@intentius/chant-lexicon-aws 0.124.54 → 0.124.55
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/api/credential-chain.d.ts +3 -3
- package/dist/api/credential-chain.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/api/credential-chain.js +2 -2
- package/dist/api/read-client.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/api/read-client.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/api/read-client.js +2 -2
- package/dist/api/{sigv4.d.ts → signing.d.ts} +14 -34
- package/dist/api/signing.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/api/signing.js +95 -0
- package/dist/components/apply.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/components/apply.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/components/apply.js +6 -1
- package/dist/components/cfn-adopt-run.d.ts +37 -0
- package/dist/components/cfn-adopt-run.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/components/cfn-adopt-run.js +104 -0
- package/dist/components/cloud-executor.d.ts +7 -0
- package/dist/components/cloud-executor.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/components/cloud-executor.js +20 -0
- package/dist/health.js +1 -1
- package/dist/index-import.d.ts +8 -0
- package/dist/index-import.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index-import.js +20 -3
- package/dist/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/integrity.json +3 -3
- package/dist/manifest.json +1 -1
- package/dist/plugin.js +3 -3
- package/dist/skills/chant-aws-carve-terraform.md +21 -14
- package/package.json +2 -2
- package/src/api/credential-chain.ts +3 -3
- package/src/api/read-client.test.ts +2 -2
- package/src/api/read-client.ts +3 -3
- package/src/api/{sigv4.test.ts → signing.test.ts} +84 -96
- package/src/api/signing.ts +130 -0
- package/src/components/apply.ts +6 -1
- package/src/components/cfn-adopt-run.test.ts +227 -0
- package/src/components/cfn-adopt-run.ts +141 -0
- package/src/components/cloud-executor.ts +25 -0
- package/src/health.ts +1 -1
- package/src/index-import.test.ts +16 -1
- package/src/index-import.ts +20 -2
- package/src/index.ts +1 -1
- package/src/plugin.ts +3 -3
- package/src/skills/chant-aws-carve-terraform.md +21 -14
- package/dist/api/sigv4.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/api/sigv4.js +0 -185
- package/src/api/sigv4.ts +0 -243
package/src/plugin.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ aws cloudformation wait stack-update-complete --stack-name my-app-prod`,
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{
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file: "chant-aws-carve-terraform.md",
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name: "chant-aws-carve-terraform",
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description: "Demo
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description: "Demo moving one Terraform resource to native CloudFormation, fully offline (advise, emit, audit, bridge, apply); Terraform keeps the rest",
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triggers: [
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{ type: "context", value: "terraform" },
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{ type: "context", value: "carve" },
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@@ -620,12 +620,12 @@ aws cloudformation wait stack-update-complete --stack-name my-app-prod`,
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{
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title: "Run the offline demo",
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description: "Demo the full advise → emit → bridge → apply loop with no cloud",
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input: "Show me how chant
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input: "Show me how chant moves one resource from Terraform to CloudFormation",
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output: "cd examples/terraform-carve-out && ./demo.sh",
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},
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{
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title: "Adopt a resource from state",
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description: "Emit
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description: "Emit chant source for the AWS lexicon from a Terraform-managed resource, offline",
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input: "Adopt aws_s3_bucket.assets into chant",
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output: "chant carve emit --from ./terraform --select aws_s3_bucket.assets --state ./terraform/terraform.tfstate",
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},
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@@ -1,20 +1,26 @@
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---
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skill: chant-aws-carve-terraform
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description: Demo
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description: Demo moving one Terraform resource to native CloudFormation, fully offline (advise, emit, audit, bridge, apply); Terraform keeps the rest
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user-invocable: true
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---
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#
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# Move one Terraform resource to CloudFormation (demo)
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Use this skill to
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-
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estate
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graduation.
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Use this skill to demonstrate chant's carve flow, which moves one resource
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from a Terraform estate to chant source for the AWS lexicon. The whole demo
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runs **offline**, with no cloud account, Terraform binary or state backend. It
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moves an S3 bucket from a small Terraform estate to chant source, patches the
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resources that stay in Terraform, and plans the graduation.
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## When to use
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- Someone asks
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- Someone asks how chant can manage one resource from a Terraform root as
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native CloudFormation.
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- Someone on Terraform or OpenTofu asks how to get chant's ownership markers
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on their resources. Point them at choudoufu instead
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(`terraform.binary: "choudoufu"`, see
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https://intentius.io/chant/lexicons/terraform/ops/#choudoufu). Their roots
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stay in OpenTofu.
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- You want to show the advise → emit → audit → bridge → apply loop end to end.
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- You are evaluating whether a Terraform estate is worth carving.
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@@ -40,12 +46,12 @@ Walk the person through the output. That is the whole demo.
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From `examples/terraform-carve-out`, with `TF=./terraform`:
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1. **Advise
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1. **Advise: rank the resources.**
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```bash
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chant carve advise --from ./terraform
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```
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Point out the three bands: clean leaves (carve now), carvable with edits,
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and leave
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and stays in Terraform (`leave in Terraform` in the JSON). `aws_s3_bucket.assets` is a clean leaf held back one
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notch by the Lambda that reads it; `random_pet` has no native mapping.
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2. **Emit — adopt the bucket into chant source, offline, from state.**
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@@ -68,9 +74,9 @@ From `examples/terraform-carve-out`, with `TF=./terraform`:
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chant build ./carveout/src --lexicon aws
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```
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The first build fails, deliberately: the post-synth audit refuses the
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adopted bucket because
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-
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adopted bucket because it has no public-access block or TLS-only policy.
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This is a feature of carving: chant tells the person which settings the
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adopted resource is missing. Show the fix (add
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`PublicAccessBlockConfiguration` and a companion `S3BucketPolicy` with an
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`aws:SecureTransport = false` Deny — the tutorial page has the exact code),
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then re-run the build and show the valid CloudFormation template.
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- Nothing is destroyed or applied; every step before graduation is reversible
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with `terraform import`.
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- You carve one resource at a time.
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- You carve one resource at a time. Everything else stays in Terraform, where
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it already works.
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- `advise` and `bridge` work against **any** Terraform tree — offer to point
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them at the person's own estate.
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package/dist/api/sigv4.d.ts.map
DELETED
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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1
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{"version":3,"file":"sigv4.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/api/sigv4.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAkCA,gFAAgF;AAChF,eAAO,MAAM,oBAAoB,qEAAqE,CAAC;AASvG,qFAAqF;AACrF,MAAM,WAAW,cAAc;IAC7B,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACxB,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACvB;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;AAErE,yDAAyD;AACzD,MAAM,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAG,cAAc,GAAG,qBAAqB,CAAC;AAEzE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AACH,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CAChC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAC5B,GAAG,GAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,CAAe,GACpD,cAAc,GAAG,SAAS,CAW5B;AAED,gFAAgF;AAChF,MAAM,WAAW,YAAY;IAC3B,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,6EAA6E;IAC7E,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACZ,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IAChC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACb,mGAAmG;IACnG,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,WAAW,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC;IAC5B,uDAAuD;IACvD,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;CACZ;AAED,6EAA6E;AAC7E,wBAAgB,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG,MAAM,CAE1C;AAED,6BAA6B;AAC7B,wBAAgB,SAAS,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAEjD;AAMD;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAgB,UAAU,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAKxG;AAmCD;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAgB,gBAAgB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG;IAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,CASvG;AAED,+EAA+E;AAC/E,wBAAgB,gBAAgB,CAC9B,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EACd,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,EACR,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,EAC/B,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,GAClB;IAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,CAavC;AAED,iFAAiF;AACjF,wBAAgB,YAAY,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAExF;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAgB,WAAW,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CA0BzE"}
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package/dist/api/sigv4.js
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/**
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* AWS Signature Version 4, for the shared read transport (#1686).
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*
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* Two modules asked for this by name before it existed: `./read-client.ts` and
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* cedar's `lexicons/cedar/src/avp/client.ts` both send a placeholder
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* `Signature=unsigned` `Authorization` header that carries a credential scope
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* and nothing else, and both say in prose that the real thing belongs here
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* once rather than twice. Nothing else in the repo signs an AWS request — the
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* appliers (`op/activities/aws-apply.ts`) are unsigned too, which is why the
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* native paths have been emulator-scoped.
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*
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* ## No dependency
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*
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* SigV4 is four HMACs and two SHA-256s. `node:crypto` has both, so signing
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* costs nothing in the dependency tree — which matters here, because the whole
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* reason these transports are hand-written is to keep `@aws-sdk/*` and its
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* thirty-odd transitive packages out of a lexicon.
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*
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* ## What is signed, and what is not
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*
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* Header signing only. Query-string (presigned-URL) signing has no caller: the
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* read paths POST to a service endpoint, they do not hand out URLs.
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*
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* `host` is signed but never emitted. `fetch` computes `Host` from the URL and
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* forbids overriding it, so the signer derives the same value from the URL it
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* was given. A transport that rewrites the URL underneath the signer — a proxy
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* that keeps the original `Host`, say — would invalidate the signature; the
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* injectable-HTTP seam is for tests and emulators, not for URL rewriting.
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*/
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import { createHash, createHmac } from "node:crypto";
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const ALGORITHM = "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256";
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const TERMINATOR = "aws4_request";
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/** SHA-256 of the empty string — the payload hash of every bodyless request. */
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export const EMPTY_PAYLOAD_SHA256 = "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855";
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/**
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* Headers that must not be signed even when a caller sets them: `authorization`
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* is the output, and the others are rewritten in transit by proxies and agents,
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* so signing them produces intermittent 403s rather than security.
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*/
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const UNSIGNABLE = new Set(["authorization", "connection", "expect", "user-agent", "x-amzn-trace-id"]);
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/**
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* Credentials for a request: explicit → environment → absent.
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*
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* A resolver function is authoritative — if one is injected and it declines,
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* the environment is not consulted behind its back, because the point of
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* injecting one is to control the answer. Literal credentials are likewise
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* final. Only the no-source case falls through to `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` /
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* `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` (plus `AWS_SESSION_TOKEN` when set), and a half-set
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* environment — a key id with no secret — is absent rather than a signature
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* that cannot verify.
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*
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* The shared profile files are resolved asynchronously by
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* `./credential-chain.ts`, and the read transport passes its answer in as
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* literal credentials (#3958), so this function stays synchronous. Not
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* implemented anywhere: IMDS and the container credential endpoints.
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*/
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export function resolveCredentials(source, env = process.env) {
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if (typeof source === "function")
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return source();
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if (source)
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return source;
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const accessKeyId = env.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID;
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const secretAccessKey = env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY;
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if (!accessKeyId || !secretAccessKey)
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return undefined;
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return {
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accessKeyId,
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secretAccessKey,
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...(env.AWS_SESSION_TOKEN ? { sessionToken: env.AWS_SESSION_TOKEN } : {}),
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};
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}
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/** `YYYYMMDDTHHMMSSZ` — the `X-Amz-Date` format, which is ISO-8601 basic. */
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export function amzDate(date) {
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return date.toISOString().replace(/[:-]|\.\d{3}/g, "");
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}
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/** Lowercase hex SHA-256. */
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export function sha256Hex(payload) {
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return createHash("sha256").update(payload, "utf8").digest("hex");
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}
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function hmac(key, data) {
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return createHmac("sha256", key).update(data, "utf8").digest();
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}
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* The signing key: four chained HMACs from the secret, so the key on the wire
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* is scoped to one day, one region and one service rather than being the
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* account secret itself.
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*/
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export function signingKey(secretAccessKey, day, region, service) {
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const dateKey = hmac(`AWS4${secretAccessKey}`, day);
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const regionKey = hmac(dateKey, region);
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const serviceKey = hmac(regionKey, service);
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return hmac(serviceKey, TERMINATOR);
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}
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/**
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* RFC 3986 percent-encoding. `encodeURIComponent` leaves `!'()*` alone and AWS
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* does not, which is the difference between a signature that verifies and one
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* that does not for any path or parameter containing them.
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*/
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function encodeRfc3986(value) {
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return encodeURIComponent(value).replace(/[!'()*]/g, (c) => `%${c.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).toUpperCase()}`);
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}
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/**
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* The canonical path.
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*
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* Every caller of this module POSTs to `/`, so the one place implementations
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* genuinely diverge — S3 signs the path once-encoded, every other service signs
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* it twice-encoded — never arises. Segments are encoded once; a future caller
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* with a real path on a non-S3 service is the moment to revisit that.
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*/
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function canonicalPath(pathname) {
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return "/";
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};
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}
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/** The canonical request, verbatim as it is hashed into the string to sign. */
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signed,
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}
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/** The string to sign: algorithm, timestamp, scope, hashed canonical request. */
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export function stringToSign(timestamp, scope, canonical) {
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}
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* The caller's headers plus everything SigV4 adds: `x-amz-date`,
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*/
|
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export function signRequest(request) {
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const url = new URL(request.url);
|
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|
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const payloadHash = request.body.length === 0 ? EMPTY_PAYLOAD_SHA256 : sha256Hex(request.body);
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const signable = {
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|
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};
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const { canonical, signed } = canonicalRequest(request.method, url, signable, payloadHash);
|
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const scope = `${day}/${request.region}/${request.service}/${TERMINATOR}`;
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|
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const key = signingKey(request.credentials.secretAccessKey, day, request.region, request.service);
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const signature = hmac(key, stringToSign(timestamp, scope, canonical)).toString("hex");
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authorization: `${ALGORITHM} Credential=${request.credentials.accessKeyId}/${scope}, ` +
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package/src/api/sigv4.ts
DELETED
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@@ -1,243 +0,0 @@
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/**
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* AWS Signature Version 4, for the shared read transport (#1686).
|
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*
|
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* Two modules asked for this by name before it existed: `./read-client.ts` and
|
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|
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* cedar's `lexicons/cedar/src/avp/client.ts` both send a placeholder
|
|
6
|
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* `Signature=unsigned` `Authorization` header that carries a credential scope
|
|
7
|
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* and nothing else, and both say in prose that the real thing belongs here
|
|
8
|
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* once rather than twice. Nothing else in the repo signs an AWS request — the
|
|
9
|
-
* appliers (`op/activities/aws-apply.ts`) are unsigned too, which is why the
|
|
10
|
-
* native paths have been emulator-scoped.
|
|
11
|
-
*
|
|
12
|
-
* ## No dependency
|
|
13
|
-
*
|
|
14
|
-
* SigV4 is four HMACs and two SHA-256s. `node:crypto` has both, so signing
|
|
15
|
-
* costs nothing in the dependency tree — which matters here, because the whole
|
|
16
|
-
* reason these transports are hand-written is to keep `@aws-sdk/*` and its
|
|
17
|
-
* thirty-odd transitive packages out of a lexicon.
|
|
18
|
-
*
|
|
19
|
-
* ## What is signed, and what is not
|
|
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|
-
*
|
|
21
|
-
* Header signing only. Query-string (presigned-URL) signing has no caller: the
|
|
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|
-
* read paths POST to a service endpoint, they do not hand out URLs.
|
|
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|
-
*
|
|
24
|
-
* `host` is signed but never emitted. `fetch` computes `Host` from the URL and
|
|
25
|
-
* forbids overriding it, so the signer derives the same value from the URL it
|
|
26
|
-
* was given. A transport that rewrites the URL underneath the signer — a proxy
|
|
27
|
-
* that keeps the original `Host`, say — would invalidate the signature; the
|
|
28
|
-
* injectable-HTTP seam is for tests and emulators, not for URL rewriting.
|
|
29
|
-
*/
|
|
30
|
-
import { createHash, createHmac } from "node:crypto";
|
|
31
|
-
|
|
32
|
-
const ALGORITHM = "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256";
|
|
33
|
-
const TERMINATOR = "aws4_request";
|
|
34
|
-
|
|
35
|
-
/** SHA-256 of the empty string — the payload hash of every bodyless request. */
|
|
36
|
-
export const EMPTY_PAYLOAD_SHA256 = "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855";
|
|
37
|
-
|
|
38
|
-
/**
|
|
39
|
-
* Headers that must not be signed even when a caller sets them: `authorization`
|
|
40
|
-
* is the output, and the others are rewritten in transit by proxies and agents,
|
|
41
|
-
* so signing them produces intermittent 403s rather than security.
|
|
42
|
-
*/
|
|
43
|
-
const UNSIGNABLE = new Set(["authorization", "connection", "expect", "user-agent", "x-amzn-trace-id"]);
|
|
44
|
-
|
|
45
|
-
/** A resolved credential set. `sessionToken` is present for STS/role credentials. */
|
|
46
|
-
export interface AwsCredentials {
|
|
47
|
-
accessKeyId: string;
|
|
48
|
-
secretAccessKey: string;
|
|
49
|
-
sessionToken?: string;
|
|
50
|
-
}
|
|
51
|
-
|
|
52
|
-
/**
|
|
53
|
-
* The credential injection seam: a function the caller supplies to decide, by
|
|
54
|
-
* whatever means it likes, what to sign with. Returning `undefined` means "this
|
|
55
|
-
* process has no credentials" and is respected as an answer, not overridden.
|
|
56
|
-
*/
|
|
57
|
-
export type AwsCredentialResolver = () => AwsCredentials | undefined;
|
|
58
|
-
|
|
59
|
-
/** Either literal credentials or a resolver for them. */
|
|
60
|
-
export type AwsCredentialSource = AwsCredentials | AwsCredentialResolver;
|
|
61
|
-
|
|
62
|
-
/**
|
|
63
|
-
* Credentials for a request: explicit → environment → absent.
|
|
64
|
-
*
|
|
65
|
-
* A resolver function is authoritative — if one is injected and it declines,
|
|
66
|
-
* the environment is not consulted behind its back, because the point of
|
|
67
|
-
* injecting one is to control the answer. Literal credentials are likewise
|
|
68
|
-
* final. Only the no-source case falls through to `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` /
|
|
69
|
-
* `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` (plus `AWS_SESSION_TOKEN` when set), and a half-set
|
|
70
|
-
* environment — a key id with no secret — is absent rather than a signature
|
|
71
|
-
* that cannot verify.
|
|
72
|
-
*
|
|
73
|
-
* The shared profile files are resolved asynchronously by
|
|
74
|
-
* `./credential-chain.ts`, and the read transport passes its answer in as
|
|
75
|
-
* literal credentials (#3958), so this function stays synchronous. Not
|
|
76
|
-
* implemented anywhere: IMDS and the container credential endpoints.
|
|
77
|
-
*/
|
|
78
|
-
export function resolveCredentials(
|
|
79
|
-
source?: AwsCredentialSource,
|
|
80
|
-
env: Record<string, string | undefined> = process.env,
|
|
81
|
-
): AwsCredentials | undefined {
|
|
82
|
-
if (typeof source === "function") return source();
|
|
83
|
-
if (source) return source;
|
|
84
|
-
const accessKeyId = env.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID;
|
|
85
|
-
const secretAccessKey = env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY;
|
|
86
|
-
if (!accessKeyId || !secretAccessKey) return undefined;
|
|
87
|
-
return {
|
|
88
|
-
accessKeyId,
|
|
89
|
-
secretAccessKey,
|
|
90
|
-
...(env.AWS_SESSION_TOKEN ? { sessionToken: env.AWS_SESSION_TOKEN } : {}),
|
|
91
|
-
};
|
|
92
|
-
}
|
|
93
|
-
|
|
94
|
-
/** One request to sign. `headers` are the caller's; the signer adds its own. */
|
|
95
|
-
export interface SigV4Request {
|
|
96
|
-
method: string;
|
|
97
|
-
/** Absolute URL. Its host is signed and its path/query are canonicalized. */
|
|
98
|
-
url: string;
|
|
99
|
-
headers: Record<string, string>;
|
|
100
|
-
body: string;
|
|
101
|
-
/** Service name as it appears in the credential scope (`cloudformation`, `cloudcontrolapi`, …). */
|
|
102
|
-
service: string;
|
|
103
|
-
region: string;
|
|
104
|
-
credentials: AwsCredentials;
|
|
105
|
-
/** Signing clock. Injected by tests; otherwise now. */
|
|
106
|
-
now?: Date;
|
|
107
|
-
}
|
|
108
|
-
|
|
109
|
-
/** `YYYYMMDDTHHMMSSZ` — the `X-Amz-Date` format, which is ISO-8601 basic. */
|
|
110
|
-
export function amzDate(date: Date): string {
|
|
111
|
-
return date.toISOString().replace(/[:-]|\.\d{3}/g, "");
|
|
112
|
-
}
|
|
113
|
-
|
|
114
|
-
/** Lowercase hex SHA-256. */
|
|
115
|
-
export function sha256Hex(payload: string): string {
|
|
116
|
-
return createHash("sha256").update(payload, "utf8").digest("hex");
|
|
117
|
-
}
|
|
118
|
-
|
|
119
|
-
function hmac(key: Buffer | string, data: string): Buffer {
|
|
120
|
-
return createHmac("sha256", key).update(data, "utf8").digest();
|
|
121
|
-
}
|
|
122
|
-
|
|
123
|
-
/**
|
|
124
|
-
* The signing key: four chained HMACs from the secret, so the key on the wire
|
|
125
|
-
* is scoped to one day, one region and one service rather than being the
|
|
126
|
-
* account secret itself.
|
|
127
|
-
*/
|
|
128
|
-
export function signingKey(secretAccessKey: string, day: string, region: string, service: string): Buffer {
|
|
129
|
-
const dateKey = hmac(`AWS4${secretAccessKey}`, day);
|
|
130
|
-
const regionKey = hmac(dateKey, region);
|
|
131
|
-
const serviceKey = hmac(regionKey, service);
|
|
132
|
-
return hmac(serviceKey, TERMINATOR);
|
|
133
|
-
}
|
|
134
|
-
|
|
135
|
-
/**
|
|
136
|
-
* RFC 3986 percent-encoding. `encodeURIComponent` leaves `!'()*` alone and AWS
|
|
137
|
-
* does not, which is the difference between a signature that verifies and one
|
|
138
|
-
* that does not for any path or parameter containing them.
|
|
139
|
-
*/
|
|
140
|
-
function encodeRfc3986(value: string): string {
|
|
141
|
-
return encodeURIComponent(value).replace(
|
|
142
|
-
/[!'()*]/g,
|
|
143
|
-
(c) => `%${c.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).toUpperCase()}`,
|
|
144
|
-
);
|
|
145
|
-
}
|
|
146
|
-
|
|
147
|
-
/**
|
|
148
|
-
* The canonical path.
|
|
149
|
-
*
|
|
150
|
-
* Every caller of this module POSTs to `/`, so the one place implementations
|
|
151
|
-
* genuinely diverge — S3 signs the path once-encoded, every other service signs
|
|
152
|
-
* it twice-encoded — never arises. Segments are encoded once; a future caller
|
|
153
|
-
* with a real path on a non-S3 service is the moment to revisit that.
|
|
154
|
-
*/
|
|
155
|
-
function canonicalPath(pathname: string): string {
|
|
156
|
-
if (!pathname || pathname === "/") return "/";
|
|
157
|
-
return pathname.split("/").map(encodeRfc3986).join("/");
|
|
158
|
-
}
|
|
159
|
-
|
|
160
|
-
/** Query parameters sorted by name, then by value, each side encoded. */
|
|
161
|
-
function canonicalQuery(search: URLSearchParams): string {
|
|
162
|
-
const pairs: Array<[string, string]> = [];
|
|
163
|
-
search.forEach((value, name) => pairs.push([encodeRfc3986(name), encodeRfc3986(value)]));
|
|
164
|
-
pairs.sort((a, b) => (a[0] === b[0] ? (a[1] < b[1] ? -1 : a[1] > b[1] ? 1 : 0) : a[0] < b[0] ? -1 : 1));
|
|
165
|
-
return pairs.map(([name, value]) => `${name}=${value}`).join("&");
|
|
166
|
-
}
|
|
167
|
-
|
|
168
|
-
/**
|
|
169
|
-
* Header names lowercased, values trimmed with internal whitespace runs
|
|
170
|
-
* collapsed, sorted by name. Returns the canonical block and the `;`-joined
|
|
171
|
-
* signed-header list that has to agree with it exactly.
|
|
172
|
-
*/
|
|
173
|
-
export function canonicalHeaders(headers: Record<string, string>): { canonical: string; signed: string } {
|
|
174
|
-
const entries = Object.entries(headers)
|
|
175
|
-
.map(([name, value]) => [name.toLowerCase().trim(), value.trim().replace(/\s+/g, " ")] as const)
|
|
176
|
-
.filter(([name]) => !UNSIGNABLE.has(name))
|
|
177
|
-
.sort((a, b) => (a[0] < b[0] ? -1 : a[0] > b[0] ? 1 : 0));
|
|
178
|
-
return {
|
|
179
|
-
canonical: entries.map(([name, value]) => `${name}:${value}\n`).join(""),
|
|
180
|
-
signed: entries.map(([name]) => name).join(";"),
|
|
181
|
-
};
|
|
182
|
-
}
|
|
183
|
-
|
|
184
|
-
/** The canonical request, verbatim as it is hashed into the string to sign. */
|
|
185
|
-
export function canonicalRequest(
|
|
186
|
-
method: string,
|
|
187
|
-
url: URL,
|
|
188
|
-
headers: Record<string, string>,
|
|
189
|
-
payloadHash: string,
|
|
190
|
-
): { canonical: string; signed: string } {
|
|
191
|
-
const { canonical: headerBlock, signed } = canonicalHeaders(headers);
|
|
192
|
-
return {
|
|
193
|
-
canonical: [
|
|
194
|
-
method.toUpperCase(),
|
|
195
|
-
canonicalPath(url.pathname),
|
|
196
|
-
canonicalQuery(url.searchParams),
|
|
197
|
-
headerBlock,
|
|
198
|
-
signed,
|
|
199
|
-
payloadHash,
|
|
200
|
-
].join("\n"),
|
|
201
|
-
signed,
|
|
202
|
-
};
|
|
203
|
-
}
|
|
204
|
-
|
|
205
|
-
/** The string to sign: algorithm, timestamp, scope, hashed canonical request. */
|
|
206
|
-
export function stringToSign(timestamp: string, scope: string, canonical: string): string {
|
|
207
|
-
return [ALGORITHM, timestamp, scope, sha256Hex(canonical)].join("\n");
|
|
208
|
-
}
|
|
209
|
-
|
|
210
|
-
/**
|
|
211
|
-
* The caller's headers plus everything SigV4 adds: `x-amz-date`,
|
|
212
|
-
* `x-amz-content-sha256`, `x-amz-security-token` when the credentials are
|
|
213
|
-
* temporary, and the `Authorization` header itself.
|
|
214
|
-
*
|
|
215
|
-
* `host` is signed (AWS requires it) but not returned — see the module header.
|
|
216
|
-
*/
|
|
217
|
-
export function signRequest(request: SigV4Request): Record<string, string> {
|
|
218
|
-
const url = new URL(request.url);
|
|
219
|
-
const timestamp = amzDate(request.now ?? new Date());
|
|
220
|
-
const day = timestamp.slice(0, 8);
|
|
221
|
-
const payloadHash = request.body.length === 0 ? EMPTY_PAYLOAD_SHA256 : sha256Hex(request.body);
|
|
222
|
-
|
|
223
|
-
const signable: Record<string, string> = {
|
|
224
|
-
...request.headers,
|
|
225
|
-
host: url.host,
|
|
226
|
-
"x-amz-date": timestamp,
|
|
227
|
-
"x-amz-content-sha256": payloadHash,
|
|
228
|
-
...(request.credentials.sessionToken ? { "x-amz-security-token": request.credentials.sessionToken } : {}),
|
|
229
|
-
};
|
|
230
|
-
|
|
231
|
-
const { canonical, signed } = canonicalRequest(request.method, url, signable, payloadHash);
|
|
232
|
-
const scope = `${day}/${request.region}/${request.service}/${TERMINATOR}`;
|
|
233
|
-
const key = signingKey(request.credentials.secretAccessKey, day, request.region, request.service);
|
|
234
|
-
const signature = hmac(key, stringToSign(timestamp, scope, canonical)).toString("hex");
|
|
235
|
-
|
|
236
|
-
const { host: _host, ...emitted } = signable;
|
|
237
|
-
return {
|
|
238
|
-
...emitted,
|
|
239
|
-
authorization:
|
|
240
|
-
`${ALGORITHM} Credential=${request.credentials.accessKeyId}/${scope}, ` +
|
|
241
|
-
`SignedHeaders=${signed}, Signature=${signature}`,
|
|
242
|
-
};
|
|
243
|
-
}
|