@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.853 → 0.28.855

package/dist/mcp/direct-chat-channel.js

@@ -31462,6 +31462,110 @@ var HOURLY_BY_REGION = {
 };
 var KNOWN_PRICING_REGIONS = Object.keys(HOURLY_BY_REGION);
 
+// ../core/dist/guardrails/enforcer-registry.js
+var GUARDRAIL_ENFORCERS = [
+  // ---- Enforced: this definition has its own enforcement point -------------
+  {
+    id: "email.domain_restrict",
+    mechanism: "enforced",
+    stage: "live",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "enforceEmailDomainGuard runs at the top of both agent-egress paths; internal_only with zero verified domains takes an explicit AUDITED no-op branch rather than failing open silently."
+  },
+  {
+    // MEASURED, and it corrects a claim ADR-0080 makes about this definition.
+    //
+    // The ADR reports calendar as `enforced` + `stage: 'shadow'`, blocked by
+    // ENG-5868 (caller identity is not threaded to `callIntegrationTool`). Read
+    // literally that says an org cannot get redaction today, and that is not
+    // what the code does. `decideCalendarRedactionMode` (calendar-policy.ts) is
+    // FAIL-CLOSED: with the caller unresolvable it returns `redact`, not
+    // pass-through. `redactCalendarToolResponseIfNeeded` then calls
+    // `applyRedactionToResponse` for every response whenever `config.stage` is
+    // `enforce`. So an org that sets the stage gets real redaction — ENG-5868
+    // costs the control its PRECISION (it cannot spare the principal), not its
+    // ability to act.
+    //
+    // The stage is therefore per-ORG configuration, which ADR-0080 decision 1
+    // is explicit is the effectiveness axis the static union deliberately does
+    // not carry. `effectiveCalendarEnforcement` in the CLAUDE.md renderer owns
+    // it, and since ENG-10104 caps `enforce` to `warn` whenever the org's stage
+    // is not `enforce`.
+    id: "calendar.confidentiality",
+    mechanism: "enforced",
+    stage: "live",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/calendar-confidentiality-guard.ts",
+    effect: "at config.stage=enforce, redacts summary/description/attendees/location out of calendar read responses; at shadow/warn it writes a would_redact audit row and returns the response unchanged."
+  },
+  // ---- Delegated: read by another definition's enforcement point -----------
+  //
+  // Both can block, because their owner's point is live — which is the question
+  // `guardrailCanBlock` asks and the right answer to it. It is NOT the whole
+  // story for these two, and the gap has its own ticket: the org's email guard
+  // STAGE is threaded into the prompt shape for `email.domain_restrict`'s id
+  // alone (`host-runtime.ts`, the ENG-7829 fix), so a row of either id stored at
+  // `enforce` on a shadow-stage org still renders under "must comply" with
+  // nothing capping it. That is the effectiveness axis, not the mechanism one —
+  // ENG-10110.
+  {
+    id: "email.require_approval",
+    mechanism: "delegated",
+    ownedBy: "email.domain_restrict",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "routes a send to an approver instead of letting it leave."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "email.mail_rules",
+    mechanism: "delegated",
+    ownedBy: "email.domain_restrict",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "gates mail-rule creation/modification on the same egress path."
+  },
+  // ---- Advisory: seeded, applied, rendered — and read by nothing -----------
+  //
+  // These are NOT dead config. They are presented to operators in the console
+  // and to agents in CLAUDE.md, three of them under a heading that promises the
+  // violation is blocked. Listed individually rather than as a wildcard so that
+  // fixing one is a one-line diff from `advisory` to `enforced`.
+  //
+  // The ticket is ENG-9800, not ENG-9874. ENG-9874 catalogued these and is
+  // closed; a closed ticket tracks nothing, which is the same shrug an absent
+  // one would be. ENG-9800 is the open sweep that owns making them real.
+  {
+    id: "require-approval-for-actions",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: `Rendered to agents as "violation blocks the action". Nothing reads it. The ENG-8562 incident is this guardrail's promise, unkept.`
+  },
+  {
+    id: "data.pii_access",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: "Rendered as Enforced with block_export semantics; no export path consults it."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "data.credential_access",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: "Rendered as Enforced with block_read/block_write; no credential path consults it."
+  },
+  { id: "comm.social_posting", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "compliance.audit_all", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "no-external-network", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "no-pii-in-output", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "restrict-file-access", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "schedule.operating_hours", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "spend.hourly_limit", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.allow_list", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.block_list", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.financial_txn", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "working-hours-only", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" }
+];
+var BY_ID = new Map(GUARDRAIL_ENFORCERS.map((e) => [e.id, e]));
+
 // ../core/dist/provisioning/frameworks/claudecode/agent-rules.js
 var MAX_AGENT_RULES = 8;
 var MAX_AGENT_RULE_CHARS = 200;
@@ -36112,6 +36216,35 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     defaultValue: false,
     envVar: "AGT_MODEL_API_ERROR_REPORTING_ENABLED"
   },
+  {
+    key: "model-policy-failover-trigger",
+    description: "Automatic model-policy failover (ENG-10156, ADR-0074). off = the trigger does not run. shadow = it evaluates every ingested model-API error against the policy's failover_trigger config and LOGS the decision with its inputs, acting on nothing. Enum gate; ships OFF.",
+    flagType: "enum",
+    // `armed` is DELIBERATELY not an allowed value yet.
+    //
+    // Nothing writes model_policy_failover_state with source='auto' — that is
+    // the actuation half, and it is gated behind a recorded shadow soak
+    // (ENG-10156 AC8). Offering `armed` now would be a setting an operator can
+    // select, that reports success, and that does nothing: the failure mode is
+    // worse than the missing feature, because it looks like a fleet running
+    // with automatic failover enabled. Add it in the same change that makes it
+    // act, not before.
+    allowedValues: ["off", "shadow"],
+    // OFF, not `shadow`, and the contrast with `channel-quarantine-mode` is the
+    // reason: that flag defaults to `shadow` because shadow WAS the live
+    // manager's compiled behaviour, so anything else would have changed the
+    // fleet. Here there is no incumbent behaviour to preserve — nothing has ever
+    // evaluated this — so `off` is the honest default and turning shadow on is a
+    // deliberate act with a soak attached to it.
+    defaultValue: "off",
+    envVar: "AGT_MODEL_POLICY_FAILOVER_TRIGGER_MODE",
+    // Marked sensitive ahead of `armed` existing: the value this flag will
+    // eventually carry moves a host onto a secondary binding whose credential
+    // may be ours (credential_owner: 'platform'), i.e. it spends money with no
+    // human in the loop. Declaring that now costs nothing and means the audited
+    // -flip behaviour is already in place on the day the value is added.
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "claude-md-skills-index",
     description: `Manager injects the "## Available Skills" bullet list (one line per installed skill, name + frontmatter description) into the agent's project CLAUDE.md. Claude Code already surfaces installed skills to the model natively from .claude/skills/*/SKILL.md, so on current models the list is duplicated context - and an expensive one: it measured 12,045 chars across 29 skills on a prod agent, pushing project/CLAUDE.md to 51k against Claude Code's 40,000-char ceiling, past which the tail of the agent's own system prompt is silently truncated. OFF suppresses ONLY the skill bullets; the "Updating Integrations" guidance in the same managed block is real instruction and is always kept. Defaults ON (today's behaviour) - flip OFF per org to reclaim the headroom.`,

package/dist/mcp/index.js

@@ -24011,6 +24011,110 @@ var HOURLY_BY_REGION = {
 };
 var KNOWN_PRICING_REGIONS = Object.keys(HOURLY_BY_REGION);
 
+// ../core/dist/guardrails/enforcer-registry.js
+var GUARDRAIL_ENFORCERS = [
+  // ---- Enforced: this definition has its own enforcement point -------------
+  {
+    id: "email.domain_restrict",
+    mechanism: "enforced",
+    stage: "live",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "enforceEmailDomainGuard runs at the top of both agent-egress paths; internal_only with zero verified domains takes an explicit AUDITED no-op branch rather than failing open silently."
+  },
+  {
+    // MEASURED, and it corrects a claim ADR-0080 makes about this definition.
+    //
+    // The ADR reports calendar as `enforced` + `stage: 'shadow'`, blocked by
+    // ENG-5868 (caller identity is not threaded to `callIntegrationTool`). Read
+    // literally that says an org cannot get redaction today, and that is not
+    // what the code does. `decideCalendarRedactionMode` (calendar-policy.ts) is
+    // FAIL-CLOSED: with the caller unresolvable it returns `redact`, not
+    // pass-through. `redactCalendarToolResponseIfNeeded` then calls
+    // `applyRedactionToResponse` for every response whenever `config.stage` is
+    // `enforce`. So an org that sets the stage gets real redaction — ENG-5868
+    // costs the control its PRECISION (it cannot spare the principal), not its
+    // ability to act.
+    //
+    // The stage is therefore per-ORG configuration, which ADR-0080 decision 1
+    // is explicit is the effectiveness axis the static union deliberately does
+    // not carry. `effectiveCalendarEnforcement` in the CLAUDE.md renderer owns
+    // it, and since ENG-10104 caps `enforce` to `warn` whenever the org's stage
+    // is not `enforce`.
+    id: "calendar.confidentiality",
+    mechanism: "enforced",
+    stage: "live",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/calendar-confidentiality-guard.ts",
+    effect: "at config.stage=enforce, redacts summary/description/attendees/location out of calendar read responses; at shadow/warn it writes a would_redact audit row and returns the response unchanged."
+  },
+  // ---- Delegated: read by another definition's enforcement point -----------
+  //
+  // Both can block, because their owner's point is live — which is the question
+  // `guardrailCanBlock` asks and the right answer to it. It is NOT the whole
+  // story for these two, and the gap has its own ticket: the org's email guard
+  // STAGE is threaded into the prompt shape for `email.domain_restrict`'s id
+  // alone (`host-runtime.ts`, the ENG-7829 fix), so a row of either id stored at
+  // `enforce` on a shadow-stage org still renders under "must comply" with
+  // nothing capping it. That is the effectiveness axis, not the mechanism one —
+  // ENG-10110.
+  {
+    id: "email.require_approval",
+    mechanism: "delegated",
+    ownedBy: "email.domain_restrict",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "routes a send to an approver instead of letting it leave."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "email.mail_rules",
+    mechanism: "delegated",
+    ownedBy: "email.domain_restrict",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "gates mail-rule creation/modification on the same egress path."
+  },
+  // ---- Advisory: seeded, applied, rendered — and read by nothing -----------
+  //
+  // These are NOT dead config. They are presented to operators in the console
+  // and to agents in CLAUDE.md, three of them under a heading that promises the
+  // violation is blocked. Listed individually rather than as a wildcard so that
+  // fixing one is a one-line diff from `advisory` to `enforced`.
+  //
+  // The ticket is ENG-9800, not ENG-9874. ENG-9874 catalogued these and is
+  // closed; a closed ticket tracks nothing, which is the same shrug an absent
+  // one would be. ENG-9800 is the open sweep that owns making them real.
+  {
+    id: "require-approval-for-actions",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: `Rendered to agents as "violation blocks the action". Nothing reads it. The ENG-8562 incident is this guardrail's promise, unkept.`
+  },
+  {
+    id: "data.pii_access",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: "Rendered as Enforced with block_export semantics; no export path consults it."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "data.credential_access",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: "Rendered as Enforced with block_read/block_write; no credential path consults it."
+  },
+  { id: "comm.social_posting", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "compliance.audit_all", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "no-external-network", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "no-pii-in-output", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "restrict-file-access", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "schedule.operating_hours", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "spend.hourly_limit", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.allow_list", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.block_list", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.financial_txn", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "working-hours-only", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" }
+];
+var BY_ID = new Map(GUARDRAIL_ENFORCERS.map((e) => [e.id, e]));
+
 // ../core/dist/provisioning/frameworks/claudecode/agent-rules.js
 var MAX_AGENT_RULES = 8;
 var MAX_AGENT_RULE_CHARS = 200;
@@ -28382,6 +28486,35 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     defaultValue: false,
     envVar: "AGT_MODEL_API_ERROR_REPORTING_ENABLED"
   },
+  {
+    key: "model-policy-failover-trigger",
+    description: "Automatic model-policy failover (ENG-10156, ADR-0074). off = the trigger does not run. shadow = it evaluates every ingested model-API error against the policy's failover_trigger config and LOGS the decision with its inputs, acting on nothing. Enum gate; ships OFF.",
+    flagType: "enum",
+    // `armed` is DELIBERATELY not an allowed value yet.
+    //
+    // Nothing writes model_policy_failover_state with source='auto' — that is
+    // the actuation half, and it is gated behind a recorded shadow soak
+    // (ENG-10156 AC8). Offering `armed` now would be a setting an operator can
+    // select, that reports success, and that does nothing: the failure mode is
+    // worse than the missing feature, because it looks like a fleet running
+    // with automatic failover enabled. Add it in the same change that makes it
+    // act, not before.
+    allowedValues: ["off", "shadow"],
+    // OFF, not `shadow`, and the contrast with `channel-quarantine-mode` is the
+    // reason: that flag defaults to `shadow` because shadow WAS the live
+    // manager's compiled behaviour, so anything else would have changed the
+    // fleet. Here there is no incumbent behaviour to preserve — nothing has ever
+    // evaluated this — so `off` is the honest default and turning shadow on is a
+    // deliberate act with a soak attached to it.
+    defaultValue: "off",
+    envVar: "AGT_MODEL_POLICY_FAILOVER_TRIGGER_MODE",
+    // Marked sensitive ahead of `armed` existing: the value this flag will
+    // eventually carry moves a host onto a secondary binding whose credential
+    // may be ours (credential_owner: 'platform'), i.e. it spends money with no
+    // human in the loop. Declaring that now costs nothing and means the audited
+    // -flip behaviour is already in place on the day the value is added.
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "claude-md-skills-index",
     description: `Manager injects the "## Available Skills" bullet list (one line per installed skill, name + frontmatter description) into the agent's project CLAUDE.md. Claude Code already surfaces installed skills to the model natively from .claude/skills/*/SKILL.md, so on current models the list is duplicated context - and an expensive one: it measured 12,045 chars across 29 skills on a prod agent, pushing project/CLAUDE.md to 51k against Claude Code's 40,000-char ceiling, past which the tail of the agent's own system prompt is silently truncated. OFF suppresses ONLY the skill bullets; the "Updating Integrations" guidance in the same managed block is real instruction and is always kept. Defaults ON (today's behaviour) - flip OFF per org to reclaim the headroom.`,

package/dist/mcp/origami.js

@@ -38167,6 +38167,110 @@ var HOURLY_BY_REGION = {
 };
 var KNOWN_PRICING_REGIONS = Object.keys(HOURLY_BY_REGION);
 
+// ../core/dist/guardrails/enforcer-registry.js
+var GUARDRAIL_ENFORCERS = [
+  // ---- Enforced: this definition has its own enforcement point -------------
+  {
+    id: "email.domain_restrict",
+    mechanism: "enforced",
+    stage: "live",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "enforceEmailDomainGuard runs at the top of both agent-egress paths; internal_only with zero verified domains takes an explicit AUDITED no-op branch rather than failing open silently."
+  },
+  {
+    // MEASURED, and it corrects a claim ADR-0080 makes about this definition.
+    //
+    // The ADR reports calendar as `enforced` + `stage: 'shadow'`, blocked by
+    // ENG-5868 (caller identity is not threaded to `callIntegrationTool`). Read
+    // literally that says an org cannot get redaction today, and that is not
+    // what the code does. `decideCalendarRedactionMode` (calendar-policy.ts) is
+    // FAIL-CLOSED: with the caller unresolvable it returns `redact`, not
+    // pass-through. `redactCalendarToolResponseIfNeeded` then calls
+    // `applyRedactionToResponse` for every response whenever `config.stage` is
+    // `enforce`. So an org that sets the stage gets real redaction — ENG-5868
+    // costs the control its PRECISION (it cannot spare the principal), not its
+    // ability to act.
+    //
+    // The stage is therefore per-ORG configuration, which ADR-0080 decision 1
+    // is explicit is the effectiveness axis the static union deliberately does
+    // not carry. `effectiveCalendarEnforcement` in the CLAUDE.md renderer owns
+    // it, and since ENG-10104 caps `enforce` to `warn` whenever the org's stage
+    // is not `enforce`.
+    id: "calendar.confidentiality",
+    mechanism: "enforced",
+    stage: "live",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/calendar-confidentiality-guard.ts",
+    effect: "at config.stage=enforce, redacts summary/description/attendees/location out of calendar read responses; at shadow/warn it writes a would_redact audit row and returns the response unchanged."
+  },
+  // ---- Delegated: read by another definition's enforcement point -----------
+  //
+  // Both can block, because their owner's point is live — which is the question
+  // `guardrailCanBlock` asks and the right answer to it. It is NOT the whole
+  // story for these two, and the gap has its own ticket: the org's email guard
+  // STAGE is threaded into the prompt shape for `email.domain_restrict`'s id
+  // alone (`host-runtime.ts`, the ENG-7829 fix), so a row of either id stored at
+  // `enforce` on a shadow-stage org still renders under "must comply" with
+  // nothing capping it. That is the effectiveness axis, not the mechanism one —
+  // ENG-10110.
+  {
+    id: "email.require_approval",
+    mechanism: "delegated",
+    ownedBy: "email.domain_restrict",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "routes a send to an approver instead of letting it leave."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "email.mail_rules",
+    mechanism: "delegated",
+    ownedBy: "email.domain_restrict",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "gates mail-rule creation/modification on the same egress path."
+  },
+  // ---- Advisory: seeded, applied, rendered — and read by nothing -----------
+  //
+  // These are NOT dead config. They are presented to operators in the console
+  // and to agents in CLAUDE.md, three of them under a heading that promises the
+  // violation is blocked. Listed individually rather than as a wildcard so that
+  // fixing one is a one-line diff from `advisory` to `enforced`.
+  //
+  // The ticket is ENG-9800, not ENG-9874. ENG-9874 catalogued these and is
+  // closed; a closed ticket tracks nothing, which is the same shrug an absent
+  // one would be. ENG-9800 is the open sweep that owns making them real.
+  {
+    id: "require-approval-for-actions",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: `Rendered to agents as "violation blocks the action". Nothing reads it. The ENG-8562 incident is this guardrail's promise, unkept.`
+  },
+  {
+    id: "data.pii_access",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: "Rendered as Enforced with block_export semantics; no export path consults it."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "data.credential_access",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: "Rendered as Enforced with block_read/block_write; no credential path consults it."
+  },
+  { id: "comm.social_posting", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "compliance.audit_all", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "no-external-network", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "no-pii-in-output", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "restrict-file-access", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "schedule.operating_hours", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "spend.hourly_limit", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.allow_list", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.block_list", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.financial_txn", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "working-hours-only", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" }
+];
+var BY_ID = new Map(GUARDRAIL_ENFORCERS.map((e) => [e.id, e]));
+
 // ../core/dist/provisioning/frameworks/claudecode/agent-rules.js
 var MAX_AGENT_RULES = 8;
 var MAX_AGENT_RULE_CHARS = 200;
@@ -42335,6 +42439,35 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     defaultValue: false,
     envVar: "AGT_MODEL_API_ERROR_REPORTING_ENABLED"
   },
+  {
+    key: "model-policy-failover-trigger",
+    description: "Automatic model-policy failover (ENG-10156, ADR-0074). off = the trigger does not run. shadow = it evaluates every ingested model-API error against the policy's failover_trigger config and LOGS the decision with its inputs, acting on nothing. Enum gate; ships OFF.",
+    flagType: "enum",
+    // `armed` is DELIBERATELY not an allowed value yet.
+    //
+    // Nothing writes model_policy_failover_state with source='auto' — that is
+    // the actuation half, and it is gated behind a recorded shadow soak
+    // (ENG-10156 AC8). Offering `armed` now would be a setting an operator can
+    // select, that reports success, and that does nothing: the failure mode is
+    // worse than the missing feature, because it looks like a fleet running
+    // with automatic failover enabled. Add it in the same change that makes it
+    // act, not before.
+    allowedValues: ["off", "shadow"],
+    // OFF, not `shadow`, and the contrast with `channel-quarantine-mode` is the
+    // reason: that flag defaults to `shadow` because shadow WAS the live
+    // manager's compiled behaviour, so anything else would have changed the
+    // fleet. Here there is no incumbent behaviour to preserve — nothing has ever
+    // evaluated this — so `off` is the honest default and turning shadow on is a
+    // deliberate act with a soak attached to it.
+    defaultValue: "off",
+    envVar: "AGT_MODEL_POLICY_FAILOVER_TRIGGER_MODE",
+    // Marked sensitive ahead of `armed` existing: the value this flag will
+    // eventually carry moves a host onto a secondary binding whose credential
+    // may be ours (credential_owner: 'platform'), i.e. it spends money with no
+    // human in the loop. Declaring that now costs nothing and means the audited
+    // -flip behaviour is already in place on the day the value is added.
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "claude-md-skills-index",
     description: `Manager injects the "## Available Skills" bullet list (one line per installed skill, name + frontmatter description) into the agent's project CLAUDE.md. Claude Code already surfaces installed skills to the model natively from .claude/skills/*/SKILL.md, so on current models the list is duplicated context - and an expensive one: it measured 12,045 chars across 29 skills on a prod agent, pushing project/CLAUDE.md to 51k against Claude Code's 40,000-char ceiling, past which the tail of the agent's own system prompt is silently truncated. OFF suppresses ONLY the skill bullets; the "Updating Integrations" guidance in the same managed block is real instruction and is always kept. Defaults ON (today's behaviour) - flip OFF per org to reclaim the headroom.`,

package/dist/mcp/slack-channel.js

@@ -32309,6 +32309,110 @@ var HOURLY_BY_REGION = {
 };
 var KNOWN_PRICING_REGIONS = Object.keys(HOURLY_BY_REGION);
 
+// ../core/dist/guardrails/enforcer-registry.js
+var GUARDRAIL_ENFORCERS = [
+  // ---- Enforced: this definition has its own enforcement point -------------
+  {
+    id: "email.domain_restrict",
+    mechanism: "enforced",
+    stage: "live",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "enforceEmailDomainGuard runs at the top of both agent-egress paths; internal_only with zero verified domains takes an explicit AUDITED no-op branch rather than failing open silently."
+  },
+  {
+    // MEASURED, and it corrects a claim ADR-0080 makes about this definition.
+    //
+    // The ADR reports calendar as `enforced` + `stage: 'shadow'`, blocked by
+    // ENG-5868 (caller identity is not threaded to `callIntegrationTool`). Read
+    // literally that says an org cannot get redaction today, and that is not
+    // what the code does. `decideCalendarRedactionMode` (calendar-policy.ts) is
+    // FAIL-CLOSED: with the caller unresolvable it returns `redact`, not
+    // pass-through. `redactCalendarToolResponseIfNeeded` then calls
+    // `applyRedactionToResponse` for every response whenever `config.stage` is
+    // `enforce`. So an org that sets the stage gets real redaction — ENG-5868
+    // costs the control its PRECISION (it cannot spare the principal), not its
+    // ability to act.
+    //
+    // The stage is therefore per-ORG configuration, which ADR-0080 decision 1
+    // is explicit is the effectiveness axis the static union deliberately does
+    // not carry. `effectiveCalendarEnforcement` in the CLAUDE.md renderer owns
+    // it, and since ENG-10104 caps `enforce` to `warn` whenever the org's stage
+    // is not `enforce`.
+    id: "calendar.confidentiality",
+    mechanism: "enforced",
+    stage: "live",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/calendar-confidentiality-guard.ts",
+    effect: "at config.stage=enforce, redacts summary/description/attendees/location out of calendar read responses; at shadow/warn it writes a would_redact audit row and returns the response unchanged."
+  },
+  // ---- Delegated: read by another definition's enforcement point -----------
+  //
+  // Both can block, because their owner's point is live — which is the question
+  // `guardrailCanBlock` asks and the right answer to it. It is NOT the whole
+  // story for these two, and the gap has its own ticket: the org's email guard
+  // STAGE is threaded into the prompt shape for `email.domain_restrict`'s id
+  // alone (`host-runtime.ts`, the ENG-7829 fix), so a row of either id stored at
+  // `enforce` on a shadow-stage org still renders under "must comply" with
+  // nothing capping it. That is the effectiveness axis, not the mechanism one —
+  // ENG-10110.
+  {
+    id: "email.require_approval",
+    mechanism: "delegated",
+    ownedBy: "email.domain_restrict",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "routes a send to an approver instead of letting it leave."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "email.mail_rules",
+    mechanism: "delegated",
+    ownedBy: "email.domain_restrict",
+    enforcer: "packages/api/src/lib/email-domain-guard.ts",
+    effect: "gates mail-rule creation/modification on the same egress path."
+  },
+  // ---- Advisory: seeded, applied, rendered — and read by nothing -----------
+  //
+  // These are NOT dead config. They are presented to operators in the console
+  // and to agents in CLAUDE.md, three of them under a heading that promises the
+  // violation is blocked. Listed individually rather than as a wildcard so that
+  // fixing one is a one-line diff from `advisory` to `enforced`.
+  //
+  // The ticket is ENG-9800, not ENG-9874. ENG-9874 catalogued these and is
+  // closed; a closed ticket tracks nothing, which is the same shrug an absent
+  // one would be. ENG-9800 is the open sweep that owns making them real.
+  {
+    id: "require-approval-for-actions",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: `Rendered to agents as "violation blocks the action". Nothing reads it. The ENG-8562 incident is this guardrail's promise, unkept.`
+  },
+  {
+    id: "data.pii_access",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: "Rendered as Enforced with block_export semantics; no export path consults it."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "data.credential_access",
+    mechanism: "advisory",
+    reason: "unimplemented",
+    ticket: "ENG-9800",
+    note: "Rendered as Enforced with block_read/block_write; no credential path consults it."
+  },
+  { id: "comm.social_posting", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "compliance.audit_all", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "no-external-network", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "no-pii-in-output", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "restrict-file-access", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "schedule.operating_hours", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "spend.hourly_limit", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.allow_list", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.block_list", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "tool.financial_txn", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" },
+  { id: "working-hours-only", mechanism: "advisory", reason: "unimplemented", ticket: "ENG-9800" }
+];
+var BY_ID = new Map(GUARDRAIL_ENFORCERS.map((e) => [e.id, e]));
+
 // ../core/dist/provisioning/frameworks/claudecode/agent-rules.js
 var MAX_AGENT_RULES = 8;
 var MAX_AGENT_RULE_CHARS = 200;
@@ -36890,6 +36994,35 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     defaultValue: false,
     envVar: "AGT_MODEL_API_ERROR_REPORTING_ENABLED"
   },
+  {
+    key: "model-policy-failover-trigger",
+    description: "Automatic model-policy failover (ENG-10156, ADR-0074). off = the trigger does not run. shadow = it evaluates every ingested model-API error against the policy's failover_trigger config and LOGS the decision with its inputs, acting on nothing. Enum gate; ships OFF.",
+    flagType: "enum",
+    // `armed` is DELIBERATELY not an allowed value yet.
+    //
+    // Nothing writes model_policy_failover_state with source='auto' — that is
+    // the actuation half, and it is gated behind a recorded shadow soak
+    // (ENG-10156 AC8). Offering `armed` now would be a setting an operator can
+    // select, that reports success, and that does nothing: the failure mode is
+    // worse than the missing feature, because it looks like a fleet running
+    // with automatic failover enabled. Add it in the same change that makes it
+    // act, not before.
+    allowedValues: ["off", "shadow"],
+    // OFF, not `shadow`, and the contrast with `channel-quarantine-mode` is the
+    // reason: that flag defaults to `shadow` because shadow WAS the live
+    // manager's compiled behaviour, so anything else would have changed the
+    // fleet. Here there is no incumbent behaviour to preserve — nothing has ever
+    // evaluated this — so `off` is the honest default and turning shadow on is a
+    // deliberate act with a soak attached to it.
+    defaultValue: "off",
+    envVar: "AGT_MODEL_POLICY_FAILOVER_TRIGGER_MODE",
+    // Marked sensitive ahead of `armed` existing: the value this flag will
+    // eventually carry moves a host onto a secondary binding whose credential
+    // may be ours (credential_owner: 'platform'), i.e. it spends money with no
+    // human in the loop. Declaring that now costs nothing and means the audited
+    // -flip behaviour is already in place on the day the value is added.
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "claude-md-skills-index",
     description: `Manager injects the "## Available Skills" bullet list (one line per installed skill, name + frontmatter description) into the agent's project CLAUDE.md. Claude Code already surfaces installed skills to the model natively from .claude/skills/*/SKILL.md, so on current models the list is duplicated context - and an expensive one: it measured 12,045 chars across 29 skills on a prod agent, pushing project/CLAUDE.md to 51k against Claude Code's 40,000-char ceiling, past which the tail of the agent's own system prompt is silently truncated. OFF suppresses ONLY the skill bullets; the "Updating Integrations" guidance in the same managed block is real instruction and is always kept. Defaults ON (today's behaviour) - flip OFF per org to reclaim the headroom.`,