@ionic/core 8.8.15 → 8.8.16-dev.11784841344.1aa1a41c

package/dist/cjs/index-Bj07IRTB.js

@@ -0,0 +1,429 @@
+/*!
+ * (C) Ionic http://ionicframework.com - MIT License
+ */
+'use strict';
+
+var index = require('./index-GZU9YrFc.js');
+
+/**
+ * Sanitize an untrusted HTML string.
+ *
+ * Parses the string into a detached DOM, removes blocked tags, strips
+ * attributes outside the narrow `domStringAllowedAttributes` list (refer
+ * `sanitizeElement`), and scrubs script-scheme URLs. Returns the sanitized
+ * HTML string.
+ *
+ * Use this when you have an HTML string from an unknown source and need to
+ * render it via `innerHTML`. Use `sanitizeDOMTree` instead when you already
+ * have a DOM tree and want to sanitize it in place without a string round
+ * trip. The two apply the same dangerous-vector scrubbing but different
+ * attribute allowlists: this path stays narrow so existing consumers
+ * (toast, loading, alert message, etc.) are unaffected, while
+ * `sanitizeDOMTree` uses the wider rich-content allowlist.
+ *
+ * @param untrustedString - The HTML string to sanitize. Pass an
+ * `IonicSafeString` to bypass sanitization, or `undefined` to short-circuit.
+ * @returns The sanitized HTML string, or `undefined` if the input was
+ * `undefined`. Returns `''` if sanitization fails or the input contains
+ * an inline `onload=` handler.
+ */
+const sanitizeDOMString = (untrustedString) => {
+    try {
+        if (untrustedString instanceof IonicSafeString) {
+            return untrustedString.value;
+        }
+        if (!isSanitizerEnabled() || typeof untrustedString !== 'string' || untrustedString === '') {
+            return untrustedString;
+        }
+        /**
+         * onload is fired when appending to a document
+         * fragment in Chrome. If a string
+         * contains onload then we should not
+         * attempt to add this to the fragment.
+         */
+        if (untrustedString.includes('onload=')) {
+            return '';
+        }
+        /**
+         * Create a document fragment
+         * separate from the main DOM,
+         * create a div to do our work in
+         */
+        const documentFragment = document.createDocumentFragment();
+        const workingDiv = document.createElement('div');
+        documentFragment.appendChild(workingDiv);
+        workingDiv.innerHTML = untrustedString;
+        /**
+         * Remove any elements
+         * that are blocked
+         */
+        blockedTags.forEach((blockedTag) => {
+            const getElementsToRemove = documentFragment.querySelectorAll(blockedTag);
+            for (let elementIndex = getElementsToRemove.length - 1; elementIndex >= 0; elementIndex--) {
+                const element = getElementsToRemove[elementIndex];
+                if (element.parentNode) {
+                    element.parentNode.removeChild(element);
+                }
+                else {
+                    documentFragment.removeChild(element);
+                }
+                /**
+                 * We still need to sanitize
+                 * the children of this element
+                 * as they are left behind
+                 */
+                const childElements = getElementChildren(element);
+                /* eslint-disable-next-line */
+                for (let childIndex = 0; childIndex < childElements.length; childIndex++) {
+                    sanitizeElement(childElements[childIndex], domStringAllowedAttributes);
+                }
+            }
+        });
+        /**
+         * Go through remaining elements and remove
+         * non-allowed attribs
+         */
+        // IE does not support .children on document fragments, only .childNodes
+        const dfChildren = getElementChildren(documentFragment);
+        /* eslint-disable-next-line */
+        for (let childIndex = 0; childIndex < dfChildren.length; childIndex++) {
+            sanitizeElement(dfChildren[childIndex], domStringAllowedAttributes);
+        }
+        // Append document fragment to div
+        const fragmentDiv = document.createElement('div');
+        fragmentDiv.appendChild(documentFragment);
+        // First child is always the div we did our work in
+        const getInnerDiv = fragmentDiv.querySelector('div');
+        return getInnerDiv !== null ? getInnerDiv.innerHTML : fragmentDiv.innerHTML;
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        index.printIonError('sanitizeDOMString', err);
+        return '';
+    }
+};
+/**
+ * Sanitize an entire trusted DOM tree in place.
+ *
+ * Removes blocked tags (`script`, `iframe`, etc.) from the subtree and
+ * then sanitizes attributes on every remaining element using the wider
+ * `richContentAllowedAttributes` allowlist (refer `sanitizeElement`).
+ * Component presentational attributes (`size`, `color`, `shape`, inline
+ * SVG, `aria-*`, `data-*`) are preserved; `style`, event handlers (`on*`),
+ * form/navigation-hijack attributes, script-scheme URLs, and non-image
+ * `data:` URLs are stripped.
+ *
+ * Use this when you have a DOM tree the developer controls (e.g.
+ * cloned slot content from a component) and you need to render it
+ * elsewhere safely.
+ *
+ * @param root - The root element whose subtree will be sanitized in
+ * place. No-op when the sanitizer is disabled via `Ionic.config`.
+ */
+const sanitizeDOMTree = (root) => {
+    if (!isSanitizerEnabled()) {
+        return;
+    }
+    blockedTags.forEach((tag) => {
+        const matches = root.querySelectorAll(tag);
+        for (let i = matches.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+            matches[i].remove();
+        }
+    });
+    sanitizeElement(root, richContentAllowedAttributes, richContentAllowedAttributePrefixes);
+};
+/**
+ * Clean up current element based on allowed attributes
+ * and then recursively dig down into any child elements to
+ * clean those up as well
+ */
+// TODO(FW-2832): type (using Element triggers other type errors as well)
+const sanitizeElement = (element, allowedAttributes, allowedAttributePrefixes = []) => {
+    // IE uses childNodes, so ignore nodes that are not elements
+    if (element.nodeType && element.nodeType !== 1) {
+        return;
+    }
+    /**
+     * If attributes is not a NamedNodeMap
+     * then we should remove the element entirely.
+     * This helps avoid DOM Clobbering attacks where
+     * attributes is overridden.
+     */
+    if (typeof NamedNodeMap !== 'undefined' && !(element.attributes instanceof NamedNodeMap)) {
+        element.remove();
+        return;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Always strip `style` (CSS injection, `background:url()` beaconing, UI
+     * spoofing). It is never on the allowlist, but it is removed explicitly
+     * here because some engines (e.g. jsdom) don't enumerate the CSSOM-backed
+     * `style` attribute in `element.attributes`, which would let the loop
+     * below skip over it.
+     */
+    element.removeAttribute('style');
+    for (let i = element.attributes.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        const attribute = element.attributes.item(i);
+        const attributeName = attribute.name;
+        const lowerName = attributeName.toLowerCase();
+        /**
+         * Remove any attribute that is not on the allowlist. This drops event
+         * handlers (`on*`), `style`, the form/navigation-hijack attributes
+         * (`formaction`, `action`, `target`), namespaced attributes like
+         * `xlink:href`, and anything else not explicitly known to be safe.
+         */
+        if (!isAttributeAllowed(lowerName, allowedAttributes, allowedAttributePrefixes)) {
+            element.removeAttribute(attributeName);
+            continue;
+        }
+        // clean up any allowed attribs
+        // that attempt to do any JS funny-business
+        const attributeValue = attribute.value;
+        if (attributeValue == null) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        /**
+         * Scrub dangerous schemes from the value. The value is normalized first
+         * (whitespace and ASCII control characters removed) so entity-obfuscated
+         * payloads such as `java&#9;script:`, which the parser decodes to
+         * `java\tscript:`, are still caught. Normalizing the value also covers
+         * namespaced attributes, where the previous `element[attributeName]`
+         * property reflection returned `undefined` and let them slip through.
+         */
+        const normalizedValue = attributeValue.replace(controlCharactersAndWhitespace, '').toLowerCase();
+        // Script schemes are never allowed, on any attribute.
+        if (normalizedValue.includes('javascript:') || normalizedValue.includes('vbscript:')) {
+            element.removeAttribute(attributeName);
+            continue;
+        }
+        /**
+         * For URL-bearing attributes, allow `data:` URIs only for raster
+         * images. Document-bearing types (`text/html`, `image/svg+xml`,
+         * `application/*`, etc.) can carry markup or script when navigated to
+         * or rendered, so they are stripped, while safe image types are kept so
+         * inline images keep working.
+         */
+        if (urlAttributes.includes(lowerName) &&
+            normalizedValue.startsWith('data:') &&
+            !safeDataImageUri.test(normalizedValue)) {
+            element.removeAttribute(attributeName);
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * Sanitize any nested children
+     */
+    const childElements = getElementChildren(element);
+    /* eslint-disable-next-line */
+    for (let i = 0; i < childElements.length; i++) {
+        sanitizeElement(childElements[i], allowedAttributes, allowedAttributePrefixes);
+    }
+};
+/**
+ * IE doesn't always support .children
+ * so we revert to .childNodes instead
+ */
+// TODO(FW-2832): type
+const getElementChildren = (el) => {
+    return el.children != null ? el.children : el.childNodes;
+};
+const isSanitizerEnabled = () => {
+    var _a;
+    const win = window;
+    const config = (_a = win === null || win === void 0 ? void 0 : win.Ionic) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.config;
+    if (config) {
+        if (config.get) {
+            return config.get('sanitizerEnabled', true);
+        }
+        else {
+            return config.sanitizerEnabled === true || config.sanitizerEnabled === undefined;
+        }
+    }
+    return true;
+};
+/**
+ * Mirror known custom-element DOM properties onto attributes so they
+ * survive `cloneNode`. Call this on a DOM subtree before cloning it for
+ * rendering elsewhere (e.g. cloning slotted option content into an
+ * overlay).
+ *
+ * Only sets the attribute when the property holds a non-empty string
+ * and the attribute isn't already present, so existing attributes
+ * take precedence.
+ *
+ * @param root - The root element whose subtree (and itself) will be
+ * inspected.
+ */
+const reflectPropertiesToAttributes = (root) => {
+    const candidates = [];
+    if (root.tagName in elementPropsToReflect) {
+        candidates.push(root);
+    }
+    for (const tagName of Object.keys(elementPropsToReflect)) {
+        candidates.push(...Array.from(root.querySelectorAll(tagName.toLowerCase())));
+    }
+    for (const el of candidates) {
+        if (!(el.tagName in elementPropsToReflect)) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        const props = elementPropsToReflect[el.tagName];
+        for (const prop of props) {
+            const value = el[prop];
+            if (typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0 && !el.hasAttribute(prop)) {
+                el.setAttribute(prop, value);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+};
+/**
+ * Attribute allowlist for `sanitizeDOMString`. Intentionally narrow: this
+ * path sanitizes developer HTML strings rendered via `innerHTML` by
+ * `ion-toast`, `ion-loading`, the `ion-alert` message,
+ * `ion-refresher-content`, and `ion-infinite-scroll-content`, so the list
+ * is kept to the minimum those have always needed. Broadening it here would
+ * change sanitization output for all of those consumers, so the wider
+ * rich-content allowlist below is deliberately scoped to `sanitizeDOMTree`
+ * instead.
+ */
+const domStringAllowedAttributes = ['class', 'id', 'href', 'src', 'name', 'slot'];
+/**
+ * Attribute allowlist for `sanitizeDOMTree` (the select rich-content path).
+ * Covers global HTML attributes, the Ionic component presentational props
+ * that cloned rich content (e.g. `ion-select-option` markup) relies on, and
+ * the inert SVG presentation attributes used by inline icons.
+ *
+ * `aria-*` and `data-*` are allowed separately by prefix (refer
+ * `richContentAllowedAttributePrefixes`) since they are inert and not worth
+ * enumerating. URL-bearing names (`href`, `src`) are allowed here, but
+ * their values are still scrubbed for script schemes in `sanitizeElement`.
+ *
+ * Notably absent: `style`, event handlers (`on*`), and the
+ * form/navigation-hijack attributes (`formaction`, `action`, `target`),
+ * which are therefore stripped.
+ */
+const richContentAllowedAttributes = [
+    // Global / structural
+    'class',
+    'id',
+    'slot',
+    'name',
+    'title',
+    'alt',
+    'lang',
+    'dir',
+    'role',
+    'type',
+    'value',
+    'disabled',
+    'width',
+    'height',
+    'href',
+    'src',
+    // Ionic component presentational props
+    'color',
+    'size',
+    'shape',
+    'fill',
+    'expand',
+    'mode',
+    'theme',
+    'icon',
+    'label',
+    'label-placement',
+    'justify',
+    'inset',
+    'lines',
+    'ios',
+    'md',
+    // SVG presentation attributes (compared lowercased, e.g. `viewBox`)
+    'xmlns',
+    'viewbox',
+    'preserveaspectratio',
+    'stroke',
+    'stroke-width',
+    'stroke-linecap',
+    'stroke-linejoin',
+    'stroke-opacity',
+    'stroke-dasharray',
+    'fill-rule',
+    'fill-opacity',
+    'clip-rule',
+    'd',
+    'points',
+    'cx',
+    'cy',
+    'r',
+    'rx',
+    'ry',
+    'x',
+    'y',
+    'x1',
+    'y1',
+    'x2',
+    'y2',
+    'transform',
+    'opacity',
+];
+/**
+ * Attribute-name prefixes that are always safe to keep in the rich-content
+ * path. `aria-*` and `data-*` attributes cannot execute script or load
+ * resources, so they are allowed wholesale rather than enumerated by name.
+ */
+const richContentAllowedAttributePrefixes = ['aria-', 'data-'];
+/**
+ * Whether an attribute name (already lowercased) is safe to keep, by exact
+ * match or by an allowed prefix.
+ */
+const isAttributeAllowed = (lowerName, allowedAttributes, allowedAttributePrefixes) => {
+    if (allowedAttributes.includes(lowerName)) {
+        return true;
+    }
+    return allowedAttributePrefixes.some((prefix) => lowerName.startsWith(prefix));
+};
+/**
+ * Matches ASCII control characters and whitespace (including the
+ * non-breaking space). Used to normalize attribute values before matching
+ * a URL scheme so entity-obfuscated payloads such as `java&#9;script:`
+ * (decoded by the parser to `java\tscript:`) can't smuggle a scheme past
+ * the check.
+ */
+// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex -- matching control characters is the point
+const controlCharactersAndWhitespace = /[\u0000-\u0020\u007f-\u00a0]/g;
+/**
+ * Attributes whose values are URLs. Their values are scheme-checked in
+ * `sanitizeElement` (e.g. `data:` filtering) beyond the script-scheme scrub
+ * applied to every attribute.
+ */
+const urlAttributes = ['href', 'src'];
+/**
+ * Matches a `data:` URI for a raster image type that cannot carry script.
+ * `image/svg+xml` is deliberately excluded (SVG can execute script), as are
+ * document types like `text/html` and `application/*`. The value is already
+ * lowercased and whitespace-stripped before this is tested.
+ */
+const safeDataImageUri = /^data:image\/(?:png|jpe?g|gif|webp|bmp|avif|x-icon|vnd\.microsoft\.icon)[;,]/;
+/**
+ * Tags removed entirely (with their subtree) before attribute sanitization.
+ * Exported so tests can assert the set without hardcoding it.
+ */
+const blockedTags = ['script', 'style', 'iframe', 'meta', 'link', 'object', 'embed', 'base'];
+/**
+ * Properties on custom elements that frameworks (Vue, Angular) often
+ * set as DOM properties rather than attributes. `cloneNode` only copies
+ * attributes, so these values are lost when slotted content is cloned
+ * into an overlay. For each known custom element, we mirror the listed
+ * properties onto attributes so the cloned copy still has the data it
+ * needs to render.
+ *
+ * Keyed by uppercased tagName so the lookup matches `Element.tagName`.
+ */
+const elementPropsToReflect = {
+    'ION-ICON': ['icon', 'name', 'src', 'ios', 'md'],
+};
+class IonicSafeString {
+    constructor(value) {
+        this.value = value;
+    }
+}
+
+exports.IonicSafeString = IonicSafeString;
+exports.reflectPropertiesToAttributes = reflectPropertiesToAttributes;
+exports.sanitizeDOMString = sanitizeDOMString;
+exports.sanitizeDOMTree = sanitizeDOMTree;

package/dist/cjs/{index-CIrkNXqJ.js → index-BxEZd5IE.js}

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
  */
 'use strict';
 
-var helpers = require('./helpers-Cv23MFHM.js');
-var index = require('./index-Ct7gcRif.js');
+var helpers = require('./helpers-DiOgV5hw.js');
+var index = require('./index-GZU9YrFc.js');
 
 const ION_CONTENT_TAG_NAME = 'ION-CONTENT';
 const ION_CONTENT_ELEMENT_SELECTOR = 'ion-content';

package/dist/cjs/{index-DqmRDbxg.js → index-Cu9JNpPi.js}

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  */
 'use strict';
 
-/* Ionicons v8.0.13, ES Modules */
+/* Ionicons v8.0.14-dev.11784821417.1c794397, ES Modules */
 
 const arrowBackSharp = "data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 512 512' class='ionicon'><path d='M244 400 100 256l144-144M120 256h292' stroke-linecap='square' stroke-miterlimit='10' stroke-width='48px' class='ionicon-fill-none'/></svg>";
 const arrowDown = "data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 512 512' class='ionicon'><path d='m112 268 144 144 144-144M256 392V100' stroke-linecap='round' stroke-linejoin='round' stroke-width='48px' class='ionicon-fill-none'/></svg>";
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ const chevronForward = "data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/20
 const chevronForwardOutline = "data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 512 512' class='ionicon'><path d='m184 112 144 144-144 144' stroke-linecap='round' stroke-linejoin='round' stroke-width='48px' class='ionicon-fill-none'/></svg>";
 const close = "data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 512 512' class='ionicon'><path d='m289.94 256 95-95A24 24 0 0 0 351 127l-95 95-95-95a24 24 0 0 0-34 34l95 95-95 95a24 24 0 1 0 34 34l95-95 95 95a24 24 0 0 0 34-34Z'/></svg>";
 const closeCircle = "data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 512 512' class='ionicon'><path d='M256 48C141.31 48 48 141.31 48 256s93.31 208 208 208 208-93.31 208-208S370.69 48 256 48m75.31 260.69a16 16 0 1 1-22.62 22.62L256 278.63l-52.69 52.68a16 16 0 0 1-22.62-22.62L233.37 256l-52.68-52.69a16 16 0 0 1 22.62-22.62L256 233.37l52.69-52.68a16 16 0 0 1 22.62 22.62L278.63 256Z'/></svg>";
+const closeOutline = "data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 512 512' class='ionicon'><path d='M368 368 144 144M368 144 144 368' stroke-linecap='round' stroke-linejoin='round' class='ionicon-fill-none ionicon-stroke-width'/></svg>";
 const closeSharp = "data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 512 512' class='ionicon'><path d='M400 145.49 366.51 112 256 222.51 145.49 112 112 145.49 222.51 256 112 366.51 145.49 400 256 289.49 366.51 400 400 366.51 289.49 256z'/></svg>";
 const ellipseOutline = "data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 512 512' class='ionicon'><circle cx='256' cy='256' r='192' stroke-linecap='round' stroke-linejoin='round' class='ionicon-fill-none ionicon-stroke-width'/></svg>";
 const ellipsisHorizontal = "data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 512 512' class='ionicon'><circle cx='256' cy='256' r='48'/><circle cx='416' cy='256' r='48'/><circle cx='96' cy='256' r='48'/></svg>";
@@ -44,6 +45,7 @@ exports.chevronForward = chevronForward;
 exports.chevronForwardOutline = chevronForwardOutline;
 exports.close = close;
 exports.closeCircle = closeCircle;
+exports.closeOutline = closeOutline;
 exports.closeSharp = closeSharp;
 exports.ellipseOutline = ellipseOutline;
 exports.ellipsisHorizontal = ellipsisHorizontal;

package/dist/cjs/{index-aC4x3Fk3.js → index-DYRcC3bw.js}

@@ -3,12 +3,10 @@
  */
 'use strict';
 
-var index = require('./index-DkNv4J_i.js');
-var hardwareBackButton = require('./hardware-back-button-iUuF_76h.js');
-var index$1 = require('./index-Ct7gcRif.js');
-var helpers = require('./helpers-Cv23MFHM.js');
-var ionicGlobal = require('./ionic-global-B-cA6LkY.js');
-var animation = require('./animation-BJq0kcy2.js');
+var ionicGlobal = require('./ionic-global-QoUqobrQ.js');
+var index = require('./index-GZU9YrFc.js');
+var helpers = require('./helpers-DiOgV5hw.js');
+var animation = require('./animation-B3xfVcDO.js');
 
 /**
  * baseAnimation
@@ -50,10 +48,10 @@ const menuOverlayAnimation = (menu) => {
     }
     menuAnimation.addElement(menu.menuInnerEl).fromTo('transform', `translateX(${closedX})`, `translateX(${openedX})`);
     const mode = ionicGlobal.getIonMode(menu);
-    const isIos = mode === 'ios';
-    const opacity = isIos ? 0.2 : 0.25;
+    const isIOS = mode === 'ios';
+    const opacity = isIOS ? 0.2 : 0.25;
     backdropAnimation.addElement(menu.backdropEl).fromTo('opacity', 0.01, opacity);
-    return baseAnimation(isIos).addAnimation([menuAnimation, backdropAnimation]);
+    return baseAnimation(isIOS).addAnimation([menuAnimation, backdropAnimation]);
 };
 
 /**
@@ -66,6 +64,7 @@ const menuPushAnimation = (menu) => {
     let menuClosedX;
     const mode = ionicGlobal.getIonMode(menu);
     const width = menu.width;
+    const isIOS = mode === 'ios';
     if (menu.isEndSide) {
         contentOpenedX = -width + 'px';
         menuClosedX = width + 'px';
@@ -81,7 +80,7 @@ const menuPushAnimation = (menu) => {
         .addElement(menu.contentEl)
         .fromTo('transform', 'translateX(0px)', `translateX(${contentOpenedX})`);
     const backdropAnimation = animation.createAnimation().addElement(menu.backdropEl).fromTo('opacity', 0.01, 0.32);
-    return baseAnimation(mode === 'ios').addAnimation([menuAnimation, contentAnimation, backdropAnimation]);
+    return baseAnimation(isIOS).addAnimation([menuAnimation, contentAnimation, backdropAnimation]);
 };
 
 /**
@@ -91,11 +90,12 @@ const menuPushAnimation = (menu) => {
  */
 const menuRevealAnimation = (menu) => {
     const mode = ionicGlobal.getIonMode(menu);
+    const isIOS = mode === 'ios';
     const openedX = menu.width * (menu.isEndSide ? -1 : 1) + 'px';
     const contentOpen = animation.createAnimation()
         .addElement(menu.contentEl) // REVIEW
         .fromTo('transform', 'translateX(0px)', `translateX(${openedX})`);
-    return baseAnimation(mode === 'ios').addAnimation(contentOpen);
+    return baseAnimation(isIOS).addAnimation(contentOpen);
 };
 
 const createMenuController = () => {
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ const createMenuController = () => {
             const menuRefs = menus.filter((m) => m.side === menu && !m.disabled);
             if (menuRefs.length >= 1) {
                 if (menuRefs.length > 1 && logOnMultipleSideMenus) {
-                    index$1.printIonWarning(`menuController queried for a menu on the "${menu}" side, but ${menuRefs.length} menus were found. The first menu reference will be used. If this is not the behavior you want then pass the ID of the menu instead of its side.`, menuRefs.map((m) => m.el));
+                    index.printIonWarning(`menuController queried for a menu on the "${menu}" side, but ${menuRefs.length} menus were found. The first menu reference will be used. If this is not the behavior you want then pass the ID of the menu instead of its side.`, menuRefs.map((m) => m.el));
                 }
                 return menuRefs[0].el;
             }
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ const createMenuController = () => {
             const sideMenuRefs = menus.filter((m) => m.side === menu);
             if (sideMenuRefs.length >= 1) {
                 if (sideMenuRefs.length > 1 && logOnMultipleSideMenus) {
-                    index$1.printIonWarning(`menuController queried for a menu on the "${menu}" side, but ${sideMenuRefs.length} menus were found. The first menu reference will be used. If this is not the behavior you want then pass the ID of the menu instead of its side.`, sideMenuRefs.map((m) => m.el));
+                    index.printIonWarning(`menuController queried for a menu on the "${menu}" side, but ${sideMenuRefs.length} menus were found. The first menu reference will be used. If this is not the behavior you want then pass the ID of the menu instead of its side.`, sideMenuRefs.map((m) => m.el));
                 }
                 return sideMenuRefs[0].el;
             }
@@ -275,10 +275,10 @@ const createMenuController = () => {
     registerAnimation('reveal', menuRevealAnimation);
     registerAnimation('push', menuPushAnimation);
     registerAnimation('overlay', menuOverlayAnimation);
-    index.doc === null || index.doc === void 0 ? void 0 : index.doc.addEventListener('ionBackButton', (ev) => {
+    ionicGlobal.doc === null || ionicGlobal.doc === void 0 ? void 0 : ionicGlobal.doc.addEventListener('ionBackButton', (ev) => {
         const openMenu = _getOpenSync();
         if (openMenu) {
-            ev.detail.register(hardwareBackButton.MENU_BACK_BUTTON_PRIORITY, () => {
+            ev.detail.register(ionicGlobal.MENU_BACK_BUTTON_PRIORITY, () => {
                 return openMenu.close();
             });
         }

package/dist/cjs/{index-Ct7gcRif.js → index-GZU9YrFc.js}

@@ -288,6 +288,12 @@ var HYDRATE_CHILD_ID = "c-id";
 var HYDRATED_CSS = "{visibility:hidden}.hydrated{visibility:inherit}";
 var SLOT_FB_CSS = "slot-fb{display:contents}slot-fb[hidden]{display:none}";
 var XLINK_NS = "http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink";
+var FORM_ASSOCIATED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_CALLBACKS = [
+  "formAssociatedCallback",
+  "formResetCallback",
+  "formDisabledCallback",
+  "formStateRestoreCallback"
+];
 var win = typeof window !== "undefined" ? window : {};
 var H = win.HTMLElement || class {
 };
@@ -1781,7 +1787,9 @@ var parsePropertyValue = (propValue, propType, isFormAssociated) => {
   }
   if (propValue != null && !isComplexType(propValue)) {
     if (propType & 4 /* Boolean */) {
-      {
+      if (isFormAssociated && typeof propValue === "string") {
+        return propValue === "" || !!propValue;
+      } else {
         return propValue === "false" ? false : propValue === "" || !!propValue;
       }
     }
@@ -2809,7 +2817,9 @@ var setValue = (ref, propName, newVal, cmpMeta) => {
   const instance = hostRef.$lazyInstance$ ;
   newVal = parsePropertyValue(
     newVal,
-    cmpMeta.$members$[propName][0]);
+    cmpMeta.$members$[propName][0],
+    !!(cmpMeta.$flags$ & 64 /* formAssociated */)
+  );
   const areBothNaN = Number.isNaN(oldVal) && Number.isNaN(newVal);
   const didValueChange = newVal !== oldVal && !areBothNaN;
   if ((!(flags & 8 /* isConstructingInstance */) || oldVal === void 0) && didValueChange) {
@@ -2853,6 +2863,26 @@ var setValue = (ref, propName, newVal, cmpMeta) => {
 var proxyComponent = (Cstr, cmpMeta, flags) => {
   var _a, _b;
   const prototype = Cstr.prototype;
+  if (cmpMeta.$flags$ & 64 /* formAssociated */ && flags & 1 /* isElementConstructor */) {
+    FORM_ASSOCIATED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_CALLBACKS.forEach((cbName) => {
+      Object.defineProperty(prototype, cbName, {
+        value(...args) {
+          var _a2;
+          const hostRef = getHostRef(this);
+          const instance = hostRef == null ? void 0 : hostRef.$lazyInstance$ ;
+          if (!instance) {
+            (_a2 = hostRef == null ? void 0 : hostRef.$onReadyPromise$) == null ? void 0 : _a2.then((asyncInstance) => {
+              const cb = asyncInstance[cbName];
+              typeof cb === "function" && cb.call(asyncInstance, ...args);
+            });
+          } else {
+            const cb = instance[cbName] ;
+            typeof cb === "function" && cb.call(instance, ...args);
+          }
+        }
+      });
+    });
+  }
   if (cmpMeta.$members$ || BUILD.propChangeCallback) {
     {
       if (Cstr.watchers && !cmpMeta.$watchers$) {
@@ -2902,7 +2932,9 @@ var proxyComponent = (Cstr, cmpMeta, flags) => {
               origSetter.apply(this, [
                 parsePropertyValue(
                   newValue,
-                  memberFlags)
+                  memberFlags,
+                  !!(cmpMeta.$flags$ & 64 /* formAssociated */)
+                )
               ]);
               newValue = memberFlags & 32 /* State */ ? this[memberName] : ref.$hostElement$[memberName];
               setValue(this, memberName, newValue, cmpMeta);
@@ -2927,7 +2959,9 @@ var proxyComponent = (Cstr, cmpMeta, flags) => {
                 }
                 ref.$lazyInstance$[memberName] = parsePropertyValue(
                   newValue,
-                  memberFlags);
+                  memberFlags,
+                  !!(cmpMeta.$flags$ & 64 /* formAssociated */)
+                );
                 setValue(this, memberName, ref.$lazyInstance$[memberName], cmpMeta);
               };
               if (ref.$lazyInstance$) {
@@ -3334,6 +3368,9 @@ var bootstrapLazy = (lazyBundles, options = {}) => {
       } else {
         patchCloneNode(HostElement.prototype);
       }
+      if (cmpMeta.$flags$ & 64 /* formAssociated */) {
+        HostElement.formAssociated = true;
+      }
       cmpMeta.$lazyBundleId$ = lazyBundle[0];
       if (!exclude.includes(tagName) && !customElements2.get(tagName)) {
         cmpTags.push(tagName);