@intentrax/sdk 1.1.0 → 1.2.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +14 -5
- package/cli/intentrax.mjs +66 -16
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/trust/production-key-set.json +27 -0
package/README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -130,8 +130,9 @@ npx @intentrax/sdk verify-proof node_modules/@intentrax/sdk/examples/sandbox/tam
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```
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To verify your own artifact, point the command at any proof lookup JSON export
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-
downloaded from your tenant's `/v1/proofs/{proof_id}/export?format=json
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-
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downloaded from your tenant's `/v1/proofs/{proof_id}/export?format=json`. The
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production key set is bundled, so you don't need any flags. Pass extra key sets
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(for example, ones that revoke a key) with `--trusted-keys <file>`.
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`verify-proof` reads a registry-backed proof lookup JSON export and, offline:
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@@ -140,14 +141,22 @@ pass the production key set Intentrax publishes with `--trusted-keys <file>`.
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(`canonical_payload_json`) and the signature quorum;
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3. checks that the signed payload carries the record's own AEP, so the AEP cannot
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be rewritten after signing even if every outer hash is recomputed;
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-
4. checks each signer against published key sets: the bundled
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-
(`trust/
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4. checks each signer against published key sets: the bundled production set
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(`trust/production-key-set.json`, trust-bearing), the bundled sandbox set
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(`trust/sandbox-key-set.json`, not trust-bearing), and any `--trusted-keys` files.
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A revocation in any loaded set wins;
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5. checks that at least the key set's `min_trusted_signers` distinct trusted keys
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signed. The production set requires 2. A proof's own quorum isn't enough,
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because a signature can be stripped along with the quorum and roster entries
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that describe it. When several sets vouch for the signers, the strictest
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minimum applies.
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| Status | Exit | Meaning |
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|---|---|---|
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-
| `PASS` | 0 | Every signer is a published, trust-bearing key |
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+
| `PASS` | 0 | Every signer is a published, trust-bearing key, and enough distinct keys signed |
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| `SANDBOX_NON_TRUST_BEARING` | 0 | Every signer is a published sandbox key: the mechanics check out, but this is not production assurance |
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| `UNPINNED_SIGNER` | 3 | Signatures are valid, but a signer is not in any trusted key set, so who signed is unproven |
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+
| `INSUFFICIENT_TRUSTED_SIGNERS` | 3 | Every signer is trusted, but fewer distinct keys signed than the key set requires (signatures may have been stripped) |
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| `REVOKED_SIGNER`, `MIXED_TRUST` | 3 | Not a trusted result |
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| (none) | 2 | An integrity, signature, or binding check failed (failed closed) |
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package/cli/intentrax.mjs
CHANGED
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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import { dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve } from "node:path";
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import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
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import { buildAgentGatewayAdmissionEnvelope } from "../index.js";
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-
const VERSION = "1.
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const VERSION = "1.2.0";
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const ADMISSION_SCHEMA_VERSION = "intentrax.runtime.agent_admission_request/1.0";
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const INIT_SCHEMA_VERSION = "intentrax.onboarding.agent_adapter_init/1.0";
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const ACTION_RECEIPT_SCHEMA_VERSION = "intentrax.onboarding.agent_adapter_action_receipt/1.0";
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@@ -22,9 +22,14 @@ const AEP_HASH_DOMAIN = "INTENTRAX_PROOF_CANONICAL_AEP_V1";
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const SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_HASH_DOMAIN = "INTENTRAX_TRUST_SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_V1";
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const SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_VERSION = "intentrax.trust.signature_payload/1.0";
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const SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_FIELDS = Object.freeze(["payload_version", "canonical_aep_json", "aep_hash"]);
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-
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// 1.1 adds a required min_trusted_signers: how many distinct trust-bearing keys
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// (by key_id) must have signed a proof for it to PASS. 1.0 is still accepted,
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// but only for sets with no trust-bearing keys (sandbox sets).
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const PUBLISHED_KEY_SET_SCHEMA_VERSION = "intentrax.trust.published_key_set/1.1";
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const PUBLISHED_KEY_SET_SCHEMA_VERSION_V1 = "intentrax.trust.published_key_set/1.0";
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const BUILT_IN_KEY_SET_URLS = Object.freeze([
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// Published production signer keys (trust-bearing),
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// Published production signer keys (trust-bearing), exported from the production
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// keyring with engine/cmd/sovereign-public-key-set.
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new URL("../trust/production-key-set.json", import.meta.url),
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// Published sandbox keys (not trust-bearing).
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new URL("../trust/sandbox-key-set.json", import.meta.url),
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@@ -1194,9 +1199,10 @@ function buildLocalProofVerificationReport(proofExport, proofExportPath, reportP
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const withoutHash = {
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schema_version: LOCAL_PROOF_VERIFICATION_SCHEMA_VERSION,
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verifier_version: LOCAL_PROOF_VERIFIER_VERSION,
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-
// PASS only when every signer is a published, trust-bearing key
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-
//
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-
// signed, so they
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// PASS only when every signer is a published, trust-bearing key and at least
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// min_trusted_signers distinct trusted keys signed. Valid signatures from
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// keys you have not chosen to trust prove nothing about who signed, so they
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// never yield PASS.
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1206
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status: trust.signer_trust === "TRUSTED" ? "PASS" : trust.signer_trust,
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signer_trust: trust.signer_trust,
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trust_bearing: trust.signer_trust === "TRUSTED",
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@@ -1205,6 +1211,10 @@ function buildLocalProofVerificationReport(proofExport, proofExportPath, reportP
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signed_bytes: "verification_bundle.payload.canonical_payload_json",
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required_signatures: signatures.required,
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valid_signatures: signatures.signers.length,
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// The published policy from the key sets, not the proof's own quorum: a
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// proof's roster and quorum metadata can be reduced together.
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min_trusted_signers: trust.min_trusted_signers,
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distinct_trusted_signers: trust.distinct_trusted_signers,
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signers: trust.signers,
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},
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key_sets: keySets.map((set) => ({ key_set_id: set.key_set_id, environment: set.environment, source: set.source })),
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@@ -1230,7 +1240,8 @@ function buildLocalProofVerificationReport(proofExport, proofExportPath, reportP
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ed25519_signatures_verified: true,
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signature_quorum_satisfied: true,
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signed_payload_binds_record_aep: true,
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signers_pinned_to_published_keys: trust.signer_trust === "TRUSTED" || trust.signer_trust === "SANDBOX_NON_TRUST_BEARING",
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signers_pinned_to_published_keys: trust.signer_trust === "TRUSTED" || trust.signer_trust === "SANDBOX_NON_TRUST_BEARING" || trust.signer_trust === "INSUFFICIENT_TRUSTED_SIGNERS",
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min_trusted_signers_met: trust.signer_trust === "TRUSTED",
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canonical_json_authoritative: true,
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pdf_receipt_non_authoritative: true,
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},
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@@ -1393,8 +1404,8 @@ function validateSignerRoster(bundle, signatureBundle, quorum, payload) {
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}
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// A published key set pins who may sign: production keys (trust_bearing) or
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// sandbox keys (not trust-bearing). The SDK ships
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-
//
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// sandbox keys (not trust-bearing). The SDK ships both published sets; extra sets
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// (or revocations) can be supplied with --trusted-keys.
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function loadPublishedKeySets(trustedKeyPaths) {
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const sets = [];
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for (const url of BUILT_IN_KEY_SET_URLS) {
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@@ -1414,9 +1425,20 @@ function parsePublishedKeySet(source, origin) {
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}
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const set = parseSingleJSON(source, "trusted key set");
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const invalid = [];
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-
if (!isRecord(set) || set.schema_version
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if (!isRecord(set) || ![PUBLISHED_KEY_SET_SCHEMA_VERSION, PUBLISHED_KEY_SET_SCHEMA_VERSION_V1].includes(set.schema_version)) invalid.push("schema_version");
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if (isRecord(set) && !stableNonEmpty(set.key_set_id)) invalid.push("key_set_id");
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if (!isRecord(set) || !Array.isArray(set.keys) || set.keys.length === 0) invalid.push("keys");
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if (isRecord(set) && Array.isArray(set.keys)) {
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const keyIds = new Set(set.keys.filter(isRecord).map((key) => key.key_id));
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if (set.schema_version === PUBLISHED_KEY_SET_SCHEMA_VERSION) {
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// The policy must be satisfiable by this set's own keys.
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if (!Number.isInteger(set.min_trusted_signers) || set.min_trusted_signers < 1 || set.min_trusted_signers > keyIds.size) invalid.push("min_trusted_signers");
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} else if (set.schema_version === PUBLISHED_KEY_SET_SCHEMA_VERSION_V1) {
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if (Object.hasOwn(set, "min_trusted_signers")) invalid.push("min_trusted_signers");
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// A 1.0 set cannot state a minimum trusted-signer count, so it may not anchor trust.
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if (set.keys.some((key) => isRecord(key) && key.trust_bearing === true)) invalid.push("schema_version");
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}
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}
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if (isRecord(set) && Array.isArray(set.keys)) {
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for (const [index, key] of set.keys.entries()) {
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if (!isRecord(key)
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@@ -1431,13 +1453,17 @@ function parsePublishedKeySet(source, origin) {
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}
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}
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if (invalid.length > 0) {
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-
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const hint = invalid.includes("schema_version") || invalid.includes("min_trusted_signers")
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? ` (trust-bearing keys need ${PUBLISHED_KEY_SET_SCHEMA_VERSION} with an integer min_trusted_signers between 1 and the number of distinct key_ids)`
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: "";
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fail(`trusted key set is invalid (${origin}): ${sortedUnique(invalid).join(",")}${hint}`);
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}
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const environments = [...new Set(set.keys.map((key) => key.environment).filter(stableNonEmpty))];
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return {
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key_set_id: set.key_set_id,
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environment: environments.length === 1 ? environments[0] : "mixed",
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source: origin,
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+
min_trusted_signers: set.schema_version === PUBLISHED_KEY_SET_SCHEMA_VERSION ? set.min_trusted_signers : 1,
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keys: set.keys,
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};
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}
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@@ -1460,13 +1486,26 @@ function classifySignerTrust(signers, keySets) {
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?? null;
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return { key_id: signer.key_id, key_version: signer.key_version, public_key_hash: signer.public_key_hash, anchor };
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});
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// The strictest policy wins: every key set that vouches for any signer as
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// trust-bearing contributes its min_trusted_signers, and the maximum applies.
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// Supplying an extra, laxer set cannot lower the bundled production policy.
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+
let minTrustedSigners = 1;
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+
for (const set of keySets) {
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+
const vouches = set.keys.some((key) => key.trust_bearing === true && key.status !== "REVOKED"
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1495
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+
&& signers.some((signer) => key.key_id === signer.key_id && key.key_version === signer.key_version && key.public_key_material === signer.public_key_material));
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+
if (vouches) minTrustedSigners = Math.max(minTrustedSigners, set.min_trusted_signers);
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+
}
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1498
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+
// Versions of one key are one signer.
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+
const distinctTrustedSigners = new Set(resolved.filter((signer) => signer.anchor?.trust_bearing === true && signer.anchor.status !== "REVOKED").map((signer) => signer.key_id)).size;
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let signerTrust;
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1464
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if (resolved.some((signer) => signer.anchor?.status === "REVOKED")) signerTrust = "REVOKED_SIGNER";
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1502
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else if (resolved.length === 0 || resolved.some((signer) => signer.anchor === null)) signerTrust = "UNPINNED_SIGNER";
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-
else if (resolved.every((signer) => signer.anchor.trust_bearing === true))
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1503
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+
else if (resolved.every((signer) => signer.anchor.trust_bearing === true)) {
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1504
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+
signerTrust = distinctTrustedSigners >= minTrustedSigners ? "TRUSTED" : "INSUFFICIENT_TRUSTED_SIGNERS";
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1505
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+
}
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else if (resolved.every((signer) => signer.anchor.trust_bearing === false)) signerTrust = "SANDBOX_NON_TRUST_BEARING";
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else signerTrust = "MIXED_TRUST";
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1469
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-
return { signer_trust: signerTrust, signers: resolved };
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1508
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+
return { signer_trust: signerTrust, signers: resolved, min_trusted_signers: minTrustedSigners, distinct_trusted_signers: distinctTrustedSigners };
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}
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1471
1510
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function signerTrustMessage(report) {
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@@ -1476,6 +1515,10 @@ function signerTrustMessage(report) {
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1515
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if (report.signer_trust === "REVOKED_SIGNER") {
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return "intentrax: a signing key is REVOKED in the trusted key set; this proof must not be relied on.";
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}
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1518
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+
if (report.signer_trust === "INSUFFICIENT_TRUSTED_SIGNERS") {
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1519
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+
const verification = report.signature_verification;
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1520
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+
return `intentrax: every signer is a published trust-bearing key, but only ${verification.distinct_trusted_signers} distinct key(s) signed and the published key set requires ${verification.min_trusted_signers}. Signatures may have been stripped from this proof; it must not be relied on.`;
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1521
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+
}
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1479
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if (report.signer_trust === "MIXED_TRUST") {
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1480
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return "intentrax: the proof mixes trust-bearing and sandbox signers; it is not a production-trusted proof.";
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1481
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}
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@@ -2686,17 +2729,24 @@ Proof export verification:
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not required. The JSON export is authoritative; PDF receipts are companions.
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Result (status / exit code):
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2689
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-
PASS 0 every signer is a published, trust-bearing key
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2732
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+
PASS 0 every signer is a published, trust-bearing key,
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2733
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+
and at least the key set's min_trusted_signers
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2734
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+
distinct keys signed
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2690
2735
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SANDBOX_NON_TRUST_BEARING 0 every signer is a published sandbox key: the
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2691
2736
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mechanics check out, but it is not production
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2692
2737
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assurance
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2693
2738
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UNPINNED_SIGNER 3 signatures are valid but a signer is not in
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2694
2739
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any trusted key set (who signed is unproven)
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2740
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+
INSUFFICIENT_TRUSTED_SIGNERS 3 every signer is trusted, but fewer distinct
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2741
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+
keys signed than the published key set
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2742
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+
requires (signatures may have been stripped)
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2695
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REVOKED_SIGNER / MIXED_TRUST 3
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2696
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any integrity or signature failure exits 2 (failed closed)
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2697
2745
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|
|
2698
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-
The SDK ships the
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2699
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-
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2746
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+
The SDK ships the production key set (trust/production-key-set.json,
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2747
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+
min_trusted_signers 2) and the sandbox key set (trust/sandbox-key-set.json).
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2748
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+
Add more sets, for example revocations, with --trusted-keys <file>
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2749
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+
(repeatable).
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2700
2750
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2701
2751
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PDF receipt verification:
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2702
2752
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verify-pdf-receipt reads downloaded PDF receipt bytes, checks the PDF header,
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package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{
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|
2
|
+
"issuer": "Intentrax",
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3
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+
"key_set_id": "intentrax-production-beta",
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4
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+
"keys": [
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5
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+
{
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6
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+
"algorithm": "ED25519",
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7
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+
"environment": "production",
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8
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+
"key_id": "runtime-sovereign-proof-key-a",
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9
|
+
"key_version": "v1",
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10
|
+
"public_key_material": "cca8a59628ffe97d9b27a1946385c3b44493be7145498f6019c65aeaef3ab82c",
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11
|
+
"status": "ACTIVE",
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12
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+
"trust_bearing": true
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13
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+
},
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14
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+
{
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15
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+
"algorithm": "ED25519",
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|
16
|
+
"environment": "production",
|
|
17
|
+
"key_id": "runtime-sovereign-proof-key-b",
|
|
18
|
+
"key_version": "v1",
|
|
19
|
+
"public_key_material": "b9c4170f3dbf862af8cff05e96b41ca377660f32c714de837b98bff02c3303b1",
|
|
20
|
+
"status": "ACTIVE",
|
|
21
|
+
"trust_bearing": true
|
|
22
|
+
}
|
|
23
|
+
],
|
|
24
|
+
"min_trusted_signers": 2,
|
|
25
|
+
"published_at": "2026-11-12T13:55:49Z",
|
|
26
|
+
"schema_version": "intentrax.trust.published_key_set/1.1"
|
|
27
|
+
}
|