@invonetwork/web-sdk 1.2.1 → 2.1.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +50 -0
- package/README.md +66 -7
- package/dist/{chunk-U3EDJUQI.js → chunk-YCEW7NC3.js} +44 -5
- package/dist/index.cjs +110 -5
- package/dist/index.d.cts +43 -5
- package/dist/index.d.ts +43 -5
- package/dist/index.js +70 -4
- package/dist/server.cjs +68 -6
- package/dist/server.d.cts +20 -3
- package/dist/server.d.ts +20 -3
- package/dist/server.js +28 -5
- package/dist/{types-DTAmriOB.d.cts → types-DtihCpOj.d.cts} +44 -3
- package/dist/{types-DTAmriOB.d.ts → types-DtihCpOj.d.ts} +44 -3
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/CHANGELOG.md
CHANGED
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@@ -4,6 +4,56 @@ All notable changes to `@invonetwork/web-sdk` are documented here. This project
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[Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/). Releases are managed with
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[changesets](https://github.com/changesets/changesets).
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## [2.1.0] — 2026-07-02
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**Passkey recovery ("lost or replaced my passkey").** Deleting a passkey on the device never
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tells the server the key is gone, so re-enrollment was dead-ended by the anti-takeover gate
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(`ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF`) with nothing left to prove possession with. The backend shipped
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a self-serve, possession-proofed recovery flow; this release wires the client side.
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- `InvoClient.recoveryBegin()` — sends a one-time code to the phone/email on file
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(`{ status: "sent", channels }`); `InvoClient.recoveryComplete(code)` — deactivates the
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stale server-side passkey and authorizes a fresh enrollment
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(`{ status: "recovered", deactivatedCount, next }`). Then retry the same `enrollPasskey()`.
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- New `InvoError` classifiers: `isEnrollmentCodeInvalid`, `isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown`, and
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`retryAfterAt` (the ISO timestamp on the 403 cooldown — distinct from the numeric
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`retryAfter` throttle field). Bare `no_channel_on_file` / `rate_limited` error tokens are
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now promoted to `err.code`.
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- **24-hour money cooldown surfaced:** a recovery-enrolled passkey logs in and collects
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funds immediately, but `approveSend`/`approveTransfer` throw 403
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`PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` for 24h (SIM-swap protection). Branch on
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`isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown`, show the pause message with `retryAfterAt`, don't retry-loop.
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- README: recovery subsection under Passkeys, incl. the password-manager cleanup tip for
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"there is a problem saving your passkey" (stale orphan entry).
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Additive, no breaking changes. Routes require SDK verification enabled for the tenant
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(dark 503 otherwise).
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## [2.0.0] — 2026-07-02
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**BREAKING — `mintPlayerToken` now requires `playerPhone` (E.164).** Requested by the INVO
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backend after a live incident: a player registered email-only couldn't receive a cross-game
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transfer (incoming transfers are matched by phone) and never got the account-linking consent
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SMS (also phone-triggered). The network identity is derived from **email + phone together**,
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so the phone must be present on the FIRST registration call — attaching it later changes the
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identity and forces device re-enrollment.
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- `mintPlayerToken({ playerEmail, playerPhone })` — `playerPhone` is required and validated
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as E.164 (`+15555550100`: leading `+`, country code, digits only) before any network call;
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the body now posts `player_phone` alongside `player_email`.
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- **Pending approval is surfaced, not an error to swallow:** minting with a phone that
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already belongs to another INVO account (same person, new email) throws the existing
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`isPhoneShareApprovalRequired` 409 — the phone holder got a consent SMS. New
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`InvoError.phoneShareApprovalId` exposes the `approval_id` from the 409 body for the
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`phoneShareApprove` OTP fallback. Docs updated to cover the registration path (previously
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documented for claims only).
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- README: new "Player registration (email + phone, required)" section; examples updated
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(`proxy-server.ts` token route now rejects a phoneless actor with a clear 400).
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**Migration:** collect the player's phone in your enrollment UI before the first
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`mintPlayerToken` call and pass it as `playerPhone` in E.164. Handle the
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`isPhoneShareApprovalRequired` error as a "pending approval" UI state.
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## [1.2.1] — 2026-07-01
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**Fix — browser "Illegal invocation".** The SDK invoked its fetch as `this.fetchImpl(...)`,
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package/README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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First-party TypeScript SDK for integrating **INVO** into partner **web** platforms (storefronts, web games, dashboards). It wraps INVO's web money flows behind a typed, versioned API — the web analog of the Unity/Unreal plugins.
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> **Status:** `
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> **Status:** `v2.1.0` — stable, published on npm. The backend it wraps is **live** on sandbox + production. The API is covered by a [stability commitment](#stability): no breaking changes without a major bump. **Since 2.0.0 (breaking):** `mintPlayerToken` requires `playerPhone` (E.164) — see the [CHANGELOG](CHANGELOG.md) migration note. **2.1.0 adds** self-serve passkey recovery (`recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete`).
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> Canonical partner reference: **https://docs.invo.network/docs/currency-purchase** and **https://docs.invo.network/docs/game-developer-integration**.
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## What it does
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- [Item purchase (spend game currency)](#item-purchase-spend-game-currency)
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- [Player balance](#player-balance)
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- [Sends & transfers (move currency between players)](#sends--transfers-move-currency-between-players)
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- [Passkeys (enroll, approve, link)](#passkeys-enroll-approve-link)
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- [Passkeys (enroll, approve, link, recover)](#passkeys-enroll-approve-link-recover)
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- [Webhooks](#webhooks)
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- [Resilience & observability](#resilience--observability)
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- [Errors](#errors)
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`InvoClient` needs a `token` and a `baseUrl` — which lets you adopt it **two ways**. Same SDK, same code in your components; only the config differs.
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### Player registration (email + phone, required)
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`mintPlayerToken` is the player **registration** call, and it requires **both** `playerEmail` and `playerPhone`:
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```ts
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// your backend
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const { token } = await invo.mintPlayerToken({
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playerEmail: "player@example.com",
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playerPhone: "+15555550100", // REQUIRED — E.164: leading "+", country code, digits only
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});
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```
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Why phone is not optional on the INVO network:
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- **Identity is derived from email + phone together.** Registering email-only and adding the phone later **changes the identity and forces device re-enrollment** — collect the phone in your enrollment UI *before* the first mint.
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- **Incoming cross-game transfers are matched by phone.** An account without a phone can never see money sent to it.
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- **The account-linking consent SMS is triggered by phone.** Without one, the "add this email to your account?" flow can't run.
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- **Format is E.164** (`+15555550100`) — the SDK rejects anything else before it reaches the wire. Don't send national/local formats.
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**Same person, new email, same phone is expected and supported.** When the phone already belongs to another INVO account, the mint throws an `InvoError` with `isPhoneShareApprovalRequired` (409) — this is **not a failure**: INVO sent the phone holder a consent SMS. Show the player a "pending approval" state, then re-issue the same mint once approved. Poll `phoneShareStatus({ phone, email })`, or use `phoneShareInitiate`/`phoneShareApprove` (the error's `phoneShareApprovalId` carries the id) for the in-app OTP fallback.
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### Token bootstrap (both modes)
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Expose one small backend endpoint that calls `mintPlayerToken` (server-side, with the game secret) and hand the token to the browser:
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- **Real partner** (one login = one player) — derive the acting player from your **session**.
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- **Trusted first-party rig** (an internal tool that impersonates arbitrary test players) — the caller names `playerEmail`, guarded by a shared-secret header (`INVO_PROXY_TRUSTED_SECRET`), the same trusted pattern as a `player_email` token minter. Never expose this mode to end-user browsers.
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> **Lowest-risk first step:** adopt just `linkDevice` (passkey ↔ app device interchange) — it's purely additive and needs no refactor. See [Passkeys](#passkeys-enroll-approve-link).
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> **Lowest-risk first step:** adopt just `linkDevice` (passkey ↔ app device interchange) — it's purely additive and needs no refactor. See [Passkeys](#passkeys-enroll-approve-link-recover).
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## Before you go live
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INVO enables each flow for your tenant in the [console](#get-your-account--game-secret-invo-console). What you need to do:
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- **Store the game secret server-side** and expose a small endpoint that calls `mintPlayerToken` so the browser can fetch/refresh its token. Never ship the secret to the browser.
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- **Collect a phone number (E.164) in your enrollment flow** — `mintPlayerToken` requires it alongside the email (see [Player registration](#player-registration-email--phone-required)).
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- **If you use browser-direct ([Mode A](#mode-a--browser-direct-default)):** ask INVO to **CORS-allow your web origin(s)** so the browser can call the API directly. (Not needed for [Mode B / proxy](#mode-b--behind-your-proxy-keep-the-token-server-side) — those requests are same-origin to your backend.)
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- **For passkeys (sends/transfers):** give INVO the **RP ID + web origin(s)** you'll serve from. Passkeys only validate on approved origins — if a call returns `WEBAUTHN_NOT_ENABLED_FOR_TENANT`, your origins aren't set up yet; contact INVO. (Until enrolled, the sender falls back to the SMS-PIN path automatically.)
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- **For currency purchase:** card checkout works out of the box; ask INVO to enable the `game`/`steam` rails if you need them.
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**"You have X to collect"**
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- **Browser (player-token):** `client.getPendingCollect()` returns the player's own pending items. Each row's `kind` tells you the action
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- **Browser (player-token):** `client.getPendingCollect()` returns the player's own pending items. Each row's `kind` tells you the action:
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- `"receiving_confirm"` → a peer/another game **sent value TO this player** (incoming) → call `confirmReceiptSend`/`confirmReceiptTransfer`.
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- `"identity_gate"` → **this player initiated** and it's awaiting them → call `approveSend`/`approveTransfer`.
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> **Seeing incoming transfers from other games?** They come back as **`kind: "receiving_confirm"`** — render **both** kinds (a UI that only shows `identity_gate` will miss all inbound). The list is scoped to the token's player, so mint the token for the **recipient**. PII-free (no claim code / phone).
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- **Server (game-secret):** `server.getInboundPending({ playerEmail | playerPhone })` — richer, includes `toPhone`/`toIdentityId` for routing a notification to the right account. Match `toPhone` to the player (`toIdentityId` is null when the phone maps to >1 of your players).
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---
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## Passkeys (enroll, approve, link)
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## Passkeys (enroll, approve, link, recover)
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Passkeys (WebAuthn) replace the SMS PIN for approving sends/transfers. The browser SDK wraps `navigator.credentials.create/get`, base64url encoding, challenge round-trips, and error mapping.
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}
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```
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### Lost or replaced passkey (recovery)
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Deleting a passkey on the device **never tells the server the key is gone**, so the next
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`enrollPasskey()` is blocked by the anti-takeover gate with `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` —
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and the player has nothing left to prove possession with. Offer a **"Lost or replaced your
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passkey?"** action that runs the possession-proofed recovery flow:
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```ts
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try {
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await client.enrollPasskey();
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} catch (e) {
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if (e instanceof InvoError && e.isEnrollmentProofRequired) {
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// Player still HAS the other method → linkDevice (above). Lost/deleted it → recover:
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await client.recoveryBegin(); // → { status:"sent", channels:["sms","email"] }
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await client.recoveryComplete(codeFromUser); // → { status:"recovered", deactivatedCount }
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await client.enrollPasskey(); // same call — now succeeds
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} else throw e;
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}
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```
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- `recoveryBegin()` errors: `no_channel_on_file` (422), `rate_limited` (429 — max 5 codes / 10 min).
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- `recoveryComplete(code)` errors: `ENROLLMENT_CODE_INVALID` (wrong/expired, attempt-capped — let the user retry or resend), `RECOVERY_FAILED` (500, transient).
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- A recovery also sends the owner an out-of-band "your passkey was reset" SMS/email — that's the intended tamper alert; surface nothing special.
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- If the **OS fails to save** a new passkey ("there is a problem saving your passkey"), have the user delete the stale entry in their password manager first (iPhone: Settings → Passwords; Android: Google Password Manager; Windows: Settings → Accounts → Passkeys).
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> ⚠️ **24-hour money cooldown after recovery.** A recovery-enrolled passkey logs in and
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> **collects funds immediately**, but `approveSend`/`approveTransfer` return **403
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> `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN`** for 24 hours (SIM-swap protection). Branch on
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> `err.isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown` and show — *"For your security, transfers are paused for
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> 24 hours after a passkey reset. You can still receive funds. Try again after
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> `err.retryAfterAt`."* — do **not** treat it as a generic failure or retry-loop it.
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> Unaffected: login, `getPendingCollect`, inbound `confirmReceipt*`.
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- **User verification is required** on every approve/claim (a missing-UV assertion fails closed).
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- Challenges are single-use and bound to `{flow}:{transactionId}`.
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- The SDK passes the backend's WebAuthn options through unchanged (it does not hard-code `pubKeyCredParams`/`timeout`/`attestation`).
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| `.isPhoneShareAlreadyApproved` | phone-share was already approved (e.g. from a `/reject`) |
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Client-side guards (bad amount, missing idempotency key, `rail:"steam"` on `purchaseCurrency`, item validation) throw `InvoError` with `.status === 0` **before** any network call. Notable backend codes: `SDK_TOKEN_EXPIRED`, `TENANT_NOT_MIGRATED`, `WEBAUTHN_NOT_ENABLED_FOR_TENANT`, `WEBAUTHN_UV_REQUIRED`, `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF`, `WRONG_RAIL_ENDPOINT`, `flow_paused`.
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Client-side guards (bad amount, missing idempotency key, `rail:"steam"` on `purchaseCurrency`, item validation) throw `InvoError` with `.status === 0` **before** any network call. Notable backend codes: `SDK_TOKEN_EXPIRED`, `TENANT_NOT_MIGRATED`, `WEBAUTHN_NOT_ENABLED_FOR_TENANT`, `WEBAUTHN_UV_REQUIRED`, `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF`, `ENROLLMENT_CODE_INVALID`, `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` (403, `retryAfterAt`), `no_channel_on_file`, `rate_limited`, `WRONG_RAIL_ENDPOINT`, `flow_paused`.
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```ts
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import { InvoError } from "@invonetwork/web-sdk"; // or "@invonetwork/web-sdk/server"
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| `mintPlayerToken({ playerEmail, playerPhone })` | `{ token, expiresAt, identityId }` — **both required**; `playerPhone` must be E.164 (see [Player registration](#player-registration-email--phone-required)) |
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| `initiateSend(input)` | `{ transactionId, verificationMethod, guardianApproval?, raw }` |
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| `initiateTransfer(input)` | `{ transactionId, verificationMethod, guardianApproval?, raw }` |
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| `createCheckout(input)` | `{ sessionId, checkoutUrl, expiresAt, raw }` |
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| `enrollPasskey()` | `{ status, device, raw }` |
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| `enrollmentBegin()` / `enrollmentVerify(code)` | OTP grant for `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_AUTHORIZATION` (then retry `enrollPasskey`) |
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| `approveSend(txnId)` / `approveTransfer(txnId)` | `{ status, next, transactionId, claimCode?, claimCodeExpiresAt?, holdReason?, risk?, guardianApproval?, pollEndpoint?, raw }` |
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| `confirmReceiptSend(txnId)` / `confirmReceiptTransfer(txnId)` | `{ status, holdReason?, raw }` |
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| `linkDevice(linkId)` | `{ status, raw }` |
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}
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/**
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24
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+
/**
|
|
25
|
+
* True if enrolling is blocked because the identity already has an enrolled method
|
|
26
|
+
* (anti-takeover gate, register/complete → 409). Two ways forward: `linkDevice` when
|
|
27
|
+
* the player still HAS the other method, or the passkey-recovery flow
|
|
28
|
+
* (`recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete` — "Lost or replaced your passkey?") when they
|
|
29
|
+
* deleted/lost it — the server can't know a device-side passkey is gone.
|
|
30
|
+
*/
|
|
25
31
|
get isEnrollmentProofRequired() {
|
|
26
32
|
return this.code === "ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF";
|
|
27
33
|
}
|
|
34
|
+
/** True if the recovery OTP was wrong or expired (attempt-capped) — let the user retry or resend. */
|
|
35
|
+
get isEnrollmentCodeInvalid() {
|
|
36
|
+
return this.code === "ENROLLMENT_CODE_INVALID";
|
|
37
|
+
}
|
|
38
|
+
/**
|
|
39
|
+
* True if a money-OUT approve was refused because the passkey was enrolled via
|
|
40
|
+
* recovery less than 24h ago (SIM-swap protection, approve → 403). NOT a generic
|
|
41
|
+
* failure — do not retry-loop. Login and inbound confirm-receipt (collecting money)
|
|
42
|
+
* still work. Show: "For your security, transfers are paused for 24 hours after a
|
|
43
|
+
* passkey reset. You can still receive funds. Try again after {retryAfterAt}."
|
|
44
|
+
*/
|
|
45
|
+
get isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown() {
|
|
46
|
+
return this.code === "PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN";
|
|
47
|
+
}
|
|
48
|
+
/** The ISO timestamp when a `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` lifts (`retry_after`), when present. */
|
|
49
|
+
get retryAfterAt() {
|
|
50
|
+
const v = this.bodyObject()["retry_after"];
|
|
51
|
+
return typeof v === "string" && v && Number.isNaN(Number(v)) ? v : void 0;
|
|
52
|
+
}
|
|
28
53
|
/**
|
|
29
54
|
* True if an item purchase failed because the player's balance was too low (§4.8 → 400).
|
|
30
55
|
* The backend carries `required_amount` + `current_balance` on the body for the UI.
|
|
@@ -36,10 +61,22 @@ var InvoError = class _InvoError extends Error {
|
|
|
36
61
|
const b = this.bodyObject();
|
|
37
62
|
return this.code === "INSUFFICIENT_BALANCE" || "required_amount" in b || /insufficient[_ ]balance/i.test(this.message);
|
|
38
63
|
}
|
|
39
|
-
/**
|
|
64
|
+
/**
|
|
65
|
+
* True if the call needs phone-share approval before it can complete (409). Raised by
|
|
66
|
+
* registration/token-mint and by claims when the phone already belongs to another INVO
|
|
67
|
+
* account (same person, new email — expected, not a failure). The phone holder gets a
|
|
68
|
+
* consent SMS; show "pending approval", then re-issue the identical call once approved
|
|
69
|
+
* (poll `phoneShareStatus`, or use `phoneShareInitiate`/`phoneShareApprove` for the OTP
|
|
70
|
+
* fallback). `phoneShareApprovalId` carries the id from the 409 body.
|
|
71
|
+
*/
|
|
40
72
|
get isPhoneShareApprovalRequired() {
|
|
41
73
|
return this.code === "PHONE_SHARE_APPROVAL_REQUIRED";
|
|
42
74
|
}
|
|
75
|
+
/** The `approval_id` from a phone-share 409 body, for `phoneShareApprove`. */
|
|
76
|
+
get phoneShareApprovalId() {
|
|
77
|
+
const v = this.bodyObject()["approval_id"];
|
|
78
|
+
return typeof v === "string" && v ? v : void 0;
|
|
79
|
+
}
|
|
43
80
|
/** True if the phone-share (phone, requesting_email) pair was already approved. */
|
|
44
81
|
get isPhoneShareAlreadyApproved() {
|
|
45
82
|
return this.code === "PHONE_SHARE_ALREADY_APPROVED";
|
|
@@ -69,7 +106,9 @@ function errorFromResponse(status, body, requestId) {
|
|
|
69
106
|
else if (typeof b["error_code"] === "string") code = b["error_code"];
|
|
70
107
|
if (typeof b["error"] === "string") message = b["error"];
|
|
71
108
|
else if (typeof b["message"] === "string") message = b["message"];
|
|
72
|
-
if (!code && typeof b["error"] === "string" && /^(flow_paused|spending_limit_exceeded|receiver_not_enrolled_use_claim_code)$/.test(
|
|
109
|
+
if (!code && typeof b["error"] === "string" && /^(flow_paused|spending_limit_exceeded|receiver_not_enrolled_use_claim_code|no_channel_on_file|rate_limited)$/.test(
|
|
110
|
+
b["error"]
|
|
111
|
+
)) {
|
|
73
112
|
code = b["error"];
|
|
74
113
|
}
|
|
75
114
|
} else if (typeof body === "string" && body.trim()) {
|
|
@@ -308,5 +347,5 @@ function toDestinationsResult(raw, direction) {
|
|
|
308
347
|
}
|
|
309
348
|
|
|
310
349
|
export { Http, InvoError, assertSecureBaseUrl, toDestinationsResult };
|
|
311
|
-
//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-
|
|
312
|
-
//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-
|
|
350
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-YCEW7NC3.js.map
|
|
351
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-YCEW7NC3.js.map
|
package/dist/index.cjs
CHANGED
|
@@ -23,10 +23,35 @@ var InvoError = class _InvoError extends Error {
|
|
|
23
23
|
get isEnrollmentAuthorizationRequired() {
|
|
24
24
|
return this.code === "ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_AUTHORIZATION";
|
|
25
25
|
}
|
|
26
|
-
/**
|
|
26
|
+
/**
|
|
27
|
+
* True if enrolling is blocked because the identity already has an enrolled method
|
|
28
|
+
* (anti-takeover gate, register/complete → 409). Two ways forward: `linkDevice` when
|
|
29
|
+
* the player still HAS the other method, or the passkey-recovery flow
|
|
30
|
+
* (`recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete` — "Lost or replaced your passkey?") when they
|
|
31
|
+
* deleted/lost it — the server can't know a device-side passkey is gone.
|
|
32
|
+
*/
|
|
27
33
|
get isEnrollmentProofRequired() {
|
|
28
34
|
return this.code === "ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF";
|
|
29
35
|
}
|
|
36
|
+
/** True if the recovery OTP was wrong or expired (attempt-capped) — let the user retry or resend. */
|
|
37
|
+
get isEnrollmentCodeInvalid() {
|
|
38
|
+
return this.code === "ENROLLMENT_CODE_INVALID";
|
|
39
|
+
}
|
|
40
|
+
/**
|
|
41
|
+
* True if a money-OUT approve was refused because the passkey was enrolled via
|
|
42
|
+
* recovery less than 24h ago (SIM-swap protection, approve → 403). NOT a generic
|
|
43
|
+
* failure — do not retry-loop. Login and inbound confirm-receipt (collecting money)
|
|
44
|
+
* still work. Show: "For your security, transfers are paused for 24 hours after a
|
|
45
|
+
* passkey reset. You can still receive funds. Try again after {retryAfterAt}."
|
|
46
|
+
*/
|
|
47
|
+
get isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown() {
|
|
48
|
+
return this.code === "PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN";
|
|
49
|
+
}
|
|
50
|
+
/** The ISO timestamp when a `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` lifts (`retry_after`), when present. */
|
|
51
|
+
get retryAfterAt() {
|
|
52
|
+
const v = this.bodyObject()["retry_after"];
|
|
53
|
+
return typeof v === "string" && v && Number.isNaN(Number(v)) ? v : void 0;
|
|
54
|
+
}
|
|
30
55
|
/**
|
|
31
56
|
* True if an item purchase failed because the player's balance was too low (§4.8 → 400).
|
|
32
57
|
* The backend carries `required_amount` + `current_balance` on the body for the UI.
|
|
@@ -38,10 +63,22 @@ var InvoError = class _InvoError extends Error {
|
|
|
38
63
|
const b = this.bodyObject();
|
|
39
64
|
return this.code === "INSUFFICIENT_BALANCE" || "required_amount" in b || /insufficient[_ ]balance/i.test(this.message);
|
|
40
65
|
}
|
|
41
|
-
/**
|
|
66
|
+
/**
|
|
67
|
+
* True if the call needs phone-share approval before it can complete (409). Raised by
|
|
68
|
+
* registration/token-mint and by claims when the phone already belongs to another INVO
|
|
69
|
+
* account (same person, new email — expected, not a failure). The phone holder gets a
|
|
70
|
+
* consent SMS; show "pending approval", then re-issue the identical call once approved
|
|
71
|
+
* (poll `phoneShareStatus`, or use `phoneShareInitiate`/`phoneShareApprove` for the OTP
|
|
72
|
+
* fallback). `phoneShareApprovalId` carries the id from the 409 body.
|
|
73
|
+
*/
|
|
42
74
|
get isPhoneShareApprovalRequired() {
|
|
43
75
|
return this.code === "PHONE_SHARE_APPROVAL_REQUIRED";
|
|
44
76
|
}
|
|
77
|
+
/** The `approval_id` from a phone-share 409 body, for `phoneShareApprove`. */
|
|
78
|
+
get phoneShareApprovalId() {
|
|
79
|
+
const v = this.bodyObject()["approval_id"];
|
|
80
|
+
return typeof v === "string" && v ? v : void 0;
|
|
81
|
+
}
|
|
45
82
|
/** True if the phone-share (phone, requesting_email) pair was already approved. */
|
|
46
83
|
get isPhoneShareAlreadyApproved() {
|
|
47
84
|
return this.code === "PHONE_SHARE_ALREADY_APPROVED";
|
|
@@ -71,7 +108,9 @@ function errorFromResponse(status, body, requestId) {
|
|
|
71
108
|
else if (typeof b["error_code"] === "string") code = b["error_code"];
|
|
72
109
|
if (typeof b["error"] === "string") message = b["error"];
|
|
73
110
|
else if (typeof b["message"] === "string") message = b["message"];
|
|
74
|
-
if (!code && typeof b["error"] === "string" && /^(flow_paused|spending_limit_exceeded|receiver_not_enrolled_use_claim_code)$/.test(
|
|
111
|
+
if (!code && typeof b["error"] === "string" && /^(flow_paused|spending_limit_exceeded|receiver_not_enrolled_use_claim_code|no_channel_on_file|rate_limited)$/.test(
|
|
112
|
+
b["error"]
|
|
113
|
+
)) {
|
|
75
114
|
code = b["error"];
|
|
76
115
|
}
|
|
77
116
|
} else if (typeof body === "string" && body.trim()) {
|
|
@@ -440,7 +479,12 @@ var InvoClient = class {
|
|
|
440
479
|
throw new Error("WebAuthn is not available in this environment (browser required).");
|
|
441
480
|
}
|
|
442
481
|
}
|
|
443
|
-
/**
|
|
482
|
+
/**
|
|
483
|
+
* Enroll a passkey for the token's identity (register/begin -> create() -> register/complete).
|
|
484
|
+
* Gates: `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_AUTHORIZATION` → {@link enrollmentBegin} OTP grant;
|
|
485
|
+
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` → {@link linkDevice}, or {@link recoveryBegin} when the
|
|
486
|
+
* player lost/deleted the old passkey ("Lost or replaced your passkey?").
|
|
487
|
+
*/
|
|
444
488
|
async enrollPasskey(opts) {
|
|
445
489
|
this.assertWebAuthn();
|
|
446
490
|
const signal = opts?.signal;
|
|
@@ -569,7 +613,9 @@ var InvoClient = class {
|
|
|
569
613
|
* this to send a 6-digit code to the player's phone + email on file, collect the code,
|
|
570
614
|
* call `enrollmentVerify(code)`, then RETRY the SAME `enrollPasskey()` —
|
|
571
615
|
* `register/complete` auto-consumes the server-side grant (30-min TTL). For
|
|
572
|
-
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`) use `linkDevice`
|
|
616
|
+
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`) use `linkDevice`
|
|
617
|
+
* (player still has the other method) or `recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete`
|
|
618
|
+
* (player lost/deleted their passkey).
|
|
573
619
|
*/
|
|
574
620
|
async enrollmentBegin(opts) {
|
|
575
621
|
return this.withTokenRetry(async () => {
|
|
@@ -597,6 +643,65 @@ var InvoClient = class {
|
|
|
597
643
|
return { status: String(raw["status"] ?? ""), raw };
|
|
598
644
|
});
|
|
599
645
|
}
|
|
646
|
+
/**
|
|
647
|
+
* Passkey recovery — "Lost or replaced your passkey?". Deleting a passkey on the
|
|
648
|
+
* device never tells the server the key is gone, so the next `enrollPasskey()` is
|
|
649
|
+
* blocked by the anti-takeover gate with `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF`
|
|
650
|
+
* (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`). When the player can't prove the old method
|
|
651
|
+
* (they deleted/lost it — otherwise prefer `linkDevice`), run:
|
|
652
|
+
*
|
|
653
|
+
* 1. `recoveryBegin()` — sends a one-time code to the phone/email on file
|
|
654
|
+
* (422 `no_channel_on_file`, 429 `rate_limited` at 5/10min).
|
|
655
|
+
* 2. `recoveryComplete(code)` — deactivates the stale server-side passkey and
|
|
656
|
+
* authorizes a fresh enrollment (400 `ENROLLMENT_CODE_INVALID` on a wrong/
|
|
657
|
+
* expired code — attempt-capped; let the user retry or resend).
|
|
658
|
+
* 3. Immediately retry the SAME `enrollPasskey()` — it now succeeds.
|
|
659
|
+
*
|
|
660
|
+
* The owner also gets an out-of-band "your passkey was reset" SMS/email — that's
|
|
661
|
+
* the intended tamper alert; surface nothing special for it.
|
|
662
|
+
*
|
|
663
|
+
* ⚠ 24-HOUR MONEY COOLDOWN: a recovery-enrolled passkey logs in and COLLECTS
|
|
664
|
+
* funds immediately, but `approveSend`/`approveTransfer` throw
|
|
665
|
+
* `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` (403; `err.isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown`,
|
|
666
|
+
* `err.retryAfterAt`) for 24h — SIM-swap protection. Show the pause message with
|
|
667
|
+
* the timestamp; do not retry-loop it.
|
|
668
|
+
*
|
|
669
|
+
* If the OS itself fails to SAVE a new passkey ("there is a problem saving your
|
|
670
|
+
* passkey"), have the user delete the stale entry in their password manager first
|
|
671
|
+
* (iPhone: Settings → Passwords; Android: Google Password Manager; Windows:
|
|
672
|
+
* Settings → Accounts → Passkeys).
|
|
673
|
+
*/
|
|
674
|
+
async recoveryBegin(opts) {
|
|
675
|
+
return this.withTokenRetry(async () => {
|
|
676
|
+
const raw = await this.post(
|
|
677
|
+
"/api/sdk/device/recover/begin",
|
|
678
|
+
void 0,
|
|
679
|
+
opts?.signal
|
|
680
|
+
);
|
|
681
|
+
return {
|
|
682
|
+
status: String(raw["status"] ?? ""),
|
|
683
|
+
channels: Array.isArray(raw["channels"]) ? raw["channels"] : [],
|
|
684
|
+
raw
|
|
685
|
+
};
|
|
686
|
+
});
|
|
687
|
+
}
|
|
688
|
+
/** Verify the recovery code (see {@link recoveryBegin}); on success, call `enrollPasskey()`. */
|
|
689
|
+
async recoveryComplete(code, opts) {
|
|
690
|
+
if (!code) throw new Error("recoveryComplete requires the one-time `code`.");
|
|
691
|
+
return this.withTokenRetry(async () => {
|
|
692
|
+
const raw = await this.post(
|
|
693
|
+
"/api/sdk/device/recover/complete",
|
|
694
|
+
{ code },
|
|
695
|
+
opts?.signal
|
|
696
|
+
);
|
|
697
|
+
return {
|
|
698
|
+
status: String(raw["status"] ?? ""),
|
|
699
|
+
deactivatedCount: Number(raw["deactivated_count"] ?? 0),
|
|
700
|
+
next: typeof raw["next"] === "string" ? raw["next"] : void 0,
|
|
701
|
+
raw
|
|
702
|
+
};
|
|
703
|
+
});
|
|
704
|
+
}
|
|
600
705
|
// --- internals ---
|
|
601
706
|
/** POST with the current player token. Token-expiry retry is handled one level
|
|
602
707
|
* up by withTokenRetry (which re-runs the whole ceremony, not a single call). */
|
package/dist/index.d.cts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import { C as ClientConfig, a as CallOptions, A as ApproveResult, b as ConfirmReceiptResult, L as LinkDeviceResult, P as PendingCollectResult, D as DestinationsQuery, c as DestinationsResult, B as BalanceResult, E as EnrollmentBeginResult, d as EnrollmentVerifyResult } from './types-
|
|
2
|
-
export {
|
|
1
|
+
import { C as ClientConfig, a as CallOptions, A as ApproveResult, b as ConfirmReceiptResult, L as LinkDeviceResult, P as PendingCollectResult, D as DestinationsQuery, c as DestinationsResult, B as BalanceResult, E as EnrollmentBeginResult, d as EnrollmentVerifyResult, R as RecoveryBeginResult, e as RecoveryCompleteResult } from './types-DtihCpOj.cjs';
|
|
2
|
+
export { f as BalanceRow, g as DestinationGame, I as InvoError, h as InvoErrorInfo, i as InvoHooks, j as InvoRequestInfo, k as InvoResponseInfo, l as PendingCollectItem, m as Rail, V as VerificationMethod } from './types-DtihCpOj.cjs';
|
|
3
3
|
|
|
4
4
|
declare class InvoClient {
|
|
5
5
|
private readonly http;
|
|
@@ -9,7 +9,12 @@ declare class InvoClient {
|
|
|
9
9
|
private refreshInFlight;
|
|
10
10
|
constructor(config: ClientConfig);
|
|
11
11
|
private assertWebAuthn;
|
|
12
|
-
/**
|
|
12
|
+
/**
|
|
13
|
+
* Enroll a passkey for the token's identity (register/begin -> create() -> register/complete).
|
|
14
|
+
* Gates: `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_AUTHORIZATION` → {@link enrollmentBegin} OTP grant;
|
|
15
|
+
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` → {@link linkDevice}, or {@link recoveryBegin} when the
|
|
16
|
+
* player lost/deleted the old passkey ("Lost or replaced your passkey?").
|
|
17
|
+
*/
|
|
13
18
|
enrollPasskey(opts?: CallOptions): Promise<{
|
|
14
19
|
status: string;
|
|
15
20
|
device: unknown;
|
|
@@ -58,11 +63,44 @@ declare class InvoClient {
|
|
|
58
63
|
* this to send a 6-digit code to the player's phone + email on file, collect the code,
|
|
59
64
|
* call `enrollmentVerify(code)`, then RETRY the SAME `enrollPasskey()` —
|
|
60
65
|
* `register/complete` auto-consumes the server-side grant (30-min TTL). For
|
|
61
|
-
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`) use `linkDevice`
|
|
66
|
+
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`) use `linkDevice`
|
|
67
|
+
* (player still has the other method) or `recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete`
|
|
68
|
+
* (player lost/deleted their passkey).
|
|
62
69
|
*/
|
|
63
70
|
enrollmentBegin(opts?: CallOptions): Promise<EnrollmentBeginResult>;
|
|
64
71
|
/** Verify the enrollment OTP (see {@link enrollmentBegin}); on success, retry `enrollPasskey()`. */
|
|
65
72
|
enrollmentVerify(code: string, opts?: CallOptions): Promise<EnrollmentVerifyResult>;
|
|
73
|
+
/**
|
|
74
|
+
* Passkey recovery — "Lost or replaced your passkey?". Deleting a passkey on the
|
|
75
|
+
* device never tells the server the key is gone, so the next `enrollPasskey()` is
|
|
76
|
+
* blocked by the anti-takeover gate with `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF`
|
|
77
|
+
* (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`). When the player can't prove the old method
|
|
78
|
+
* (they deleted/lost it — otherwise prefer `linkDevice`), run:
|
|
79
|
+
*
|
|
80
|
+
* 1. `recoveryBegin()` — sends a one-time code to the phone/email on file
|
|
81
|
+
* (422 `no_channel_on_file`, 429 `rate_limited` at 5/10min).
|
|
82
|
+
* 2. `recoveryComplete(code)` — deactivates the stale server-side passkey and
|
|
83
|
+
* authorizes a fresh enrollment (400 `ENROLLMENT_CODE_INVALID` on a wrong/
|
|
84
|
+
* expired code — attempt-capped; let the user retry or resend).
|
|
85
|
+
* 3. Immediately retry the SAME `enrollPasskey()` — it now succeeds.
|
|
86
|
+
*
|
|
87
|
+
* The owner also gets an out-of-band "your passkey was reset" SMS/email — that's
|
|
88
|
+
* the intended tamper alert; surface nothing special for it.
|
|
89
|
+
*
|
|
90
|
+
* ⚠ 24-HOUR MONEY COOLDOWN: a recovery-enrolled passkey logs in and COLLECTS
|
|
91
|
+
* funds immediately, but `approveSend`/`approveTransfer` throw
|
|
92
|
+
* `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` (403; `err.isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown`,
|
|
93
|
+
* `err.retryAfterAt`) for 24h — SIM-swap protection. Show the pause message with
|
|
94
|
+
* the timestamp; do not retry-loop it.
|
|
95
|
+
*
|
|
96
|
+
* If the OS itself fails to SAVE a new passkey ("there is a problem saving your
|
|
97
|
+
* passkey"), have the user delete the stale entry in their password manager first
|
|
98
|
+
* (iPhone: Settings → Passwords; Android: Google Password Manager; Windows:
|
|
99
|
+
* Settings → Accounts → Passkeys).
|
|
100
|
+
*/
|
|
101
|
+
recoveryBegin(opts?: CallOptions): Promise<RecoveryBeginResult>;
|
|
102
|
+
/** Verify the recovery code (see {@link recoveryBegin}); on success, call `enrollPasskey()`. */
|
|
103
|
+
recoveryComplete(code: string, opts?: CallOptions): Promise<RecoveryCompleteResult>;
|
|
66
104
|
/** POST with the current player token. Token-expiry retry is handled one level
|
|
67
105
|
* up by withTokenRetry (which re-runs the whole ceremony, not a single call). */
|
|
68
106
|
private post;
|
|
@@ -81,4 +119,4 @@ declare class InvoClient {
|
|
|
81
119
|
private confirmReceipt;
|
|
82
120
|
}
|
|
83
121
|
|
|
84
|
-
export { ApproveResult, BalanceResult, CallOptions, ClientConfig, ConfirmReceiptResult, DestinationsQuery, DestinationsResult, EnrollmentBeginResult, EnrollmentVerifyResult, InvoClient, LinkDeviceResult, PendingCollectResult };
|
|
122
|
+
export { ApproveResult, BalanceResult, CallOptions, ClientConfig, ConfirmReceiptResult, DestinationsQuery, DestinationsResult, EnrollmentBeginResult, EnrollmentVerifyResult, InvoClient, LinkDeviceResult, PendingCollectResult, RecoveryBeginResult, RecoveryCompleteResult };
|
package/dist/index.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import { C as ClientConfig, a as CallOptions, A as ApproveResult, b as ConfirmReceiptResult, L as LinkDeviceResult, P as PendingCollectResult, D as DestinationsQuery, c as DestinationsResult, B as BalanceResult, E as EnrollmentBeginResult, d as EnrollmentVerifyResult } from './types-
|
|
2
|
-
export {
|
|
1
|
+
import { C as ClientConfig, a as CallOptions, A as ApproveResult, b as ConfirmReceiptResult, L as LinkDeviceResult, P as PendingCollectResult, D as DestinationsQuery, c as DestinationsResult, B as BalanceResult, E as EnrollmentBeginResult, d as EnrollmentVerifyResult, R as RecoveryBeginResult, e as RecoveryCompleteResult } from './types-DtihCpOj.js';
|
|
2
|
+
export { f as BalanceRow, g as DestinationGame, I as InvoError, h as InvoErrorInfo, i as InvoHooks, j as InvoRequestInfo, k as InvoResponseInfo, l as PendingCollectItem, m as Rail, V as VerificationMethod } from './types-DtihCpOj.js';
|
|
3
3
|
|
|
4
4
|
declare class InvoClient {
|
|
5
5
|
private readonly http;
|
|
@@ -9,7 +9,12 @@ declare class InvoClient {
|
|
|
9
9
|
private refreshInFlight;
|
|
10
10
|
constructor(config: ClientConfig);
|
|
11
11
|
private assertWebAuthn;
|
|
12
|
-
/**
|
|
12
|
+
/**
|
|
13
|
+
* Enroll a passkey for the token's identity (register/begin -> create() -> register/complete).
|
|
14
|
+
* Gates: `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_AUTHORIZATION` → {@link enrollmentBegin} OTP grant;
|
|
15
|
+
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` → {@link linkDevice}, or {@link recoveryBegin} when the
|
|
16
|
+
* player lost/deleted the old passkey ("Lost or replaced your passkey?").
|
|
17
|
+
*/
|
|
13
18
|
enrollPasskey(opts?: CallOptions): Promise<{
|
|
14
19
|
status: string;
|
|
15
20
|
device: unknown;
|
|
@@ -58,11 +63,44 @@ declare class InvoClient {
|
|
|
58
63
|
* this to send a 6-digit code to the player's phone + email on file, collect the code,
|
|
59
64
|
* call `enrollmentVerify(code)`, then RETRY the SAME `enrollPasskey()` —
|
|
60
65
|
* `register/complete` auto-consumes the server-side grant (30-min TTL). For
|
|
61
|
-
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`) use `linkDevice`
|
|
66
|
+
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`) use `linkDevice`
|
|
67
|
+
* (player still has the other method) or `recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete`
|
|
68
|
+
* (player lost/deleted their passkey).
|
|
62
69
|
*/
|
|
63
70
|
enrollmentBegin(opts?: CallOptions): Promise<EnrollmentBeginResult>;
|
|
64
71
|
/** Verify the enrollment OTP (see {@link enrollmentBegin}); on success, retry `enrollPasskey()`. */
|
|
65
72
|
enrollmentVerify(code: string, opts?: CallOptions): Promise<EnrollmentVerifyResult>;
|
|
73
|
+
/**
|
|
74
|
+
* Passkey recovery — "Lost or replaced your passkey?". Deleting a passkey on the
|
|
75
|
+
* device never tells the server the key is gone, so the next `enrollPasskey()` is
|
|
76
|
+
* blocked by the anti-takeover gate with `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF`
|
|
77
|
+
* (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`). When the player can't prove the old method
|
|
78
|
+
* (they deleted/lost it — otherwise prefer `linkDevice`), run:
|
|
79
|
+
*
|
|
80
|
+
* 1. `recoveryBegin()` — sends a one-time code to the phone/email on file
|
|
81
|
+
* (422 `no_channel_on_file`, 429 `rate_limited` at 5/10min).
|
|
82
|
+
* 2. `recoveryComplete(code)` — deactivates the stale server-side passkey and
|
|
83
|
+
* authorizes a fresh enrollment (400 `ENROLLMENT_CODE_INVALID` on a wrong/
|
|
84
|
+
* expired code — attempt-capped; let the user retry or resend).
|
|
85
|
+
* 3. Immediately retry the SAME `enrollPasskey()` — it now succeeds.
|
|
86
|
+
*
|
|
87
|
+
* The owner also gets an out-of-band "your passkey was reset" SMS/email — that's
|
|
88
|
+
* the intended tamper alert; surface nothing special for it.
|
|
89
|
+
*
|
|
90
|
+
* ⚠ 24-HOUR MONEY COOLDOWN: a recovery-enrolled passkey logs in and COLLECTS
|
|
91
|
+
* funds immediately, but `approveSend`/`approveTransfer` throw
|
|
92
|
+
* `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` (403; `err.isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown`,
|
|
93
|
+
* `err.retryAfterAt`) for 24h — SIM-swap protection. Show the pause message with
|
|
94
|
+
* the timestamp; do not retry-loop it.
|
|
95
|
+
*
|
|
96
|
+
* If the OS itself fails to SAVE a new passkey ("there is a problem saving your
|
|
97
|
+
* passkey"), have the user delete the stale entry in their password manager first
|
|
98
|
+
* (iPhone: Settings → Passwords; Android: Google Password Manager; Windows:
|
|
99
|
+
* Settings → Accounts → Passkeys).
|
|
100
|
+
*/
|
|
101
|
+
recoveryBegin(opts?: CallOptions): Promise<RecoveryBeginResult>;
|
|
102
|
+
/** Verify the recovery code (see {@link recoveryBegin}); on success, call `enrollPasskey()`. */
|
|
103
|
+
recoveryComplete(code: string, opts?: CallOptions): Promise<RecoveryCompleteResult>;
|
|
66
104
|
/** POST with the current player token. Token-expiry retry is handled one level
|
|
67
105
|
* up by withTokenRetry (which re-runs the whole ceremony, not a single call). */
|
|
68
106
|
private post;
|
|
@@ -81,4 +119,4 @@ declare class InvoClient {
|
|
|
81
119
|
private confirmReceipt;
|
|
82
120
|
}
|
|
83
121
|
|
|
84
|
-
export { ApproveResult, BalanceResult, CallOptions, ClientConfig, ConfirmReceiptResult, DestinationsQuery, DestinationsResult, EnrollmentBeginResult, EnrollmentVerifyResult, InvoClient, LinkDeviceResult, PendingCollectResult };
|
|
122
|
+
export { ApproveResult, BalanceResult, CallOptions, ClientConfig, ConfirmReceiptResult, DestinationsQuery, DestinationsResult, EnrollmentBeginResult, EnrollmentVerifyResult, InvoClient, LinkDeviceResult, PendingCollectResult, RecoveryBeginResult, RecoveryCompleteResult };
|
package/dist/index.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import { assertSecureBaseUrl, Http, toDestinationsResult, InvoError } from './chunk-
|
|
2
|
-
export { InvoError } from './chunk-
|
|
1
|
+
import { assertSecureBaseUrl, Http, toDestinationsResult, InvoError } from './chunk-YCEW7NC3.js';
|
|
2
|
+
export { InvoError } from './chunk-YCEW7NC3.js';
|
|
3
3
|
|
|
4
4
|
// src/shared/webauthn.ts
|
|
5
5
|
function b64urlToBuffer(value) {
|
|
@@ -132,7 +132,12 @@ var InvoClient = class {
|
|
|
132
132
|
throw new Error("WebAuthn is not available in this environment (browser required).");
|
|
133
133
|
}
|
|
134
134
|
}
|
|
135
|
-
/**
|
|
135
|
+
/**
|
|
136
|
+
* Enroll a passkey for the token's identity (register/begin -> create() -> register/complete).
|
|
137
|
+
* Gates: `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_AUTHORIZATION` → {@link enrollmentBegin} OTP grant;
|
|
138
|
+
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` → {@link linkDevice}, or {@link recoveryBegin} when the
|
|
139
|
+
* player lost/deleted the old passkey ("Lost or replaced your passkey?").
|
|
140
|
+
*/
|
|
136
141
|
async enrollPasskey(opts) {
|
|
137
142
|
this.assertWebAuthn();
|
|
138
143
|
const signal = opts?.signal;
|
|
@@ -261,7 +266,9 @@ var InvoClient = class {
|
|
|
261
266
|
* this to send a 6-digit code to the player's phone + email on file, collect the code,
|
|
262
267
|
* call `enrollmentVerify(code)`, then RETRY the SAME `enrollPasskey()` —
|
|
263
268
|
* `register/complete` auto-consumes the server-side grant (30-min TTL). For
|
|
264
|
-
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`) use `linkDevice`
|
|
269
|
+
* `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF` (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`) use `linkDevice`
|
|
270
|
+
* (player still has the other method) or `recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete`
|
|
271
|
+
* (player lost/deleted their passkey).
|
|
265
272
|
*/
|
|
266
273
|
async enrollmentBegin(opts) {
|
|
267
274
|
return this.withTokenRetry(async () => {
|
|
@@ -289,6 +296,65 @@ var InvoClient = class {
|
|
|
289
296
|
return { status: String(raw["status"] ?? ""), raw };
|
|
290
297
|
});
|
|
291
298
|
}
|
|
299
|
+
/**
|
|
300
|
+
* Passkey recovery — "Lost or replaced your passkey?". Deleting a passkey on the
|
|
301
|
+
* device never tells the server the key is gone, so the next `enrollPasskey()` is
|
|
302
|
+
* blocked by the anti-takeover gate with `ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF`
|
|
303
|
+
* (`err.isEnrollmentProofRequired`). When the player can't prove the old method
|
|
304
|
+
* (they deleted/lost it — otherwise prefer `linkDevice`), run:
|
|
305
|
+
*
|
|
306
|
+
* 1. `recoveryBegin()` — sends a one-time code to the phone/email on file
|
|
307
|
+
* (422 `no_channel_on_file`, 429 `rate_limited` at 5/10min).
|
|
308
|
+
* 2. `recoveryComplete(code)` — deactivates the stale server-side passkey and
|
|
309
|
+
* authorizes a fresh enrollment (400 `ENROLLMENT_CODE_INVALID` on a wrong/
|
|
310
|
+
* expired code — attempt-capped; let the user retry or resend).
|
|
311
|
+
* 3. Immediately retry the SAME `enrollPasskey()` — it now succeeds.
|
|
312
|
+
*
|
|
313
|
+
* The owner also gets an out-of-band "your passkey was reset" SMS/email — that's
|
|
314
|
+
* the intended tamper alert; surface nothing special for it.
|
|
315
|
+
*
|
|
316
|
+
* ⚠ 24-HOUR MONEY COOLDOWN: a recovery-enrolled passkey logs in and COLLECTS
|
|
317
|
+
* funds immediately, but `approveSend`/`approveTransfer` throw
|
|
318
|
+
* `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` (403; `err.isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown`,
|
|
319
|
+
* `err.retryAfterAt`) for 24h — SIM-swap protection. Show the pause message with
|
|
320
|
+
* the timestamp; do not retry-loop it.
|
|
321
|
+
*
|
|
322
|
+
* If the OS itself fails to SAVE a new passkey ("there is a problem saving your
|
|
323
|
+
* passkey"), have the user delete the stale entry in their password manager first
|
|
324
|
+
* (iPhone: Settings → Passwords; Android: Google Password Manager; Windows:
|
|
325
|
+
* Settings → Accounts → Passkeys).
|
|
326
|
+
*/
|
|
327
|
+
async recoveryBegin(opts) {
|
|
328
|
+
return this.withTokenRetry(async () => {
|
|
329
|
+
const raw = await this.post(
|
|
330
|
+
"/api/sdk/device/recover/begin",
|
|
331
|
+
void 0,
|
|
332
|
+
opts?.signal
|
|
333
|
+
);
|
|
334
|
+
return {
|
|
335
|
+
status: String(raw["status"] ?? ""),
|
|
336
|
+
channels: Array.isArray(raw["channels"]) ? raw["channels"] : [],
|
|
337
|
+
raw
|
|
338
|
+
};
|
|
339
|
+
});
|
|
340
|
+
}
|
|
341
|
+
/** Verify the recovery code (see {@link recoveryBegin}); on success, call `enrollPasskey()`. */
|
|
342
|
+
async recoveryComplete(code, opts) {
|
|
343
|
+
if (!code) throw new Error("recoveryComplete requires the one-time `code`.");
|
|
344
|
+
return this.withTokenRetry(async () => {
|
|
345
|
+
const raw = await this.post(
|
|
346
|
+
"/api/sdk/device/recover/complete",
|
|
347
|
+
{ code },
|
|
348
|
+
opts?.signal
|
|
349
|
+
);
|
|
350
|
+
return {
|
|
351
|
+
status: String(raw["status"] ?? ""),
|
|
352
|
+
deactivatedCount: Number(raw["deactivated_count"] ?? 0),
|
|
353
|
+
next: typeof raw["next"] === "string" ? raw["next"] : void 0,
|
|
354
|
+
raw
|
|
355
|
+
};
|
|
356
|
+
});
|
|
357
|
+
}
|
|
292
358
|
// --- internals ---
|
|
293
359
|
/** POST with the current player token. Token-expiry retry is handled one level
|
|
294
360
|
* up by withTokenRetry (which re-runs the whole ceremony, not a single call). */
|
package/dist/server.cjs
CHANGED
|
@@ -25,10 +25,35 @@ var InvoError = class _InvoError extends Error {
|
|
|
25
25
|
get isEnrollmentAuthorizationRequired() {
|
|
26
26
|
return this.code === "ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_AUTHORIZATION";
|
|
27
27
|
}
|
|
28
|
-
/**
|
|
28
|
+
/**
|
|
29
|
+
* True if enrolling is blocked because the identity already has an enrolled method
|
|
30
|
+
* (anti-takeover gate, register/complete → 409). Two ways forward: `linkDevice` when
|
|
31
|
+
* the player still HAS the other method, or the passkey-recovery flow
|
|
32
|
+
* (`recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete` — "Lost or replaced your passkey?") when they
|
|
33
|
+
* deleted/lost it — the server can't know a device-side passkey is gone.
|
|
34
|
+
*/
|
|
29
35
|
get isEnrollmentProofRequired() {
|
|
30
36
|
return this.code === "ENROLLMENT_REQUIRES_PROOF";
|
|
31
37
|
}
|
|
38
|
+
/** True if the recovery OTP was wrong or expired (attempt-capped) — let the user retry or resend. */
|
|
39
|
+
get isEnrollmentCodeInvalid() {
|
|
40
|
+
return this.code === "ENROLLMENT_CODE_INVALID";
|
|
41
|
+
}
|
|
42
|
+
/**
|
|
43
|
+
* True if a money-OUT approve was refused because the passkey was enrolled via
|
|
44
|
+
* recovery less than 24h ago (SIM-swap protection, approve → 403). NOT a generic
|
|
45
|
+
* failure — do not retry-loop. Login and inbound confirm-receipt (collecting money)
|
|
46
|
+
* still work. Show: "For your security, transfers are paused for 24 hours after a
|
|
47
|
+
* passkey reset. You can still receive funds. Try again after {retryAfterAt}."
|
|
48
|
+
*/
|
|
49
|
+
get isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown() {
|
|
50
|
+
return this.code === "PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN";
|
|
51
|
+
}
|
|
52
|
+
/** The ISO timestamp when a `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` lifts (`retry_after`), when present. */
|
|
53
|
+
get retryAfterAt() {
|
|
54
|
+
const v = this.bodyObject()["retry_after"];
|
|
55
|
+
return typeof v === "string" && v && Number.isNaN(Number(v)) ? v : void 0;
|
|
56
|
+
}
|
|
32
57
|
/**
|
|
33
58
|
* True if an item purchase failed because the player's balance was too low (§4.8 → 400).
|
|
34
59
|
* The backend carries `required_amount` + `current_balance` on the body for the UI.
|
|
@@ -40,10 +65,22 @@ var InvoError = class _InvoError extends Error {
|
|
|
40
65
|
const b = this.bodyObject();
|
|
41
66
|
return this.code === "INSUFFICIENT_BALANCE" || "required_amount" in b || /insufficient[_ ]balance/i.test(this.message);
|
|
42
67
|
}
|
|
43
|
-
/**
|
|
68
|
+
/**
|
|
69
|
+
* True if the call needs phone-share approval before it can complete (409). Raised by
|
|
70
|
+
* registration/token-mint and by claims when the phone already belongs to another INVO
|
|
71
|
+
* account (same person, new email — expected, not a failure). The phone holder gets a
|
|
72
|
+
* consent SMS; show "pending approval", then re-issue the identical call once approved
|
|
73
|
+
* (poll `phoneShareStatus`, or use `phoneShareInitiate`/`phoneShareApprove` for the OTP
|
|
74
|
+
* fallback). `phoneShareApprovalId` carries the id from the 409 body.
|
|
75
|
+
*/
|
|
44
76
|
get isPhoneShareApprovalRequired() {
|
|
45
77
|
return this.code === "PHONE_SHARE_APPROVAL_REQUIRED";
|
|
46
78
|
}
|
|
79
|
+
/** The `approval_id` from a phone-share 409 body, for `phoneShareApprove`. */
|
|
80
|
+
get phoneShareApprovalId() {
|
|
81
|
+
const v = this.bodyObject()["approval_id"];
|
|
82
|
+
return typeof v === "string" && v ? v : void 0;
|
|
83
|
+
}
|
|
47
84
|
/** True if the phone-share (phone, requesting_email) pair was already approved. */
|
|
48
85
|
get isPhoneShareAlreadyApproved() {
|
|
49
86
|
return this.code === "PHONE_SHARE_ALREADY_APPROVED";
|
|
@@ -73,7 +110,9 @@ function errorFromResponse(status, body, requestId) {
|
|
|
73
110
|
else if (typeof b["error_code"] === "string") code = b["error_code"];
|
|
74
111
|
if (typeof b["error"] === "string") message = b["error"];
|
|
75
112
|
else if (typeof b["message"] === "string") message = b["message"];
|
|
76
|
-
if (!code && typeof b["error"] === "string" && /^(flow_paused|spending_limit_exceeded|receiver_not_enrolled_use_claim_code)$/.test(
|
|
113
|
+
if (!code && typeof b["error"] === "string" && /^(flow_paused|spending_limit_exceeded|receiver_not_enrolled_use_claim_code|no_channel_on_file|rate_limited)$/.test(
|
|
114
|
+
b["error"]
|
|
115
|
+
)) {
|
|
77
116
|
code = b["error"];
|
|
78
117
|
}
|
|
79
118
|
} else if (typeof body === "string" && body.trim()) {
|
|
@@ -469,7 +508,7 @@ async function hmacHexSubtle(secret, message) {
|
|
|
469
508
|
}
|
|
470
509
|
|
|
471
510
|
// src/server.ts
|
|
472
|
-
var DEFAULT_UA = "invonetwork-web-sdk/
|
|
511
|
+
var DEFAULT_UA = "invonetwork-web-sdk/2.1.0 (+https://invo.network)";
|
|
473
512
|
var MAX_USD_AMOUNT = 999.99;
|
|
474
513
|
var MAX_ITEM_PRICE = 999999.99;
|
|
475
514
|
function invalidInput(label, value, why) {
|
|
@@ -501,6 +540,12 @@ function parseMoney(value, max, label) {
|
|
|
501
540
|
function assertUsdAmount(usdAmount) {
|
|
502
541
|
parseMoney(usdAmount, MAX_USD_AMOUNT, "usdAmount");
|
|
503
542
|
}
|
|
543
|
+
var E164 = /^\+[1-9]\d{1,14}$/;
|
|
544
|
+
function assertE164(value, label) {
|
|
545
|
+
if (typeof value !== "string" || !E164.test(value)) {
|
|
546
|
+
throw invalidInput(label, value, 'must be an E.164 phone number, e.g. "+15555550100"');
|
|
547
|
+
}
|
|
548
|
+
}
|
|
504
549
|
function toOrderDetails(raw) {
|
|
505
550
|
return {
|
|
506
551
|
order: raw["order"] ?? {},
|
|
@@ -641,14 +686,31 @@ var InvoServer = class {
|
|
|
641
686
|
});
|
|
642
687
|
this.auth = { kind: "game-secret", secret: config.gameSecret };
|
|
643
688
|
}
|
|
644
|
-
/**
|
|
689
|
+
/**
|
|
690
|
+
* Mint a short-lived, game-scoped player token to hand to the browser InvoClient.
|
|
691
|
+
*
|
|
692
|
+
* This is the player REGISTRATION call: the network identity is derived from
|
|
693
|
+
* `email + phone` TOGETHER, so both are required. Registering email-only and
|
|
694
|
+
* attaching the phone later changes the identity and forces device re-enrollment —
|
|
695
|
+
* collect the phone before the first mint. `playerPhone` must be E.164
|
|
696
|
+
* (e.g. "+15555550100"); incoming cross-game transfers and the account-linking
|
|
697
|
+
* consent SMS are both matched by phone, so an account without one can't receive
|
|
698
|
+
* either.
|
|
699
|
+
*
|
|
700
|
+
* If the phone already belongs to another INVO account (same person, new email),
|
|
701
|
+
* this throws an InvoError with `isPhoneShareApprovalRequired` — NOT a failure:
|
|
702
|
+
* the phone holder was sent a consent SMS. Surface "pending approval" to the user,
|
|
703
|
+
* then re-issue the same call once approved (poll `phoneShareStatus`, or use
|
|
704
|
+
* `phoneShareInitiate`/`phoneShareApprove` for the in-app OTP fallback).
|
|
705
|
+
*/
|
|
645
706
|
async mintPlayerToken(input, opts) {
|
|
646
707
|
if (typeof input.playerEmail !== "string" || !input.playerEmail.trim()) {
|
|
647
708
|
throw invalidInput("playerEmail", input.playerEmail, "is required");
|
|
648
709
|
}
|
|
710
|
+
assertE164(input.playerPhone, "playerPhone");
|
|
649
711
|
const raw = await this.http.post(
|
|
650
712
|
"/api/sdk/player-token",
|
|
651
|
-
{ player_email: input.playerEmail },
|
|
713
|
+
{ player_email: input.playerEmail, player_phone: input.playerPhone },
|
|
652
714
|
this.auth,
|
|
653
715
|
{ idempotent: true, signal: opts?.signal }
|
|
654
716
|
// safe to retry: re-mint just issues a fresh token
|
package/dist/server.d.cts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import { I as InvoError, S as ServerConfig, a as CallOptions,
|
|
2
|
-
export {
|
|
1
|
+
import { I as InvoError, S as ServerConfig, a as CallOptions, n as PlayerToken, o as InitiateSendInput, p as InitiateResult, q as InitiateTransferInput, r as CreateCheckoutInput, s as CreateCheckoutResult, t as PurchaseInput, u as PurchaseResult, v as ConfirmPaymentResult, O as OrderDetailsResult, w as PurchaseItemInput, x as PurchaseItemResult, y as ItemHistoryQuery, z as ItemHistoryResult, F as ItemOrderQuery, G as PlayerBalanceQuery, H as PlayerBalanceResult, J as InboundPendingQuery, K as InboundPendingResult, M as LinkedIdentitiesQuery, N as LinkedIdentitiesResult, Q as SmsVerifyResult, T as ClaimTransferInput, U as ClaimResult, W as ClaimCurrencyInput, X as TransactionStatusResult, Y as GuardianApprovalStatusResult, Z as ServerDestinationsQuery, c as DestinationsResult, _ as PhoneShareContact, $ as PhoneShareInitiateResult, a0 as PhoneShareApproveInput, a1 as PhoneShareApproveResult, a2 as PhoneShareStatusResult } from './types-DtihCpOj.cjs';
|
|
2
|
+
export { a3 as CurrencyBalance, g as DestinationGame, a4 as InboundPendingItem, h as InvoErrorInfo, i as InvoHooks, j as InvoRequestInfo, k as InvoResponseInfo, a5 as LinkedIdentityEmail, m as Rail, V as VerificationMethod } from './types-DtihCpOj.cjs';
|
|
3
3
|
|
|
4
4
|
interface VerifyWebhookOptions {
|
|
5
5
|
/** Max age of the signed timestamp, in seconds. Default 300 (5 min). */
|
|
@@ -149,9 +149,26 @@ declare class InvoServer {
|
|
|
149
149
|
private readonly http;
|
|
150
150
|
private readonly auth;
|
|
151
151
|
constructor(config: ServerConfig);
|
|
152
|
-
/**
|
|
152
|
+
/**
|
|
153
|
+
* Mint a short-lived, game-scoped player token to hand to the browser InvoClient.
|
|
154
|
+
*
|
|
155
|
+
* This is the player REGISTRATION call: the network identity is derived from
|
|
156
|
+
* `email + phone` TOGETHER, so both are required. Registering email-only and
|
|
157
|
+
* attaching the phone later changes the identity and forces device re-enrollment —
|
|
158
|
+
* collect the phone before the first mint. `playerPhone` must be E.164
|
|
159
|
+
* (e.g. "+15555550100"); incoming cross-game transfers and the account-linking
|
|
160
|
+
* consent SMS are both matched by phone, so an account without one can't receive
|
|
161
|
+
* either.
|
|
162
|
+
*
|
|
163
|
+
* If the phone already belongs to another INVO account (same person, new email),
|
|
164
|
+
* this throws an InvoError with `isPhoneShareApprovalRequired` — NOT a failure:
|
|
165
|
+
* the phone holder was sent a consent SMS. Surface "pending approval" to the user,
|
|
166
|
+
* then re-issue the same call once approved (poll `phoneShareStatus`, or use
|
|
167
|
+
* `phoneShareInitiate`/`phoneShareApprove` for the in-app OTP fallback).
|
|
168
|
+
*/
|
|
153
169
|
mintPlayerToken(input: {
|
|
154
170
|
playerEmail: string;
|
|
171
|
+
playerPhone: string;
|
|
155
172
|
}, opts?: CallOptions): Promise<PlayerToken>;
|
|
156
173
|
/** Initiate a cross-game currency SEND. Inspect result.verificationMethod. */
|
|
157
174
|
initiateSend(input: InitiateSendInput, opts?: CallOptions): Promise<InitiateResult>;
|
package/dist/server.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import { I as InvoError, S as ServerConfig, a as CallOptions,
|
|
2
|
-
export {
|
|
1
|
+
import { I as InvoError, S as ServerConfig, a as CallOptions, n as PlayerToken, o as InitiateSendInput, p as InitiateResult, q as InitiateTransferInput, r as CreateCheckoutInput, s as CreateCheckoutResult, t as PurchaseInput, u as PurchaseResult, v as ConfirmPaymentResult, O as OrderDetailsResult, w as PurchaseItemInput, x as PurchaseItemResult, y as ItemHistoryQuery, z as ItemHistoryResult, F as ItemOrderQuery, G as PlayerBalanceQuery, H as PlayerBalanceResult, J as InboundPendingQuery, K as InboundPendingResult, M as LinkedIdentitiesQuery, N as LinkedIdentitiesResult, Q as SmsVerifyResult, T as ClaimTransferInput, U as ClaimResult, W as ClaimCurrencyInput, X as TransactionStatusResult, Y as GuardianApprovalStatusResult, Z as ServerDestinationsQuery, c as DestinationsResult, _ as PhoneShareContact, $ as PhoneShareInitiateResult, a0 as PhoneShareApproveInput, a1 as PhoneShareApproveResult, a2 as PhoneShareStatusResult } from './types-DtihCpOj.js';
|
|
2
|
+
export { a3 as CurrencyBalance, g as DestinationGame, a4 as InboundPendingItem, h as InvoErrorInfo, i as InvoHooks, j as InvoRequestInfo, k as InvoResponseInfo, a5 as LinkedIdentityEmail, m as Rail, V as VerificationMethod } from './types-DtihCpOj.js';
|
|
3
3
|
|
|
4
4
|
interface VerifyWebhookOptions {
|
|
5
5
|
/** Max age of the signed timestamp, in seconds. Default 300 (5 min). */
|
|
@@ -149,9 +149,26 @@ declare class InvoServer {
|
|
|
149
149
|
private readonly http;
|
|
150
150
|
private readonly auth;
|
|
151
151
|
constructor(config: ServerConfig);
|
|
152
|
-
/**
|
|
152
|
+
/**
|
|
153
|
+
* Mint a short-lived, game-scoped player token to hand to the browser InvoClient.
|
|
154
|
+
*
|
|
155
|
+
* This is the player REGISTRATION call: the network identity is derived from
|
|
156
|
+
* `email + phone` TOGETHER, so both are required. Registering email-only and
|
|
157
|
+
* attaching the phone later changes the identity and forces device re-enrollment —
|
|
158
|
+
* collect the phone before the first mint. `playerPhone` must be E.164
|
|
159
|
+
* (e.g. "+15555550100"); incoming cross-game transfers and the account-linking
|
|
160
|
+
* consent SMS are both matched by phone, so an account without one can't receive
|
|
161
|
+
* either.
|
|
162
|
+
*
|
|
163
|
+
* If the phone already belongs to another INVO account (same person, new email),
|
|
164
|
+
* this throws an InvoError with `isPhoneShareApprovalRequired` — NOT a failure:
|
|
165
|
+
* the phone holder was sent a consent SMS. Surface "pending approval" to the user,
|
|
166
|
+
* then re-issue the same call once approved (poll `phoneShareStatus`, or use
|
|
167
|
+
* `phoneShareInitiate`/`phoneShareApprove` for the in-app OTP fallback).
|
|
168
|
+
*/
|
|
153
169
|
mintPlayerToken(input: {
|
|
154
170
|
playerEmail: string;
|
|
171
|
+
playerPhone: string;
|
|
155
172
|
}, opts?: CallOptions): Promise<PlayerToken>;
|
|
156
173
|
/** Initiate a cross-game currency SEND. Inspect result.verificationMethod. */
|
|
157
174
|
initiateSend(input: InitiateSendInput, opts?: CallOptions): Promise<InitiateResult>;
|
package/dist/server.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import { InvoError, assertSecureBaseUrl, Http, toDestinationsResult } from './chunk-
|
|
2
|
-
export { InvoError } from './chunk-
|
|
1
|
+
import { InvoError, assertSecureBaseUrl, Http, toDestinationsResult } from './chunk-YCEW7NC3.js';
|
|
2
|
+
export { InvoError } from './chunk-YCEW7NC3.js';
|
|
3
3
|
import { createHmac } from 'crypto';
|
|
4
4
|
|
|
5
5
|
var DEFAULT_TOLERANCE_SEC = 300;
|
|
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ async function hmacHexSubtle(secret, message) {
|
|
|
161
161
|
}
|
|
162
162
|
|
|
163
163
|
// src/server.ts
|
|
164
|
-
var DEFAULT_UA = "invonetwork-web-sdk/
|
|
164
|
+
var DEFAULT_UA = "invonetwork-web-sdk/2.1.0 (+https://invo.network)";
|
|
165
165
|
var MAX_USD_AMOUNT = 999.99;
|
|
166
166
|
var MAX_ITEM_PRICE = 999999.99;
|
|
167
167
|
function invalidInput(label, value, why) {
|
|
@@ -193,6 +193,12 @@ function parseMoney(value, max, label) {
|
|
|
193
193
|
function assertUsdAmount(usdAmount) {
|
|
194
194
|
parseMoney(usdAmount, MAX_USD_AMOUNT, "usdAmount");
|
|
195
195
|
}
|
|
196
|
+
var E164 = /^\+[1-9]\d{1,14}$/;
|
|
197
|
+
function assertE164(value, label) {
|
|
198
|
+
if (typeof value !== "string" || !E164.test(value)) {
|
|
199
|
+
throw invalidInput(label, value, 'must be an E.164 phone number, e.g. "+15555550100"');
|
|
200
|
+
}
|
|
201
|
+
}
|
|
196
202
|
function toOrderDetails(raw) {
|
|
197
203
|
return {
|
|
198
204
|
order: raw["order"] ?? {},
|
|
@@ -333,14 +339,31 @@ var InvoServer = class {
|
|
|
333
339
|
});
|
|
334
340
|
this.auth = { kind: "game-secret", secret: config.gameSecret };
|
|
335
341
|
}
|
|
336
|
-
/**
|
|
342
|
+
/**
|
|
343
|
+
* Mint a short-lived, game-scoped player token to hand to the browser InvoClient.
|
|
344
|
+
*
|
|
345
|
+
* This is the player REGISTRATION call: the network identity is derived from
|
|
346
|
+
* `email + phone` TOGETHER, so both are required. Registering email-only and
|
|
347
|
+
* attaching the phone later changes the identity and forces device re-enrollment —
|
|
348
|
+
* collect the phone before the first mint. `playerPhone` must be E.164
|
|
349
|
+
* (e.g. "+15555550100"); incoming cross-game transfers and the account-linking
|
|
350
|
+
* consent SMS are both matched by phone, so an account without one can't receive
|
|
351
|
+
* either.
|
|
352
|
+
*
|
|
353
|
+
* If the phone already belongs to another INVO account (same person, new email),
|
|
354
|
+
* this throws an InvoError with `isPhoneShareApprovalRequired` — NOT a failure:
|
|
355
|
+
* the phone holder was sent a consent SMS. Surface "pending approval" to the user,
|
|
356
|
+
* then re-issue the same call once approved (poll `phoneShareStatus`, or use
|
|
357
|
+
* `phoneShareInitiate`/`phoneShareApprove` for the in-app OTP fallback).
|
|
358
|
+
*/
|
|
337
359
|
async mintPlayerToken(input, opts) {
|
|
338
360
|
if (typeof input.playerEmail !== "string" || !input.playerEmail.trim()) {
|
|
339
361
|
throw invalidInput("playerEmail", input.playerEmail, "is required");
|
|
340
362
|
}
|
|
363
|
+
assertE164(input.playerPhone, "playerPhone");
|
|
341
364
|
const raw = await this.http.post(
|
|
342
365
|
"/api/sdk/player-token",
|
|
343
|
-
{ player_email: input.playerEmail },
|
|
366
|
+
{ player_email: input.playerEmail, player_phone: input.playerPhone },
|
|
344
367
|
this.auth,
|
|
345
368
|
{ idempotent: true, signal: opts?.signal }
|
|
346
369
|
// safe to retry: re-mint just issues a fresh token
|
|
@@ -28,8 +28,26 @@ declare class InvoError extends Error {
|
|
|
28
28
|
get isTokenExpired(): boolean;
|
|
29
29
|
/** True if `enrollPasskey()` needs the OTP-grant flow (`enrollmentBegin`/`enrollmentVerify`). */
|
|
30
30
|
get isEnrollmentAuthorizationRequired(): boolean;
|
|
31
|
-
/**
|
|
31
|
+
/**
|
|
32
|
+
* True if enrolling is blocked because the identity already has an enrolled method
|
|
33
|
+
* (anti-takeover gate, register/complete → 409). Two ways forward: `linkDevice` when
|
|
34
|
+
* the player still HAS the other method, or the passkey-recovery flow
|
|
35
|
+
* (`recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete` — "Lost or replaced your passkey?") when they
|
|
36
|
+
* deleted/lost it — the server can't know a device-side passkey is gone.
|
|
37
|
+
*/
|
|
32
38
|
get isEnrollmentProofRequired(): boolean;
|
|
39
|
+
/** True if the recovery OTP was wrong or expired (attempt-capped) — let the user retry or resend. */
|
|
40
|
+
get isEnrollmentCodeInvalid(): boolean;
|
|
41
|
+
/**
|
|
42
|
+
* True if a money-OUT approve was refused because the passkey was enrolled via
|
|
43
|
+
* recovery less than 24h ago (SIM-swap protection, approve → 403). NOT a generic
|
|
44
|
+
* failure — do not retry-loop. Login and inbound confirm-receipt (collecting money)
|
|
45
|
+
* still work. Show: "For your security, transfers are paused for 24 hours after a
|
|
46
|
+
* passkey reset. You can still receive funds. Try again after {retryAfterAt}."
|
|
47
|
+
*/
|
|
48
|
+
get isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown(): boolean;
|
|
49
|
+
/** The ISO timestamp when a `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` lifts (`retry_after`), when present. */
|
|
50
|
+
get retryAfterAt(): string | undefined;
|
|
33
51
|
/**
|
|
34
52
|
* True if an item purchase failed because the player's balance was too low (§4.8 → 400).
|
|
35
53
|
* The backend carries `required_amount` + `current_balance` on the body for the UI.
|
|
@@ -37,8 +55,17 @@ declare class InvoError extends Error {
|
|
|
37
55
|
* is a rate-limit, not a top-up condition) is NOT misclassified as this.
|
|
38
56
|
*/
|
|
39
57
|
get isInsufficientBalance(): boolean;
|
|
40
|
-
/**
|
|
58
|
+
/**
|
|
59
|
+
* True if the call needs phone-share approval before it can complete (409). Raised by
|
|
60
|
+
* registration/token-mint and by claims when the phone already belongs to another INVO
|
|
61
|
+
* account (same person, new email — expected, not a failure). The phone holder gets a
|
|
62
|
+
* consent SMS; show "pending approval", then re-issue the identical call once approved
|
|
63
|
+
* (poll `phoneShareStatus`, or use `phoneShareInitiate`/`phoneShareApprove` for the OTP
|
|
64
|
+
* fallback). `phoneShareApprovalId` carries the id from the 409 body.
|
|
65
|
+
*/
|
|
41
66
|
get isPhoneShareApprovalRequired(): boolean;
|
|
67
|
+
/** The `approval_id` from a phone-share 409 body, for `phoneShareApprove`. */
|
|
68
|
+
get phoneShareApprovalId(): string | undefined;
|
|
42
69
|
/** True if the phone-share (phone, requesting_email) pair was already approved. */
|
|
43
70
|
get isPhoneShareAlreadyApproved(): boolean;
|
|
44
71
|
/** True if an idempotency-keyed request was a duplicate (item purchase → 409). */
|
|
@@ -466,6 +493,20 @@ interface EnrollmentVerifyResult {
|
|
|
466
493
|
status: string;
|
|
467
494
|
raw: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
468
495
|
}
|
|
496
|
+
interface RecoveryBeginResult {
|
|
497
|
+
status: string;
|
|
498
|
+
/** Channels the one-time code was sent to, e.g. ["sms","email"]. */
|
|
499
|
+
channels: string[];
|
|
500
|
+
raw: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
501
|
+
}
|
|
502
|
+
interface RecoveryCompleteResult {
|
|
503
|
+
status: string;
|
|
504
|
+
/** How many stale server-side passkeys were deactivated. */
|
|
505
|
+
deactivatedCount: number;
|
|
506
|
+
/** Human hint from the backend (what to do next). */
|
|
507
|
+
next?: string;
|
|
508
|
+
raw: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
509
|
+
}
|
|
469
510
|
interface LinkDeviceResult {
|
|
470
511
|
/** "authorized" on success — a single-use grant that register/complete consumes. */
|
|
471
512
|
status: string;
|
|
@@ -594,4 +635,4 @@ interface PhoneShareStatusResult {
|
|
|
594
635
|
raw: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
595
636
|
}
|
|
596
637
|
|
|
597
|
-
export { type
|
|
638
|
+
export { type PhoneShareInitiateResult as $, type ApproveResult as A, type BalanceResult as B, type ClientConfig as C, type DestinationsQuery as D, type EnrollmentBeginResult as E, type ItemOrderQuery as F, type PlayerBalanceQuery as G, type PlayerBalanceResult as H, InvoError as I, type InboundPendingQuery as J, type InboundPendingResult as K, type LinkDeviceResult as L, type LinkedIdentitiesQuery as M, type LinkedIdentitiesResult as N, type OrderDetailsResult as O, type PendingCollectResult as P, type SmsVerifyResult as Q, type RecoveryBeginResult as R, type ServerConfig as S, type ClaimTransferInput as T, type ClaimResult as U, type VerificationMethod as V, type ClaimCurrencyInput as W, type TransactionStatusResult as X, type GuardianApprovalStatusResult as Y, type ServerDestinationsQuery as Z, type PhoneShareContact as _, type CallOptions as a, type PhoneShareApproveInput as a0, type PhoneShareApproveResult as a1, type PhoneShareStatusResult as a2, type CurrencyBalance as a3, type InboundPendingItem as a4, type LinkedIdentityEmail as a5, type ConfirmReceiptResult as b, type DestinationsResult as c, type EnrollmentVerifyResult as d, type RecoveryCompleteResult as e, type BalanceRow as f, type DestinationGame as g, type InvoErrorInfo as h, type InvoHooks as i, type InvoRequestInfo as j, type InvoResponseInfo as k, type PendingCollectItem as l, type Rail as m, type PlayerToken as n, type InitiateSendInput as o, type InitiateResult as p, type InitiateTransferInput as q, type CreateCheckoutInput as r, type CreateCheckoutResult as s, type PurchaseInput as t, type PurchaseResult as u, type ConfirmPaymentResult as v, type PurchaseItemInput as w, type PurchaseItemResult as x, type ItemHistoryQuery as y, type ItemHistoryResult as z };
|
|
@@ -28,8 +28,26 @@ declare class InvoError extends Error {
|
|
|
28
28
|
get isTokenExpired(): boolean;
|
|
29
29
|
/** True if `enrollPasskey()` needs the OTP-grant flow (`enrollmentBegin`/`enrollmentVerify`). */
|
|
30
30
|
get isEnrollmentAuthorizationRequired(): boolean;
|
|
31
|
-
/**
|
|
31
|
+
/**
|
|
32
|
+
* True if enrolling is blocked because the identity already has an enrolled method
|
|
33
|
+
* (anti-takeover gate, register/complete → 409). Two ways forward: `linkDevice` when
|
|
34
|
+
* the player still HAS the other method, or the passkey-recovery flow
|
|
35
|
+
* (`recoveryBegin`/`recoveryComplete` — "Lost or replaced your passkey?") when they
|
|
36
|
+
* deleted/lost it — the server can't know a device-side passkey is gone.
|
|
37
|
+
*/
|
|
32
38
|
get isEnrollmentProofRequired(): boolean;
|
|
39
|
+
/** True if the recovery OTP was wrong or expired (attempt-capped) — let the user retry or resend. */
|
|
40
|
+
get isEnrollmentCodeInvalid(): boolean;
|
|
41
|
+
/**
|
|
42
|
+
* True if a money-OUT approve was refused because the passkey was enrolled via
|
|
43
|
+
* recovery less than 24h ago (SIM-swap protection, approve → 403). NOT a generic
|
|
44
|
+
* failure — do not retry-loop. Login and inbound confirm-receipt (collecting money)
|
|
45
|
+
* still work. Show: "For your security, transfers are paused for 24 hours after a
|
|
46
|
+
* passkey reset. You can still receive funds. Try again after {retryAfterAt}."
|
|
47
|
+
*/
|
|
48
|
+
get isPasskeyRecoveryCooldown(): boolean;
|
|
49
|
+
/** The ISO timestamp when a `PASSKEY_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` lifts (`retry_after`), when present. */
|
|
50
|
+
get retryAfterAt(): string | undefined;
|
|
33
51
|
/**
|
|
34
52
|
* True if an item purchase failed because the player's balance was too low (§4.8 → 400).
|
|
35
53
|
* The backend carries `required_amount` + `current_balance` on the body for the UI.
|
|
@@ -37,8 +55,17 @@ declare class InvoError extends Error {
|
|
|
37
55
|
* is a rate-limit, not a top-up condition) is NOT misclassified as this.
|
|
38
56
|
*/
|
|
39
57
|
get isInsufficientBalance(): boolean;
|
|
40
|
-
/**
|
|
58
|
+
/**
|
|
59
|
+
* True if the call needs phone-share approval before it can complete (409). Raised by
|
|
60
|
+
* registration/token-mint and by claims when the phone already belongs to another INVO
|
|
61
|
+
* account (same person, new email — expected, not a failure). The phone holder gets a
|
|
62
|
+
* consent SMS; show "pending approval", then re-issue the identical call once approved
|
|
63
|
+
* (poll `phoneShareStatus`, or use `phoneShareInitiate`/`phoneShareApprove` for the OTP
|
|
64
|
+
* fallback). `phoneShareApprovalId` carries the id from the 409 body.
|
|
65
|
+
*/
|
|
41
66
|
get isPhoneShareApprovalRequired(): boolean;
|
|
67
|
+
/** The `approval_id` from a phone-share 409 body, for `phoneShareApprove`. */
|
|
68
|
+
get phoneShareApprovalId(): string | undefined;
|
|
42
69
|
/** True if the phone-share (phone, requesting_email) pair was already approved. */
|
|
43
70
|
get isPhoneShareAlreadyApproved(): boolean;
|
|
44
71
|
/** True if an idempotency-keyed request was a duplicate (item purchase → 409). */
|
|
@@ -466,6 +493,20 @@ interface EnrollmentVerifyResult {
|
|
|
466
493
|
status: string;
|
|
467
494
|
raw: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
468
495
|
}
|
|
496
|
+
interface RecoveryBeginResult {
|
|
497
|
+
status: string;
|
|
498
|
+
/** Channels the one-time code was sent to, e.g. ["sms","email"]. */
|
|
499
|
+
channels: string[];
|
|
500
|
+
raw: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
501
|
+
}
|
|
502
|
+
interface RecoveryCompleteResult {
|
|
503
|
+
status: string;
|
|
504
|
+
/** How many stale server-side passkeys were deactivated. */
|
|
505
|
+
deactivatedCount: number;
|
|
506
|
+
/** Human hint from the backend (what to do next). */
|
|
507
|
+
next?: string;
|
|
508
|
+
raw: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
509
|
+
}
|
|
469
510
|
interface LinkDeviceResult {
|
|
470
511
|
/** "authorized" on success — a single-use grant that register/complete consumes. */
|
|
471
512
|
status: string;
|
|
@@ -594,4 +635,4 @@ interface PhoneShareStatusResult {
|
|
|
594
635
|
raw: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
595
636
|
}
|
|
596
637
|
|
|
597
|
-
export { type
|
|
638
|
+
export { type PhoneShareInitiateResult as $, type ApproveResult as A, type BalanceResult as B, type ClientConfig as C, type DestinationsQuery as D, type EnrollmentBeginResult as E, type ItemOrderQuery as F, type PlayerBalanceQuery as G, type PlayerBalanceResult as H, InvoError as I, type InboundPendingQuery as J, type InboundPendingResult as K, type LinkDeviceResult as L, type LinkedIdentitiesQuery as M, type LinkedIdentitiesResult as N, type OrderDetailsResult as O, type PendingCollectResult as P, type SmsVerifyResult as Q, type RecoveryBeginResult as R, type ServerConfig as S, type ClaimTransferInput as T, type ClaimResult as U, type VerificationMethod as V, type ClaimCurrencyInput as W, type TransactionStatusResult as X, type GuardianApprovalStatusResult as Y, type ServerDestinationsQuery as Z, type PhoneShareContact as _, type CallOptions as a, type PhoneShareApproveInput as a0, type PhoneShareApproveResult as a1, type PhoneShareStatusResult as a2, type CurrencyBalance as a3, type InboundPendingItem as a4, type LinkedIdentityEmail as a5, type ConfirmReceiptResult as b, type DestinationsResult as c, type EnrollmentVerifyResult as d, type RecoveryCompleteResult as e, type BalanceRow as f, type DestinationGame as g, type InvoErrorInfo as h, type InvoHooks as i, type InvoRequestInfo as j, type InvoResponseInfo as k, type PendingCollectItem as l, type Rail as m, type PlayerToken as n, type InitiateSendInput as o, type InitiateResult as p, type InitiateTransferInput as q, type CreateCheckoutInput as r, type CreateCheckoutResult as s, type PurchaseInput as t, type PurchaseResult as u, type ConfirmPaymentResult as v, type PurchaseItemInput as w, type PurchaseItemResult as x, type ItemHistoryQuery as y, type ItemHistoryResult as z };
|
package/package.json
CHANGED