@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.974 → 0.28.975

package/dist/bin/agt.js

@@ -40,12 +40,12 @@ import {
   success,
   table,
   warn
-} from "../chunk-3PYNSD4I.js";
+} from "../chunk-KUSBSYQA.js";
 import {
   getProjectDir,
   isSessionResumeDisabled,
   readDirectChatSessionState
-} from "../chunk-PHPOHMSK.js";
+} from "../chunk-YBDGTOXI.js";
 import {
   AnchorSessionClient,
   CHANNEL_REGISTRY,
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ import {
   serializeManifestForSlackCli,
   sessionFileExists,
   sessionTranscriptDir
-} from "../chunk-HRHDATT5.js";
+} from "../chunk-VRYNZ3G5.js";
 import "../chunk-DHWNVVX4.js";
 import "../chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 
@@ -5471,7 +5471,7 @@ import { execFileSync, execSync } from "child_process";
 import { existsSync as existsSync11, realpathSync as realpathSync2 } from "fs";
 import chalk18 from "chalk";
 import ora16 from "ora";
-var cliVersion = true ? "0.28.974" : "dev";
+var cliVersion = true ? "0.28.975" : "dev";
 async function fetchLatestVersion() {
   const host2 = getHost();
   if (!host2) return null;
@@ -6731,7 +6731,7 @@ function handleError(err) {
 }
 
 // src/bin/agt.ts
-var cliVersion2 = true ? "0.28.974" : "dev";
+var cliVersion2 = true ? "0.28.975" : "dev";
 var program = new Command();
 program.name("agt").description("Augmented CLI \u2014 agent provisioning and management").version(cliVersion2).option("--json", "Emit machine-readable JSON output (suppress spinners and colors)").option("--skip-update-check", "Skip the automatic update check on startup");
 program.hook("preAction", async (thisCommand, actionCommand) => {

package/dist/{chunk-3PYNSD4I.js → chunk-KUSBSYQA.js}

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import {
   parseEnvFileEntries,
   parseEnvIntegrations,
   shellQuote
-} from "./chunk-PHPOHMSK.js";
+} from "./chunk-YBDGTOXI.js";
 import {
   BIND_FAILURE_QUARANTINE_THRESHOLD,
   INTEGRATIONS_SECTION_END,
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ import {
   sessionTranscriptDir,
   worseConnectivityOutcome,
   wrapScheduledTaskPrompt
-} from "./chunk-HRHDATT5.js";
+} from "./chunk-VRYNZ3G5.js";
 import {
   classifyUnanswerablePane,
   summarizeUnanswerablePane
@@ -6967,7 +6967,7 @@ function exchangeFailureKind(err) {
 }
 
 // src/lib/api-client.ts
-var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.974" : "dev";
+var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.975" : "dev";
 var lastConfigHash = null;
 function setConfigHash(hash) {
   lastConfigHash = hash && hash.length > 0 ? hash : null;
@@ -11709,4 +11709,4 @@ export {
   managerInstallSystemUnitCommand,
   managerUninstallSystemUnitCommand
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-3PYNSD4I.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-KUSBSYQA.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-HRHDATT5.js → chunk-VRYNZ3G5.js}

@@ -7378,11 +7378,18 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "ip-allowlist-enforce-admin-debug",
-    description: "ENG-10594 - whether the IP allowlist on the admin-debug surface (/admin/debug/*, including the deliberately unauthenticated POST /admin/debug/token that exchanges a tlk_ key) REFUSES, or merely observes. OFF (default) = shadow: every request is still evaluated and logged with verdict=admit or verdict=would-refuse, and nothing is ever rejected. ON = a caller whose platform-attested source address is outside AGT_IP_ALLOWLIST_ADMIN_DEBUG gets a bare 403. THE SSM PARAMETER IS A SECOND LEVER AND BOTH ARE NEEDED: with the list unset this flag does nothing, because an unconfigured allowlist admits everyone by design. Arm in that order - populate the list, read the shadow logs until the would-refuse set is understood, then flip this. Deliberately global (evaluated with an empty context): the middleware runs BEFORE authentication, so there is no verified org to scope by, and taking one from an unverified request would let a caller choose its own enforcement posture. Separate from the mcp flag on purpose - see that entry.",
+    description: "ENG-10594 - whether the IP allowlist on the admin-debug surface (/admin/debug/*, including the deliberately unauthenticated POST /admin/debug/token that exchanges a tlk_ key) REFUSES, or merely observes. OFF (default) = shadow: every request is still evaluated and logged with verdict=admit or verdict=would-refuse, and nothing is ever rejected. ON = a caller whose platform-attested source address is outside AGT_IP_ALLOWLIST_ADMIN_DEBUG gets a bare 403. THE SSM PARAMETER IS A SECOND LEVER AND BOTH ARE NEEDED: with the list unset this flag does nothing, because an unconfigured allowlist admits everyone by design. Arm in that order - populate the list, read the shadow logs until the would-refuse set is understood, then flip this. Deliberately global (evaluated with an empty context): the middleware runs BEFORE authentication, so there is no verified org to scope by, and taking one from an unverified request would let a caller choose its own enforcement posture. There is deliberately NO counterpart flag for the per-agent MCP surface: that one is shadow-only structurally (its ENFORCE_FLAG entry is null), so arming this one does not and cannot arm that one. See the comment below this entry for why.",
     flagType: "boolean",
-    // Shadow. The measurement comes first: nobody yet knows the real set of
-    // staff addresses, and arming against a guess locks you out of the very
-    // tool you would use to diagnose the lockout.
+    // Shadow. The measurement comes first - and ENG-10664 corrected what the
+    // measurement is OF. This comment used to say "nobody yet knows the real set
+    // of staff addresses": there is no such set. Measured over 48h, all 315
+    // requests to this surface came from ONE address, the agt-hosts AZ-2a NAT
+    // EIP - an AGENT calling the debug_* tools, not a person. The decided policy
+    // is that it stays that way (admin-debug is only ever reached from our own
+    // NAT gateways). So the pre-arm check is not "does my laptop appear" but
+    // "is every NAT EIP in the list", because an AZ whose NAT has not yet
+    // carried a debug_* call is absent from the log and would be refused the
+    // instant this flips. See docs/runbooks/ip-allowlist-rollout.md step 3.
     defaultValue: false,
     // Arming it changes who can reach production diagnostics. Worth one
     // confirmation.
@@ -7397,20 +7404,34 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   // ENFORCE_FLAG (packages/api/src/middleware/ip-allowlist.ts) is null, so no
   // flag is consulted and no flag flip can arm it.
   //
-  // Why it is not simply a second flag defaulting false: most of that surface's
-  // callers have no allowlistable address at all. Per ADR-0032 only hosts in the
-  // agt-hosts account egress through stable NAT EIPs; a host with
-  // provision_source `self` or `customer-ec2`, or any BYO account, egresses from
-  // an address the control plane cannot know. Arming against that population
-  // black-holes a customer's whole fleet, and per
-  // docs/runbooks/composio-allowlist-rollout.md this class of change has no
+  // Why it is not simply a second flag defaulting false (CORRECTED, ENG-10664):
+  //
+  // This comment used to say the callers are agent HOSTS, most of which have no
+  // allowlistable address per ADR-0032. That is the wrong caller. Agent hosts do
+  // not call this surface at all: its handler's first act is
+  // validateMcpAccessToken() against `mcp_oauth_tokens` (routes/mcp.ts:87, token
+  // check at :91), so a host JWT is rejected outright - routes/host-runtime.ts
+  // :33421 says so in as many words, which is why the ENG-4724 /host/* twins
+  // exist. The caller set is remote MCP OAuth clients, structurally.
+  //
+  // The conclusion is unchanged and ONLY the reason has moved. Allowlisting this
+  // surface would mean pinning a THIRD PARTY's egress ranges rather than our own
+  // NAT EIPs - a different control, a different owner, a different failure mode:
+  // they move a range and agent MCP access breaks with no signal on our side.
+  // Per docs/runbooks/composio-allowlist-rollout.md this class of change has no
   // fleet-level undo. A flag would leave that one toggle away during an
   // incident, from someone who had just armed the admin-debug surface and
   // reasonably assumed the pair moved together. Requiring a code change puts
   // review in front of an irreversible action, which is the right price.
   //
-  // If the shadow data ever shows the population IS allowlistable, adding the
-  // flag here and a key in ENFORCE_FLAG is a small, deliberate diff.
+  // Keeping the false rationale would have been worse than having none: a reader
+  // who checked it would find it does not hold and might "fix" it by adding the
+  // flag. That is the failure this rewrite exists to prevent.
+  //
+  // If we ever DECIDE to take on that third-party dependency deliberately,
+  // adding the flag here and a key in ENFORCE_FLAG is a small diff - but it is a
+  // decision to own someone else's egress, not a discovery that the population
+  // was allowlistable all along.
 ];
 var REGISTRY_BY_KEY = new Map(FLAG_REGISTRY.map((definition) => [definition.key, definition]));
 function getFlagDefinition(key) {
@@ -15179,4 +15200,4 @@ export {
   peekCurrentSession,
   readDailySessionPin
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-HRHDATT5.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-VRYNZ3G5.js.map