@iowarp/clio-coder 0.4.4 → 0.4.6

package/src/domains/safety/autonomy.ts

@@ -139,7 +139,16 @@ export function autonomyDenyRejection(level: AutonomyLevel, tool: string, action
 		detail:
 			`Clio is at autonomy ${level}: ${actionClass} actions are denied without prompting. ` +
 			"Describe the change you would make instead, so the operator can apply it or raise the autonomy level.",
-		hints: ["Propose the exact edit or command as text.", "The operator can change the level in /settings."],
+		hints: [
+			...(level === "read-only" && actionClass === "execute"
+				? [
+						"For independent permitted inspection, use the native read, grep, find, or ls tools when available. " +
+							"Do not use them to reproduce the denied execution or write; each call still follows its safety policy.",
+					]
+				: []),
+			"Propose the exact edit or command as text.",
+			"The operator can change the level in interactive /settings or start a new headless run with clio-coder run --autonomy <level>.",
+		],
 	};
 }
 

package/src/domains/safety/contract.ts

@@ -49,7 +49,11 @@ export interface SafetyContract {
 	isSubset(worker: ScopeSpec, orchestrator: ScopeSpec): boolean;
 
 	/** Immutable safety policy metadata for receipts, audit, and replay. */
-	readonly policy?: { metadata(posture?: string): SafetyPolicyMetadata };
+	readonly policy?: {
+		metadata(posture?: string): SafetyPolicyMetadata;
+		/** Pure search-result filter using the same compiled policy as admission. */
+		allowsObservationPath?(path: string): boolean;
+	};
 
 	/**
 	 * Shared audit sink. `recordCount` is for diagnostics; `recordToolCall` is

package/src/domains/safety/default-path-policy.ts

@@ -125,3 +125,14 @@ export function mergePathPolicyInputs(base: PathPolicyInput, override: PathPolic
 		noDeletePaths: [...(base.noDeletePaths ?? []), ...(override.noDeletePaths ?? [])],
 	};
 }
+
+/** Operator and host authority survives every project-local exemption. */
+export const OPERATOR_PATH_POLICY: PathPolicyInput = {
+	zeroAccessPaths: DEFAULT_DAMAGE_CONTROL_PATH_POLICY.zeroAccessPaths?.filter((entry) => entry.startsWith("~/")) ?? [],
+	readOnlyPaths:
+		DEFAULT_DAMAGE_CONTROL_PATH_POLICY.readOnlyPaths?.filter(
+			(entry) => entry.startsWith("~/") || entry.startsWith("/") || entry.startsWith(".clio-coder/"),
+		) ?? [],
+	noWritePaths: DEFAULT_DAMAGE_CONTROL_PATH_POLICY.noWritePaths ?? [],
+	noDeletePaths: DEFAULT_DAMAGE_CONTROL_PATH_POLICY.noDeletePaths?.filter((entry) => entry.startsWith("~/")) ?? [],
+};

package/src/domains/safety/extension.ts

@@ -118,6 +118,11 @@ export function createSafetyBundle(context: DomainContext): DomainBundle<SafetyC
 	let unsubscribeDispatchFailed: (() => void) | null = null;
 	const recordedRequestedPermissionIds = new Set<string>();
 
+	function activePolicyEngine(): SafetyPolicyEngine {
+		policyEngine ??= createSafetyPolicyEngine();
+		return policyEngine;
+	}
+
 	function writeAudit(rec: AuditRecord): void {
 		if (writer === null) return;
 		writer.write(rec);
@@ -274,7 +279,7 @@ export function createSafetyBundle(context: DomainContext): DomainBundle<SafetyC
 			return classifyCall(call);
 		},
 		evaluate(call, posture) {
-			const policy = (policyEngine ?? createSafetyPolicyEngine()).evaluate(call, posture);
+			const policy = activePolicyEngine().evaluate(call, posture);
 			const classification = policy.classification;
 
 			context.bus.emit(BusChannels.SafetyClassified, {
@@ -363,7 +368,11 @@ export function createSafetyBundle(context: DomainContext): DomainBundle<SafetyC
 		},
 		scopes: { readonly: READONLY_SCOPE, workspace: WORKSPACE_SCOPE, confirmed: CONFIRMED_SCOPE },
 		isSubset,
-		policy: { metadata: (posture) => (policyEngine ?? createSafetyPolicyEngine()).metadata(posture) },
+		policy: {
+			metadata: (posture) => activePolicyEngine().metadata(posture),
+			allowsObservationPath: (path) =>
+				activePolicyEngine().evaluate({ tool: "read", args: { path } }).reasonCode !== "path-policy:zeroAccessPaths",
+		},
 		audit: {
 			recordCount: () => recordCount,
 			recordToolCall: recordToolCallAudit,

package/src/domains/safety/policy-engine.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
 import path from "node:path";
 import { artifactDefaultPath } from "../../core/artifact-paths.js";
 import { pathBoundaryCovers, resolvePathBoundary } from "../../core/path-boundary.js";
@@ -8,7 +9,11 @@ import { clioConfigDir } from "../../core/xdg.js";
 import { type DeclaredCheck, loadProjectVerifierCatalog } from "../../tools/verify/catalog.js";
 import { type ActionClass, type Classification, type ClassifierCall, classify } from "./action-classifier.js";
 import type { DamageControlMatch, DamageControlRule } from "./damage-control.js";
-import { DEFAULT_DAMAGE_CONTROL_PATH_POLICY, mergePathPolicyInputs } from "./default-path-policy.js";
+import {
+	DEFAULT_DAMAGE_CONTROL_PATH_POLICY,
+	mergePathPolicyInputs,
+	OPERATOR_PATH_POLICY,
+} from "./default-path-policy.js";
 import {
 	type CompiledPathPolicy,
 	compilePathPolicy,
@@ -32,6 +37,8 @@ import { formatRejection, type RejectionMessage } from "./rejection-feedback.js"
 import { getCachedDefaultRulePacks, type PackId, type RulePacks } from "./rule-pack-loader.js";
 import { activeClioSkillRoots, skillMutationReason } from "./skill-authority.js";
 
+import { gateProjectSafetyPolicy, workspaceTrustDirectory } from "./workspace-trust.js";
+
 export type SafetyPolicySource =
 	| "damage-control:base"
 	| "project-policy"
@@ -79,6 +86,8 @@ export interface SafetyPolicyMetadata {
 	projectPolicyHash: string | null;
 	projectPolicyValid: boolean;
 	projectPolicyErrors: ReadonlyArray<string>;
+	disableDefaultPathPolicy?: boolean;
+	workspaceTrustVerdict?: "trusted" | "untrusted" | "changed";
 	cwd: string;
 }
 
@@ -113,6 +122,9 @@ const BUILTIN_ALLOWLIST: ReadonlyArray<{ id: string; re: RegExp }> = [
 	{ id: "builtin:git-status", re: /^git\s+status(?:\s+--short|\s+--branch|\s+-sb)*$/ },
 	{ id: "builtin:git-diff", re: /^git\s+diff(?:\s+--cached|\s+--stat|\s+--name-only|\s+--\s+[\w./-]+)*$/ },
 	{ id: "builtin:git-log", re: /^git\s+log\s+--oneline(?:\s+-n\s+[1-9]\d{0,2})?(?:\s+--\s+[\w./-]+)?$/ },
+];
+
+const PROJECT_SCRIPT_COMMANDS: ReadonlyArray<{ id: string; re: RegExp }> = [
 	{ id: "builtin:npm-test", re: /^npm\s+(?:test|run\s+test)(?:\s+--\s+[\w=./:-]+(?:\s+[\w=./:-]+)*)?$/ },
 	{ id: "builtin:npm-lint", re: /^npm\s+run\s+lint(?:\s+--\s+[\w=./:-]+(?:\s+[\w=./:-]+)*)?$/ },
 	{ id: "builtin:npm-build", re: /^npm\s+run\s+build(?:\s+--\s+[\w=./:-]+(?:\s+[\w=./:-]+)*)?$/ },
@@ -198,21 +210,19 @@ export function createSafetyPolicyEngine(options: SafetyPolicyEngineOptions = {}
 	const writeRoots = (options.writeRoots ?? []).map((root) => resolvePathBoundary(writeRootCwd, root));
 	const skillRoots = activeClioSkillRoots(cwd);
 	const packs = options.rulePacks ?? getCachedDefaultRulePacks();
-	const projectPolicy = options.projectPolicy ?? loadProjectSafetyPolicy(cwd);
+	const projectPolicy = options.projectPolicy ?? gateProjectSafetyPolicy(cwd, loadProjectSafetyPolicy(cwd));
 	const projectPolicyRoot =
-		projectPolicy.path === null ? cwd : path.dirname(path.dirname(canonicalizeExistingPath(projectPolicy.path)));
+		projectPolicy.path === null ? cwd : path.dirname(path.dirname(path.resolve(projectPolicy.path)));
 	const pathPolicyInput = projectPolicy.disableDefaultPathPolicy
 		? projectPolicy.pathPolicy
 		: mergePathPolicyInputs(DEFAULT_DAMAGE_CONTROL_PATH_POLICY, projectPolicy.pathPolicy);
 	// Clio's own secret store and user skills, by absolute path.
 	// Config directory expansion has to happen here because
 	// the list cannot call config helpers at module scope.
-	const expandedDefaults = projectPolicy.disableDefaultPathPolicy
-		? pathPolicyInput
-		: mergePathPolicyInputs(pathPolicyInput, {
-				zeroAccessPaths: clioCredentialStorePaths(),
-				readOnlyPaths: clioSkillsRootPaths(),
-			});
+	const expandedDefaults = mergePathPolicyInputs(mergePathPolicyInputs(pathPolicyInput, OPERATOR_PATH_POLICY), {
+		zeroAccessPaths: clioCredentialStorePaths(),
+		readOnlyPaths: [...clioSkillsRootPaths(), path.join(clioConfigDir(), "settings.yaml"), workspaceTrustDirectory()],
+	});
 	const pathPolicy = compilePathPolicy(expandedDefaults, projectPolicyRoot);
 	// Bash-read scanning tests argument tokens against zero-access entries only:
 	// read-only paths stay readable from bash by design, secrets do not.
@@ -317,6 +327,31 @@ export function createSafetyPolicyEngine(options: SafetyPolicyEngineOptions = {}
 			// Editing active instructions is an operator privilege at every autonomy
 			// level, in both the coordinator and the shared worker safety contract.
 			const mutationCommand = call.tool === ToolNames.Bash ? command : catalogCommand;
+			if (mutationCommand !== null && invokesTrustMutation(mutationCommand)) {
+				return blockDecision(base, {
+					reasonCode: "trust-authority",
+					ruleId: "trust-authority",
+					reasons: ["workspace trust grants require the operator CLI"],
+					policySource: "builtin-classifier",
+				});
+			}
+			// Reuse the canonical authority boundary scan for parent deletions,
+			// shell cwd changes and aliases that a literal path-policy lookup misses.
+			if (
+				skillMutationReason(
+					[path.join(clioConfigDir(), "settings.yaml"), workspaceTrustDirectory()],
+					pathPolicyTargets(catalogCommand === null ? call : { tool: ToolNames.Bash, args: { command: catalogCommand } }),
+					callCwd,
+					mutationCommand,
+				) !== null
+			) {
+				return blockDecision(base, {
+					reasonCode: "path-policy:readOnlyPaths",
+					ruleId: "path-policy:readOnlyPaths",
+					reasons: ["Clio settings and workspace trust records are operator-owned and cannot be mutated by tools"],
+					policySource: "builtin-classifier",
+				});
+			}
 			const skillReason =
 				mutationCommand !== null && invokesClioSkillMutation(mutationCommand)
 					? "skill installation and updates require the operator CLI or an explicit operator install choice; draft outside active skill roots"
@@ -421,8 +456,39 @@ export function createSafetyPolicyEngine(options: SafetyPolicyEngineOptions = {}
 				return posture === "confirmed" ? allowDecision(base, input) : askDecision(base, input);
 			}
 
-			if (call.tool === ToolNames.Bash && classification.actionClass === "execute") {
-				const bash = evaluateBashPolicy(command ?? "", callCwd, cwd, posture, projectPolicy);
+			const packageCommand =
+				call.tool === ToolNames.Verify &&
+				catalogCheck === null &&
+				typeof call.args?.check === "string" &&
+				call.args.check !== "frontend"
+					? `npm run ${call.args.check}`
+					: null;
+			if (
+				(call.tool === ToolNames.Bash || catalogCheck !== null || packageCommand !== null) &&
+				classification.actionClass === "execute"
+			) {
+				const bash = evaluateBashPolicy(
+					catalogCheck?.command ?? packageCommand ?? command ?? "",
+					catalogCheck === null ? callCwd : path.resolve(cwd, catalogCheck.cwd),
+					cwd,
+					posture,
+					projectPolicy,
+				);
+				if (
+					(catalogCheck !== null || packageCommand !== null) &&
+					bash.kind === "allow" &&
+					bash.execRecognition !== "recognized" &&
+					posture !== "confirmed"
+				) {
+					return askDecision(base, {
+						...bash,
+						reasonCode: "project-verifier-confirm",
+						reasons: [
+							...bash.reasons,
+							`Repository verifier requires confirmation or an approved safety declaration: ${catalogCommand ?? packageCommand}`,
+						],
+					});
+				}
 				if (bash.kind === "block") return blockDecision(base, bash);
 				if (bash.kind === "ask") return askDecision(base, bash);
 				return allowDecision(base, bash);
@@ -438,22 +504,9 @@ export function createSafetyPolicyEngine(options: SafetyPolicyEngineOptions = {}
 			};
 			if (hit?.match.ruleId !== undefined) allowInput.ruleId = hit.match.ruleId;
 			if (hit?.match !== undefined) allowInput.match = hit.match;
-			// The typed execution tool (verify) sits in the no-prompt set when the
-			// check is a package script or the frontend validator: both are bounded
-			// by the verification-script family and run a fixed argv shape. A
-			// project-catalog check runs whatever argv the workspace file declares,
-			// so it is unrecognized: auto-edit parks it for one confirmation that
-			// shows the argv, full-auto runs it, and the damage-control match and
-			// zero-access scan above have already seen the declared vector.
-			if (classification.actionClass === "execute") {
-				allowInput.execRecognition = catalogCheck === null ? "recognized" : "unrecognized";
-				if (catalogCheck !== null) {
-					allowInput.reasons = [
-						...allowInput.reasons,
-						`project verifier '${catalogCheck.id}' runs declared argv: ${catalogCommand ?? ""}`,
-					];
-				}
-			}
+			// Catalog argv already went through canonical command recognition above.
+			// Package scripts and the frontend validator retain their fixed typed surface.
+			if (classification.actionClass === "execute") allowInput.execRecognition = "recognized";
 			return allowDecision(base, allowInput);
 		},
 		metadata() {
@@ -466,6 +519,8 @@ export function createSafetyPolicyEngine(options: SafetyPolicyEngineOptions = {}
 				projectPolicyHash: projectPolicy.hash,
 				projectPolicyValid: projectPolicy.valid,
 				projectPolicyErrors: [...projectPolicy.errors, ...pathPolicy.diagnostics],
+				disableDefaultPathPolicy: projectPolicy.disableDefaultPathPolicy,
+				workspaceTrustVerdict: projectPolicy.trustVerdict ?? "trusted",
 				cwd,
 			};
 		},
@@ -613,12 +668,27 @@ function pathPolicyTargets(call: ClassifierCall): Array<{ operation: PathPolicyO
  * admission seam decides whether it runs, asks, or is denied.
  */
 function evaluateBashPolicy(
-	command: string,
+	input: string | ReadonlyArray<string>,
 	callCwd: string,
 	workspaceRoot: string,
 	posture: string | undefined,
 	policy: LoadedProjectSafetyPolicy,
 ): Omit<SafetyPolicyDecision, "classification" | "tool" | "actionClass" | "cwd" | "posture" | "command"> {
+	// Catalog commands execute as argv, never as shell source. Only bare words
+	// have an unambiguous representation in the canonical command matcher.
+	// Keep whitespace, empty arguments, and shell syntax out of recognition;
+	// joining them would erase argument boundaries or invent a shell chain.
+	if (typeof input !== "string" && !input.every((arg) => /^[\w=./:-]+$/u.test(arg))) {
+		return {
+			kind: posture === "confirmed" ? "allow" : "ask",
+			ruleId: "verify-unrecognized-argv",
+			reasonCode: "verify-unrecognized-argv",
+			reasons: ["project verifier argv is outside the bare-word no-prompt command set"],
+			policySource: "builtin-command-allowlist",
+			execRecognition: "unrecognized",
+		};
+	}
+	const command = typeof input === "string" ? input : input.join(" ");
 	if (command.trim().length === 0) {
 		return {
 			kind: "block",
@@ -628,6 +698,21 @@ function evaluateBashPolicy(
 			policySource: "builtin-command-allowlist",
 		};
 	}
+	if (
+		typeof input === "string" &&
+		(/\$(?:[A-Za-z_{0-9@*#?!-])/.test(command) ||
+			/(?:^|[\s;&|])(?:python[\d.]*|node|ruby|perl|php|lua)\s+(?:[^\n]*?\s)?-[ce]\b/.test(command)) &&
+		posture !== "confirmed"
+	) {
+		return {
+			kind: "ask",
+			reasonCode: "bash-hidden-content",
+			ruleId: "bash-hidden-content",
+			reasons: ["shell variables or interpreter source hide paths from the safety scan and require one-shot confirmation"],
+			policySource: "builtin-command-allowlist",
+			execRecognition: "unrecognized",
+		};
+	}
 	const projectMatch = matchingProjectCommand(policy, command, callCwd);
 	if (projectMatch) {
 		const base: Omit<
@@ -680,15 +765,34 @@ function evaluateBashPolicy(
 			execRecognition: "unrecognized",
 		};
 	}
+	if (PROJECT_SCRIPT_COMMANDS.some((entry) => entry.re.test(recognitionCommand))) {
+		return {
+			kind: posture === "confirmed" ? "allow" : "ask",
+			reasonCode: "project-script-confirm",
+			ruleId: "project-script-confirm",
+			reasons: [
+				"Repository-authored code requires one-shot confirmation or an operator-approved safety command declaration.",
+				projectScriptPreview(recognitionCommand, callCwd),
+			],
+			policySource: "builtin-command-allowlist",
+			execRecognition: "unrecognized",
+		};
+	}
 	const chain = recognizeCommandChain(recognitionCommand, callCwd, workspaceRoot, policy);
 	if (chain !== null) {
 		const chainReasons = [`every step of the && chain is recognized: ${chain.ruleIds.join(", ")}`];
+		if (chain.requiresConfirmation) {
+			for (const segment of recognitionCommand.split("&&").map((part) => part.trim())) {
+				if (PROJECT_SCRIPT_COMMANDS.some((entry) => entry.re.test(segment)))
+					chainReasons.push(projectScriptPreview(segment, callCwd));
+			}
+		}
 		if (chain.requiresConfirmation && posture !== "confirmed") {
 			return {
 				kind: "ask",
 				ruleId: "bash-recognized-chain",
 				reasonCode: "bash-recognized-chain",
-				reasons: [...chainReasons, "project policy requires confirmation for one step"],
+				reasons: [...chainReasons, "repository code or project policy requires confirmation for one step"],
 				policySource: "builtin-command-allowlist",
 				execRecognition: "recognized",
 			};
@@ -709,6 +813,23 @@ function evaluateBashPolicy(
 	// the full string, so a destructive verb behind an operator was caught before
 	// this point.
 	if (hasSequencingOperators(command)) {
+		const scriptSegments = recognitionCommand
+			.split(/&&|\|\||[;|\n]/)
+			.map((part) => part.trim())
+			.filter((part) => PROJECT_SCRIPT_COMMANDS.some((entry) => entry.re.test(part)));
+		if (scriptSegments.length > 0 && posture !== "confirmed") {
+			return {
+				kind: "ask",
+				ruleId: "project-script-confirm",
+				reasonCode: "project-script-confirm",
+				reasons: [
+					"Repository scripts in compound commands require one-shot confirmation",
+					...scriptSegments.map((part) => projectScriptPreview(part, callCwd)),
+				],
+				policySource: "builtin-command-allowlist",
+				execRecognition: "unrecognized",
+			};
+		}
 		return {
 			kind: "allow",
 			ruleId: "bash-shell-operators",
@@ -925,6 +1046,11 @@ function recognizeCommandChain(
 			if (projectMatch.requireConfirmation) requiresConfirmation = true;
 			continue;
 		}
+		if (PROJECT_SCRIPT_COMMANDS.some((entry) => entry.re.test(rendered))) {
+			ruleIds.push("project-script-confirm");
+			requiresConfirmation = true;
+			continue;
+		}
 		const builtin = BUILTIN_ALLOWLIST.find((entry) => entry.re.test(rendered));
 		if (builtin === undefined) return null;
 		ruleIds.push(builtin.id);
@@ -1024,9 +1150,9 @@ function damageControlScan(call: ClassifierCall): string {
  * declare. The catalog is an argv vector the operator authored, but the file
  * sits in the workspace, so the engine reads it fresh on every verify call and
  * treats the declared argv exactly like a bash command string: it is what the
- * damage-control rules and the zero-access read guard scan, and it is not in
- * the no-prompt set. An unreadable or invalid catalog resolves to null here and
- * fails closed in the tool itself.
+ * damage-control rules and the zero-access read guard scan. Recognition uses
+ * canonical command policy with argv boundaries preserved. An unreadable or
+ * invalid catalog resolves to null here and fails closed in the tool itself.
  */
 function resolveVerifyCatalogCheck(call: ClassifierCall, workspaceRoot: string): DeclaredCheck | null {
 	if (call.tool !== ToolNames.Verify) return null;
@@ -1077,3 +1203,34 @@ function packPayload(rules: ReadonlyArray<DamageControlRule>): Array<Record<stri
 		...(rule.ask !== undefined ? { ask: rule.ask } : {}),
 	}));
 }
+
+function invokesTrustMutation(command: string): boolean {
+	// Wrappers, package launchers, quoted argv and source-tree CLI invocations
+	// must not turn an operator-only grant into model authority.
+	const words = scanShellLike(command)
+		.filter((token) => !token.operator)
+		.map((token) => token.value);
+	return (
+		words.some((word, index) => word === "config" && words[index + 1] === "trust") ||
+		/\bconfig\s+trust\b/.test(inlineShellScript(command) ?? "")
+	);
+}
+
+function projectScriptPreview(command: string, cwd: string): string {
+	const match = /^npm\s+(?:run\s+)?([\w:-]+)/.exec(command);
+	if (match) {
+		try {
+			const manifest = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path.join(cwd, "package.json"), "utf8")) as {
+				scripts?: Record<string, unknown>;
+			};
+			const name = match[1] ?? "test";
+			const scripts = [`pre${name}`, name, `post${name}`].flatMap((key) =>
+				typeof manifest.scripts?.[key] === "string" ? [`${key}: ${manifest.scripts[key]}`] : [],
+			);
+			return `package.json scripts (repository data): ${scripts.join("; ") || "no script resolved"}`;
+		} catch {
+			return "package.json script body could not be resolved; repository code will execute.";
+		}
+	}
+	return `Repository command: ${command}. Its test/build files and dependencies execute with the child process permissions.`;
+}

package/src/domains/safety/project-policy.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
-import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { existsSync, readFileSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs";
 import path from "node:path";
 import { parse as parseYaml } from "yaml";
 import type { ActionClass } from "./action-classifier.js";
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ export interface ProjectCommandPolicy {
 }
 
 export interface LoadedProjectSafetyPolicy {
+	trustVerdict?: "trusted" | "untrusted" | "changed";
 	path: string | null;
 	hash: string | null;
 	valid: boolean;
@@ -80,7 +81,7 @@ function projectSafetyPolicyPath(cwd: string = process.cwd()): string | null {
 }
 
 export function loadProjectSafetyPolicy(cwd: string = process.cwd()): LoadedProjectSafetyPolicy {
-	const policyPath = projectSafetyPolicyPath(cwd);
+	let policyPath = projectSafetyPolicyPath(cwd);
 	if (policyPath === null) {
 		return {
 			path: null,
@@ -94,6 +95,10 @@ export function loadProjectSafetyPolicy(cwd: string = process.cwd()): LoadedProj
 	}
 	let raw: string;
 	try {
+		// Relative entries are interpreted against this source directory. Pin its
+		// canonical identity before reading; downstream trust and compilation use
+		// the captured path, not a symlink that may move after admission.
+		policyPath = realpathSync(policyPath);
 		raw = readFileSync(policyPath, "utf8");
 	} catch (err) {
 		return {

package/src/domains/safety/workspace-trust.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/** Shared trust API for safety callers; core owns persistence so settings can gate before domain startup. */
+export {
+	captureProjectSurface,
+	type ProjectSurfaceSnapshot,
+	type ProjectTrustSurface,
+	projectSurfaceTrust,
+	projectSurfaceTrustNotice,
+	recordProjectSurfaceTrust,
+	revokeProjectSurfaceTrust,
+	type WorkspaceTrustVerdict,
+	workspaceTrustDirectory,
+} from "../../core/workspace-trust.js";
+
+import { projectSurfaceTrust, safetySurfaceTrustHash } from "../../core/workspace-trust.js";
+import type { LoadedProjectSafetyPolicy } from "./project-policy.js";
+
+/** Keep discovered provenance visible while withholding unapproved project authority. */
+export function gateProjectSafetyPolicy(
+	workspaceRoot: string,
+	policy: LoadedProjectSafetyPolicy,
+): LoadedProjectSafetyPolicy {
+	if (policy.path === null) return policy;
+	const trustVerdict =
+		policy.hash === null
+			? "untrusted"
+			: projectSurfaceTrust(workspaceRoot, "safety", safetySurfaceTrustHash(policy.path, policy.hash));
+	if (trustVerdict === "trusted") return { ...policy, trustVerdict };
+	return {
+		...policy,
+		trustVerdict,
+		// This is the admitted empty policy, whose execution defaults are valid.
+		// Unapproved parse failures retain diagnostics below but cannot acquire the
+		// authority to block execution. An approved malformed policy stays invalid.
+		valid: true,
+		commands: [],
+		pathPolicy: {},
+		disableDefaultPathPolicy: false,
+		errors: [
+			...policy.errors,
+			`${policy.path} is ${trustVerdict}; project safety ignored. Review with clio-coder config trust safety.`,
+		],
+	};
+}