@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.648 → 0.28.650

package/dist/mcp/augmented-admin.js

@@ -21827,7 +21827,7 @@ server.registerTool(
 );
 server.registerTool(
   "debug_query_audit_log",
-  { description: 'Read recent audit events to troubleshoot why/when agents bounced \u2014 primarily restart events. Defaults to the "agent.restart" action: each event returns { created_at, source, reason, detail, actor_kind, agent_id, code_name }, where `source` is the restart trigger (agent-self-request, channel-command, maintenance-window, stale-mcp, hot-reload-mcp, mcp-presence-reaper, day-rollover, auth-tuple-change, \u2026) and `reason` is the free-text rationale when one was given (e.g. the agent\'s own words for a request_restart). `detail` (ENG-8293) is the structured "what changed?" payload, null for sources that don\'t emit one. For `auth-tuple-change` it is { auth_tuple: { changed[], unchanged[], components[] } } naming WHICH credential/identity component moved and its before/after fingerprint \u2014 the auth tuple is deliberately NOT keyed on the rotating access token, so an auth-tuple-change is always a genuine credential or identity change, and `detail.auth_tuple.changed` is how you tell which one. Comparing `components[].to` across agents answers whether a restart WAVE was one control-plane push (same new value everywhere) or coincidental per-agent rotations. Two modes: (1) pass { agent_id } to scope to ONE agent (fails closed if you\'re not authorized for its org) \u2014 use when a specific agent went quiet. (2) OMIT agent_id for a CROSS-AGENT sweep across every org you\'re authorized for (optionally narrow with { org_id }) \u2014 use to spot fleet-wide restart storms or compare agents. Filter the action with `action` (pass "all" to drop the action filter and read every event type), and bound with { since_hours?, limit? }. Cross-agent results are org-walled in SQL; unauthorized orgs are invisible.', inputSchema: queryAuditLogSchema },
+  { description: 'Read recent audit events to troubleshoot why/when agents bounced \u2014 primarily restart events. Defaults to the "agent.restart" action: each event returns { id, created_at, action, actor_kind, user_id, agent_id, organization_id, source, reason, detail, code_name, impersonated, impersonated_by_user_id, impersonated_agent_id, impersonation_session_id } \u2014 `user_id` is the identity the action was performed AS, `agent_id` the agent it was performed ON, `impersonated_by_user_id` the operator who was actually driving a user-impersonation session, and `impersonated_agent_id` the agent identity an operator was driving in the agent-impersonation flow (the two flows are distinct and a row carries at most one). `source` is the restart trigger (agent-self-request, channel-command, maintenance-window, stale-mcp, hot-reload-mcp, mcp-presence-reaper, day-rollover, auth-tuple-change, \u2026) and `reason` is the free-text rationale when one was given (e.g. the agent\'s own words for a request_restart). `detail` (ENG-8293) is the structured "what changed?" payload, null for sources that don\'t emit one. For `auth-tuple-change` it is { auth_tuple: { changed[], unchanged[], components[] } } naming WHICH credential/identity component moved and its before/after fingerprint \u2014 the auth tuple is deliberately NOT keyed on the rotating access token, so an auth-tuple-change is always a genuine credential or identity change, and `detail.auth_tuple.changed` is how you tell which one. Comparing `components[].to` across agents answers whether a restart WAVE was one control-plane push (same new value everywhere) or coincidental per-agent rotations. Two modes: (1) pass { agent_id } to scope to ONE agent (fails closed if you\'re not authorized for its org) \u2014 use when a specific agent went quiet. (2) OMIT agent_id for a CROSS-AGENT sweep across every org you\'re authorized for (optionally narrow with { org_id }) \u2014 use to spot fleet-wide restart storms or compare agents. Filter the action with `action` (pass "all" to drop the action filter and read every event type), and bound with { since_hours?, limit? }. Cross-agent results are org-walled in SQL; unauthorized orgs are invisible. ENG-9079 \u2014 IMPERSONATION: `user_id` is the identity an action was performed AS, which is not always who performed it. When `impersonated` is true an Integrity Labs operator was driving: `impersonated_by_user_id` is that operator and `impersonation_session_id` joins every action in the same session. `actor_kind` does NOT distinguish these \u2014 an impersonated user action still reads `user`, so read `impersonated`, not `actor_kind`, to answer "was this really the customer?". Two caveats an investigator must hold: rows written before ENG-9018 shipped (17 Aug 06:04Z) carry NULL because the information was never captured, so absence there is not evidence of a genuine customer action; and a small number of audit writers are still unthreaded, so `impersonated: false` on a recent row means "not recorded as impersonated", not "proven genuine".', inputSchema: queryAuditLogSchema },
   async (args) => {
     try {
       const result = await client.queryAuditLog(args);

package/dist/{persistent-session-TE6CKC5R.js → persistent-session-2JT7HIFF.js}

@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ import {
   writeDirectChatSessionState,
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
-} from "./chunk-UTNGCJLO.js";
-import "./chunk-WP6LYCRS.js";
+} from "./chunk-CSLG2XMX.js";
+import "./chunk-ZAZKEL4Y.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 export {
   EGRESS_BASELINE_DOMAINS,
@@ -92,4 +92,4 @@ export {
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-TE6CKC5R.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-2JT7HIFF.js.map

package/dist/{responsiveness-probe-BQNVH63L.js → responsiveness-probe-5TOZHK3H.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   paneLogPath
-} from "./chunk-UTNGCJLO.js";
-import "./chunk-WP6LYCRS.js";
+} from "./chunk-CSLG2XMX.js";
+import "./chunk-ZAZKEL4Y.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 
 // src/lib/responsiveness-probe.ts
@@ -727,4 +727,4 @@ export {
   readAndResetSlackReplyBindingClassifications,
   readAndResetSlackReplyTargetClassifications
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-BQNVH63L.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-5TOZHK3H.js.map

package/dist/{session-auth-dead-SZXCIJ4S.js → session-auth-dead-PFCVB7MZ.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   sessionTranscriptDir
-} from "./chunk-WP6LYCRS.js";
+} from "./chunk-ZAZKEL4Y.js";
 
 // src/lib/session-auth-dead.ts
 import { closeSync, openSync, readSync, readdirSync, statSync } from "fs";
@@ -203,4 +203,4 @@ export {
   decideSessionAuthState,
   probeSessionAuth
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=session-auth-dead-SZXCIJ4S.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=session-auth-dead-PFCVB7MZ.js.map

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@integrity-labs/agt-cli",
-  "version": "0.28.648",
+  "version": "0.28.650",
   "description": "Augmented Team CLI — agent provisioning and management",
   "type": "module",
   "engines": {