@intentius/chant-lexicon-cedar 0.44.8 → 0.44.9

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Files changed (108) hide show
  1. package/README.md +58 -0
  2. package/dist/codegen/package.d.ts.map +1 -1
  3. package/dist/config.d.ts +25 -0
  4. package/dist/config.d.ts.map +1 -1
  5. package/dist/dogwood/cli.d.ts +206 -0
  6. package/dist/dogwood/cli.d.ts.map +1 -0
  7. package/dist/dogwood/event-schema.d.ts +161 -0
  8. package/dist/dogwood/event-schema.d.ts.map +1 -0
  9. package/dist/dogwood/index.d.ts +33 -0
  10. package/dist/dogwood/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  11. package/dist/dogwood/macros.d.ts +96 -0
  12. package/dist/dogwood/macros.d.ts.map +1 -0
  13. package/dist/dogwood/policy.d.ts +120 -0
  14. package/dist/dogwood/policy.d.ts.map +1 -0
  15. package/dist/dogwood/scan.d.ts +109 -0
  16. package/dist/dogwood/scan.d.ts.map +1 -0
  17. package/dist/dogwood/serialize.d.ts +46 -0
  18. package/dist/dogwood/serialize.d.ts.map +1 -0
  19. package/dist/dogwood/temporal.d.ts +259 -0
  20. package/dist/dogwood/temporal.d.ts.map +1 -0
  21. package/dist/dogwood/upstream.d.ts +41 -0
  22. package/dist/dogwood/upstream.d.ts.map +1 -0
  23. package/dist/dogwood/window.d.ts +73 -0
  24. package/dist/dogwood/window.d.ts.map +1 -0
  25. package/dist/index.d.ts +4 -0
  26. package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  27. package/dist/integrity.json +13 -3
  28. package/dist/lint/audit-catalog.d.ts.map +1 -1
  29. package/dist/lint/post-synth/dogwood-helpers.d.ts +63 -0
  30. package/dist/lint/post-synth/dogwood-helpers.d.ts.map +1 -0
  31. package/dist/lint/post-synth/dwdc010.d.ts +25 -0
  32. package/dist/lint/post-synth/dwdc010.d.ts.map +1 -0
  33. package/dist/lint/post-synth/dwdc011.d.ts +19 -0
  34. package/dist/lint/post-synth/dwdc011.d.ts.map +1 -0
  35. package/dist/lint/post-synth/dwdc012.d.ts +21 -0
  36. package/dist/lint/post-synth/dwdc012.d.ts.map +1 -0
  37. package/dist/lint/post-synth/dwde010.d.ts +32 -0
  38. package/dist/lint/post-synth/dwde010.d.ts.map +1 -0
  39. package/dist/lint/post-synth/dwde011.d.ts +33 -0
  40. package/dist/lint/post-synth/dwde011.d.ts.map +1 -0
  41. package/dist/lint/post-synth/dwds010.d.ts +24 -0
  42. package/dist/lint/post-synth/dwds010.d.ts.map +1 -0
  43. package/dist/lint/post-synth/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  44. package/dist/manifest.json +1 -1
  45. package/dist/okf/index.md +6 -0
  46. package/dist/okf/rules/DWDC010.md +11 -0
  47. package/dist/okf/rules/DWDC011.md +11 -0
  48. package/dist/okf/rules/DWDC012.md +11 -0
  49. package/dist/okf/rules/DWDE010.md +11 -0
  50. package/dist/okf/rules/DWDE011.md +11 -0
  51. package/dist/okf/rules/DWDS010.md +11 -0
  52. package/dist/policy-text.d.ts +53 -0
  53. package/dist/policy-text.d.ts.map +1 -0
  54. package/dist/rules/dogwood-helpers.ts +139 -0
  55. package/dist/rules/dwdc010.ts +62 -0
  56. package/dist/rules/dwdc011.ts +61 -0
  57. package/dist/rules/dwdc012.ts +46 -0
  58. package/dist/rules/dwde010.ts +130 -0
  59. package/dist/rules/dwde011.ts +108 -0
  60. package/dist/rules/dwds010.ts +46 -0
  61. package/dist/serializer.d.ts +10 -18
  62. package/dist/serializer.d.ts.map +1 -1
  63. package/dist/skills/chant-cedar-authoring.md +180 -0
  64. package/dist/skills/chant-cedar-avp-embedding.md +125 -0
  65. package/dist/skills/chant-cedar-meta-policy.md +119 -0
  66. package/package.json +2 -2
  67. package/src/codegen/package.ts +3 -2
  68. package/src/config.test.ts +12 -0
  69. package/src/config.ts +28 -0
  70. package/src/dogwood/cli.test.ts +392 -0
  71. package/src/dogwood/cli.ts +545 -0
  72. package/src/dogwood/event-schema.test.ts +218 -0
  73. package/src/dogwood/event-schema.ts +318 -0
  74. package/src/dogwood/index.ts +198 -0
  75. package/src/dogwood/macros.test.ts +104 -0
  76. package/src/dogwood/macros.ts +229 -0
  77. package/src/dogwood/policy.test.ts +94 -0
  78. package/src/dogwood/policy.ts +141 -0
  79. package/src/dogwood/scan.ts +287 -0
  80. package/src/dogwood/serialize.test.ts +331 -0
  81. package/src/dogwood/serialize.ts +209 -0
  82. package/src/dogwood/temporal.test.ts +272 -0
  83. package/src/dogwood/temporal.ts +592 -0
  84. package/src/dogwood/testdata/custom-kinds.dwschema +17 -0
  85. package/src/dogwood/testdata/default-macros.dw +23 -0
  86. package/src/dogwood/testdata/lowered-read-after-login.json +13 -0
  87. package/src/dogwood/testdata/max-window-raised.dwschema +25 -0
  88. package/src/dogwood/testdata/pinned.dwschema +31 -0
  89. package/src/dogwood/testdata/read-after-login.cedarschema +20 -0
  90. package/src/dogwood/testdata/read-after-login.dw +17 -0
  91. package/src/dogwood/testdata/temporal-policies.dw +53 -0
  92. package/src/dogwood/upstream.ts +41 -0
  93. package/src/dogwood/window.ts +124 -0
  94. package/src/index.ts +24 -0
  95. package/src/lint/audit-catalog.ts +56 -0
  96. package/src/lint/post-synth/dogwood-helpers.ts +139 -0
  97. package/src/lint/post-synth/dwd-post-synth.test.ts +256 -0
  98. package/src/lint/post-synth/dwdc010.ts +62 -0
  99. package/src/lint/post-synth/dwdc011.ts +61 -0
  100. package/src/lint/post-synth/dwdc012.ts +46 -0
  101. package/src/lint/post-synth/dwde-post-synth.test.ts +368 -0
  102. package/src/lint/post-synth/dwde010.ts +130 -0
  103. package/src/lint/post-synth/dwde011.ts +108 -0
  104. package/src/lint/post-synth/dwds010.ts +46 -0
  105. package/src/lint/post-synth/index.ts +12 -0
  106. package/src/lint/post-synth/post-synth.test.ts +7 -3
  107. package/src/policy-text.ts +128 -0
  108. package/src/serializer.ts +71 -109
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
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+ ---
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+ skill: chant-cedar-authoring
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+ description: Author Cedar authorization policies as typed chant resources — schema to generated classes to .cedar and JSON outputs
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+ user-invocable: true
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+ ---
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+
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+ # Cedar Policies as Typed Resources
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+
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+ ## What this lexicon covers
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+
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+ Cedar is an authorization policy language. Its toolchain validates and evaluates
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+ policies; it does not help you write them. There are no functions, no modules,
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+ no loops, and templates carry exactly two slots (`?principal`, `?resource`), so
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+ teams managing large policy sets generate `.cedar` text with string templating.
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+ This lexicon replaces that with typed TypeScript.
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+
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+ Two artifacts come out of every build:
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+
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+ - `<name>.cedar` — the policy text every Cedar evaluator reads (Amazon Verified
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+ Permissions, cedar-agent, an embedded `cedar-wasm`).
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+ - `policies.cedar.json` — the same set in the Cedar JSON policy format, beside
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+ it. This is also the parse source for import.
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+
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+ chant is nowhere in either. An emitted policy set is consumed by any evaluator.
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+
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+ ## The three steps
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+
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+ ### 1. Declare a schema
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+
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+ The schema is *your* file, not a global upstream — it is the input codegen
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+ reads. Write it in Cedar's human-readable syntax and point the config at it:
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+
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+ ```typescript
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+ // chant.config.ts
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+ import type { ChantConfig } from "@intentius/chant";
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+ import "@intentius/chant-lexicon-cedar";
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+
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+ export default {
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+ lexicons: ["cedar"],
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+ cedar: {
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+ schema: "authz/app.cedarschema",
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+ validation: { mode: "strict", requireProjectSchema: true },
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+ },
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+ } satisfies ChantConfig;
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+ ```
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+
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+ Turn `requireProjectSchema` on once the project has its own schema. Without it a
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+ missing file silently falls back to the bundled default, and the difference
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+ between "your entity types" and "somebody else's" is invisible.
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+
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+ ### 2. Run generate
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+
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+ ```bash
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+ npx chant generate --lexicon cedar
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+ ```
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+
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+ That produces, per declaration in the schema:
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+
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+ | Schema declaration | Generated |
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+ |---|---|
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+ | `entity Document in [Folder] = { … }` | `Document` class, `DocumentAttributes` property class, `DocumentUid` template-literal type |
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+ | `action read appliesTo { … }` | `ReadAction` constant, `ReadContext` property class |
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+ | — | `Policy` class, `EntityTypeName`, `ActionUid`, `PolicyScope`, `ALL_ACTIONS`, `ALL_ENTITY_TYPES` |
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+
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+ `DocumentUid` is `` `App::Document::"${string}"` `` — a typo'd namespace is a
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+ compile error, not a validation error hours later.
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+
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+ ### 3. Write policies
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+
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+ ```typescript
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+ import { Policy, ReadAction, WriteAction, type UserUid } from "@intentius/chant-lexicon-cedar";
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+
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+ const archivist: UserUid = 'App::User::"archivist"';
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+
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+ export const ownerRead = new Policy({
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+ effect: "permit",
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+ principal: { is: "App::User" },
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+ action: { in: [ReadAction, WriteAction] },
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+ resource: { is: "App::Document" },
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+ when: ["resource.owner == principal"],
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+ annotations: { doc: "Owners always read their own documents." },
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+ });
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+
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+ export const restrictDelete = new Policy({
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+ effect: "forbid",
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+ resource: { is: "App::Document" },
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+ when: ['resource.classification == "confidential"'],
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+ unless: [`principal == ${archivist}`],
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+ });
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+ ```
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+
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+ ## Policy props
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+
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+ | Prop | Meaning |
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+ |------|---------|
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+ | `effect` | `"permit"` or `"forbid"`. Defaults to `permit` |
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+ | `principal`, `action`, `resource` | Scope constraints. Omit for unconstrained |
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+ | `when` | Cedar expression strings, one `when { … }` clause each |
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+ | `unless` | Cedar expression strings, one `unless { … }` clause each |
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+ | `annotations` | `Record<string, string>`, emitted as `@key("value")` |
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+
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+ ### Scope forms
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+
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+ | Written | Emitted |
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+ |---|---|
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+ | `{}` or omitted | `principal` |
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+ | `{ eq: X }` | `principal == X` |
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+ | `{ in: X }` | `principal in X` |
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+ | `{ in: [X, Y] }` | `principal in [X, Y]` |
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+ | `{ is: "App::User" }` | `principal is App::User` |
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+ | `{ is: "App::User", in: X }` | `principal is App::User in X` |
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+
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+ `when`/`unless` stay strings. Cedar's expression grammar *is* the policy
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+ language; typing it in TypeScript is a separate problem, and the escape hatch
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+ would leak either way.
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+
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+ ## Policy ids
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+
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+ The id comes from the export's logical name, kebab-cased: `allowAdminRead`
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+ becomes `@id("allow-admin-read")`. Set `annotations.id` to pin one explicitly —
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+ worth doing for a policy whose id something downstream references.
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+
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+ ## Composites
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+
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+ Repeated policy shapes go in a factory, because Cedar has nowhere to put them.
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+
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+ ```typescript
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+ import {
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+ DeleteAction,
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+ DenyByDefaultSet,
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+ OwnerCanManage,
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+ ReadAction,
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+ WriteAction,
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+ } from "@intentius/chant-lexicon-cedar";
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+
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+ const docOwner = OwnerCanManage({
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+ entityType: "App::Document",
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+ actions: [ReadAction, WriteAction],
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+ principal: "App::User",
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+ });
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+
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+ const guarded = DenyByDefaultSet({
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+ policies: [docOwner],
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+ entityType: "App::Document",
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+ actions: DeleteAction,
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+ when: ['resource.classification == "confidential"'],
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+ unless: ['principal == App::User::"archivist"'],
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+ });
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+
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+ export const [confidentialFloor, documentOwnerGrant] = guarded.all;
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+ ```
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+
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+ `DenyByDefaultSet` returns the `forbid` floor and its members from one call, so
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+ deleting the floor deletes the grants with it. A `forbid` beats every `permit`
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+ in the set unconditionally — it is the only construct that survives a later,
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+ wider grant.
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+
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+ ## Checking the result
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+
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+ ```bash
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+ npx chant build # emits both artifacts, runs the CED rules
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+ npx chant coverage --lexicon cedar # is every schema declaration generated?
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+ ```
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+
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+ The MCP tool `cedar:coverage` answers the other question: which schema entity
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+ types and actions the *policy set* can reach, which are reachable only from a
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+ `forbid`, and which no policy touches at all. An entity type nothing covers is
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+ inert under Cedar's default-deny — either the intent or a hole.
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+
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+ ## Things that will bite
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+
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+ - **An empty schema validates everything clean.** `checkParseSchema("")`
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+ succeeds. Set `requireProjectSchema: true`.
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+ - **`Group` and `Team`-shaped container entities appear in no `appliesTo`.**
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+ They exist to be `in`, so no policy — not even `permit (principal, action,
176
+ resource)` — resolves to them. `cedar:coverage` reports that honestly rather
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+ than rounding it up.
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+ - **A policy naming an entity type outside the schema still parses.** It
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+ resolves to an empty request envelope and never fires. `cedar:coverage`
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+ reports it under `inert`.
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
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+ ---
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+ skill: chant-cedar-avp-embedding
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+ description: Embed a typed cedar-lexicon policy into an AWS Verified Permissions policy resource instead of a hand-written string
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+ user-invocable: true
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+ ---
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+
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+ # Cedar Policies Inside Verified Permissions
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+
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+ ## The seam
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+
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+ Amazon Verified Permissions is one deployment vehicle for Cedar, and chant
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+ already ships it: `AWS::VerifiedPermissions::Policy` in the aws lexicon carries
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+ its policy text in a `definition.static.statement` field typed `CedarPolicy` —
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+ which is to say, `string`.
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+
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+ That string is the seam. Everything upstream of it — the schema, the entity
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+ types, the actions, the scope constraints — is what the cedar lexicon owns.
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+ Everything downstream — the policy store, the CloudFormation `ApplyOp`, the IAM
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+ around it — is the aws lexicon's, and already works.
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+
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+ ```
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+ cedar lexicon aws lexicon
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+ schema → Policy → .cedar text → VerifiedPermissionsPolicy.definition.static.statement
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+ ```
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+
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+ The walk-away test holds on both sides. The emitted `.cedar` file is read by any
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+ evaluator with no AWS involved; the AVP resource deploys through the same
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+ CloudFormation path every other AWS resource does.
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+
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+ ## The typed handoff
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+
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+ `avpPolicyDefinition(name, props)` returns exactly the `Definition` property
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+ `AWS::VerifiedPermissions::Policy` takes, rendered by the same renderer that
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+ writes the `.cedar` file — so the deployed policy and the reviewed file cannot
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+ disagree.
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+
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+ ```typescript
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+ import { Policy, ReadAction, avpPolicyDefinition } from "@intentius/chant-lexicon-cedar";
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+ import { VerifiedPermissionsPolicy } from "@intentius/chant-lexicon-aws";
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+
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+ const ownerReadProps = {
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+ effect: "permit",
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+ principal: { is: "App::User" },
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+ action: { eq: ReadAction },
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+ resource: { is: "App::Document" },
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+ when: ["resource.owner == principal"],
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+ } as const;
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+
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+ /** The evaluator-agnostic artifact: this is what lands in the `.cedar` file. */
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+ export const ownerRead = new Policy(ownerReadProps);
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+
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+ /** The AVP deployment view of the same policy. */
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+ export const ownerReadAvp = new VerifiedPermissionsPolicy({
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+ PolicyStoreId: policyStore.ref(),
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+ Definition: avpPolicyDefinition("ownerRead", ownerReadProps, {
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+ ownership: { stack: "authz", env: "prod" },
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+ description: "Owners read their own documents.",
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+ }),
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+ });
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+ ```
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+
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+ Beside it: `avpStatement()` for the bare string, `avpStatementJSON()` for
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+ evaluators that take the JSON policy format, and `avpPolicySet(entities)` to
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+ render a whole build's policies at once, keyed by chant entity name.
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+
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+ **The cedar lexicon does not depend on the aws lexicon.** The seam is the data
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+ shape, which is stable CloudFormation. `examples/avp-embedding/` shows the
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+ pairing with a plain-object stand-in, because the shipped cedar examples build
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+ against the cedar serializer alone.
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+
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+ ## The lifecycle surface
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+
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+ `describeResources()`, `observeAmbient()` and `exportResources()` read a live
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+ policy store. Point them at one with `CEDAR_AVP_POLICY_STORE_ID` (or
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+ `CEDAR_AVP_POLICY_STORE_ID_<ENV>`), or a `policyStoreId` prop on a declared
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+ policy.
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+
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+ The link from a chant entity to a live policy is the Cedar `@id` annotation,
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+ which is derived from the export name (`ownerRead` → `owner-read`) unless
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+ `annotations.id` overrides it. Rename an export and the observation follows it;
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+ rename it *and* pin `annotations.id` and the live policy stays matched.
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+
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+ ## Rules
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+
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+ - **Do not write the statement as prose.** A hand-typed
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+ `"permit(principal, action, resource);"` in an AVP resource is the exact thing
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+ this lexicon exists to remove, and the meta-policy wall (see the
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+ `chant-cedar-meta-policy` skill) fails a bare permit in a prod build.
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+ - **Do not try to tag an individual policy.** AVP policy *stores* are taggable;
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+ individual policies are not — `CreatePolicy` has no tag surface and a policy
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+ has no ARN. chant's per-policy marker therefore rides in the policy
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+ description, stamped by passing `ownership` to `avpPolicyDefinition` and read
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+ back by `describeResources`/`exportResources`. Store tags remain the coarse
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+ channel. The design record, including what the choice costs, is
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+ `src/avp/OWNERSHIP.md`.
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+ - **Do not hand-write the description when you want ownership.** Pass
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+ `ownership` and let the marker be encoded; the description is capped at 150
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+ characters and the encoder truncates prose rather than the marker, which is
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+ what keeps a chant-owned policy from silently reading as foreign.
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+ - **Do not treat an ambient permit as housekeeping.** A permit found in a store
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+ that no source file declares is a standing grant somebody made outside review.
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+ It is a security finding. `observeAmbient()` reports the statement and its
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+ effect and stops short of the verdict — the judgement is yours.
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+
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+ ## Non-AVP evaluators
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+
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+ AVP is not the only target, and the lexicon does not privilege it. The same
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+ emitted `.cedar` and `policies.cedar.json` feed:
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+
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+ - **cedar-agent** — a standalone Cedar decision service; point it at the policy
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+ file and the entity store.
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+ - **An embedded `cedar-wasm`** — the package this lexicon already depends on.
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+ Load the policy text in-process and call `isAuthorized`.
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+ - **Cloudflare-style embeddings** — the same file, read at the edge.
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+
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+ If the deployment target is anything other than AVP, there is no embedding step
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+ at all. Emit the files and ship them.
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+
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+ ## Cedar-for-Kubernetes
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+
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+ The CNCF push includes Cedar as a Kubernetes authorizer, with policies as CRDs.
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+ Those kinds belong to the k8s lexicon's CRD sources — the same rule that kept
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+ `helm.cattle.io` out of the k3s lexicon. What the cedar lexicon does there is
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+ lint the policy *text* embedded in those kinds, which is the pattern the ARGO
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+ rules already use.
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
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+ ---
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+ skill: chant-cedar-meta-policy
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+ description: Organizational policy over Cedar policy sets — the bare-permit wall, forbid conventions, and env-aware severity
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+ user-invocable: true
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+ ---
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+
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+ # Policy About Policy
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+
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+ ## The ruling this sits under
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+
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+ Cedar is a target, never chant's gate. There is no `cedarGate()` and there will
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+ not be one: organizational policy in chant is TypeScript post-synth checks, and
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+ a second policy engine would duplicate the lint engine and break "TypeScript is
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+ the one language."
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+
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+ So the rules below are ordinary `PostSynthCheck`s and lint rules under the `CED`
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+ prefix. They read the emitted policy set the way any other check reads emitted
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+ YAML. Cedar's own validator runs beside them, in-process, through
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+ `@cedar-policy/cedar-wasm` — no CLI on PATH, no Docker.
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+
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+ ## The bare-permit wall
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+
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+ ```cedar
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+ permit (principal, action, resource);
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+ ```
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+
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+ Every scope position unconstrained, no `when`, no `unless`. It grants every
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+ principal every action on every resource. It is legal Cedar, it validates
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+ clean, and it is the single most damaging line a policy set can contain.
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+
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+ The rule is **env-aware, not absolute**:
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+
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+ | Environment | Verdict |
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+ |---|---|
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+ | dev / local | warn — a scratch policy set during development is a normal state |
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+ | staging | warn, and expect it fixed before promotion |
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+ | **prod** | **fail the build** |
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+
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+ Env-aware because an absolute rule gets suppressed the first time it fires
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+ during development, and a suppressed rule protects nothing. Failing only where
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+ the blast radius is real keeps the wall credible.
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+
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+ A permit with any of the following is not bare and does not trip the wall:
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+
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+ - a constrained scope position (`is`, `in`, `==`) on principal, action, or
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+ resource, or
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+ - at least one `when` or `unless` clause.
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+
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+ ## Schema-absent references
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+
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+ A policy naming an entity type or action the schema does not declare fails
52
+ **everywhere** — dev included. There is no environment where that is intended.
53
+ Two distinct failure modes hide behind it:
54
+
55
+ 1. **The typo.** `App::Documnt`. With generated classes this is a compile error
56
+ before any check runs, which is the point of the codegen. It survives only in
57
+ hand-written expression strings inside `when`/`unless`.
58
+ 2. **The silent no-op.** A scope naming an entity type outside the schema
59
+ *parses*, and `getValidRequestEnvsPolicy` answers "success, nothing" — an
60
+ empty request envelope. The policy is well-formed, deployed, and can never
61
+ fire. `cedar:coverage` reports these under `inert`.
62
+
63
+ ## Forbid conventions
64
+
65
+ Cedar is default-deny, so a `forbid` is never about the absence of a grant. It
66
+ is about the presence of a bad one: a forbid beats every permit in the set
67
+ unconditionally, which makes it the only construct that survives a later, wider
68
+ grant somebody adds next quarter.
69
+
70
+ Three conventions follow:
71
+
72
+ **Every forbid carries a guard.** An unguarded `forbid (principal, action,
73
+ resource)` denies everything and no permit can lift it — the policy set
74
+ authorizes nothing. `DenyByDefaultSet` throws on an empty `when` for this
75
+ reason.
76
+
77
+ **A forbid and the permits it governs ship together.** Separated, the forbid
78
+ gets deleted during a refactor and the permits keep working, wider than anyone
79
+ intended. `DenyByDefaultSet({ policies, when })` returns both from one call.
80
+
81
+ **Sensitive resources get an explicit floor, not just an absent permit.**
82
+ "Nobody wrote a permit for it" and "a forbid says no" look identical at
83
+ evaluation time and completely different in review. `cedar:coverage`'s
84
+ `forbidOnly` list is how you find declarations that have a floor; its
85
+ `uncovered` list is how you find the ones relying on absence.
86
+
87
+ ## Cross-domain checks
88
+
89
+ This is the thing no Cedar tool can express, because Cedar only ever sees
90
+ policies. In a chant build, policies and the infrastructure they govern are in
91
+ one entity graph, so a post-synth check can span both:
92
+
93
+ - an entity id in a policy references an actual resource declaration
94
+ - every declared bucket is covered by at least one `forbid`
95
+ - no schema action lacks any policy
96
+
97
+ These are ordinary post-synth checks. They are the differentiator, and they only
98
+ work because the policy set and the estate are built together.
99
+
100
+ ## Severity, by environment
101
+
102
+ | Finding | dev | staging | prod |
103
+ |---|---|---|---|
104
+ | Bare permit | warn | warn | fail |
105
+ | Entity type or action absent from schema | fail | fail | fail |
106
+ | Unguarded forbid | fail | fail | fail |
107
+ | Policy with an empty request envelope (inert) | warn | warn | fail |
108
+ | Schema action no policy covers | info | warn | warn |
109
+ | Entity type reachable only from a forbid | info | info | info |
110
+
111
+ The last row is deliberately never a failure. A resource nothing grants access
112
+ to is frequently correct.
113
+
114
+ ## Where these live
115
+
116
+ Post-synth checks and their catalog entries are **INTENTIUS/chant#1651**'s
117
+ scope. This skill describes the conventions the checks encode; if you are
118
+ writing a check, put it in `src/lint/post-synth/` with a `CED` id and an
119
+ `auditCatalog()` entry, not in a policy file.
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@intentius/chant-lexicon-cedar",
3
- "version": "0.44.8",
3
+ "version": "0.44.9",
4
4
  "description": "Cedar lexicon for chant — typed authoring for Cedar authorization policies",
5
5
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
6
6
  "homepage": "https://intentius.io/chant",
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
69
69
  },
70
70
  "peerDependencies": {
71
71
  "zod": "^4.3.6",
72
- "@intentius/chant": "^0.44.8",
72
+ "@intentius/chant": "^0.44.9",
73
73
  "typescript": "^5.9.3"
74
74
  }
75
75
  }
@@ -2,10 +2,12 @@
2
2
  * Cedar lexicon packaging — delegates to core's packagePipeline.
3
3
  */
4
4
 
5
+ import { cedarPlugin } from "../plugin";
5
6
  import { readFileSync } from "fs";
6
7
  import { dirname, join } from "path";
7
8
  import { fileURLToPath } from "url";
8
9
  import {
10
+ collectSkills,
9
11
  packagePipeline,
10
12
  type PackageOptions,
11
13
  type PackageResult,
@@ -42,8 +44,7 @@ export async function packageLexicon(opts: PackageOptions = {}): Promise<Package
42
44
 
43
45
  srcDir: pkgDir,
44
46
 
45
- // Skills, initTemplates and the docs site are #1654.
46
- collectSkills: () => new Map(),
47
+ collectSkills: () => collectSkills(cedarPlugin.skills?.() ?? []),
47
48
 
48
49
  version: pkgJson.version ?? "0.0.0",
49
50
  },
@@ -37,6 +37,18 @@ describe("cedar config namespace", () => {
37
37
  it("leaves everything optional, so an empty namespace is legal", () => {
38
38
  expect(cedarConfigSchema.parse({})).toEqual({});
39
39
  });
40
+
41
+ it("takes the dogwood binary path (#1659)", () => {
42
+ const parsed = cedarConfigSchema.parse({ dogwood: { binary: "../dogwood/target/release/dogwood" } });
43
+ expect(parsed.dogwood?.binary).toBe("../dogwood/target/release/dogwood");
44
+ });
45
+
46
+ it("rejects a typo in the dogwood namespace, where a silent skip would follow", () => {
47
+ // A misspelled key here means "no binary found", and "no binary found" is
48
+ // an advisory rather than a failure — exactly the case strictObject exists
49
+ // to catch before it turns into a validation gap nobody notices.
50
+ expect(() => cedarConfigSchema.parse({ dogwood: { path: "/usr/local/bin/dogwood" } })).toThrow();
51
+ });
40
52
  });
41
53
 
42
54
  describe("schema resolution", () => {
package/src/config.ts CHANGED
@@ -71,6 +71,34 @@ export const cedarConfigSchema = z.strictObject({
71
71
  requireProjectSchema: z.boolean().optional(),
72
72
  })
73
73
  .optional(),
74
+
75
+ /**
76
+ * The dogwood dialect's CLI-gated leg (#1659).
77
+ *
78
+ * `strictObject` again, for the reason the outer one is: a typo here is the
79
+ * difference between "full .dw validation ran" and "DWDE010 said it could
80
+ * not run", and the second is easy to skim past.
81
+ */
82
+ dogwood: z
83
+ .strictObject({
84
+ /**
85
+ * Path to the `dogwood` binary, absolute or relative to the config file.
86
+ *
87
+ * Optional, and its absence is not an error: DWDE010 warns-and-skips
88
+ * with an issue-linked advisory when no binary is found, which is the
89
+ * epic's explicit exception. Set this when the binary is built somewhere
90
+ * `PATH` does not reach — the on-demand harness shape the epic borrows
91
+ * from forgejo-runtime-e2e.
92
+ *
93
+ * A `chant.config.ts` cannot be read from inside a post-synth check —
94
+ * `check()` is synchronous and evaluating project code is not — so this
95
+ * key is honoured from `chant.config.json` and the `CHANT_DOGWOOD_BINARY`
96
+ * environment variable covers the TypeScript-config case. See
97
+ * `src/dogwood/cli.ts`.
98
+ */
99
+ binary: z.string().optional(),
100
+ })
101
+ .optional(),
74
102
  });
75
103
 
76
104
  export type CedarConfig = z.infer<typeof cedarConfigSchema>;