@intentius/chant-lexicon-gitlab 0.1.23 → 0.2.0

package/src/migrate/from-github/security.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+/**
+ * Security-aware migration (#306).
+ *
+ * Migration is the edge between the two security endpoints (#296 ↔ #305).
+ * Security properties don't translate 1:1 — some are silently preserved, some
+ * lost, some need re-establishing on the GitLab side. This module classifies
+ * each security-relevant property's fate as it crosses the boundary and runs
+ * the GitLab security post-synth checks against the migrated output so anything
+ * lost in translation is caught on the target side.
+ */
+
+import type { ProvenanceRecord } from "./provenance";
+
+const UNTRUSTED_CONTEXTS = [
+  "github.event.issue.title",
+  "github.event.issue.body",
+  "github.event.pull_request.title",
+  "github.event.pull_request.body",
+  "github.event.pull_request.head.ref",
+  "github.event.comment.body",
+  "github.event.review.body",
+  "github.event.head_commit.message",
+  "github.head_ref",
+];
+
+const SHA_PINNED_USES = /uses:\s*['"]?([\w.-]+\/[\w.-]+(?:\/[\w.-]+)*)@([0-9a-f]{40})['"]?/g;
+const SECRET_REF = /\$\{\{\s*secrets\.([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*\}\}/g;
+
+/**
+ * Classify the fate of security-relevant properties as they migrate from a
+ * GitHub Actions workflow to GitLab CI. Returns provenance records carrying a
+ * `security` classification (which flow into diagnostics, SARIF, and the report
+ * like any other provenance record).
+ */
+export function analyzeSecurity(sourceYaml: string, opts: { sourceFile?: string } = {}): ProvenanceRecord[] {
+  const records: ProvenanceRecord[] = [];
+  const file = opts.sourceFile;
+
+  // MIG-PIN-LOST — a GitHub SHA pin has no meaning once the action maps to a
+  // GitLab include/image (or becomes a hand-written script). Re-pin on GitLab.
+  const seenPins = new Set<string>();
+  let m: RegExpExecArray | null;
+  SHA_PINNED_USES.lastIndex = 0;
+  while ((m = SHA_PINNED_USES.exec(sourceYaml)) !== null) {
+    const slug = m[1];
+    if (seenPins.has(slug)) continue;
+    seenPins.add(slug);
+    records.push({
+      gitlabPath: "(target)",
+      sourceKey: `uses: ${slug}`,
+      sourceFile: file,
+      category: "synthesis",
+      rule: "MIG-PIN-LOST",
+      note: `The SHA pin on "${slug}" does not carry to its GitLab include/image — re-pin the GitLab target to a tag or digest (WGL029/WGL031).`,
+      security: { property: "Pinned action SHA", fate: "lost", severity: "warning", reestablish: "#297" },
+    });
+  }
+
+  // MIG-SECRET-UNSCOPED — ${{ secrets.X }} → $X, but masking/protection is set
+  // outside the YAML; the reference assumes a masked + protected variable.
+  const seenSecrets = new Set<string>();
+  SECRET_REF.lastIndex = 0;
+  while ((m = SECRET_REF.exec(sourceYaml)) !== null) {
+    const name = m[1];
+    if (seenSecrets.has(name)) continue;
+    seenSecrets.add(name);
+    records.push({
+      gitlabPath: "(target)",
+      sourceKey: `secrets.${name}`,
+      sourceFile: file,
+      category: "needs-review",
+      rule: "MIG-SECRET-UNSCOPED",
+      note: `secrets.${name} → $${name}, which assumes a masked + protected GitLab CI/CD variable. Mark it masked and protected (WGL038).`,
+      security: { property: "Secret reference", fate: "needs-review", severity: "warning", reestablish: "#300" },
+    });
+  }
+
+  // MIG-INJECTION-CARRIED — an untrusted-context interpolation translates
+  // verbatim, carrying the injection straight across.
+  const seenInjection = new Set<string>();
+  for (const ctx of UNTRUSTED_CONTEXTS) {
+    if (sourceYaml.includes(ctx) && !seenInjection.has(ctx)) {
+      seenInjection.add(ctx);
+      records.push({
+        gitlabPath: "(target)",
+        sourceKey: ctx,
+        sourceFile: file,
+        category: "needs-review",
+        rule: "MIG-INJECTION-CARRIED",
+        note: `Untrusted input \${{ ${ctx} }} translates to a $CI_* reference verbatim — the script-injection risk carries across (WGL035).`,
+        security: { property: "Template injection site", fate: "translated", severity: "warning", reestablish: "#299" },
+      });
+    }
+  }
+
+  // MIG-TRUST-BOUNDARY — pull_request_target maps to merge-request pipelines,
+  // which fork contributors can trigger; the trust boundary shifts.
+  if (/pull_request_target/.test(sourceYaml)) {
+    records.push({
+      gitlabPath: "(target)",
+      sourceKey: "on.pull_request_target",
+      sourceFile: file,
+      category: "needs-review",
+      rule: "MIG-TRUST-BOUNDARY",
+      note: `pull_request_target → merge-request pipelines, which fork contributors can trigger. Re-establish the trust boundary (protected refs, approvals) on GitLab (WGL034/WGL036).`,
+      security: { property: "Trigger trust boundary", fate: "needs-review", severity: "warning", reestablish: "#299" },
+    });
+  }
+
+  // MIG-PERMISSIONS-001 (reframed as least-privilege) — permissions: has no
+  // per-job GitLab YAML equivalent; least privilege lives in project settings.
+  if (/^permissions:/m.test(sourceYaml) || /^\s+permissions:/m.test(sourceYaml)) {
+    records.push({
+      gitlabPath: "(target)",
+      sourceKey: "permissions",
+      sourceFile: file,
+      category: "needs-review",
+      rule: "MIG-PERMISSIONS-001",
+      note: `Least-privilege permissions: have no per-job GitLab YAML equivalent — re-establish via project CI/CD token settings and id_tokens scoping (WGL033).`,
+      security: { property: "Least-privilege permissions", fate: "needs-review", severity: "warning", reestablish: "#298" },
+    });
+  }
+
+  return records;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Run the GitLab security post-synth checks against the migrated `.gitlab-ci.yml`
+ * and return their findings as provenance records — *migrate, then prove the
+ * output clears the GitLab security bar*. Anything lost in translation that
+ * lands as a concrete weakness on the target is caught here.
+ */
+export async function runSecurityChecks(gitlabYaml: string, opts: { sourceFile?: string } = {}): Promise<ProvenanceRecord[]> {
+  const { gitlabPlugin } = await import("../../plugin");
+  const checks = gitlabPlugin.postSynthChecks?.() ?? [];
+  const ctx = {
+    outputs: new Map<string, string>([["gitlab", gitlabYaml]]),
+    entities: new Map(),
+    buildResult: {
+      outputs: new Map<string, string>([["gitlab", gitlabYaml]]),
+      entities: new Map(),
+      warnings: [],
+      errors: [],
+      sourceFileCount: 1,
+    },
+  };
+
+  const records: ProvenanceRecord[] = [];
+  for (const check of checks) {
+    let diags;
+    try {
+      diags = check.check(ctx as never);
+    } catch {
+      continue; // a check that needs entities/other context simply yields nothing here
+    }
+    for (const d of diags) {
+      records.push({
+        gitlabPath: "(target)",
+        sourceKey: d.entity ?? d.checkId,
+        sourceFile: opts.sourceFile,
+        category: "synthesis",
+        rule: d.checkId,
+        note: `Migrated output triggers ${d.checkId}: ${d.message}`,
+        security: {
+          property: "GitLab security check",
+          fate: "needs-review",
+          severity: d.severity === "error" ? "error" : d.severity === "info" ? "info" : "warning",
+        },
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  return records;
+}
+
+/** A one-property line in the security posture summary. */
+interface PostureLine {
+  property: string;
+  fate: string;
+  rule: string;
+  count: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Render a "Security posture" Markdown section from the security provenance
+ * records (those carrying a `security` classification).
+ */
+export function renderSecurityPosture(records: ProvenanceRecord[]): string {
+  const security = records.filter((r) => r.security);
+  if (security.length === 0) {
+    return "## Security posture\n\nNo security-relevant properties detected at the migration edge.\n";
+  }
+
+  const byRule = new Map<string, PostureLine>();
+  for (const r of security) {
+    const s = r.security!;
+    const existing = byRule.get(r.rule);
+    if (existing) existing.count += 1;
+    else byRule.set(r.rule, { property: s.property, fate: s.fate, rule: r.rule, count: 1 });
+  }
+
+  let out = "## Security posture\n\n";
+  out += "| Property | Fate | Rule | Count |\n|---|---|---|---|\n";
+  for (const line of byRule.values()) {
+    out += `| ${line.property} | ${line.fate} | ${line.rule} | ${line.count} |\n`;
+  }
+  out += "\nFates: **translated** (weakness carried as-is) · **approximated** · **needs-review** (re-establish on GitLab) · **lost** (no GitLab equivalent for the property).\n";
+  return out;
+}

package/src/plugin.test.ts

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ describe("gitlabPlugin", () => {
 
   test("returns post-synth checks", () => {
     const checks = gitlabPlugin.postSynthChecks!();
-    expect(checks).toHaveLength(19);
+    expect(checks).toHaveLength(39);
     const ids = checks.map((c) => c.id);
     expect(ids).toContain("WGL010");
     expect(ids).toContain("WGL011");
@@ -104,6 +104,26 @@ describe("gitlabPlugin", () => {
     expect(ids).toContain("WGL026");
     expect(ids).toContain("WGL027");
     expect(ids).toContain("WGL028");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL029");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL030");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL031");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL032");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL033");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL034");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL035");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL036");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL037");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL038");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL039");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL040");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL041");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL042");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL043");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL044");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL045");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL046");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL047");
+    expect(ids).toContain("WGL048");
   });
 
   // -----------------------------------------------------------------------

package/src/skills/chant-gitlab-migrate.md

@@ -79,6 +79,16 @@ npx chant migrate path/to/workflow.yml --output .gitlab-ci.yml --validate
 
 The CLI picks `glci` (offline, no auth) first; `glab ci lint` second. If neither is on PATH, `--validate` warns and skips. Pair with `--strict` to make validation failures hard.
 
+`--validate` also runs the **security backend** (#306): it classifies the fate of each security property across the migration edge and runs the GitLab security post-synth checks (WGL029+) against the emitted YAML — *migrate, then prove the output clears the GitLab security bar*. The report gains a **Security posture** section plus `MIG-*` security diagnostics:
+
+- `MIG-PIN-LOST` — a GitHub SHA pin can't follow the action to its GitLab include/image; re-pin on GitLab (→ #297 / WGL029, WGL031).
+- `MIG-SECRET-UNSCOPED` — a migrated `$VAR` assumes a masked + protected GitLab variable, set outside the YAML (→ #300 / WGL038).
+- `MIG-INJECTION-CARRIED` — an untrusted-input injection site translated verbatim; the weakness carries across (→ #299 / WGL035).
+- `MIG-TRUST-BOUNDARY` — `pull_request_target` → merge-request pipelines that fork contributors can trigger; re-establish protected-ref/approval gating (→ #299 / WGL034, WGL036).
+- `MIG-PERMISSIONS-001` (least-privilege) — no per-job GitLab YAML equivalent; lives in project token settings + `id_tokens` scoping (→ #298 / WGL033).
+
+Fates mirror the functional provenance model: **translated** (weakness carried as-is), **approximated**, **needs-review** (re-establish on GitLab), **lost** (no GitLab equivalent for the property). Use these to tell the user not just *did it migrate* but *did the security posture survive*.
+
 ## Step 5: Decide the emit mode
 
 Two modes serve different intents: