@inversealtruism/cairn-sdk 0.3.2 → 0.4.1

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -10,9 +10,10 @@ export { ContentClientOptions, PreparedContent } from './content.cjs';
 import { RegistryClient } from './registry.cjs';
 import { WalletConnection, DetectOptions } from './connect.cjs';
 export { AttestParams, CairnProvider, ConnectResult, FillParams, ProposeParams, ProviderDetail, ProviderInfo, SealClaimParams, SendParams, SignInResult, SiwcParams, SiwcResult, TxResult, WalletCapabilities, WalletPermission, connect, detectProvider, discoverProviders, getWallet, isInstalled } from './connect.cjs';
+import { ProvenOfferTerms } from '@inversealtruism/cairnx-core';
+export { FillEndorsement, FillOutputPlan, FillPreview, FillSafety, ProvenOfferTerms, bindOfferTerms, feeBpsAt, fillEndorsement, fillIsSafe, fillOutputPlan, previewFill, requiredFillOutputs } from '@inversealtruism/cairnx-core';
 import { InclusionResult } from '@inversealtruism/csd-light';
 export { CairnController, CairnControllerOptions, CairnState } from './controller.cjs';
-export { bindOfferTerms, feeBpsAt } from '@inversealtruism/cairnx-core';
 import '@inversealtruism/csd-client';
 import '@inversealtruism/csd-tx';
 import '@inversealtruism/csd-codec';
@@ -105,15 +106,6 @@ declare class NamesClient {
     state(): Promise<unknown>;
 }
 
-/** The fee/rebate-relevant fields of an offer, derived from the MERKLE-PROVEN offer (never a served object). */
-interface ProvenOfferTerms {
-    height: number;
-    feeBps: number;
-    value?: string;
-    taker?: string;
-    bid?: string;
-    min?: string;
-}
 /** The trust-labeled verdict. `ok:false` + `transient:true` = a retryable chain-catching-up soft-fail (NOT a
  *  proven mismatch). `payto`/`seller`/`terms` are populated whenever they could be merkle-derived. */
 interface OfferFillCheck {
@@ -127,13 +119,24 @@ interface OfferFillCheck {
     seller?: string;
     terms?: ProvenOfferTerms;
     blockHeight?: number;
+    /** B7b (REBIND W3/M1): the PROVEN CSD outputs to build for `pay` (a WHOLE fill of a non-partial offer),
+     *  sized from the merkle-proven offer by the single-sourced `fillOutputPlan`. Present only when `pay` was
+     *  passed and the offer could be sized. Build EXACTLY these; never the resolver-served outputs a lying
+     *  resolver could redirect. A partial (min-bearing) offer is left unsized (its running paid/delivered is
+     *  not provable at this corroboration layer; the wallet's fill-SPV is the payment-grade sizer). */
+    outputPlan?: {
+        to: string;
+        value: bigint;
+    }[];
 }
 
 /**
  * Pre-verify an offer on-chain before building a `fillOffer` payment. `light` is a PoW-verifying light client
  * (its `verifyTxInclusion` surfaces the merkle-proven tx + committed appPayloadHash); `client` reads source txs
  * for the prevout-owner author bind. Pass `servedOffer` (the resolver's offer object) to also bind its
- * payto/seller/terms to the proven values. See the module header for the trust posture.
+ * payto/seller/terms to the proven values. The FULL object is required: a served offer missing want.payto
+ * or seller is refused (P75-5). A token-priced offer's served want.ticker/want.amount are bound verbatim to
+ * the record. See the module header for the trust posture.
  */
 declare function preverifyOffer(opts: {
     light: {
@@ -144,11 +147,20 @@ declare function preverifyOffer(opts: {
     };
     offerId: string;
     servedOffer?: unknown;
+    /** B7b (REBIND W3/M1): the CSD base units you intend to pay. When given, the result carries `outputPlan`
+     *  (the PROVEN CSD outputs to build for a WHOLE fill of a non-partial offer, sized by the single-sourced
+     *  `fillOutputPlan`) and, if you also pass `plannedOutputs`, binds them EXACTLY to that proven plan.
+     *  A partial (min-bearing) offer is left unsized here; the wallet's fill-SPV is its payment-grade sizer. */
+    pay?: bigint | string | number;
+    /** B7b: your planned per-address CSD sums (the outputs you WILL build), bound both ways to `outputPlan`.
+     *  Requires `pay`. A missing/low leg is a doomed underpay; an extra/high leg is a W3 overpay or an N26
+     *  smuggled output - both refused. */
+    plannedOutputs?: Record<string, bigint | string | number>;
 }): Promise<OfferFillCheck>;
 
 /** Stable machine-readable error codes (branch on these, not the message text). */
 type CairnErrorCode = "NOT_INSTALLED" | "USER_REJECTED" | "WALLET_LOCKED" | "UNSUPPORTED_METHOD" | "HTTP_ERROR" | "CONTENT_VERIFICATION" | "ACCOUNT_CHANGED" | "FIRST_PARTY_ONLY" | "RATE_LIMITED" | "APPROVAL_CLOSED" | "FORBIDDEN" | "INTERNAL" | "GHOST_INPUTS_SKIPPED" | "VERIFY_UNAVAILABLE" | "VERIFY_TAMPER" | "INSUFFICIENT" | "TOO_MANY_INPUTS" | "FEE_TOO_LOW" | "FEE_CAP" | "BAD_FEE" | "ZERO_ADDR_REFUSED" | "BAD_OUTPUTS" | "NO_OUTPUTS" | "BAD_REQUEST" | "OFFER_UNKNOWN" | "FILL_UNSAFE" | "FILL_WRONG_TARGET" | "SOURCE_DIVERGENCE" | "SUBMIT_REJECTED" | "SUBMIT_MAYBE_INFLIGHT" | "SUBMIT_DUPLICATE" | "NOTHING_TO_CONSOLIDATE" | "UNKNOWN";
-declare const SDK_VERSION = "0.3.2";
+declare const SDK_VERSION = "0.4.1";
 interface CairnErrorOptions {
     code?: CairnErrorCode;
     docsPath?: string;
@@ -168,7 +180,7 @@ declare class CairnError extends Error {
     /** Relative docs path (under the SDK docs base), if any. */
     readonly docsPath?: string;
     /** The cairn-sdk version that produced this error. */
-    readonly version = "0.3.2";
+    readonly version = "0.4.1";
     /**
      * Whether a dApp may safely AUTO-retry this failure. `false` for fund-safety refusals and user-intent
      * declines (the default); `true` only for provably transient infra faults where nothing was signed.
@@ -307,8 +319,9 @@ declare class Cairn {
     wallet?: WalletConnection;
     private readonly cairnHttp;
     private _spvLight;
-    private _spvSeeded;
+    private _spvSeedInflight;
     private readonly _spvCp;
+    private readonly _cairnBase;
     constructor(config?: CairnConfig);
     /**
      * PoW-VERIFIED header merkle at a height (audit M3 — the no-PoW half). Lazily seeds a light
@@ -317,11 +330,38 @@ declare class Cairn {
      * checkpoint (can't verify backward) or if verification fails — the IndexerClient then degrades
      * to the honest "proof-consistent" instead of over-claiming "verified-inclusion". The verified
      * header chain is cached across calls; the first call near tip syncs the post-checkpoint span.
+     * MF-03: a STRUCTURAL forward-sync break (a reorg orphaned the cached tip) reseeds ONCE via
+     * withSpvReseed. RESIDUAL: a height at or below the cached tip answers from the cached branch with
+     * NO network touch, so a tx in a reorg-orphaned block can still read "verified-inclusion" until a
+     * read PAST the tip trips the reseed; this closes the permanent post-reorg brick, not reorg-blindness.
      */
     private verifiedHeaderMerkleAt;
-    /** The PoW-verifying SPV light client, seeded ONCE from the pinned checkpoint (shared by the M3 header-merkle
-     *  bind and the F13 offer pre-verify). Reused across calls; the first call near tip syncs the post-checkpoint span. */
+    private withSpvReseed;
+    private seedFreshSpvLight;
+    /** The PoW-verifying SPV light client, seeded from the pinned checkpoint and cached across calls
+     *  (shared by the M3 header-merkle bind and the F13 offer pre-verify). The client is committed to
+     *  the field ONLY after a fully successful seed (MF-14): a failed seed leaves NO cached state, so
+     *  the next call retries on a fresh client instead of wedging on "seedTrusted must be called on a
+     *  fresh client". Concurrent first callers share ONE in-flight seed. Re-seeded only when a
+     *  structural (reorg) break is detected, see withSpvReseed. */
     private seededSpvLight;
+    /**
+     * W12 batch header transport for the checkpoint..tip forward sync, backed by the cairn server's
+     * `/api/headers/:from/:count`. Carries ZERO trust: the LightClient re-verifies every header's PoW /
+     * prev-link / LWMA, so a forged or stale row fails closed and retrying transport proves nothing new.
+     * Retry budget: a 429 (per-IP header budget) or 502/503 (a height past the lagging indexer, or the
+     * server's 10s deadline), a transport/timeout error, or a body-read fault (an oversize stream past the
+     * SPV_MAX_BATCH_BYTES cap, or a non-JSON 200 body such as a CF interstitial) is a transient
+     * data-availability hiccup; back off (honouring Retry-After) a bounded number of times, then THROW so
+     * `sync()` fails closed. A non-dense range is rejected terminally (never retried).
+     *
+     * B7d / F6 DEPENDENCY: `/api/headers` serves no Access-Control-Allow-Origin today (`corsPublic` is
+     * mounted on `/explorer/api`, `/trade/api` and `/api/rpc`, not here). A SAME-ORIGIN dApp (hosted on the
+     * cairn base) reaches it now; a CROSS-ORIGIN third-party dApp cannot until B7d adds the CORS mount and
+     * restarts the cairn service. This code is correct as written; it becomes reachable cross-origin only
+     * once B7d ships. This is a recorded dependency, not a blocker for authoring/testing.
+     */
+    private fetchHeadersBatch;
     /**
      * F13 — corroborate an offer ON-CHAIN before building a `fillOffer` payment's `outputs`. Merkle-proves the
      * offer into the PoW-verified header chain (from the pinned SPV checkpoint), binds the record to its on-chain
@@ -333,8 +373,15 @@ declare class Cairn {
      * This is best-effort corroboration, NOT the payment-grade boundary: the Cairn Wallet's OWN on-device
      * fill-SPV (0.2.60+, fails-closed before signing) is that. A dApp settling real value should still clear this
      * before building `outputs`, so it never hands the wallet a payment a lying resolver would redirect.
+     *
+     * Pass opts.pay (the CSD base units you intend to pay) to receive the PROVEN outputPlan for a whole fill of a
+     * non-partial offer, and opts.plannedOutputs to bind your planned per-address sums to it before signing; build
+     * EXACTLY the outputPlan, never resolver-served outputs.
      */
-    verifyOfferForFill(offerId: string, servedOffer?: unknown): Promise<OfferFillCheck>;
+    verifyOfferForFill(offerId: string, servedOffer?: unknown, opts?: {
+        pay?: bigint | string | number;
+        plannedOutputs?: Record<string, bigint | string | number>;
+    }): Promise<OfferFillCheck>;
     /**
      * Detect + connect the Cairn Wallet (browser only). Wires the wallet into
      * `cairn.board` for signed writes. Resolves to the connected address.
@@ -346,4 +393,4 @@ declare class Cairn {
     get connected(): boolean;
 }
 
-export { BoardClient, Cairn, type CairnBaseUrls, type CairnConfig, CairnError, type CairnErrorCode, type CairnErrorOptions, Chain, ContentClient, ContentVerificationError, DEFAULT_SPV_CHECKPOINT, DetectOptions, FetchLike, Http, HttpError, IndexerClient, type NameDetail, type NameResolution, NamesClient, NotInstalledError, type OfferFillCheck, type PrimaryName, type ProvenOfferTerms, RegistryClient, SDK_VERSION, SubmitInFlightError, type TokenInfo, UnsupportedMethodError, UserRejectedError, WalletConnection, WalletLockedError, errorCode, mapProviderError, mapSubmitResultError, preverifyOffer };
+export { BoardClient, Cairn, type CairnBaseUrls, type CairnConfig, CairnError, type CairnErrorCode, type CairnErrorOptions, Chain, ContentClient, ContentVerificationError, DEFAULT_SPV_CHECKPOINT, DetectOptions, FetchLike, Http, HttpError, IndexerClient, type NameDetail, type NameResolution, NamesClient, NotInstalledError, type OfferFillCheck, type PrimaryName, RegistryClient, SDK_VERSION, SubmitInFlightError, type TokenInfo, UnsupportedMethodError, UserRejectedError, WalletConnection, WalletLockedError, errorCode, mapProviderError, mapSubmitResultError, preverifyOffer };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -10,9 +10,10 @@ export { ContentClientOptions, PreparedContent } from './content.js';
 import { RegistryClient } from './registry.js';
 import { WalletConnection, DetectOptions } from './connect.js';
 export { AttestParams, CairnProvider, ConnectResult, FillParams, ProposeParams, ProviderDetail, ProviderInfo, SealClaimParams, SendParams, SignInResult, SiwcParams, SiwcResult, TxResult, WalletCapabilities, WalletPermission, connect, detectProvider, discoverProviders, getWallet, isInstalled } from './connect.js';
+import { ProvenOfferTerms } from '@inversealtruism/cairnx-core';
+export { FillEndorsement, FillOutputPlan, FillPreview, FillSafety, ProvenOfferTerms, bindOfferTerms, feeBpsAt, fillEndorsement, fillIsSafe, fillOutputPlan, previewFill, requiredFillOutputs } from '@inversealtruism/cairnx-core';
 import { InclusionResult } from '@inversealtruism/csd-light';
 export { CairnController, CairnControllerOptions, CairnState } from './controller.js';
-export { bindOfferTerms, feeBpsAt } from '@inversealtruism/cairnx-core';
 import '@inversealtruism/csd-client';
 import '@inversealtruism/csd-tx';
 import '@inversealtruism/csd-codec';
@@ -105,15 +106,6 @@ declare class NamesClient {
     state(): Promise<unknown>;
 }
 
-/** The fee/rebate-relevant fields of an offer, derived from the MERKLE-PROVEN offer (never a served object). */
-interface ProvenOfferTerms {
-    height: number;
-    feeBps: number;
-    value?: string;
-    taker?: string;
-    bid?: string;
-    min?: string;
-}
 /** The trust-labeled verdict. `ok:false` + `transient:true` = a retryable chain-catching-up soft-fail (NOT a
  *  proven mismatch). `payto`/`seller`/`terms` are populated whenever they could be merkle-derived. */
 interface OfferFillCheck {
@@ -127,13 +119,24 @@ interface OfferFillCheck {
     seller?: string;
     terms?: ProvenOfferTerms;
     blockHeight?: number;
+    /** B7b (REBIND W3/M1): the PROVEN CSD outputs to build for `pay` (a WHOLE fill of a non-partial offer),
+     *  sized from the merkle-proven offer by the single-sourced `fillOutputPlan`. Present only when `pay` was
+     *  passed and the offer could be sized. Build EXACTLY these; never the resolver-served outputs a lying
+     *  resolver could redirect. A partial (min-bearing) offer is left unsized (its running paid/delivered is
+     *  not provable at this corroboration layer; the wallet's fill-SPV is the payment-grade sizer). */
+    outputPlan?: {
+        to: string;
+        value: bigint;
+    }[];
 }
 
 /**
  * Pre-verify an offer on-chain before building a `fillOffer` payment. `light` is a PoW-verifying light client
  * (its `verifyTxInclusion` surfaces the merkle-proven tx + committed appPayloadHash); `client` reads source txs
  * for the prevout-owner author bind. Pass `servedOffer` (the resolver's offer object) to also bind its
- * payto/seller/terms to the proven values. See the module header for the trust posture.
+ * payto/seller/terms to the proven values. The FULL object is required: a served offer missing want.payto
+ * or seller is refused (P75-5). A token-priced offer's served want.ticker/want.amount are bound verbatim to
+ * the record. See the module header for the trust posture.
  */
 declare function preverifyOffer(opts: {
     light: {
@@ -144,11 +147,20 @@ declare function preverifyOffer(opts: {
     };
     offerId: string;
     servedOffer?: unknown;
+    /** B7b (REBIND W3/M1): the CSD base units you intend to pay. When given, the result carries `outputPlan`
+     *  (the PROVEN CSD outputs to build for a WHOLE fill of a non-partial offer, sized by the single-sourced
+     *  `fillOutputPlan`) and, if you also pass `plannedOutputs`, binds them EXACTLY to that proven plan.
+     *  A partial (min-bearing) offer is left unsized here; the wallet's fill-SPV is its payment-grade sizer. */
+    pay?: bigint | string | number;
+    /** B7b: your planned per-address CSD sums (the outputs you WILL build), bound both ways to `outputPlan`.
+     *  Requires `pay`. A missing/low leg is a doomed underpay; an extra/high leg is a W3 overpay or an N26
+     *  smuggled output - both refused. */
+    plannedOutputs?: Record<string, bigint | string | number>;
 }): Promise<OfferFillCheck>;
 
 /** Stable machine-readable error codes (branch on these, not the message text). */
 type CairnErrorCode = "NOT_INSTALLED" | "USER_REJECTED" | "WALLET_LOCKED" | "UNSUPPORTED_METHOD" | "HTTP_ERROR" | "CONTENT_VERIFICATION" | "ACCOUNT_CHANGED" | "FIRST_PARTY_ONLY" | "RATE_LIMITED" | "APPROVAL_CLOSED" | "FORBIDDEN" | "INTERNAL" | "GHOST_INPUTS_SKIPPED" | "VERIFY_UNAVAILABLE" | "VERIFY_TAMPER" | "INSUFFICIENT" | "TOO_MANY_INPUTS" | "FEE_TOO_LOW" | "FEE_CAP" | "BAD_FEE" | "ZERO_ADDR_REFUSED" | "BAD_OUTPUTS" | "NO_OUTPUTS" | "BAD_REQUEST" | "OFFER_UNKNOWN" | "FILL_UNSAFE" | "FILL_WRONG_TARGET" | "SOURCE_DIVERGENCE" | "SUBMIT_REJECTED" | "SUBMIT_MAYBE_INFLIGHT" | "SUBMIT_DUPLICATE" | "NOTHING_TO_CONSOLIDATE" | "UNKNOWN";
-declare const SDK_VERSION = "0.3.2";
+declare const SDK_VERSION = "0.4.1";
 interface CairnErrorOptions {
     code?: CairnErrorCode;
     docsPath?: string;
@@ -168,7 +180,7 @@ declare class CairnError extends Error {
     /** Relative docs path (under the SDK docs base), if any. */
     readonly docsPath?: string;
     /** The cairn-sdk version that produced this error. */
-    readonly version = "0.3.2";
+    readonly version = "0.4.1";
     /**
      * Whether a dApp may safely AUTO-retry this failure. `false` for fund-safety refusals and user-intent
      * declines (the default); `true` only for provably transient infra faults where nothing was signed.
@@ -307,8 +319,9 @@ declare class Cairn {
     wallet?: WalletConnection;
     private readonly cairnHttp;
     private _spvLight;
-    private _spvSeeded;
+    private _spvSeedInflight;
     private readonly _spvCp;
+    private readonly _cairnBase;
     constructor(config?: CairnConfig);
     /**
      * PoW-VERIFIED header merkle at a height (audit M3 — the no-PoW half). Lazily seeds a light
@@ -317,11 +330,38 @@ declare class Cairn {
      * checkpoint (can't verify backward) or if verification fails — the IndexerClient then degrades
      * to the honest "proof-consistent" instead of over-claiming "verified-inclusion". The verified
      * header chain is cached across calls; the first call near tip syncs the post-checkpoint span.
+     * MF-03: a STRUCTURAL forward-sync break (a reorg orphaned the cached tip) reseeds ONCE via
+     * withSpvReseed. RESIDUAL: a height at or below the cached tip answers from the cached branch with
+     * NO network touch, so a tx in a reorg-orphaned block can still read "verified-inclusion" until a
+     * read PAST the tip trips the reseed; this closes the permanent post-reorg brick, not reorg-blindness.
      */
     private verifiedHeaderMerkleAt;
-    /** The PoW-verifying SPV light client, seeded ONCE from the pinned checkpoint (shared by the M3 header-merkle
-     *  bind and the F13 offer pre-verify). Reused across calls; the first call near tip syncs the post-checkpoint span. */
+    private withSpvReseed;
+    private seedFreshSpvLight;
+    /** The PoW-verifying SPV light client, seeded from the pinned checkpoint and cached across calls
+     *  (shared by the M3 header-merkle bind and the F13 offer pre-verify). The client is committed to
+     *  the field ONLY after a fully successful seed (MF-14): a failed seed leaves NO cached state, so
+     *  the next call retries on a fresh client instead of wedging on "seedTrusted must be called on a
+     *  fresh client". Concurrent first callers share ONE in-flight seed. Re-seeded only when a
+     *  structural (reorg) break is detected, see withSpvReseed. */
     private seededSpvLight;
+    /**
+     * W12 batch header transport for the checkpoint..tip forward sync, backed by the cairn server's
+     * `/api/headers/:from/:count`. Carries ZERO trust: the LightClient re-verifies every header's PoW /
+     * prev-link / LWMA, so a forged or stale row fails closed and retrying transport proves nothing new.
+     * Retry budget: a 429 (per-IP header budget) or 502/503 (a height past the lagging indexer, or the
+     * server's 10s deadline), a transport/timeout error, or a body-read fault (an oversize stream past the
+     * SPV_MAX_BATCH_BYTES cap, or a non-JSON 200 body such as a CF interstitial) is a transient
+     * data-availability hiccup; back off (honouring Retry-After) a bounded number of times, then THROW so
+     * `sync()` fails closed. A non-dense range is rejected terminally (never retried).
+     *
+     * B7d / F6 DEPENDENCY: `/api/headers` serves no Access-Control-Allow-Origin today (`corsPublic` is
+     * mounted on `/explorer/api`, `/trade/api` and `/api/rpc`, not here). A SAME-ORIGIN dApp (hosted on the
+     * cairn base) reaches it now; a CROSS-ORIGIN third-party dApp cannot until B7d adds the CORS mount and
+     * restarts the cairn service. This code is correct as written; it becomes reachable cross-origin only
+     * once B7d ships. This is a recorded dependency, not a blocker for authoring/testing.
+     */
+    private fetchHeadersBatch;
     /**
      * F13 — corroborate an offer ON-CHAIN before building a `fillOffer` payment's `outputs`. Merkle-proves the
      * offer into the PoW-verified header chain (from the pinned SPV checkpoint), binds the record to its on-chain
@@ -333,8 +373,15 @@ declare class Cairn {
      * This is best-effort corroboration, NOT the payment-grade boundary: the Cairn Wallet's OWN on-device
      * fill-SPV (0.2.60+, fails-closed before signing) is that. A dApp settling real value should still clear this
      * before building `outputs`, so it never hands the wallet a payment a lying resolver would redirect.
+     *
+     * Pass opts.pay (the CSD base units you intend to pay) to receive the PROVEN outputPlan for a whole fill of a
+     * non-partial offer, and opts.plannedOutputs to bind your planned per-address sums to it before signing; build
+     * EXACTLY the outputPlan, never resolver-served outputs.
      */
-    verifyOfferForFill(offerId: string, servedOffer?: unknown): Promise<OfferFillCheck>;
+    verifyOfferForFill(offerId: string, servedOffer?: unknown, opts?: {
+        pay?: bigint | string | number;
+        plannedOutputs?: Record<string, bigint | string | number>;
+    }): Promise<OfferFillCheck>;
     /**
      * Detect + connect the Cairn Wallet (browser only). Wires the wallet into
      * `cairn.board` for signed writes. Resolves to the connected address.
@@ -346,4 +393,4 @@ declare class Cairn {
     get connected(): boolean;
 }
 
-export { BoardClient, Cairn, type CairnBaseUrls, type CairnConfig, CairnError, type CairnErrorCode, type CairnErrorOptions, Chain, ContentClient, ContentVerificationError, DEFAULT_SPV_CHECKPOINT, DetectOptions, FetchLike, Http, HttpError, IndexerClient, type NameDetail, type NameResolution, NamesClient, NotInstalledError, type OfferFillCheck, type PrimaryName, type ProvenOfferTerms, RegistryClient, SDK_VERSION, SubmitInFlightError, type TokenInfo, UnsupportedMethodError, UserRejectedError, WalletConnection, WalletLockedError, errorCode, mapProviderError, mapSubmitResultError, preverifyOffer };
+export { BoardClient, Cairn, type CairnBaseUrls, type CairnConfig, CairnError, type CairnErrorCode, type CairnErrorOptions, Chain, ContentClient, ContentVerificationError, DEFAULT_SPV_CHECKPOINT, DetectOptions, FetchLike, Http, HttpError, IndexerClient, type NameDetail, type NameResolution, NamesClient, NotInstalledError, type OfferFillCheck, type PrimaryName, RegistryClient, SDK_VERSION, SubmitInFlightError, type TokenInfo, UnsupportedMethodError, UserRejectedError, WalletConnection, WalletLockedError, errorCode, mapProviderError, mapSubmitResultError, preverifyOffer };