@iowarp/clio-coder 0.3.7 → 0.3.8

package/src/domains/dispatch/extension.ts

@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ import { AssignmentRegistry, applyActiveRouteSelection, asAssignmentId } from ".
 import type { AssignmentAttemptStartEvent } from "./assignment-events.js";
 import { reconcileOrphanAssignments } from "./assignment-reconcile.js";
 import {
+	assignmentProcessOwnerAlive,
 	cancelStoredAssignment,
 	failQueuedAssignment,
 	getStoredAssignment,
@@ -167,6 +168,7 @@ import { routeFactVerdict } from "./fleet-preflight.js";
 import { competeStanceLiner, isBoundedGateRolePrompt } from "./gate-role-prompts.js";
 import { classifyHeartbeat, DEFAULT_HEARTBEAT_SPEC, type HeartbeatSpec, type HeartbeatStatus } from "./heartbeat.js";
 import { hostVerificationRejection, runHostVerification } from "./host-verification.js";
+import { renderDispatchIntentRequirements } from "./intent-requirements.js";
 import { adaptJointRouteInput } from "./joint-route-adapter.js";
 import {
 	configuredJointNodes,
@@ -181,6 +183,12 @@ import {
 	resultContractWasDue,
 	runStatusForOutcome,
 } from "./outcome.js";
+import {
+	type DispatchPathScope,
+	declaredScopeReplacementDiagnostic,
+	declaredScopeReplacementNotice,
+	resolveDispatchPathScope,
+} from "./path-scope.js";
 import { deriveEnvelopePhaseDurations, deriveRunPhaseDurations, recordRunTimingBestEffort } from "./phase-timing.js";
 import { createFleetPlacementPreviewResolver, createFleetPlacementResolver } from "./placement.js";
 import {
@@ -614,6 +622,14 @@ function recordWorkerRunEffect(recorder: RunEffectsRecorder, event: Record<strin
  */
 const DISPATCH_DRAIN_GRACE_MS = 2000;
 
+/**
+ * How many finalized runs keep their observed write targets in memory. The
+ * write boundary reads a run's record while closing the window it ran in, which
+ * is the same wave, so a few hundred runs of headroom is far more than the
+ * lookup ever reaches back for.
+ */
+const RUN_WRITE_TARGET_HISTORY = 512;
+
 async function awaitEventDrain(drained: Promise<void>, graceMs = DISPATCH_DRAIN_GRACE_MS): Promise<boolean> {
 	let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
 	const grace = new Promise<false>((resolve) => {
@@ -751,9 +767,14 @@ function pickOrchestratorScope(safety: SafetyContract): ScopeSpec {
 	return safety.scopes.workspace;
 }
 
-function pickWorkerScope(safety: SafetyContract, requestedActions: ReadonlyArray<ActionClass>): ScopeSpec {
+function pickWorkerScope(
+	safety: SafetyContract,
+	requestedActions: ReadonlyArray<ActionClass>,
+	pathScope: DispatchPathScope,
+): ScopeSpec {
 	if (requestedActions.every((action) => action === "read")) return safety.scopes.readonly;
-	return safety.scopes.workspace;
+	if (pathScope.writeBoundaries.length === 0) return safety.scopes.workspace;
+	return { ...safety.scopes.workspace, allowedWriteRoots: pathScope.writeBoundaries };
 }
 
 function deriveRequestedActions(tools: ReadonlyArray<ToolName>, safety: SafetyContract): ReadonlyArray<ActionClass> {
@@ -993,6 +1014,25 @@ function hasPersonaOverride(req: DispatchRequest): boolean {
 	return typeof req.systemPrompt === "string" && req.systemPrompt.trim().length > 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Whether this request's system prompt is a caller-authored persona rather
+ * than one of the coordinator's own bounded gate-role prompts.
+ *
+ * A reviewer, a compete judge, and a council synthesis all carry a system
+ * prompt the coordinator wrote, pinned by {@link isBoundedGateRolePrompt} to
+ * one exact text under one gate role and read-only autonomy. That is the
+ * topology speaking, not an operator reshaping a recipe, so it is not the
+ * thing the shadow and internal audiences are protected from. The ACP
+ * delegation path already draws the line here; without the same line, a
+ * council that seats the builtin read-only `researcher` (a shadow recipe, and
+ * the agent every unnamed council seats) refused `--synthesis judge` outright,
+ * before a single member ran.
+ */
+function hasCallerPersonaOverride(req: DispatchRequest): boolean {
+	if (!hasPersonaOverride(req)) return false;
+	return !isBoundedGateRolePrompt({ role: req.gate?.role, autonomy: req.autonomy, systemPrompt: req.systemPrompt });
+}
+
 function personaOverrideFor(req: DispatchRequest, staticCompositionHash: string | null): RunPersonaOverride | null {
 	if (!hasPersonaOverride(req) || staticCompositionHash === null) return null;
 	return { promptHash: staticCompositionHash };
@@ -1003,9 +1043,8 @@ function personaOverrideFor(req: DispatchRequest, staticCompositionHash: string
  * flows through dynamic messages, never through the system prompt. The system
  * prompt itself is stable per recipe and tool surface with one exception: the
  * operator-editable layer (`additionalFragments`) folds in path-scoped project
- * rules selected by `workerWorkingContextPaths`, which are recalled from the
- * task and briefing text, so `staticCompositionHash` can differ between two
- * runs of one recipe when a rule's glob matches one task and not the other.
+ * rules selected from the canonical request scope, so `staticCompositionHash`
+ * can differ between two runs of one recipe when their scoped rules differ.
  * A local model's worker prefix cache misses on that flip; the trade was made
  * deliberately in #96 to keep rules scoped rather than shipped wholesale.
  */
@@ -1074,35 +1113,6 @@ function workerProjectContextIncludesVerification(body: string): boolean {
 	return body.includes("\nVerification expectations:\n");
 }
 
-/**
- * Path-like tokens in free text: a slash-separated segment, or a bare
- * `name.ext` token. The model-facing dispatch tool has no structured
- * path/file field, so a worker's task text is the only working-context
- * signal available at compile time; this is best-effort recall, not a
- * parser. A false-positive token is harmless because `selectActiveRules`
- * only activates a rule when the token matches that rule's own glob.
- */
-const PATH_TOKEN_RE = /(?:[\w.-]+\/)+[\w.-]+|\b[\w-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9]{1,8}\b/g;
-
-/**
- * Best-effort working-context paths for a dispatched worker: `writeRoots`
- * when the caller set them (the precise signal, for internal/programmatic
- * callers), plus path-like tokens recalled from the task and briefing text.
- * Feeds the same `selectActiveRules` a session uses, so a worker whose task
- * touches a ruled path reads that rule instead of never hearing about it.
- */
-function workerWorkingContextPaths(req: DispatchRequest): string[] {
-	const out = new Set<string>();
-	for (const root of req.writeRoots ?? []) out.add(root);
-	const text = `${req.task}\n${req.briefing ?? ""}`;
-	for (const match of text.matchAll(PATH_TOKEN_RE)) {
-		const token = match[0];
-		if (token.startsWith("http://") || token.startsWith("https://")) continue;
-		out.add(token);
-	}
-	return [...out];
-}
-
 export function buildDynamicPromptMessages(
 	req: DispatchRequest,
 	dynamicContext: WorkerDynamicContext = {},
@@ -1126,6 +1136,10 @@ export function buildDynamicPromptMessages(
 		const body = `Safety posture: autonomy ${autonomy}. ${workerSafetyOneLiner(autonomy, permission)} Worker permission routing: ${permission}.`;
 		messages.push({ id: "dispatch-safety-posture", body, contentHash: sha256(body) });
 	}
+	const requirements = renderDispatchIntentRequirements(req.intent);
+	if (requirements !== null) {
+		messages.push({ id: "dispatch-intent-requirements", body: requirements, contentHash: sha256(requirements) });
+	}
 	if (req.competeStance !== undefined) {
 		const body = competeStanceLiner(req.competeStance);
 		messages.push({ id: "dispatch-compete-stance", body, contentHash: sha256(body) });
@@ -1250,6 +1264,7 @@ interface DispatchAdmissionStage {
 
 interface DispatchWorkerSpecInput {
 	req: DispatchRequest;
+	pathScope: DispatchPathScope;
 	target: ResolvedTarget;
 	admission: DispatchAdmissionStage;
 	recipe?: AgentRecipe | null;
@@ -1269,6 +1284,7 @@ interface DispatchWorkerSpecInput {
 
 interface DispatchLifecycleStage {
 	recipe: AgentRecipe | null;
+	pathScope: DispatchPathScope;
 	admission: DispatchAdmissionStage;
 	target: ResolvedTarget;
 	cwd: string;
@@ -1304,6 +1320,7 @@ interface DispatchLifecycleStage {
 
 interface AcpDelegationLifecycleStage {
 	admission: DispatchAdmissionStage;
+	pathScope: DispatchPathScope;
 	agentConfig: ReturnType<ConfigContract["get"]>["delegation"]["agents"][number];
 	cwd: string;
 	systemPrompt: string;
@@ -1488,10 +1505,6 @@ function explicitToolCapability(
 	return typeof fromKnowledgeBase === "boolean" ? fromKnowledgeBase : null;
 }
 
-function writeConfinedRequest(req: DispatchRequest): boolean {
-	return req.writeRoots !== undefined && req.writeRoots.length > 0;
-}
-
 function effectiveToolNames(
 	allowedTools: ReadonlyArray<ToolName>,
 	target: ResolvedTarget,
@@ -1717,6 +1730,7 @@ function resolveDispatchAdmissionStage(
 	req: DispatchRequest,
 	recipe: AgentRecipe,
 	safety: SafetyContract,
+	pathScope: DispatchPathScope,
 ): DispatchAdmissionStage {
 	const recipeTools = recipe.tools;
 	const candidateTools = recipeTools && recipeTools.length > 0 ? (Array.from(recipeTools) as ToolName[]) : [];
@@ -1730,7 +1744,7 @@ function resolveDispatchAdmissionStage(
 	}
 	const requestedActions = deriveRequestedActions(allowedTools, safety);
 	const orchScope = pickOrchestratorScope(safety);
-	const workerScope = pickWorkerScope(safety, requestedActions);
+	const workerScope = pickWorkerScope(safety, requestedActions, pathScope);
 	const verdict = admit(
 		{
 			requestedScope: workerScope,
@@ -1755,7 +1769,7 @@ function resolveDelegationAdmissionStage(req: DispatchRequest, safety: SafetyCon
 	const allowedTools = applyToolProfile([], req.toolProfile);
 	const requestedActions = deriveRequestedActions(allowedTools, safety);
 	const orchScope = pickOrchestratorScope(safety);
-	const workerScope = pickWorkerScope(safety, requestedActions);
+	const workerScope = pickWorkerScope(safety, requestedActions, resolveDispatchPathScope(req));
 	const verdict = admit(
 		{
 			requestedScope: workerScope,
@@ -1833,9 +1847,17 @@ function buildDispatchWorkerSpec(input: DispatchWorkerSpecInput, config?: Config
 	// The worker repairs against exactly the contract the orchestrator will seal.
 	// A gate role that overrides the recipe contract gets no worker-side repair,
 	// for the same reason it gets no recipe validation.
-	if (appliesRecipeResultContract(input.req.gate?.role) && input.recipe?.resultContract) {
-		spec.resultContract = input.req.resultContractOverride ?? input.recipe.resultContract;
-	}
+	//
+	// The request's own override is the contract whether or not the seated
+	// recipe declares one, because that is the resolution the seal already uses.
+	// Requiring a recipe contract here meant a caller-supplied override against a
+	// recipe with none was sealed but never sent, so the worker spent no repair
+	// round on a contract it was never told about and the run failed on a shape
+	// nothing had asked it for.
+	const workerResultContract = appliesRecipeResultContract(input.req.gate?.role)
+		? (input.req.resultContractOverride ?? input.recipe?.resultContract)
+		: undefined;
+	if (workerResultContract) spec.resultContract = workerResultContract;
 	const product = input.req.product ?? input.recipe?.product;
 	if (product) spec.product = product;
 	// The orchestrator's tool decision is the one the run was admitted under and
@@ -1886,14 +1908,9 @@ function buildDispatchWorkerSpec(input: DispatchWorkerSpecInput, config?: Config
 		if (escalation) spec.escalation = { timeoutMs: escalation.timeoutMs, fallback: escalation.fallback };
 	}
 	assertRuntimeCanHonorWorkerPermissionMode(input.target.runtime, spec.onPermission);
-	// Carry write-root confinement to the worker safety seam. Refuse it up front
-	// on runtimes that cannot mediate per-tool calls (subprocess) so it is never
-	// silently ignored. Roots are resolved against the job cwd so a relative root
-	// reaches the worker absolute, matching the validation contract.
-	if (input.req.writeRoots !== undefined && input.req.writeRoots.length > 0) {
-		const jobCwd = input.req.cwd !== undefined && input.req.cwd.length > 0 ? input.req.cwd : process.cwd();
-		spec.writeRoots = input.req.writeRoots.map((root) => resolvePath(jobCwd, root));
-	}
+	// Carry canonical write boundaries to the worker safety seam. Exact files
+	// remain exact and trailing-slash entries remain subtrees after resolution.
+	if (input.pathScope.writeBoundaries.length > 0) spec.writeRoots = [...input.pathScope.writeBoundaries];
 	assertWriteRootsEnforceable(input.target.runtime, spec.writeRoots);
 	// Carry the tool profile so external CLI runtimes that cannot mediate
 	// per-tool calls can refuse a narrowing profile they would otherwise ignore.
@@ -2388,6 +2405,26 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 	const active = new Map<string, ActiveRun>();
 	const targetCooldowns = new Map<string, { until: number; reason: string }>();
 	const ownedReservations = new Set<string>();
+	/**
+	 * Paths each finalized run's own tool calls aimed a successful mutation at,
+	 * newest last. `null` records a run whose write record is unusable, which is
+	 * a different answer from an empty list and has to survive as one.
+	 *
+	 * Held in memory rather than sealed into the receipt: the only reader is the
+	 * write boundary closing a window seconds later in this process, and a
+	 * per-run path list is run-shaped evidence the receipt schema does not carry.
+	 * Bounded because a long session finalizes many runs and none of this is
+	 * needed once its window has closed.
+	 */
+	const runWriteTargets = new Map<string, ReadonlyArray<string> | null>();
+	const recordRunWriteTargets = (runId: string, paths: ReadonlyArray<string> | null): void => {
+		runWriteTargets.set(runId, paths);
+		while (runWriteTargets.size > RUN_WRITE_TARGET_HISTORY) {
+			const oldest = runWriteTargets.keys().next();
+			if (oldest.done === true) break;
+			runWriteTargets.delete(oldest.value);
+		}
+	};
 	const capacityAdmission = createCapacityAdmissionController({
 		limits: () => {
 			const settings = getEffectiveSettings();
@@ -3169,6 +3206,27 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 		targetCooldowns.set(key, { until: now() + cooldownMs, reason: failureClass });
 	}
 
+	function publishDispatchPathScope(req: DispatchRequest, pathScope: DispatchPathScope): void {
+		const replacementDiagnostic = declaredScopeReplacementDiagnostic(pathScope);
+		if (replacementDiagnostic !== null) {
+			reportDispatchDiagnostic("typed scope replacement", new Error(replacementDiagnostic));
+		}
+		// Only the replacement case reaches the transcript. A dispatch that
+		// declared no intent is the ordinary case rather than an anomaly, and one
+		// receipt in ninety-nine carries an intent key today, so noticing it would
+		// warn on almost every dispatch and teach the operator to skip the channel.
+		// Its provenance is not lost: the receipt seals `pathProvenance`, and the
+		// approval artifact renders every inferred entry in full before a
+		// supervised dispatch runs, which is where an operator can still act on it.
+		const notice = declaredScopeReplacementNotice(pathScope);
+		if (notice !== null) {
+			context.bus.emit(BusChannels.DispatchScopeNotice, {
+				...notice,
+				agentId: req.agentId,
+			});
+		}
+	}
+
 	async function resolveLifecycle(req: DispatchRequest, settings: EffectiveSettings): Promise<DispatchLifecycleStage> {
 		const recipe = agents.get(req.agentId);
 		if (!recipe) {
@@ -3180,7 +3238,7 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 				`dispatch: agent '${req.agentId}' is a ${spec.audience} agent reserved for Clio internal orchestration`,
 			);
 		}
-		if (hasPersonaOverride(req) && (spec.audience === "shadow" || spec.audience === "internal")) {
+		if (hasCallerPersonaOverride(req) && (spec.audience === "shadow" || spec.audience === "internal")) {
 			throw new Error(`dispatch: persona overrides are not allowed for ${spec.audience} agent '${req.agentId}'`);
 		}
 		// A read-only recipe pointed at a mutating task is knowable here and costs
@@ -3202,7 +3260,9 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 						specs: agents.listSpecs(),
 					});
 		if (capabilityMismatch?.verdict === "refuse") throw new Error(capabilityMismatch.detail);
-		const admission = resolveDispatchAdmissionStage(req, recipe, safety);
+		const pathScope = resolveDispatchPathScope(req);
+		publishDispatchPathScope(req, pathScope);
+		const admission = resolveDispatchAdmissionStage(req, recipe, safety, pathScope);
 		const targets = readWorkerTargets(settings);
 		const target = resolveDispatchTarget(
 			req,
@@ -3221,7 +3281,7 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 		const sessionAutonomy = settings?.autonomy ?? "auto-edit";
 		const effectiveAutonomy = clampWorkerAutonomy(sessionAutonomy, req.autonomy);
 		const effectiveTools = withLedgerToolNarrowing(
-			effectiveToolNames(admission.allowedTools, target, writeConfinedRequest(req), deniedToolNames(req)),
+			effectiveToolNames(admission.allowedTools, target, pathScope.writeBoundaries.length > 0, deniedToolNames(req)),
 			req,
 		);
 		assertPostRuntimeToolCompatibility(req.agentId, spec, effectiveTools, target);
@@ -3250,7 +3310,7 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 				dynamic: false,
 			},
 			cwd,
-			workingContextPaths: workerWorkingContextPaths(req),
+			workingContextPaths: pathScope.workingContextPaths,
 		});
 		const systemPrompt = compiledWorkerPrompt.systemPrompt;
 		const budgetEnvelope = resolveEffectiveWorkerBudget({
@@ -3294,6 +3354,7 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 		const limitations = runtimeLimitations(runtimeKind, target.runtime.id);
 		return {
 			recipe,
+			pathScope,
 			admission: effectiveAdmission,
 			target,
 			cwd,
@@ -3331,12 +3392,7 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 	): AcpDelegationLifecycleStage {
 		const agentId = req.delegationAgentId;
 		if (!agentId) throw new Error("dispatch: missing delegationAgentId");
-		const boundedGateRolePrompt = isBoundedGateRolePrompt({
-			role: req.gate?.role,
-			autonomy: req.autonomy,
-			systemPrompt: req.systemPrompt,
-		});
-		if (hasPersonaOverride(req) && !boundedGateRolePrompt) {
+		if (hasCallerPersonaOverride(req)) {
 			throw new Error(`dispatch: persona overrides are not allowed for ACP delegation agent '${agentId}'`);
 		}
 		if (req.agentId && maybeAgents) {
@@ -3365,6 +3421,7 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 			);
 		}
 		const cwd = req.cwd ?? process.cwd();
+		const pathScope = resolveDispatchPathScope(req);
 		const personaBody = workerPersonaBody(req, null, []);
 		// ACP owns an unknown external tool inventory, so it receives the raw
 		// bounded persona rather than a native Clio schema-harness claim.
@@ -3391,6 +3448,7 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 		const personaOverride = personaOverrideFor(req, staticCompositionHash);
 		return {
 			admission,
+			pathScope,
 			agentConfig: configured,
 			cwd,
 			systemPrompt,
@@ -3426,6 +3484,7 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 		finalPromise: Promise<RunReceipt>;
 	}> {
 		const lifecycle = resolveAcpDelegationLifecycle(req, settings);
+		publishDispatchPathScope(req, lifecycle.pathScope);
 		timing.decisionCompletedAt = new Date(now()).toISOString();
 		const targetId = `delegation:${lifecycle.agentConfig.id}`;
 		const runtimeId = "acp";
@@ -3799,6 +3858,7 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 				requestOrigin: lifecycle.requestOrigin,
 				task: req.task,
 				...(req.intent !== undefined ? { intent: structuredClone(req.intent) } : {}),
+				pathScope: structuredClone(lifecycle.pathScope.provenance),
 				targetId,
 				wireModelId,
 				runtimeId,
@@ -4276,6 +4336,7 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 		const spec = buildDispatchWorkerSpec(
 			{
 				req,
+				pathScope: lifecycle.pathScope,
 				target: lifecycle.target,
 				admission: lifecycle.admission,
 				recipe: lifecycle.recipe,
@@ -4893,6 +4954,7 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 				outcomeCode,
 				lineage,
 				...(req.intent !== undefined ? { intent: structuredClone(req.intent) } : {}),
+				pathScope: structuredClone(lifecycle.pathScope.provenance),
 				identity,
 				node: placement?.node ?? LOCAL_RUN_NODE,
 				...receiptAttestationFields(worker.attestation?.() ?? null),
@@ -5276,6 +5338,25 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 				}
 				ledgerRef.update(envelope.id, ledgerPatch);
 				const receipt = ledgerRef.recordReceipt(envelope.id, sealRouteDecision(receiptDraft, routeObservation.decision));
+				// Two independent ways a run's write record can fail to be a closed
+				// list, and either one files it as `null` rather than as an empty
+				// one. The difference decides whether the write boundary may clear a
+				// path it did not see this run touch.
+				//
+				// The telemetry axis is whether the events were seen at all: a
+				// subprocess runtime publishes no tool events, and a partial trail
+				// has its holes exactly where an unobserved write would sit.
+				//
+				// The opacity axis is whether the events that were seen say enough.
+				// A run that called bash, verify, dispatch, or steer to a clean exit
+				// could have written through a channel no argument names, so nothing
+				// in the checkout can be cleared on the strength of its absence from
+				// the set. That run's window keeps today's blame-the-whole-diff
+				// behaviour; a run that never touched such a tool keeps the
+				// protection.
+				const writeRecordUsable =
+					receipt.safety?.toolTelemetry?.coverage === "complete" && observedRunEffects.writeRecordComplete;
+				recordRunWriteTargets(envelope.id, writeRecordUsable ? [...observedRunEffects.mutatedPaths] : null);
 				await ledgerRef.persist();
 				if (worktreeReceipt?.applied === true && req.taskWorktree !== undefined) {
 					try {
@@ -5510,10 +5591,11 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 				`dispatch: agent '${req.agentId}' is a ${agentSpec.audience} agent reserved for Clio internal orchestration`,
 			);
 		}
-		if (hasPersonaOverride(req) && (agentSpec.audience === "shadow" || agentSpec.audience === "internal")) {
+		if (hasCallerPersonaOverride(req) && (agentSpec.audience === "shadow" || agentSpec.audience === "internal")) {
 			throw new Error(`dispatch: persona overrides are not allowed for ${agentSpec.audience} agent '${req.agentId}'`);
 		}
-		const admission = resolveDispatchAdmissionStage(req, recipe, safety);
+		const pathScope = resolveDispatchPathScope(req);
+		const admission = resolveDispatchAdmissionStage(req, recipe, safety, pathScope);
 		const targets = readWorkerTargets(settings);
 		const target = resolveDispatchTarget(
 			req,
@@ -5526,14 +5608,14 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 		);
 		enforceCapabilityGate(target.target.id, target.modelCapabilities, req.requiredCapabilities);
 		const effectiveTools = withLedgerToolNarrowing(
-			effectiveToolNames(admission.allowedTools, target, writeConfinedRequest(req), deniedToolNames(req)),
+			effectiveToolNames(admission.allowedTools, target, pathScope.writeBoundaries.length > 0, deniedToolNames(req)),
 			req,
 		);
 		assertPostRuntimeToolCompatibility(req.agentId, agentSpec, effectiveTools, target);
 		assertRuntimeCanHonorWorkerPermissionMode(target.runtime, settings?.workers.onPermission ?? "deny");
 		assertWorkerBudgetEnforceable(target.runtime, agentSpec.budget !== null || req.budget !== undefined);
 		assertResponseSchemaEnforceable(target.runtime, target.modelCapabilities, req.responseSchema, effectiveTools.length);
-		assertWriteRootsEnforceable(target.runtime, req.writeRoots);
+		assertWriteRootsEnforceable(target.runtime, pathScope.writeBoundaries);
 		assertProtectedArtifactsEnforceable(
 			target.runtime.id,
 			target.runtime.kind !== "subprocess",
@@ -5833,7 +5915,7 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 	async function sealCouncilSynthesis(input: {
 		group: string;
 		round: number;
-		kind: "none" | "vote";
+		kind: "none" | "vote" | "judge";
 		text: string;
 		subjects: ReadonlyArray<{ runId: string; digest: string | null }>;
 		template: RunReceipt;
@@ -5991,6 +6073,7 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 				const reconciledLedger = ledger;
 				const reconciled = await reconcileOrphanAssignments({
 					listRunning: () => listStoredAssignments().filter((record) => record.status === "running"),
+					ownerAlive: assignmentProcessOwnerAlive,
 					lookupAttempt: (runId) => {
 						const envelope = reconciledLedger?.get(runId) ?? null;
 						if (!envelope) return null;
@@ -6000,7 +6083,8 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 							succeeded: envelope.outcome === "succeeded",
 						};
 					},
-					settle: (assignmentId, terminalRunId, status) => settleStoredAssignment(assignmentId, terminalRunId, status),
+					settle: (assignmentId, terminalRunId, status, owner) =>
+						settleStoredAssignment(assignmentId, terminalRunId, status, owner),
 				});
 				if ((reconciled.recovered > 0 || reconciled.abandoned > 0) && process.env.CLIO_CODER_INTERACTIVE !== "1") {
 					process.stderr.write(
@@ -6204,6 +6288,11 @@ export function createDispatchBundle(
 			if (!ledger) return null;
 			return ledger.get(runId);
 		},
+		observedRunWrites(runId) {
+			// A run this process never finalized, or finalized long enough ago to
+			// have been evicted, is unknown rather than silent, so both answer null.
+			return runWriteTargets.get(runId) ?? null;
+		},
 		assignments: {
 			get: (id) => assignments.get(id),
 			getStored: (id) => getStoredAssignment(id),

package/src/domains/dispatch/fleet-run.ts

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import type { FleetCommandRegistry } from "../agents/fleet-commands.js";
 import type { FleetContract } from "../agents/fleet-contract.js";
 import { resultContractAuthorship } from "../agents/result-contract.js";
 import type { AgentSpec } from "../agents/spec.js";
+import { claimAssignmentVerdict, recordAssignmentAttempt, settleStoredAssignment } from "./assignment-store.js";
 import { runCodeStep } from "./code-step.js";
 import { codeStepDir, writeCodeStepRecord } from "./code-step-store.js";
 import type { DispatchContract, DispatchRequest } from "./contract.js";
@@ -247,13 +248,47 @@ export async function executeFleetRun(input: ExecuteFleetRunInput): Promise<Flee
 		dynamicPlans: [],
 	};
 	await writeFleetRun(fleetRunRecord);
+	// Every step of this run dispatches under `fleetRootId` as its lineage root,
+	// so every agent step also settles the assignment row of that id. One step is
+	// not the run, and letting the last one to finish write the row reported a
+	// green step of a run that aborted at step 2 of 7 as `succeeded`. The run
+	// claims the verdict here and answers for itself at the end.
+	await claimAssignmentVerdict(fleetRootId, "fleet");
+	/** File one step's terminal run id, whichever kind produced it. */
+	const fileStepAttempt = (terminalRunId: string): Promise<unknown> =>
+		recordAssignmentAttempt(fleetRootId, terminalRunId);
+	/**
+	 * The run's own word on its ledger row. A settle that cannot be written
+	 * leaves the row `running`, which startup reconciliation resolves to failed,
+	 * so a lost write never becomes a false success.
+	 */
+	const settleFleetAssignment = (cleanRun: boolean): Promise<unknown> =>
+		settleStoredAssignment(
+			fleetRootId,
+			fleetRunRecord.steps.at(-1)?.result.terminalRunId ?? fleetRootId,
+			cleanRun ? "succeeded" : "failed",
+			"fleet",
+		).catch(() => undefined);
 	const boundaryEnforcer = createWriteBoundaryEnforcer({
 		root: workspaceRoot,
 		rootId: fleetRootId,
 		boundaryFor: (stepId) => livePlan.steps.find((step) => step.id === stepId)?.writes,
+		recordedWritesFor: (stepId) => {
+			const step = livePlan.steps.find((entry) => entry.id === stepId);
+			// A code step runs a registered command in a subprocess. Nothing
+			// enumerates what that command wrote, so the step contributes no record
+			// and its window falls back to blaming the whole diff.
+			if (step === undefined || step.kind !== "agent") return null;
+			const receipt = receiptsByStep.get(stepId);
+			if (receipt === undefined) return null;
+			return dispatch.observedRunWrites?.(receipt.runId) ?? null;
+		},
 		onVerdict(verdict, path) {
-			if (verdict.reason === null) return;
-			notice(`write boundary ${verdict.window}: ${verdict.detail ?? verdict.reason} record=${path}`, "write-boundary");
+			// Concurrent changes are reported too. The window did not fail for them
+			// and nothing was touched, and an operator whose file changed under a
+			// running fleet should hear it from the fleet.
+			if (verdict.detail === null) return;
+			notice(`write boundary ${verdict.window}: ${verdict.detail} record=${path}`, "write-boundary");
 		},
 	});
 	const receipts: RunReceipt[] = [];
@@ -285,6 +320,7 @@ export async function executeFleetRun(input: ExecuteFleetRunInput): Promise<Flee
 			costUsd: receiptsByStep.get(stepId)?.costUsd ?? 0,
 			result: replayedResult,
 		});
+		await fileStepAttempt(replayedResult.terminalRunId);
 	}
 	const planStep = (stepId: string) => livePlan.steps.find((entry) => entry.id === stepId);
 
@@ -322,6 +358,9 @@ export async function executeFleetRun(input: ExecuteFleetRunInput): Promise<Flee
 	try {
 		result = await executePlan(livePlan, {
 			preflight(step) {
+				// The fleet write boundary is deliberately enforced after the step. The enforcer in
+				// write-boundary-enforcer.ts snapshots and verifies the step window. Pre-emptive
+				// confinement for declared commands would require a command sandbox, which does not exist.
 				const request: DispatchRequest = {
 					agentId: step.agentId,
 					executionRole: step.executionRole,
@@ -372,6 +411,9 @@ export async function executeFleetRun(input: ExecuteFleetRunInput): Promise<Flee
 				if (step.planParentId !== undefined && parentReceipt === undefined) {
 					throw new Error(`fleet dynamic step '${step.id}' has no terminal plan-step receipt`);
 				}
+				// The fleet write boundary is deliberately enforced after the step. The enforcer in
+				// write-boundary-enforcer.ts snapshots and verifies the step window. Pre-emptive
+				// confinement for declared commands would require a command sandbox, which does not exist.
 				const request: DispatchRequest = {
 					agentId: step.agentId,
 					executionRole: step.executionRole,
@@ -671,6 +713,11 @@ export async function executeFleetRun(input: ExecuteFleetRunInput): Promise<Flee
 			onStepSettled: async (step, stepResult) => {
 				fleetRunRecord.steps.push({ stepId: step.id, result: stepResult });
 				await writeFleetRun(fleetRunRecord);
+				// The scheduler settles both kinds of step here, so this is where a
+				// deterministic step enters the assignment: a code step's `code-*` run
+				// id reads exactly like an agent receipt id, and its evidence sits under
+				// `code-steps/<fleetRootId>/`.
+				await fileStepAttempt(stepResult.terminalRunId);
 			},
 			spliceAfter(currentPlan, step, stepResult) {
 				if (stepResult.delegationPlan === undefined) return null;
@@ -712,6 +759,9 @@ export async function executeFleetRun(input: ExecuteFleetRunInput): Promise<Flee
 	} catch (error) {
 		fleetRunRecord.endedAt = new Date().toISOString();
 		await writeFleetRun(fleetRunRecord);
+		// A run the scheduler could not carry to the end never reached a verdict,
+		// and a fleet that threw is not a fleet that worked.
+		await settleFleetAssignment(false);
 		throw error;
 	}
 	fleetRunRecord.endedAt = new Date().toISOString();
@@ -723,6 +773,10 @@ export async function executeFleetRun(input: ExecuteFleetRunInput): Promise<Flee
 	const required = livePlan.steps.filter((step) => step.loop === undefined && !result.unneeded.includes(step.id));
 	const failedLoops = result.loops.filter((loop) => !loop.resolved);
 	const succeededStepCount = required.filter((step) => result.results.get(step.id)?.succeeded === true).length;
+	// A step a stop policy left unrun is counted but never succeeded, so a run
+	// that halted early can never reach the required count.
+	const cleanRun = failedLoops.length === 0 && result.skipped.length === 0 && succeededStepCount === required.length;
+	await settleFleetAssignment(cleanRun);
 	return {
 		rootId: fleetRootId,
 		planHash: input.plan.hash,
@@ -732,6 +786,6 @@ export async function executeFleetRun(input: ExecuteFleetRunInput): Promise<Flee
 		requiredStepCount: required.length,
 		succeededStepCount,
 		resolvedLoopCount: result.loops.length - failedLoops.length,
-		cleanRun: failedLoops.length === 0 && result.skipped.length === 0 && succeededStepCount === required.length,
+		cleanRun,
 	};
 }

package/src/domains/dispatch/gate-role-prompts.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 /** Bounded role prompts shared by dispatch topology construction and ACP admission. */
 
+import { COUNCIL_BALLOT_SHAPE, COUNCIL_BALLOT_VERDICT_MAX_BYTES } from "../agents/result-contract.js";
+
 export const REVIEWER_GATE_PROMPT = [
 	"You are a strict, read-only reviewer of one implementation run.",
 	"Inspect the supplied result and repository state with read-only tools.",
@@ -26,6 +28,42 @@ export const COUNCIL_JUDGE_PROMPT = [
 	'End with a JSON object only: {"verdict":"...","text":"the supported synthesis"}.',
 ].join("\n");
 
+/**
+ * What a council member is told when the synthesis is `vote`.
+ *
+ * The tally is a strict majority over the members' `verdict` fields, and until
+ * this directive existed nothing ever asked a member for one (#230). It rides
+ * on the member's task rather than on a system prompt, so the seated recipe
+ * keeps its own persona: a council's point is running *that* agent across
+ * several targets, and replacing its body with a ballot prompt would run a
+ * different agent under the same name. The matching `council-ballot` contract
+ * travels with it as a `resultContractOverride`, so the postcondition the run
+ * seals is the one this text asks for, and a member that answers in its
+ * recipe's shape instead gets the ordinary bounded repair rounds rather than a
+ * silent absence from the tally.
+ *
+ * The precedence line is not decoration. A recipe body states its own result
+ * shape (`researcher` asks for findings), so without it the member holds two
+ * contradictory instructions and small local models resolve the conflict by
+ * burying a verdict inside the recipe's shape, which is exactly what the 0.3.7
+ * release test observed and read as correct behavior.
+ */
+export const COUNCIL_VOTE_MEMBER_DIRECTIVE = [
+	"This council round is a vote. Do the work the task asks for, then cast one ballot on it.",
+	`The verdict is a short comparable token the other members can match exactly, such as "yes", "no", "keep", or the name of an option you were given. It must be a single line of at most ${COUNCIL_BALLOT_VERDICT_MAX_BYTES} bytes and is lower-cased before the tally. Anything longer is reasoning: put that in text, along with the evidence behind it.`,
+	"Your recipe's own result shape does not apply to this run. The council reads the ballot and nothing else.",
+	`End with a JSON object only: ${COUNCIL_BALLOT_SHAPE}`,
+].join("\n");
+
+/**
+ * The task a council member is given under `synthesis: "vote"`. Plan admission
+ * composes it here once, then the runner reuses the task pinned by that plan so
+ * the approval artifact shows the exact ask the member receives.
+ */
+export function renderCouncilVoteMemberTask(originalTask: string): string {
+	return [originalTask, COUNCIL_VOTE_MEMBER_DIRECTIVE].join("\n\n");
+}
+
 /**
  * Posture a compete candidate runs under. Candidates otherwise differ only by
  * worktree, and identical agents produce correlated output, so each candidate