@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.502 → 0.28.504

package/dist/{chunk-HMBECQIY.js → chunk-HEUDF73X.js}

@@ -4977,7 +4977,36 @@ var OAUTH_PROVIDERS = {
     // products/commerce/analytics per CS-1427). Best-effort + idempotent: an
     // unknown/unscoped name is logged and skipped by the proxy, and the
     // toolAllowlist above still caps what is actually callable.
-    preEnableToolsets: ["courses", "products", "commerce", "analytics", "pages", "themes"]
+    //
+    // ENG-8392: `contacts` + `emails` were missing, so thirteen allowlisted
+    // tools were unreachable by construction — list_tags, create_tag,
+    // tag_contact, untag_contact, list_segments, create_segment,
+    // update_segment (contacts) and list_broadcasts, get_broadcast,
+    // create_broadcast, list_sequences, get_sequence, create_sequence
+    // (emails). A customer agent was blocked on exactly those.
+    //
+    // These two ids are Kajabi's OWN spelling, not ours: the server names the
+    // toolset in its rejection, e.g. `list_tags` returns
+    //   "The 'contacts' toolset is not active. Call enable_toolset with
+    //    name: 'contacts' to activate it first."
+    // and `list_sequences` returns the same with 'emails'. Sourced that way
+    // deliberately — a wrong id here is logged and SKIPPED by the proxy, so a
+    // guess would look applied and change nothing.
+    //
+    // Why this went unnoticed for four rounds: `get_contacts_analytics` lives
+    // in the `analytics` group, which we already pre-enable. So the contacts
+    // family read as partly alive (you could see a site's contact count and
+    // growth curve) while every tag and segment call failed.
+    preEnableToolsets: [
+      "courses",
+      "products",
+      "commerce",
+      "analytics",
+      "pages",
+      "themes",
+      "contacts",
+      "emails"
+    ]
   },
   "notion-cli": {
     // Notion's public OAuth app. Tokens are workspace-scoped and long-lived —
@@ -7248,6 +7277,7 @@ var AGENT_DIRECTED_NOTICE_KINDS = ["scheduled_task_nudge", "kanban_check"];
 var AGENT_DIRECTED_KIND_SET = new Set(AGENT_DIRECTED_NOTICE_KINDS);
 
 // ../../packages/core/dist/direct-chat/cursor-advance.js
+var CURSOR_ADVANCE_NON_SHORTFALL_KEYS = ["advanced", "advanced_unreported", "failed"];
 var CURSOR_SHORTFALL_REASONS = [
   "not_found",
   // ENG-8348: `/consume` only. The row belongs to this agent+session but was
@@ -7262,9 +7292,16 @@ var CURSOR_SHORTFALL_REASONS = [
   "unknown",
   "unreported",
   "malformed_count",
-  "other"
+  "other",
+  // ENG-8393: the non-shortfall outcomes — two benign, plus `failed`. Written
+  // on the paths that previously wrote nothing, so a zero on the shortfall
+  // reasons above becomes readable — see CURSOR_ADVANCE_NON_SHORTFALL_KEYS.
+  "advanced",
+  "advanced_unreported",
+  "failed"
 ];
-var KNOWN_REASONS = new Set(CURSOR_SHORTFALL_REASONS);
+var NON_SHORTFALL_KEYS = new Set(CURSOR_ADVANCE_NON_SHORTFALL_KEYS);
+var KNOWN_REASONS = new Set(CURSOR_SHORTFALL_REASONS.filter((k) => !NON_SHORTFALL_KEYS.has(k)));
 function normalizeCursorShortfallReason(raw) {
   if (raw == null || raw === "")
     return "unreported";
@@ -7274,7 +7311,7 @@ function classifyCursorAdvance(input) {
   const body = input.body ?? void 0;
   if (!input.httpOk || body?.error != null) {
     const error = body?.error ?? input.statusText ?? (input.httpStatus !== void 0 ? `HTTP ${input.httpStatus}` : "request failed");
-    return { outcome: "failed", error };
+    return { outcome: "failed", error, expected: new Set(input.messageIds).size };
   }
   const expected = new Set(input.messageIds).size;
   const raw = body?.consumed;
@@ -7306,6 +7343,17 @@ function classifyCursorAdvance(input) {
 function cursorShortfallKey(route, reason, partial) {
   return `${route}|${reason}|${partial ? "true" : "false"}`;
 }
+function cursorAdvanceCounterKey(route, verdict) {
+  if (verdict.expected === 0)
+    return null;
+  if (verdict.outcome === "shortfall") {
+    return cursorShortfallKey(route, verdict.reason, verdict.partial);
+  }
+  if (verdict.outcome === "failed") {
+    return cursorShortfallKey(route, "failed", false);
+  }
+  return cursorShortfallKey(route, verdict.reported ? "advanced" : "advanced_unreported", false);
+}
 function formatCursorAdvanceShortfall(verdict, ctx) {
   const cleared = ctx.cleared.length > 0 ? ctx.cleared.join(",") : "none";
   return `[direct-chat] cursor advance shortfall route=/${ctx.route} site=${ctx.site} session=${ctx.sessionId} expected=${verdict.expected} consumed=${verdict.consumed} reason=${verdict.reason} partial=${verdict.partial} cleared_anyway=${cleared}`;
@@ -9942,6 +9990,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // safety control, so mutations require explicit confirmation.
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "docker-hygiene",
+    description: "Manager-side docker hygiene on Docker-isolated hosts (ENG-8401): off = no-op, reap-superseded = after a successful agt-runtime retag, remove the prior untagged agt-runtime images that retag orphaned (Layer 1), full = reap-superseded plus a daily dangling-only image+builder prune (Layer 2). agt-runtime:latest and the just-pulled image are never removed and -a/--volumes are never used. Read host-side via hostFlagStore (getString); ships dark.",
+    flagType: "enum",
+    allowedValues: ["off", "reap-superseded", "full"],
+    // Declared safe value is `off`: this flag introduces NEW janitorial behaviour
+    // (the pre-flag compiled behaviour is "never reap"), so off preserves fleet
+    // behaviour on rollout. Not `sensitive` — weakening it (full → off) only stops
+    // cleanup; it relaxes no safety/enforcement control. No envVar by design: this
+    // gate is flag-managed only, with no operator env override.
+    defaultValue: "off",
+    // New host-side reader (ENG-8401): its consumer lands in the agt-cli build
+    // this PR publishes (auto-publish patch-bumps from npm's current 0.28.503 →
+    // 0.28.504), so a flip only takes effect on hosts running >= that version.
+    // Best-effort reach estimate only; not part of the schema fingerprint.
+    since: "0.28.504"
+  },
   {
     key: "composio-hitl-mode",
     description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls and route them to Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card). Since ENG-7828 enforce ALWAYS routes to a Human Approval card by default; set hitl-approval-routing=off to make enforce a hard block with no approval instead. Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",
@@ -14645,7 +14710,7 @@ export {
   readRemoteMcpAuthConfig,
   buildForwardHeaders,
   classifyCursorAdvance,
-  cursorShortfallKey,
+  cursorAdvanceCounterKey,
   formatCursorAdvanceShortfall,
   AnchorSessionClient,
   isOnboardingArea,
@@ -14759,4 +14824,4 @@ export {
   stopAllSessionsAndWait,
   getProjectDir
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-HMBECQIY.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-HEUDF73X.js.map