@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.690 → 0.28.692

package/dist/mcp/direct-chat-channel.js

@@ -35962,30 +35962,17 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // first the real cut is higher than this and the pin under-reports.
     since: "0.28.570"
   },
-  {
-    key: "secret-files-tmpfs",
-    description: "Host-side RAM-backing of the per-agent .env.integrations secret files (ENG-9348, epic ENG-9347). When on, the manager turns both copies (the agent-dir file and the project/ mirror) into symlinks pointing at a 0700 per-agent directory under tmpfs (/dev/shm, else /run), so plaintext channel/integration tokens live only in RAM: the persistent EBS volume holds a symlink (no token bytes), an EBS snapshot captures nothing, and a host shutdown is a genuine wipe. Every consumer path is unchanged (same file paths). Boolean gate; ships dark. Fail-safe in every direction \u2014 off is byte-for-byte today; a host with no genuine tmpfs root (e.g. macOS dev) silently keeps the persistent files; a symlink-setup error logs and falls back to the persistent path. Reboot clears tmpfs, and the manager re-backs on its next refresh (surviving reboot is not required \u2014 secrets are re-fetched on refresh).",
-    flagType: "boolean",
-    // Declared safe value is `false` (persistent files, today's behaviour).
-    // Fail-safe direction: a flag-DB read error must never, on its own, start
-    // relocating where prod secret files physically live. Flip on per-host for a
-    // canary, verify no plaintext lands on the persistent volume, then fleet-wide
-    // from the admin Feature Flags page.
-    defaultValue: false,
-    // ADR-0022 operator override, read by the host flag store's env layer (not a
-    // hand-written process.env gate) — same posture as memory-extraction /
-    // tool-call-audit above. Gives a per-host canary before the DB flag exists.
-    envVar: "AGT_SECRET_FILES_TMPFS_ENABLED",
-    // The real published build that carries the manager reader + core writer,
-    // replacing the deliberately-unreachable `99.0.0` this flag shipped with.
-    // Verified against the tarball (`npm pack @integrity-labs/agt-cli@0.28.678`):
-    // `setSecretFileTmpfsBacking` is present in package/dist/lib/manager-worker.js
-    // and the `secret-files-tmpfs` key ships in the bundle. Auto-publish patch-
-    // bumps from main, so if a CLI-touching PR landed between the ENG-9348 merge
-    // and this one the real cut is higher than 0.28.678 and reach under-reports;
-    // re-verify before flipping the flag on for a canary (ENG-8575/ENG-9350).
-    since: "0.28.678"
-  },
+  // ENG-9348 RETIRED (2026-08-24): the `secret-files-tmpfs` flag and its whole
+  // tmpfs-backing implementation are removed after TWO prod outages. Symlinking
+  // `.env.integrations` into /dev/shm raced the agent wrapper's `set -e; source
+  // .env.integrations` (a symlink observed before its target existed → crashloop);
+  // the seed-before-symlink fix (PR #4960) proved insufficient (a flag-read flap
+  // let the destructive disable-revert re-open the window). Approach abandoned in
+  // favour of the spawn-env path (ENG-9350, which never writes the file at all)
+  // plus disk shred (ENG-9349). Removing the flag makes a third outage impossible.
+  // Any lingering feature_flag_overrides rows for this key are inert (no reader);
+  // clear them out-of-band if desired.
+  // flag-archive-allow: secret-files-tmpfs retired after two prod outages — feature removed, no manager reader remains
   {
     key: "memory-file-tombstones",
     description: "Host-side removal of RETIRED agent memory files (ENG-9257). The control plane sends an explicit tombstone list on /host/memories and the manager moves the matching .md out of the agent's memory directory \u2014 but only when its write-time manifest says the manager itself wrote that exact file and the sha256 still matches, so an agent-edited or hand-authored file is retained and reported instead. Boolean gate; ships dark. Scope is retirement only, never expiry: /host/memories has always withheld expired rows, so an expiry-driven list would make months of accumulated backlog deletable on the first armed tick. This is the ONLY thing that makes retirement visible to the agent, which reads its memory directory straight off disk \u2014 every server-side reader already excludes retired rows, so with this off a retired memory is gone everywhere except the one surface that changes the agent's behaviour.",

package/dist/mcp/index.js

@@ -42913,30 +42913,17 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // first the real cut is higher than this and the pin under-reports.
     since: "0.28.570"
   },
-  {
-    key: "secret-files-tmpfs",
-    description: "Host-side RAM-backing of the per-agent .env.integrations secret files (ENG-9348, epic ENG-9347). When on, the manager turns both copies (the agent-dir file and the project/ mirror) into symlinks pointing at a 0700 per-agent directory under tmpfs (/dev/shm, else /run), so plaintext channel/integration tokens live only in RAM: the persistent EBS volume holds a symlink (no token bytes), an EBS snapshot captures nothing, and a host shutdown is a genuine wipe. Every consumer path is unchanged (same file paths). Boolean gate; ships dark. Fail-safe in every direction \u2014 off is byte-for-byte today; a host with no genuine tmpfs root (e.g. macOS dev) silently keeps the persistent files; a symlink-setup error logs and falls back to the persistent path. Reboot clears tmpfs, and the manager re-backs on its next refresh (surviving reboot is not required \u2014 secrets are re-fetched on refresh).",
-    flagType: "boolean",
-    // Declared safe value is `false` (persistent files, today's behaviour).
-    // Fail-safe direction: a flag-DB read error must never, on its own, start
-    // relocating where prod secret files physically live. Flip on per-host for a
-    // canary, verify no plaintext lands on the persistent volume, then fleet-wide
-    // from the admin Feature Flags page.
-    defaultValue: false,
-    // ADR-0022 operator override, read by the host flag store's env layer (not a
-    // hand-written process.env gate) — same posture as memory-extraction /
-    // tool-call-audit above. Gives a per-host canary before the DB flag exists.
-    envVar: "AGT_SECRET_FILES_TMPFS_ENABLED",
-    // The real published build that carries the manager reader + core writer,
-    // replacing the deliberately-unreachable `99.0.0` this flag shipped with.
-    // Verified against the tarball (`npm pack @integrity-labs/agt-cli@0.28.678`):
-    // `setSecretFileTmpfsBacking` is present in package/dist/lib/manager-worker.js
-    // and the `secret-files-tmpfs` key ships in the bundle. Auto-publish patch-
-    // bumps from main, so if a CLI-touching PR landed between the ENG-9348 merge
-    // and this one the real cut is higher than 0.28.678 and reach under-reports;
-    // re-verify before flipping the flag on for a canary (ENG-8575/ENG-9350).
-    since: "0.28.678"
-  },
+  // ENG-9348 RETIRED (2026-08-24): the `secret-files-tmpfs` flag and its whole
+  // tmpfs-backing implementation are removed after TWO prod outages. Symlinking
+  // `.env.integrations` into /dev/shm raced the agent wrapper's `set -e; source
+  // .env.integrations` (a symlink observed before its target existed → crashloop);
+  // the seed-before-symlink fix (PR #4960) proved insufficient (a flag-read flap
+  // let the destructive disable-revert re-open the window). Approach abandoned in
+  // favour of the spawn-env path (ENG-9350, which never writes the file at all)
+  // plus disk shred (ENG-9349). Removing the flag makes a third outage impossible.
+  // Any lingering feature_flag_overrides rows for this key are inert (no reader);
+  // clear them out-of-band if desired.
+  // flag-archive-allow: secret-files-tmpfs retired after two prod outages — feature removed, no manager reader remains
   {
     key: "memory-file-tombstones",
     description: "Host-side removal of RETIRED agent memory files (ENG-9257). The control plane sends an explicit tombstone list on /host/memories and the manager moves the matching .md out of the agent's memory directory \u2014 but only when its write-time manifest says the manager itself wrote that exact file and the sha256 still matches, so an agent-edited or hand-authored file is retained and reported instead. Boolean gate; ships dark. Scope is retirement only, never expiry: /host/memories has always withheld expired rows, so an expiry-driven list would make months of accumulated backlog deletable on the first armed tick. This is the ONLY thing that makes retirement visible to the agent, which reads its memory directory straight off disk \u2014 every server-side reader already excludes retired rows, so with this off a retired memory is gone everywhere except the one surface that changes the agent's behaviour.",
@@ -45810,11 +45797,61 @@ server.tool(
     return { content: [{ type: "text", text: data.message ?? `Offer ${data.offer_id} filed.` }] };
   }
 );
+server.tool(
+  "routine_list",
+  "List the routines YOU own - the recurring responsibilities a human accepted on your behalf. Call this FIRST whenever you need a routine_id: routine_revise and submit_routine_output both require one, and this is the only tool that produces it. Each entry gives you the routine_id, its name and status, the schedule it runs on (id, cron, timezone), its version, whether it owes a submit_routine_output call, and its FULL current prompt. The prompt is complete and untruncated on purpose: routine_revise replaces a routine's substance wholesale, so anything missing from what you read is missing from what you write. Read it here before revising rather than reconstructing it from memory. Returns an empty list if you own none - that is an answer, not an error.",
+  {},
+  async () => {
+    try {
+      const data = await apiPost("/host/routines/list", { agent_id: AGT_AGENT_ID }, false, 15e3, "routine_list", true);
+      if (!data.ok) {
+        return { content: [{ type: "text", text: data.error ?? "Could not list routines." }] };
+      }
+      const routines = data.routines ?? [];
+      if (routines.length === 0) {
+        return {
+          content: [
+            {
+              type: "text",
+              text: "You own no routines. A routine is created when you propose one with routine_propose and a human accepts it."
+            }
+          ]
+        };
+      }
+      const body = routines.map((r) => {
+        const when = r.cron ? `cron ${r.cron}` : r.every ? `every ${r.every}` : "no schedule";
+        const tz = r.timezone ? ` ${r.timezone}` : "";
+        const gated = r.requires_output_approval ? "\n  approval: REQUIRED \u2014 call submit_routine_output instead of delivering directly" : "";
+        return `\u2022 ${r.name} [${r.status}] v${r.version}
+  routine_id: ${r.routine_id}
+  schedule_id: ${r.schedule_id ?? "(none \u2014 this routine has no runtime row)"} (${when}${tz})${gated}
+  prompt:
+${r.prompt ?? "(none)"}`;
+      }).join("\n\n");
+      return {
+        content: [
+          {
+            type: "text",
+            text: `${routines.length} routine${routines.length === 1 ? "" : "s"} you own:
+
+${body}`
+          }
+        ]
+      };
+    } catch (err) {
+      const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+      return {
+        content: [{ type: "text", text: `Could not list your routines: ${msg}` }],
+        isError: true
+      };
+    }
+  }
+);
 server.tool(
   "routine_revise",
   "Propose a CORRECTION to a routine you already own, for your manager to accept or decline. Use this when a routine you run is wrong: bad instructions, a gate that never fires, a step that no longer applies, or a defect you spotted before it ever ran. This is the only way to change what a routine DOES - schedule_update deliberately refuses prompt edits, and it will point you here. It does NOT change when the routine runs: to retime it, send only schedule fields to schedule_update instead. Nothing changes until your manager accepts: they get an accept/decline card, and the live routine keeps running as-is until they tap. On acceptance the SAME routine is updated in place - no duplicate is created. Pass the full replacement description, not a diff or a patch: it replaces the routine's substance wholesale, so anything you leave out is gone.",
   {
-    routine_id: external_exports.string().trim().min(1).describe("The id of the routine to revise. It must be a routine YOU own; anything else reads as not-found."),
+    routine_id: external_exports.string().trim().min(1).describe("The routine to revise. Get this from routine_list. A schedule_id from schedule_list is also accepted and resolved server-side. It must be a routine YOU own; anything else reads as not-found."),
     description: external_exports.string().trim().min(1).describe(
       "The FULL replacement description - what the routine should do, from scratch. This becomes the routine's instructions verbatim, so write it as a complete brief rather than as a change to the old one. Anything you omit is removed."
     ),
@@ -45852,7 +45889,7 @@ server.tool(
         content: [
           {
             type: "text",
-            text: notFound ? `Could not revise: no routine "${params.routine_id}" that you own. Check the id - you can only revise routines that are yours.` : `Could not propose the revision: ${msg}`
+            text: notFound ? `Could not revise: nothing matched "${params.routine_id}". Call routine_list to get the routine_id \u2014 it also accepts a schedule_id from schedule_list.` : `Could not propose the revision: ${msg}`
           }
         ],
         isError: true
@@ -46604,6 +46641,8 @@ var LOCAL_TOOL_NAMES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
   "routine_propose",
   // ENG-9392: the correction half of routine_propose.
   "routine_revise",
+  // ENG-9431: the discovery primitive both of the above depend on.
+  "routine_list",
   "knowledge_list",
   "knowledge_add",
   "knowledge_update",

package/dist/mcp/origami.js

@@ -41700,30 +41700,17 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // first the real cut is higher than this and the pin under-reports.
     since: "0.28.570"
   },
-  {
-    key: "secret-files-tmpfs",
-    description: "Host-side RAM-backing of the per-agent .env.integrations secret files (ENG-9348, epic ENG-9347). When on, the manager turns both copies (the agent-dir file and the project/ mirror) into symlinks pointing at a 0700 per-agent directory under tmpfs (/dev/shm, else /run), so plaintext channel/integration tokens live only in RAM: the persistent EBS volume holds a symlink (no token bytes), an EBS snapshot captures nothing, and a host shutdown is a genuine wipe. Every consumer path is unchanged (same file paths). Boolean gate; ships dark. Fail-safe in every direction \u2014 off is byte-for-byte today; a host with no genuine tmpfs root (e.g. macOS dev) silently keeps the persistent files; a symlink-setup error logs and falls back to the persistent path. Reboot clears tmpfs, and the manager re-backs on its next refresh (surviving reboot is not required \u2014 secrets are re-fetched on refresh).",
-    flagType: "boolean",
-    // Declared safe value is `false` (persistent files, today's behaviour).
-    // Fail-safe direction: a flag-DB read error must never, on its own, start
-    // relocating where prod secret files physically live. Flip on per-host for a
-    // canary, verify no plaintext lands on the persistent volume, then fleet-wide
-    // from the admin Feature Flags page.
-    defaultValue: false,
-    // ADR-0022 operator override, read by the host flag store's env layer (not a
-    // hand-written process.env gate) — same posture as memory-extraction /
-    // tool-call-audit above. Gives a per-host canary before the DB flag exists.
-    envVar: "AGT_SECRET_FILES_TMPFS_ENABLED",
-    // The real published build that carries the manager reader + core writer,
-    // replacing the deliberately-unreachable `99.0.0` this flag shipped with.
-    // Verified against the tarball (`npm pack @integrity-labs/agt-cli@0.28.678`):
-    // `setSecretFileTmpfsBacking` is present in package/dist/lib/manager-worker.js
-    // and the `secret-files-tmpfs` key ships in the bundle. Auto-publish patch-
-    // bumps from main, so if a CLI-touching PR landed between the ENG-9348 merge
-    // and this one the real cut is higher than 0.28.678 and reach under-reports;
-    // re-verify before flipping the flag on for a canary (ENG-8575/ENG-9350).
-    since: "0.28.678"
-  },
+  // ENG-9348 RETIRED (2026-08-24): the `secret-files-tmpfs` flag and its whole
+  // tmpfs-backing implementation are removed after TWO prod outages. Symlinking
+  // `.env.integrations` into /dev/shm raced the agent wrapper's `set -e; source
+  // .env.integrations` (a symlink observed before its target existed → crashloop);
+  // the seed-before-symlink fix (PR #4960) proved insufficient (a flag-read flap
+  // let the destructive disable-revert re-open the window). Approach abandoned in
+  // favour of the spawn-env path (ENG-9350, which never writes the file at all)
+  // plus disk shred (ENG-9349). Removing the flag makes a third outage impossible.
+  // Any lingering feature_flag_overrides rows for this key are inert (no reader);
+  // clear them out-of-band if desired.
+  // flag-archive-allow: secret-files-tmpfs retired after two prod outages — feature removed, no manager reader remains
   {
     key: "memory-file-tombstones",
     description: "Host-side removal of RETIRED agent memory files (ENG-9257). The control plane sends an explicit tombstone list on /host/memories and the manager moves the matching .md out of the agent's memory directory \u2014 but only when its write-time manifest says the manager itself wrote that exact file and the sha256 still matches, so an agent-edited or hand-authored file is retained and reported instead. Boolean gate; ships dark. Scope is retirement only, never expiry: /host/memories has always withheld expired rows, so an expiry-driven list would make months of accumulated backlog deletable on the first armed tick. This is the ONLY thing that makes retirement visible to the agent, which reads its memory directory straight off disk \u2014 every server-side reader already excludes retired rows, so with this off a retired memory is gone everywhere except the one surface that changes the agent's behaviour.",

package/dist/mcp/slack-channel.js

@@ -36171,30 +36171,17 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // first the real cut is higher than this and the pin under-reports.
     since: "0.28.570"
   },
-  {
-    key: "secret-files-tmpfs",
-    description: "Host-side RAM-backing of the per-agent .env.integrations secret files (ENG-9348, epic ENG-9347). When on, the manager turns both copies (the agent-dir file and the project/ mirror) into symlinks pointing at a 0700 per-agent directory under tmpfs (/dev/shm, else /run), so plaintext channel/integration tokens live only in RAM: the persistent EBS volume holds a symlink (no token bytes), an EBS snapshot captures nothing, and a host shutdown is a genuine wipe. Every consumer path is unchanged (same file paths). Boolean gate; ships dark. Fail-safe in every direction \u2014 off is byte-for-byte today; a host with no genuine tmpfs root (e.g. macOS dev) silently keeps the persistent files; a symlink-setup error logs and falls back to the persistent path. Reboot clears tmpfs, and the manager re-backs on its next refresh (surviving reboot is not required \u2014 secrets are re-fetched on refresh).",
-    flagType: "boolean",
-    // Declared safe value is `false` (persistent files, today's behaviour).
-    // Fail-safe direction: a flag-DB read error must never, on its own, start
-    // relocating where prod secret files physically live. Flip on per-host for a
-    // canary, verify no plaintext lands on the persistent volume, then fleet-wide
-    // from the admin Feature Flags page.
-    defaultValue: false,
-    // ADR-0022 operator override, read by the host flag store's env layer (not a
-    // hand-written process.env gate) — same posture as memory-extraction /
-    // tool-call-audit above. Gives a per-host canary before the DB flag exists.
-    envVar: "AGT_SECRET_FILES_TMPFS_ENABLED",
-    // The real published build that carries the manager reader + core writer,
-    // replacing the deliberately-unreachable `99.0.0` this flag shipped with.
-    // Verified against the tarball (`npm pack @integrity-labs/agt-cli@0.28.678`):
-    // `setSecretFileTmpfsBacking` is present in package/dist/lib/manager-worker.js
-    // and the `secret-files-tmpfs` key ships in the bundle. Auto-publish patch-
-    // bumps from main, so if a CLI-touching PR landed between the ENG-9348 merge
-    // and this one the real cut is higher than 0.28.678 and reach under-reports;
-    // re-verify before flipping the flag on for a canary (ENG-8575/ENG-9350).
-    since: "0.28.678"
-  },
+  // ENG-9348 RETIRED (2026-08-24): the `secret-files-tmpfs` flag and its whole
+  // tmpfs-backing implementation are removed after TWO prod outages. Symlinking
+  // `.env.integrations` into /dev/shm raced the agent wrapper's `set -e; source
+  // .env.integrations` (a symlink observed before its target existed → crashloop);
+  // the seed-before-symlink fix (PR #4960) proved insufficient (a flag-read flap
+  // let the destructive disable-revert re-open the window). Approach abandoned in
+  // favour of the spawn-env path (ENG-9350, which never writes the file at all)
+  // plus disk shred (ENG-9349). Removing the flag makes a third outage impossible.
+  // Any lingering feature_flag_overrides rows for this key are inert (no reader);
+  // clear them out-of-band if desired.
+  // flag-archive-allow: secret-files-tmpfs retired after two prod outages — feature removed, no manager reader remains
   {
     key: "memory-file-tombstones",
     description: "Host-side removal of RETIRED agent memory files (ENG-9257). The control plane sends an explicit tombstone list on /host/memories and the manager moves the matching .md out of the agent's memory directory \u2014 but only when its write-time manifest says the manager itself wrote that exact file and the sha256 still matches, so an agent-edited or hand-authored file is retained and reported instead. Boolean gate; ships dark. Scope is retirement only, never expiry: /host/memories has always withheld expired rows, so an expiry-driven list would make months of accumulated backlog deletable on the first armed tick. This is the ONLY thing that makes retirement visible to the agent, which reads its memory directory straight off disk \u2014 every server-side reader already excludes retired rows, so with this off a retired memory is gone everywhere except the one surface that changes the agent's behaviour.",

package/dist/mcp/telegram-channel.js

@@ -36327,30 +36327,17 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // first the real cut is higher than this and the pin under-reports.
     since: "0.28.570"
   },
-  {
-    key: "secret-files-tmpfs",
-    description: "Host-side RAM-backing of the per-agent .env.integrations secret files (ENG-9348, epic ENG-9347). When on, the manager turns both copies (the agent-dir file and the project/ mirror) into symlinks pointing at a 0700 per-agent directory under tmpfs (/dev/shm, else /run), so plaintext channel/integration tokens live only in RAM: the persistent EBS volume holds a symlink (no token bytes), an EBS snapshot captures nothing, and a host shutdown is a genuine wipe. Every consumer path is unchanged (same file paths). Boolean gate; ships dark. Fail-safe in every direction \u2014 off is byte-for-byte today; a host with no genuine tmpfs root (e.g. macOS dev) silently keeps the persistent files; a symlink-setup error logs and falls back to the persistent path. Reboot clears tmpfs, and the manager re-backs on its next refresh (surviving reboot is not required \u2014 secrets are re-fetched on refresh).",
-    flagType: "boolean",
-    // Declared safe value is `false` (persistent files, today's behaviour).
-    // Fail-safe direction: a flag-DB read error must never, on its own, start
-    // relocating where prod secret files physically live. Flip on per-host for a
-    // canary, verify no plaintext lands on the persistent volume, then fleet-wide
-    // from the admin Feature Flags page.
-    defaultValue: false,
-    // ADR-0022 operator override, read by the host flag store's env layer (not a
-    // hand-written process.env gate) — same posture as memory-extraction /
-    // tool-call-audit above. Gives a per-host canary before the DB flag exists.
-    envVar: "AGT_SECRET_FILES_TMPFS_ENABLED",
-    // The real published build that carries the manager reader + core writer,
-    // replacing the deliberately-unreachable `99.0.0` this flag shipped with.
-    // Verified against the tarball (`npm pack @integrity-labs/agt-cli@0.28.678`):
-    // `setSecretFileTmpfsBacking` is present in package/dist/lib/manager-worker.js
-    // and the `secret-files-tmpfs` key ships in the bundle. Auto-publish patch-
-    // bumps from main, so if a CLI-touching PR landed between the ENG-9348 merge
-    // and this one the real cut is higher than 0.28.678 and reach under-reports;
-    // re-verify before flipping the flag on for a canary (ENG-8575/ENG-9350).
-    since: "0.28.678"
-  },
+  // ENG-9348 RETIRED (2026-08-24): the `secret-files-tmpfs` flag and its whole
+  // tmpfs-backing implementation are removed after TWO prod outages. Symlinking
+  // `.env.integrations` into /dev/shm raced the agent wrapper's `set -e; source
+  // .env.integrations` (a symlink observed before its target existed → crashloop);
+  // the seed-before-symlink fix (PR #4960) proved insufficient (a flag-read flap
+  // let the destructive disable-revert re-open the window). Approach abandoned in
+  // favour of the spawn-env path (ENG-9350, which never writes the file at all)
+  // plus disk shred (ENG-9349). Removing the flag makes a third outage impossible.
+  // Any lingering feature_flag_overrides rows for this key are inert (no reader);
+  // clear them out-of-band if desired.
+  // flag-archive-allow: secret-files-tmpfs retired after two prod outages — feature removed, no manager reader remains
   {
     key: "memory-file-tombstones",
     description: "Host-side removal of RETIRED agent memory files (ENG-9257). The control plane sends an explicit tombstone list on /host/memories and the manager moves the matching .md out of the agent's memory directory \u2014 but only when its write-time manifest says the manager itself wrote that exact file and the sha256 still matches, so an agent-edited or hand-authored file is retained and reported instead. Boolean gate; ships dark. Scope is retirement only, never expiry: /host/memories has always withheld expired rows, so an expiry-driven list would make months of accumulated backlog deletable on the first armed tick. This is the ONLY thing that makes retirement visible to the agent, which reads its memory directory straight off disk \u2014 every server-side reader already excludes retired rows, so with this off a retired memory is gone everywhere except the one surface that changes the agent's behaviour.",

package/dist/{persistent-session-LVBNKFMF.js → persistent-session-42FL5BEW.js}

@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ import {
   writeDirectChatSessionState,
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
-} from "./chunk-XF2B7JHC.js";
-import "./chunk-2GNXBVWJ.js";
+} from "./chunk-WHW747J3.js";
+import "./chunk-7K2I4LJZ.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 export {
   EGRESS_BASELINE_DOMAINS,
@@ -92,4 +92,4 @@ export {
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-LVBNKFMF.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-42FL5BEW.js.map

package/dist/{responsiveness-probe-T52RFYK3.js → responsiveness-probe-RG2SD7HX.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   paneLogPath
-} from "./chunk-XF2B7JHC.js";
-import "./chunk-2GNXBVWJ.js";
+} from "./chunk-WHW747J3.js";
+import "./chunk-7K2I4LJZ.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 
 // src/lib/responsiveness-probe.ts
@@ -745,4 +745,4 @@ export {
   readAndResetSlackReplyBindingClassifications,
   readAndResetSlackReplyTargetClassifications
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-T52RFYK3.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-RG2SD7HX.js.map

package/dist/{session-auth-dead-MV6C7TBH.js → session-auth-dead-SHLP7FRQ.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   sessionTranscriptDir
-} from "./chunk-2GNXBVWJ.js";
+} from "./chunk-7K2I4LJZ.js";
 
 // src/lib/session-auth-dead.ts
 import { closeSync, openSync, readSync, readdirSync, statSync } from "fs";
@@ -203,4 +203,4 @@ export {
   decideSessionAuthState,
   probeSessionAuth
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=session-auth-dead-MV6C7TBH.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=session-auth-dead-SHLP7FRQ.js.map

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@integrity-labs/agt-cli",
-  "version": "0.28.690",
+  "version": "0.28.692",
   "description": "Augmented Team CLI — agent provisioning and management",
   "type": "module",
   "engines": {