@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.948 → 0.28.949

package/dist/bin/agt.js

@@ -40,12 +40,12 @@ import {
   success,
   table,
   warn
-} from "../chunk-YGYDTSMZ.js";
+} from "../chunk-MTRJTGJL.js";
 import {
   getProjectDir,
   isSessionResumeDisabled,
   readDirectChatSessionState
-} from "../chunk-LRVXTEFJ.js";
+} from "../chunk-A3T3WOC2.js";
 import {
   AnchorSessionClient,
   CHANNEL_REGISTRY,
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ import {
   serializeManifestForSlackCli,
   sessionFileExists,
   sessionTranscriptDir
-} from "../chunk-YZ5HGHPG.js";
+} from "../chunk-JANAAFED.js";
 import "../chunk-DHWNVVX4.js";
 import "../chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 
@@ -5471,7 +5471,7 @@ import { execFileSync, execSync } from "child_process";
 import { existsSync as existsSync11, realpathSync as realpathSync2 } from "fs";
 import chalk18 from "chalk";
 import ora16 from "ora";
-var cliVersion = true ? "0.28.948" : "dev";
+var cliVersion = true ? "0.28.949" : "dev";
 async function fetchLatestVersion() {
   const host2 = getHost();
   if (!host2) return null;
@@ -6731,7 +6731,7 @@ function handleError(err) {
 }
 
 // src/bin/agt.ts
-var cliVersion2 = true ? "0.28.948" : "dev";
+var cliVersion2 = true ? "0.28.949" : "dev";
 var program = new Command();
 program.name("agt").description("Augmented CLI \u2014 agent provisioning and management").version(cliVersion2).option("--json", "Emit machine-readable JSON output (suppress spinners and colors)").option("--skip-update-check", "Skip the automatic update check on startup");
 program.hook("preAction", async (thisCommand, actionCommand) => {

package/dist/{chunk-LRVXTEFJ.js → chunk-A3T3WOC2.js}

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ import {
   rotateDailySession,
   sessionFileExists,
   todayLocalIso
-} from "./chunk-YZ5HGHPG.js";
+} from "./chunk-JANAAFED.js";
 import {
   classifyUnanswerablePane,
   findUsageLimitResetHint,
@@ -5454,4 +5454,4 @@ export {
   stopAllSessionsAndWait,
   getProjectDir
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-LRVXTEFJ.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-A3T3WOC2.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-YZ5HGHPG.js → chunk-JANAAFED.js}

@@ -7218,7 +7218,42 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // Deliberately NOT public. The browser has no decision to make here; the
     // consumers are the host payload that builds `input.integrations` and the
     // grant route that refuses to install the row while the flag is off.
+  },
+  {
+    key: "ip-allowlist-enforce-admin-debug",
+    description: "ENG-10594 - whether the IP allowlist on the admin-debug surface (/admin/debug/*, including the deliberately unauthenticated POST /admin/debug/token that exchanges a tlk_ key) REFUSES, or merely observes. OFF (default) = shadow: every request is still evaluated and logged with verdict=admit or verdict=would-refuse, and nothing is ever rejected. ON = a caller whose platform-attested source address is outside AGT_IP_ALLOWLIST_ADMIN_DEBUG gets a bare 403. THE SSM PARAMETER IS A SECOND LEVER AND BOTH ARE NEEDED: with the list unset this flag does nothing, because an unconfigured allowlist admits everyone by design. Arm in that order - populate the list, read the shadow logs until the would-refuse set is understood, then flip this. Deliberately global (evaluated with an empty context): the middleware runs BEFORE authentication, so there is no verified org to scope by, and taking one from an unverified request would let a caller choose its own enforcement posture. Separate from the mcp flag on purpose - see that entry.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Shadow. The measurement comes first: nobody yet knows the real set of
+    // staff addresses, and arming against a guess locks you out of the very
+    // tool you would use to diagnose the lockout.
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Arming it changes who can reach production diagnostics. Worth one
+    // confirmation.
+    sensitive: true
+    // Not public: the browser makes no decision from this. The only consumer is
+    // packages/api/src/middleware/ip-allowlist.ts.
   }
+  // THERE IS DELIBERATELY NO `ip-allowlist-enforce-mcp` FLAG.
+  //
+  // The per-agent MCP surface (POST /agents/:codeName/mcp) is allowlist
+  // SHADOW-ONLY, enforced structurally rather than by a default: its entry in
+  // ENFORCE_FLAG (packages/api/src/middleware/ip-allowlist.ts) is null, so no
+  // flag is consulted and no flag flip can arm it.
+  //
+  // Why it is not simply a second flag defaulting false: most of that surface's
+  // callers have no allowlistable address at all. Per ADR-0032 only hosts in the
+  // agt-hosts account egress through stable NAT EIPs; a host with
+  // provision_source `self` or `customer-ec2`, or any BYO account, egresses from
+  // an address the control plane cannot know. Arming against that population
+  // black-holes a customer's whole fleet, and per
+  // docs/runbooks/composio-allowlist-rollout.md this class of change has no
+  // fleet-level undo. A flag would leave that one toggle away during an
+  // incident, from someone who had just armed the admin-debug surface and
+  // reasonably assumed the pair moved together. Requiring a code change puts
+  // review in front of an irreversible action, which is the right price.
+  //
+  // If the shadow data ever shows the population IS allowlistable, adding the
+  // flag here and a key in ENFORCE_FLAG is a small, deliberate diff.
 ];
 var REGISTRY_BY_KEY = new Map(FLAG_REGISTRY.map((definition) => [definition.key, definition]));
 function getFlagDefinition(key) {
@@ -14800,4 +14835,4 @@ export {
   peekCurrentSession,
   readDailySessionPin
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-YZ5HGHPG.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-JANAAFED.js.map