia approvals
-pending --all-sessions` shows rows that need clearing, either revoke each by id
-or call `store.revoke()` in a short Python loop. Do not report "bulk cleanup
-done" after `reject-all` if the DB queue still has pending rows -- check
-`gaia approvals pending --all-sessions` to confirm.
+Do not report "bulk cleanup done" after `reject-all` alone -- it only clears
+the filesystem queue. Run `gaia approvals clean` to drain the DB backlog, then
+confirm with `gaia approvals pending --all-sessions`.
 
 Do not offer `reject-all` when there are active same-session pendings the user
 may still want to approve.
@@ -123,8 +127,9 @@ may still want to approve.
 - Approving without showing the exact COMANDO -- the user consents on the
   verbatim string, not a summary. The full presentation discipline lives in
   `orchestrator-present-approval`; this skill does not restate it.
-- Treating `gaia approvals reject-all` as a DB cleanup -- it operates on the
-  filesystem queue only. DB rows survive the call.
+- Treating `gaia approvals reject-all` as a full cleanup -- it operates on the
+  filesystem queue only; DB rows survive the call. Use `gaia approvals clean`
+  to drain the DB backlog.
 - Reporting "rechazado" without verifying the store -- `revoke` returns
   `not_found` for filesystem-only pendings; the inverse happens for `reject` on
   DB rows. Pick the verb by store, or be ready to fall back.