@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.732 → 0.28.733

package/dist/{chunk-DGIYNBDG.js → chunk-LT7UGH4O.js}

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import {
   parseEnvFileEntries,
   parseEnvIntegrations,
   shellQuote
-} from "./chunk-QB6TIA3Z.js";
+} from "./chunk-7KT2QNXF.js";
 import {
   BIND_FAILURE_QUARANTINE_THRESHOLD,
   INTEGRATIONS_SECTION_END,
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ import {
   sessionTranscriptDir,
   worseConnectivityOutcome,
   wrapScheduledTaskPrompt
-} from "./chunk-BADE2W6M.js";
+} from "./chunk-IBBBIE4K.js";
 import {
   parsePsRows
 } from "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
@@ -6427,7 +6427,7 @@ function exchangeFailureKind(err) {
 }
 
 // src/lib/api-client.ts
-var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.732" : "dev";
+var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.733" : "dev";
 var lastConfigHash = null;
 function setConfigHash(hash) {
   lastConfigHash = hash && hash.length > 0 ? hash : null;
@@ -10473,4 +10473,4 @@ export {
   managerInstallSystemUnitCommand,
   managerUninstallSystemUnitCommand
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-DGIYNBDG.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-LT7UGH4O.js.map

package/dist/{claude-pair-runtime-BZVFVAMR.js → claude-pair-runtime-K5OUT4QN.js}

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ async function spawnPairSession(session) {
     return { ok: true };
   } catch {
   }
-  const { resolveClaudeBinary } = await import("./persistent-session-BHJLZTYX.js");
+  const { resolveClaudeBinary } = await import("./persistent-session-H7CP2TUX.js");
   const claudeBin = resolveClaudeBinary();
   const pairEnv = {
     ...process.env,
@@ -373,4 +373,4 @@ export {
   startClaudePair,
   submitClaudePairCode
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=claude-pair-runtime-BZVFVAMR.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=claude-pair-runtime-K5OUT4QN.js.map

package/dist/lib/manager-worker.js

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ import {
   safeWriteJsonAtomic,
   setConfigHash,
   tripClass
-} from "../chunk-DGIYNBDG.js";
+} from "../chunk-LT7UGH4O.js";
 import {
   getProjectDir as getProjectDir2,
   getReadyTasks,
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ import {
   takeZombieDetection,
   toOpencodeModel,
   writeEgressAllowlist
-} from "../chunk-QB6TIA3Z.js";
+} from "../chunk-7KT2QNXF.js";
 import {
   ACCOUNT_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_FILENAME,
   AnchorSessionClient,
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ import {
   subagentActivityAgeSeconds,
   sumTranscriptUsageInWindow,
   transcriptActivityAgeSeconds
-} from "../chunk-BADE2W6M.js";
+} from "../chunk-IBBBIE4K.js";
 import {
   reapOrphanChannelMcps
 } from "../chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
@@ -12347,7 +12347,7 @@ var pendingDayRolloverReset = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
 var dayRolloverInboundHold = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 var INBOUND_HOLD_EPISODE_GAP_MS = 12e4;
 async function channelInboundActivityAgeSecondsFor(codeName) {
-  const { newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-457EYSWZ.js");
+  const { newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-MPPDJSOL.js");
   const newest = newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs(dirname10(paneLogPath(codeName)));
   if (newest === null) return null;
   return Math.max(0, Math.floor((Date.now() - newest) / 1e3));
@@ -12995,7 +12995,7 @@ var agentRestartTimezoneInputs = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 var lastVersionCheckAt = 0;
 var VERSION_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1e3;
 var lastResponsivenessProbeAt = 0;
-var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.732" : "dev";
+var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.733" : "dev";
 function resolveBrewPath(execFileSync3) {
   try {
     const out = execFileSync3("which", ["brew"], { timeout: 5e3 }).toString().trim();
@@ -14522,7 +14522,7 @@ function flushRestartedAgentDiagnostics(hostId, codeNames) {
   if (codeNames.length === 0) return;
   void (async () => {
     try {
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-BHJLZTYX.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-H7CP2TUX.js");
       await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
         host_id: hostId,
         agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics(codeNames, quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor)
@@ -14663,7 +14663,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
     }
     try {
       const { detectHostSecurity } = await import("../host-security-6PDFG7F5.js");
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-BHJLZTYX.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-H7CP2TUX.js");
       const diagCodeNames = [...agentState.persistentSessionAgents];
       const agentDiagnostics = diagCodeNames.length > 0 ? collectDiagnostics(diagCodeNames, quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor) : void 0;
       let tailscaleHostname;
@@ -14832,7 +14832,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
         collectPanelessActivityProbes,
         getResponsivenessIntervalMs,
         occupancyQualificationClassifications
-      } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-457EYSWZ.js");
+      } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-MPPDJSOL.js");
       const probeIntervalMs = getResponsivenessIntervalMs();
       if (now - lastResponsivenessProbeAt > probeIntervalMs) {
         const probeCodeNames = [...agentState.persistentSessionAgents];
@@ -14942,7 +14942,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
           collectResponsivenessProbes,
           livePendingInboundOldestAgeSeconds,
           parkPendingInbound
-        } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-457EYSWZ.js");
+        } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-MPPDJSOL.js");
         const { getProjectDir: wedgeProjectDir } = await import("../scheduler-engine-NDP36U7O.js");
         const wedgeNow = /* @__PURE__ */ new Date();
         const liveAgents = agentState.persistentSessionAgents;
@@ -15098,7 +15098,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
     }
     try {
       const { scrapeMcpFailedBannerCount } = await import("../pane-mcp-banner-scraper-JA437JIB.js");
-      const { probeSessionAuth } = await import("../session-auth-dead-YUPZGR3F.js");
+      const { probeSessionAuth } = await import("../session-auth-dead-TK3KNAH4.js");
       const observations = [];
       const pendingCacheCommits = [];
       const modelApiErrorReportingOn = hostFlagStore().getBoolean("model-api-error-reporting");
@@ -19009,7 +19009,7 @@ async function handleRestartDoorbell(agentId, requestedAt, restartReason) {
     void api.post("/host/restart-ack", { host_id: hostId, agent_id: agentId, restart_requested_at: requestedAt }).catch((err) => log(`[restart-lane] ack failed for '${codeName}': ${err.message}`));
     void (async () => {
       try {
-        const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-BHJLZTYX.js");
+        const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-H7CP2TUX.js");
         await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
           host_id: hostId,
           agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics([codeName], quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor)
@@ -19055,7 +19055,7 @@ async function respawnAgentAfterMcpStop(codeName, reason) {
     }
     try {
       const hostId = await getHostId();
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-BHJLZTYX.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-H7CP2TUX.js");
       await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
         host_id: hostId,
         agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics([codeName], quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor)
@@ -19687,7 +19687,7 @@ async function processClaudePairSessions(agents) {
     killPairSession,
     pairTmuxSession,
     finalizeClaudePairOnboarding
-  } = await import("../claude-pair-runtime-BZVFVAMR.js");
+  } = await import("../claude-pair-runtime-K5OUT4QN.js");
   for (const pairId of pendingResp.cancelled_pair_ids ?? []) {
     log(`[claude-pair] sweeping orphan tmux session for pair ${pairId.slice(0, 8)}`);
     const killed = await killPairSession(pairTmuxSession(pairId));

package/dist/mcp/direct-chat-channel.js

@@ -29878,11 +29878,19 @@ function buildDirectChatChannelMeta(input) {
   if (input.userName) identity.user_name = input.userName;
   if (input.userEmail) identity.user_email = input.userEmail;
   if (input.userRole) identity.user_role = input.userRole;
+  const page = {};
+  if (input.pageSlug) page.page_slug = input.pageSlug;
+  if (input.pageTitle) page.page_title = input.pageTitle;
+  if (input.pageUrl) page.page_url = input.pageUrl;
+  if (input.pageContentUrl) page.page_content_url = input.pageContentUrl;
+  if (input.pageArtefactId) page.page_artefact_id = input.pageArtefactId;
+  if (input.pageGated != null) page.page_gated = input.pageGated ? "true" : "false";
   return {
     session_id: input.sessionId,
     user: "webapp",
     source: "direct-chat",
     ...identity,
+    ...page,
     // String flag the agent's channel instructions (and the renderer) read:
     // 'false' = notice (do not reply), 'true' = normal message (reply expected).
     requires_reply: input.isNotice ? "false" : "true",
@@ -31876,7 +31884,11 @@ var ORG_ROLE_PERMISSIONS = {
     "org.manage_teams",
     "org.manage_guardrails",
     "org.manage_integrations",
-    "org.view_audit_log"
+    "org.view_audit_log",
+    // ENG-9486 (ADR-0074). Authoring is owner+admin, matching every other action
+    // that can write a secret or change what an org is billed for.
+    "org.manage_model_policies",
+    "org.assign_model_policies"
   ],
   admin: [
     "org.manage_settings",
@@ -31884,7 +31896,9 @@ var ORG_ROLE_PERMISSIONS = {
     "org.manage_teams",
     "org.manage_guardrails",
     "org.manage_integrations",
-    "org.view_audit_log"
+    "org.view_audit_log",
+    "org.manage_model_policies",
+    "org.assign_model_policies"
   ],
   member: [
     "org.manage_teams",
@@ -36577,7 +36591,22 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // seeding code, so `listNewOrgFlagOverrides()` is the one answer to "which flags
     // does a new org get". `defaultValue` stays false so the ~4 months of orgs already
     // carrying an inert enforce-level email.require_approval row are NOT armed on deploy.
-    newOrgOverride: true
+    newOrgOverride: true,
+    // ENG-9630: API-created organizations only, and this is a deliberate,
+    // reviewed asymmetry rather than an oversight.
+    //
+    // Arming this holds EVERY dispatching send for human approval. The hold
+    // itself works fine on a self-serve org — `hitl-approval-routing` has
+    // defaulted to 'on' since ENG-7828, so a real Human Approval card is minted
+    // and it is actionable at /organization/approvals. What a self-serve org
+    // does NOT have is any means of being TOLD: no Slack alert channel is wired
+    // at signup, so the card sits in a console surface nobody has pointed the
+    // user at, and their agent's first email silently waits on it.
+    //
+    // So the blocker is the notification path, not the control. Whoever revisits
+    // this should treat "a self-serve org actually receives the card" as the
+    // prerequisite and then drop this line — do not simply widen it.
+    newOrgOverrideOrigins: ["api"]
   },
   {
     key: "mail-rule-control-enforcement",
@@ -39199,7 +39228,17 @@ async function pollForMessages(sinceMs) {
               // ENG-8047: pure passthrough of the server-resolved human identity.
               userName: msg.sender_name,
               userEmail: msg.sender_email,
-              userRole: msg.sender_role
+              userRole: msg.sender_role,
+              // ENG-9518: pure passthrough, same as the identity block. The
+              // server already decided what this agent may know about the page,
+              // including withholding the content URL on a gated page it does
+              // not own, so there is nothing left to judge here.
+              pageArtefactId: msg.page_context?.artefact_id ?? null,
+              pageSlug: msg.page_context?.slug ?? null,
+              pageTitle: msg.page_context?.title ?? null,
+              pageUrl: msg.page_context?.live_url ?? null,
+              pageContentUrl: msg.page_context?.content_url ?? null,
+              pageGated: msg.page_context?.gated ?? null
             }),
             ...attachmentMeta
           }

package/dist/mcp/index.js

@@ -39276,7 +39276,11 @@ var ORG_ROLE_PERMISSIONS = {
     "org.manage_teams",
     "org.manage_guardrails",
     "org.manage_integrations",
-    "org.view_audit_log"
+    "org.view_audit_log",
+    // ENG-9486 (ADR-0074). Authoring is owner+admin, matching every other action
+    // that can write a secret or change what an org is billed for.
+    "org.manage_model_policies",
+    "org.assign_model_policies"
   ],
   admin: [
     "org.manage_settings",
@@ -39284,7 +39288,9 @@ var ORG_ROLE_PERMISSIONS = {
     "org.manage_teams",
     "org.manage_guardrails",
     "org.manage_integrations",
-    "org.view_audit_log"
+    "org.view_audit_log",
+    "org.manage_model_policies",
+    "org.assign_model_policies"
   ],
   member: [
     "org.manage_teams",
@@ -43538,7 +43544,22 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // seeding code, so `listNewOrgFlagOverrides()` is the one answer to "which flags
     // does a new org get". `defaultValue` stays false so the ~4 months of orgs already
     // carrying an inert enforce-level email.require_approval row are NOT armed on deploy.
-    newOrgOverride: true
+    newOrgOverride: true,
+    // ENG-9630: API-created organizations only, and this is a deliberate,
+    // reviewed asymmetry rather than an oversight.
+    //
+    // Arming this holds EVERY dispatching send for human approval. The hold
+    // itself works fine on a self-serve org — `hitl-approval-routing` has
+    // defaulted to 'on' since ENG-7828, so a real Human Approval card is minted
+    // and it is actionable at /organization/approvals. What a self-serve org
+    // does NOT have is any means of being TOLD: no Slack alert channel is wired
+    // at signup, so the card sits in a console surface nobody has pointed the
+    // user at, and their agent's first email silently waits on it.
+    //
+    // So the blocker is the notification path, not the control. Whoever revisits
+    // this should treat "a self-serve org actually receives the card" as the
+    // prerequisite and then drop this line — do not simply widen it.
+    newOrgOverrideOrigins: ["api"]
   },
   {
     key: "mail-rule-control-enforcement",

package/dist/mcp/origami.js

@@ -38068,7 +38068,11 @@ var ORG_ROLE_PERMISSIONS = {
     "org.manage_teams",
     "org.manage_guardrails",
     "org.manage_integrations",
-    "org.view_audit_log"
+    "org.view_audit_log",
+    // ENG-9486 (ADR-0074). Authoring is owner+admin, matching every other action
+    // that can write a secret or change what an org is billed for.
+    "org.manage_model_policies",
+    "org.assign_model_policies"
   ],
   admin: [
     "org.manage_settings",
@@ -38076,7 +38080,9 @@ var ORG_ROLE_PERMISSIONS = {
     "org.manage_teams",
     "org.manage_guardrails",
     "org.manage_integrations",
-    "org.view_audit_log"
+    "org.view_audit_log",
+    "org.manage_model_policies",
+    "org.assign_model_policies"
   ],
   member: [
     "org.manage_teams",
@@ -42309,7 +42315,22 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // seeding code, so `listNewOrgFlagOverrides()` is the one answer to "which flags
     // does a new org get". `defaultValue` stays false so the ~4 months of orgs already
     // carrying an inert enforce-level email.require_approval row are NOT armed on deploy.
-    newOrgOverride: true
+    newOrgOverride: true,
+    // ENG-9630: API-created organizations only, and this is a deliberate,
+    // reviewed asymmetry rather than an oversight.
+    //
+    // Arming this holds EVERY dispatching send for human approval. The hold
+    // itself works fine on a self-serve org — `hitl-approval-routing` has
+    // defaulted to 'on' since ENG-7828, so a real Human Approval card is minted
+    // and it is actionable at /organization/approvals. What a self-serve org
+    // does NOT have is any means of being TOLD: no Slack alert channel is wired
+    // at signup, so the card sits in a console surface nobody has pointed the
+    // user at, and their agent's first email silently waits on it.
+    //
+    // So the blocker is the notification path, not the control. Whoever revisits
+    // this should treat "a self-serve org actually receives the card" as the
+    // prerequisite and then drop this line — do not simply widen it.
+    newOrgOverrideOrigins: ["api"]
   },
   {
     key: "mail-rule-control-enforcement",

package/dist/mcp/slack-channel.js

@@ -32175,7 +32175,11 @@ var ORG_ROLE_PERMISSIONS = {
     "org.manage_teams",
     "org.manage_guardrails",
     "org.manage_integrations",
-    "org.view_audit_log"
+    "org.view_audit_log",
+    // ENG-9486 (ADR-0074). Authoring is owner+admin, matching every other action
+    // that can write a secret or change what an org is billed for.
+    "org.manage_model_policies",
+    "org.assign_model_policies"
   ],
   admin: [
     "org.manage_settings",
@@ -32183,7 +32187,9 @@ var ORG_ROLE_PERMISSIONS = {
     "org.manage_teams",
     "org.manage_guardrails",
     "org.manage_integrations",
-    "org.view_audit_log"
+    "org.view_audit_log",
+    "org.manage_model_policies",
+    "org.assign_model_policies"
   ],
   member: [
     "org.manage_teams",
@@ -36829,7 +36835,22 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // seeding code, so `listNewOrgFlagOverrides()` is the one answer to "which flags
     // does a new org get". `defaultValue` stays false so the ~4 months of orgs already
     // carrying an inert enforce-level email.require_approval row are NOT armed on deploy.
-    newOrgOverride: true
+    newOrgOverride: true,
+    // ENG-9630: API-created organizations only, and this is a deliberate,
+    // reviewed asymmetry rather than an oversight.
+    //
+    // Arming this holds EVERY dispatching send for human approval. The hold
+    // itself works fine on a self-serve org — `hitl-approval-routing` has
+    // defaulted to 'on' since ENG-7828, so a real Human Approval card is minted
+    // and it is actionable at /organization/approvals. What a self-serve org
+    // does NOT have is any means of being TOLD: no Slack alert channel is wired
+    // at signup, so the card sits in a console surface nobody has pointed the
+    // user at, and their agent's first email silently waits on it.
+    //
+    // So the blocker is the notification path, not the control. Whoever revisits
+    // this should treat "a self-serve org actually receives the card" as the
+    // prerequisite and then drop this line — do not simply widen it.
+    newOrgOverrideOrigins: ["api"]
   },
   {
     key: "mail-rule-control-enforcement",

package/dist/mcp/telegram-channel.js

@@ -32337,7 +32337,11 @@ var ORG_ROLE_PERMISSIONS = {
     "org.manage_teams",
     "org.manage_guardrails",
     "org.manage_integrations",
-    "org.view_audit_log"
+    "org.view_audit_log",
+    // ENG-9486 (ADR-0074). Authoring is owner+admin, matching every other action
+    // that can write a secret or change what an org is billed for.
+    "org.manage_model_policies",
+    "org.assign_model_policies"
   ],
   admin: [
     "org.manage_settings",
@@ -32345,7 +32349,9 @@ var ORG_ROLE_PERMISSIONS = {
     "org.manage_teams",
     "org.manage_guardrails",
     "org.manage_integrations",
-    "org.view_audit_log"
+    "org.view_audit_log",
+    "org.manage_model_policies",
+    "org.assign_model_policies"
   ],
   member: [
     "org.manage_teams",
@@ -36985,7 +36991,22 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // seeding code, so `listNewOrgFlagOverrides()` is the one answer to "which flags
     // does a new org get". `defaultValue` stays false so the ~4 months of orgs already
     // carrying an inert enforce-level email.require_approval row are NOT armed on deploy.
-    newOrgOverride: true
+    newOrgOverride: true,
+    // ENG-9630: API-created organizations only, and this is a deliberate,
+    // reviewed asymmetry rather than an oversight.
+    //
+    // Arming this holds EVERY dispatching send for human approval. The hold
+    // itself works fine on a self-serve org — `hitl-approval-routing` has
+    // defaulted to 'on' since ENG-7828, so a real Human Approval card is minted
+    // and it is actionable at /organization/approvals. What a self-serve org
+    // does NOT have is any means of being TOLD: no Slack alert channel is wired
+    // at signup, so the card sits in a console surface nobody has pointed the
+    // user at, and their agent's first email silently waits on it.
+    //
+    // So the blocker is the notification path, not the control. Whoever revisits
+    // this should treat "a self-serve org actually receives the card" as the
+    // prerequisite and then drop this line — do not simply widen it.
+    newOrgOverrideOrigins: ["api"]
   },
   {
     key: "mail-rule-control-enforcement",

package/dist/{persistent-session-BHJLZTYX.js → persistent-session-H7CP2TUX.js}

@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ import {
   writeDirectChatSessionState,
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
-} from "./chunk-QB6TIA3Z.js";
-import "./chunk-BADE2W6M.js";
+} from "./chunk-7KT2QNXF.js";
+import "./chunk-IBBBIE4K.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 export {
   EGRESS_BASELINE_DOMAINS,
@@ -98,4 +98,4 @@ export {
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-BHJLZTYX.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-H7CP2TUX.js.map

package/dist/{responsiveness-probe-457EYSWZ.js → responsiveness-probe-MPPDJSOL.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   paneLogPath
-} from "./chunk-QB6TIA3Z.js";
-import "./chunk-BADE2W6M.js";
+} from "./chunk-7KT2QNXF.js";
+import "./chunk-IBBBIE4K.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 
 // src/lib/responsiveness-probe.ts
@@ -745,4 +745,4 @@ export {
   readAndResetSlackReplyBindingClassifications,
   readAndResetSlackReplyTargetClassifications
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-457EYSWZ.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-MPPDJSOL.js.map

package/dist/{session-auth-dead-YUPZGR3F.js → session-auth-dead-TK3KNAH4.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   sessionTranscriptDir
-} from "./chunk-BADE2W6M.js";
+} from "./chunk-IBBBIE4K.js";
 
 // src/lib/session-auth-dead.ts
 import { closeSync, openSync, readSync, readdirSync, statSync } from "fs";
@@ -203,4 +203,4 @@ export {
   decideSessionAuthState,
   probeSessionAuth
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=session-auth-dead-YUPZGR3F.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=session-auth-dead-TK3KNAH4.js.map

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@integrity-labs/agt-cli",
-  "version": "0.28.732",
+  "version": "0.28.733",
   "description": "Augmented Team CLI — agent provisioning and management",
   "type": "module",
   "engines": {