@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.695 → 0.28.696

package/dist/{claude-pair-runtime-MRA4KSDR.js → claude-pair-runtime-I7MIDQSW.js}

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ async function spawnPairSession(session) {
     return { ok: true };
   } catch {
   }
-  const { resolveClaudeBinary } = await import("./persistent-session-PEY2TMJI.js");
+  const { resolveClaudeBinary } = await import("./persistent-session-5ZWDVVIH.js");
   const claudeBin = resolveClaudeBinary();
   const pairEnv = {
     ...process.env,
@@ -373,4 +373,4 @@ export {
   startClaudePair,
   submitClaudePairCode
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=claude-pair-runtime-MRA4KSDR.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=claude-pair-runtime-I7MIDQSW.js.map

package/dist/lib/manager-worker.js

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ import {
   safeWriteJsonAtomic,
   setConfigHash,
   tripClass
-} from "../chunk-A2W4K7IH.js";
+} from "../chunk-WB6ERJPU.js";
 import {
   getProjectDir as getProjectDir2,
   getReadyTasks,
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ import {
   takeZombieDetection,
   toOpencodeModel,
   writeEgressAllowlist
-} from "../chunk-OUERGATQ.js";
+} from "../chunk-QCYRC5FK.js";
 import {
   ACCOUNT_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_FILENAME,
   AnchorSessionClient,
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ import {
   subagentActivityAgeSeconds,
   sumTranscriptUsageInWindow,
   transcriptActivityAgeSeconds
-} from "../chunk-XB2RCS5S.js";
+} from "../chunk-Y7AHOXHP.js";
 import {
   reapOrphanChannelMcps
 } from "../chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
@@ -11840,7 +11840,7 @@ var pendingDayRolloverReset = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
 var dayRolloverInboundHold = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 var INBOUND_HOLD_EPISODE_GAP_MS = 12e4;
 async function channelInboundActivityAgeSecondsFor(codeName) {
-  const { newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-VJP2AHNR.js");
+  const { newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-KDQFIROB.js");
   const newest = newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs(dirname10(paneLogPath(codeName)));
   if (newest === null) return null;
   return Math.max(0, Math.floor((Date.now() - newest) / 1e3));
@@ -12488,7 +12488,7 @@ var agentRestartTimezoneInputs = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 var lastVersionCheckAt = 0;
 var VERSION_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1e3;
 var lastResponsivenessProbeAt = 0;
-var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.695" : "dev";
+var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.696" : "dev";
 function resolveBrewPath(execFileSync3) {
   try {
     const out = execFileSync3("which", ["brew"], { timeout: 5e3 }).toString().trim();
@@ -13989,7 +13989,7 @@ function flushRestartedAgentDiagnostics(hostId, codeNames) {
   if (codeNames.length === 0) return;
   void (async () => {
     try {
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-PEY2TMJI.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-5ZWDVVIH.js");
       await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
         host_id: hostId,
         agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics(codeNames, quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor)
@@ -14107,7 +14107,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
     }
     try {
       const { detectHostSecurity } = await import("../host-security-6PDFG7F5.js");
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-PEY2TMJI.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-5ZWDVVIH.js");
       const diagCodeNames = [...agentState.persistentSessionAgents];
       const agentDiagnostics = diagCodeNames.length > 0 ? collectDiagnostics(diagCodeNames, quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor) : void 0;
       let tailscaleHostname;
@@ -14259,7 +14259,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
         collectPanelessActivityProbes,
         getResponsivenessIntervalMs,
         occupancyQualificationClassifications
-      } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-VJP2AHNR.js");
+      } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-KDQFIROB.js");
       const probeIntervalMs = getResponsivenessIntervalMs();
       if (now - lastResponsivenessProbeAt > probeIntervalMs) {
         const probeCodeNames = [...agentState.persistentSessionAgents];
@@ -14369,7 +14369,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
           collectResponsivenessProbes,
           livePendingInboundOldestAgeSeconds,
           parkPendingInbound
-        } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-VJP2AHNR.js");
+        } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-KDQFIROB.js");
         const { getProjectDir: wedgeProjectDir } = await import("../scheduler-engine-NDP36U7O.js");
         const wedgeNow = /* @__PURE__ */ new Date();
         const liveAgents = agentState.persistentSessionAgents;
@@ -14525,7 +14525,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
     }
     try {
       const { scrapeMcpFailedBannerCount } = await import("../pane-mcp-banner-scraper-JA437JIB.js");
-      const { probeSessionAuth } = await import("../session-auth-dead-QCZ2EOVS.js");
+      const { probeSessionAuth } = await import("../session-auth-dead-7S7IQGNX.js");
       const observations = [];
       const pendingCacheCommits = [];
       const modelApiErrorReportingOn = hostFlagStore().getBoolean("model-api-error-reporting");
@@ -18285,7 +18285,7 @@ async function handleRestartDoorbell(agentId, requestedAt, restartReason) {
     void api.post("/host/restart-ack", { host_id: hostId, agent_id: agentId, restart_requested_at: requestedAt }).catch((err) => log(`[restart-lane] ack failed for '${codeName}': ${err.message}`));
     void (async () => {
       try {
-        const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-PEY2TMJI.js");
+        const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-5ZWDVVIH.js");
         await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
           host_id: hostId,
           agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics([codeName], quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor)
@@ -18336,7 +18336,7 @@ async function respawnAgentAfterMcpStop(codeName, reason) {
     }
     try {
       const hostId = await getHostId();
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-PEY2TMJI.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-5ZWDVVIH.js");
       await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
         host_id: hostId,
         agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics([codeName], quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor)
@@ -18968,7 +18968,7 @@ async function processClaudePairSessions(agents) {
     killPairSession,
     pairTmuxSession,
     finalizeClaudePairOnboarding
-  } = await import("../claude-pair-runtime-MRA4KSDR.js");
+  } = await import("../claude-pair-runtime-I7MIDQSW.js");
   for (const pairId of pendingResp.cancelled_pair_ids ?? []) {
     log(`[claude-pair] sweeping orphan tmux session for pair ${pairId.slice(0, 8)}`);
     const killed = await killPairSession(pairTmuxSession(pairId));

package/dist/mcp/direct-chat-channel.js

@@ -35960,7 +35960,7 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "tool-call-audit",
-    description: "Host-side tool-call audit extraction (ENG-8575, slice 3 of ENG-8427): the manager scans agent transcripts for tool calls, redacts each to identity-without-content, and POSTs them to /host/tool-calls. Boolean gate; ships dark \u2014 when off the manager reads no transcripts and sends nothing, so 0 agent_tool_calls rows fleet-wide is the expected steady state until it is armed. NOT the commercial gate: /host/tool-calls independently re-checks the advanced_governance entitlement and refuses regardless of this flag, because the host is customer-owned infrastructure. This flag is rollout control only.",
+    description: "Host-side tool-call audit extraction (ENG-8575, slice 3 of ENG-8427): the manager scans agent transcripts for tool calls, redacts each to identity-without-content, and POSTs them to /host/tool-calls. Boolean gate; when off the manager reads no transcripts and sends nothing. ARMED STAGE-WIDE SINCE 2026-08-17 \u2014 the compiled default below is what a host resolves when nothing else says otherwise, NOT a description of the fleet. This text once asserted the opposite and outlived its truth by nine days, which is what got ENG-9472 filed to arm an already-armed flag. Query the table, do not infer it from this line. NOT the commercial gate: /host/tool-calls independently re-checks the advanced_governance entitlement and refuses regardless of this flag, because the host is customer-owned infrastructure. This flag is rollout control only.",
     flagType: "boolean",
     // Declared safe value is `false` (no extraction). Fail-safe direction: a
     // flag-DB read error must never start shipping tool-call metadata across the

package/dist/mcp/index.js

@@ -42921,7 +42921,7 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "tool-call-audit",
-    description: "Host-side tool-call audit extraction (ENG-8575, slice 3 of ENG-8427): the manager scans agent transcripts for tool calls, redacts each to identity-without-content, and POSTs them to /host/tool-calls. Boolean gate; ships dark \u2014 when off the manager reads no transcripts and sends nothing, so 0 agent_tool_calls rows fleet-wide is the expected steady state until it is armed. NOT the commercial gate: /host/tool-calls independently re-checks the advanced_governance entitlement and refuses regardless of this flag, because the host is customer-owned infrastructure. This flag is rollout control only.",
+    description: "Host-side tool-call audit extraction (ENG-8575, slice 3 of ENG-8427): the manager scans agent transcripts for tool calls, redacts each to identity-without-content, and POSTs them to /host/tool-calls. Boolean gate; when off the manager reads no transcripts and sends nothing. ARMED STAGE-WIDE SINCE 2026-08-17 \u2014 the compiled default below is what a host resolves when nothing else says otherwise, NOT a description of the fleet. This text once asserted the opposite and outlived its truth by nine days, which is what got ENG-9472 filed to arm an already-armed flag. Query the table, do not infer it from this line. NOT the commercial gate: /host/tool-calls independently re-checks the advanced_governance entitlement and refuses regardless of this flag, because the host is customer-owned infrastructure. This flag is rollout control only.",
     flagType: "boolean",
     // Declared safe value is `false` (no extraction). Fail-safe direction: a
     // flag-DB read error must never start shipping tool-call metadata across the

package/dist/mcp/origami.js

@@ -41708,7 +41708,7 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "tool-call-audit",
-    description: "Host-side tool-call audit extraction (ENG-8575, slice 3 of ENG-8427): the manager scans agent transcripts for tool calls, redacts each to identity-without-content, and POSTs them to /host/tool-calls. Boolean gate; ships dark \u2014 when off the manager reads no transcripts and sends nothing, so 0 agent_tool_calls rows fleet-wide is the expected steady state until it is armed. NOT the commercial gate: /host/tool-calls independently re-checks the advanced_governance entitlement and refuses regardless of this flag, because the host is customer-owned infrastructure. This flag is rollout control only.",
+    description: "Host-side tool-call audit extraction (ENG-8575, slice 3 of ENG-8427): the manager scans agent transcripts for tool calls, redacts each to identity-without-content, and POSTs them to /host/tool-calls. Boolean gate; when off the manager reads no transcripts and sends nothing. ARMED STAGE-WIDE SINCE 2026-08-17 \u2014 the compiled default below is what a host resolves when nothing else says otherwise, NOT a description of the fleet. This text once asserted the opposite and outlived its truth by nine days, which is what got ENG-9472 filed to arm an already-armed flag. Query the table, do not infer it from this line. NOT the commercial gate: /host/tool-calls independently re-checks the advanced_governance entitlement and refuses regardless of this flag, because the host is customer-owned infrastructure. This flag is rollout control only.",
     flagType: "boolean",
     // Declared safe value is `false` (no extraction). Fail-safe direction: a
     // flag-DB read error must never start shipping tool-call metadata across the

package/dist/mcp/slack-channel.js

@@ -36169,7 +36169,7 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "tool-call-audit",
-    description: "Host-side tool-call audit extraction (ENG-8575, slice 3 of ENG-8427): the manager scans agent transcripts for tool calls, redacts each to identity-without-content, and POSTs them to /host/tool-calls. Boolean gate; ships dark \u2014 when off the manager reads no transcripts and sends nothing, so 0 agent_tool_calls rows fleet-wide is the expected steady state until it is armed. NOT the commercial gate: /host/tool-calls independently re-checks the advanced_governance entitlement and refuses regardless of this flag, because the host is customer-owned infrastructure. This flag is rollout control only.",
+    description: "Host-side tool-call audit extraction (ENG-8575, slice 3 of ENG-8427): the manager scans agent transcripts for tool calls, redacts each to identity-without-content, and POSTs them to /host/tool-calls. Boolean gate; when off the manager reads no transcripts and sends nothing. ARMED STAGE-WIDE SINCE 2026-08-17 \u2014 the compiled default below is what a host resolves when nothing else says otherwise, NOT a description of the fleet. This text once asserted the opposite and outlived its truth by nine days, which is what got ENG-9472 filed to arm an already-armed flag. Query the table, do not infer it from this line. NOT the commercial gate: /host/tool-calls independently re-checks the advanced_governance entitlement and refuses regardless of this flag, because the host is customer-owned infrastructure. This flag is rollout control only.",
     flagType: "boolean",
     // Declared safe value is `false` (no extraction). Fail-safe direction: a
     // flag-DB read error must never start shipping tool-call metadata across the

package/dist/mcp/telegram-channel.js

@@ -36325,7 +36325,7 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "tool-call-audit",
-    description: "Host-side tool-call audit extraction (ENG-8575, slice 3 of ENG-8427): the manager scans agent transcripts for tool calls, redacts each to identity-without-content, and POSTs them to /host/tool-calls. Boolean gate; ships dark \u2014 when off the manager reads no transcripts and sends nothing, so 0 agent_tool_calls rows fleet-wide is the expected steady state until it is armed. NOT the commercial gate: /host/tool-calls independently re-checks the advanced_governance entitlement and refuses regardless of this flag, because the host is customer-owned infrastructure. This flag is rollout control only.",
+    description: "Host-side tool-call audit extraction (ENG-8575, slice 3 of ENG-8427): the manager scans agent transcripts for tool calls, redacts each to identity-without-content, and POSTs them to /host/tool-calls. Boolean gate; when off the manager reads no transcripts and sends nothing. ARMED STAGE-WIDE SINCE 2026-08-17 \u2014 the compiled default below is what a host resolves when nothing else says otherwise, NOT a description of the fleet. This text once asserted the opposite and outlived its truth by nine days, which is what got ENG-9472 filed to arm an already-armed flag. Query the table, do not infer it from this line. NOT the commercial gate: /host/tool-calls independently re-checks the advanced_governance entitlement and refuses regardless of this flag, because the host is customer-owned infrastructure. This flag is rollout control only.",
     flagType: "boolean",
     // Declared safe value is `false` (no extraction). Fail-safe direction: a
     // flag-DB read error must never start shipping tool-call metadata across the

package/dist/{persistent-session-PEY2TMJI.js → persistent-session-5ZWDVVIH.js}

@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ import {
   writeDirectChatSessionState,
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
-} from "./chunk-OUERGATQ.js";
-import "./chunk-XB2RCS5S.js";
+} from "./chunk-QCYRC5FK.js";
+import "./chunk-Y7AHOXHP.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 export {
   EGRESS_BASELINE_DOMAINS,
@@ -92,4 +92,4 @@ export {
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-PEY2TMJI.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-5ZWDVVIH.js.map

package/dist/{responsiveness-probe-VJP2AHNR.js → responsiveness-probe-KDQFIROB.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   paneLogPath
-} from "./chunk-OUERGATQ.js";
-import "./chunk-XB2RCS5S.js";
+} from "./chunk-QCYRC5FK.js";
+import "./chunk-Y7AHOXHP.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 
 // src/lib/responsiveness-probe.ts
@@ -745,4 +745,4 @@ export {
   readAndResetSlackReplyBindingClassifications,
   readAndResetSlackReplyTargetClassifications
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-VJP2AHNR.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-KDQFIROB.js.map

package/dist/{session-auth-dead-QCZ2EOVS.js → session-auth-dead-7S7IQGNX.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   sessionTranscriptDir
-} from "./chunk-XB2RCS5S.js";
+} from "./chunk-Y7AHOXHP.js";
 
 // src/lib/session-auth-dead.ts
 import { closeSync, openSync, readSync, readdirSync, statSync } from "fs";
@@ -203,4 +203,4 @@ export {
   decideSessionAuthState,
   probeSessionAuth
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=session-auth-dead-QCZ2EOVS.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=session-auth-dead-7S7IQGNX.js.map

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@integrity-labs/agt-cli",
-  "version": "0.28.695",
+  "version": "0.28.696",
   "description": "Augmented Team CLI — agent provisioning and management",
   "type": "module",
   "engines": {