@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.797 → 0.28.799

package/dist/{claude-pair-runtime-7GV7YJAX.js → claude-pair-runtime-2ADID7UG.js}

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ async function spawnPairSession(session) {
     return { ok: true };
   } catch {
   }
-  const { resolveClaudeBinary } = await import("./persistent-session-YDK4ZLC2.js");
+  const { resolveClaudeBinary } = await import("./persistent-session-Z5QFD6JR.js");
   const claudeBin = resolveClaudeBinary();
   const pairEnv = {
     ...process.env,
@@ -373,4 +373,4 @@ export {
   startClaudePair,
   submitClaudePairCode
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=claude-pair-runtime-7GV7YJAX.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=claude-pair-runtime-2ADID7UG.js.map

package/dist/lib/manager-worker.js

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ import {
   safeWriteJsonAtomic,
   setConfigHash,
   tripClass
-} from "../chunk-BLPEFF5R.js";
+} from "../chunk-BPAGPPAN.js";
 import {
   getProjectDir as getProjectDir2,
   getReadyTasks,
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ import {
   takeZombieDetection,
   toOpencodeModel,
   writeEgressAllowlist
-} from "../chunk-KGOED2L3.js";
+} from "../chunk-M3IVSY6S.js";
 import {
   ACCOUNT_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_FILENAME,
   AnchorSessionClient,
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ import {
   subagentActivityAgeSeconds,
   sumTranscriptUsageInWindow,
   transcriptActivityAgeSeconds
-} from "../chunk-ZL7RC5VO.js";
+} from "../chunk-XEPLW5LY.js";
 import {
   reapOrphanChannelMcps
 } from "../chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
@@ -12917,7 +12917,7 @@ var pendingDayRolloverReset = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
 var dayRolloverInboundHold = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 var INBOUND_HOLD_EPISODE_GAP_MS = 12e4;
 async function channelInboundActivityAgeSecondsFor(codeName) {
-  const { newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-2WHOALYI.js");
+  const { newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-3M2QIBJ5.js");
   const newest = newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs(dirname10(paneLogPath(codeName)));
   if (newest === null) return null;
   return Math.max(0, Math.floor((Date.now() - newest) / 1e3));
@@ -13577,7 +13577,7 @@ var agentRestartTimezoneInputs = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 var lastVersionCheckAt = 0;
 var VERSION_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1e3;
 var lastResponsivenessProbeAt = 0;
-var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.797" : "dev";
+var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.799" : "dev";
 function resolveBrewPath(execFileSync2) {
   try {
     const out = execFileSync2("which", ["brew"], { timeout: 5e3 }).toString().trim();
@@ -15124,7 +15124,7 @@ function flushRestartedAgentDiagnostics(hostId, codeNames) {
   if (codeNames.length === 0) return;
   void (async () => {
     try {
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-YDK4ZLC2.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-Z5QFD6JR.js");
       await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
         host_id: hostId,
         agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics(codeNames, quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor)
@@ -15265,7 +15265,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
     }
     try {
       const { detectHostSecurity } = await import("../host-security-6PDFG7F5.js");
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-YDK4ZLC2.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-Z5QFD6JR.js");
       const diagCodeNames = [...agentState.persistentSessionAgents];
       const agentDiagnostics = diagCodeNames.length > 0 ? collectDiagnostics(diagCodeNames, quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor) : void 0;
       let tailscaleHostname;
@@ -15434,7 +15434,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
         collectPanelessActivityProbes,
         getResponsivenessIntervalMs,
         occupancyQualificationClassifications
-      } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-2WHOALYI.js");
+      } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-3M2QIBJ5.js");
       const probeIntervalMs = getResponsivenessIntervalMs();
       if (now - lastResponsivenessProbeAt > probeIntervalMs) {
         const probeCodeNames = [...agentState.persistentSessionAgents];
@@ -15551,7 +15551,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
           collectResponsivenessProbes,
           livePendingInboundOldestAgeSeconds,
           parkPendingInbound
-        } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-2WHOALYI.js");
+        } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-3M2QIBJ5.js");
         const { getProjectDir: wedgeProjectDir } = await import("../scheduler-engine-NDP36U7O.js");
         const wedgeNow = /* @__PURE__ */ new Date();
         const liveAgents = agentState.persistentSessionAgents;
@@ -15707,7 +15707,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
     }
     try {
       const { scrapeMcpFailedBannerCount } = await import("../pane-mcp-banner-scraper-JA437JIB.js");
-      const { probeSessionAuth } = await import("../session-auth-dead-EQK6TGMD.js");
+      const { probeSessionAuth } = await import("../session-auth-dead-RWNURZER.js");
       const observations = [];
       const pendingCacheCommits = [];
       const modelApiErrorReportingOn = hostFlagStore().getBoolean("model-api-error-reporting");
@@ -19808,7 +19808,7 @@ async function handleRestartDoorbell(agentId, requestedAt, restartReason) {
     void api.post("/host/restart-ack", { host_id: hostId, agent_id: agentId, restart_requested_at: requestedAt }).catch((err) => log(`[restart-lane] ack failed for '${codeName}': ${err.message}`));
     void (async () => {
       try {
-        const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-YDK4ZLC2.js");
+        const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-Z5QFD6JR.js");
         await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
           host_id: hostId,
           agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics([codeName], quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor)
@@ -19854,7 +19854,7 @@ async function respawnAgentAfterMcpStop(codeName, reason) {
     }
     try {
       const hostId = await getHostId();
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-YDK4ZLC2.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-Z5QFD6JR.js");
       await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
         host_id: hostId,
         agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics([codeName], quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor)
@@ -20490,7 +20490,7 @@ async function processClaudePairSessions(agents) {
     killPairSession,
     pairTmuxSession,
     finalizeClaudePairOnboarding
-  } = await import("../claude-pair-runtime-7GV7YJAX.js");
+  } = await import("../claude-pair-runtime-2ADID7UG.js");
   for (const pairId of pendingResp.cancelled_pair_ids ?? []) {
     log(`[claude-pair] sweeping orphan tmux session for pair ${pairId.slice(0, 8)}`);
     const killed = await killPairSession(pairTmuxSession(pairId));

package/dist/mcp/direct-chat-channel.js

@@ -36661,6 +36661,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // the flip is a deliberate, confirmed one (ADR-0022 sensitive-flag confirm).
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "org-email-domain-derivation",
+    description: "Auto-derive an organization's own email domain from its members' signup addresses (ENG-9888) and add it to organization_email_domains already verified, so email.domain_restrict's internal_only mode has the allow set it resolves against. Without a verified domain internal_only is a runtime no-op (an empty allow set would block every send), which was the live state for 22 of 23 orgs while the console showed the strictest egress mode. Server-side only \u2014 the API derives lazily when the guard finds no verified domain; there is no host-side reader, hence no envVar. Flipping this ON is the backfill: derivation runs per-org on first need rather than as a batch job, and the vendor-domain exclusion is what stops the six orgs whose earliest member is a staff account from being given integritylabs.dev.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Ships dark. The safe value is `false` (derive nothing) because arming this
+    // gives internal_only a real allow set, which CHANGES what the guard evaluates
+    // for every org it touches — and not only the guard: getVerifiedOrgEmailDomains
+    // also feeds the Linear customer-need linker and the support/host-runtime
+    // prompts, so a row appearing is visible beyond the send path. A flag-read
+    // error must never start writing verified domains on its own.
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Arming it makes a previously-inert egress control start evaluating, so the
+    // flip wants a deliberate confirm rather than a casual toggle. Before flipping,
+    // check which orgs sit at the `enforce` / `require_approval` email-guard stage:
+    // those are the ones where a newly-effective policy can reach a real block.
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "memory-extraction",
     description: "Host-side durable-memory extraction (ENG-6200): the manager extracts candidate memories from completed conversations and POSTs them to /host/memories/candidates, which writes dream_log via promoteCandidates. Post persistent-session cutover this is the ONLY live consolidation path. Boolean gate; ships dark \u2014 when off the manager runs no extraction, so 0 dream_log rows fleet-wide is the expected steady state until it is armed.",

package/dist/mcp/index.js

@@ -43745,6 +43745,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // the flip is a deliberate, confirmed one (ADR-0022 sensitive-flag confirm).
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "org-email-domain-derivation",
+    description: "Auto-derive an organization's own email domain from its members' signup addresses (ENG-9888) and add it to organization_email_domains already verified, so email.domain_restrict's internal_only mode has the allow set it resolves against. Without a verified domain internal_only is a runtime no-op (an empty allow set would block every send), which was the live state for 22 of 23 orgs while the console showed the strictest egress mode. Server-side only \u2014 the API derives lazily when the guard finds no verified domain; there is no host-side reader, hence no envVar. Flipping this ON is the backfill: derivation runs per-org on first need rather than as a batch job, and the vendor-domain exclusion is what stops the six orgs whose earliest member is a staff account from being given integritylabs.dev.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Ships dark. The safe value is `false` (derive nothing) because arming this
+    // gives internal_only a real allow set, which CHANGES what the guard evaluates
+    // for every org it touches — and not only the guard: getVerifiedOrgEmailDomains
+    // also feeds the Linear customer-need linker and the support/host-runtime
+    // prompts, so a row appearing is visible beyond the send path. A flag-read
+    // error must never start writing verified domains on its own.
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Arming it makes a previously-inert egress control start evaluating, so the
+    // flip wants a deliberate confirm rather than a casual toggle. Before flipping,
+    // check which orgs sit at the `enforce` / `require_approval` email-guard stage:
+    // those are the ones where a newly-effective policy can reach a real block.
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "memory-extraction",
     description: "Host-side durable-memory extraction (ENG-6200): the manager extracts candidate memories from completed conversations and POSTs them to /host/memories/candidates, which writes dream_log via promoteCandidates. Post persistent-session cutover this is the ONLY live consolidation path. Boolean gate; ships dark \u2014 when off the manager runs no extraction, so 0 dream_log rows fleet-wide is the expected steady state until it is armed.",

package/dist/mcp/origami.js

@@ -42385,6 +42385,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // the flip is a deliberate, confirmed one (ADR-0022 sensitive-flag confirm).
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "org-email-domain-derivation",
+    description: "Auto-derive an organization's own email domain from its members' signup addresses (ENG-9888) and add it to organization_email_domains already verified, so email.domain_restrict's internal_only mode has the allow set it resolves against. Without a verified domain internal_only is a runtime no-op (an empty allow set would block every send), which was the live state for 22 of 23 orgs while the console showed the strictest egress mode. Server-side only \u2014 the API derives lazily when the guard finds no verified domain; there is no host-side reader, hence no envVar. Flipping this ON is the backfill: derivation runs per-org on first need rather than as a batch job, and the vendor-domain exclusion is what stops the six orgs whose earliest member is a staff account from being given integritylabs.dev.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Ships dark. The safe value is `false` (derive nothing) because arming this
+    // gives internal_only a real allow set, which CHANGES what the guard evaluates
+    // for every org it touches — and not only the guard: getVerifiedOrgEmailDomains
+    // also feeds the Linear customer-need linker and the support/host-runtime
+    // prompts, so a row appearing is visible beyond the send path. A flag-read
+    // error must never start writing verified domains on its own.
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Arming it makes a previously-inert egress control start evaluating, so the
+    // flip wants a deliberate confirm rather than a casual toggle. Before flipping,
+    // check which orgs sit at the `enforce` / `require_approval` email-guard stage:
+    // those are the ones where a newly-effective policy can reach a real block.
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "memory-extraction",
     description: "Host-side durable-memory extraction (ENG-6200): the manager extracts candidate memories from completed conversations and POSTs them to /host/memories/candidates, which writes dream_log via promoteCandidates. Post persistent-session cutover this is the ONLY live consolidation path. Boolean gate; ships dark \u2014 when off the manager runs no extraction, so 0 dream_log rows fleet-wide is the expected steady state until it is armed.",

package/dist/mcp/slack-channel.js

@@ -36908,6 +36908,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // the flip is a deliberate, confirmed one (ADR-0022 sensitive-flag confirm).
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "org-email-domain-derivation",
+    description: "Auto-derive an organization's own email domain from its members' signup addresses (ENG-9888) and add it to organization_email_domains already verified, so email.domain_restrict's internal_only mode has the allow set it resolves against. Without a verified domain internal_only is a runtime no-op (an empty allow set would block every send), which was the live state for 22 of 23 orgs while the console showed the strictest egress mode. Server-side only \u2014 the API derives lazily when the guard finds no verified domain; there is no host-side reader, hence no envVar. Flipping this ON is the backfill: derivation runs per-org on first need rather than as a batch job, and the vendor-domain exclusion is what stops the six orgs whose earliest member is a staff account from being given integritylabs.dev.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Ships dark. The safe value is `false` (derive nothing) because arming this
+    // gives internal_only a real allow set, which CHANGES what the guard evaluates
+    // for every org it touches — and not only the guard: getVerifiedOrgEmailDomains
+    // also feeds the Linear customer-need linker and the support/host-runtime
+    // prompts, so a row appearing is visible beyond the send path. A flag-read
+    // error must never start writing verified domains on its own.
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Arming it makes a previously-inert egress control start evaluating, so the
+    // flip wants a deliberate confirm rather than a casual toggle. Before flipping,
+    // check which orgs sit at the `enforce` / `require_approval` email-guard stage:
+    // those are the ones where a newly-effective policy can reach a real block.
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "memory-extraction",
     description: "Host-side durable-memory extraction (ENG-6200): the manager extracts candidate memories from completed conversations and POSTs them to /host/memories/candidates, which writes dream_log via promoteCandidates. Post persistent-session cutover this is the ONLY live consolidation path. Boolean gate; ships dark \u2014 when off the manager runs no extraction, so 0 dream_log rows fleet-wide is the expected steady state until it is armed.",

package/dist/mcp/telegram-channel.js

@@ -37066,6 +37066,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // the flip is a deliberate, confirmed one (ADR-0022 sensitive-flag confirm).
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "org-email-domain-derivation",
+    description: "Auto-derive an organization's own email domain from its members' signup addresses (ENG-9888) and add it to organization_email_domains already verified, so email.domain_restrict's internal_only mode has the allow set it resolves against. Without a verified domain internal_only is a runtime no-op (an empty allow set would block every send), which was the live state for 22 of 23 orgs while the console showed the strictest egress mode. Server-side only \u2014 the API derives lazily when the guard finds no verified domain; there is no host-side reader, hence no envVar. Flipping this ON is the backfill: derivation runs per-org on first need rather than as a batch job, and the vendor-domain exclusion is what stops the six orgs whose earliest member is a staff account from being given integritylabs.dev.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Ships dark. The safe value is `false` (derive nothing) because arming this
+    // gives internal_only a real allow set, which CHANGES what the guard evaluates
+    // for every org it touches — and not only the guard: getVerifiedOrgEmailDomains
+    // also feeds the Linear customer-need linker and the support/host-runtime
+    // prompts, so a row appearing is visible beyond the send path. A flag-read
+    // error must never start writing verified domains on its own.
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Arming it makes a previously-inert egress control start evaluating, so the
+    // flip wants a deliberate confirm rather than a casual toggle. Before flipping,
+    // check which orgs sit at the `enforce` / `require_approval` email-guard stage:
+    // those are the ones where a newly-effective policy can reach a real block.
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "memory-extraction",
     description: "Host-side durable-memory extraction (ENG-6200): the manager extracts candidate memories from completed conversations and POSTs them to /host/memories/candidates, which writes dream_log via promoteCandidates. Post persistent-session cutover this is the ONLY live consolidation path. Boolean gate; ships dark \u2014 when off the manager runs no extraction, so 0 dream_log rows fleet-wide is the expected steady state until it is armed.",

package/dist/{persistent-session-YDK4ZLC2.js → persistent-session-Z5QFD6JR.js}

@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ import {
   writeDirectChatSessionState,
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
-} from "./chunk-KGOED2L3.js";
-import "./chunk-ZL7RC5VO.js";
+} from "./chunk-M3IVSY6S.js";
+import "./chunk-XEPLW5LY.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 export {
   EGRESS_BASELINE_DOMAINS,
@@ -104,4 +104,4 @@ export {
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-YDK4ZLC2.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-Z5QFD6JR.js.map

package/dist/{responsiveness-probe-2WHOALYI.js → responsiveness-probe-3M2QIBJ5.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   paneLogPath
-} from "./chunk-KGOED2L3.js";
-import "./chunk-ZL7RC5VO.js";
+} from "./chunk-M3IVSY6S.js";
+import "./chunk-XEPLW5LY.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 
 // src/lib/responsiveness-probe.ts
@@ -745,4 +745,4 @@ export {
   readAndResetSlackReplyBindingClassifications,
   readAndResetSlackReplyTargetClassifications
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-2WHOALYI.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-3M2QIBJ5.js.map

package/dist/{session-auth-dead-EQK6TGMD.js → session-auth-dead-RWNURZER.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   sessionTranscriptDir
-} from "./chunk-ZL7RC5VO.js";
+} from "./chunk-XEPLW5LY.js";
 
 // src/lib/session-auth-dead.ts
 import { closeSync, openSync, readSync, readdirSync, statSync } from "fs";
@@ -203,4 +203,4 @@ export {
   decideSessionAuthState,
   probeSessionAuth
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=session-auth-dead-EQK6TGMD.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=session-auth-dead-RWNURZER.js.map

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@integrity-labs/agt-cli",
-  "version": "0.28.797",
+  "version": "0.28.799",
   "description": "Augmented Team CLI — agent provisioning and management",
   "type": "module",
   "engines": {