@invonetwork/web-sdk 2.0.0 → 2.1.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +45 -0
- package/README.md +40 -6
- package/dist/{chunk-6XCI53XJ.js → chunk-4GNJIQY2.js} +48 -7
- package/dist/index.cjs +125 -8
- package/dist/index.d.cts +43 -5
- package/dist/index.d.ts +43 -5
- package/dist/index.js +81 -5
- package/dist/server.cjs +54 -7
- package/dist/server.d.cts +2 -2
- package/dist/server.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/server.js +11 -5
- package/dist/{types-bp0UtN_N.d.cts → types-DtihCpOj.d.cts} +34 -2
- package/dist/{types-bp0UtN_N.d.ts → types-DtihCpOj.d.ts} +34 -2
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/CHANGELOG.md
CHANGED
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@@ -4,6 +4,51 @@ All notable changes to `@invonetwork/web-sdk` are documented here. This project
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[Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/). Releases are managed with
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[changesets](https://github.com/changesets/changesets).
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## [2.1.1] — 2026-07-06
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**Security & correctness hardening** from a full audit + red-team of both SDKs. No API changes;
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upgrade recommended.
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- **Fail closed on HTTP redirects (security).** The transport now sends `redirect:"manual"` and
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throws `UNEXPECTED_REDIRECT` on any 3xx instead of following it. Previously a redirect from
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the API host could cause the game-secret header to be re-sent to an unvalidated URL (matches
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the Python SDK fix, where the leak also covered the player token and an `http://` downgrade).
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- **`retryAfter` no longer treats a blank `retry_after` as `0`.** An empty/whitespace
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`retry_after` string used to become `0` (`Number("")===0`) — an immediate, no-backoff retry.
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It's now correctly `undefined`, in both `InvoError.retryAfter` and the retry layer.
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- **Whitespace OTP codes rejected client-side.** `recoveryComplete`/`enrollmentVerify` now
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reject a whitespace-only `code` before the network call, so it can't burn an attempt against
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the attempt-capped endpoints (parity with the Python SDK).
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- **Webhook verify uses `crypto.timingSafeEqual`** on the sync path (parity with Python's
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`hmac.compare_digest`); the runtime-agnostic async/edge path keeps its string compare.
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- **WebAuthn option mappers fail cleanly.** A malformed `register/begin` body now throws
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`WEBAUTHN_OPTIONS_MALFORMED` (an `InvoError`) instead of a raw `TypeError`.
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## [2.1.0] — 2026-07-02
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**Passkey recovery ("lost or replaced my passkey").** Deleting a passkey on the device never
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tells the server the key is gone, so re-enrollment was dead-ended by the anti-takeover gate
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(`ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF`) with nothing left to prove possession with. The backend shipped
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a self-serve, possession-proofed recovery flow; this release wires the client side.
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- `InvoClient.recoveryBegin()` — sends a one-time code to the phone/email on file
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(`{ status: "sent", channels }`); `InvoClient.recoveryComplete(code)` — deactivates the
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stale server-side passkey and authorizes a fresh enrollment
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(`{ status: "recovered", deactivatedCount, next }`). Then retry the same `enrollPasskey()`.
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- New `InvoError` classifiers: `isEnrollmentCodeInvalid`, `isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown`, and
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`retryAfterAt` (the ISO timestamp on the 403 cooldown — distinct from the numeric
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`retryAfter` throttle field). Bare `no_channel_on_file` / `rate_limited` error tokens are
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now promoted to `err.code`.
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- **24-hour money cooldown surfaced:** a recovery-enrolled passkey logs in and collects
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funds immediately, but `approveSend`/`approveTransfer` throw 403
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`PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` for 24h (SIM-swap protection). Branch on
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`isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown`, show the pause message with `retryAfterAt`, don't retry-loop.
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- README: recovery subsection under Passkeys, incl. the password-manager cleanup tip for
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"there is a problem saving your passkey" (stale orphan entry).
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Additive, no breaking changes. Routes require SDK verification enabled for the tenant
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(dark 503 otherwise).
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## [2.0.0] — 2026-07-02
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**BREAKING — `mintPlayerToken` now requires `playerPhone` (E.164).** Requested by the INVO
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package/README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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First-party TypeScript SDK for integrating **INVO** into partner **web** platforms (storefronts, web games, dashboards). It wraps INVO's web money flows behind a typed, versioned API — the web analog of the Unity/Unreal plugins.
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> **Status:** `v2.
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> **Status:** `v2.1.1` — stable, published on npm. The backend it wraps is **live** on sandbox + production. The API is covered by a [stability commitment](#stability): no breaking changes without a major bump. **Since 2.0.0 (breaking):** `mintPlayerToken` requires `playerPhone` (E.164) — see the [CHANGELOG](CHANGELOG.md) migration note. **2.1.0 adds** self-serve passkey recovery (`recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete`); **2.1.1** is a security/correctness hardening patch.
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> Canonical partner reference: **https://docs.invo.network/docs/currency-purchase** and **https://docs.invo.network/docs/game-developer-integration**.
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## What it does
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- [Item purchase (spend game currency)](#item-purchase-spend-game-currency)
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- [Player balance](#player-balance)
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- [Sends & transfers (move currency between players)](#sends--transfers-move-currency-between-players)
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- [Passkeys (enroll, approve, link)](#passkeys-enroll-approve-link)
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- [Passkeys (enroll, approve, link, recover)](#passkeys-enroll-approve-link-recover)
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- [Webhooks](#webhooks)
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- [Resilience & observability](#resilience--observability)
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- [Errors](#errors)
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@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ The WebAuthn ceremony still runs in the browser (it must — it's `navigator.cre
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- **Real partner** (one login = one player) — derive the acting player from your **session**.
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- **Trusted first-party rig** (an internal tool that impersonates arbitrary test players) — the caller names `playerEmail`, guarded by a shared-secret header (`INVO_PROXY_TRUSTED_SECRET`), the same trusted pattern as a `player_email` token minter. Never expose this mode to end-user browsers.
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> **Lowest-risk first step:** adopt just `linkDevice` (passkey ↔ app device interchange) — it's purely additive and needs no refactor. See [Passkeys](#passkeys-enroll-approve-link).
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> **Lowest-risk first step:** adopt just `linkDevice` (passkey ↔ app device interchange) — it's purely additive and needs no refactor. See [Passkeys](#passkeys-enroll-approve-link-recover).
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## Before you go live
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---
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## Passkeys (enroll, approve, link)
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## Passkeys (enroll, approve, link, recover)
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Passkeys (WebAuthn) replace the SMS PIN for approving sends/transfers. The browser SDK wraps `navigator.credentials.create/get`, base64url encoding, challenge round-trips, and error mapping.
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}
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```
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### Lost or replaced passkey (recovery)
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Deleting a passkey on the device **never tells the server the key is gone**, so the next
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`enrollPasskey()` is blocked by the anti-takeover gate with `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` —
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and the player has nothing left to prove possession with. Offer a **"Lost or replaced your
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passkey?"** action that runs the possession-proofed recovery flow:
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```ts
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try {
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await client.enrollPasskey();
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} catch (e) {
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if (e instanceof InvoError && e.isEnrollmentProofRequired) {
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// Player still HAS the other method → linkDevice (above). Lost/deleted it → recover:
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await client.recoveryBegin(); // → { status:"sent", channels:["sms","email"] }
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await client.recoveryComplete(codeFromUser); // → { status:"recovered", deactivatedCount }
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await client.enrollPasskey(); // same call — now succeeds
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} else throw e;
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}
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```
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- `recoveryBegin()` errors: `no_channel_on_file` (422), `rate_limited` (429 — max 5 codes / 10 min).
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- `recoveryComplete(code)` errors: `ENROLLMENT_CODE_INVALID` (wrong/expired, attempt-capped — let the user retry or resend), `RECOVERY_FAILED` (500, transient).
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- A recovery also sends the owner an out-of-band "your passkey was reset" SMS/email — that's the intended tamper alert; surface nothing special.
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- If the **OS fails to save** a new passkey ("there is a problem saving your passkey"), have the user delete the stale entry in their password manager first (iPhone: Settings → Passwords; Android: Google Password Manager; Windows: Settings → Accounts → Passkeys).
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> ⚠️ **24-hour money cooldown after recovery.** A recovery-enrolled passkey logs in and
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> **collects funds immediately**, but `approveSend`/`approveTransfer` return **403
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> `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN`** for 24 hours (SIM-swap protection). Branch on
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> `err.isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown` and show — *"For your security, transfers are paused for
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> 24 hours after a passkey reset. You can still receive funds. Try again after
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> `err.retryAfterAt`."* — do **not** treat it as a generic failure or retry-loop it.
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> Unaffected: login, `getPendingCollect`, inbound `confirmReceipt*`.
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- **User verification is required** on every approve/claim (a missing-UV assertion fails closed).
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- Challenges are single-use and bound to `{flow}:{transactionId}`.
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- The SDK passes the backend's WebAuthn options through unchanged (it does not hard-code `pubKeyCredParams`/`timeout`/`attestation`).
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| `.isPhoneShareApprovalRequired` | a new-account phone needs owner approval → run the `phoneShare*` handshake, then retry |
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| `.isPhoneShareAlreadyApproved` | phone-share was already approved (e.g. from a `/reject`) |
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Client-side guards (bad amount, missing idempotency key, `rail:"steam"` on `purchaseCurrency`, item validation) throw `InvoError` with `.status === 0` **before** any network call. Notable backend codes: `SDK_TOKEN_EXPIRED`, `TENANT_NOT_MIGRATED`, `WEBAUTHN_NOT_ENABLED_FOR_TENANT`, `WEBAUTHN_UV_REQUIRED`, `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF`, `WRONG_RAIL_ENDPOINT`, `flow_paused`.
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Client-side guards (bad amount, missing idempotency key, `rail:"steam"` on `purchaseCurrency`, item validation) throw `InvoError` with `.status === 0` **before** any network call. Notable backend codes: `SDK_TOKEN_EXPIRED`, `TENANT_NOT_MIGRATED`, `WEBAUTHN_NOT_ENABLED_FOR_TENANT`, `WEBAUTHN_UV_REQUIRED`, `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF`, `ENROLLMENT_CODE_INVALID`, `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` (403, `retryAfterAt`), `no_channel_on_file`, `rate_limited`, `WRONG_RAIL_ENDPOINT`, `flow_paused`.
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```ts
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import { InvoError } from "@invonetwork/web-sdk"; // or "@invonetwork/web-sdk/server"
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| `enrollPasskey()` | `{ status, device, raw }` |
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| `enrollmentBegin()` / `enrollmentVerify(code)` | OTP grant for `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_AUTHORIZATION` (then retry `enrollPasskey`) |
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| `recoveryBegin()` / `recoveryComplete(code)` | passkey recovery for `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` when the passkey was lost/deleted (then retry `enrollPasskey`) — recovered keys can't move money OUT for 24h (`PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN`) |
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| `approveSend(txnId)` / `approveTransfer(txnId)` | `{ status, next, transactionId, claimCode?, claimCodeExpiresAt?, holdReason?, risk?, guardianApproval?, pollEndpoint?, raw }` |
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| `confirmReceiptSend(txnId)` / `confirmReceiptTransfer(txnId)` | `{ status, holdReason?, raw }` |
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| `linkDevice(linkId)` | `{ status, raw }` |
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### Stability
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Since **`1.0.0`** the public API is **stable**: it follows [semver](https://semver.org/), and **no breaking change ships without a major version bump + a migration note** (the `2.0.0` `playerPhone` requirement is the one such change to date). Patch = fixes, minor = additive surface (new methods/fields, backward-compatible — e.g. `2.1.0`'s passkey recovery), major = breaking changes (rare). The wire contract is the same live INVO API you'd call directly, and it's backward-compatible within a major — so a pinned SDK keeps working. Safe to depend on in production; pin a version and watch [releases](https://github.com/Invo-Technologies/invo-web-sdk/releases) for security updates.
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Full history: [CHANGELOG](https://github.com/Invo-Technologies/invo-web-sdk/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md) · [release notes](https://github.com/Invo-Technologies/invo-web-sdk/blob/main/docs/RELEASES.md) (absolute links to `main`).
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get isEnrollmentAuthorizationRequired() {
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return this.code === "ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_AUTHORIZATION";
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}
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/**
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/**
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* True if enrolling is blocked because the identity already has an enrolled method
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* (anti-takeover gate, register/complete → 409). Two ways forward: `linkDevice` when
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* the player still HAS the other method, or the passkey-recovery flow
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* (`recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete` — "Lost or replaced your passkey?") when they
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* deleted/lost it — the server can't know a device-side passkey is gone.
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*/
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get isEnrollmentProofRequired() {
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return this.code === "ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF";
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}
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/** True if the recovery OTP was wrong or expired (attempt-capped) — let the user retry or resend. */
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get isEnrollmentCodeInvalid() {
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return this.code === "ENROLLMENT_CODE_INVALID";
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}
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/**
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* True if a money-OUT approve was refused because the passkey was enrolled via
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* recovery less than 24h ago (SIM-swap protection, approve → 403). NOT a generic
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* failure — do not retry-loop. Login and inbound confirm-receipt (collecting money)
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* still work. Show: "For your security, transfers are paused for 24 hours after a
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* passkey reset. You can still receive funds. Try again after {retryAfterAt}."
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*/
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get isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown() {
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return this.code === "PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN";
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}
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/** The ISO timestamp when a `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` lifts (`retry_after`), when present. */
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get retryAfterAt() {
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const v = this.bodyObject()["retry_after"];
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return typeof v === "string" && v && Number.isNaN(Number(v)) ? v : void 0;
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}
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/**
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* True if an item purchase failed because the player's balance was too low (§4.8 → 400).
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/** Seconds to wait before retrying, when the backend throttled the call (429 `retry_after`). */
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get retryAfter() {
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const n = typeof v === "string" ? v.trim() === "" ? NaN : Number(v) : v;
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}
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/** `body` as a plain object, or `{}` if it's a string/number/null (non-JSON responses).
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if (!code && typeof b["error"] === "string" && /^(flow_paused|spending_limit_exceeded|receiver_not_enrolled_use_claim_code)$/.test(
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if (!code && typeof b["error"] === "string" && /^(flow_paused|spending_limit_exceeded|receiver_not_enrolled_use_claim_code|no_channel_on_file|rate_limited)$/.test(
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b["error"]
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} else if (typeof body === "string" && body.trim()) {
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let networkError;
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try {
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res = await this.fetchImpl(url, {
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res = await this.fetchImpl(url, {
|
|
195
|
+
method,
|
|
196
|
+
headers,
|
|
197
|
+
body: payload,
|
|
198
|
+
signal: controller.signal,
|
|
199
|
+
redirect: "manual"
|
|
200
|
+
});
|
|
168
201
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
169
202
|
networkError = new InvoError({
|
|
170
203
|
message: err instanceof Error && err.name === "AbortError" ? `Request to ${path} timed out after ${this.timeoutMs}ms` : `Network error calling ${path}: ${err?.message ?? err}`,
|
|
@@ -185,6 +218,14 @@ var _Http = class _Http {
|
|
|
185
218
|
}
|
|
186
219
|
throw networkError;
|
|
187
220
|
}
|
|
221
|
+
if (res.type === "opaqueredirect" || res.status >= 300 && res.status < 400) {
|
|
222
|
+
throw new InvoError({
|
|
223
|
+
message: `Refused to follow a redirect from ${path} \u2014 credentials are never re-sent to a redirected URL.`,
|
|
224
|
+
code: "UNEXPECTED_REDIRECT",
|
|
225
|
+
status: res.status || 0,
|
|
226
|
+
body: null
|
|
227
|
+
});
|
|
228
|
+
}
|
|
188
229
|
const requestId = pickRequestId(res.headers);
|
|
189
230
|
const text = await res.text();
|
|
190
231
|
let parsed = null;
|
|
@@ -265,7 +306,7 @@ function pickRequestId(headers) {
|
|
|
265
306
|
function retryAfterMs(parsed, headers) {
|
|
266
307
|
if (parsed && typeof parsed === "object") {
|
|
267
308
|
const v = parsed["retry_after"];
|
|
268
|
-
const n = typeof v === "string" ? Number(v) : v;
|
|
309
|
+
const n = typeof v === "string" ? v.trim() === "" ? NaN : Number(v) : v;
|
|
269
310
|
if (typeof n === "number" && Number.isFinite(n) && n >= 0) return n * 1e3;
|
|
270
311
|
}
|
|
271
312
|
const header = headers && typeof headers.get === "function" ? headers.get("retry-after") : null;
|
|
@@ -320,5 +361,5 @@ function toDestinationsResult(raw, direction) {
|
|
|
320
361
|
}
|
|
321
362
|
|
|
322
363
|
export { Http, InvoError, assertSecureBaseUrl, toDestinationsResult };
|
|
323
|
-
//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-
|
|
324
|
-
//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-
|
|
364
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-4GNJIQY2.js.map
|
|
365
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-4GNJIQY2.js.map
|
package/dist/index.cjs
CHANGED
|
@@ -23,10 +23,35 @@ var InvoError = class _InvoError extends Error {
|
|
|
23
23
|
get isEnrollmentAuthorizationRequired() {
|
|
24
24
|
return this.code === "ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_AUTHORIZATION";
|
|
25
25
|
}
|
|
26
|
-
/**
|
|
26
|
+
/**
|
|
27
|
+
* True if enrolling is blocked because the identity already has an enrolled method
|
|
28
|
+
* (anti-takeover gate, register/complete → 409). Two ways forward: `linkDevice` when
|
|
29
|
+
* the player still HAS the other method, or the passkey-recovery flow
|
|
30
|
+
* (`recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete` — "Lost or replaced your passkey?") when they
|
|
31
|
+
* deleted/lost it — the server can't know a device-side passkey is gone.
|
|
32
|
+
*/
|
|
27
33
|
get isEnrollmentProofRequired() {
|
|
28
34
|
return this.code === "ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF";
|
|
29
35
|
}
|
|
36
|
+
/** True if the recovery OTP was wrong or expired (attempt-capped) — let the user retry or resend. */
|
|
37
|
+
get isEnrollmentCodeInvalid() {
|
|
38
|
+
return this.code === "ENROLLMENT_CODE_INVALID";
|
|
39
|
+
}
|
|
40
|
+
/**
|
|
41
|
+
* True if a money-OUT approve was refused because the passkey was enrolled via
|
|
42
|
+
* recovery less than 24h ago (SIM-swap protection, approve → 403). NOT a generic
|
|
43
|
+
* failure — do not retry-loop. Login and inbound confirm-receipt (collecting money)
|
|
44
|
+
* still work. Show: "For your security, transfers are paused for 24 hours after a
|
|
45
|
+
* passkey reset. You can still receive funds. Try again after {retryAfterAt}."
|
|
46
|
+
*/
|
|
47
|
+
get isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown() {
|
|
48
|
+
return this.code === "PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN";
|
|
49
|
+
}
|
|
50
|
+
/** The ISO timestamp when a `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` lifts (`retry_after`), when present. */
|
|
51
|
+
get retryAfterAt() {
|
|
52
|
+
const v = this.bodyObject()["retry_after"];
|
|
53
|
+
return typeof v === "string" && v && Number.isNaN(Number(v)) ? v : void 0;
|
|
54
|
+
}
|
|
30
55
|
/**
|
|
31
56
|
* True if an item purchase failed because the player's balance was too low (§4.8 → 400).
|
|
32
57
|
* The backend carries `required_amount` + `current_balance` on the body for the UI.
|
|
@@ -65,7 +90,7 @@ var InvoError = class _InvoError extends Error {
|
|
|
65
90
|
/** Seconds to wait before retrying, when the backend throttled the call (429 `retry_after`). */
|
|
66
91
|
get retryAfter() {
|
|
67
92
|
const v = this.bodyObject()["retry_after"];
|
|
68
|
-
const n = typeof v === "string" ? Number(v) : v;
|
|
93
|
+
const n = typeof v === "string" ? v.trim() === "" ? NaN : Number(v) : v;
|
|
69
94
|
return typeof n === "number" && Number.isFinite(n) && n >= 0 ? n : void 0;
|
|
70
95
|
}
|
|
71
96
|
/** `body` as a plain object, or `{}` if it's a string/number/null (non-JSON responses).
|
|
@@ -83,7 +108,9 @@ function errorFromResponse(status, body, requestId) {
|
|
|
83
108
|
else if (typeof b["error_code"] === "string") code = b["error_code"];
|
|
84
109
|
if (typeof b["error"] === "string") message = b["error"];
|
|
85
110
|
else if (typeof b["message"] === "string") message = b["message"];
|
|
86
|
-
if (!code && typeof b["error"] === "string" && /^(flow_paused|spending_limit_exceeded|receiver_not_enrolled_use_claim_code)$/.test(
|
|
111
|
+
if (!code && typeof b["error"] === "string" && /^(flow_paused|spending_limit_exceeded|receiver_not_enrolled_use_claim_code|no_channel_on_file|rate_limited)$/.test(
|
|
112
|
+
b["error"]
|
|
113
|
+
)) {
|
|
87
114
|
code = b["error"];
|
|
88
115
|
}
|
|
89
116
|
} else if (typeof body === "string" && body.trim()) {
|
|
@@ -166,7 +193,13 @@ var _Http = class _Http {
|
|
|
166
193
|
let res;
|
|
167
194
|
let networkError;
|
|
168
195
|
try {
|
|
169
|
-
res = await this.fetchImpl(url, {
|
|
196
|
+
res = await this.fetchImpl(url, {
|
|
197
|
+
method,
|
|
198
|
+
headers,
|
|
199
|
+
body: payload,
|
|
200
|
+
signal: controller.signal,
|
|
201
|
+
redirect: "manual"
|
|
202
|
+
});
|
|
170
203
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
171
204
|
networkError = new InvoError({
|
|
172
205
|
message: err instanceof Error && err.name === "AbortError" ? `Request to ${path} timed out after ${this.timeoutMs}ms` : `Network error calling ${path}: ${err?.message ?? err}`,
|
|
@@ -187,6 +220,14 @@ var _Http = class _Http {
|
|
|
187
220
|
}
|
|
188
221
|
throw networkError;
|
|
189
222
|
}
|
|
223
|
+
if (res.type === "opaqueredirect" || res.status >= 300 && res.status < 400) {
|
|
224
|
+
throw new InvoError({
|
|
225
|
+
message: `Refused to follow a redirect from ${path} \u2014 credentials are never re-sent to a redirected URL.`,
|
|
226
|
+
code: "UNEXPECTED_REDIRECT",
|
|
227
|
+
status: res.status || 0,
|
|
228
|
+
body: null
|
|
229
|
+
});
|
|
230
|
+
}
|
|
190
231
|
const requestId = pickRequestId(res.headers);
|
|
191
232
|
const text = await res.text();
|
|
192
233
|
let parsed = null;
|
|
@@ -267,7 +308,7 @@ function pickRequestId(headers) {
|
|
|
267
308
|
function retryAfterMs(parsed, headers) {
|
|
268
309
|
if (parsed && typeof parsed === "object") {
|
|
269
310
|
const v = parsed["retry_after"];
|
|
270
|
-
const n = typeof v === "string" ? Number(v) : v;
|
|
311
|
+
const n = typeof v === "string" ? v.trim() === "" ? NaN : Number(v) : v;
|
|
271
312
|
if (typeof n === "number" && Number.isFinite(n) && n >= 0) return n * 1e3;
|
|
272
313
|
}
|
|
273
314
|
const header = headers && typeof headers.get === "function" ? headers.get("retry-after") : null;
|
|
@@ -279,6 +320,13 @@ function retryAfterMs(parsed, headers) {
|
|
|
279
320
|
}
|
|
280
321
|
|
|
281
322
|
// src/shared/webauthn.ts
|
|
323
|
+
function malformedOptions(field) {
|
|
324
|
+
return new InvoError({
|
|
325
|
+
message: `Malformed WebAuthn options from the backend: missing/invalid \`${field}\`.`,
|
|
326
|
+
code: "WEBAUTHN_OPTIONS_MALFORMED",
|
|
327
|
+
status: 0
|
|
328
|
+
});
|
|
329
|
+
}
|
|
282
330
|
function b64urlToBuffer(value) {
|
|
283
331
|
const pad = value.length % 4 === 0 ? "" : "=".repeat(4 - value.length % 4);
|
|
284
332
|
const b64 = value.replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/") + pad;
|
|
@@ -304,6 +352,8 @@ function descriptorsToBinary(list) {
|
|
|
304
352
|
});
|
|
305
353
|
}
|
|
306
354
|
function toCreationOptions(json) {
|
|
355
|
+
if (typeof json?.["challenge"] !== "string") throw malformedOptions("challenge");
|
|
356
|
+
if (typeof json["user"]?.id !== "string") throw malformedOptions("user.id");
|
|
307
357
|
const opts = {
|
|
308
358
|
...json,
|
|
309
359
|
challenge: b64urlToBuffer(json["challenge"]),
|
|
@@ -318,6 +368,7 @@ function toCreationOptions(json) {
|
|
|
318
368
|
return opts;
|
|
319
369
|
}
|
|
320
370
|
function toRequestOptions(json) {
|
|
371
|
+
if (typeof json?.["challenge"] !== "string") throw malformedOptions("challenge");
|
|
321
372
|
const opts = {
|
|
322
373
|
...json,
|
|
323
374
|
challenge: b64urlToBuffer(json["challenge"])
|
|
@@ -452,7 +503,12 @@ var InvoClient = class {
|
|
|
452
503
|
throw new Error("WebAuthn is not available in this environment (browser required).");
|
|
453
504
|
}
|
|
454
505
|
}
|
|
455
|
-
/**
|
|
506
|
+
/**
|
|
507
|
+
* Enroll a passkey for the token's identity (register/begin -> create() -> register/complete).
|
|
508
|
+
* Gates: `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_AUTHORIZATION` → {@link enrollmentBegin} OTP grant;
|
|
509
|
+
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` → {@link linkDevice}, or {@link recoveryBegin} when the
|
|
510
|
+
* player lost/deleted the old passkey ("Lost or replaced your passkey?").
|
|
511
|
+
*/
|
|
456
512
|
async enrollPasskey(opts) {
|
|
457
513
|
this.assertWebAuthn();
|
|
458
514
|
const signal = opts?.signal;
|
|
@@ -581,7 +637,9 @@ var InvoClient = class {
|
|
|
581
637
|
* this to send a 6-digit code to the player's phone + email on file, collect the code,
|
|
582
638
|
* call `enrollmentVerify(code)`, then RETRY the SAME `enrollPasskey()` —
|
|
583
639
|
* `register/complete` auto-consumes the server-side grant (30-min TTL). For
|
|
584
|
-
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`) use `linkDevice`
|
|
640
|
+
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`) use `linkDevice`
|
|
641
|
+
* (player still has the other method) or `recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete`
|
|
642
|
+
* (player lost/deleted their passkey).
|
|
585
643
|
*/
|
|
586
644
|
async enrollmentBegin(opts) {
|
|
587
645
|
return this.withTokenRetry(async () => {
|
|
@@ -599,7 +657,7 @@ var InvoClient = class {
|
|
|
599
657
|
}
|
|
600
658
|
/** Verify the enrollment OTP (see {@link enrollmentBegin}); on success, retry `enrollPasskey()`. */
|
|
601
659
|
async enrollmentVerify(code, opts) {
|
|
602
|
-
if (!code) throw new Error("enrollmentVerify requires the OTP `code`.");
|
|
660
|
+
if (!code || !code.trim()) throw new Error("enrollmentVerify requires the OTP `code`.");
|
|
603
661
|
return this.withTokenRetry(async () => {
|
|
604
662
|
const raw = await this.post(
|
|
605
663
|
"/api/sdk/device/enrollment/verify",
|
|
@@ -609,6 +667,65 @@ var InvoClient = class {
|
|
|
609
667
|
return { status: String(raw["status"] ?? ""), raw };
|
|
610
668
|
});
|
|
611
669
|
}
|
|
670
|
+
/**
|
|
671
|
+
* Passkey recovery — "Lost or replaced your passkey?". Deleting a passkey on the
|
|
672
|
+
* device never tells the server the key is gone, so the next `enrollPasskey()` is
|
|
673
|
+
* blocked by the anti-takeover gate with `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF`
|
|
674
|
+
* (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`). When the player can't prove the old method
|
|
675
|
+
* (they deleted/lost it — otherwise prefer `linkDevice`), run:
|
|
676
|
+
*
|
|
677
|
+
* 1. `recoveryBegin()` — sends a one-time code to the phone/email on file
|
|
678
|
+
* (422 `no_channel_on_file`, 429 `rate_limited` at 5/10min).
|
|
679
|
+
* 2. `recoveryComplete(code)` — deactivates the stale server-side passkey and
|
|
680
|
+
* authorizes a fresh enrollment (400 `ENROLLMENT_CODE_INVALID` on a wrong/
|
|
681
|
+
* expired code — attempt-capped; let the user retry or resend).
|
|
682
|
+
* 3. Immediately retry the SAME `enrollPasskey()` — it now succeeds.
|
|
683
|
+
*
|
|
684
|
+
* The owner also gets an out-of-band "your passkey was reset" SMS/email — that's
|
|
685
|
+
* the intended tamper alert; surface nothing special for it.
|
|
686
|
+
*
|
|
687
|
+
* ⚠ 24-HOUR MONEY COOLDOWN: a recovery-enrolled passkey logs in and COLLECTS
|
|
688
|
+
* funds immediately, but `approveSend`/`approveTransfer` throw
|
|
689
|
+
* `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` (403; `err.isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown`,
|
|
690
|
+
* `err.retryAfterAt`) for 24h — SIM-swap protection. Show the pause message with
|
|
691
|
+
* the timestamp; do not retry-loop it.
|
|
692
|
+
*
|
|
693
|
+
* If the OS itself fails to SAVE a new passkey ("there is a problem saving your
|
|
694
|
+
* passkey"), have the user delete the stale entry in their password manager first
|
|
695
|
+
* (iPhone: Settings → Passwords; Android: Google Password Manager; Windows:
|
|
696
|
+
* Settings → Accounts → Passkeys).
|
|
697
|
+
*/
|
|
698
|
+
async recoveryBegin(opts) {
|
|
699
|
+
return this.withTokenRetry(async () => {
|
|
700
|
+
const raw = await this.post(
|
|
701
|
+
"/api/sdk/device/recover/begin",
|
|
702
|
+
void 0,
|
|
703
|
+
opts?.signal
|
|
704
|
+
);
|
|
705
|
+
return {
|
|
706
|
+
status: String(raw["status"] ?? ""),
|
|
707
|
+
channels: Array.isArray(raw["channels"]) ? raw["channels"] : [],
|
|
708
|
+
raw
|
|
709
|
+
};
|
|
710
|
+
});
|
|
711
|
+
}
|
|
712
|
+
/** Verify the recovery code (see {@link recoveryBegin}); on success, call `enrollPasskey()`. */
|
|
713
|
+
async recoveryComplete(code, opts) {
|
|
714
|
+
if (!code || !code.trim()) throw new Error("recoveryComplete requires the one-time `code`.");
|
|
715
|
+
return this.withTokenRetry(async () => {
|
|
716
|
+
const raw = await this.post(
|
|
717
|
+
"/api/sdk/device/recover/complete",
|
|
718
|
+
{ code },
|
|
719
|
+
opts?.signal
|
|
720
|
+
);
|
|
721
|
+
return {
|
|
722
|
+
status: String(raw["status"] ?? ""),
|
|
723
|
+
deactivatedCount: Number(raw["deactivated_count"] ?? 0),
|
|
724
|
+
next: typeof raw["next"] === "string" ? raw["next"] : void 0,
|
|
725
|
+
raw
|
|
726
|
+
};
|
|
727
|
+
});
|
|
728
|
+
}
|
|
612
729
|
// --- internals ---
|
|
613
730
|
/** POST with the current player token. Token-expiry retry is handled one level
|
|
614
731
|
* up by withTokenRetry (which re-runs the whole ceremony, not a single call). */
|
package/dist/index.d.cts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import { C as ClientConfig, a as CallOptions, A as ApproveResult, b as ConfirmReceiptResult, L as LinkDeviceResult, P as PendingCollectResult, D as DestinationsQuery, c as DestinationsResult, B as BalanceResult, E as EnrollmentBeginResult, d as EnrollmentVerifyResult } from './types-
|
|
2
|
-
export {
|
|
1
|
+
import { C as ClientConfig, a as CallOptions, A as ApproveResult, b as ConfirmReceiptResult, L as LinkDeviceResult, P as PendingCollectResult, D as DestinationsQuery, c as DestinationsResult, B as BalanceResult, E as EnrollmentBeginResult, d as EnrollmentVerifyResult, R as RecoveryBeginResult, e as RecoveryCompleteResult } from './types-DtihCpOj.cjs';
|
|
2
|
+
export { f as BalanceRow, g as DestinationGame, I as InvoError, h as InvoErrorInfo, i as InvoHooks, j as InvoRequestInfo, k as InvoResponseInfo, l as PendingCollectItem, m as Rail, V as VerificationMethod } from './types-DtihCpOj.cjs';
|
|
3
3
|
|
|
4
4
|
declare class InvoClient {
|
|
5
5
|
private readonly http;
|
|
@@ -9,7 +9,12 @@ declare class InvoClient {
|
|
|
9
9
|
private refreshInFlight;
|
|
10
10
|
constructor(config: ClientConfig);
|
|
11
11
|
private assertWebAuthn;
|
|
12
|
-
/**
|
|
12
|
+
/**
|
|
13
|
+
* Enroll a passkey for the token's identity (register/begin -> create() -> register/complete).
|
|
14
|
+
* Gates: `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_AUTHORIZATION` → {@link enrollmentBegin} OTP grant;
|
|
15
|
+
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` → {@link linkDevice}, or {@link recoveryBegin} when the
|
|
16
|
+
* player lost/deleted the old passkey ("Lost or replaced your passkey?").
|
|
17
|
+
*/
|
|
13
18
|
enrollPasskey(opts?: CallOptions): Promise<{
|
|
14
19
|
status: string;
|
|
15
20
|
device: unknown;
|
|
@@ -58,11 +63,44 @@ declare class InvoClient {
|
|
|
58
63
|
* this to send a 6-digit code to the player's phone + email on file, collect the code,
|
|
59
64
|
* call `enrollmentVerify(code)`, then RETRY the SAME `enrollPasskey()` —
|
|
60
65
|
* `register/complete` auto-consumes the server-side grant (30-min TTL). For
|
|
61
|
-
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`) use `linkDevice`
|
|
66
|
+
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`) use `linkDevice`
|
|
67
|
+
* (player still has the other method) or `recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete`
|
|
68
|
+
* (player lost/deleted their passkey).
|
|
62
69
|
*/
|
|
63
70
|
enrollmentBegin(opts?: CallOptions): Promise<EnrollmentBeginResult>;
|
|
64
71
|
/** Verify the enrollment OTP (see {@link enrollmentBegin}); on success, retry `enrollPasskey()`. */
|
|
65
72
|
enrollmentVerify(code: string, opts?: CallOptions): Promise<EnrollmentVerifyResult>;
|
|
73
|
+
/**
|
|
74
|
+
* Passkey recovery — "Lost or replaced your passkey?". Deleting a passkey on the
|
|
75
|
+
* device never tells the server the key is gone, so the next `enrollPasskey()` is
|
|
76
|
+
* blocked by the anti-takeover gate with `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF`
|
|
77
|
+
* (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`). When the player can't prove the old method
|
|
78
|
+
* (they deleted/lost it — otherwise prefer `linkDevice`), run:
|
|
79
|
+
*
|
|
80
|
+
* 1. `recoveryBegin()` — sends a one-time code to the phone/email on file
|
|
81
|
+
* (422 `no_channel_on_file`, 429 `rate_limited` at 5/10min).
|
|
82
|
+
* 2. `recoveryComplete(code)` — deactivates the stale server-side passkey and
|
|
83
|
+
* authorizes a fresh enrollment (400 `ENROLLMENT_CODE_INVALID` on a wrong/
|
|
84
|
+
* expired code — attempt-capped; let the user retry or resend).
|
|
85
|
+
* 3. Immediately retry the SAME `enrollPasskey()` — it now succeeds.
|
|
86
|
+
*
|
|
87
|
+
* The owner also gets an out-of-band "your passkey was reset" SMS/email — that's
|
|
88
|
+
* the intended tamper alert; surface nothing special for it.
|
|
89
|
+
*
|
|
90
|
+
* ⚠ 24-HOUR MONEY COOLDOWN: a recovery-enrolled passkey logs in and COLLECTS
|
|
91
|
+
* funds immediately, but `approveSend`/`approveTransfer` throw
|
|
92
|
+
* `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` (403; `err.isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown`,
|
|
93
|
+
* `err.retryAfterAt`) for 24h — SIM-swap protection. Show the pause message with
|
|
94
|
+
* the timestamp; do not retry-loop it.
|
|
95
|
+
*
|
|
96
|
+
* If the OS itself fails to SAVE a new passkey ("there is a problem saving your
|
|
97
|
+
* passkey"), have the user delete the stale entry in their password manager first
|
|
98
|
+
* (iPhone: Settings → Passwords; Android: Google Password Manager; Windows:
|
|
99
|
+
* Settings → Accounts → Passkeys).
|
|
100
|
+
*/
|
|
101
|
+
recoveryBegin(opts?: CallOptions): Promise<RecoveryBeginResult>;
|
|
102
|
+
/** Verify the recovery code (see {@link recoveryBegin}); on success, call `enrollPasskey()`. */
|
|
103
|
+
recoveryComplete(code: string, opts?: CallOptions): Promise<RecoveryCompleteResult>;
|
|
66
104
|
/** POST with the current player token. Token-expiry retry is handled one level
|
|
67
105
|
* up by withTokenRetry (which re-runs the whole ceremony, not a single call). */
|
|
68
106
|
private post;
|
|
@@ -81,4 +119,4 @@ declare class InvoClient {
|
|
|
81
119
|
private confirmReceipt;
|
|
82
120
|
}
|
|
83
121
|
|
|
84
|
-
export { ApproveResult, BalanceResult, CallOptions, ClientConfig, ConfirmReceiptResult, DestinationsQuery, DestinationsResult, EnrollmentBeginResult, EnrollmentVerifyResult, InvoClient, LinkDeviceResult, PendingCollectResult };
|
|
122
|
+
export { ApproveResult, BalanceResult, CallOptions, ClientConfig, ConfirmReceiptResult, DestinationsQuery, DestinationsResult, EnrollmentBeginResult, EnrollmentVerifyResult, InvoClient, LinkDeviceResult, PendingCollectResult, RecoveryBeginResult, RecoveryCompleteResult };
|
package/dist/index.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import { C as ClientConfig, a as CallOptions, A as ApproveResult, b as ConfirmReceiptResult, L as LinkDeviceResult, P as PendingCollectResult, D as DestinationsQuery, c as DestinationsResult, B as BalanceResult, E as EnrollmentBeginResult, d as EnrollmentVerifyResult } from './types-
|
|
2
|
-
export {
|
|
1
|
+
import { C as ClientConfig, a as CallOptions, A as ApproveResult, b as ConfirmReceiptResult, L as LinkDeviceResult, P as PendingCollectResult, D as DestinationsQuery, c as DestinationsResult, B as BalanceResult, E as EnrollmentBeginResult, d as EnrollmentVerifyResult, R as RecoveryBeginResult, e as RecoveryCompleteResult } from './types-DtihCpOj.js';
|
|
2
|
+
export { f as BalanceRow, g as DestinationGame, I as InvoError, h as InvoErrorInfo, i as InvoHooks, j as InvoRequestInfo, k as InvoResponseInfo, l as PendingCollectItem, m as Rail, V as VerificationMethod } from './types-DtihCpOj.js';
|
|
3
3
|
|
|
4
4
|
declare class InvoClient {
|
|
5
5
|
private readonly http;
|
|
@@ -9,7 +9,12 @@ declare class InvoClient {
|
|
|
9
9
|
private refreshInFlight;
|
|
10
10
|
constructor(config: ClientConfig);
|
|
11
11
|
private assertWebAuthn;
|
|
12
|
-
/**
|
|
12
|
+
/**
|
|
13
|
+
* Enroll a passkey for the token's identity (register/begin -> create() -> register/complete).
|
|
14
|
+
* Gates: `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_AUTHORIZATION` → {@link enrollmentBegin} OTP grant;
|
|
15
|
+
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` → {@link linkDevice}, or {@link recoveryBegin} when the
|
|
16
|
+
* player lost/deleted the old passkey ("Lost or replaced your passkey?").
|
|
17
|
+
*/
|
|
13
18
|
enrollPasskey(opts?: CallOptions): Promise<{
|
|
14
19
|
status: string;
|
|
15
20
|
device: unknown;
|
|
@@ -58,11 +63,44 @@ declare class InvoClient {
|
|
|
58
63
|
* this to send a 6-digit code to the player's phone + email on file, collect the code,
|
|
59
64
|
* call `enrollmentVerify(code)`, then RETRY the SAME `enrollPasskey()` —
|
|
60
65
|
* `register/complete` auto-consumes the server-side grant (30-min TTL). For
|
|
61
|
-
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`) use `linkDevice`
|
|
66
|
+
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`) use `linkDevice`
|
|
67
|
+
* (player still has the other method) or `recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete`
|
|
68
|
+
* (player lost/deleted their passkey).
|
|
62
69
|
*/
|
|
63
70
|
enrollmentBegin(opts?: CallOptions): Promise<EnrollmentBeginResult>;
|
|
64
71
|
/** Verify the enrollment OTP (see {@link enrollmentBegin}); on success, retry `enrollPasskey()`. */
|
|
65
72
|
enrollmentVerify(code: string, opts?: CallOptions): Promise<EnrollmentVerifyResult>;
|
|
73
|
+
/**
|
|
74
|
+
* Passkey recovery — "Lost or replaced your passkey?". Deleting a passkey on the
|
|
75
|
+
* device never tells the server the key is gone, so the next `enrollPasskey()` is
|
|
76
|
+
* blocked by the anti-takeover gate with `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF`
|
|
77
|
+
* (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`). When the player can't prove the old method
|
|
78
|
+
* (they deleted/lost it — otherwise prefer `linkDevice`), run:
|
|
79
|
+
*
|
|
80
|
+
* 1. `recoveryBegin()` — sends a one-time code to the phone/email on file
|
|
81
|
+
* (422 `no_channel_on_file`, 429 `rate_limited` at 5/10min).
|
|
82
|
+
* 2. `recoveryComplete(code)` — deactivates the stale server-side passkey and
|
|
83
|
+
* authorizes a fresh enrollment (400 `ENROLLMENT_CODE_INVALID` on a wrong/
|
|
84
|
+
* expired code — attempt-capped; let the user retry or resend).
|
|
85
|
+
* 3. Immediately retry the SAME `enrollPasskey()` — it now succeeds.
|
|
86
|
+
*
|
|
87
|
+
* The owner also gets an out-of-band "your passkey was reset" SMS/email — that's
|
|
88
|
+
* the intended tamper alert; surface nothing special for it.
|
|
89
|
+
*
|
|
90
|
+
* ⚠ 24-HOUR MONEY COOLDOWN: a recovery-enrolled passkey logs in and COLLECTS
|
|
91
|
+
* funds immediately, but `approveSend`/`approveTransfer` throw
|
|
92
|
+
* `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` (403; `err.isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown`,
|
|
93
|
+
* `err.retryAfterAt`) for 24h — SIM-swap protection. Show the pause message with
|
|
94
|
+
* the timestamp; do not retry-loop it.
|
|
95
|
+
*
|
|
96
|
+
* If the OS itself fails to SAVE a new passkey ("there is a problem saving your
|
|
97
|
+
* passkey"), have the user delete the stale entry in their password manager first
|
|
98
|
+
* (iPhone: Settings → Passwords; Android: Google Password Manager; Windows:
|
|
99
|
+
* Settings → Accounts → Passkeys).
|
|
100
|
+
*/
|
|
101
|
+
recoveryBegin(opts?: CallOptions): Promise<RecoveryBeginResult>;
|
|
102
|
+
/** Verify the recovery code (see {@link recoveryBegin}); on success, call `enrollPasskey()`. */
|
|
103
|
+
recoveryComplete(code: string, opts?: CallOptions): Promise<RecoveryCompleteResult>;
|
|
66
104
|
/** POST with the current player token. Token-expiry retry is handled one level
|
|
67
105
|
* up by withTokenRetry (which re-runs the whole ceremony, not a single call). */
|
|
68
106
|
private post;
|
|
@@ -81,4 +119,4 @@ declare class InvoClient {
|
|
|
81
119
|
private confirmReceipt;
|
|
82
120
|
}
|
|
83
121
|
|
|
84
|
-
export { ApproveResult, BalanceResult, CallOptions, ClientConfig, ConfirmReceiptResult, DestinationsQuery, DestinationsResult, EnrollmentBeginResult, EnrollmentVerifyResult, InvoClient, LinkDeviceResult, PendingCollectResult };
|
|
122
|
+
export { ApproveResult, BalanceResult, CallOptions, ClientConfig, ConfirmReceiptResult, DestinationsQuery, DestinationsResult, EnrollmentBeginResult, EnrollmentVerifyResult, InvoClient, LinkDeviceResult, PendingCollectResult, RecoveryBeginResult, RecoveryCompleteResult };
|
package/dist/index.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,7 +1,14 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import { assertSecureBaseUrl, Http, toDestinationsResult, InvoError } from './chunk-
|
|
2
|
-
export { InvoError } from './chunk-
|
|
1
|
+
import { assertSecureBaseUrl, Http, toDestinationsResult, InvoError } from './chunk-4GNJIQY2.js';
|
|
2
|
+
export { InvoError } from './chunk-4GNJIQY2.js';
|
|
3
3
|
|
|
4
4
|
// src/shared/webauthn.ts
|
|
5
|
+
function malformedOptions(field) {
|
|
6
|
+
return new InvoError({
|
|
7
|
+
message: `Malformed WebAuthn options from the backend: missing/invalid \`${field}\`.`,
|
|
8
|
+
code: "WEBAUTHN_OPTIONS_MALFORMED",
|
|
9
|
+
status: 0
|
|
10
|
+
});
|
|
11
|
+
}
|
|
5
12
|
function b64urlToBuffer(value) {
|
|
6
13
|
const pad = value.length % 4 === 0 ? "" : "=".repeat(4 - value.length % 4);
|
|
7
14
|
const b64 = value.replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/") + pad;
|
|
@@ -27,6 +34,8 @@ function descriptorsToBinary(list) {
|
|
|
27
34
|
});
|
|
28
35
|
}
|
|
29
36
|
function toCreationOptions(json) {
|
|
37
|
+
if (typeof json?.["challenge"] !== "string") throw malformedOptions("challenge");
|
|
38
|
+
if (typeof json["user"]?.id !== "string") throw malformedOptions("user.id");
|
|
30
39
|
const opts = {
|
|
31
40
|
...json,
|
|
32
41
|
challenge: b64urlToBuffer(json["challenge"]),
|
|
@@ -41,6 +50,7 @@ function toCreationOptions(json) {
|
|
|
41
50
|
return opts;
|
|
42
51
|
}
|
|
43
52
|
function toRequestOptions(json) {
|
|
53
|
+
if (typeof json?.["challenge"] !== "string") throw malformedOptions("challenge");
|
|
44
54
|
const opts = {
|
|
45
55
|
...json,
|
|
46
56
|
challenge: b64urlToBuffer(json["challenge"])
|
|
@@ -132,7 +142,12 @@ var InvoClient = class {
|
|
|
132
142
|
throw new Error("WebAuthn is not available in this environment (browser required).");
|
|
133
143
|
}
|
|
134
144
|
}
|
|
135
|
-
/**
|
|
145
|
+
/**
|
|
146
|
+
* Enroll a passkey for the token's identity (register/begin -> create() -> register/complete).
|
|
147
|
+
* Gates: `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_AUTHORIZATION` → {@link enrollmentBegin} OTP grant;
|
|
148
|
+
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` → {@link linkDevice}, or {@link recoveryBegin} when the
|
|
149
|
+
* player lost/deleted the old passkey ("Lost or replaced your passkey?").
|
|
150
|
+
*/
|
|
136
151
|
async enrollPasskey(opts) {
|
|
137
152
|
this.assertWebAuthn();
|
|
138
153
|
const signal = opts?.signal;
|
|
@@ -261,7 +276,9 @@ var InvoClient = class {
|
|
|
261
276
|
* this to send a 6-digit code to the player's phone + email on file, collect the code,
|
|
262
277
|
* call `enrollmentVerify(code)`, then RETRY the SAME `enrollPasskey()` —
|
|
263
278
|
* `register/complete` auto-consumes the server-side grant (30-min TTL). For
|
|
264
|
-
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`) use `linkDevice`
|
|
279
|
+
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`) use `linkDevice`
|
|
280
|
+
* (player still has the other method) or `recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete`
|
|
281
|
+
* (player lost/deleted their passkey).
|
|
265
282
|
*/
|
|
266
283
|
async enrollmentBegin(opts) {
|
|
267
284
|
return this.withTokenRetry(async () => {
|
|
@@ -279,7 +296,7 @@ var InvoClient = class {
|
|
|
279
296
|
}
|
|
280
297
|
/** Verify the enrollment OTP (see {@link enrollmentBegin}); on success, retry `enrollPasskey()`. */
|
|
281
298
|
async enrollmentVerify(code, opts) {
|
|
282
|
-
if (!code) throw new Error("enrollmentVerify requires the OTP `code`.");
|
|
299
|
+
if (!code || !code.trim()) throw new Error("enrollmentVerify requires the OTP `code`.");
|
|
283
300
|
return this.withTokenRetry(async () => {
|
|
284
301
|
const raw = await this.post(
|
|
285
302
|
"/api/sdk/device/enrollment/verify",
|
|
@@ -289,6 +306,65 @@ var InvoClient = class {
|
|
|
289
306
|
return { status: String(raw["status"] ?? ""), raw };
|
|
290
307
|
});
|
|
291
308
|
}
|
|
309
|
+
/**
|
|
310
|
+
* Passkey recovery — "Lost or replaced your passkey?". Deleting a passkey on the
|
|
311
|
+
* device never tells the server the key is gone, so the next `enrollPasskey()` is
|
|
312
|
+
* blocked by the anti-takeover gate with `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF`
|
|
313
|
+
* (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`). When the player can't prove the old method
|
|
314
|
+
* (they deleted/lost it — otherwise prefer `linkDevice`), run:
|
|
315
|
+
*
|
|
316
|
+
* 1. `recoveryBegin()` — sends a one-time code to the phone/email on file
|
|
317
|
+
* (422 `no_channel_on_file`, 429 `rate_limited` at 5/10min).
|
|
318
|
+
* 2. `recoveryComplete(code)` — deactivates the stale server-side passkey and
|
|
319
|
+
* authorizes a fresh enrollment (400 `ENROLLMENT_CODE_INVALID` on a wrong/
|
|
320
|
+
* expired code — attempt-capped; let the user retry or resend).
|
|
321
|
+
* 3. Immediately retry the SAME `enrollPasskey()` — it now succeeds.
|
|
322
|
+
*
|
|
323
|
+
* The owner also gets an out-of-band "your passkey was reset" SMS/email — that's
|
|
324
|
+
* the intended tamper alert; surface nothing special for it.
|
|
325
|
+
*
|
|
326
|
+
* ⚠ 24-HOUR MONEY COOLDOWN: a recovery-enrolled passkey logs in and COLLECTS
|
|
327
|
+
* funds immediately, but `approveSend`/`approveTransfer` throw
|
|
328
|
+
* `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` (403; `err.isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown`,
|
|
329
|
+
* `err.retryAfterAt`) for 24h — SIM-swap protection. Show the pause message with
|
|
330
|
+
* the timestamp; do not retry-loop it.
|
|
331
|
+
*
|
|
332
|
+
* If the OS itself fails to SAVE a new passkey ("there is a problem saving your
|
|
333
|
+
* passkey"), have the user delete the stale entry in their password manager first
|
|
334
|
+
* (iPhone: Settings → Passwords; Android: Google Password Manager; Windows:
|
|
335
|
+
* Settings → Accounts → Passkeys).
|
|
336
|
+
*/
|
|
337
|
+
async recoveryBegin(opts) {
|
|
338
|
+
return this.withTokenRetry(async () => {
|
|
339
|
+
const raw = await this.post(
|
|
340
|
+
"/api/sdk/device/recover/begin",
|
|
341
|
+
void 0,
|
|
342
|
+
opts?.signal
|
|
343
|
+
);
|
|
344
|
+
return {
|
|
345
|
+
status: String(raw["status"] ?? ""),
|
|
346
|
+
channels: Array.isArray(raw["channels"]) ? raw["channels"] : [],
|
|
347
|
+
raw
|
|
348
|
+
};
|
|
349
|
+
});
|
|
350
|
+
}
|
|
351
|
+
/** Verify the recovery code (see {@link recoveryBegin}); on success, call `enrollPasskey()`. */
|
|
352
|
+
async recoveryComplete(code, opts) {
|
|
353
|
+
if (!code || !code.trim()) throw new Error("recoveryComplete requires the one-time `code`.");
|
|
354
|
+
return this.withTokenRetry(async () => {
|
|
355
|
+
const raw = await this.post(
|
|
356
|
+
"/api/sdk/device/recover/complete",
|
|
357
|
+
{ code },
|
|
358
|
+
opts?.signal
|
|
359
|
+
);
|
|
360
|
+
return {
|
|
361
|
+
status: String(raw["status"] ?? ""),
|
|
362
|
+
deactivatedCount: Number(raw["deactivated_count"] ?? 0),
|
|
363
|
+
next: typeof raw["next"] === "string" ? raw["next"] : void 0,
|
|
364
|
+
raw
|
|
365
|
+
};
|
|
366
|
+
});
|
|
367
|
+
}
|
|
292
368
|
// --- internals ---
|
|
293
369
|
/** POST with the current player token. Token-expiry retry is handled one level
|
|
294
370
|
* up by withTokenRetry (which re-runs the whole ceremony, not a single call). */
|
package/dist/server.cjs
CHANGED
|
@@ -25,10 +25,35 @@ var InvoError = class _InvoError extends Error {
|
|
|
25
25
|
get isEnrollmentAuthorizationRequired() {
|
|
26
26
|
return this.code === "ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_AUTHORIZATION";
|
|
27
27
|
}
|
|
28
|
-
/**
|
|
28
|
+
/**
|
|
29
|
+
* True if enrolling is blocked because the identity already has an enrolled method
|
|
30
|
+
* (anti-takeover gate, register/complete → 409). Two ways forward: `linkDevice` when
|
|
31
|
+
* the player still HAS the other method, or the passkey-recovery flow
|
|
32
|
+
* (`recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete` — "Lost or replaced your passkey?") when they
|
|
33
|
+
* deleted/lost it — the server can't know a device-side passkey is gone.
|
|
34
|
+
*/
|
|
29
35
|
get isEnrollmentProofRequired() {
|
|
30
36
|
return this.code === "ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF";
|
|
31
37
|
}
|
|
38
|
+
/** True if the recovery OTP was wrong or expired (attempt-capped) — let the user retry or resend. */
|
|
39
|
+
get isEnrollmentCodeInvalid() {
|
|
40
|
+
return this.code === "ENROLLMENT_CODE_INVALID";
|
|
41
|
+
}
|
|
42
|
+
/**
|
|
43
|
+
* True if a money-OUT approve was refused because the passkey was enrolled via
|
|
44
|
+
* recovery less than 24h ago (SIM-swap protection, approve → 403). NOT a generic
|
|
45
|
+
* failure — do not retry-loop. Login and inbound confirm-receipt (collecting money)
|
|
46
|
+
* still work. Show: "For your security, transfers are paused for 24 hours after a
|
|
47
|
+
* passkey reset. You can still receive funds. Try again after {retryAfterAt}."
|
|
48
|
+
*/
|
|
49
|
+
get isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown() {
|
|
50
|
+
return this.code === "PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN";
|
|
51
|
+
}
|
|
52
|
+
/** The ISO timestamp when a `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` lifts (`retry_after`), when present. */
|
|
53
|
+
get retryAfterAt() {
|
|
54
|
+
const v = this.bodyObject()["retry_after"];
|
|
55
|
+
return typeof v === "string" && v && Number.isNaN(Number(v)) ? v : void 0;
|
|
56
|
+
}
|
|
32
57
|
/**
|
|
33
58
|
* True if an item purchase failed because the player's balance was too low (§4.8 → 400).
|
|
34
59
|
* The backend carries `required_amount` + `current_balance` on the body for the UI.
|
|
@@ -67,7 +92,7 @@ var InvoError = class _InvoError extends Error {
|
|
|
67
92
|
/** Seconds to wait before retrying, when the backend throttled the call (429 `retry_after`). */
|
|
68
93
|
get retryAfter() {
|
|
69
94
|
const v = this.bodyObject()["retry_after"];
|
|
70
|
-
const n = typeof v === "string" ? Number(v) : v;
|
|
95
|
+
const n = typeof v === "string" ? v.trim() === "" ? NaN : Number(v) : v;
|
|
71
96
|
return typeof n === "number" && Number.isFinite(n) && n >= 0 ? n : void 0;
|
|
72
97
|
}
|
|
73
98
|
/** `body` as a plain object, or `{}` if it's a string/number/null (non-JSON responses).
|
|
@@ -85,7 +110,9 @@ function errorFromResponse(status, body, requestId) {
|
|
|
85
110
|
else if (typeof b["error_code"] === "string") code = b["error_code"];
|
|
86
111
|
if (typeof b["error"] === "string") message = b["error"];
|
|
87
112
|
else if (typeof b["message"] === "string") message = b["message"];
|
|
88
|
-
if (!code && typeof b["error"] === "string" && /^(flow_paused|spending_limit_exceeded|receiver_not_enrolled_use_claim_code)$/.test(
|
|
113
|
+
if (!code && typeof b["error"] === "string" && /^(flow_paused|spending_limit_exceeded|receiver_not_enrolled_use_claim_code|no_channel_on_file|rate_limited)$/.test(
|
|
114
|
+
b["error"]
|
|
115
|
+
)) {
|
|
89
116
|
code = b["error"];
|
|
90
117
|
}
|
|
91
118
|
} else if (typeof body === "string" && body.trim()) {
|
|
@@ -168,7 +195,13 @@ var _Http = class _Http {
|
|
|
168
195
|
let res;
|
|
169
196
|
let networkError;
|
|
170
197
|
try {
|
|
171
|
-
res = await this.fetchImpl(url, {
|
|
198
|
+
res = await this.fetchImpl(url, {
|
|
199
|
+
method,
|
|
200
|
+
headers,
|
|
201
|
+
body: payload,
|
|
202
|
+
signal: controller.signal,
|
|
203
|
+
redirect: "manual"
|
|
204
|
+
});
|
|
172
205
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
173
206
|
networkError = new InvoError({
|
|
174
207
|
message: err instanceof Error && err.name === "AbortError" ? `Request to ${path} timed out after ${this.timeoutMs}ms` : `Network error calling ${path}: ${err?.message ?? err}`,
|
|
@@ -189,6 +222,14 @@ var _Http = class _Http {
|
|
|
189
222
|
}
|
|
190
223
|
throw networkError;
|
|
191
224
|
}
|
|
225
|
+
if (res.type === "opaqueredirect" || res.status >= 300 && res.status < 400) {
|
|
226
|
+
throw new InvoError({
|
|
227
|
+
message: `Refused to follow a redirect from ${path} \u2014 credentials are never re-sent to a redirected URL.`,
|
|
228
|
+
code: "UNEXPECTED_REDIRECT",
|
|
229
|
+
status: res.status || 0,
|
|
230
|
+
body: null
|
|
231
|
+
});
|
|
232
|
+
}
|
|
192
233
|
const requestId = pickRequestId(res.headers);
|
|
193
234
|
const text = await res.text();
|
|
194
235
|
let parsed = null;
|
|
@@ -269,7 +310,7 @@ function pickRequestId(headers) {
|
|
|
269
310
|
function retryAfterMs(parsed, headers) {
|
|
270
311
|
if (parsed && typeof parsed === "object") {
|
|
271
312
|
const v = parsed["retry_after"];
|
|
272
|
-
const n = typeof v === "string" ? Number(v) : v;
|
|
313
|
+
const n = typeof v === "string" ? v.trim() === "" ? NaN : Number(v) : v;
|
|
273
314
|
if (typeof n === "number" && Number.isFinite(n) && n >= 0) return n * 1e3;
|
|
274
315
|
}
|
|
275
316
|
const header = headers && typeof headers.get === "function" ? headers.get("retry-after") : null;
|
|
@@ -352,6 +393,12 @@ function parseSignatureHeader(header) {
|
|
|
352
393
|
function hmacHex(secret, message) {
|
|
353
394
|
return crypto.createHmac("sha256", secret).update(message).digest("hex");
|
|
354
395
|
}
|
|
396
|
+
function safeEqualHexNode(a, b) {
|
|
397
|
+
const ba = Buffer.from(a, "utf8");
|
|
398
|
+
const bb = Buffer.from(b, "utf8");
|
|
399
|
+
if (ba.length !== bb.length) return false;
|
|
400
|
+
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(ba, bb);
|
|
401
|
+
}
|
|
355
402
|
function safeEqualHex(a, b) {
|
|
356
403
|
if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
|
|
357
404
|
let diff = 0;
|
|
@@ -404,7 +451,7 @@ function verifyWebhook(rawBody, signatureHeader, secret, opts = {}) {
|
|
|
404
451
|
);
|
|
405
452
|
const matched = secrets.some((s) => {
|
|
406
453
|
const expected = hmacHex(s, message);
|
|
407
|
-
return sigs.some((sig) =>
|
|
454
|
+
return sigs.some((sig) => safeEqualHexNode(sig, expected));
|
|
408
455
|
});
|
|
409
456
|
if (!matched) {
|
|
410
457
|
throw webhookError("Webhook signature verification failed.", "WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_INVALID");
|
|
@@ -481,7 +528,7 @@ async function hmacHexSubtle(secret, message) {
|
|
|
481
528
|
}
|
|
482
529
|
|
|
483
530
|
// src/server.ts
|
|
484
|
-
var DEFAULT_UA = "invonetwork-web-sdk/2.
|
|
531
|
+
var DEFAULT_UA = "invonetwork-web-sdk/2.1.1 (+https://invo.network)";
|
|
485
532
|
var MAX_USD_AMOUNT = 999.99;
|
|
486
533
|
var MAX_ITEM_PRICE = 999999.99;
|
|
487
534
|
function invalidInput(label, value, why) {
|
package/dist/server.d.cts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import { I as InvoError, S as ServerConfig, a as CallOptions,
|
|
2
|
-
export {
|
|
1
|
+
import { I as InvoError, S as ServerConfig, a as CallOptions, n as PlayerToken, o as InitiateSendInput, p as InitiateResult, q as InitiateTransferInput, r as CreateCheckoutInput, s as CreateCheckoutResult, t as PurchaseInput, u as PurchaseResult, v as ConfirmPaymentResult, O as OrderDetailsResult, w as PurchaseItemInput, x as PurchaseItemResult, y as ItemHistoryQuery, z as ItemHistoryResult, F as ItemOrderQuery, G as PlayerBalanceQuery, H as PlayerBalanceResult, J as InboundPendingQuery, K as InboundPendingResult, M as LinkedIdentitiesQuery, N as LinkedIdentitiesResult, Q as SmsVerifyResult, T as ClaimTransferInput, U as ClaimResult, W as ClaimCurrencyInput, X as TransactionStatusResult, Y as GuardianApprovalStatusResult, Z as ServerDestinationsQuery, c as DestinationsResult, _ as PhoneShareContact, $ as PhoneShareInitiateResult, a0 as PhoneShareApproveInput, a1 as PhoneShareApproveResult, a2 as PhoneShareStatusResult } from './types-DtihCpOj.cjs';
|
|
2
|
+
export { a3 as CurrencyBalance, g as DestinationGame, a4 as InboundPendingItem, h as InvoErrorInfo, i as InvoHooks, j as InvoRequestInfo, k as InvoResponseInfo, a5 as LinkedIdentityEmail, m as Rail, V as VerificationMethod } from './types-DtihCpOj.cjs';
|
|
3
3
|
|
|
4
4
|
interface VerifyWebhookOptions {
|
|
5
5
|
/** Max age of the signed timestamp, in seconds. Default 300 (5 min). */
|
package/dist/server.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import { I as InvoError, S as ServerConfig, a as CallOptions,
|
|
2
|
-
export {
|
|
1
|
+
import { I as InvoError, S as ServerConfig, a as CallOptions, n as PlayerToken, o as InitiateSendInput, p as InitiateResult, q as InitiateTransferInput, r as CreateCheckoutInput, s as CreateCheckoutResult, t as PurchaseInput, u as PurchaseResult, v as ConfirmPaymentResult, O as OrderDetailsResult, w as PurchaseItemInput, x as PurchaseItemResult, y as ItemHistoryQuery, z as ItemHistoryResult, F as ItemOrderQuery, G as PlayerBalanceQuery, H as PlayerBalanceResult, J as InboundPendingQuery, K as InboundPendingResult, M as LinkedIdentitiesQuery, N as LinkedIdentitiesResult, Q as SmsVerifyResult, T as ClaimTransferInput, U as ClaimResult, W as ClaimCurrencyInput, X as TransactionStatusResult, Y as GuardianApprovalStatusResult, Z as ServerDestinationsQuery, c as DestinationsResult, _ as PhoneShareContact, $ as PhoneShareInitiateResult, a0 as PhoneShareApproveInput, a1 as PhoneShareApproveResult, a2 as PhoneShareStatusResult } from './types-DtihCpOj.js';
|
|
2
|
+
export { a3 as CurrencyBalance, g as DestinationGame, a4 as InboundPendingItem, h as InvoErrorInfo, i as InvoHooks, j as InvoRequestInfo, k as InvoResponseInfo, a5 as LinkedIdentityEmail, m as Rail, V as VerificationMethod } from './types-DtihCpOj.js';
|
|
3
3
|
|
|
4
4
|
interface VerifyWebhookOptions {
|
|
5
5
|
/** Max age of the signed timestamp, in seconds. Default 300 (5 min). */
|
package/dist/server.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import { InvoError, assertSecureBaseUrl, Http, toDestinationsResult } from './chunk-
|
|
2
|
-
export { InvoError } from './chunk-
|
|
3
|
-
import { createHmac } from 'crypto';
|
|
1
|
+
import { InvoError, assertSecureBaseUrl, Http, toDestinationsResult } from './chunk-4GNJIQY2.js';
|
|
2
|
+
export { InvoError } from './chunk-4GNJIQY2.js';
|
|
3
|
+
import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'crypto';
|
|
4
4
|
|
|
5
5
|
var DEFAULT_TOLERANCE_SEC = 300;
|
|
6
6
|
var ENCODER = new TextEncoder();
|
|
@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ function parseSignatureHeader(header) {
|
|
|
32
32
|
function hmacHex(secret, message) {
|
|
33
33
|
return createHmac("sha256", secret).update(message).digest("hex");
|
|
34
34
|
}
|
|
35
|
+
function safeEqualHexNode(a, b) {
|
|
36
|
+
const ba = Buffer.from(a, "utf8");
|
|
37
|
+
const bb = Buffer.from(b, "utf8");
|
|
38
|
+
if (ba.length !== bb.length) return false;
|
|
39
|
+
return timingSafeEqual(ba, bb);
|
|
40
|
+
}
|
|
35
41
|
function safeEqualHex(a, b) {
|
|
36
42
|
if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
|
|
37
43
|
let diff = 0;
|
|
@@ -84,7 +90,7 @@ function verifyWebhook(rawBody, signatureHeader, secret, opts = {}) {
|
|
|
84
90
|
);
|
|
85
91
|
const matched = secrets.some((s) => {
|
|
86
92
|
const expected = hmacHex(s, message);
|
|
87
|
-
return sigs.some((sig) =>
|
|
93
|
+
return sigs.some((sig) => safeEqualHexNode(sig, expected));
|
|
88
94
|
});
|
|
89
95
|
if (!matched) {
|
|
90
96
|
throw webhookError("Webhook signature verification failed.", "WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_INVALID");
|
|
@@ -161,7 +167,7 @@ async function hmacHexSubtle(secret, message) {
|
|
|
161
167
|
}
|
|
162
168
|
|
|
163
169
|
// src/server.ts
|
|
164
|
-
var DEFAULT_UA = "invonetwork-web-sdk/2.
|
|
170
|
+
var DEFAULT_UA = "invonetwork-web-sdk/2.1.1 (+https://invo.network)";
|
|
165
171
|
var MAX_USD_AMOUNT = 999.99;
|
|
166
172
|
var MAX_ITEM_PRICE = 999999.99;
|
|
167
173
|
function invalidInput(label, value, why) {
|
|
@@ -28,8 +28,26 @@ declare class InvoError extends Error {
|
|
|
28
28
|
get isTokenExpired(): boolean;
|
|
29
29
|
/** True if `enrollPasskey()` needs the OTP-grant flow (`enrollmentBegin`/`enrollmentVerify`). */
|
|
30
30
|
get isEnrollmentAuthorizationRequired(): boolean;
|
|
31
|
-
/**
|
|
31
|
+
/**
|
|
32
|
+
* True if enrolling is blocked because the identity already has an enrolled method
|
|
33
|
+
* (anti-takeover gate, register/complete → 409). Two ways forward: `linkDevice` when
|
|
34
|
+
* the player still HAS the other method, or the passkey-recovery flow
|
|
35
|
+
* (`recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete` — "Lost or replaced your passkey?") when they
|
|
36
|
+
* deleted/lost it — the server can't know a device-side passkey is gone.
|
|
37
|
+
*/
|
|
32
38
|
get isEnrollmentProofRequired(): boolean;
|
|
39
|
+
/** True if the recovery OTP was wrong or expired (attempt-capped) — let the user retry or resend. */
|
|
40
|
+
get isEnrollmentCodeInvalid(): boolean;
|
|
41
|
+
/**
|
|
42
|
+
* True if a money-OUT approve was refused because the passkey was enrolled via
|
|
43
|
+
* recovery less than 24h ago (SIM-swap protection, approve → 403). NOT a generic
|
|
44
|
+
* failure — do not retry-loop. Login and inbound confirm-receipt (collecting money)
|
|
45
|
+
* still work. Show: "For your security, transfers are paused for 24 hours after a
|
|
46
|
+
* passkey reset. You can still receive funds. Try again after {retryAfterAt}."
|
|
47
|
+
*/
|
|
48
|
+
get isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown(): boolean;
|
|
49
|
+
/** The ISO timestamp when a `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` lifts (`retry_after`), when present. */
|
|
50
|
+
get retryAfterAt(): string | undefined;
|
|
33
51
|
/**
|
|
34
52
|
* True if an item purchase failed because the player's balance was too low (§4.8 → 400).
|
|
35
53
|
* The backend carries `required_amount` + `current_balance` on the body for the UI.
|
|
@@ -475,6 +493,20 @@ interface EnrollmentVerifyResult {
|
|
|
475
493
|
status: string;
|
|
476
494
|
raw: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
477
495
|
}
|
|
496
|
+
interface RecoveryBeginResult {
|
|
497
|
+
status: string;
|
|
498
|
+
/** Channels the one-time code was sent to, e.g. ["sms","email"]. */
|
|
499
|
+
channels: string[];
|
|
500
|
+
raw: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
501
|
+
}
|
|
502
|
+
interface RecoveryCompleteResult {
|
|
503
|
+
status: string;
|
|
504
|
+
/** How many stale server-side passkeys were deactivated. */
|
|
505
|
+
deactivatedCount: number;
|
|
506
|
+
/** Human hint from the backend (what to do next). */
|
|
507
|
+
next?: string;
|
|
508
|
+
raw: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
509
|
+
}
|
|
478
510
|
interface LinkDeviceResult {
|
|
479
511
|
/** "authorized" on success — a single-use grant that register/complete consumes. */
|
|
480
512
|
status: string;
|
|
@@ -603,4 +635,4 @@ interface PhoneShareStatusResult {
|
|
|
603
635
|
raw: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
604
636
|
}
|
|
605
637
|
|
|
606
|
-
export { type
|
|
638
|
+
export { type PhoneShareInitiateResult as $, type ApproveResult as A, type BalanceResult as B, type ClientConfig as C, type DestinationsQuery as D, type EnrollmentBeginResult as E, type ItemOrderQuery as F, type PlayerBalanceQuery as G, type PlayerBalanceResult as H, InvoError as I, type InboundPendingQuery as J, type InboundPendingResult as K, type LinkDeviceResult as L, type LinkedIdentitiesQuery as M, type LinkedIdentitiesResult as N, type OrderDetailsResult as O, type PendingCollectResult as P, type SmsVerifyResult as Q, type RecoveryBeginResult as R, type ServerConfig as S, type ClaimTransferInput as T, type ClaimResult as U, type VerificationMethod as V, type ClaimCurrencyInput as W, type TransactionStatusResult as X, type GuardianApprovalStatusResult as Y, type ServerDestinationsQuery as Z, type PhoneShareContact as _, type CallOptions as a, type PhoneShareApproveInput as a0, type PhoneShareApproveResult as a1, type PhoneShareStatusResult as a2, type CurrencyBalance as a3, type InboundPendingItem as a4, type LinkedIdentityEmail as a5, type ConfirmReceiptResult as b, type DestinationsResult as c, type EnrollmentVerifyResult as d, type RecoveryCompleteResult as e, type BalanceRow as f, type DestinationGame as g, type InvoErrorInfo as h, type InvoHooks as i, type InvoRequestInfo as j, type InvoResponseInfo as k, type PendingCollectItem as l, type Rail as m, type PlayerToken as n, type InitiateSendInput as o, type InitiateResult as p, type InitiateTransferInput as q, type CreateCheckoutInput as r, type CreateCheckoutResult as s, type PurchaseInput as t, type PurchaseResult as u, type ConfirmPaymentResult as v, type PurchaseItemInput as w, type PurchaseItemResult as x, type ItemHistoryQuery as y, type ItemHistoryResult as z };
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@@ -28,8 +28,26 @@ declare class InvoError extends Error {
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28
28
|
get isTokenExpired(): boolean;
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|
29
29
|
/** True if `enrollPasskey()` needs the OTP-grant flow (`enrollmentBegin`/`enrollmentVerify`). */
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|
30
30
|
get isEnrollmentAuthorizationRequired(): boolean;
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|
31
|
-
/**
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|
31
|
+
/**
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32
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+
* True if enrolling is blocked because the identity already has an enrolled method
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33
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+
* (anti-takeover gate, register/complete → 409). Two ways forward: `linkDevice` when
|
|
34
|
+
* the player still HAS the other method, or the passkey-recovery flow
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35
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+
* (`recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete` — "Lost or replaced your passkey?") when they
|
|
36
|
+
* deleted/lost it — the server can't know a device-side passkey is gone.
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37
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+
*/
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32
38
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get isEnrollmentProofRequired(): boolean;
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39
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+
/** True if the recovery OTP was wrong or expired (attempt-capped) — let the user retry or resend. */
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|
40
|
+
get isEnrollmentCodeInvalid(): boolean;
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|
41
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+
/**
|
|
42
|
+
* True if a money-OUT approve was refused because the passkey was enrolled via
|
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43
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+
* recovery less than 24h ago (SIM-swap protection, approve → 403). NOT a generic
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|
44
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+
* failure — do not retry-loop. Login and inbound confirm-receipt (collecting money)
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|
45
|
+
* still work. Show: "For your security, transfers are paused for 24 hours after a
|
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46
|
+
* passkey reset. You can still receive funds. Try again after {retryAfterAt}."
|
|
47
|
+
*/
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|
48
|
+
get isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown(): boolean;
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|
49
|
+
/** The ISO timestamp when a `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` lifts (`retry_after`), when present. */
|
|
50
|
+
get retryAfterAt(): string | undefined;
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|
33
51
|
/**
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|
34
52
|
* True if an item purchase failed because the player's balance was too low (§4.8 → 400).
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|
35
53
|
* The backend carries `required_amount` + `current_balance` on the body for the UI.
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@@ -475,6 +493,20 @@ interface EnrollmentVerifyResult {
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475
493
|
status: string;
|
|
476
494
|
raw: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
477
495
|
}
|
|
496
|
+
interface RecoveryBeginResult {
|
|
497
|
+
status: string;
|
|
498
|
+
/** Channels the one-time code was sent to, e.g. ["sms","email"]. */
|
|
499
|
+
channels: string[];
|
|
500
|
+
raw: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
501
|
+
}
|
|
502
|
+
interface RecoveryCompleteResult {
|
|
503
|
+
status: string;
|
|
504
|
+
/** How many stale server-side passkeys were deactivated. */
|
|
505
|
+
deactivatedCount: number;
|
|
506
|
+
/** Human hint from the backend (what to do next). */
|
|
507
|
+
next?: string;
|
|
508
|
+
raw: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
509
|
+
}
|
|
478
510
|
interface LinkDeviceResult {
|
|
479
511
|
/** "authorized" on success — a single-use grant that register/complete consumes. */
|
|
480
512
|
status: string;
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@@ -603,4 +635,4 @@ interface PhoneShareStatusResult {
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|
603
635
|
raw: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
604
636
|
}
|
|
605
637
|
|
|
606
|
-
export { type
|
|
638
|
+
export { type PhoneShareInitiateResult as $, type ApproveResult as A, type BalanceResult as B, type ClientConfig as C, type DestinationsQuery as D, type EnrollmentBeginResult as E, type ItemOrderQuery as F, type PlayerBalanceQuery as G, type PlayerBalanceResult as H, InvoError as I, type InboundPendingQuery as J, type InboundPendingResult as K, type LinkDeviceResult as L, type LinkedIdentitiesQuery as M, type LinkedIdentitiesResult as N, type OrderDetailsResult as O, type PendingCollectResult as P, type SmsVerifyResult as Q, type RecoveryBeginResult as R, type ServerConfig as S, type ClaimTransferInput as T, type ClaimResult as U, type VerificationMethod as V, type ClaimCurrencyInput as W, type TransactionStatusResult as X, type GuardianApprovalStatusResult as Y, type ServerDestinationsQuery as Z, type PhoneShareContact as _, type CallOptions as a, type PhoneShareApproveInput as a0, type PhoneShareApproveResult as a1, type PhoneShareStatusResult as a2, type CurrencyBalance as a3, type InboundPendingItem as a4, type LinkedIdentityEmail as a5, type ConfirmReceiptResult as b, type DestinationsResult as c, type EnrollmentVerifyResult as d, type RecoveryCompleteResult as e, type BalanceRow as f, type DestinationGame as g, type InvoErrorInfo as h, type InvoHooks as i, type InvoRequestInfo as j, type InvoResponseInfo as k, type PendingCollectItem as l, type Rail as m, type PlayerToken as n, type InitiateSendInput as o, type InitiateResult as p, type InitiateTransferInput as q, type CreateCheckoutInput as r, type CreateCheckoutResult as s, type PurchaseInput as t, type PurchaseResult as u, type ConfirmPaymentResult as v, type PurchaseItemInput as w, type PurchaseItemResult as x, type ItemHistoryQuery as y, type ItemHistoryResult as z };
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package/package.json
CHANGED